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I. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

A.

The Business Judgment Rule.
1.

Most state corporation laws contain language to the effect that the "business and
affairs of every corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors." See Del. § 141 and N.Y. § 701. Courts have developed a
firmly established policy ofjudicial deference to corporate decision-making that
is commonly referred to as the "business judgment rule." In general, assuming
directors of a corporation act with due care and have no self-interest, this rule
establishes a presumption that in making a business decision the directors acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company and its stockholders. The burden is on
the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption by
a showing of fraud, bad faith, self-interest or lack of care on the part ofthe
directors. In cases where the business judgment rule is applied, the courts will
not "second guess" the judgment of the directors if the directors' actions can be
"attributed to any rational business purpose." Unitrin. v. American General
Corp.• 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717 (Del. 1971).

2.

In a decision by the Delaware Supreme Court, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984), a case involving the need for a demand to be made on a company's
board of directors in order to bring a derivative suit, the Supreme Court restated
and reaffirmed the protections afforded directors by the business judgment rule:

r
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"The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial
prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a). It is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish
facts rebutting the presumption."

r
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3.

In order to overcome the presumption, a plaintiff must show that the board acted
with "gross negligence." Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
Gross negligence is generally found only in egregious cases, where there is no
rational basis for the board's actions or the board failed to obtain and consider
information reasonably available before acting. "For example, where their
methodologies and procedures are so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution,
or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham, then
inquiry into their acts is not shielded by the business judgment rule." Hanson
Trust PLCv. SCM Corporation, 781 F.2d 264 (2nd Cir. 1986) (applying New
York law).
In Van Gorkom, the Supreme Court of Delaware held the directors ofa
corporation liable to the corporation's stockholders for failing to adequately
evaluate a merger proposal before adopting it and failing to provide to stockholders all information which the stockholders would consider important in

r
r,
I
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deciding whether to vote for the merger. The court concluded that the directors
were grossly negligent in approving the merger because, among other things,
they were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the company (there was no
independent investment banking advice), they approved the transaction upon two
hours' consideration without prior notice and they relied on an oral description of
the merger agreement by an officer who had never read the agreement. As a
result of the Van Gorkom decision, many states passed laws enabling the
corporation, with shareholder approval, to eliminate monetary liability for
directors for breach of a duty of care, with certain exceptions.

B.

RevloD Duties.

1.

Director's Actions to Sell Company - "Revlon duties." A board of directors is
under no duty to sell the company, but once the board decides to sell the
company or deems that a break-up is inevitable, the board assumes a duty to
negotiate the best price for the shareholders. Rev/on, Inc. v. MacAndres &
Forbes Ho/dings. Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Often referred to as a board's
"Rev/on" duties, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision and its progeny in some
cases require the conduct of a formal auction of the corporation, or other
alternatives. The court observed that in this context the board's responsibilities
are altered significantly:
[The corporation] no longer faces[s] threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate
bid. The whole question of defensive measures [becomes] moot. The
directors' role [is] changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.

Rev/on at 182. The Rev/on duty is to try in good faith to get the best available
transaction. The Board is entitled to take a lower offer with higher certainty over
a higher offer which may not close. Rev/on does not require that every change in
control be preceded by an auction. Rev/on duties arise when it is inevitable that
the company will be sold and stockholders' interests terminated.
In Rev/on, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's
injunction against the use of a "crown jewel" lock-up device in the midst of a
bidding contest for a corporation. The court found that when the board of
directors ceased protecting the interests of the corporation as a going concern
and decided to break-up the Company by selling to an LBO group, the board
assumed a duty to negotiate the best price for the shareholders and that the board
could not, by granting the lock-up, stop an active bidding contest between two
essentially equivalent bidders, particularly where such lock-up was in part
granted in exchange for relieving the directors of potential liability. See a/so
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (in an
auction, the proper objective "was to obtain the highest price reasonably
attainable for the company, provided it was offered by a reputable and
responsible bidder...."), and In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 11495 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (market check
not required where there was no bidding contest and no allegation that directors
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were uninformed about company's value), and Giammargo v. Snapp/e Beverage
Corp., C.A. No. 13845 (Del. Ch. November 15, 1994) (court refused to grant a
preliminary injunction to enjoin a merger on the grounds that the price was "too
low" and that the target directors received approximately $2 million in "side
payments" for option terminations, etc.; the court reasoned that the target
directors, who were also 68% stockholders, had a strong economic self-interest
to obtain a fair price for the stock and were not influenced by the relatively small
side payments in the context ofa $1.4 billion deal). See Herdv. Major Rea/ty,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95,772 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990) (Rev/on duties not
applicable in transaction where stockholders may elect cash or to keep their
stock.); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, 1996 WL 32169 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 19, 1996) (dismissing Rev/on claims on the grounds that, as a matter of
law, no Rev/on duties had been breached because proposed merger was a stockfor-stock deal where control stayed in a large shareholder group).

r
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2.

Rev/on duties do not apply in the context of a parent-subsidiary merger. Bershad
v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987). See a/so K/einhand/er v.
Borgia (1989 WL 76299, Del. Ch.) (Rev/on duties inapplicable to freeze-out of
40% owned subsidiary).

3.

Lock-up agreements. Under Rev/on, once the target board has made a decision to
sell the corporation, a lock-up agreement (an agreement conferring an advantage
on a favored bidder in order to evade a raider) may only be used to protect and
benefit shareholders. Rev/on and its progeny did not invalidate all lock-up
agreements, only those that foreclose competition in the sale ofthe company.
See a/so Samjens Partners Iv. Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Applying Delaware law, board may use lock-ups ifit enhances
the bidding process, such as when used to convince a white knight to enter the
bidding, compensating the white knight for the risk it undertakes).

r

r
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a.

When management has seats on the board, lock-up options may be
subject to higher scrutiny. "When the intended effect [ofa lock-up
agreement] is to end an active auction, at the very least the independent
members of the board must attempt to negotiate alternative bids before
granting such a significant concession." Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).

b.

Duty to seek the best value for shareholders, but no duty to conduct an
auction. QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, Inc. 635 A.2d
1245 (Del. Ch. 1993). The court found, that a lock-up option given by
Paramount to Viacom did not satisfy the Rev/on test. The lock-up option
at issue gave Viacom'the right to purchase almost 20 percent of
Paramount stock for approximately $1.6 billion, which Viacom could
opt to pay with a subordinated note instead of cash. Additionally, the
lock-up option contained a put provision that permitted Viacom to
require Paramount to pay Viacom the difference between the share
option price and the market price of Paramount's stock at the time the
option was triggered, with no cap limiting the maximum dollar value of
the put. The court enjoined the lock-up on the grounds that the note and
put provisions were "potentially 'draconian'" to Paramount and
"unusually and highly beneficial" to Viacom.

r
r
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The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's opinion,
and explained further what actions will satisfy the duty to obtain "the
best value reasonably available to the stockholders." In defining the
Paramount board's duties, the Court stopped short of stating that
Paramount's board had to auction the company, instead defining the
board's duties as follows: (i) to be diligent and vigilant in examining
critically the offer and all other offers; (ii) to act in good faith; (iii) to
summon, and act with due care on, all material information reasonably
available, including information to compare competing offers to
determine which provides the best value available to the stockholders;
and (iv) to negotiate actively and in good faith with all bidders.
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994).

c.

c.

Certain termination fee provisions have been validated by a different
standard than Revlon. In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43
(Del. 1997), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a merger agreement
between Bell Atlantic Corp. and NYNEX Corp., which contained a
reciprocal, two-tiered $550 million termination fee. The express
language of the agreement unambiguously stated that the termination fee
constituted liquidated damages and not a penalty. The Supreme Court
held that "we find no compelling justification for treating the
termination fee in this agreement as anything but a liquidated damages
provision, in light of the express intent of the parties to have it so
treated."

..1
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Enhanced Scrutiny (Unocal and Blasius).
1.

Applying the Business Judgment Rule in the Acquisition Context.

a.

Directors' Actions Subject to Enhanced Scrutiny. As described above,
under the business judgment rule, directors' actions carry a presumption
of regularity. That is, directors are presumed to have acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interest of the company. However, in the context of
defensive measures implemented in anticipation of or in response to an
unsolicited takeover threat, courts generally follow Delaware law which
reviews board actions with enhanced scrutiny as described below. If this
burden of enhanced scrutiny is met, the traditional Business Judgment
Rule applies, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of demonstrating a
breach ofthe directors' fiduciary duties.
For a discussion of the desirability of broadened, enhanced judicial
scrutiny, see Martin Lipton and Theodore N. Mirvis, Enhanced Scrutiny
and Corporate Performance: The New Frontier for Corporate Directors,
20 Del. J. Corp. L. 123 (1995).

b.

Court Review of Defensive Measures - Delaware's Unocal Approach:
The Delaware Supreme Court's landmark decision in Unocal Corp v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), established the standard

A-4
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by which the Delaware courts review defensive measures in response to
a threat to corporate control. In Unocal, the court upheld the board's
decision to make an issuer tender offer in which a hostile tender offeror
was not allowed to participate. The court found that, faced with a
grossly inadequate two-tiered coercive tender offer coupled with the
threat of greenmail, the board had a clear duty to protect the corporate
enterprise and the selective repurchase plan chosen was reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. The Unocal court adopted this standard
upon observing that, in taking steps to deter an unsolicited offer, there
exists the "omnipresent specter that the board may be acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders."

r
r

r
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c.

Two-Prong Unocal Test. The initial burden of proof in cases involving
defensive measures lies with the directors, who must show: (l) that
directors had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed," and (2) that the defensive
measure decided upon was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
1.

I

r

r
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r
r
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ii.

To satisfy the first prong, directors have a duty to investigate
carefully a responsible offer and to respond to that offer in good
faith and on a reasonable basis. See Paramount Communications
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (Paramount
Board was obligated to investigate competing and "unfriendly"
QVC offer). While the Unocal court did not define what
constitutes good faith and reasonable investigation, in Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. ]989),
the De]aware Supreme Court stated that in conducting such an
investigation, the board's analysis should consider, among
various proper factors:
(a)

the adequacy and terms of the offer; its fairness and
feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for the
offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions
of illegality; the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it
bears some reasonable relationship to general
shareholder interests;

(b)

the risk of nonconsummation; the basic stockholder
interests at stake; the bidder's identity, prior background
and other business venture experiences; and the bidder's
business plans for the corporation and their effects on
stockholder interest. MacMillan at ]282 n.29.

The proof presented by the board in support of its burden is
"materially enhanced" where a majority ofthe board consists of
"outside independent directors." See Unilrin v. American
General, 65] A.2d 136], 1375 (Del. ]995); Paramount

r
r
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Communications, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1990).

iii.

d.

There is no per se duty to negotiate in response to an offer. See
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984); Desert
Partners v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1300 (N.D. Ill.
1988). The duty is to respond to the offer as presented. In fact,
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
901 (N.D. Ga. 1985), the court held that "[i]n considering tender
offers management has the responsibility to oppose offers which
in its best business judgment are detrimental to the company or
its stockholders," and that if directors "determine in good faith
that the threatened action is adverse to the shareholders' and
corporation's interests, they have a duty to resist the takeover
through all legal means at their disposal." See generally DiBlasi
& Feit, Where Must a Target's Board Negotiate With a Potential
Acquiror, The National Law Journal (Sept. 25, 1989);

Board's Actions Must be "Defensive" to be Subject to the Unocal
Standard. All defensive measures adopted by Delaware corporations are
subject to enhanced scrutiny if the directors adopted the measure "in
reaction to a perceived 'threat to corporate policy and effectiveness
which touches upon issues of control," Unitrin. v. American General
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 n. 9 (Del. 1995); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 82 (Del. 1992) (quoting Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d at 1131,
1144 (Del. 1990».
1.

ii.

Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990) - The Delaware Supreme Court viewed Time's pending
merger with Warner as a long-planned business combination, not
as a defensive measure in response to Paramount's bid to
acquire Time, and affirmed the Chancery Court's application of
traditional business judgment concepts because the combination
with Warner was part of Time's strategic business plan.
Accordingly, the transaction was not subject to Unocal's
enhanced judicial scrutiny until the form of the transaction
changed in response to Paramount's bid. Gilbert v. El Paso, 575
A.2d 1131, 1143 (Del. 1990) (describing the court's reasoning in
Paramount v. Time). In addition, the court observed that
directors "are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is
clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." Time, 567
A.2d at 1154.
Similarly, in Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), the
Delaware Supreme Court determined that neither the Unocalor
Blasius standards applied (see discussion of Blasius infra) where
the board acted in the absence of a threat or act of
disenfranchisement. The Court affirmed a Chancery Court
summary judgment upholding as valid an amendment to
Cincinnati Milacron's charter that provided for "tenure voting" --

J
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each existing share would receive ten votes, but upon sale or
other transfer, would revert to one-vote-per share status until
held by its owner for three years. Milacron was controlled by
the Geier family, which owned a little over 50% of its stock.
Thus, the stockholder approval of the charter amendment was
virtually assured. Moreover, the Geier family peculiarly
benefited from the amendment because it permitted them to sell
some of their shares without relinquishing control of the
company.

r
r
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The majority determined that, because the plan did "not involve
either unilateral director action in the face of a claimed threat Q!
an act of disenfranchisement ... neither Blasius nor Unocal
applie[d]." Rather, the majority concluded that the decision of
the board to recommend the amendment was subject to business
judgment rule review and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the
presumption of the rule because at summary judgment he failed
to demonstrate that the board's purpose in proposing the
amendment was anything other than promoting the long-term
stability of the company. The majority also rejected various
arguments that the stockholder vote in favor of the plan was
ineffective.

r
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e.

Directors' Actions must be "reasonable in response to threat posed."
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.
Sup., 1987), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Newmont board,
faced with an inadequate two-tier, coercive tender offer, (i) had no duty
to conduct an auction for the company unless and until it decided to sell
the company, (ii) reasonably responded to the threat posed by the
Ivanhoe offer by declaring a $33 cash dividend which enabled
Newmont's largest shareholder to increase its position from 26% to
49.7% through open market purchases, subject to a ten-year standstill
agreement that assured Newmont's continued independence.
In Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, et al., 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988) the
Delaware Chancery Court enjoined a recapitalization proposal to be
undertaken by Macmillan, Inc. in response to a series of offers from the
Bass Group to acquire the company. The restructuring involved a
complicated split-up/spin-off of Macmillan and would have resulted in
management increasing its ownership interest (through "equitable
adjustments" to outstanding options and restricted stock awards) from
.
4.5% to approximately 39% in one of the spun-off businesses.
Having found that the recapitalization was tantamount to a "sale of
control" and that the offer eventually made by the Bass Group was (i) for
all shares and (ii) within Macmillan's "fairness" range, the Court held
that the recapitalization was an unreasonable response to the "minimal"
threat posed by the Bass Group.
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"The circumstances of each individual case detennine the
reasonableness of an anti-takeover defense. That detennination,
of course, will depend upon the nature of the threat posed. Here,
the threat was that the Bass $73 per share proposal, while fair,
was not the highest price that might be available if the company
were being sold.... Thus, given the nature of the threat, a
reasonable response would, at a minimum, offer stockholders
higher value than the Bass Group offer or, at the very least, offer
stockholders a choice between equivalent values in different
fonns. The management restructuring offers neither. Not only
does it offer inferior value to the shareholders, it also forces
them to accept it. No shareholder vote is afforded; no choice is
given. The restructuring is crafted to take the fonn of a
dividend, requiring only director approval. On that basis alone,
as more fully discussed below, I find preliminarily that the
restructuring is a coercive, and economically inferior, response
to the Bass Group 'threat. n,

f.

j

Judicial Deference to Board Actions. Despite the hurdle imposed by
Unocal, its progeny have demonstrated that boards retain substantial
discretion to enact defensive measures to combat hostile takeover
attempts.
i.

Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A 2.d 1361 (Del. 1995)
In the Unitrin decision, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a
Chancery Court decision preliminarily enjoining a stock
repurchase program announced by Unitrin in the face of a
hostile tender offer by American General.
Applying Unocal, the Court affirmed the Chancery Court's
holding that the American General proposal constituted a
"threat" because the board of directors believed in good faith
that the price was inadequate. The Court disagreed, however,
with the Chancery Court's analysis of the second prong of
Unocal, which considered whether the repurchase program was
"necessary" in light ofUnitrin's poison pill. The Court held that
the "necessary" analysis was incorrect and instead the Chancery
Court should have determined whether (1) the defensive
measure was "draconian" (which the court defined as coercive or
preclusive) and (2) if it detennined that the defensive measure
was not drac,?nian, whether it was within a "range of
reasonableness". In remanding the case to the Chancery Court,
the Supreme Court noted that Delaware courts had frequently
found defensive repurchases of stock to be "reasonable."
The Supreme Court specifically found two holdings of the
Chancery Court to be erroneous: first, the Chancery Court,
without any record support, had assumed that the directors
would be motivated to entrench themselves; the Supreme Court
found this an unreasonable conclusion considering the fact that
the board owned $450 million worth ofUnitrin stock. Second,
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the Chancery Court had held that the repurchase program would
permit Unitrin's board to take undue advantage of a supermajority voting provision in the Unitrin charter that required a
vote of a majority of directors Q! 75% of the shareholders for a
merger to be approved. The repurchase program would have
increased the directors' ownership interest from 23% to 28%
and, thereby, according to the Chancery Court, allow the
directors to control any super-majority vote. The Supreme Court
noted that the Chancery Court had apparently overlooked the
fact that American General could replace the Unitrin board In a
proxy contest, which would only require a 50% vote (for this
reason, the Supreme Court also strongly hinted that it would not
find the program "preclusive"). In making this determination,
the Court noted that a high percentage ofUnitrin's stock was
held by institutions, which, according to the Court, do not
routinely favor management.

r
r

r
r

r
r
,.

ii.

~

r

r
r

"No hand" provisions are not dead in every jurisdiction. See
Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp.
1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (provision requiring one continuing
director to approve pill's redemption valid under the Georgia
Corporation statute); AMP, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 1998 WL
778348 (E.D. Pa.) (court applied business judgment rule under
Pennsylvania law to finite "no hand" provision in favor of target
board of directors).

r

r
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There are other considerations besides Unocal, however, which
might serve to invalidate defensive measures. In Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No.5 11 (Del.
December 31, 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a
"no hand" feature of Quickturn's shareholder rights plan. The
effect of the "no hand" provision would have been to delay the
ability of a newly-elected board to redeem the poison pill for six
months in any transaction with an "Interested Person" as defined
in the provision. The Supreme Court held that the provision was
invalid under 8 Del. C. Section 141(a), "which confers upon any
newly elected board of directors full power to manage and direct
the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation." "[The 'no
hand' p]rovision, however, would prevent a newly elected board
of directors from completely discharging its fundamental
management duties [in the area of corporate control] to the
corporation and its shareholders for six months."

g.

Actions that Interfere with Stockholder Vote. Courts will accord even
closer scrutiny, beyond the Unocal Reasonable Response test, when an
exercise of legal authority is designed for the primary purpose of
interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote. Blasius
Industries, Inc. v.Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (1988). Although an
action diminishing a shareholder's vote is not invalid, per se, the right of
an individual stockholder to exercise the voting rights of its shares is a
fundamental corporate right. The right of franchise must not be diluted

r
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except where reasonably necessary to accomplish an appropriate
corporate business policy. Id.
The Blasius case challenged the validity of a board action that added two
new members to Atlas' seven member board. That action was taken as an
immediate response to the delivery to Atlas by Blasius the previous day
of a form of stockholder consent that, ifjoined in by holders of a
majority of Atlas' stock, would have increased the board of Atlas from
seven to fifteen members and would have elected eight new members
nominated by Blasius.
In increasing the size of Atlas' board by two and filling the newly
created positions, the members of the board realized that they were
thereby precluding the holders ofa majority of the Company's shares
from placing a majority of new directors on the board through Blasius'
consent solicitation, should they want to do so. Chancellor Allen found
that when a board acts for the primary purpose of preventing or
impeding an unaffiliated majority of shareholders from expanding the
board and electing a new majority, even though in good faith and with
appropriate care, the action offends the traditional relationship between
corporate directors and shareholders. As a result the court concluded that
the board action was invalid and must be voided.
One court has held that board interference with the right of franchise is
governed by the Blasius standard even where outright control of the
board cannot be achieved by the stockholders. In IBS Fin. Corp. v.
Seidman and Assocs., 1998 WL 52292 (3rd. Cir. (N.J.», the Third
Circuit Court invalidated a decision ofthe board of directors ofa N.J.
corporation to reduce its size from seven to six directors prior to an
annual meeting where a shareholder committee planned to seek
representation on the board. The court rejected the argument that a
contest must be for outright control of the board in order to trigger
Blasius, reasoning that the anticipated election "represented a step
towards control of the board by the Committee."
h.

Entire Fairness. Successful resistance to a takeover attempt will most
likely have the collateral effect of perpetuating the incumbent directors'
control so that the directors' self-interest in maintaining control may
appear to have been one of the purposes of resistance. In a transaction
approved by the board of directors, once the presumption of the business
judgment rule has been rebutted, the board of directors' actions are
examined under the entire fairness standard, which is discussed under
II.A.I., below.
Fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price (discussed
below). The board bears the burden of demonstrating entire fairness by
presenting evidence that it discharged all of its fiduciary duties. In order
to meet such burden the directors are not, however, required to prove
that they discharged all of their fiduciary duties: "[a] finding of
perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis. That is
because the entire fairness standard is not applied unless the
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presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted by
evidence that the directors ... breached anyone of the triads oftheir
fiduciary duty - good faith, loyalty or due care. Thus, perfection is not
possible, or expected as a condition precedent to a judicial determination
of entire fairness." Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156
(1995) (citations omitted). If fully informed shareholders approve the
transaction, claims alleging breaches ofthe duty of care are
extinguished, but duty of loyalty claims remain subject to entire fairness
or business judgment review, depending on whether the other party to
the transaction is a controlling shareholder. In re Wheelabrator
Technologies, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 1995 WL 301416 (Del.
Ch.).
i.

r
r

r

r
r

On remand in Cinerama, Chancellor Allen examined the merger
under the entire fairness standard. He found the price to be fair
because the merger price was a 100% premium over the
unaffected market price and had been bargained for at armslength. As to "process," Chancellor Allen found the process to
be fair even though the board did not conduct any market check
because there was no evidence that the board had not bargained
in good faith in the best interests ofthe shareholders (the board
had negotiated the merger price up to 523.00 from 515.00). The
Court went on to discuss whether rescissory damages would
have been an-appropriate remedy ifthe merger had not satisfied
the entire fairness test. The Court held that rescissory damages
will generally be unavailable to remedy a breach of care
unaccompanied by a material conflict of interest.

r
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In a decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cinerama v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), the Court indicated
in dicta that it agreed with the Chancery Court which stated that
it had "grave doubts" about the Technicolor Board's exercise of
due care because, among other things, (i) the merger agreement
was not preceded by a prudent search for alternatives, (ii) seven
ofthe nine Technicolor directors knew virtually nothing about
the proposed merger until they approved it and (iii) the stock
purchase agreement and stock option agreement with
McAndrews & Forbes Group, Inc. ("MAF") (the PartY seeking
to acquire Technicolor), which gave MAF over 34% of
Technicolor's stock and Technicolor's repeal of its supermajority
provision in its charter, which required a 95% stockholder vote
to approve a merger, effectively locked up the transaction early
on. In Technicolor, the Court went on to reject the Chancery
Court's position that a plaintiff must show proof of injury to
overcome the presumption ofthe business judgment rule.

ii.

Presumption of Independence. To rebut the presumption of a
Board's independence there must be evidence that the material
self-interest of one or more directors infected or affected the
deliberation process of the board (after evaluating the directors'
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self interests on a director by director basis). Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
iii.

IV.

Section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Section 144(a) which protects corporate action from invalidation
on grounds of director self-interest if such self-interest is
(i) disclosed to and approved by a majority of disinterested
directors; or (ii) disclosed to and approved by the stockholders;
or (iii) the transaction is found to be fair.
Disinterested Directors. While not an absolute safeguard, courts
are more likely to apply the protection afforded by the business
judgment rule to director action where proof is made that at least
a majority of the directors voting to approve an action were
"disinterested" outside directors possessing business and
financial sophistication.
(a)

(b)

v.

See Unitrin v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1375 (Del. 1995): "[T]he presence ofa majority of
outside independent directors will materially enhance
such evidence [that the board made a good faith,
reasonable investigation]." For the definition of an
"independent" director, see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d
1368, 1377n. 19 (Del. 1996).
In the Norlin case discussed below, however, the Second
Circuit said it was not persuaded that a different test
applies to "independent" as opposed to "inside"
directors under the business judgment rule, and that a
showing of a "collective" conflict of interest underlying
the directors' actions would shift the burden of proof to
the directors.

J

...i

Shareholder Votes: In In re Wheelabrator Technologies. Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, reversing his decision
in an earlier phase of this litigation, Chancellor Jacobs held,
based on recent Delaware Supreme Court cases including Kahn
v. Lynch and Stroud v. Grace, that a fully-informed shareholder
vote on a transaction does not extinguish a claim that the board
breached its duty of loyalty. Instead, the board's action is
evaluated under the business judgment rule (not the entire
fairness standard), with the party challenging the board's action
having the burden of proof.
For the purposes of the entire fairness test, however, tender of
shares for merger by a majority of a corporation's shareholders
constitutes substantial evidence of fair dealing. Cinerama, Inc.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176 (Del. 1995).

2.

J

The Unocal test has not been followed in all states, notably New York where the
traditional business judgment rule applies in takeover situations.
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For example. in Norfo/k Southern Corp. v. Conrail/nc., Civ.A.No. 96-7350, slip
op. at 635 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996), which applied Pennsylvania law, the Court
applied the business judgment rule to efforts by Conrail Inco's ("Conrail")
directors to protect against an unwanted tender offer from Norfolk Southern
Corp. ("Norfolk"). Norfolk instituted an all-cash for all-shares tender offer for
Conrail's outstanding stock that was clearly superior to a previously announced
merger agreement between CSX Corporation ("CSX") and Conrail. In response
to the Norfolk bid, Conrail and CSX amended their merger agreement so as to
change the structure of the tender offer and increase the cash portion of the
merger consideration.

r
r
,
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Norfolk sued contending that the CSX transaction was a front-end loaded, twotiered acquisition that was coercive to Conrail's shareholders. In determining
whether the Conrail board had gone too far in its protection of the CSX deal, the
Court primarily relied on § 1715 of the PBCL, which provides that a director's
fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation as a whole as opposed to the
shareholders. The PBCL also rejects the application of heightened levels of
scrutiny for board conduct in the takeover area and states that any act of a
Pennsylvania board, including actions taken relating to an attempted change of
control, shall be presumed to be in the best interest of the corporation. Because
Conrail argued that it had considered both merger partners and concluded the
CSX provided better long-term prospects, the Court declined to second guess
this decision. The Court also disagreed with Norfolk's contention that the CSX
deal was "coercive" because the Conrail shareholders could reject the transaction
either by not tendering into the first step of the tender offer or voting against
Conrail's opting out of the fair price provision (which was part of the
restructured merger plan).

r

r
r
r
r

The Court also criticized the Unoca/ and Rev/on decisions. The Court stated:

r
r

There are practical problems with the Unoca/ and Rev/on line of
cases as I see it, aside from their myopic view that because
stockholders are at least in theory the owners of the corporation .
. . only their interests should be considered or at a minimum
given the highest priority and importance. The primary problem
is that it replaces the discretion of a corporate board of directors
who hopefully are sophisticated practical business managers,
and eventually under Unoca/ and those decisions places it in the
hands ofjudges whose business judgment, however altruistic, is
certainly apt to be less reliable than that of business managers.

,

r

r

See alsoAMP,/nc. v. AlliedSigna/, /nc., 1998 WL 778348 (E.D. Pa.) (applying
business judgment rule to finite "no hand" provision in favor of target board of
directors). But see Union Pacific/So. Pacific (Del. Supr. 1995). Shareholder vote
doesn't extinguish Revlon claims.

r
J

r
r
I

D.

Additional Cases Related to the Duties of Directors and the Business Judgment
Standard in the Context of Acquisitions.
1.

Wittman v. Crooke, No. 769 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. March 27, 1998).

r
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Appellant, a shareholder in Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. (BGE), filed a claim
against BGE's board of directors alleging that in BGE's merger with the
Potomac Electric Power Co. (PEPCO), each director stood a chance of being
named a director in the new company, and as such, the directors should be
prohibited from deciding whether to recommend the merger. Appellant also
alleged that Goldman, Sachs & Co. was "interested" because Goldman stood to
gain $8.5 million more by recommending the merger than by advising against it.

.,

J

The court held in favor of the directors regarding the breach of duty of loyalty
claim. Regarding the Goldman claim, the court noted that Goldman examined
several utilities in the Northeast before determining that PEPCO was the most
suitable candidate with whom BGE could merge. The court concluded that ''to
say that [Goldman] just [approved the merger] because they want to make $8
million ... there has to be more than that." Moreover, the stockholders vote
ratifying the transaction extinguished any duty of care claim.

2.

Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 97 C 8003 (N.D. III. Feb. 4, 1998).
The district court, applying Wisconsin law, refused to force Safety-Kleen to
redeem a poison pill in the face of a hostile bid by Laidlaw Environmental
Services for stock and cash worth approximately $30 per share, even though
Safety-Kleen had signed up a friendly, all cash deal with Phillip Services Corp.
for $27 per share.
The court acknowledged that Wisconsin law permits the board of directors to
look at factors other than simply enhancing shareholder value, but proceeded to
apply the Delaware law of enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and Paramount v.
QVC. The court noted that the board was largely independent and that the
directors' financial interests were aligned with those of the shareholders. The
court concluded that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duty, as
evidenced by a long and scrupulously deliberate auction process, the reasonable
judgment that a $27 all cash bid was too good to lose and the fact that an
exclusivity condition was necessary to make the deal happen.

3.

AMP, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 1998 WL 778348 (E.D. Pa.).
Allied Signal announced an unsolicited cash tender offer for all AMP shares and
a consent solicitation seeking AMP shareholder approval to expand AMP's
board in order to redeem AMP's shareholder rights plan. AMP's board
proceeded to add "no hand" provisions to its Rights Plan. Allied Signal, in tum,
amended its consent solicitation, seeking AMP shareholder approval to remove
from AMP's board all power, rights, and duties concerning the Rights Plan and
to give that authority to a designated three-person committee. The companies
then sued each other: AMP sought partial summary judgment on its request for
declaratory reliefthat the court enjoin Allied Signal from proceeding with its
consent solicitation; Allied Signal sought summary judgment on its claims that
the amendments to the Rights Plan were illegal and void under Pennsylvania
law.
Regarding the consent solicitation proposal to delegate to a three-person
committee control over AMP's Rights Plan, the court held that the proposal
violated Pennsylvania law (PBCL § 2513) because Pennsylvania corporations
have broad power to adopt shareholder rights plans on such terms as are fixed by
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the board and that AMP shareholders have no power to take away the board's
authority.

r

Regarding the "no hand" provisions, the court stated that because the Rights Plan
was finite in time, the "no hand" provisions must be viewed in light of the
ordinary business judgment rule and presumed to be in the best interests of
AMP.

r

r
r

The court refused to preclude Allied Signal's consent solicitation to expand the
board, but enjoined the consent solicitation until its nominees stated
unequivocally to the shareholders that they have a fiduciary duty solely to AMP.

4.

Kahn v. MSB Bancorp, Inc., 1998 WL 409335 (Del. Ch.). MSB Bancorp, Inc.
rejected a merger offer from HUBCO, a bank holding company in New Jersey.
Shareholders of MSB brought claims for damages against individual directors
alleging breach of their fiduciary duties. The court refused to apply the Unocal
rule, holding instead that "Unocal applies when a board takes defensive action in
response to a threat to its control. Here, there was no defensive action. The
board merely voted not to negotiate the merger offer." Under the business
judgment rule, the court noted that the presence of90% outside directors
strengthens the presumption of good faith. The court rejected the notion that the
fact that directors receive fees for their services is enough to establish an
entrenchment motive.

5.

Rand v. Western Air Lines, Inc.. et al., 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (February 25,
1994), aff'd, 1995 Del. LEXIS 6 (January 6, 1995). Plaintiffs, the former
stockholders of Western Air Lines ("Western"), filed suit challenging the 1986
merger between Delta Airlines and Western. Vice Chancellor Berger rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the negotiating directors were biased because of "golden
parachute" arrangements, stating that there was no evidence that the directors did
not negotiate in good faith, and held that Delaware law did not require that the
directors delegate negotiating responsibility to a special committee. The court
further found that because alleged "valuations" done for Western by Dillon Read
were aimed at inducing Delta to make an attractive offer and not at estimating
the true value of the company, they need not have been considered by the
directors or disclosed to shareholders. Finally, the court held that the directors
had not breached their fiduciary duties by entering into a "no-shop" provision
and "lock-up" agreement with Delta because (i) Delta made an important
concession in exchange for these agreements and (ii) Western had canvassed the
marketplace and found Delta to be the only viable merger prospect before
entering into these agreemen~s.

6.

Moore Corporation v. Wallace Computer Services Inc., (No. 95-472) the District
Court for the District of Delaware, interpreting Delaware law, refused to order
the redemption of the rights issued pursuant to Wallace Computer Services,
Inc.'s stockholder rights plan. The Moore Corporation court analyzed the
Wallace board's defensive measures under the standards established by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal and Unitrin. The court read Unocal and
Unitrin to provide that a board's defensive response to a hostile offer will be
evaluated under the business judgment rule if the board shows (a) that it had
reasonable grounds to believe that the hostile offer posed a danger to the target's
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"corporate policy and effectiveness" and (b) that the defensive measure was
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed" by the offer, meaning (i) that the
defensive measure was not "coercive" to the target's shareholders or "preclusive"
to the hostile bidder and (ii) that the defensive measure fell within a "range of
reasonableness". The court first determined that Wallace's retention of the pill in
response to Moore's all cash offer was reasonable based on Moore's recent sales
and profit results noting that Wallace's shareholders, who had tendered more
than 70% of the shares in Moore's offer, might tender without appreciating the
fact that Wallace's business strategy was beginning to payoff. In addition, the
court determined that retention of the pill was neither coercive or preclusive as
the board's action would neither have a discriminating effect on shareholders nor
have an effect on a proxy contest by Moore. The court then examined whether
the retention of the pill was within "range of reasonableness" and determined
that it was because of the board's good faith belief that Moore's offer was
inadequate.

7.

8.

In Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995), the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld a board's decision to amend a by-law in order to delay a
special stockholder meeting demanded by a bidder. After The Learning
Company ("TLC") announced a merger agreement with Broderbund, Softkey
announced a tender offer for TLC and called a special meeting to remove TLC's
board. TLC subsequently negotiated an increase in the Broderbund deal and
then amended its special meeting by-law in such a way as to insure that the vote
on the proposed Broderbund merger occurred prior to the occurrence of the
special meeting. The Chancery Court approved the by-law amendment under a
"Unoca/lUnitrin analysis," reasoning that the board acted appropriately in
responding to the last minute Softkey offer by seeking to protect the ability of
the stockholders to vote on the pre-existing Broderbund merger and, thereby,
exercised its fiduciary duties with respect to the Softkey proposal. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court without opinion.
In H F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great Western (Letter Opinion dated April 25,
1997), the Delaware Chancery Court (a) granted a motion by Great Western to
dismiss Ahmanson's claim that the Great Western board's fiduciary duties
required them to hold its annual meeting sooner than June 13, 1997, but
(b) denied the motion with respect to a claim that the board had ignored a by-law
requiring it to hold a special meeting for the election of directors as soon as
practicable after the date when the annual meeting was originally to be held.
On February 24, 1997, six days after Ahmanson had announced an unsolicited
proposal for the company, Great Western adjourned indefinitely a previously
scheduled April 22, 1997 amlual meeting. On April 10, Great Western
rescheduled the annual meeting for June 13, 1997. Ahmanson argued that no
good reason existed for the June 13 date other than entrenchment and therefore
the board's behavior was in breach of its fiduciary duties. The Court dismissed
this claim on the grounds that a mere delay in the annual meeting did not
sufficiently establish irreparable injury to support an injunction moving the date
forward. The Court held that, in order to establish irreparable injury. the "delay
must adversely threaten the exercise of the shareholders' right to vote in some
tangible way." Mere delay "without more" is legally deficient.
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The Court also held, however, that the by-law count stood on a different footing
because the violation of a by-law encompasses harm not only to the corporation's
electoral process but also to the corporation's governance process. The Court
stated "[w]here the shareholders or the directors, by adopting a by-law,
command a performance of a certain act, to hold that coercive relief cannot be
had to enforce that command would violate basic concepts of corporate
governance."
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9.

In Hi/ton Hotels Corp. v. mCorp., 962 F. Supp. 1309 (D. Nev. 1997), the U.S.
District Court in Nevada enjoined ITT's attempt to proceed with a corporate
plan, adopted in the face of Hilton's hostile tender offer, which would split ITT
into three new entities. The plan was to be implemented before the 1997 annual
shareholders meeting. Under the plan, one of the new entities, ITT Destinations,
would be comprised ofITT's current board but that board would be classified.
Citing the lack ofNevada statutory or case law on point, the Court applied
Delaware law, specifically the Unocal analysis, and found that the plan was
preclusive because the classified board provision for ITT Destinations would
force ITT's stockholders to accept the plan as well as a majority ofITT's
incumbent directors for at least one year. [The Court acknowledged that ITT's
board could normally adopt a classified board to create ITT Destinations.
However, the Court applied the reasoning of Blasius to hold that these actions
could not be undertaken if the board's primary purpose was to disenfranchise ITT
stockholders in light of Hilton's tender offer and proxy contest.

10.

Arnoldv. Society for Savings Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994). Arnold
arose out ofa merger between the Bank of Boston Corporation ("BOB") and
Society for Savings Bancorp ("Society"), pursuant to which Society shareholders
received 0.8 shares in BOB for each Society share held. Plaintiff argued that the
Society board's approval of the merger should have been subjected to "enhanced
scrutiny" as opposed to the business judgment rule because the merger
constituted a "sale of control" under Paramount. The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that no "sale of control" had occurred because control of the combining
companies remained in a "large, fluid, changeable and changing market". The
Court also rejected plaintiffs argument that a sale of control took place because
Society's former shareholders were relegated to minority status in BOB. The
Court held that because Society's former shareholders continued as BOB
shareholders, their opportunity to realize a control premium had not been
foreclosed. Often cited for the proposition that a nondilutive stock-for-stock
merger does not involve a sale of control.

II.

Numerous cases in addition to those cited above have applied the business
judgment rules to director actions in response to hostile efforts to take control of
a company. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 550 (1983) (no fiduciary breach in sale to "white knight"
of treasury stock along with grant ofa "lock-up" 18 1/2% option to purchase
additional treasury stock); Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.,
741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (court affirms trial court decision not to enjoin sale
of debentures with "poison pill" warrants attached which were issued in
response to anticipated hostile tender offer); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) aff'dNos. 82-1307, (7th Cir. March 5,
1982) (no fiduciary breach in "PAC-MAN" counter-tender offer by target for
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shares of bidder); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(no fiduciary breach in sale of "crown jewel" subsidiary to a third party in the
face ofa hostile tender offer); Thompson v. Enstar Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 7641,
7643 (Slip Op. Del. Ch. June 20, 1984, revised August 16, 1984) (applying the
business judgment rule to a board's decision, in the face of a proxy contest, to
enter into a "lock-up" agreement which conveyed to a potential ''white knight" a
valuable corporate asset solely to induce it to make a bid); Carter Hawley Hale
Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., C.A. No. 84-2200-AWT (Slip Op. C.D. Cal.
April 17, 1984) (no fiduciary breach where target company bought in more than
half its outstanding common stock, while issuing a new preferred, with the result
of frustrating a tender offer and giving the directors practical voting control of
the company); Pogo Producing Co. v. Northwest Industries, Inc., No. H-83-2667
(Slip Op. S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983) (no fiduciary breach in competing issuer
tender offer by target); GAF Corporation v. Union Carbide Corporation, Civ. A.
No. 85-9588 (S.D.N.Y., December 30, 1985) (no fiduciary breach by
commencing issuer exchange offer using securities with restrictive covenants
which would make hostile offer difficult to complete). Samjens Partners Iv.
Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614 (SONY 1987) (break-up fees equal
to 2% of aggregate deal upheld). Tomczakv. Morton Thiokol, Inc. C.A. No.
7861 (Del. Ch. April 5, 1990) (swap of a company division for 8.23% of its stock
acquired in a creeping acquisition held a reasonable response to a perceived
threat); Newell Co. v. Vermont American Corporation, No. 89 C 5202 (N.D. III.
October 13, 1989) (upholding share repurchase, issuance of 7% of stock in
friendly acquisition and lower threshold on poison pill); Day v. Quotron
Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 8502 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 1989) (no breach of fiduciary to
take no position on, and no defensive actions with respect to, a tender offer at a
price within range of fairness even if not as high as board believes might be
attainable; Union Pacific Corporation v. Santa Fe Pacific Corporation (letter
opinion) (Del. Ch. January 30, 1995) (based on the hostile bidder's delay in filing
its motion, refusing the hostile bidder's request for an expedited preliminary
injunction hearing on its claim seeking a court order that the target redeem or
exempt the hostile offer from its poison pill».
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Constituency Statutes.
1.

Constituencies the Board of Directors May Consider.

a.

Stockholders (must consider).

b.

A growing number of states have specific statutory provisions
addressing constituencies, other than stockholders, the Board may
address:
1.

Employees

•

See N.Y. § 717(b), § 1716 of Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law.
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ii.

rt

•

iii.

r
r
r

Depositors (for banks) and any others to whom the corporation
or the board acts in a fiduciary position.

v.

New York cases have explicitly recognized that directors may
consider constituencies other than stockholders. GAF
Corporation v. Union Carbide, Civ. A. No. 85-9588 (S.D.N.Y.,
December 30, 1985). ("The protection of loyal employees,
including managers, of the organization is not anathema in the
Courthouse.") But see Revlon, where Delaware Supreme Court
held that directors may have regard for various constituencies,
provided that there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders. The court also stated that concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction is in
progress and the object is no longer to protect the corporate
enterprise. Indiana statute (§ 23-1-35-1) specifically states that
"Certain judicial decisions in Delaware ... are inconsistent with
the proper application of the business judgment rule under this
article."

r
r

Similarly, in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail Inc., Civ.A.No.
96-7350, slip op. at 635 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996), the Court
noted that § 1715 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporate Law
expressly states that the board should consider all affected
entities including the corporation's employees, suppliers,
customers, creditors and communities in which the corporation
is located, as well as shareholders, with no group taking any
particular precedence over any other.

r

r

See N.Y. § 717(b), § 1716 of Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law.

iv.

r

r

When a corporation is insolvent, a fiduciary duty is
owed to the creditors. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications,
621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).

Community interests

•

r
r
r

r

Creditors

vi.

Bondholders. See Wyoming § 17-18-201.

vii.

Long term vs. short term interests:
•

New York (§ 111(b))

•

New Jersey (§ 14A:6-1; 14A:6-14)

•

Pennsylvania(§ 1715)

r
r
r
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J
II. DUTIES OF MAJORITY OR CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS TO MINORITY.

A.

Delaware Cases.

1.

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (cash merger with majority
stockholder to eliminate 49.5% minority, conditioned on approval by a majority
of the minority voting on the merger).

a.

b.

c.

d.

Delaware Supreme Court explicitly overruled "business purpose" requirement for cash-out mergers of earlier line of cases following Singer
v. Magnovox.

...

In Delaware, the interested party seeking the merger generally has the
ultimate burden of proving the "entire fairness" of the transaction, Sealy
Mattress Co. ofN. J. v. Sealy Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch. 1987),
although the plaintiff still has an initial threshold burden to demonstrate
some basis for the claim that the terms of the transaction are unfair to the
minority, Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1345 (Del. Ch.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).

-

In Delaware, the transaction itself is generally judged under the "entire
fairness" standard. The ~~entire fairness" test is defined to be both procedural ("fair dealing") and substantive ("fair price"). In the case of a
tender or exchange, however, a claim based on unfair price alone
generally is not sufficient to support a preliminary injunction. See
Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.• 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del.
1996) (as a general principle, Delaware law holds that ~~he
determinative factor as to voluntariness is whether coercion is present, or
whether there is materially false or misleading disclosures made to
shareholders in connection with the offer. . .. Moreover, in the absence
of coercion or disclosure violations, the adequacy of the price in a
voluntary tender offer cannot be an issue.").
See Kumar v. Racing Corp. ofAmerica, C.A. No. 12039 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 26, 1991), in which the Court of Chancery enjoined a proposed
freeze-out merger on the grounds that the majority shareholder had
breached its duties of entire fairness and due care in structuring and
causing the approval of the merger (because representatives of the
majority shareholder stood on both sides of the transaction, fixed its
terms and caused it to be effectuated, the transaction was to be judged
under the "entire fairness" standard).

e.

dealing" involves timing of transaction, how the process was
initiated, structure, how it was negotiated, disclosure and how approvals
of directors and stockholders were obtained.

f.

Approval of merger by an informed majority of the minority, where such
is a condition to the merger, or by a committee of independent directors
acting autonomously and aggressively shifts burden of proof to plaintiffs

j

J
..J

'~Fair
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to show unfairness. See generally, Warden & Feit, Reviewing the Work
ofSpecial Committees in Freeze-Out Transactions.' Should the Business
Judgment Rule Govern?, M&A and Corporate Governance Law
Reporter (Feb. 1991); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., C.A.
No. 7129, slip op. at 48 (Del Ch. Oct. 19, 1990); Citron v. E.1 Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990); Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)Arnoldv.
Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.; Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422
(Del. 1997) (burden did not shift, even though committee of supposedly
independent directors advised buyer's board regarding fairness; two
members of the committee failed to attend all the informational meetings
and the third member had a long history of providing legal and advisory
services to the controlling shareholder).

r

r

r

r
r

g.

r
r

r

Court held that in non-fraudulent transaction, appraisal proceedings
under § 262 ofDGCL is exclusive remedy. However, it deemed the
traditional Delaware valuation method (the combined weighted average
of asset value, market price of stock and earnings) as "out-moded" and
significantly broadened the factors Delaware courts may now consider in
arriving at "fair value".

!

r

r

See Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, Inc., 1995 WL 405750 (Del. Ch.);
Cavalier Oil v. Harnett supra; In re: Appraisal ofShell Oil Co., C.A.
8080 (Del. Ch. December 11, 1990). Shareholders are entitled to their
proportionate interest in a "going concern". Minority discount at
shareholder level is contrary to requirement that company be viewed as
going concern, however a minority discount at company level may be
permissible in weighting ofdifferent valuation methodologies.
Appraisal ofShell Oil Co. See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
C.A. No. 7129 (Del. Ch. October 19, 1990).

r

r
r

r
r

r

"Fair price." See Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35
(Del. 1995), in which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Chancery
Court opinion holding that, in the absence of coercion or disclosure
violations, a controlling shareholder has no duty to offer a fair price in a
voluntary tender offer. This is the first explicit holding by the Delaware
Supreme Court to this affect. However, this ruling may be of only
marginal significance to controlling shareholders who plan to follow
their tender offer with a cash-out merger at the ilme price as the tender
offer.

For a recent case anaiyzing different valuation methodologies, see
LeBeau v. MG. Bancorporation, Inc., 1998 WL 44993 (Del. Ch.).

h.

Bershadv. Curtis-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987). Court ruled
that Revlon duties do not apply in the context of a parent-subsidiary
merger. See also Kleinhandler v. Borgia (Del. Ch.) (Revlon duties
inapplicable to freeze-out of 40% owned subsidiary).
Similarly, in Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), the
Delaware Supreme Court determined that neither the Unocal or Blasius

r
r
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standards applied where the board acted in the absence of a threat or act
of disenfranchisement. The Court affirmed a Chancery Court summary
judgment upholding as valid an amendment to Cincinnati Milacron's
charter that provided for "tenure voting" -- each existing share would
receive ten votes, but upon sale or other transfer, would revert to onevote-per share status until held by its owner for three years. Milacron
was controlled by the Geier family, which owned a little over 50% of its
stock. Thus, the stockholder approval of the charter amendment was
virtually assured. Moreover, the Geier family peculiarly benefited from
the amendment because it permitted them to sell some oftheir shares
without relinquishing control of the company.
. The majority determined that, because the plan did "not involve either
unilateral director action in the face of a claimed threat.Qr an act of
disenfranchisement ... neither Blasius nor Unocal applie[d]." Rather,
the majority concluded that the decision of the board to recommend the
amendment was subject to business judgment rule review and that the
plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption ofthe rule because at summary
judgment he failed to demonstrate that the board's purpose in proposing
the amendment was anything other than promoting the long-term
stability of the company. The majority also rejected various arguments
that the stockholder vote in favor of the plan was ineffective.
The dissent rejected the significance of an essentiaIly meaningless
shareholder vote that was arguably coercive -- the proxy statement
disclosed that, because of the Geier control bloc, the amendment was
virtually assured of passing but that, if it was not approved by two-thirds
of the shares, the company's stock would be delisted by the NYSE. The
dissent argued that a trial was necessary to determine if the board's
purpose in recommending "tenure voting" was to either reduce the
minority's voting powers (Blasius) or entrench the controlling
shareholders (Unocal).
J.

Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). In Kahn, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed a Chancery Court decision holding that Alcatel
U.S.A. Corp. ("Alcatel"), a 43.3% shareholder in Lynch Communication
Systems, Inc. ("Lynch"), had not breached its fiduciary duties by
instigating a cash-out merger of Lynch's minority shareholders.
Although the Supreme Court agreed that Alcatel incurred fiduciary
duties through the exercise of "actual control" over Lynch and,
accordingly, bore the initial burden of demonstrating the entire fairness
of the merger, the court rejected Alcatel's argument (and the Chancery
Court's determination) that the approval of an independent committee of
Lynch directors shifted the burden of proof to the shareholder-plaintiff
to demonstrate that the merger was unfair. In doing so, the court held
that for such burden-shifting to occur, (a) the controlling shareholder
must not dictate the terms of the merger and (b) the special committee
must have real bargaining power it can exercise on an arms-length basis.
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the shareholder
committee appointed to negotiate the merger did not have sufficient
bargaining power to warrant burden-shifting where, inter alia, Alcatel
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had demonstrated its willingness to block alternative transactions and
threatened to commence a tender offer at a lower price if its final merger
proposal was not accepted.

r

,

r

On remand, the Chancery Court held (1) that the Supreme Court's
finding that the independent committee had been coerced into accepting
the transaction did not preclude a determination that the transaction met
the "entire fairness" test, and (2) that despite the absence of certain
elements of fair dealing and Alcatel's failure to disclose that the
independent committee had been coerced into accepting Alcatel's
transaction, Alcatel satisfied its disclosure obligations and met both the
"fair dealing" and the "fair price" elements of the "entire fairness"
standard. Kahn v. Lynch, 1995 WL 301403 (Del. Ch. April 17, 1995),
aff'd C.A. No. 8748 (Del. November 22, 1995). The Supreme Court also
held that coercive conduct towards selling shareholders does not create
liability per se; to be actionable the coercion must be a material
influence on the decision to sell, as in the case of a squeezeout merger or
a two-tiered tender offer.

r

r
r
r
r
,

r
r

r

r
r
r

r
r

r

j.

Mende/ v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994). In Mende/,
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court held that a board of
directors was not required to issue a block of stock to dilute a
shareholder's controlling interest in the corporation. The case arose after
the Carroll family, controlling shareholder ofKaty Industries, made a
proposal to purchase the remaining Katy shares at $25.75, which was
accepted by the Katy board. The Carroll family later withdrew its
proposal after Pensler Capital Partners made a merger proposal for Katy
at a price of $27.80 per share. The Pensler Capital proposal was
conditioned on the board issuing sufficient stock to dilute the Carroll
family's controlling interest. The board declined to issue the stock,
thereby derailing the Pensler Capital bid because the Carroll family
refused to sell its stock.
Plaintiffs argued that once the Katy board had agreed to the Carroll
proposal, "Rev/on Duties" were visited upon the board, which required
to board to do all it could to secure the Pensler transaction, including
diluting the Carroll family's controlling interest. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that even though the Carroll proposal was for less
value than the Pensler proposal, it still may have been "fair" because,
unlike the Pensler proposal, it did not involve a purchase of control. The
Court held that under these circumstances, the Katy board's fiduciary
obligations did not require it "to deploy corporate power against the
majority stockholders in the absence of a threatened serious breach of
fiduciary duty by the controlling stock". The Court left open the
possibility that circumstances could exist that would justify the
extraordinary remedy of ordering a board to issue a dilutive block of
stock, stating "... I continue to hold open the possibility that a situation
might arise in which a board could, consistently with its fiduciary duties,
issue a dilutive option in order to protect the corporation or its minority
shareholders from exploitation by a controlling shareholder who was in

r
r
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j
the process or threatening to violate his fiduciary duties to the
corporation ....".

k.

Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). The board of
Tremont, advised by an independent committee, approved the purchase
of shares ofNL held by Valhi, Inc. Valhi owned the majority ofNL
stock and controlled Tremont through its ownership of 44% of the
shares. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the fact that two of the
three members ofthe independent committee advising Tremont as to
fairness did not regularly attend informational meetings and the third
member had a long history of providing legal and advisory services to
the controlling shareholder of Valhi, NL and Tremont meant that the
burden of proving entire fairness remained with the buyer.

The Supreme Court held that Valhi was not required to disclose to
Tremont that two other companies had rejected the offer to buy the
shares, because such information was immaterial. The Supreme Court
also held that Valhi had no duty to disclose that an investment advisory
firm had issued an informal opinion that a 20% liquidity discount from
market would be required in order to conclude the sale. "because the
normal standards of arms-length bargaining do not mandate a disclosure
of weaknesses".
2.

Appraisal is not the exclusive remedy for challenge to a merger on grounds of
"entire fairness" or "unfair dealing." See Stauffer v. Standard Brands. Inc.• 187
A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, 281 A.2d 30
(Del. Ch. 1971); CEDE & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 18 (Del. June 10. 1988)
(appraisal and fraud actions may be prosecuted simultaneously). In re:
Radiology Associates, Inc., C.A. No. 900 I (Del. Ch. May 16. 1990); Nebel v.
Southwest Bancorp, Inc., 1995 WL 405750 (Del. Ch.).

..
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3.

Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.• 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), on remand 402 A.2d
5 (Del. Ch. 1979) (majority stockholder making tender offer has duty to make
"full and frank disclosure"; finding of fair price on remand). See also Zirn v.
VLI Corp.• Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95,862 (Del. Ch. 1991) (a tender offeror
that became a majority stockholder of the target company upon completion of
the offer thereby acquired a fiduciary duty to non-tendering stockholders. No
fiduciary duty prior to that time).

4.

In Joseph v. Shell Oil Co.• 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984). the Chancery Court
enjoined a tender offer for Shell Oil Co. by its majority shareholder, the Royal
Dutch Shell Group; the court "rejected the contention that a majority shareholder
has a duty to offer a fair price in a tender offer. since all shareholders are free to
accept or reject the offer. Since the burden of "complete candor" requires
disclosure of all germane facts with respect to the tender offer and the offeror's
subsequent plans. and since the court found that the majority shareholder had
failed to disclose certain critical information necessary to make an informed
investment decision, shareholders were thereafter provided with a limited right
of rescission. See also Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1995 WL
250374 (Del. Ch. April 21. 1995) (majority shareholder has no obligation to
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make a tender offer at a "fair price" so long as a free choice to accept or reject
the tender offer is present).

r

5.

r
r

B.

r

r

New York Cases.
1.

Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195,273 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1966)(cash merger to
eliminate 3% minority; finding offaimess by Superintendent of Insurance; held,
minority has no right to continue as stockholders).

2.

People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120,371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. Cty.
1975), aff'd (4-1),50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dept. 1975)
(following public offering at $25 per share in 1968, the stock fell and in 1975 the
majority (68%) stockholders proposed to eliminate the minority for $3 per share;
in suit by Attorney General to enjoin "fraudulent practices", injunction was
granted where no "real corporate purpose" was demonstrated).

3.

Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167,383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (N.Y. Cty. 1976) (shortform merger after tender offer providing for same price; court refused to issue
injunction where no showing of fraud, illegality, concealment or nondisclosure
of material facts, etc.).

4.

Bosee v. Babcock International Inc., No. 17370177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd,
410 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (App. Div. 1978) (holds that, under New York law,
"appraisal is the only remedy afforded dissenting stockholders in a [short-form]
merger, absent extraordinary circumstances").

5.

Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corporation, 63 N.Y.2d 557; 473 N.E.2d ]9; 483
N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984) - A unanimous Court of Appeals held, in the context ofa
two-step cash-out merger, that the transaction viewed as a whole must be fair,
and that variant treatment of the minority shareholders will be sustained only if
related to the advancement of an independent corporate purpose.

r
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c.

Control (and fiduciary obligations) can be found in a less than 50% stockholder.
In re: Tri Star Pictures, Inc. Litigation, 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993) (Coca Cola,
36% stockholder, loses motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims based
on possible influence over directors).

"Going Private" under Federal Laws.
].

Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holds that no cause of
action exists under Rule IOb-5 where a Delaware short-form merger is effected
without any business purpose, since Rule IOb-5 requires only full and fair disclosure and not fairness of the transaction).

2.

Rule 13e-3; applies where issuer or an affiliate undertakes a merger, purchase of
stock, reverse stock split or other transaction that results in delisting from a
national exchange, removal from NASDAQ or non-reporting status -- i.e., the
corporation "goes private"; detailed, burdensome and extensive disclosure

r
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requirements, including statement of opinion whether transaction is fair, together
with reasons, and disclosure of any valuation opinions received. Broadly
speaking, there are two general exceptions to the application of Rule l3e-3:

3.

a.

"unitary" transactions -- second-stage transactions occurring within one
year ofthe termination of a tender offer in which "affiliate" status was
established where the consideration offered is at least equal to the
highest consideration offered in the tender offer, provided this was
disclosed in the initial tender offer. Rule 13e-3(g)(I);

b.

similar equity security -- securityholders receive only an equity security
having substantially the same rights as the equity security removed, and
the issuer files reports under the 1934 Act. Rule 13e-3(g)(2);

c.

SEC Release No. 34-17719 provides guidance on how to structure certain multi-step acquisitions to avoid Rule l3e-3 application. See (c)
below.

The Commission proposed in 1981 to broaden the "unitary" transaction
exception to conform to "no-action" positions taken by the staff with respect to
transactions involving the purchase, other than by means of a tender offer, of a
controlling interest in a class of equity securities of an issuer prior to the acquisition of the remaining outstanding shares. The exception requires that certain
conditions be met which relate to the timing ofthe steps, the consideration
offered and the lack of affiliation between the issuer and the acquiring entity
prior to entry into a binding agreement or agreements to acquire all of the
outstanding stock. Although the proposed broadened exception of Rule 13e3(g)(1) was never adopted, it is still possible to get "no-action" relief with
respect to such transactions.
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4.

The Commission is taking an increasingly expansive view of the reach of Be-3 - e.g., the merger of The Continental Group was held to be a going-private
transaction merely because two representatives of the acquiror went on
Continental's Board of Directors after the execution of the merger agreement. In
situations where a party's status as an "affiliate" is not clear, the Commission has
taken the position that affiliation cannot be eliminated by attempting to conduct
arms' length negotiations. Recently, the Commission has taken the position that
an acquiror which is a large stockholder with board representation and
significant business relationships with the target has a sufficient enough ability
to influence the management and policies of the target to constitute control for
purposes of the definition of affiliate.

J
J

5.

The Commission is also taking an increasingly stringent view of the disclosure
required by l3e-3 -- e.g., great detail must be given with respect to the
investment bankers' presentations and all materials prepared by them and given
to the Board must be filed as exhibits; the Commission is also requiring such
disclosure and filing of exhibits with respect to presentations and reports given
to the acquiror.

6.

The Sixth Circuit has held that there is a rebuttable presumption that any
information required to be disclosed by Schedule l3E-3 is material in a

J
J
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Section 14(a) damages action. Bowing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., No. 89-4084
(6th Cir. Mar. 6, 1991) (Item 8 of Schedule 13E-3 creates ~ presumption that a
discussion of book, going concern and liquidation value would be material to a
reasonable shareholder).

..

-

-..

7.

D.

Other Cases.
1.

Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (redemption of class A
common stock at $80.80 per share followed by liquidation in which the class A
stockholders, had they converted into class B, would have received $240 gave
rise to cause of action by class A stockholder for breach of board's fiduciary
duty; controlling shareholder may not use that control to avoid equitable
distribution of corporate assets).

2.

Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952) (merger of 83%
owned subsidiary into parent; Court found that parent met the burden of
establishing the transaction's "entire fairness").

3.

Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (Justice
Traynor articulates an expansive fiduciary duty of majority to minority; such a
duty also exists when no sale or transfer is directly involved, such as here, where
majority used its power to exclude the minority from a trading market. Here,
majority holders of U.S. Savings & Loan Ass'n created a Delaware holding
company -- United Financial -- and then went public; so anyone interested in
Ass'n stock bought stock of United Financial, thereby ending trading market in
Ass'n stock. United Financial then offered to buyout the Ass'n holders at a very
low price; the offer was refused and Ass'n holders sued and the court held that
majority's actions breached their fiduciary duty).

4.

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (97% owned subsidiary
had a contract with 100% owned subsidiary; breach of contract action was
judged by "intrinsic fairness standard"; parent failed to meet burden of proof that
decision not to enforce contract was intrinsically fair to minority shareholders).

.

..
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..

..

-

-

-

-

E.

The SEC has recently adopted extensive disclosure requirements for "roll-up"
transactions involving the combination or reorganization of limited partners'
interests for securities of or interests in successor entities, and the President
signed into law in December 1993 a Roll-Up Statute passed by Congress.

Leveraged Buyouts.
1.

Normally a transaction in which management and principal shareholders (who
may be one and the same) combine with outside investors to buyout the
remaining shareholders, using a significant amount of secured and unsecured
debt and/or preferred stock to fund the acquisition. Since January 1991, credit
conditions have made these transactions very difficult to arrange.
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2.

Usually takes the form of a merger where newly formed company owned by
"insiders" is merged with existing company and remaining shareholders are
cashed out.

3.

Because most LBOs involve affiliates of "acquired" company, the same Federal
and state law questions of disclosure and "fairness" are usually present.

4.

To enhance proof of "fairness", transactions are now generally structured so that
a special committee of "independent" directors is created, with its own legal and
financial advisors, to negotiate on behalf of the "public" shareholders.

5.

A former SEC Commissioner, Bevis Longstreth, has criticized the failure of the
current Federal and state laws (including the Weinberger decision) to assure that
public shareholders get fair market value for their shares in leveraged buyouts.
a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

As a result of recent developments, it is clear that a management LBO
cannot be entered into unless an auction has been conducted first or
LBO bid is structured to allow for a subsequent "market test" (In re Fort
Howard Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Civ. A. No. 9991 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Del. Library, Del Ch. File) appeal denied,
547 A.2d 633 (Del. 1988); In re KDI; In re Formica.
Should "acquired" company be able to agree with buyout group that it
will not solicit other buyers? Edelman v. FruehaufCorporation, 798
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), invalidated, among other things, an absolute
"no-shop" agreement by the company. Samjens Partners v. Burlington
Industries, 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y., 1987) allowed "window shop"
agreement, foreclosing solicitation of bids but not responses to
unsolicited offers. Consider Del. Supreme Court views in Paramount.
Should issuer be able to grant an option on unissued stock, or other
forms of financial assistance, to the buyout group essentially "Iockingup" the company? In Fort Howard, court allowed $1.00 per share breakup fee in return for LBO management group agreeing to "market test"
(i.e., LBO group had to keep tender offer open for 30 business days,
during which time Board was allowed to consider and provide
information to any third parties interested in competing). After
Paramount, lock-ups are certain to come under "enhanced" judicial
scrutiny. In Burlington, the court allowed a breakup fee equal to 2% of
the value ofthe transactions.
Should the Company be able to grant "crown jewel" lock-ups to buyout
group? See Revlon and SCM. Macmillan allows such a grant during an
auction only if the Board properly perceives that such favoritism will
enhance shareholder interests and the action is reasonable in relation to
the goal sought to be achieved (i.e., obtaining the highest price for the
Company).
Should investment bankers be able to give "fairness" opinions where
they have not "shopped" the company? Is disclosure of this fact
enough?
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Is the use of "outside directors" to negotiate on behalf of the public
shareholders adequate protection? Fruehauf, Fort Howard; Macmillan
suggest that direct negotiation by outside directors, independently
advised, is essential. See generally, Warden & Feit, Macmillan:
Outside Directors and Other Observations, Mergers and Acquisitions
Law Reporter (June 1989).

g.

"Fairness" of auction process. Courts have allowed some disparity of
treatment. In Burlington, court did not require the company to provide
confidential data to Edelman since he refused to sign the same
confidentiality agreement (with a standstill) that all other bidders signed.
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F.

Sale of Control - Sale of a Controlling Interest at a Premium.

r

1.

r
r

If other stockholders are not given the opportunity to participate, do they have a
remedy? Absent "special circumstances", probably not. See Zetlin v. Hanson
Holdings. Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684 (1979); O'Neal, Sale ofa Controlling Corporate
Interest: Bases ofPossible Seller Liability, 38 U. Pgh. L. Rev. (1976). Citron v.
Steego, C.A. No. 10171 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1988) (large stockholder could obtain
control premium).

2.

Cases involving looting; e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (investment companies); Harris v. Carter, C.A. No. 8768 (Del. Ch. May
4, 1990) (controlling shareholder can be liable for negligently selling shares to a
purchaser who then loots the company).

3.

Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) ("We do not mean to suggest
that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his controlling block of stock to
outsiders without having to account to his corporation for profits or even never
do this with impunity when the buyer is an interested customer, actual or
potential, for the corporation's product. But when the sale necessarily results in
a sacrifice of this element of corporate goodwill and consequent unusual profit to
the fiduciary who has caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains.")
See also Jones v. HF. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) ("... majority
shareholders ... have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the
corporation to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just and
equitable manner. Majority shareholders may not use their power to control
corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the
minority"); Berle theory that ~'control" is a "corporate asset", see Berle &
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), has not generally
been followed in the courts, see, e.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F.
Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), affd309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 941 (1963). See also Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal
Opportunity in the Sale ofShares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965), for another
theory that has not attained widespread acceptance. ("A controlling stockholder
should not be free to sell, at least to an outsider, except pursuant to a purchase
offer made equally to other stockholders; or, put in the affirmative, that one of
the rights of minority stockholders is to have an equal opportunity, with all other
stockholders to participate ratably in any sale of shares pursuant to a favorable
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offer for the purchase of controlling shares in their corporation.") See, e.g.
Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978); Zet/in v. Hanson Holdings.
Inc., 421 N.Y.S. 2d 877, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979), rejecting Andrews proposition.
4.

Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., where the Delaware Chancery Court denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment where plaintiffs alleged that two
controlling stockholders of CERBCO, who were also officers and directors, had
attempted to usurp a corporate opportunity by precluding a sale of CERBCO's
holdings to a third party in order to pursue a sale of their own stock. The \court
held that if the sale of defendants' shares constituted a sale of substantially all
CERBCO's assets, thus triggering a shareholder vote under Del. § 271,
defendants were free to act in their capacity as shareholders to pursue a
transaction in their own best interest even where alternatives would have better
served the interests of minority shareholders. If a shareholder vote was not
required, however, the court held that defendants could be liable as officers and
directors for breaching their duty of loyalty by attempting to divert a corporate
transaction to their personal benefit.

5.

Narrow applicability of Rule IOb-5; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1952); theory that Rule lOb-5 applies only to an injury suffered in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities (i.e., non-purchaser and nonseller have no cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5) affirmed in Blue Chip Stamps V.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). However, 1934 Act § 13(d) provides
for disclosure of identity of 5% beneficial owners and plans and intentions.

6.

"Sale of Corporate Office" -- changes in the Board of Directors incident to sale
of control are generally upheld where shares are sold. (Question often arises in
connection with investment companies.) See SEC v.Insurance Securities, 254
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958); compare Rosenfeldv. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 802 (1972). But see 1934 Act § 14(f).
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SULLIVAN &. CROMWELL
November 4. 1999

MEMORANDUM

Three ReftIlt De"ware Rulings Address
MNo-Ialk" Provisions in Stoek-for-Stock Mergen
Three recent Delaware Court of Chancery rulings on motions for injunctive relief
highlight the Court's sensitivity to the fiduciary duty implications of"no-talk" provisions in
stock-for-stock merger agreements. No-talk provisions can either strictly prohibit a party
from engaging in discussions with third parties concerning alternative business combination
transactions, or merely limit the circumstances under which such discussions can take place.
11lc rulings indicate that a court applying Delaware law is likely to scrutinize carefully a
board ofdirectors' decision to enter into a strict no-talk provision (i.e., one which does not
contain any type of "fiduciary out"), even if the transaction can be deemed a "strategic
merger."

»
w

....

In a bench ruling on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction in Phelp.~ DtJC/Kf!
Corporation v. Cyprus Ama.t Minerals Comf'CIny (Civ. Act. No. 17398).· the Court stated
that the decision by the boards ofdirectors ofdefendants Cyprus Amax and Asarco to enter
into a strict no-talk provision likely constituted a breach of the boards' duty of care.
notwithstanding the fact that Delaware courts ha\'e long held that absent special
circumstances a stock·for-stock merger does not constitute a sale of control and therefore
does not trigger a board's so-called Rel'lon duties.·· (Under the R"'/rm doctrine. in the
context ofa transaction that constitutes a sale ofcontrol ofthe corporation. the board's duty
is to negotiate the best price reasonably available for the stockholders and the board may not.
by adopting "deal protection" mechanisms or otherwise. take action that would th\vart its
ability to satislY that duty.) Although the Court confirmed that the Cyprus Amall and Asarco
boards did not have a duty to negotiate with a third party. the Court stated that the boards'
decision not to negotiate must be an informed one. According to the Court, by agreeing in
the merger agreement not to engage in discussions with any third parties. the Cyprus Amall

•

Cyprus Amax was the subject ofour Memorandum dated Septcmber 29. 1999 .

••

See Rev/on. Inc. v. MacAmlrew.fcf: Forhe.~ HoldinK.f.lnc.. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
and Arnoldv. SocietyforSDvings Bancorp. IIIc.• 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996).
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and Asarco boards had completely foreclosed the opportunity to engage in non-public
discussions with Phelps Dodge and had essentially bargained away their right even to
become informed about whether or not to negotiate. 11lc Court stated that this was the "legal
equivalent of willful blindness, a blindness that may constitute a breach ofa board's duty of
care." Despite this reasoning. the Court held that an injunction was unavailable because the
probability of irreparable injury had not been shown. The bench ruling did not discuss the
negotiating process that culminated in the no-talk provision or address the applicability of
the business judgment rule.
In ACE Limitedv. Capital Re Corporation (Civ. Act. No. 17488), the Court was
faced with a target company that had received a superior proposal and two competing
readings of a no-talk provision in the merger agreement that contained a fiduciary out.
Capital Re. the target company. asserted that the no-talk provision left it to the board to
decide whether its fiduciary duties required it to enter into discussions with third parties.
based on advice it received from legal and financial advisors. ACE asserted that the
provision allowed the Capital Re board to engage in discussions only if it received written
legal advice opining that its fiduciary duties "required" such discussions.· Finding Capital
Re's reading persuasive, the Court held that ACE would be unlikely to prevail on the merits
and denied ACE's request for a temporary restraining order against Capital Re's termination
of the agreement.··
The Court. however. went on to analyze the no-talk provision under the assumption
that ACE's reading ofthe fiduciary out was correct, and expressed its view that in that case
the no-talk provision would likely be found invalid. Such a provision. the Court reasoned,
"comes close to self-disablement by the board" and "involves an abdication by the board of
its duty to determine what its own fiduciary obligations require at precisely that time in the
life of the company in which the board's own judgment is most important:' In forming ils
view, the Capital Re Court was apparently innucnced by the fact that approximately 46% of
the outstanding shares of Capital Re's common stock were either held by ACE. or were

•

The Court noted that ACE had not brought a suit against XL Capital (the competing
bidder) alleging tortious interference by XL Capital wilh the merger agreement. In
strongly worded dicta, the Court stated that in the context ora merger agreement with
a fiduciary out such a claim would be "farfetched, if not outrageous."

••

The Court stated that "although [the no-talk provision is) perhaps not so clear as to
preclude another interpretation, [it) is on its face better read as leaving the ultimate
'good faith' judgment about whether the board's fiduciary duties required it to enter
into discussions wilh XL Capital to the board itself. Though the board must 'base'
ils judgment on the 'written advice' ofoutside counsel. the language ofthe contract
does not preclude the board from concluding, even ifits outside counsel equivocates
(as lawyers sometimes tcrKf to do) that such negotiations are fiduciarily mandated."

2
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"locked up~ by voting arrangements that could not be tenninated •• and would effectively
ensure consummation ofthe merger notwithstanding the existence ofa superior proposal _.
unless the Capital Re board could terminate the merger agreement.

>
W
N

canvassed the market. negotiated with various bidders in a competitive environment and
believes that the necessity to close a transaction requires the sales contest end."
The relative importance ofother "deal protection" provisions to the analysis of notalk clauses in stock·for-stock merger transactions is not completely clear. Although the
Court in Capital Re was apparently troubled by the fact that approximately 460/. of Capital
Re's stock was "locked up," therefore making the fiduciary out the only practical escape
clause urlder the contract, the fact that approximately 40-A of IXC's stock was similarly
"locked up," even when combined with a tennination fee and stock option agreements, did
not produce a holding that the IXC board had failed to discharge its duty of care. In any
event, the Court in each of Capital Re and IXC folkwl.-ed earlier Delaware cases in examining
the provisions in question arid the other deal protection provisions as a totality, suggesting
that the interrelation among all ofthe deal protection features ofa given merger transaction
must be given careful consideration.

Vice Chancellor Steele's opinion in In re IXC Commllnicati(lns. Inc. Shareholder.'
Litigation (Consolid. Civ. Act. Nos. 17324 and 17334) was issued only two days after Vice
Chancellor Strine's Capital Re opinion. The no-talk provision at issue in IXC was amended
in light of Cyprus Amox to add a fiduciary out that pennitted either party to "participate in
discussions~ regarding any superior proposal for the purpose ofdeciding whether to change
its recommendation to stockholders. Unlike Capital Re, a superior proposal never emerged,
so the meaning and enforceability ofthe fiduciary out in IXC was not at issue. In moving to
preliminarily enjoin the stockholder vote on the merger agreement, the /XC plaintiffs alleged
(among other things) that the pre-amendment version of the no-talk provision somehow
evidenced a pattern of"willful blindness" on the Jl8rl ofthe IXC board ofdirectors. Stating
that no-talk provisions "arc common in merger agrccrncnts and do not imply some automatic
breach offiduciary duty,~ the Court was "comfortable concluding that the IXC board met its
duty of care~ in view ofthe facts that the board had conducted an auction process for nearly
six months and that the fiduciary out allowed the IXC board to participate in discussions
concerning superior proposals. The Court went on to find that the IXC's board's decision
to approve a tennination fee, stock option agreements and certain voting and stock purchase
arrangements which "locked up~ approximately 40-10 of IXC's outstanding common stock
was entitled to deference under the business judgment rule, and injunctive reliefwas denied.

Finally, the appropriate legal framework urlder which no-talk provisions should be
evaluated in the context of stock-for-stock mergers is not clear. The Capital Re decision
does not even allude to the business judgment rule. and contains dicta to the effect that a noescape no-talk provision might constitute an unreasonable preclusive and defensive obstacle
within the meaning of Unocal.· implying that an enhanced level of scrutiny and a more
rigorous standard ofrevicw are appropriate. In IXC, however, the Court addressed notjUSl
the no-talk provision, but also the tennination fee and the stock option agreements, and stated
that as none of these mechanisms was instituted to respond to a perceived threat from a
potential acquiror, "enhanced judicial scrutiny docs not apply and entire fairness is not the
standard ofreview.~ According to the IXC Court. in the absence ofa showing ofdisloyalty
or lack ofcare, these provisions "are reviewable as businessjudgments and are. thus. granted
deference." Further development of the caselaw will be necessary to reconcile Capital Re
with ICX.

The decisions in the Cyprus Amox, CaPital Re and IXC cases appear to be influenced
substantially by the cases' respective factual records. Certain aspects of the decisions in
Capital Re and /XC arc particularly diffICult to reconcile, however. and the clarification of
certain issues will be possible only as a result of further developments in these cases or as
the result ofdecisions in other cases. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain factors
ofsignificance in the Court ofChancery's evaluation ofno-talk provisions in stock-for-stock
merger agreements.

Clients with questions concerning issues raised by the Court ofChancery rulings are
encouraged to contact any of James C. Morphy, John L. Hardiman, Joseph B. Frumkin.
Mitchell S. Eitel or Matthew G. Hurd, all ofour New York offICe, at (212) 558-4000.

First, although it is not clear that C)JJf'US Amax should be interpreted as an absolute
ban on no·talk provisions that do not contain fiduciary outs, both Capital Re and IXC make
clear that provisions which include fiduciary outs arc significantly more likely to withstand
the scrutiny ofcourts applying Delaware law. Second, a board that decides to enter into a
strict no-talk provision should be prepared to convince the court that it has satisfied its duty
ofcare by conducting a thorough "market check" before entering into such a provision and
that other provisions do not preclude an informed stockholder vote. The Court in IXC based
its finding that the board discharged its duty of care not only on the fact that the no~talk
provision, as later amended, contained a fiduciary out, but also on the fact thatlXC had
negotiated with various purchasers. Indeed. according to the Court in er,piltll Re. "one
legitimate circumstance" in which a board could prudently place itself in the position of not
being able to entertain and consider a superior proposal "may be where a board has actively

SULLIVAN &. CROMWELL

Unncal Corp. v. Mesa Petrolellm Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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SULUVAN &. CROMWELL
Limited exemptions from the U.S. tender oITer requirements would be
available to allow tender oITers for securities of non-U.S. issuers when
U.S. holders hold forty percent or less ofthe class of securities sought.
without the need to obtain case-by-case relief to harmonize conflicting
rules (the "Tier ,," exemption).

November 9. 1999

Rights oITerings by non-U.S. issuers generally could be made on the basis
of applicable regulations of the target issuer's home jurisdiction when U.S.
holders hold ten percent· or less of the class of securities sought (the
"Rule 801" exemption).

MEMORANDUM

Re:

SEC Adopts Final Exemptive Rules for Cross-Border Tender
OITers. Business Combinations. and Ril!.hts OITerinl!.s

Exchange oITers for the securities of non-U.S. issuers generally could be
made on the basis ofapplicable regulations ofthe target issuer's home
jurisdiction when U.S. holders hold ten percent or less ofthe class of
securities sought (the "Rule 802" exemption).

On October 22. 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC")· adopted a number ofexemptive rules that would facilitate participation by u.S.
holders of the securities of non-U.8. companies in cross-border tender oITers, business

Under certain circumstances, tender oITers for the securities of non-U.5.
issuers would be exempt from new Rule 14e-5 (formerly Rule 10b-13)··
to allow purchases outside the tender oITer when U.S. holders hold ten
percent or less of the class of securities sought.

combinations, and rights oITerings. The adoption of these rules culminates the SEC's
eITorts in this area which began in 1990.

>
IN
IN

The rules as adopted renect certain modifications suggested by
commenters on the proposed rules" and become eITective on January 24. 2000.
SUMMARY

Qualif}'ing for the new exemptions will in certain cases require the oITeror to make filings
with or furnish information to the SEC and to observe certain U.S. procedural
requirements. These procedural requirements. however, are significantly less extensive
than the SEC requirements currently applicable to these transactions.

The rules, which are discussed in more detail below. provide that:
Tender oITers for the securities of non-U.S. issuers generally could be
made on the basis of the applicable regulations of the target issuer"s home
jurisdiction when U.S. holders (as defined below) hold ten percent or less
of the class ofsecurities sought (the "Tier I" exemption).

•

Release Nos. 33-7759, 34-42054. 39-2378, International Series Release No. 1208;
File No. 57-29-98; _ Fed. Reg. _ _ (October 22. 1999) (the "Adopting
Release").

••

The proposed rules were made in Release Nos. 33-7611. 34-40678. International
Series Release No. 117J; File No. 57-29-98; 63 Fed. Reg. 69136 (November 13.
1998) (the "1998 Release"). See also our Memorandum dated December 7. 1998
discussing the 1998 Release.

•

The percentage threshold proposed in the 1998 Release for the Rule 80I
exemption and the Rule 802 exemption was five percent. In raising this
percentage, the Adopting Release notes that when U.S. security holders own ten
percent or less of the issuer, the participation of U.S. holders is generally not
necessary for the oITer to be successful. As a result, the SEC found that U.S.
security holders are commonly excluded when the U.S. ownership is below the
ten percent level.

••

New Rule 14e-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"). was adopted in a separate release that updates and simplifies the
rules and regulations applicable to takeover transactions. ~ Regulation of
Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Release Nos. 33-7760. 3442055,IC-24107; File No. 57-29-98; _ Fed. Reg. _ _ (October 22.1(99) (the
"Regulation M-A Release''). We are distributing a separate Memorandum
discussing the Regulation M-A Release.

~
"'tl
trl

-2-

Z

=
~
N

The general antifraud and civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal

securities laws. which relate principally to material misstatements and omissions, will

II. TENPER ANp EXCHANGE OFFERS: RIGHTS OFFERINGS
A. Tender Offc;rs

continue to apply to any tender or exchange offer or rights offering made to U.S. security

I. Tier I Exemption

holders. In view of the requirement that written information be disseminated to U.S.
security holders or published in the United States if it is used in the home jurisdiction,
tender offer materials and offering documents in transactions which are exempt under the
new rules will need to be prepared with the potential for liability under U.S. law in mind.

The Adopting Release exempls from the procedural and disclosure

requirements of the Williams Act· any issuer or third-party tender offer for a class of
securities ora foreign private issuer··. regardless of the nationality of the bidder···. if

All of the following conditions are satisfied:

I. BACKGROUND

U.S. holders hold ten percent or less of the subject class.

The Adopting Release notes that U.S. security holders are commonly

In the case ora class ofsecurities subject to Rule l3e-4 or Regulation 140
under the Exchange Act, bidders submit (but not ..tile......) an English
language translation ofthe offering materials to the SEC under cover of
Form CD and tile a consent to service on Form F-X.•••••

excluded from tender and exchange offers, business combinations and rights offerings
involving non-U.S. issuers. In order to avoid the application ofthe U.S. securities laws,
bidders and issuers will exclude U.S. security holders from these transactions. This. the

U.S. holders (including holders of American Depositary Receipts
("APRs"» are permitted to participate in the offer on terms at least as

Adopting Release notes. is particularly true when U.S. security holders own a small
percentage ofthe outstanding shares of the non-U.S. foreign private issuer. The SEC is

>-

concerned that by excluding U.S. security holders from tender or exchange offers. U.S.

I

UJ
~

•

security holders are denied the opportunity to receive a premium for their securities. In
the case of rights offerings. U.S. security holders that are excluded from such offerings

••

lose the opportunity to purchase shares at a posSible discount from the market price.
In order to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. holders in such transactions. the
Adopting Release sets forth an approach that will permit qualifying offers to be extended
to U.S. holders on the basis ofhome country requirements in cases where U.S. investors

•••

own a small percentage of the securities sought. subject to compliance with the general
antifraud provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws. Given this relief, non-U.S.
offerors and issuers would presumably be encouraged to extend more offers to U.S.
holders in these circumstances. To implement this approach, the SEC has issued the rules
described in the Adopting Release.

••••

Primarily Sections 14(d), 14(e) and 14(1) ofthe Exchange Act. which principally
relate to tender offers.
The term "foreign private issuer" is defined to mean any foreign (j.~., non-U.S.)
issuer other than a foreign government and other than an issuer with more than
fifty percent of its outstanding voting securities held of record by U.S. residents
that also has: (i) U.S. citi2ens or residents making up a majority of its executive
officers or directors; (ii) more than fifty percent of its assets located in the United
States; or (iii) its business administered principally in the United States.

U.S. offerors would be eligible for this reliefon the same basis as non-U.S.
offerors.
Liability under Section 18 of the Exchange Act for making false and misleading
statements with respect to material facts in documents "filed" with the SEC under
the Exchange Act would not apply. However. the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws other than Section 18 would still apply.

..... The Form CB must be received by the SEC no later than the next business day

after the lender offer has commenced. If the bidder is a non-U.S. company it must
also file a Form F-X to appoint an agent for service of process in the United
States.
-3-
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favorable as those ofTemi to any other holder of the subject class, subject
to pennitted exceptions as discussed below.
Dissemination ofthe tender ofTer circular or disclosure document, to the
extent requiml by the target's home jurisdiction. is made to U.S. security
holders on a comparable basis as provided to security holders in the
target's home jurisdiction, except that any olTering circular or disclosure
document disseminated in the United States must be in English and, where
dissemination is made by publication, the olTeror must simultaneously
publish the olTering materials in the United States.

--, -., --, -, -, --, -, --, ......,

detennination is to be made at the commencement ofthe offer and the amount of cash
consideration must be adjusted during the tenn of the olTer if the bidder no longer has a
reasonable basis to believe the cash is substantially equivalent to the value ofother
consideration olTered to non-U.S. holders.

2. Tier II Exemption
Under the Tier II exemption, eligible tender ofTers would be entitled to
limited exemptive relief from the U.S. tender olTer rules to minimize conflicts with non-

Satisfaction of the above conditions would exempt the tender olTer from the disclosure.
filing, dissemination and minimum olTering period requirements. proration and
withdrawal rights, and other requirements of the Williams Act and the tender ofTer rules.
except that the general antifraud provisions would still apply.

U.S. regulatory schemes. To be eligible for the Tier II exemption. the tender olTer must
be for the securities ofa foreign private issuer and U.S. security holders of record must
hold forty percent or less of the class ofsecurities sought in the tender ofTer·. The
exemptive relief provided under the Tier II exemption consist ofthe following:

An exception to the equal treatment rule discussed above would pennit the

All Ho!ders!Best Price Rule: A bidder may divide its offer into two
separate olTers if the olTer to U.S. holders is made on tenns at least as
favorable as those olTemito any other holder of the subject class.·· In
this instance, the U.S. offer would comply with the U.S. regulatory scheme
and would be limited to U.S. security holders and the non-U.S. offer
would comply with the home jurisdiction rules and would exclude U.S.
security holders.

bidder to olTer U.S. holders only cash if the bidder has a reasonable basis to believe that

>
I

W

v.

the cash consideration is substantially equivalent to the value of the securities offered to
non-U.S. holders. If the offeml security is not a "margin security" within the meaning of
Regulation T,· the olTeror must provide, upon the request of the SEC or a U.S. security
holder. an opinion from an independent expert stating that the cash-only consideration is

Notice of Extensions: A bidder may announce extensions ofthe olTer in
accordance with the practices of its home jurisdiction, rather than before
the commencement oftrading on the ncxt business day as is required by
the U.S. rules. However, the rules do not provide relief from the

substantially equivalent to the securities and any cash offered outside the United States.
If the offeml security is a "margin security" within the meaning of Regulation T. such an
opinion is not requiml.·· Under this exception, the substantially equivalent value

•

The tenn "margin security" includes: (I) any security registered or having unlisted
trading privileges on a national securities exchange; (2) after January I. 1999. any
security listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market; (3) any non-equity security; (4) any
security issued by either an open-end investment company or unit investment trust
which is registered under Section 8 ofthe Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
"Investment Company Act"); (5) any foreign margin stock; or (6) any debt
security convertible into a margin security.

••

In this case, the ofTeror must undertake to provide any U.S. holder or the SEC
staff, upon request, information on recent trading prices of the olTeror's securities.
-5-

•

When U.S. ownership exceeds forty percent, the SEC will consider reliefon a
case-by-ease basis when there is a direct conflict between the U.S. laws and
practice and those ofthe home jurisdiction. In such an instance. the bidder (as in
the past) must submit a written application requesting relief. along with a
discussion ofthe basis for the request. Any relief granted by the SEC would be
limited to what is necessary to accommodate conflicts between the regulatory
schemes and practices.

••

A bidder may ofTer loan notes only to non-U.S. holders. However. the "cash
only" exception to the equal treatment condition ofthe Tier I exemption is not
applicable to Tier II offers.
-6-

requirement that all tender offers must provide mandatory extensions for
certain changes in the terms of the offer.•

B. Exchange Offers. Business Combinations and Rights Offerings
The Adopting Release provides exemptions from the registration

Prom Payment for or Return of Tendered Securities: A bidder will meet
the requirements for prompt payment for. or return of. tendered securities
if it complies with the home jurisdiction requirements and practice.

requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. as amended (the "Securities Act"). for
securities issued to U.S. security holders of a foreign private issuer in exchange offers.
business combinations·. and rights offerings. The target company (or the issuer in an

Reduction of Minimum Condition: A bidder may reduce or waive the
minimum acceptance condition without extending withdrawal rights
during the remainder of the offer (unless an extension is required by Rule
I4e.I). if. among other things. the bidder announces through a press
release or otherwise. that it may reduce the minimum condition five
business days prior to the time it reduces such condition.••

issuer tender offer or rights offering) must be a foreign private issuer.
Rule 801 provides an exemption from Securities Act registration for rights
offerings that are made on the basis of applicable regulations of the
issuer's home jurisdiction when U.S. holders hold ten percent or less of
the class of securities sought.

Thus, although a bidder must still comply with the U.S. tender offer rules. the Tier II
Rule 802 provides an exemption from Securities Act registration for
exchange offers for the securities of non-U.S. issuers that are made on the
basis ofapplicable regulations of the target issuer's home jurisdiction
when U.S. holders hold ten percent or less of the class of securities sought.

exemption would provide the bidder with the exemptive relief outlined above without
requiring the bidder to submit a written application to the SEC.
The 1998 Release had also proposed exemptive relief relating to the

I f the conditions to one of these alternatives can not be satisfied. the offeror would be

commencement of the offer and withdrawal rights. In the Regulation M·A Release. the

>,

requirement that a cash tender offer com~e or be withdrawn within five business days

required to register the securities offered in the United States or to qualify for another

W

ofannouncement has been rescinded. An offer will now be deemed to commence once a

exemption. An issuer making an offering in reliance on either Rule 801 or Rule 802 may

0'\

claim any other available exemption under the Securities Act.

bidder disseminates transmittal forms or discloses instructions on how to tender into an
offer. In addition. the Regulation M·A Release adopted a proposal with respect to

Rules 80I and 802 impose certain restrictions on the transferability of the

withdrawal rights that would permit a third.party bidder in both domestic and foreign

securities that an offeror may issue in exchange offers or business combinations or the

transactions to provide at its election for a "subsequent offering period" without

equity securities that may be purchased pursuant to Rule 801 upon the exercise of the

withdrawal rights.

rights. To the extent that the subject securities are "restricted securities...• prior to the

•

•

"Business combination" is defined u a statutory amalgamation. merger,
arrangement or other reorganization requiring the vote ofshareholders ofone or
more of the participating companies. It also includes a statutory short-form
merger that does not require a shareholder vote.

••

Restricted securities are generally securities acquired from the issuer in
transactions not involving a public offering. resales of which may require
registration uoder the Securities Act or the availability of an exemption such as
(continued...)

••

In the 1998 Release. the SEC indicated that it was not aware of any jurisdiction
where the U.S. duration and extension periods connicted with those of the home
jurisdiction. Even though some jurisdictions permit a shorter time period. the
SEC noted in the 1998 Release that those horne jurisdiction rules do not prohibit
the bidder from keeping the offer open or extending the offer for a longer period
of time.
The SEC stated that a statement at the commencement of the offer that the bidder

may reduce the minimum condition would not be sufficient.
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Rule 801 or Rule 802 transaction. securities acquired by the U.S. investor in such

to U.S. offerees would be included as an attachment to Form CD. A non-U.S. company

transaction will be "restricted securities." On the other hand. if the subject securities are

must also file a Form F-X when it submits the Form CD.

unrestricted. then the securities acquired in the transaction will also be unrestricted.· For

I. RuleBOI

purposes ofrights offerings, the proportion of restricted to unrestricted securities is
Rule 80 I is available only for rights offerings ofequity securities made on

determined as of the record date that determines the allocation ofrights among security
holders. In the case ofan exchange offer or business combination. the proportion is based

a pro rata basis to existing security holders ofthe same class, including holders of ADRs

upon the securities tendeted or exchanged by the holders.

evidencing those securities. The SEC limited Rule 801 in this regard since the offerees
have already made their investment decision with respect to that class of securities. In

Rules 801 and 802 do not require that specific information be disclosed or
sent to U.S. security holders. The rules do. however. require that when any document,

addition, this rule would require that the rights granted to U.S. security holders not be
transferable except in accordance with Regulation S.

notice or other information is provided to offerees outside the United States. copies that

2. RuleS02

are translated into English must be provided to U.S. security holders. To encourage nonU.S. issuers to include U.S. security holders in rights offerings and exchange offers. the

>
W
-...J

Rule 802 does not have any limitations based on the domicile or reporting

rules provide that the offeror must circulate any informational documents to U.S. holders.

status ofthe offeror. An offeror need not be a reporting company and may be either a

in English, on at least a comparable basis to that provided to security holders in the

U.S. company or a foreign private issuer.· The target company, on the other hand. must

offeror's home jurisdiction. Ifthe offeror publishes information regarding the offering in

be a foreign private issuer.

its home jurisdiction. the offeror must publish the information in the United States in a
manner reasonably designed to inform U.S. holders ofthe offer. In any event. the offeror
may mail the relevant documents to U.S. security holders. Under both rules. the offeror
must provide the notice or offering document to U.S. security holders in English at the
same time it provides the information to offerees outside the United States.
Under both Rules 801 and 802, the offeror must submit a notification to
the SEC on new Form CD. A copy of any document, notice or other information mailed

Rule 802 does not contain any restrictions on the type ofsecurities that an
issuer could offer in reliance on the rule. As a result. offerors may offer debt securities in
an exchange offer or business combination for the subject company's equity or debt
securities. Generally, unless otherwise exempted. the issuance ofdebt securities requires
qualification ofan indenture under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the "Trust Indenture

Actj. Absent relief from this requirement. the usefulness of the other reliefafforded by
Rule 802 would be undermined in the case ofdebt securities. In view ofthe SEC's belief
that the benefits to be obtained by U.S. investors justified not providing U.S. investors
with the protections of the Trust Indenture Act, a new rule was adopted that exempts any

··(...continued)
Rule 144 under the Securities Act.

•

The Adopting Release observes that because no more than ten percent of the
subject company's securities may be held in the United States the potential that
Rule 801 and Rule 802 will be misused as a means to conduct illegal distributions
in the United States should be minimal.

-9-

•

The SEC recognized that a U.S. bidder would be at a competitive disadvantage if

this exemption were available only to foreign private issuers since a U.S. bidder
for the securities ofa non-U.S. target would then be required to register the U.S.
portion of its exchange offer while a non-U.S. bidder would not be so required.
·10·

-,

debt security issued pursuant to Rule 802 from having to comply with the provisions of

calculating U.S. ownership. On the other hand, the outstanding class of securities subject

the Trust Indenture Act.

to the tender or exchange olTer would include securities represented by ADRs. as well as

C. Qmml

the amount of the subject class of securities held by U.S. holders.
To accommodate the planning process of an olTeror or an issuer. the new

Certain aspects of the rules adopted in the Adopting Release common to

rules include a 30-day "look back" period. As adopted. the olTeror would make the

the transactions discussed above are discussed in this part C.

calculation of U.S. ownership 30 days before the commencement of the tender olTer.

U.S. ownership ceilings. The Adopting Release defines "U.S. holder" to

exchange olTer or rights olTering. In the case ofa business combination such as a merger

include those persons resident in the United States. Record ownership is determined in

where the securities are issued by the acquiring company. the calculation will be based on

accordance with Rule 12g3-2(a) under the Exchange Act. except that the olTeror is

U.S. ownership of the target company 30 days before the commencement of the

required to "look through" record ownership of brokers. dealers. banks and other

solicitation for the merger. In business combinations such IS an amalgamation. where a

nominees located (i) in the United States. (ii) in the subject company's jurisdiction of

successor company issues securities to all participating companies. the calculation would

incorporation or that ofeach participant in a business combination. and (iii) in the

be based on U.S. holder information available 30 days before commencement. but applied

jurisdiction that is the primary trading market for the subject securities. ifdilTerent from

on a pro forma basis as if measured immediately after completion of the business

the subject company's jurisdiction of incorporation.· OlTerors must also count securities

>

as owned by U.S. holders when publicly filed reports or information that is otherwise

W

provided to an olTeror indicates that the securities are held by U.S. residents. If. after

combination.

I

00

The Adopting Release recognizes that it would be difficult for third-party

reasonable inquiry. an olTeror is not able to obtain information about the amount of

bidders to ascertain whether any exemption is available without information on the

securities represented by the nominee's customer accounts. the olTeror may assume that

subject company's U.S. ownership. Accordingly, under the rules a third-party bidder in a

such customers are residents of the jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal

hostile tender olTer· would be entitled to a presumption that the percentage threshold

place of business.

requirements of the Tier I. Tier II or Rule 802 exemptions are m1 exceeded unless one of
the following conditions is met:

In determining U.S. ownership for purposes of the U.S. ownership
the aggregate trading volume in the United States of the subject class of
securities exceeds ten percent in the case ofTier I olTers and Rule 802. or
forty percent in the case ofTier II olTers. of the worldwide aggregate
trading volume over the 12-ealendar-month period ending 30 days prior to
commencement of the alTer;

ceilings. shares held by holders of more than ten percent of the subject class. and shares
held by the olTeror in an exchange olTer or business combination. would be excluded. In
addition, other types of securities that are convertible into or exchangeable for the subject
securities ~.&., warrants, options. and convertible securities) are not taken into account in

the most recent annual report or other informational form filed or
submitted by the issuer to securities regulators in its home jurisdiction or

•

The SEC noted that these jurisdictions should cover most of the trading volume of
the subject securities and is likely to yield the greatest number of U.S. beneficial
owners.

•

This presumption would not be available in negotiated transactions since the
bidder would be able to get this information from the target company.
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with the SEC indicates that U.S. holdings exceed ten percent in the case of
Tier I offers and Rule 802. or forty percent in the case ofTier II offers; or
the bidder knows or has reason to know from other sources that the level
of U.S. ownership oflhe subject class of security exceeds the thresholds.
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recognition of capital gain until the redemption of the note. The Adopting Release notes
that such tax treatment is not available under U.S. law. which would require gain
recognition at the time ofthe exchange for the notes.
Competina offers. In order to provide a level playing field in the case of

Even if this presumption is not available, the bidder may nevertheless rely on the
applicable exemption ifit can demonstrate that U.S. ownership is less than the relevant
threshold.

competing offers, a subsequent competing bidder would not be subject to the applicable
U.S. ownership limitation conditions if the initial bidder relied on the Tier I or Tier II
exemption or the exemption in Rule 802. Accordingly, the competing bidder will be

Equal treatment. As a general condition to the availability of the relief
granted in the rules. U.S. security holders must be allowed to participate in the offer on

eligible to use such reliefas long as all ofthe other conditions to the relevant exemption
are satisfied.

terms at least as favorable as those offered to any other security holders of the subject
securities. As such. U.S. security holders must be offered the same amount and form of
payment. including securities if offered elsewhere. Moreover. the procedural terms of the
offer <i.~.• duration and withdrawal rights) must be the same for all security holders.

>
VJ

\0

One exception to this condition would arise when (i) despite a good faith

Investment Company Act. The Tier I and Tier II exemptions are available
if the subject company is a closed-end investment company that is registered under the
Investment Company Act. Similarly, the registration exemptions for rights offerings.
business combinations and exchange offers provided by Rules 801 and 802 are also
available for securities issued by closed-end investment companies that are registered

effort to register or qualify an exchange offer. the sale of the offered securities is

under the Investment Company Act. In adopting the rules. the SEC stated that it believed

prohibited in a particular U.S. state under its securities (so-called "blue sky") laws. or (ii)

extending the relief to closed-end investment companies was consistent with the SEC's

the exchange offer in the United States is exempt from Securities Act registration under

previous decision to permit closed-end investment companies to rely on the Regulation S

Rule 802 but a state's blue sky laws do not provide a corresponding exemption. In eithcr

safe harbor to issue unregistered securities abroad.· However. these rules are not

event. instead ofexcluding such security holders. the offeror must offer them cash

available to any other type of investment company, whether foreign or domestic. that is

consideration if it has offered cash consideration to security holders in another state or in

registered or required to be registered under the Investment Company Act.

a jurisdiction outside the United States. In this instance, the ofTeror must offer the cash
consideration only if it is offering a cash-only alternative consideration ~.Jl .• not if it is
only offering a part cash/part stock form ofconsideration).
Another exception to the general condition would permit U.S. holders to
be precluded from electing to receive "loan note" securities. The Adopting Release

Informatjonallmnds. Although the disclosure to be provided to U.S.
holders generally would be governed by the requirements of the target's home country. an
offering circular or other published notice disseminated to U.S. holders would be required
to bear specified informational legends regarding the foreign nature oflhe transaction and
that the offer is subject to the disclosure requirements of a foreign country that are

points out that it is common in the United Kingdom for a bidder in a cash tender ofTer to
offer a loan note alternative that allows target security holders to receive a short-term note
in lieu ofan immediate cash payment and thereby. under U.K. tax law. generally dcfer the
-13-

•

~ Offshore Offers and

Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863 (April 24. 1990).

55 Fed. Reg. 18306.
-14-

different from those ofthe United States. In addition, the legend must state that investors

The Adopting Release provides for an exception to Rule 14e-S for Tier I

may have difficulty in enforcing rights against the issuer and its officers and directors.

tender or exchange offers (i.£., when U.S. persons held of record ten percent or less of the

This legend does not have to be placed on the cover page; instead, it may be placed in

class of subject securities), if!!1 of the following conditions are satisfied:

another prominent location in the document.
The bidder prominently discloses in the U.S. offering documents the
possibility ofany purchases, or arrangements to purchase, or the intent to
make such purchases otherwise than pursuant to the terms of the tender or
exchange offer.

Limits ofgrante<! relief. The civil liability and general antifraud
provisions ofthe U.S. federal securities laws would remain applicable to these
transactions to the extent extended to security holders in the United States.•

The bidder discloses information in the United States regarding purchases
or arrangements made in the United States in a manner comparable to the
disclosure made in its home jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Adopting Release does not grant any relief from the share ownership
disclosure requirements of Sections 13(d), 13(1) and 13(g) orthe Exchange Act and the
rules thereunder.··

The bidder discloses in the U.S. offering documents the manner in which
any information about such purchases or arrangements will be disclosed.

III. RULE 14e-S (FORMERLY RULE IOb-13l

The purchases comply with the applicable tender offer laws and
regulations of the home jurisdiction.•

As the Adopting Release notes, many non-U.S. jurisdictions permit
participants in tender and exchange offers to engage in activities that would be prohibited

>
I

~

o

in the United States by Rule 14e-S under the Exchange Act.••• Indeed, certain non-U.S.

This exception for Tier I tender offers basically represents a codification of the conditions

jurisdictions may have regulations that effectively require market-making affiliates of the

contained in exemptions previously granted by the SEC. As noted in the Adopting

offeror or its financial advisers to engage in activities that would be prohibited by

Release, no exception to Rule 14e-S is granted for Tier II offers in light of the greater

Rule 14e-S.

U.S. interest in such offers. The SEC will continue, ho~ver, to review requests for relief
from Rule 14e-S for otTers other than Tier I eligible offers on a case-by-ease basis.

•

••

•••

In the context ofcross-border otTers that are subject to the requirements of

Civil liability and antifraud provisions that may be applicable, depending upon the
circumstances, include Sections II, 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act. Sections
100b), l4(e) and 18 ofthe Exchange Act, and Exchange Act Rules IOb-S, l3e4(bXI) and 14e-3.

the U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the "City Code"), the SEC has in the past
granted relief to permit market makers and principal traders that are affiliated with the
bidder's advisors ("Eligible Traders") to continue their U.K. market making activities

Any penon acquiring benefteial ownership of more than five percent ohny class
ofsecurities registered WIder Section 12 of the Exchange Act generally is required
to file a statement on Schedule 130 or Schedule 130, as appropriate, disclosing
such ownership and certain other information, and to promptly amend such
statement to disclose material changes.

during such an otTer. Without relieffrom Rule 14e-S, Eligible Traders would be forced to
withdraw from trading in U.K. target securities, with possible adverse consequences for
the liquidity of those securities. The SEC has codified in the Adopting Release this class
exemption which is not limited to Tier I offers. The rules provide relief to bidders or

Rule 1Ob-13 was revised and redesignated IS new Rule 14e-S in the Regulation
M-A Release. Rule 14e·S generally prohibits a person making a tender offer from
directly or indirectly purchasing the subject security otherwise than pursuant to
such otTer, from the time of its public announcement until its expiration.

•

The SEC did not adopt a requirement that purchases must be made outside the
United States.
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anyone acting on behalfofbidders (such as advisors and other nominees or brokers). The
rules for Eligible Traders are available if!ll ofthe following conditions are satisfied:

The issuer ofthe target security is a foreign private issuer.
The tender offer is subject to the City Code.
The Eligible Trader is a "connected exempt market maker" or "connected
exempt principal trader," as those terms are defined in the City Code.

~

-.., -, -, .-' -,

-., -,

As noted in the Adopting Release, posting materials relating to tender and
exchange offers and rights offerings on a web site raises issues not present in the context
of public underwritten offerings. Accordingly, the SEC indicated that offerors using a
web site to publicize their offer should take special care to ensure that it is not used to
induce indirect participation by U.S. holders ofthose securities. One safeguard suggested
by the SEC is for an offeror to obtain adequate information to determine whether the
holder is a person in the United States or a U.S. person in responding to inquiries and

The offering documents disclose the identity ofthe Eligible Trader and
describe how U.S. security holders can obtain information regarding an
Eligible Trader's market making or principal purchases to the extent such
information is required to be made public under the City Code.

obtain representations by the investor that the investor is not a person in the United States

In response to commenters. the SEC provided guidance in the Adopting

.....

--.

The Eligible Trader complies with the applicable provisions of the City
Code.

IV. SEC'S VIEWS ON INTERNET DISCLOSURE

»

I

processing letters oftransmittal. Another example that an offeror could employ is to
or a U.S. person. Special care should also be taken to avoid mailing the cash or securities
consideration into the United States. Despite the use of precautionary measures, a web
site could be viewed as an offer in the United States if the content is clearly designed to
induce U.S. investors to lind an indirect means to participate in the offer through offshore
nominees or other means.

Release regarding when bidders can provide information on the Intemet about offshore
tender and exchange offers without triggering U.S. tender offer and securities registration

• • •

requirements. This guidance is designed to provide certain clarification regarding the
SEC's views published in March 1998 regarding when the posting of materials on
Internet web sites would not be considered an offer or soliciting activity in the United

The Adopting Release will be published in the fnkml Rmim and
reproduced in various securities law reporting services. and is available on the SEC's web

States for purposes of the registration requirements of the federal securities laws (the

site (www.sec.gov). Copies of the Adopting Release are also available from Ivy Moreno

"1998 Internet Release").· In the 1998 Internet Release. the SEC indicated that offering

(212-558-3448) in our New York office.

materials posted on a web site would not be deemed an offer. general solicitation or
directed selling efforts in the United States, as long as the offeror implemented
precautionary measures reasonably designed to ensure that the Internet offer is not

Clients having questions regarding the above rules are invited to call one
ofthe lawyers on the attached list.

targeted to persons in the United States or to U.S. persons.

•

SULLIVAN &: CROMWELL

Statement ofthe Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer
Securities. Securities Act Release No. 7516 (March 23. 1998).63 Fed. Reg.
14806. The SEC's interpretation is discussed in our Memorandum dated April 3.
1998.

.
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adopted what amounts to a free market approach to the use of such information. Under
the new rules, participants in a business combination transaction or proxy solicitation are
November 10, 1999

generally free to communicate with securityholders, employees, customm and othm
without the constraint of fint having to prepare and file a registration, proxy or tender
offer statement. Instead, the SEC has imposed only three fundamental rules:

MEMORANDUM

Re:

•

SEC Adopts Amendments to the Rules Regulating
Takeovm and Sec;urityholder Communications

•

SUMMARY
On October 19, 1999, the SEC adopted far-reaching amendments to the

•

rules regulating takeovm and sec:urityholder communications in business combination
transactions and proxy solicitations. These amendments. which become effective January

24,2000, represent a significant modernization ofthe SEC's regulatory scheme. The
amendments primarily (i) liberalize the current restrictions on publicity and other

Participants must file all written communications with the SEC on the day
of lirst use, so that the information in the communication is
"disseminated" broadly and promptly.
Participants must include in their written communications a legend noting,
among other things, that a full disclosure document is forthcoming.
Parties to a merger who elect to take advantage ofthe liberalized
communications rules cannot file their proxy statements confidentially
with the SEC. As a practical matter, this requirement is likely to rnalce the
confidential review process far less common than it is today.· The SEC
has reiterated that its accounting staff is available to discuss particular
accounting issues in advance of filing.

:>

communications in connection with business combination transactions and proxy

~

solicitations to allow for significantly greater disclosure and communications with

sec:urityholdm - only the basic registration, proxy and/or tender offer statements and

securityholdm before the filing of any registration, proxy or tender offer statement that

amendments and supplements thereto must be mailed to sec:urityholdm.

w

Significantly, the SEC has not required that copies of filed communications be sent to

may eventually be required, and (ii) eliminate certain existing disparities between
exchange offen and cash tender offm.
I. EXPANSION OF PERMITTED COMMUNICATIONS WITH
SECURITYHOLDERS

The SEC also has relaxed the timing requirements for filing certain
registration, proxy and tender offer statements. Thus, the SEC has repealed the so-called
"five business day" filing rule applicable to third-party cash tender offers, the "prompt"
filing requirement applicable to exchange offen and the "as promptly as practicable"

Genef'tll

Acknowledging the need ofmarket participants for more rapid
dissemination of information regarding business combination transactions,· the SEC has

•

In this memorandum, the term "business combination" refm to all tender offm
and mergers. whether for cash or securities and whether initiated by the issuer or a
third party. The term "mergm" includes asset transfers, consolidations and
(continued...)

·(...continued)
reclassifications where the vote of sec:urityholden is sought.

•

To preserve the right to file proxies confidentially, parties to a merger will be
limited to making public statements that contain no more than the information
permitted by current Rule 14S(b), and therefore will not be able to publicize the
transaction in any meaningful way,

-2-
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Scope

filing requirement under the proxy rules.· In recognition of the unique nature of tender
offers as a tool for fraudulent market manipulation and of the fact that the five business

The amendments are extremely broad in scope:

day rule has acted as a deterrent for such behavior, the SEC also has adopted an antifraud
rule specifically targeted at persons who announce tender offers fraudulently or without

•

The rules allow generally unrestricted freedom in communications relating
to business combination transactions and other actions requiring a
securityholder vote, subject only to the antifraud rules. a legending
requirement and a same-day filing requirement for written
communications.•

•

The exemptions are available to all issuers, regardless of size or seasoned
status. and to all participants and persons authorized to act on behalf of
participants in a business combination transaction.

•

The proxy rules exemption applies to all proxy solicitations. not just those
relating to a business combination transaction. Thus, subject to the filing
requirement. management and securityholders are free to discuss proxy
issues and proposals before the filing of a preliminary proxy statement.
provided no proxies are sought until a definitive proxy statement is
filed.··

intending or being reasonably capable ofcommencing the offer. This relaxation of
timing. combined with the increased latitude permitted in communications, will permit a
target company to respond to a tender offer that has not been formally "commenced" in
the manner it deems best before filing a complete Schedule 140-9. no longer constrained
to the SUbject matter limits imposed by the current "stop-look-and-listen" rule.
The amendments do not. however. represent a fundamental change in the
federal liability regime for communications relating to business combination
transactions·· or the basic requirement that securityholders receive an SEC-mandated
registration. proxy or tender offer statement before being asked to vote or make an
investment decision. There also continues to exist a distinction between "oral" and
"written" communications.···

The Securities Act exemptions, however. apply only to business combination transactions

>

- therefore. communications with the primary purpose or effect ofconditioning the
market for capital raising or resale transactions. for example, would not be protected by

~
~

the new safe harbor.

•

Current Rule 14d-2(b). Rule 14d·2(e) and Rule 14a-12(a)(4). respectively.

••

Thus. (i) oral and written communications in connection with a registered offering
of securities but not contained in the registration statement would be subject to
liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. (ii) oral and written
communications in connection with solicitation ofa securityholder vote would be
subject to Rule 14a-9. (iii) oral and written communications in connection with a
tender offer would be subject to liability under Section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and new Rule 14e-8. and (iv) all communications could be
subject to liability under Section 1O(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and other applicable antifraud rules.

•••

The SEC stated in the release that "written" communications would generally
include. for example, "scripts used by parties to the transaction to communicate
information to the public and other written material (e.g.• slides) relating to the
transaction that is shown to investors." We do not believe this is a change from
the SEC's current position on these materials.

•

The legending and filings requirements are embodied in: Rules 165(c)(l) and
425(a). respectively (for stock mergers and exchange offers). Rules 13e-4(c) and
13e-4(c)(I). respectively (for issuer cash tender offers). Rules 14a-12(a)( I)(ii) and
14a-12(b). respectively (for cash mergers). Rule 14d·2(b)(2) (for cash tender
offers) and Rule 14d·9(a)(2) (for target company responses 10 cash tender offers).
Consistent with the relaxation ofcontent restrictions on communications made in
advance of the registration, proxy or tender offer statement, the content
restrictions formerly imposed upon summary advertisements used to commence
tender offers (current Rule 14d-6(a)(2» have been removed.

••

Although the SEC solicited comment on a broader "test the waters" proposal•
pursuant to which management could communicate proposals to securityholders
without being required to file written communications related thereto. the final
rules did not contain such a rule.
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II. LEVELING OF TIlE PLAYING FIELD FOR ACQUIRORS USING STOCK

Other notable rule revisions contained in the release include:

exchange offers under the current rules, the SEC adopted largely as proposed rules
permitting (but not mandating) the commencement ofexchange offers. including the
solicitation of tenders, upon the filing ora registration statement (rather than upon

•

The release promulgates new Regulation M-A. which consolidates and in
many cases simplifies the disclosure requirements for issuer tender offers.
third-party tender offers and going-private transactions (including the
related tender offer statements) into a single disclosure regulation. Former
Schedules 13E-4 and 14D-1 are combined into a single new Schedule TO.
and each tender offer schedule now refers to Regulation M-A for all
substantive disclosure requirements. Regulation M-A does not contain
significant new disclosure requirements.

•

A "plain English" summary term sheet ofthe proposed transaction is now
required for issuer and third-party tender offer statements. cash merger
proxy statements· and going-private disclosure documents.

•

The new rules streamline certain financial statement requirements for
business combinations by

effectiveness of the registration statement). This relaxation does not apply to goingprivate transactions or roll-up transactions, but is applicable to other issuer exchange
offers. In order to commence an exchange offer before a registration statement becomes
effective, the offeror must
file a complete registration statement relating to the securities offered.
disseminate a complete preliminary prospectus to all securityholders.

•

file a tender offer statement with the SEC, and

•

not purchase shares until after the registration statement is effective.

pointed out that delays associated with t~ SEC review process of registered exchange

~

offers could affect the stated goal of leveling the playing field for cash and stock offers.

v.

eliminating the requirement to file financial statements for target
companies in cash mergers where the acquiror's shareholders are
not voting on the transaction,

Many commenters on the proposed rules. including Sullivan &. Cromwell.

>

--, -, -, -., -, -,

III. UPDATING AND HARMONIZING OF THE TENDER OFFER AND
PROXY RULES

Noting the "distinct timing advantage" for cash tender offers o\'er

•
•

.....,

clarifying that acquirors are not required 10 file financial statements
in cash mergers and cash tender offers iflhe financial statements
are not material to the securityholders' voting or investment
decision and. where the financial statements are required. reducing
the requirement from three years to two, and

While the final release expresses the SEC's "commitment" to expedited staff review of
exchange offers. there remains a risk that the SEC staffwill not review an exchange offer
registration statement in time to permit the timing of the exchange offer to compete
effectively with the timing ofa cash tender offer. Even if the staffdoes act promptly to
review an exchange offer. the risk that staffcomments will necessitate material changes
in the offering documents and an extension ofthe exchange offer period likely remains
greater in exchange offers than in tender offers.·
•

The rules specify minimum time periods necessary for the dissemination of
changes to preliminary prospectuses that are used to commence an exchange offer
early: (i) five business days for most material changes. (ii) ten business days for
changes in price, number of shares sought or similarly significant changes and (iii)
twenty business days for materially deficient preliminary prospectuses. The SEC
(continued...)

-5-

·(...continued)
expressed in the release its view that "these time periods represent general
guidelines that should be applied uniformly to all tender offers," including cash
tender offers. Material changes can be disclosed in a prospectus supplement
rather than a redelivered complete final prospectus.
•

Mergers and tender offers involving the registration of securities are already
subject to the SEC's "plain English" rules.

-6-

easing the requirements for three years ofaudited financial
statements for non-reporting target companies in stock mergers and
stock tender ofTers (no financial statements required if a nonreporting target is not significant to the acquiror above the 20"10
level described in Rule 3-05 of Regulation SoX, and the target's
securityholders are not voting on the transaction; if the nonreporting target's securityholders are voting on the transaction, at
least one year's financial statements prepared in accordance with
GAAP are required).

•

The new rules also permit (but do not require) securities to be tendered

without withdrawal rights during a 3- to 20-day subsequent ofTering period after the close
ofan acquiror's initial ofTer period if the ofTeror commits to purchase all outstanding
securities of the class sought and discloses its intent to do so in advance of the expiration
of the initial ofTering period. In response to strong criticism from commenters that the
advance notice requirement may create a "hold-out" problem with securityholders. the

The rules add a requirement for pro forma and related financial
information in cash tender ofTers where the ofTeror intends to engage in a
back-end stock merger with a significant (greater than the 20"10 level
described in Rule 3-65) target.

•

>
I

~

0\

IV. SUBSEQUENT OFFERJNG PERJOD

•

•

SEC did not include the advance notice requirement in the rule. stating instead that they
would rely on stafTinterpretation to guide the advance notice requirement's future
development.- The same consideration would have to be paid in both the initial and
subsequent ofTering period.

Rule 13e-I, which prohibits IR issuer whose securities are the subject of a
third party tender ofTer from repurchasing any of its equity securities until
information about the intended acquisition is filed and disseminated to
securityholders, has been amended to (i) delete the requirement for
sending such information to securityholders, (ii) exclude from the rule's
application periodic repurchases made in the ordinary course of business
and not in response to the tender ofTer and (iii) require such information to
be provided after the tender ofTer is made (rather than up to six months
before, as under the current rules).

V. EFFECTIVE DATE
The new rules become efTective January 24. 2000. and would generally be
applicable on that date to all business combination transactions, whether or not then
underway. Persons with confidential preliminary proxy statements on file as of that date
must choose whether to limit written communication regarding their transaction or forgo
confidential treatmen! by making a public filing. ExchBRge ofTers for which a registration

The SEC has conformed the stockholder list requirements under the tender
ofTer rules to those under the proxy rules. Accordingly, companies
electing to provide a stockholder list to a requesting party in lieu of
mailing the requesting party's materials would be required to disclose the
most recent list of names. addresses and security positions of nonobjecting benefICial ownen (as well as record owners) it has in its
possession. or subsequently obtains.

statement has been filed but is not yet efTective may be commenced on or after JIRUBry
24. 2000 by complying with the applicable provisions. The new disclosure requirements
will apply only to registration statements, tender ofTer statements and proxy statements
and information statements initially filed on or after JBRuary 24. 2000. however.
VI. ACTIONSNOTTAKEN

The new rules clarify and codify certain stafT interpretations of Rule
lOb-I 3 (which prohibits IR ofTeror from making purchases of subject
securities outside of its tender ofTer), adopt four new eltelllptions and two
exemptions originally proposed in the release on cross-border tender ofTers
and redesignate the rule as Rule 10k-So As adopted. Rule 14e-S has ten
exceptions. the most significant ofwhich for domestic business
combinations is that the person making the tender may exercise options
acquired before announcement of the tender ofTer.

Although the release signiflcantly rationalizes the difTering SEC regulatory
requirements for business combination transactions utilizing cash and securities. some

-

In the release the Commission states. "After the Division ofCorporation Finance
gains practical experience with the operation of the subsequent ofTering period.
the Division may decide. through stafT interpretation. to shorten or possibly
eliminate the requirement for advance notice."
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available on the SEC's web site (www.sec.gov). Copies ofthe release are also available
from Ivy Moreno (212-558-3448) in our New York office.

•

~

~

distinctions remain. In three significant areas. however. the release is panicularly

•

-..J

-, --,

significant for actions mt taken.

•

>-

-I

First, the SEC has positioned itself to move quickly and without additional
rulemaking to abandon the requirement that advance notice of a
subsequent ofTering period is required. In our view. this would make the
subsequent ofTering period more appealing to ofTerors.

If you have any questions regarding the rule amendments, please call
James C. Morphy (212.558-3988), Joseph B. Frumkin (212-558-4101). John K. Robinson
(212.558.3154) or any ofthe other lawyers on the attached list.

Second. the SEC has not extended the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements authorized in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 to statements made in connection with tender ofTers. The SEC stated
in the release that "given the relative infancy of the body of law
interpreting the PSLRA generally and the safe harbor in panicular, we do
not believe that extending the reach of the safe harbor would be prudent."

SULLIVAN et CROMWELL

Finally. while acknowledging that "some selective disclosure may
continue to occur" despite the new rules because a distinction between oral
and written communications remains. the SEC clearly has made an attempt
to reduce the potential for selective disclosure by clarifying what it
considers "written" and by imposing the filing requirement for all written
communications in a business combination transaction. In the release. the
SEC states that "(aJlthough this release does not impose new requirements
on oral communications, We remain extremely troubled by the selective
disclosure of material information." Whether this is a portent offuture
rulemaking or merely a warning to market panicipants to conduct
themselves in an appropriate manner to prevent the SEC from doing so
remains to be seen.

The SEC also chose not to adopt final rules in other less significant areas.
such as the broader ''test the waters" proposal described above and the direct delivery of
proxy statements and other soliciting material to non-objecting beneficial owners to
facilitate more timely and informed voting decisions. In each ofthese areas. the SEC has
indicated that it may revisit these topics in the future.

• • •
The release. which was first published October 22. 1999. will be published
in the &sImIl ~ and reproduced in various securities law reponing services. and is
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DEALING WITH NEWS - THE BAD, THE GOOD AND THE UGLY

By David C. Fannin

1. What is Bad News?
This paper focuses on the required and discretionary delivery of news both negative and positive news - on behalf of a public company. As many wellpublicized cases have illustrated recently, the release of negative information "bad news" - can have a profound effect on a public company. In many cases,
the immediate result can be a quick devaluation of the company in the form of a
lowered stock price. In some cases, a single company's release of negative
information can impact an entire segment of the market or industry group.1

r

There has been much public focus recently on one particular type of
negative information about public companies, viz. adverse financial information.
,

,,.
r
..

Company's frequently issue "pre-releases" warning the investment community
that they will not meet earnings expectations for the current fiscal period or for a
year. In addition - and more drastically - numerous companies have been
required to restate previously issued (and filed with the SEC) financial
information. In some respects, this is the ultimate "bad news" scenario and
inevitably leads to stockholder litigation, possible SEC investigation and even

I

f

sanctions of the entity or individuals. Other than restatements on technical
grounds, such a move says to the investment community that "our prior
representations to you were inaccurate and you can't trust our numbers."

r

Another category of bad news involves disclosure that the company has
engaged in improper or even illegal conduct. This sometimes goes hand-in-hand

r

with an announcement of earnings restatement. Among several recent

r

years was obliged to disclose intentional wrongdoing, to restate its financial

examples is the situation at Cendant Corporation, which within the past two

r

r
r

I

For a recent example, see the News Article "Dell's Warning Spurs Hardware Sell-ofT' in the Appendix.
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J
results for several years and settle a class action lawsuit for multi-billions of
dollars. 2

t

.J

Once a company discovers that its officers or employees have engaged in
wrongful conduct - regardless of the nature of the conduct - it must weigh
carefully whether it has an obligation to make a disclosure. Similarly, if a
company becomes the subject of an informal inquiry or formal investigation by a
governmental agency, particularly if the investigation is criminal in nature, it must
decide whether and to what extent to make that fact public.
Many public companies have received informal inquiry letters from the
SEC, the FTC and other governmental agencies, ranging from routine questions
to questions regarding more serious concerns, even leading to potential criminal
action or other enforcement action by the agency. Knowing when it is required
that disclosure be made is of critical importance to counsel advising public
companies.
This topic is not just about "bad news" in the strict sense. Consideration
needs to be given to all areas of news and information which may have a less
direct but equally significant impact on the valuation of the enterprise and the
verdict of the marketplace - a depressed stock price. Sometimes news that is
not "bad" in the classic sense can have a negative impact. For example, a
company may exceed the consensus of financial analysts who follow the

j

J
J
J
J
J
•

J

company but not beat the so-called "whisper number" on the street. 3 That is to
say that if the news is not "good enough," the effect may be the same as really
bad news - or perhaps it merely expands the definition of "bad news."
The capital marketplace today is driven as much by "expectation" as by
any other factor, and a company's stock price may decline and its profile among
the plaintiff's bar may increase in direct proportion to the extent to which the
company falls short of, or exceeds, expectations of the investment community.
2

See the Fonn 8-K filed by Cendant Corporation on December 7, 1999, in the Appendix.

3 This issue is quite common in the so-calIed high tech industry, where merely being good is often not
enough.
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So-called "whisper numbers," rising stock prices in "anticipation" of a company's
earnings press releases and other similar situations suggest strongly that a
company has been less than diligent in avoiding selective disclosure to financial
analysts and others, a topic covered in greater detail below. The existence of
these expectations also evidences the power of the analyst community to ferret

r

out information and to create expectations among investors.

r

carefully consider every press release, every statement to an analyst, every

r
i

Given the potential for drastic effects on its stock price, a company must

presentation to an investor conference, indeed every statement outside the
confines of the company itself. Ours is an age on information overload.
Consider the many cable television channels that exist to provide 24-hour
coverage of business topics. These media outlets will seize upon and analyze if not overanalyze - every bit of information about a public company that they

r

can gather by proper means or otherwise. In an area which places a premium
on being able to distinguish the "material" from the "immaterial," even seemingly

r

trivial matters can be elevated to the material.

r

missed earnings, restated financials and the like. Other examples of news with

i

r
I

r
r
r

r
r
..r

r

Bad news certainly is not limited to purely financial information, such as

the potential to affect materially a company's stock price include: poor sales or
the clear failure of a new product line or marketing scheme, business cycles that
impact a company's products (e.g. a drought that impacts a seller of agricultural
machinery), product defects and recalls, adverse verdicts in litigation, the filing of
a class action (securities or otherwise and meritorious or frivolous), informal or
formal SEC inquiries, management changes, health concerns of key senior
managers, to cite but a few examples. Even rumors - which are often adamantly
denied by a company - can have a serious impact on the company's stock price.
Consider, for example, the situation surrounding one-time high flier, Tyco
International, Ltd.:

B-3
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mere questions about the accounting methods of Tyco

International, Inc. have sent the formerly highflying stock down

J

more than 25% this fall. ,.,

j
In considering the example of Tyco, rumor became reality. In this case, the SEC
launched its own investigation into Tyco's accounting practices relative to
acquisitions, presumably because SEC staffers can read the newspapers and
visit Websites as well as anyone else. 5

J

Companies and their managers have to deal every day with information
that has the potential to constitute "bad news" in the sense that it has the power
to affect the assessment of the company in the investment community. Analysts
and investors are all too ready to read into virtually any development the
potential of negative impact on the business. Therefore every disclosure made

j

by a public company needs to be measured against the potential for a negative
impact on the company's stock, and its perceived value in the investment
community. Let's look at some examples of particular types of "bad news"
releases of information.

J
Earnings Pre-Releases

Perhaps the most common type of release of "bad news" in today's

J

financial marketplace is the so-called earnings pre-release. Dissemination of this

,

sort of information is usually issued in the form of a press release, which is then

J

frequently filed with the SEC under Form 8_KG• Such a pre-release is required

"Why Investors and Companies Should Fear a Year-End Audit" by Herb Greenberg, Fortune, December
6, 1999, Vol. 140, No. 11, page 374. Of interest is the fact that the fIrst information regarding Tyco came
from a prominent "short seller" who operates a fund specializing in short selling and similar techniques,
(continued) known as the Prudent Bear Fund. Regardless of whether the information is accurate, it would
appear newsworthy that the source of the news has a clearly vested interest in seeing the prices of stocks he
has sold short decline in price, as that is how he makes a living, covering his short positions with cheaply
purchased stocks. Several Tyco International Forms 8-K are included in the Appendix.
S See the Tyco International Form 8-K on this topic in the Appendix.
4

Note that the fIling is not required by the SEC. See the discussion below regarding mandatory and
discretionary use of Form 8-K.
6

B-4

J
J

j

r
r
r
t

r.

under the following scenario. Public companies usually are followed by a
number of industry analysts, employees (usually) of large investment banking
institutions. Through a variety of means (including frequent badgering of
company representatives, requesting the company to review their assumptions in
creating financial "models" of the company, etc.), these person periodically
publish reports on the company, including their "estimates" of the company's

I

likely financial results for upcoming quarters and usually for the next full year as

r

a whole. Their analysis of the reasons for their estimates forms the backbone of

r
r
r
j

r
r
r

the "research" arm of most investment banking firms.
While there is technically no requirement that a public company get
involved with analysts at all, much less assist them in writing their reports, it is
common practice to cooperate with the analyst community. Various bodies from
the SEC to the New York Stock Exchange to the United States Supreme Court
have recognized that analysts perform a valuable service and are a vital part of
the total mix of information available to investors.
Another concept important to this subject and necessary to understanding
the necessity for earnings "warnings" - as they also are called - is the
"consensus" of analysts following the company. Various services (the most
prominent is First Call®) compile the recommendations, earnings estimates and
"ratings" of various analysts who follow a particular company and publish those
ratings on a regular basis. While certain estimates included in FirstCall® may be

r

"thrown out" or disregarded as being too far off the mark, in general the average

r

viewed as the "consensus" of those analysts. You will see press releases in

r
r

,.
•
r
j

of the analysts' estimates regarding earnings of a company becomes commonly

which companies refer to being "on target" or "comfortable" with the consensus
of the "street" which refers to the consensus of the analysts following that
particular company.
The issue of "pre-releasing" is one which arises when a company, for any
number of reasons recognizes that its actual operating results will differ in a
material way from the so-called street consensus. When this occurs, the

B-5

j
company must face the issue of whether to issue a press release with the news
(which may be either bad or good, although the vast majority of pre-releases
deal with disappointing news) that the company's actual results are expected to
differ from the estimates of the analysts. 7 Why is such a statement a "prerelease" in the usual parlance of the investment community and why is it

.

J
J
j

necessary at all?
Because of the close involvement of public companies with the analyst
community, it is very difficult for a public company today to fully disassociate
itself from the reports of the various analysts who follow the company. For
reasons discussed in more detail later, companies frequently see analyst reports
before they are published, and in very many cases, they comment on the reports
prior to publication - presumably just to correct factual errors, but in far too many
cases also to provide insights that may constitute the sharing of material
nonpublic information.
The earnings warning is a "pre-release" because it comes at a time other
than (and prior to) the date when the company releases its actual results of its
operations. Whereas the company usually will release its earnings and other
operating information at a predictable time following each fiscal quarter or fiscal
year - and this is referred to as the company's earnings "release" date, the
realization that the company's actual results will differ can be material nonpublic
information and almost certainly is so when the company has cooperated with
the analyst community to the extent that is common today.
So why does the company not simply wait for its regular press release as
to earnings and simply "disappoint" or pleasantly surprise the investment
community at that time? In fact, some companies do so, although today most
public companies recognize that the level of their cooperation with the analysts
following the company is so pervasive that if there is a significant market
movement in the stock following a good or bad "surprise" in announced earnings

7 See Fonns 8-K and Press Releases of Office Depot, Inc., dated August 30, 1999 and The Coca-Cola
Company, dated January 26, 2000, in the Appendix.
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results, there is a distinct possibility of litigation asserting that the company was

~

responsible for the consensus of the analysts and therefore had a duty to
"correct" the misinformation available to the public.
Some companies attempt to avoid having to pre-release disappointing

r

news by a process known as "talking down the street" or "lowering analyst

j

expectations" in the hope that the analysts will public updating reports that

r

gradually lower the consensus. This practice refers to the company's using the
informal contacts it has with financial analysts to stress "risks" in the company's

r
r

meeting its objectives or to drop hints that the company is looking at a "tough"
quarter or year.
This is a highly dangerous practice for a number of reasons. For one

r

thing, the company - whether it wishes to admit it or not - is using the process to

r

information for a desired result. Further, there can be no guarantee that the

I

r

r

r

,.
I

r

make selective disclosures to analysts in the expectation that they will use this

analysts will take the hint if the company is too subtle, for example, in leaking or
indirectly alluding to bad or good news to come. Moreover, this process causes
the company to become even more entangled that it already is in the analysts'
reports on the company. 8
The practical advice in this area is to follow what is probably the prevailing
practice among public companies. That is (1) to recognize that the company is
sufficiently entangled with the analyst community to be held responsible for the
reports of analysts that are published, (2) to be constantly aware of the
consensus of the analysts following the company and (3) to be prepared to bite
the bullet and issue a release whenever the company has sufficient information

r

to know that it will miss the consensus.

r

release. One truism that is actually true is that Wall Street hates missing

j

r

r
r

An additional complicating factor is knowing what to say in such a pre-

information. If the laws of physics dictate that nature abhors a vacuum, then
See the Article, "Compromised Analysts? The SEC is Shocked," The Wall Street Journal, December 29,
1999, in the Appendix.

8
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Wall Street equally abhors a vacuum of information. Without guidance from
either the company or analysts, investors would - God forbid! - have to make
their own decisions on which securities to buy or sell. In the absence of
information - a vacuum of knowledge - the street likely will sell the stock, period!

J
J

For this reason, it is difficult to imagine a company issuing a pre-release without
establishing in the release at least a range of potential outcomes for the period in
question. That is, it is almost never sufficient to state simply that the company
will "miss" its own forecasts or the estimates of the analyst community. It must
advise investors as to the amount by which it will miss its numbers, the reasons

J

why it will miss those numbers and, ideally, a good explanation as to what
management proposes to do to ensure that such a thing doesn't happen again.
To do otherwise - to state simply that the company will not meet street estimates
-without stating what the company will do suggests either that the company
doesn't have a clue as to its own operations, that its financial forecasting function
is broken, that management is incompetent or all of the foregoing.
The earnings pre-release is among the most common forms of "bad news"
(and occasionally good news) release from a public company. Before it happens
to you, you are well advised to collect several examples of how other companies
have dealt with similar information, particularly companies in your business
segment. Some recent examples are included in the Appendix.

Other Financial News

j

.J

J

J
J
j

Numerous other kinds of financial developments will warrant a press
release and possibly the filing of a Form 8-K as well. For example, changes in a
company's credit rating are often quite material. 9 Material defaults under bank
credit agreements, agreements with bank lending groups to extend dates for
covenant compliance, defaults under, or other changes in material agreements
could also require disclosure. Consider for example the situation in which a

9 See Form 8-K in the Appendix, filed by The Coca-Cola Company to advise investors of the lowering of
its credit rating by Standard & Poors.
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company's lending arrangements, if defaulted, could cause the company to
cease operations or even file for bankruptcy.

Management Changes
Another kind of "bad news" - or sometimes "good news" - release deals

i

r

with management changes. Investors invest in many things - good ideas or
products, a track record of consistent results - but among the things that inspire

r

the most confidence in investors are good managers. One need only look at the

r

significance of a an effective CEO. If Bill Gates founded a new company

impact of Steve Jobs on Apple Computer in recent times to appreciate the

tomorrow, that company would automatically have credibility in the marketplace,
and its stock would move upward in price. So the hiring of a "star" manager may
be material news - usually good news.

r
~.

r

r

r

Conversely the termination, health concerns or death of a key manager is
another area in which a company may find itself having to issue bad news - or at
least news, as this information is almost always material. Generally speaking,
any news about the company's chief executive officer is material if it may affect
his or her ability to function or continue to function in the future. While the mere
naming of a new chief executive - particularly one with a stellar track record or
other attributes - has the power to "move" a stock price upward, the termination,
resignation, poor health or death of a well recognized CEO can move a
company's stock in the opposite direction.

r
r
r

So, any change in the top position in a company warrants a press release
as soon as practicable after the event occurs. Typically, the exchange on which
the company's stock is traded will treat such news of sufficient significance to
"halt trading" in the company's stock. This sort of management news is the kind
that can add or take away millions of dollars in "stockholder value. "10

,

r

r
r

10 See, for example, the account ofthe impact of the hiring of one-time celebrity CEO, Al Dunlap on the
stock of Sunbeam Corporation in Chainsaw: The Notorious Career of Al Dunlap in the Era of Profit-atany-Price, by John A. Byrne, pages 10-12. See also, the Fonn 8-K filed by the Coca-Cola Company on
December 6, 1999, advising that the Board of Directors accepted the resignation of the company's CEO.
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As to other executive level positions, the issue of whether to make a
special release of information and, if so, when to make it is largely a test of
materiality. The New York Stock Exchange requires member companies to
notify the Exchange ..... of any changes in directors or officers of the company."11

J
J

Since the NYSE requires this information, which is usually provided by way of
letter or memorandum to the Exchange, one is left to wonder why the public
should not also be informed by means of a press release at the same time.
Accordingly, if any executive officer of the company arrives or departs, a press
release appears warranted. The news may be good or bad, but it is material

J
J

news.
Other management changes include the resignation of directors, which
may be a required disclosure under the instructions to Form 8-K but almost
always at least merits some form of press release. The resignation of certain
key officers in the compliance area, such as the Chief Financial Officer,.
Controller or General Counsel also would suggest that a release is appropriate,
particularly to reassure the investment community that there is nothing wrong - if
that is the case.
Health Concerns
The question of when or whether to inform the public of the health
concerns of an executive officer is less clear. Most companies readily inform the

J
J
J

J
j

public of major - and noncontroversial - concerns, such as a heart attack suffered
by the CEO of the company. Less clear is how many companies would choose

]

to inform the public that the CEO is undergoing alcohol or drug treatment at a
clinic, or is undergoing treatment for depression. Of course, there may be no
choice if she or he must cancel numerous speaking engagements or other
opportunities to be seen by the public. Most public company CEO's are
prominent people in the communities in which they live and as a result cannot

\I NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 204.14. Other examples ofNYSE required disclosures include
resignation of directors (Rule 204.14); changes in auditors (Rule 204.04), among others. All press releases
by an Exchange listed company are required to be filed in duplicate with the NYSE (Rule 204.26).

J

J
j

J

J
B - 10

j

,.
1

r
r

simply disappear from view for long without provoking questions. Many CEO's
have become highly visible personalities in their own right - Bill Gates, Lee
lacoca, Dave Thomas, AI Dunlap and others come readily to mind.

I

r
r
r
r

r!

r
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r
r
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Clearly the CEO has some right to privacy, but the test appears to be one
of materiality once again - whether the news is of such nature that it is likely to
be important to investors in the overall mix of information available. If the CEO
dies, that is material. 12 By contrast, if he or she is undergoing treatment for
depression on an outpatient basis or through regular visits to the psychiatrist or
psychologist, that news is probably private and immaterial, if for no other reason
than it is unlikely to affect performance - and even less so than the alternative of
not getting treatment.
But what if the CEO were diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease,
with AIDS or with some other problem that, in and of itself, is likely to make at
least some investors uncomfortable? What would be the company's position on
disclosure? When does the information move from the purely personal to
requiring public comment? The test: Is the situation one that is likely to
materially affect the executive's performance of his or her position and duties? If
you can honestly say that the situation is unlikely to affect job performance, then
the right of privacy likely will prevail over the investing public's right to be made
aware of material information affecting the company.

SEC Inquiries; Criminal Inquiries

Another question involves whether and, if so, when to make a disclosure
of an SEC inquiry or other governmental inquiry. Some such inquiries are
routine, not much more material than a routine audit by the IRS, clearly not
worthy of public disclosure unless adversely determined, and the result of the

,..

determination is material. On the other hand, an SEC formal investigation is

J

another type of "animal" altogether. Unlike an informal inquiry letter, such a

r

r

12 For example, the tragic and untimely death of Coca-Cola CEO Roberto Goizuetta within the past two
years.
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J
proceeding has at least some of the trappings of a criminal investigation, and
disclosure is almost certainly mandated. Given the potential impact of such an

J
I

announcement - would you buy the stock of a company that announced the

J

SEC was launching a formal investigation into its accounting practices, at least

until you knew the outcome - considerable care must go into crafting this sort of
statement,13 Generally speaking, it probably is not news that requires
immediate disclosure, meaning immediately after being notified by the agency
that an investigation is being launched. A thoughtful disclosure is mandated,
and legal counsel MUST be closely involved in the drafting of this sort of

J
J
J

disclosure.
Some companies will use the announcement as an opportunity to
proclaim their "confidence" in the individuals or practices called into question.
This can be a high-risk proposition, however, For the very release that protests
the innocence of the company or its executives may become a subsequent count
in a shareholder lawsuit if the persons or practices defended are subsequently
found to be a problem. The company's "reassurance" or "defense" of its own
conduct or that of its executives can be construed as an independent act of
issuing a materially misleading statement by the company.

j
j

J
j

How to deal with this situation? State the facts and any "explanation" in
as neutral terms as possible. It is certainly okay to express a "belief' that the
company has not done anything wrong, without strident denials that may come
back to haunt the company. But don't do so if you don't really believe what you
are saying! An example of a rather "neutral" type of statement is the following:

XYZ Corporation announced today that it has received notice from the
Enforcement Division of the United Stated Securities and Exchange
Commission that the company is the subject of a formal investigation into
13 See the example of a Fonn 8-K and Press Release in the Appendix from Tyco International Ltd.,
disclosing that the SEC had launched an infonnal inquiry of the company. In this case the company chose
to make a public disclosure of an infonnal inquiry presumably because of rampant rumors swirling about
the company. See discussion below on the topic of dealing with rumors.
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its accounting for acquisitions over the past several years. While the
company believes that its accounting for acquisitions has been in

r

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that its

t

previously released financial statements, filed with the SEC, have been

r

correct and complete in all material respects, the company is cooperating
fully with the SEC in this matter. The company does not intend to make

r

further comment on this matter while the investigation is pending.

r

In the case of other types of inquiries or investigations, including those that may

r
r
)

r

have criminal penalties attached (e.g. antitrust investigations), a disclosure is
undoubtedly appropriate or even required, particularly if a large fine or prohibition
from conducting business in a particular manner is at issue. Again, this is an
area in which the prudent exercise of judgment is paramount. This topic is
discussed in more detail below.

r

Product Recalls, Problems, Etc.
Another subspecies of "material" information involves a company's having

r

to decide from time to time whether and in what manner to deal with product

r

themselves, as by their very nature public notification is required. For example in

r

r

r

r

r
r
r

problems, recalls, etc. Generally speaking, true product recalls will take care of

the case of most consumer products, the U.S. Consumer Products Safety
Commission requires that a joint press release be issued whenever a consumer
product is recalled under the auspices of that agency.14
However, such a CPSC news release may not be universally and
uniformly disseminated to the financial community. The CPSC has its own list of
media to which it wants releases sent, and a company may wish to make its own
release supplemental to the CPSC release in order to inform (and possibly
For the perils of not cooperating with the CPSC, note the administrative law case ofCPSC v. Black &
Decker, in which administrative proceedings were brought against a consumer products manufacturer for
issuing its own release unilaterally, which the agency deemed "inadequate." See www.CPSC.gov @ topic
"New/Recalls" and a copy of the joint press release in the Appendix.
14
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reassure) the investment community. If so, the company would be well advised
to inform the agency of its intention to do so, and to get clearance on the form
and content of the release. Dealings with other governmental agencies are

J
j

similarly best handled with a "full disclosure" approach to the agency.

J
Allegations of Harassment, Employee Litigation, Other Litigation
Among other types of allegations, charges and suits pertaining to
harassment, discrimination and other types of employee litigation must be
considered. Here once again, the primary determinant of whether to disclose is
materiality. Truly individual claims, regardless of the facts, are unlikely to merit
disclosure because the potential for financial impact on the company is
immaterial. Even if the conduct complained about is distasteful, disclosure and
the measure of materiality are financial impact on the company, not the prurient
interest of the public.
If the accused executive is the CEO, and if the allegations appear to have
at least some semblance of merit, then the pendulum begins to swing in the
direction of disclosure, although the news still may be immaterial. If the CEO is
accused of harassment by his secretary, that is not necessarily news. If the
CEO is accused of routinely and systematically harassing employees, it may be
difficult to avoid making some type of disclosure.

J
J
I

.J

j

J
J
J
J

Class actions alleging widespread problems with discrimination,
harassment and the like are likely to require disclosure because of the greater
potential for financial impact on the company. Generally speaking, however,
prior to class certification, there would appear little need to make a disclosure as

J

J

putative class actions are as easy and inexpensive to file as any other type of
litigation. Once again, however, the intervention of the traditional media may
require that a company make a statement. Suits are generally public

J

J
J
B -14

r
,i

r

,.
r
,

r

r
r
~

information, and the likelihood of a news account of the filing of an alleged class
action is great. 15
In most other types of litigation, legal counsel will be called upon to make
an early determination as to the likelihood of an adverse result and to assess the
potential for damages - and to provide input as to whether a disclosure is
required. Just because a civil suit alleges "millions of dollars" in damages does
not make it worthy of disclosure. As our litigation colleagues will tell us, it costs
less than $100 in most locales to file any sort of complaint one wants, alleging
whatever one wishes. Fortunately in most cases, the decision is an easy one disclosure is required in only the most extreme cases until there has been an
adverse determination, and then you can always say that you plan to appeal!
If responding to media accounts of litigation, it may be advisable to defer

I

to the company's legal counsel. The best approach is probably to respond as

r

"clinically" as possible and that usually means that legal counsel (including the
General Counsel of the company) is a better spokesperson than the company's
media relations person.

r
r

When to Release - During the Trading Day or Otherwise
One of the key decisions to be made once a decision is reached that
some sort of disclosure is required is when to make the announcement.
Traditionally, material announcements are made either prior to the opening of the
markets or after they close. However, there is a potential for liability, if the

r

necessity of issuing material news is sufficiently clear, in holding it until after the
markets close. Moreover, there is so much trading in the after hours market

r

today that the "neat and tidy" practice of releasing either before or after the

r

sudden and therefore does not lend itself to choosing the timing (such as would

r

markets appears less neat and tidy all the time. If the news is material and

IS For an example of a company release disclosing the filing of class action lawsuits against it see in the
Appendix, the release ofTyco International, Ltd.

r

r
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j
be the case in announcing the arrival or departure of an executive officer), then

j

the better practice may well be to release it during the trading day.
The New York Stock Exchange requires that it be given advance notice of

J

such releases, that a copy be furnished in advance of the release going over the
financial wires and that it have the opportunity to decide whether to halt trading

I

.J

"pending news."16 In many cases of releases during the trading, the Exchange
will notify the trading floor that trading in the company's stock is to be halted.
Trading will resume only when there is assurance (1) that the news has been
adequately disseminated to the investment community and (2) there is sufficient
balance in buy and sell orders with the company's specialist on the floor of the
Exchange to ensure an orderly market in the stock of the company.

2. Mandatory Disclosures
While certain disclosures by public companies are discretionary and .require
an exercise of judgment as to timing and content, there are also many mandated
disclosures in the form of Registration Statements, Forms 10-K, 10-0 and 8-K
and Proxy Statements. The Management Discussion & Analysis ("MD&A")
sections of required filings which are subject to Regulation S-K provide one area
of "discretion" in terms of content, and SEC enforcement actions have indicated
that candor and disclosure are expected, rather than mere "boilerplate," in the

J
J
J
j

J

J
J
J

preparation of such management discussions of the company. MD&A is
intended to provide management insights "behind the numbers." Regulation S-K
requires, among other things, disclosure of "known trends, commitments, events
or uncertainties"17 involving a company's business.
One fairly recent case, In the Matter of Caterpillar, 18 provides significant
insight into the Commission's views on content of MD&A - and the
consequences of failing to fully disclose material uncertainties known to

17

NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 204.26.
Regulation S-K, Item 303.

18

Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 51 S.E.C. Docket 147 (March 31,1992).

16
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management but not generally known to investors. In Catepillar, the
Commission issued a cease-and-desist order against The Caterpillar Company
for failing to disclose major uncertainties relating to its Brazilian subsidiary. The
subsidiary was a material one, accounting for almost a quarter of Caterpillar's net
profits in 1989 (the enforcement action pertains to inadequate disclosures in the

;;:

r

1989 10-K and 1990 first quarter 10-0).

r

number of non-operating factors, including gains on currency translation, export

r
rI

rI

r

r

r
r

r

r
r

r
r
r

Asserting that operating income of the subsidiary was inflated due to a

subsidies and tax loss carry-forward, among other matters, and noting also that
Caterpillar's management was well aware of turmoil in the Brazilian economy
and political scene, the SEC sanctioned Caterpillar for failing to disclose to
investors the potential materiality of these circumstances and uncertainties, the
materiality of the Brazilian subsidiary to overall company results and the
possibility of materially lower operating results in the future as a result. The
Commission stated further that not only was disclosure of these facts required,
Caterpillar also should have made an effort to quantify the impact of these facts
on its then-current (in a positive sense) and likely future (in a negative sense)
financial results.
While the Catepillar order came as something of a shock to reporting
companies at the time in 1992, it really should not have, any more than a
motorist who regularly exceeds the speed limit - but is moving with the flow of
traffic - has a right to be shocked when he is pulled over and given a ticket.
Regulation S-K is replete with requirements, for example, that a reporting
company disclose "any risks attendant to [its] foreign operations and any
dependence of one or more of the registrant's industry segments upon such
foreign operations. "19
MD&A is required, among other things, to "identify any known trends or
any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or
that are reasonably likely to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or
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decreasing in any material way;

"20

"describe any unusual or infrequent events or

transactions or any significant economic changes that materially affected the
amount of reported income from continuing operations... ;"21 and to "describe any
known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably
expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or
revenues or income from continuing operations."22
If the "black letter" of the rule were not clear enough, the instructions to
Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K surely leave no doubt as to the nature and extent
of required disclosures:

2. The purpose of the discussion and analysis shall be to provide to

J
j

J
J
J

J

investors and other users information relevant to an assessment of the
financial condition and results of operations by evaluating the amounts
and certainty of cash flows from operations and from outside
sources ...

3. The discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future
operating results or of future financial condition. 23

Other examples of reporting companies sanctioned for inadequate MD&A
include In the matter of Bank of Boston COrp,24 in which the failure to disclose a
deteriorating real estate loan portfolio was cited; In the Matter of Gibson

Greetings, Inc. 25 , in which the company was sanctioned for inadequate

S-K, Item 10 I(d)
S-K, Item 303(a)(l)
21 S-K, Item 303(a)(3)(i)
22 S-K, Item 303(a)(3Xii)
23 S-K, Instructions to Para. 303(a), emphasis added.
24 Release No. 81,60 S.E.C. Docket (December 33, 1995).
25 Exchange Act Release No. 34-36357, 60 S.E.C. Docket 1154 (October II, 1995).
19

20

B -18

j

J
J
j

r.1

r
,r

disclosure of derivatives transactions; In the Matter of Larry L. Skaff and John F.

Liechty,26 in which the CFO's of two merging companies, Fruehauf Trailer
Corporation and Terex Corporation, were sanctioned for failing in the MD&A of
their respective companies to disclose the impact of purchase accounting

r

treatment relating to the merger transaction; In the Matter of Cypress Bioscience

r

for a quarter by disclosing that a substantial portion (nearly half) of the revenue

r
r
r

Inc.,27 in which a company was cited for failing to comment on its increased sales

was due to unusual "bill and hold" transactions as part of a special promotion,
and that the company had changed its accounting policies to recognize the
revenue earlier than it otherwise would have, which also jeopardized future
results.
An interesting recent case is In the Matter of WR. Grace & Co.

28

In this

I

case, Grace and two partners from Grace's accounting firm, Price Waterhouse

ri

(now PriceWaterhouseCoopers) were sanctioned for understating revenues and

r
r
f

r

r

r
r
r

r
r
r

earnings in the 1991-1995 period. The accountants were sanctioned for failing
to detect the earnings manipulation in connection with their audits of Grace for
the relevant periods. In an era when the headlines primarily concern companies
which "pad" their earnings through accounting devices or outright fraud 29 , why
would a company understate revenues and earnings, and why would the SEC
be concerned about it?
A Grace subsidiary, National Medical Care ("NMC") had enjoyed
substantial and unexpected revenue boosts in the early 1990's due to changes
in Medicare reimbursement rules. Grace decided, in effect, to "manage
earnings" by reporting only so much of the revenues and earnings of NMC as it
needed to "meet street expectations." The rest was tucked away in a reserve for
the future, thereby creating a "cookie jar" reserve for future reporting periods. In

Exchange Act Release No. 41313 (April 20, 1999) .
Securities Act Release No. 7333; Exchange Act Release No. 817 (September 19, 1996).
28 Exchange Act Release No. 41578 (June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Eugene F. Gaughan, C.P.A.,
Exchange Act Release No. 41580; In the Matter of Thomas J. Scanlon, C.P.A..
29 See, for example, the Form 8-K filed by Cendant Corporation in the Appendix.
26

27
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1995, Grace sold NMC and reversed the excess reserves remaining, describing

j

the change in its MD&A as "change in accounting estimate."
The SEC has made the issue of so-called "managed earnings" a matter of
the highest priority. The issue is quite simple to articulate and yet quite complex
in application. A company may "manage" its earnings in many ways. Indeed, it
may be argued that most public companies engage to some degree in earnings
management on a regular basis. One need only look at the "remarkable ability"
of Wall Street analysts so often to predict quarterly earnings of companies "on
the nose" to realize that companies will make various judgment calls to ensure
that they neither disappoint the analysts nor overshoot the mark bytoo much.
In pronouncements, including public speeches, and enforcement actions,
the SEC has made clear its distaste for earnings "management" which it is safe
to say they view as simply a polite word for earnings "manipulation."

In the

preparation of MD&A, one cannot stress too forcefully the necessity of full,
accurate and truthful disclosure that recognizes the obligation to provide the
company's own "analysis" of its numbers and what current and anticipated future
trends may do to those results in the future.

3. Discretionary Disclosures
Press Releases; Use of Form 8-K
In addition to the required filings of public companies, many situations
arise from time to time which cannot wait for the next quarterly or annual filing.
Such situations frequently call for the issuance of a company press release in
order to disseminate the news between filing intervals. These sorts of press
releases are, of course, distinguished in the first instance from the routine and
often "feel good" sorts of press releases that companies issue on a regular basis
to announce the launch of new products or advertising programs, the opening of
new retail outlets, etc. Financial press releases, as distinguished from "PR"
press releases provide one of the most common ways for public companies to
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communicate with the investing public. When is such a press release required to
be issued, and what should it say?
The timing and content of press releases have perhaps had more impact
on companies in terms of securities litigation than almost any other area. As
discussed earlier, earnings warnings - press releases that "warn" analysts and
investors that a company is unlikely to meet the then-current "expectations" of
Wall Street - often result in dramatic declines in stock price, with the consequent
increased exposure to shareholder litigation.
Frequently, however, information develops into "material" information
over a period of time. As an advisor to a public company, you may have to make
a decision as to when the information is sufficiently material to warrant a press
release. Then you will need to ensure that the press release does not do more
harm than good. By this I do not mean that one should buffer bad news with
some good news. One unfortunate tendency of company managements is the
overwhelming urge to include some "good news" in a release that is being made
because of a requirement to disseminate negative information. How that good
news is handled, and whether it essentially undercuts the message of the
negative announcement may mean the difference between a suit against the
company or not.
Why and when do companies issue such press releases? Where does
one discover the "duty" to do so? Effectively there probably is no requirement

r

that a public company ever issue a press release. But there are so many

r

the general rule.

r

r

circumstances that may necessitate such a release that the exceptions outweigh

One of the most common reasons for issuing a press release is
compliance with the basic legal requirement that the company must correct
previous disclosures that the company determines were incorrect when made or

r

r

r
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which have become inaccurate due to intervening circumstances. 3D Perhaps the
most common single form of "bad news" press release is one correcting either
prior announcements by the company or correcting "street" expectations

J
J
J

regarding a company's earnings - the so-called "earnings warning." In addition
to entanglement with analysts, discussed earlier1 , most public companies have
issued press releases and most CEO's and other senior executives have made
statements at investor conferences and in other forums that describe anticipated
future financial results. While never a good idea it does and will happen.
Despite the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
supposedly protecting most forward-looking statements if the company has in
advance warned of risks inherent in its business, such statements sometimes
still require the issuance of a press release to correct prior statements that were
too optimistic regarding future financial performance.

J
J
J
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J
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With regard to corrective and "early warnings," the New York Stock
Exchange is explicit in its Listed Company Manual 32 that:

A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the
market for its securities. This is one of the most important and
fundamental purposes of the listing agreement which the company enters
into with the Exchange. 33

J

J
J
J
.J

J
Although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as amended, provides certain safe
harbors for "forward looking information," companies still face peril if they fail to advise the public of
changes that make previously "correct" statements no longer correct.
31 See also the discussion below under the topic, Selective Disclosure.
32 NYSE's Listed Company Manual is available online for any user at www.nyse.com or in hard copy from
the Exchange for listed companies.
33 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Sec. 202.05
30
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In these two short sentences are encompassed several important
concepts, which are important to public companies whether they are listed on the

r

NYSE or not. The first is that news which is required to be issued should be

r

whether that information"... might reasonably be expected to materially affect. .. "

r

r
r
r
r

r

r
r

released "quickly." Another is that a key determinant of whether to issue news is

the market price of securities. This standard suggests that even in the absence
of certainty, the possibility of a material effect - if that possibility moves towards
a reasonable likelihood - then disclosure may well be required.

Disclosure of Pending Legal Proceedings and Investigations34
One of the stickier issues facing public companies is whether and when to
make disclosure of improper conduct and pending or threatened governmental
regulatory or even criminal action. You will recall that Item 103 of Regulation SK requires disclosure of pending civil legal proceedings which are material to the
company's business or financial condition.

In at least one area, however,

environmental disclosure, a reporting company is required to make a specific
and detailed disclosure when it is sUbject to "proceedings involv[ing] a
governmental authority and there is a potential monetary sanction (translation:
fine or penalty) of more than $100,000."35 At least in the environmental area
there is a requirement to disclose governmental proceedings where the company

f

r

faces a fine or other monetary sanction which to many companies would
otherwise be an "immaterial" amount and therefore not disclosable if it were

r

exposure in a civil case.

r

conviction of a director or officer of the company during the past five years or any

r
r

Item 401 (f) of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of any criminal

pending criminal proceedings against that person (excluding traffic offenses or
other minor offenses).36 What is not so clear is whether there is any obligation to
34 See examples in the Appendix of disclosures of the pendency of SEC investigation and also of securities
class action filings, both by Tyco International Ltd.
3S Regulation S-K, Item 103, Instructions, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
36 Regulation S-K, Item 40I(f), 17 C.F.R. § 229.40 I(f).
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disclose other sorts of potentially criminal conduct if the company or individual
has not yet been charged. The Second Circuit has provided some guidance on
the subject, however, in United States v. Matthews, 787 F. 2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986),
in which the court overturned a criminal conviction of a company director for
failing to disclose in a proxy statement "that he had engaged in a conspiracy to
bribe public officials and to defraud the United States" - crimes with which he
had not been charged!37 The Second Circuit found that "... at least as long as
uncharged criminal conduct is not required to be disclosed by any rule lawfully
promulgated by the SEC, nondisclosure of such conduct cannot be the basis of a
criminal prosecution."38
However, other courts, in cases following Matthews have been careful to
distinguish that case where information withheld from investors - while
potentially criminal but not involving formal charges - nevertheless was deemed
material to investors and potential investors. For example, see Roeder v. Alpha
Industries, Inc., 814 F. 2d 22 (1 st Cir. 1987); In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. N.Y. 1990); and Balian v. Wilfred
American Educational Corporation, 720 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). For
cases following the holding in Matthews, see, e.g. United States v. Crop Growers
Corporation, 954 F. Supp. 335 (D. D.C. Jan. 3, 1997); United States v. Cisneros,
26 F. Supp.2d 24 (D. D.C. 1998); and In re Teledyne Defense Contracting
Derivative Litigation, 849 F. Supp. 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1993).

Dealing with Rumors and Information Leaks
Rumors! Another reason to issue a press release may be the existence in
the marketplace of rumors or unusual market activity, frequently coupled
together. While many public companies try to take a consistent position of not
commenting on rumors and issue releases to the effect that "the company's
policy is not to comment on rumors about the company," there are times when
37

United States v. Matthews, 787 F. 2d 38, at 49 (2d. Cir. 1986).
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that approach simply will not work. The New York Stock Exchange, once again,
takes a position with regard to companies listed on the Exchange:

If rumors or unusual market activity indicate that information on impending
developments has leaked out,

a frank and explicit announcement is

clearly required.

A listed company should act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which
result in unusual market activity or price variations. 39

All too often, what are characterized as "rumors" are in fact "leaks" from
within the parties to a transaction or their advisors. Applying the rule that it is
often permissible to say nothing but it is never permissible to mislead or issue
false information, a public company must be extremely careful in issuing a
release to the effect that "the company knows of no reason for the unusual
activity in its stock" or that "the company denies rumors to the effect ... " as these
statements may simply be untrue. If there is truth to the rumor, and you are not
prepared to give a "no comment" response, then extreme care is warranted to
ensure that the company does not mislead investors by denying something
which is knows to be true.
For example, if a company is engaged in substantive discussions
regarding a possible transaction, such as an acquisition, divestiture, sale or
merger, and if the information somehow "leaks out" and affects the stock price,
there are a number of alternatives available:
1. The company may issue a statement to the effect that "it never
comments on rumors in the marketplace." However such a statement (a) should
be true (i.e. has the company taken a consistent position on rumors in the past)

38Id.
39 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Sections 202.03 and 202.05.
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and (b) risks running afoul of the requirement - at least for NYSE listed
companies - that "a frank and explicit announcement is clearly required."40
2. The company should consider the status of whatever transaction is
under way - if the rumor or leak involves a transaction - and determine whether
it is in a position to make the "frank and explicit announcement" referred to in the

J
J
j

NYSE Listed Company Manual. For example, the company may choose to
"acknowledge that it is in discussions regarding the strategic direction of the
company and will make an announcement when and if something concrete
develops."41 This may be coupled with a statement to the effect that "...the
company does not intend to make any further announcement regarding this
matter until it has reached a definitive agreement." Depending upon the
circumstances, however, such an announcement might be deemed to be less
than "frank and explicit" and the effort to "disclaim" any obligation to update may
not be sufficient to avoid in fact having to provide updated information """":
especially if there is further unusual activity in the stock.
3. The company may decide that due to the "leak" it has no other choice
than to make a truly "frank and explicit" announcement by disclosing such of the
details as are concrete at that time. Before making a unilateral decision to do so,
however, the company has to consider several important matters: (a) it may
have signed a non-disclosure agreement with the other party, (b) it has to
consider the impact on the other party, especially if it also is a public company,
regardless of whether a non-disclosure agreement was signed and (c) it has to
consider the impact of the "frank and explicit" announcement on the future
course of events. For example, in deciding to issue such a release, there arises
a fairly clear duty to continue to update a specific statement regarding the
matter, if for no other reason than the risk of selective disclosure of further
information to analysts and other third parties.

40
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Form 8-K - When to Use It; Mandatory Use Discussed
From discussions with other house counsel and outside counsel as well,
there appears to be considerable uncertainty as to when to use Form 8-K, as
some companies seem to file a great number of 8-K's whereas others seldom file
such a form. There is a misconception among some that Form 8-K is always a
discretionary filing, which is not the case. Certain filings on Form 8-K are
mandatory in nature. The instructions to Form 8-K provide that a current report
on Form 8-K is "... required to be filed by every reporting company upon the
occurrence of anyone or more of the events specified in Items 1-4, 6 and 8 of
[Form 8-K]. "42
Required reports are the following, all due within 15 calendar days following the
occurrence of the event unless otherwise noted:
•

A change in control of the registrant

•

Acquisition or disposition of a "significant amount of assets, otherwise
than in the ordinary course of business... n43 by the registrant or by any
majority-owned subsidiary

•

Bankruptcy or receivership of the registered company

•

Change's in the registrant's certifying accountant - due within five
days of the occurrence of the even~

•

Resignation of a director, or a director's declining to stand for reelection, "... because of a disagreement with the registrant on any
matter relating to the registrant's operations, policies or practices... " due within five days after the event45

41 Note that such an announcement almost certainly mandates a subsequent announcement when either a
transaction can be disclosed or when discussions are terminated.
42 General Instructions to Form 8-K, at para. B, emphasis added.
43 "An acquisition or disposition shall be deemed to involve a significant amount of assets (I) if the
registrant's [and subsidiary's] equity in the net book value of such assets or the amount paid or
received...exceeded 10 percent of the total assets of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries, or if it
involved a business...which is significant..... General Instructions to Form 8-K, Item 2.
44 The resignation or dismissal of an independent accountant and the appointment of a new accountant are
separate events, which in some cases will require two separate 8-K filings. General Instructions, Item 4.
45 Under this provision, disclosure is required only if the resigning director furnishes the registrant a letter
describing the disagreement and requesting disclosure. "Ifthe registrant believes that the description
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•

A change in the registrant's fiscal year from the fiscal year used in the
most recent filing with the SEC.

If any of these events occurs, an 8-K filing is required, and is not discretionary.
In most cases, the company also will issue a press release, and one effective
use of 8-K is to file a copy of the press release, with nothing more than an

J
j

J
J

introductory paragraph.

Voluntary use of Form 8-K

j

In addition to the mandatory filing requirements, the instructions to Form
8-K provide for a registrant "... at its option, [to] report under this item any events,
with respect to which information is not otherwise called for by this form, that the
registrant deems of importance to security holders.""6 Consistent with the
voluntary nature of this sort of filing, no time frame is mandated. The SEC

encourages registrants to make such filings, and to make them "promptly" after
the event. 47
It is this "voluntary" use of Form 8-K which gives rise to more questions
than the instances of required use of the form. When should this form be used,
and when is it not advisable? If the SEC encourages the use of Form 8-K, why
not just file the form whenever possible? Clearly some companies have elected
to utilize Form 8-K as almost a routine method of providing information, utilizing
such a filing with even routine press releases. Other companies utilize a
voluntary 8-K filing only with respect to "significant" press releases, attaching the
press release as an exhibit to the 8-K. For example, a number of companies
have decided to file their quarterly and annual releases detailing earnings and
other financial information for the quarter as an exhibit to Form 8-K.

provided by the director is incorrect or incomplete, it may include a brief statement presenting its views of
the disagreement."
46 Form 8-K, General Instructions, Item 5, Other Events.
47 See Discussion, CCH Federal Securities Law Reports, '23,591.020, at p. 17,291-3.
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Given that the use of Form 8-K is voluntary under Item 5, there is no hard
and fast rule as to whether or when to file. However it would appear obvious that
"overuse" of this form of Report could be unwise. Consider whether the
information contained in a Form 8-K (such as the filing of a press release as an
exhibit to an 8-K) more clearly requires "updating" than information disseminated
in other ways. Having decided to use an 8-K filing for a particular matter, does a
subsequent occurrence of a similar matter, which is not filed with an 8-K give rise
to a question as to why no filing was made? There are no clear-cut answers to
these questions, but each public company and its advisers must face the

r

questions.

r

Appendix. These include 8-Ks filed on December 6, 1999 and on January 12,

!

2000 by The Kroger Co. The January 12 Form 8-K serves to update the 8-K

r
r

filed in December of last year and to disclose that the company held a meeting

Some interesting examples of the use of Form 8-K are contained in the

with analysts on January 12, including a very detailed description of estimates
and assumptions furnished to the analysts in completing their "models" for the
current year. Kroger's December 6, 1999 8-K includes a copy of the company's

r

third quarter earnings press release. While a number of companies make a

rI

also includes the text of prepared remarks made at the beginning of the

r

level of detail at present, but as discussed below, with the potential advent of

r
r

r
r

similar filing, i.e. a filing attaching their earnings press release, note that the 8-K

investor/analyst conference call made on December 6. This is a rather unusual

Regulation FD, more if not most companies will find themselves making similar
filings.
While on the one hand, it certainly appears that the management of The
Kroger Co. has taken to heart the SEC's recent admonitions regarding selective
disclosure48 , it also is arguable that these disclosures border on "information
overload." How many investors are really concerned with this level of detail?
And aren't the professionals who are interested generally attuned to the analysts'

r

r
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reports as soon as they are issued? Without filings such as those made by The
Kroger Co., few companies would deem themselves obligated to update
comments made in a conference call, unless extremely material and not covered
in an earnings press release. By filing the information, however, it may increase
the extent to which updating is required. Does the filing of the information in and
of itself suggest a level of importance that mandates updating if the information
changes?
Once a company adopts a practice of filing to this level of detail, where
does the practice end? Since most companies made presentations to numerous
analysts and investor conferences throughout the year, since most CEO's make
many speeches to various groups, and since investor relations officers speak
almost daily to sell side and buy side analysts49 , when is a disclosure to be
made? Must a company file with Form 8-K a copy of each speech its CEO
makes? Must the IR officer consider whether he or she has told one analyst
some new fact requiring disclosure, measuring carefully the materiality of every
telephone conversation?50 Unfortunately - or fortunately, depending upon one's
point of view - newly promulgated Regulation FD from the SEC may make such
filings rather routine in the very near future. Forms 8-K of the sort filed by Kroger
and included in the Appendix may become routine, and, as usual, the risk that
the presence of "too much" information may serve to obscure truly material
information.
The SEC's view of integrated disclosure indicates that proper use of Form
8-K plays an important and even critical role in providing investors with a
"continuous stream of corporate information."51 Coupled with recent SEC
emphasis on avoiding selective disclosure, it appears likely that we will see more
See discussion infra, in detail, of recently promulgated preliminary SEC rules on selective disclosure.
"Sell side" analysts generally work for the major investment banking frrms and follow a particular
segment of the marketplace, making buy or sell recommendations to their firm's investors and publishing
their recommendations for a variety of investors. "Buy side" analysts generally work for major
institutional investors, such as large mutual funds, and analyze companies for the purpose of investment
decisions made by their companies.
50 See Discussion infra at topic Selective Disclosure and discussion of proposed SEC Regulation FD.
51 CCH Federal Securities Law Reports,' 23,591.055, citing to SEC Release No. 33-6383.
48

49
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rather than less utilization of Form 8-K filings, accompanied by all sorts of
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information, ranging from the text of press releases to copies of prepared
comments made in a variety of forums.
In this environment, what approach should the company take? My own
view is that use of Form 8-K is still best reserved for more material information,
rather than routine filings of all sorts of information. It is all too easy to imagine a
plaintiffs' suit against a company that routinely uses 8-K filings and yet fails to do
so in that one critical instance in which equally material information is not so
filed, because the company simply decides not to file, or overlooks the matter
and its past practice of filing in similar circumstances. Where the use of such
filings is reserved for really material news, there appears less likelihood of a "slipup" resulting in a suit that otherwise might have been avoided. Moreover, there
are other ways of dealing with concerns about selective disclosure, including
making conference calls more inclusive of the investing public and not just
analysts, utilizing Websites to post conference call information and similar
devices.
Selective Disclosures
We have already discussed the topic of selective disclosure in the context
of several other areas of interest. But what is "selective disclosure" exactly, and
what are the consequences of engaging in it? "Selective Disclosure" refers to
the disclosure to one or more persons, but not to others, information that is
"material" to the company. The topic of selective disclosure, whether of bad
news or good news, cannot be understood in the absence of a clear
understanding of "materiality" since it is only material information that is of

r
r
r
r

r

concern in dealing with selective disclosure.
The issue of materiality of information can be determinative of (1)
whether a company has a disclosure obligation; (2) whether insiders may have
individual liability when trading in the securities of a company while in possession
of information and (3) whether discussion of the information with analysts and
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other third parties constitutes "selective disclosure" of that information. To
understand whether you must make a disclosure, when you must make it,
whether you are free to trade in a company's securities or whether your
communications with third parties may be coming close to the line of selective
disclosure, you must know what information is material.
Guidance from the Supreme Court is that information is material if there
exists "... a substantial likelihood that the... [information] would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available. "52 Another source of guidance is the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), which states that a statement in a
financial report is material:

.. .if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is
such that it is probably that the judgment of a reasonable person .relying
upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion
or correction of the item. 53

The SEC also has provided recent guidance as what is "material" in the
context of financial statements. In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (August 12,
1999), the SEC staff deals with materiality by way of rejecting a purely
quantitative analysis of whether information is material or not. In so doing, it
offers some guidance to considerations you might make in evaluating
"materiality" in other contexts. 54

•
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Does a particular item of information "mask a change in earnings or
other trends"?

TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231
(1988).
53 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information, at 132 (1980).
54 SAB No. 99, available at www.SEC.gov.
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•

Does the information reflect a failure to meet estimates of financial
analysts who follow the company?

•

Does the information change a loss into income or vice versa?

•

Does the information concern a change or particularly favorable or
unfavorable trend with respect to a particular segment of the business
that is key to its success, even though not yet reflected in a major
change in results of the enterprise as a whole?

•

Does the information pertain to non-compliance with a regulatory
matter, including environmental, FTC, FDA and similar considerations?

•

Does the information disclose a failure to satisfy covenants in loan
agreements or other mandatory requirements binding the company?

•

Does the information reveal an unlawful transaction or practice?

•

Is the information likely to cause a significant movement in the price of
the company's securities?55

While SAB No. 99 deals with financial statement reporting and not the
determination of whether other types of information require public disclosure, it
certainly offers a sense of the SEC accounting staff and presumably all the staff,
including enforcement, on the topic of what is material. When evaluating
whether to make a public release of information, the checklist of items material in
the financial statement context is not a bad guide.
With this "guidance" what can we say about "materiality" and "material
information"? It seems clear that determining whether information is material
cannot be a purely quantitative analysis but requires a qualitative evaluation as
well. It takes us back to the Supreme Court test: Would the information be
important to, or make a difference to an average investor in deciding whether to
buy, sell or hold a particular security? In some contexts, even seemingly
insignificant bits of information may reflect issues that have far-reaching
importance. All of this suggests that dealing with analysts and investors,

\

55
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r

SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99, Materiality, August 12, 1999, See Appendix at page 4
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especially institutional investors, is a process of constantly evaluating on a
qualitative basis the information sought by those with whom the company comes
into contact, determining whether that information has been made public and the

J
j

likely consequences of disclosing it in the context of an interview, conference call

J

or investor conference appearance.
In addition to the regulations promulgated by the SEC (including proposed
Regulation FD, discussed below), there are many other indications of the
concerns of the Commission with selective disclosure of material information.
When Chairman Levitt stated in a 1998 speech that "it is very clear to me - and
the SEC's Enforcement Division - that issuers should not selectively disclose

j

J

J

information to certain influential analysts in order to curry favor with them and
reap a tangible benefit, such as a positive press spin," 56 companies and their

j

counsel need to sit up and take notice.
There are many insidious problems in dealing with analysts, as discussed
elsewhere in this paper. Despite the supposed "wall of silence" between the

J
j

analyst side of the house and the brokerage side of the house at major
investment banking institutions, there have been far too many instances of
analysts providing early warnings to their brokerage colleagues, or to their own
"clients" based upon information gathered in the process of due diligence in
anticipation of issuing a report on a company.
Dealing with analysts has been compared to "fencing on a tightrope,

"57

an

image that you need to pause over for a moment to fully appreciate the nuances
of that metaphor. It is at once exhilarating and dangerous. It requires enormous
skill, training and preparation, but no matter how skilled you may be, there
remains an element of luck in staying on the wire. If you are an in house counsel
or attorney who regularly counsels managers who deal with analysts, the media
and investors, you must insist that those managers take the time to learn the
basic rules of doing so. Make certain that you know the basic case law and the
Levitt, A Question ofIntegrity, Speech delivered February 27, 1998, available at WWW.SEC.gov.
57 Dirks v. SEC, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
56
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rules embodied in that caselaw -- and then be very careful. As if such care were
not already obvious enough, the publication of proposed Regulation FD has
underscored the dangers of selective disclosure in new and interesting ways.

Proposed New SEC Rule on Selective Disclosure - Regulation FD
The SEC has recently promulgated new rules, summarized by the
Commission as addressing three issues:
[1 ]The selective disclosure by issuers of material nonpublic
information; [2] whether insider trading liability depends on a trader's "use"
or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information; and [3] when
the breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to
liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The.
proposals are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of
information by issuers, and to clarify and enhance existing prohibitions
against insider trading. 58
Three proposed new SEC rules are available for public comment through March
29, 2000. Of the three proposed rules (Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), Rule
10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2), we will focus on proposed Regulation FD.
Succinctly put in the Commission's executive summary, "Regulation
FD... deals with the problem of issuers making selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information to analysts, institutional investors or others, but not to the
public at large."s9 As the summary continues, "Although analysts play an
important role in gathering and analyzing information, and disseminating their
analysis to investors, we do not believe that allowing issuers to disclose material

58 Proposed rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading; Release Nos. 3307787, 34-42259, File No. S731-99. A copy is contained in the Appendix to this paper.
59 Id., at p. 2.
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information selectively to analysts is in the best interests of investors or the
securities markets generally."60
In a lengthy "background" section explaining the need for Regulation FD,
the Commission discusses the caselaw, including the Supreme Court's decisions
in Chiarella v. United States~ and Dirks v. SEC~ and notes that "promoting
investor confidence in the fairness of our securities markets... " requires
"... protecting investors from the prospect that others in the market possess
'unerodable informational advantages' obtained through superior access to
corporate insiders."63 Noting that "issuers are continuing to engage in selective
disclosures of material nonpublic information, perhaps due in part to the
uncertainty in current law about when selective disclosures are prohibited ... ,"64
the SEC's proposed Regulation FD uses the Commission's regulatory authority
over public companies "...to require "full and fair disclosure [from issuers] of
material information... " 65
The basic outline of Regulation FD is contained in Rule 100:
§243. 100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.

J
J
J
J
j

J
j

J
J
j

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an
issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
person or persons outside the issuer, the issuer shall:
(1)ln the case of an intentional disclosure, make public disclosure
of that information simultaneously; and

60 Id. It should be noted that the New York Stock Exchange has had a similar rule for many years,
embodied in Rule 202.02. Among other things, this rule provides that ..... if during the course of a
discussion with analysts substantive material not previously published is disclosed, that material should be
simultaneously released to the public. While "on the books" it seems that this rule may have been honored
more in the breach than the observance. See Appendix for copy ofNYSE Rule 202 on Material
Information.
61
445 U.S.222 (1980)
62
463 U.S. 646 (1983)
63 Id., at p.3.
64 Id., at p.2.
65 Id., at p.5.
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(2) In the case of non-intentional disclosure, make public
disclosure of that information promptly.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply when

a disclosure is

made to a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer
(including, for example, an outside consultant such as an attorney,
investment banker, or accountant) or to

a person who has expressly

agreed to maintain such information in confidence. 66
The definitions in §243.1 01 provide further guidance. A disclosure is "intentional"
when the issuer or person making the disclosure"... either knew prior to the
disclosure, or was reckless in not knowing, that he or she would be
communicating information that was material and nonpublic."67 A "person acting
on behalf of an issuer" includes "any officer, director, employee, or agent of an
issuer, who discloses material nonpublic information while acting within the

scope of his or her authority... "68 An interesting exception states that "an
officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material
nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer

r

shall not be considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer. '169

r
r
r

filing an 8-K; issuance of a press release containing the information through a

r
r

r

A "public disclosure" of the information is made in one of three ways:

widely circulated news or wire service; or dissemination of". ~. the information
through any other method of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide
broad public access to the information and does not exclude any members of the
public from access, such as announcement at a press conference to which the
public is granted access... by personal attendance or by telephonic or other
electronic transmission."70

Proposed Regulation FD, §243.100, at page 35 of SEC Release contained in the Appendix to this paper.
§243.101(a)
68 §243.101(c), emphasis added
69 Id., emphasis added
70 §243.101(e).
66
67

r
r
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As with many rules having profound impact (e.g. Rule 10b-5), proposed
Regulation FD says quite a lot in relatively few words. Assuming its final
adoption in current form (and there is really no reason to suspect otherwise), it

J
J

has the potential to make significant changes in the manner in which public
companies relate to the investment community. Relationships with analysts and
institutional investors are likely to be changed in ways as yet unclear. CEO's
and CFO's who routinely meet in "one on ones" with analysts and major
institutional investors conceivably may be limited to carefully scripted statements
or may have to consider whether to maintain a verbatim record of the interview
or meeting in order (1) to remember precisely what they said, whether any of it
constituted "material nonpublic information" thereby requiring "prompt" 71
disclosure to the public and (2) as a defense to Commission enforcement action
or possible third party lawsuits. And this is only to safeguard against "non-

intentional" disclosures of material nonpublic information.
Analysts and institutional investors periodically travel hundreds and
thousands of miles to visit the companies they follow or in which they may have
millions of dollars invested. They are paid handsomely to provide accurate
investment analysis or to make "smart" investments that give their institutions an
edge over the competition. They are smart and inquisitive. Does anyone really
think that they will continue to go to all that trouble for "nonmaterial" information
or only for material information that is already public anyway?
The fact is that analysts on both the sell and buy sides will continue to
probe and ask tough questions of managements. They will pry and prod,
seeking to gain an advantage in terms of having a more insightful report or a
better return for investors than the competition. In some respects, these people

exist precisely for the purpose of seeking to get behind the information that is
publicly available. They will continue to sponsor conferences in exotic locations
- Hawaii and Vail in the Winter, beach resorts and England in the Summer - for
71 Disclosure is to be made promptly, meaning "as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event more
than 24 hours) after a senior official of the issuer... knows, or is reckless in not knowing, of the non-
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the primary purpose, I would argue, of trying to gain access to material nonpublic
information.
And why should they not continue to do so? The burden of proposed
Regulation FD rests squarely on issuers, their officers, directors, employees and
agents. Nothing in the proposed regulation says that an analyst or financial
reporter cannot ask questions that call for disclosures of material nonpublic
information. They can ask, but the issuer must carefully evaluate before it
answers, and particularly so if Regulation FD becomes final in its present form.
As we all know, it is not always easy to decide what information is "material"
particularly when dealing with a skilled analyst who may string together a series
of disclosures that could seem "immaterial" standing alone, but which become
"material" when combined with other disclosures and the analysis of the analyst.
Certainly in some contexts, the easiest course of action for an issuer may
be to issue a printed copy of the CEO's prepared remarks to an investor
conference. Why run the risk that he or she will inadvertently make a selective
disclosure of material information? But such forums always include question and
answer sessions. And since they are in exotic locales, most attendees will come
early and stay late, for the skiing or the watersports, talking to other attendees
over dinner or on the golf course - not to mention at cocktails, where inhibitions
may be reduced. How will issuers deal with those situations?

For Immediate Release
New York, NY - While playing golf today with

our Chairman and CEO, Larry Loudmouth, predicted record sales for the
second half of the year, noting for the first time that production at our
facilities in Louisiana is expected to resume well ahead of schedule. We
determined that this information may be material and therefore require
disclosure under Regulation FD. For further information, contact our
investor relations officer, Sally Silly, but don't expect her to answer
questions beyond the scope of this press release.

r
r

a group of analysts,

intentional disclosure.
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Of course it sounds rather silly today, but is it so far from reality if Regulation FD
becomes final and is conservatively interpreted? In the context of proposed
Regulation FD, such disclosures do not sound as much like a case of "overdisclosure".
In the area of precautionary activity, the commentary provided by the SEC
in its Release on Regulation FD suggests some steps that companies may take
to avoid non-compliance with the proposed rules. First, they recommend limiting
the number of persons who are authorized to make disclosures and answer
questions from analysts, investors or the media. 72 Most public companies today
have a designated "investor relations" and/or "media relations" person to handle
day to day inquiries that come in to the company. Attendance at investor and
analyst conferences is largely limited to CEO's and CFO's, but many of them particularly CEO's - are not among the most "trainable" members of any
executive team, so considerable emphasis needs to be placed on training and
instructing senior managers as the rules.
A second recommendation contained in the Release is that issuers
"... make sure that some record is kept of the substance of private
communications with analysts or private investors - for example, by having more
than one person present during these contacts or by recording conversations. "73
The third suggestion is that"... issuer personnel can decline to answer questions
that raise issues of materiality until they have had an opportunity to consult with
others. "74
The commentary to proposed Regulation FD also suggests that issuers
"... secure the agreement of analysts not to make use of certain information for a
limited time until they have had the opportunity to review ... notes of the

72 SEC Release on Regulation FD, at p. 7.
73Id.
74Id.
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conversations and engage in whatever consultation they deem necessary to
reach a conclusion as to materiality."7s
For anyone experienced in dealing with analysts and investors, the
specter of entering a brave new world is clearly present. Attorneys may cheer
the SEC's advice that "when particularly difficult issues arise, responsible
officials should seek the advice of counsel."76 While commenting that "... though
it is likely that this Regulation will require corporate officials to consider more
thoughtfully precisely what to disclose, it is unlikely, given the robust, active
capital market, that the flow of information to the market will be significantly
chilled."77 But two sentences later, the writers of the SEC commentary state that
"we request comment on whether the use of the procedures discussed above or
similar procedures can significantly reduce the risk of "chilling" the flow of
corporate information to the marketplace."78 It will prove interesting to see what
effect, if any, comments from corporate America and the corporate bar will have
on the proposed rule.
Since it is reasonable to assume that Regulation FD will become final in
something like its proposed form, some views on reasonable efforts to comply
with it are in order. First, issuers, their senior officers and spokespersons will
simply have to become more knowledgeable in the area of what is "material" and

r

what information is likely to lead to material conclusions by analysts and

r

necessarily have to be "chilled" somewhat. When companies begin to tape

r

investors. Secondly, the open and friendly relationships with analysts will

record conversations with analysts and/or insist that someone be in the room
during the conversation - for example inhouse counsel- the relationship cannot

r

remain as open as it is today.

r
r

Regulation FD, the burden will be on the issuer to "reign in" these persons by

r

Because analysts, investors and the media are essentially unaffected by

Id.
Id.
77 Id.
78 Id, at p.8
75

76

:j

'r
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imposing on them a responsibility that could give rise to liability for trading on
inside information, or becoming a "tipper". This will most likely be accomplished
by requiring that such persons sign a confidentiality agreement, a form of which

J
J

is contained in the Appendix. Such an agreement will state that during the
course of the conversation, there may be a "disclosure of material nonpublic
information" and requiring that all information be embargoed for a given period of
time (say, 24 hours) during which the issuer will evaluate the interview and
advise the analyst if any portion of the interview must remain subject to the
confidentiality agreement. The burden will undoubtedly be on the issuer to make
a quick evaluation and communication to the analyst, or otherwise he or she will
be free to use the information.
The adoption of such a policy would afford the issuer the protection of
proposed Rule 243.100(b), which states in material part that public disclosure of
material information is not required"... when a disclosure is made to a person
who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer... or to a person who has
expressly agreed to maintain such information in confidence. "79 The analyst
who signs a confidentiality agreement would become such a "person" and would
thereby both free the issuer from having to make any disclosure and also would
become potentially liable under Rule 10b for violating that confidentiality

J
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J
j
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agreement. 80
As the use of the Internet and Websites grows, one question may be the
extent to which a company's Website may serve to satisfy the public disclosure
requirements of Regulation FD. While encouraging the use of Websites, the
SEC commentary in its Release makes clear that it "...would not consider a
Website posing by itself to be a sufficient means of public disclosure." A footnote
explains that "despite the rapid expansion of Internet access, a significant

Proposed Rule 243.100(b)
Not to mention, of course, potential liability for breach of contract with the issue, which could be
imposed on the analyst's employer, for example.
79

80
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number of households do not have access. Moreover, simply putting information
on a Website does not alert investors that it is available."81
Another topic of concern - although perhaps it becomes a foregone
conclusion under the proposed Regulation - is access to quarterly and other
conference call with analysts. Many companies have made it a practice to limit
access to such calls in the past. The phone number is not publicly disseminated,
and analysts are in essence "invited" to phone in, hear a presentation and ask
questions. Given the nature of such calls, which aim to provide information
"behind" the text of earnings and other press releases, it would seem virtually
impossible to deny access on the call to anyone who chooses to call in if
Regulation FD is adopted in its present form. An "open" call would appear much
preferable to another alternative, which would be to "embargo" the information on
the call pending a company determination as to whether it must make a full
public disclosure by means of press release or similar disclosure. As a practical
matter, such an embargo would be virtually impossible.
In conclusion on this topic, here are some suggestions for consideration in
the likely event that Regulation FD becomes final:
•

behalf of the issuer, and see that those persons are educated as to the

r
r
r

requirements of the Regulation and the meaning of "materiality"
•

On quarterly earnings release and other conference calls with multiple
analysts, the call should be open to the "public" including of course
media and even the competition.

•

In "one on one" meetings with analysts and investors, insist on having
signed some form of confidentiality agreement that will embargo the

r
r

r
r
r

Designate a limited number of persons who are authorized to speak on

information disclosed in the meeting until a thoughtful analysis can be
made and any material information kept confidential unless the issuer
is prepared to make full public disclosure of it.

81

SEC Release, at p. I 1.
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•

Whenever possible, disclosures should be carefully scripted and even
rehearsed. An investor relations executive who answers her own
phone is asking for problems. It is almost always better to return calls
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than to take them. This affords an opportunity to consider the identity
of the caller, the likely areas of inquiry, the best ways to phrase the
responses, etc. It also increases the likelihood that consistent
information will be provided from person to person.
•

Issuers should routinely release the text of prepared remarks made by
company spokespersons at analyst and investor conferences, and
conference organizers should consider a "blanket rule" that answers to

Q&A be embargoed for some period of time to allow speakers at the
conference to declare information "confidential". Release of the text of
prepared remarks should be made "simultaneously" with the actual
presentation by means of a press release. The text also may, be
posted on the issuer's Website, but this is not adequate disclosure

j

J
J

J
J
j

under the rule.
•

J

When providing information for analysts "models" or reviewing their
reports for "factual errors," be especially careful. 82 It is all too easy to
become "entangled" in the reports of analysts. Your job in reviewing
the draft report is to look for factual errors, or assumptions that are
wildly off the mark. Don't correct the analyst's "conclusions," but it is
okay to point out erroneous assumptions or math errors. Above all,
don't write the report for any analyst. If you check, you will find that
most of these people are making a lot more money than you are, so
why should you do their work for them? There is no guarantee that
following these steps will avoid the problem of "entanglement" but if
you write the report, you may as well publish it as well, because it is
yours.

See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, 635 F.2d 156, at 162-164 (2 nd Cir. 1980) for a good discussion of the
consequences of becoming "entangled" in analysts' reports.

82
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•

will avoid much grief later. If the truth is too painful to disclose, then
make it clear that you cannot deal with that particular topic. Never try
to "fake it" and never resort to information that is what you wish things

r

were, rather than the way they really are.
•

r
r

r
r

When in doubt, stick to the truth. Sounds too easy, but it is a rule that

Have counsel - whether inhouse or outside - become more involved
in all presentations to analysts and investors and in evaluating whether
and when to make full public disclosures.
The Internet and Chatrooms

One of the particular phenomenons of the Internet Age is the proliferation
of chatrooms and other forums for the exchange of ideas. The SEC has recently
begun to look closely at the potential for such forums to move a stock price, and

r

therefore the potential for manipulation of a stock price. In fact, the entire
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(www.SEC.gov) under the Enforcement Division section of the site under

r
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r
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subject of the Internet has been made a separate page on the SEC's Website

"Internet Related Announcements." Violations range from chatroom
manipulations to the offering for sale of unregistered over auction sites such as
eBay!83
In one particularly well-publicized enforcement action, the SEC recently
(January 5, 2000) filed suit against an Internet "personality popular with day
traders, nicknamed "Tokyo Joe" and his company, which dispensed investment
advice over the Internet. The defendants, whose real names are Yun Soo Oh
Park (alkla Tokyo Joe) and Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme Corporation, have

been charged with engaging in schemes to defraud members of the Tokyo Joe
stock recommendation service. Among other things, "Joe" is charged by the
SEC with having posted false performance results, failing to disclose that he
received compensation from companies whose stock he recommended over the
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Internet and failing to disclose that he was selling stocks he recommended that
others purchase.
Members of the day trading community paid $100 to $200 per month for
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Joe's advice, including stock picks. In addition, Joe's company operated a chat
room to discuss Joe's picks and other investment matters. He also sent e-mails
recommending stock picks to members of his service. According to the
complaint, Joe bought stocks, recommended them to his members (who
regularly traded up the price of the stock) by means of his chatroom and then
selling the stock himself at a handsome profit. The SEC complaint seeks a
permanent injunction against Tokyo Joe and his company and disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains as well as civil monetary penalties.
Without of course prejudging the outcome of the case, if the allegations
are established by the Commission's enforcement division, it serves to prove
perhaps one thing. The Internet is no different than any other channel of
communication in terms of the potential for spreading false and misleading
information and plain old-fashioned fraud. Yet there remain many who somehow
believe that the Internet is used only by well-intentioned and honest individuals
desiring to share information with their fellow day traders.
What should you do if your company becomes (and it almost certainly will)
the subject of chatroom conversation? Even if your company is not the subject
of a "fraudulent" chatroom, the fact is that many investor chatrooms are little
more than "rumor mills". Yet more than a few companies have been placed into
difficulty for years by rumors spread in ways other than over the Internet. In this
sense there is little to distinguish chatrooms from other kinds of rumors. The
principal difference is that chatrooms offer the potential for rumors to spread
much more quickly and widely than at any other time in the history of financial
markets.

B3 For example, see the cases in the Appendix, In the Matter of Richard L. Davis, In the Matter of l.R. Hoff
and In the Matter of Louis B. Sitaras, all issued on October 20, 1999.
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The basic principles remain the same as with dealing with any other
rumors. The wrong response is to get the company or its representatives
involved in the world of chatrooms themselves. Avoid the temptation to have a
company representative go "into" the chatroom to set the record straight. Doing
so only adds credibility to the chatroom process and validates the information
contained in the chatroom. If it were meaningless, or the chatroom itself not
credible, why would the company go on line to refute it? Even worse is to have a
company representative go into the chatroom anonymously to try to correct
misinformation. The risks are many. If discovered (and that is a real possibility),

r

there is an impression that the company did something wrong in concealing that

r

friend, Tokyo Joe. Another real concern is that by participating in a chatroom
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it was behind a chatroom participant. You don't want to be compared with our

"discussion" the Company or its representative could engage in what amounts to
selective disclosure. Company communications should come in very limited
ways as discussed above. Only official company spokespersons, using
customary means of communications - press releases, filings of Forms 10-K, 10Q and 8-K - should speak on behalf of the company.

Conclusion
We have looked at a number of issues relating to the release of bad news
- or simply news - by or on behalf of public companies. What conclusions can
we draw from this review? First of all, that every public company, its
management and advisers, including it inhouse and outside attorneys, must
ensure that they understand thoroughly the mandatory disclosures required by
SEC rules and releases. In areas such as MD&A, there remain far too many
instances of companies not taking seriously the requirements inherent in this
required disclosures, relying too heavily on boilerplate language and merely
updating "last year's filings."

r

r
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Additionally we can safely conclude that areas such as selective
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disclosure are at the highest levels of attention and concern at the SEC. With
the likely advent of Regulation FD, and reviewing the commentary that
accompanies the rule during the period in which persons may comment on the
Regulation, it is obvious to anyone who follows these sorts of developments that
the Commission is going to be looking very closely at instances of perceived
selective disclosure and likely will seek early enforcement of alleged violations of
Regulation FD in order to make a point about these matters.
In the midst of the longest running bull market in the history of American
securities, with companies trading at multiples of sales that used to be reserved
for multiples of earnings, the potential risks to public companies have never been
greater. One way of controlling those risks is to adhere rigorously to the
standards of disclosure that mandate revealing that information which a
reasonable investor would find material in making a decision to buy or sell the
securities of the company at the earliest time at which the company can make a
reasonably definitive determination as to the existence of the information and its
materiality. In the Internet age, coupled with Moneyline, CNN's Business Hour,
CNBC's 24-hour ticker and the venerable Wall Street Week with Louis RUkeyser,
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there remains no excuse for sharing material information only with a select group
of analysts and large investors.
To test your own knowledge of the rules and principles applicable to
dissemination of news and selective disclosure, I have provided some
hypothetical examples of fact situations which serve to provoke your own
thinking in the context of real world situations. Those are contained in the
following pages, after which there is an Appendix with several items relevant to
this discussion.
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Hypothetical Case Studies
In each of the following hypotheticals, consider whether a disclosure is required,
how and when any required disclosure should be made and the consequence of
not making disclosure.
1. Company XYZ.com, Inc. has developed a technology that greatly expedites
ordering of products by repeat customers, allowing them to place orders by
"one click" of a computer mouse. XYZ has secured a patent on the
technology. A competitor, Q&R.com, Inc., obtains advice of counsel that the
patent should not have issued and therefore is invalid as the technology is
merely a non-unique compilation of various elements of prior art. Q&R
launches its own slightly modified "one click" system and is promptly sued by
XYZ. A district judge enjoins Q&R from using the system while the case
proceeds to trial on the merits. Assuming that the convenience of one click
ordering is a material advantage to XYZ, what disclosure is Q&R required to
make? Naturally, XYZ will probably issue its own "good news" press release
discussing its "triumph" over Q&R, but is this sufficient to discharge any duty
of disclosure by Q&R?
2. Texas Pete's, a Mexican fast food chain, has enjoyed rapid growth in a
relatively short period of time. The brainchild of Pete Schmedlap, the IPO
was a huge success, and the stock has quadrupled in only two years, with
rapid growth, fueled in part by a series of television ads featuring the CEO in
various amusing skits. The last of 10 children, Pete is now a multimillionaire, at least on paper, since all of his wealth is tied up in Texas Pete
stock. At a Board meeting, Pete announces:

A. That he is an alcoholic and needs to take several months off to take the
"cure" for his condition. This is personally embarrassing to Pete, and he
wants to avoid disclosing the situation. Several ads are "in the can" and
the CFO can handle investors for a while.
B. That he has inoperable cancer and has been given only a year to live. He
can function for about six months, during which time he will continue to
lead the company while a successor is selected. He will also continue his
personalTY ads. For the sake of his family, however, he would like an
opportunity to liquidate a portion of his substantial holdings in Texas
Pete's and therefore would like to delay any announcement until he is too
ill to function or a successor is named.
The Board asks your advice on what disclosure, if any, is required in these
situations.
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3. Big Corp. has received a letter from the SEC advising that the Commission is
informally investigating trading activity in Big Corp's stock in the period
surrounding the announcement of its acquisition of its largest rival. The SEC
provides a list of individual names and asks Big Corp if it can identify any of
the persons named on the list. The General Counsel circulates the list to the
executive management team, but no one recognizes any of the names.
Does Big Corp have an obligation to make a disclosure?
What if Big Corp's CEO recognizes the names of his brother-in-law and
several other members of his wife's family?
What if the list contains the names of several high-ranking employees of the
company's largest division?
What if the list contains the names of several administrative level employees
(i.e. secretaries)? What if they are in the executive suite or the finance
department?
4. Sam, the secretary, accuses CEO Martha of sexual harassment. Martha
founded the company, took it public and is the personification of
wholesomeness in the media and on her popular TV appearances. .
a.

An internal investigation is inconclusive, but the consensus is to settle
the claim for big bucks, with a confidentiality covenant.
b. Alternatively, the investigation discloses that the actions occurred, and
Martha is remorseful, stating that nothing like this has ever happened to
her before and it won't happen again.
c. Alternatively the investigation uncovers not only credible evidence of the
harassment, but also a pattern of such activity by Martha over the years.
Nevertheless, given the importance of Martha to the company, a
settlement is negotiated with Sam.
What disclosures are required or should be made in these situations?
5. Large Corp.'s CEO is attending an investor conference and ski-weekend at a
Colorado resort. The meeting is sponsored by Big Fees, Inc., an investment
banking firm. In attendance at the conference are a number of companies in
Large's industry group, as well as dozens of analysts and investment
bankers from Big Fees. At a cocktail party, the CEO is surrounded by a
group of analysts who engage in Q&A about new product ideas, what is on
the drawing boards. Also in the discussion are CEO's from Ultra, Inc. and
Big-Is-Us Corporation, both arch-competitors of Large. The next morning on
the ski slopes, Large's CEO wonders if she talked too much at the cocktail
reception, especially about several new products that are still in testing. She
calls the company's general counsel and asks you for advice as to what to
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do, and please have the answers by the time she skis to the bottom of the
black diamond course!
What advice do you give? What disclosure obligations do you see for Large?
Are there any disclosure obligations for the other two CEO's? What impact
would new Regulation FD have on your advice?
6. Your company's stock has been moving steadily downward for the past
several weeks. You have no material unpublished information, and the
business appears to be doing well, or at least as well as you have told the
street. There have been "rumblings" of a slowdown in the second half of the
fiscal year, but those have not yet risen to the level of mandatory disclosure,
as there has been no determination that earnings will not meet expectations.
You learn that a popular trading chatroom has been discussing your stock
and that the discussions have included "rumors" of a slowdown in the second
half of the year. You are furious that these rumors, which have at least some
basis in fact, have managed to leak outside the company, but you are
uncertain as to what action to take. What can you do? What should you
do?
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SEC RELEASE ON PROPOSED REGULATION FD

I. Executive Summary
Proposed Rule:

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading

------------,'
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 230, 240, 243, and 249
Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259,IC-24209, File No. S7-31-99
RIN 3235-AH82
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Proposed rule
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Summary: The Securities and Exchange Commission is proposing new rules to address three
issues: the selective disclosure by issuers of material nonpublic information; whether insider trading
liability depends on a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information; and
when the breach ofa family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading. The proposals are designed to promote the full and fair
disclosure of information by issuers, and to clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider
trading.
Dates: Public comments are due on or before March 29, 3000.
Addresses: Please send three copies of your comment letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 5th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549-0609.
Comments can also be sent electronically to the following e-mail address: rule-comments@sec.gov.
Your comment letter should refer to File No. S7-31-99.lfe-mail is used, include this file number on
the subject line. Anyone can inspect and copy the comment letters in the Commission's Public
Reference Room at 450 5th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549. Electronically submitted comments
will be posted on the Commission's Internet web site (http://\\ww.sec.gov).
For Further Information Contact: Richard A. levine, Assistant General Counsel, Sharon
lamore, Senior Counsel. or Elizabeth No\\icki, Attorney. Office of the General Counsel, at (202)
942-0890.
Supplementary Information: The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) today
is proposing for comment new rules: Regulation FD,I Rule 181 under the Securities Act,2 Rule IOb51,3 Rule IOb5-2,<l and amendments to Forms 8-KS and 6-K.6

Information is the lifeblood ofour securities markets. Congress enacted the federal securities laws to
promote fair and honest securities markets, and a critical purpose of these laws is to promote full and
fair disclosure of important information by issuers of securities to the investing public. The Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). as
implemented by Commission rules and regulations, provide for systems of mandatory disclosure of
certain material information in securities offerings and in periodic reports.
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws also playa very important role in funhering
full and fair disclosure. Among other things. the antifraud provisions prohibit insider trading, or the
fraudulent misuse of material nonpublic information. Unlike the law underlying the issuer disclosure
requirements, which generally has been developed through statutes and rules, the law of insider
trading has largely been developed through a series ofCommission and judicial decisions in civil and
criminal enforcement cases involving fraud charges. As a result, a few areas ofinsider trading law
have been marked by disagreement among the courts.
Today's proposals address several issues related to full and fair disclosure of information, and insider
trading law. The proposed rules are the following:
• Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure). a new issuer disclosure rule, deals with the problem of
issuers making selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to analysts, institutional
investors. or others, but not to the public at large. Although analysts play an imponant role in
gathering and analyzing information, and disseminating their analysis to investors, we do not
believe that allowing issuers to disclose material information selectively to analysts is in the
best interests of investors or the securities markets generally. Instead, to the maximum extent
practicable, we believe that all investors should have access to an issuer's material disclosures
at the same time. Regulation FD, therefore, would require that: (I) when an issuer intentionally
discloses material information, it do so through public disclosure, not through selective
disclosure; and (2) whenever an issuer learns that it has made a non-intentional material
selective disclosure. the issuer make prompt public disclosure of that information.
• Rule IOb5-1 addresses an important unsettled issue in insider trading law: whether the
Commission must show in its insider trading cases that the defendant "used" the inside
information in trading, or merely that the defendant traded while in "knowing possession" of
the information. The Rule would state the general principle that insider trading liability arises
when a person trades while "aware" of material nonpublic information, but also provides four
exceptions to liability. In these four situations, where a trade resulted from a pre-existing plan.
contract. or instruction that was made in good faith, it will be clear that the trader did not use
the information he or she was aware of.
• Rule IObS..2 addresses another unsettled issue in current insider trading law: what types of
family or other non-business relationships Clll\ give rise to liability under the misappropriation
theory of insider trading. The Rule would set fonh three non-exclusive bases for determining
that a duty of trust or confidence was owed by a person receiving information: (1) when the
person agreed to keep information confidential; (2) when the persons involved in the
communication had a history. pattern. or practice of sharing confidences that resulted in a
reasonable expectation ofconfidentiality; and (3) when the person who provided the
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information was a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person who received the infonnation,
unless it were shown affirmatively, based on the facts and circumstances of that family
relationship, that there was no reasonable expectation ofconfidentiality.

the securities markets. As a recent academic study indicated, selective disclosure has the immediate
effect of enabling those privy to the information to make a quick profit (or quickly minimize losses)
by trading before the information is disseminated to the public.J~ Indeed, while issuer selective
disclosure is not a new practice,l~ the impact of such selective disclosure appears to be much greater
in today's more volatile, earnings-sensitive markets. Accordingly, we think that a continued practice
of selective disclosure by issuers inevitably will lead to a loss of public confidence in the fairness of
the markets.

II. Selective Disclosure: Regulation FD
A. Background
Full and fair disclosure of information by issuers of securities to the investing public is a cornerstone
of the federal securities laws. In enacting the mandatory disclosure system of the Exchange Act,
Congress sought to promote disclosure of "honest, complete, and correct information"Z to facilitate
the operation of fair and efficient markets.~

Even apart from the issue offundamental fairness to all investors, selective disclosure poses other
real threats to the health and integrity ofour securities markets. Corporate managers should be
encouraged to make broad public disclosure of important information promptly. If, however, they are
permitted to treat material information as a commodity that can be parceled out selectively, they may
delay general public disclosure so that they can selectively disclose the information to curry favor or
bolster credibility with particular analysts or institutional investorsJl
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Despite this well-recognized principle, the federal securities laws do not generally require an issuer to
make public disclosure ofall important corporate developments when they occur. Periodic reports
(e.g., Forms IO-K and IO-Q) call for disclosure of specified information on a regular basis, and
domestic issuers are additionally required to report some types of events on a Form 8-K soon after
they occur. However, in the absence ofa specific duty to disclose, the federal securities laws do not
require an issuer to publicly disclose all material events as soon as they occur. While we encourage
prompt disclosure of material information as the best disclosure practice,'l and self-regulatory
organization (SRO) rules often require this,H! issuers retain some control over the precise timing of
many important corporate disclosures.

Moreover, ifselective disclosure were to go unchecked, opportunities for analyst conflicts of interests
would flourish. We are greatly concerned by reports indicating a trend toward less independent
research and analysis as a basis for analysts' advice, and a correspondingly greater dependence by
analysts on access to corporate insiders to provide guidance and "comfort" for their earnings
forecasts.ie In this environment, analysts are likely to feel pressured to report favorably about
particular issuers to avoid being "cut ... off from access to the flow of non-public information
through future analyst conference phone calls" or other means of selective disclosure.l'l This raises
troubling questions about the degree to which analysts may be pressured to shade their analysis in
order to maintain their access to corporate management. We believe that these pressures would be
reduced ifissuers were clearly prohibited from selectively disclosing material information to favored
analysts.

In practice, issuers also retain control over the audience and forum for some important disclosures. If
a disclosure is made at a time when no Commission filing is immediately required, the issuer
dctermines how and to whom to make its initial disclosure. As a result, issuers sometimes choose to
disclose information selectively - i.e.' to a small group ofanalysts or institutional investors - before
making broad public disclosure by a press release or Commission filing.

These concerns about selective disclosure are widely shared, as reflected both in stock exchange
listing standards and in "best practices" guidelines of investor relations and analyst groups. The New
York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual and the NASD Rules both require listed issuers to
disclose promptly "to the public" information about material developments.2!! The National Investor
Relations Institute (NIRI) guidance in this area also states that an issuer "should not disclose in
selective situations - such as conference calls and analyst meetings - information that it is unwilling
to make available for general public use."2.! Similarly, the Association oflnvestment Management
and Research Standards of Practice Handbook states that if an analyst selecth'ely receives disclosure
of information that he deems material, "the member must encourage the public dissemination of that
information and abstain from making investment decisions on the basis of that information unless and
until it is broadly disseminated to the marketplace."n

Many recent cases of selective disclosure have been reported in the media.JJ In some cases, selective
disclosures have been made in conference calls or meetings that are open only to analysts and/or
institutional investors, and exclude other investors, members ofthe public, and the media. In other
cases, company officials have made selective disclosures directly to individual analysts. Commonly,
these situations involve advance notice of the issuer's upcoming quarterly earnings or sales figures figures which, when announced, have a predictable and significant impact on the market price of the
issuer's securities.
We are troubled by the many recent reports of selective disclosure and the potential impact of this
practice on market integrity. As the Supreme Court has recently emphasized, promoting investor
confidence in the fairness ofour securities markets is an "animating purpose" of the Exchange Act. 12
Clearly, one critical component of that mission is protecting investors from the prospect that others in
the market possess "unerodable informational advantages"U obtained through superior access to
corporate insiders.

Finally, revolutions in communications and information technologies have made it much easier for
issuers today to disseminate important information broadly and swiftly. A generation ago, issuers may
have relied on conferences attended by a handful of interested parties, or news releases that led to
delayed, indirect retransmission of information to the public. Lacking effective means to
communicate directly to large numbers of investors, issuers may have relied on analysts to serve as
information intermediaries. In the last few years, however, new, effective methods for mass
communications have become widely available. Today, issuers can - and many do - use a variety of
these new methods to communicate with the market, including: live transmissions of annual meetings
and news conferences on the Internet or closed circuit television; listen-only telephone transmission
of meetings and analyst conferences; and company websites.~~ With the availability of these new
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In our view, the current practice of selective disclosure poses a serious threat to investor confidence
in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets. We have recognized that benefits may flow to
the markets from the legitimate efforts of securities analysts to "ferret out and analyze information"l<j
based on their superior diligence and acumen. But we do not believe that selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information to analysts - or to others, such as selected investors - is beneficial to
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technologies. issuers can much more easily reach a wide investor audience with their disclosures. and
do not need to rely on analysts as heavily as in the past to serve as information intermediaries. 2.4
Nevertheless. issuers are continuing to engage in selective disclosures of material nonpublic
information. perhaps due in part to the uncenainty in current law about when selective disclosures are
prohibited. For at least the past 30 years. the issue of potential liability for selective disclosure has
been addressed under the principles of fraud law. particularly the law of insider trading. Under early
insider trading case law. which appeared to require that traders have equal access to corporate
information.~~ selective disclosure of material information to securities analysts could lead to
Iiability.~

ttl
VI
VI

.",..,

-, -, -, -, --, --, -,

B. Description of Proposed Regulation FD
Rule 101 of Regulation FD sets forth the basic rule regarding "selective disclosure." Under this Rule,
whenever:
(I) an issuer. or any person acting on its behalf.

(2) discloses material nonpublic information
(3) to any other person outside the issuer,

This changed with the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella v. United State;'l and Dirks v. SEC·~f!
In Chiarella. the Court rejected the "parity of information" approach. which considered trading to be
fraudulent whenever the trader possessed material information not generally available. The Court
instead held that there must be a breach of a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence
before the law imposes a duty to disclose information or refrain from trading.

(4) the issuer must

In Dirks. the Supreme Court addressed the disclosure. or "tipping. " of material nonpublic
information by an insider to an analyst.~9 The Court rejected the idea that a person is prohibited from
trading whenever he knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider. Instead, it
stated that a recipient of inside information is prohibited from trading only when the information has
been made available to him" improperly" - that is, in breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to
shareholders. To determine whether a breach ofduty occurred. "courts [must] focus on objective
criteria, i.e.' whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such
as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."~

(5) make public disclosure of that same information.

After Dirks, there have been very few insider trading cases based on disclosure to. or trading by,
securities analysts. In some situations. an insider's selective disclosure can be viewed as improper,
because the disclosure was motivated by a desire for some type of personal benefit.li In other cases,
however. the evidence to support the "personal benefit" argument under Dirks is less clear. As a
result, many have viewed Dirks as affording considerable protection to insiders who make selective
disclosures to analysts. and to the analysts (and their clients) who receive selectively disclosed
information}2
Although the antifraud provisions of the securities laws do not require that all traders possess equal
information when they trade. we believe that our disclosure rules should promote fair treatment of
large and small investors by. among other things, giving all investors timely access to the material
information an issuer chooses to disclose. Therefore. we are today proposing new rules. which use a
different legal approach. to address selective disclosure.
The approach we propose does not treat selective disclosure as a type of fraudulent conduct or revisit
the insider trading issues addressed in Dirks. Rather, we propose to use our authority to require full
and fair disclosure from issuers. primarily under Section l3(a) of the Exchange Act, as a basis for
proposed Regulation FD. This Regulation is designed as an issuer disclosure rule. similar to existing
Commission rules under Exchange Act Sections l3(a) and 15(d).33 We believe this approach would
further the full and fair public disclosure of material information, and thereby promote fair dealing in
the securities of covered issuers.

(a) simultaneously (for intentional disclosures), or
(b) ·promptly" (for non-intentional disclosures)

Several definitional and other provisions in the Regulation establish the scope and effect of the
general rule. As a whole. the Regulation would require that whenever an issuer makes an intentional
disclosure of material nonpublic information. it must do so in a manner that provides general public
disclosure, rather than through a selective disclosure. In the case ofan unintentional selective
disclosure. the issuer must make full public disclosure promptly after it learns of the selective
disclosure. Regulation FD does not mandate that issuers make public disclosure of all material
developments when they occur. What it does require, however. is that when an issuer chooses to
disclose material nonpublic information. it must do so broadly to the investing public. not selectively
to a favored few.
The key provisions of the Regulation are discussed in greater detail below.
I, Disclosures by "An Issuer or Person Acting on its Behatr

Regulation FD applies to all issuers with securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange
Act. and those issuers required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, including
closed-end investment companies but not including other investment companies.3 4 It would apply not
only to a selective disclosure formally made in the name of the issuer. but also to a selective
disclosure made by a "person acting on behalfofan issuer." This term is defined by Rule 101 (c) as
any officer. director. employee, or agent of the issuer who discloses material nonpublic information
while acting within the scope of his or her authority.
The definition of "person acting on behalfofan issuer" distinguishes between cases where a properly
authorized employee or agent of the issuer makes a selective disclosure, and cases where an employee
or agent discloses material nonpubl ic information for his or her own benefit - i.e.' provides a "tip"
that would violate Rule IOb-5 if securities trading ensued. This distinction means that the issuer
would not automatically be liable under Regulation FD (or be responsible for making simultaneous or
prompt public disclosure) whenever one of its employees or agents improperly trades or tips,35 The
Rule also would not apply if an official disclosed information to another person who owed him or her

a duty of trust or confidence - such as a medical professional. By focusing on employees and agents
acting within the scope of their authority, the Rule would make an issuer responsible only for the
disclosures ofcompany officials, employees, or agents who are properly authorized or designated to
speak to the media, the analyst community, and/or investors.

Although materiality issues do not lend themselves to a bright-line test, we believe that the majority
ofcases are reasonably clear. At one end of the spectrum, we believe issuers should avoid giving
guidance or express warnings to analysts or selected investors about important upcoming earnings or
sales figures; such earnings or sales figures will frequently have a significant impact on the issuer's
stock price. At the other end of the spectrum, more generalized background information is less likely
to be material. We request comment on whether use of the procedures discussed above or similar
procedures can significantly reduce the risk of "chilling" the flow of corporate information to the
marketplace.

We request comment on this approach. Is the definition of "person acting on behalf ofan issuer"
appropriate? Should it be narrower - for example, limited to executive officers and directors, and
persons acting on their behalf? Or should it be broader, to prevent evasion - for example, covering
any person authorized to act on behalfof the issuer?

The Regulation also does not specifically define the term "nonpublic." It is well established that
information is nonpublic if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors
genera1ly.~ In order to make information public, "it must be disseminated in a manner calculated to
reach the securities market place in general through recognized channels ofdistribution, and public
investors must be afforded a reasonable waiting period to react to the information. "~1! The Regulation
does specify means by which "public disclosure" is to be made.~J We request comment on whether to
rely on existing standards for the term "nonpublic." Should we provide further guidance, or is the
specific definition of "public disclosure" provided in Rule 101 (e) sufficient?

2. Disclosure 0/ Material Nonpublic In/ormation

Regulation FD addresses the selective disclosure of "material nonpublic information." The
Regulation does not define the term "material, " but instead relies on the same definition as is
generally applicable under the federal securities laws: information is material if "there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment
decision, or if it would have "significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available. "~_6
We recognize that materiality judgments can be difficult. Corporate officials may therefore become
more cautious in communicating with analysts or selected investors, or may feel compelled to consult
with counsel more frequently about their ability to respond to questions from analysts and investors.
We understand that these communications take many forms, including unrehearsed question-andanswer sessions, and responses to unsolicited inquiries. We are mindful of the potential burdens of
requiring instant materiality judgments to be made by those put in the position of responding
immediately to questions.
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J. Selective Disclosure "To Any Other Penon Outside the Issuer"

Rule 1000a) covers selective disclosures made to "any person or persons outside the issuer."
Therefore, the Rule would not apply to communications ofconfidential information by officials and
employees of issuers to each other. Only selective disclosures to outsiders, such as analysts or
selected investors, are covered by the Regulation.
To make clear the scope of the Regulation, paragraph (b) of Rule 100 expressly states that the Rule
does not apply to disclosures of material information to persons who are bound by duties of trust or
confidence not to disclose or use the information for trading. Paragraph (b) expressly refers to several
types of persons whose misuse of the information would subject them to insider trading liability
under Rule 10b-5: (I) "temporary" insiders ofan issuer- e.g.' outside consultants, such as its
attorneys, investment bankers, or accountants;~~ and (2) any other person who has expressly agreed to
maintain the information in confidence, and whose misuse of the information for trading would thus
be covered either under the "temporary insider" or "misappropriation" theory .41

We believe that these concerns are significant but can be mitigated in several ways, many of which
involve practices already in place at many issuers.il First, issuers can designate a limited number of
persons who are authorized to make disclosures or field inquiries from analysts, investors, or the
media. Second, issuers can make sure that some record is kept of the substance of private
communications with analysts or selected investors - for example, by having more than one person
present during these contacts or by recording conversations. Third, issuer personnel can decline to
answer questions that raise issues of materiality until they have had an opportunity to consult with
others. Fourth, issuer personnel can secure the agreement of analysts not to make use of certain
information for a limited time until they have had the opportunity to review their notes of the
conversation and engage in whatever consultation they deem necessary to reach a conclusion as to
materiality;3' then, if the issuer determines that public disclosure of the information is necessary, it
can do so. Finally, and most importantly, as described in greater detail below, the Regulation
recognizes that issuers may sometimes unintentionally make a selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information, and it treats such unintentional disclosures differently from cases in which the
issuer makes a planned selective disclosure.

This approach recognizes that issuers and their officials may properly share material nonpublic
information with outsiders when those outsiders agree to keep the information confidential. This
would permit issuers to discuss confidential strategies or plans with outsiders, as necessary for
business purposes, without need to make public disclosure under this Rule. For example, issuers
could share material nonpublic information with other parties to a business combination transaction
or with a purchaser in a private placement without having to make public disclosure if the party
receiving the information agrees to hold the information in confidence. Similarly, ifit served an
issuer's corporate interests to make disclosure of material information to selected analysts - for
example, to give the analysts sufficient time to analyze complex information before its public release.
or to solicit analysts' views on a business strategy under consideration - it could do so, provided that
the recipients of the information expressly agreed not to use the information and to keep it
confidential prior to public disclosure. Such a confidentiality agreement would also include an
agreement not to trade on the nonpublic information.

We also believe that a heightened awareness of materiality issues may well have overall benefits to
the disclosure process. Senior corporate officials who are responsible for dealing with analysts,
investor relations, and disclosure issues already should be sensitive to materiality questions. When
particularly difficult issues arise, responsible officials should seek the advice of counsel. Though it is
likely that this Regulation will require corporate officials to consider more thoughtfully precisely
what to disclose, it is unlikely, given the robust, active capital market, that the flow of information to
the market will be significantly chilled.
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We request comment on whether the proposed Regulation covers the appropriate categories of
persons. Should other types of persons be enumerated in Rule l00(b) as proper recipients of material
nonpublic information? By permitting disclosures to outsiders who agree to confidentiality
requirements. does the Regulation adequately permit issuers to engage in legitimate business
communications with customers or suppliers. potential co-venturers. and others? Would purchasers in
private offering who receive material nonpublic information be willing to sign confidentiality
agreements? How would this affect the resale market for private offerings and the flow of
information in these transaction? Would the proposals reduce liquidity in the 144A market? How •
should the Regulation account for practices in this market? Should we require that confidentiality
agreements take any specific form - i.e.• be written - or include certain required provisions?
4. Timing 0/ Public Disclosure Required by Regulation FD

An important provision of Regulation FD is that the timing of required public disclosure differs
depending on whether the issuer has made an "intentional" or a "non-intentional" selective disclosure.
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If. however. an inadvertent selective disclosure of material information occurs. the issuer must take
prompt "corrective" action when it knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that the disclosure of
material information has occurred. The requirement to take corrective action arises when a senior
official of the issuer (as defined above) becomes aware of the selective disclosure.4'7 When that
occurs, the issuer is required to act "as soon as reasonably practicable" to make full public disclosure
of the information that has been selectively disclosed."!
We request comment on the distinction between "intentional" and "non-intentional" disclosures for
purposes of the timing of public disclosure. Does the proposed definition of "intentional" disclosure
draw the appropriate distinction? Does the definition of "promptly" provide an appropriate time
period for the required public disclosure? Should the time period be shorter (e.g.• same trading day);
or longer <e.g.• next businessltrading day or 48 hours later)? Is the definition ofsenior official
appropriate. or should it be narrower (e.g.• executive officers only) or broader (e.g.• all employees)?
5. Definition o/"P"blic Disclosure"

When an issuer makes an "intentional" disclosure of material nonpublic information. Rule 100(a)(I)
requires the issuer to publicly disclose the same information simultaneously. In effect, this
requirement for simultaneous disclosure means that issuers cannot engage in an intentional selective
disclosure consistent with the terms of Regulation FD.
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Under the definition provided in Rule 101(a). a selective disclosure is "intentional" when the
individual making the disclosure either knew prior to making the disclosure. or was reckless in not
knowing. that he or she would be communicating information that was material and nonpublic. This
definition would cover. for example, situations where an issuer official determined to hold a
conference call or meeting that excluded the public. or selectively contacted a particular analyst or
investor, to disclose material nonpublic information. The individual making the disclosure must
know (or be reckless in not knowing) that the information he or she is going to disclose is both
material and nonpublic. Thus. for example, a communication would not be "intentional" under this
Rule if it was disclosed inadvertently through an honest slip of the tongue. or because the individual
mistakenly (but not in reckless disregard of the truth) believed that the information had already been
made public.
Under Rule 100(a)(2). when this type of "non-intentional" disclosure of material nonpublic
information occurs. the issuer is required to make public disclosure promptly. In this situation.
because the disclosure was unplanned. the Rule does not require simultaneous public disclosure.
Instead. the Rule requires "prompt" public disclosure. with "promptly" defined to mean "as soon as
reasonably practicable" (but no later than 24 hours) after a senior official of the issuer knows (or is
reckless in not knowing) of the non-intentional disclosure. 44 "Senior official" is defined as any
executive officer of the issuer, any director of the issuer. any investor relations officer or public
relations officer. or any employee possessing equivalent functions.4~
By creating a separate requirement for "prompt" public disclosure in the case of a non-intentional
selective disclosure. the Rule recognizes that corporate officers may sometimes make mistakes
without the intent to selectively disclose material nonpublic information. When mistakes are made.
absent intent or recklessness. we do not believe that the issuer should be held in violation of
Regulation FD for not having made simultaneous public disclosure.46

Rule 101(e) defines the type of "public disclosure" that will satisfy the requirements of the
Regulation. This definition provides issuers with considerable flexibility in determining how to make
the required public disclosure.
In general. the Rule states that issuers can comply with the "public disclosure" requirement by filing a
Form 8-K with the Commission containing the information (or. in the case offoreign private issuers.
by filing a Form 6-K). 4~ We are proposing to add a new Item 10 to Form 8-K for disclosures made
under Regulation FD. Should we permit issuers to make Regulation FD disclosures on existing Item
5 ofFonn 8-K as an alternative to proposed new Item 10? Item 5 is not confined to material
disclosures; accordingly. ifa registrant used Item 5 it would not acknowledge that the information
disclosed was necessarily material. Is this a preferable approach?
As alternatives to making a Commission filing. the Rule permits an issuer to choose other methods of
public disclosure. Under Rule 101(eX2). an issuer will be exempt from the filing requirement ifit
uses one of the following alternative methods of public disclosure:
• First. an issuer could make public disclosure by disseminating a press release containing the
information through a widely circulated news or wire service. Under current practice and SRO
rules. corporate issuers typically provide press releases to services such as Dow Jones.
Bloomberg. Business Wire. PR Newswire. or Reuters. Any of these services would continue to
be a satisfactory means of making public disclosure.
• Second. an issuer could make public disclosure by disseminating information through any other
method ofdisclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access. and does not
exclude access to members of the public - such as announcement at a press conference to
which the public is granted access (for example. by personal attendance or by telephonic or
electronic transmission). In order to afford broad public access. an issuer must provide notice
of the disclosure in a form that is reasonably available to investors.
As noted above. current technology provides various means that issuers can use to transmit
announcements and press conferences to the public. The Rule would not require use ofany particular
technological means. but would give issuers their choice ofany method that did not limit public
access to announcements and conferences.

An additional method for issuer dissemination of material information is posting the information on
the issuer's website. 5QWe encourage issuers who maintain websites to post information on their
websites whenever they make public disclosure through one of the means described above. However,
the proposed Rule would not consider a website posting by itself to be a sufficient means of public
disclosure.H Will this limitation make issuers less willing to post information on their websites?
We request comment on the proposal's approach for making public disclosure. We acknowledge that
filings on EDGAR may only be made during specified hours, and only on business days of the
Commission. In the case of filings permitted to be made in paper (as in the case of foreign private
issuers), there are similar constraints because ofour filing desk hours. Therefore, when an issuer is
required to make public disclosure within 24 hours, the timing of a weekend or holiday may mean
that EDGAR filing is not an available method of public disclosure. Issuers would therefore have to
use one of the other methods. We solicit comment on whether this approach is workable, or whether
we should alter the timing requirements of the Rule so that filing is always an available method. How
else can we promote issuer flexibility and investor access?
We are also considering whether to require a delayed filing ofa Form 8-K (within two business days)
when an issuer chooses one of the other methods of making public disclosure. This would ensure that
the information is part of the Commission's public files. Should we adopt this alternative approach? If
so, is two business days the appropriate time period, or should it be shorter (e.g., one business day) or
longer (e.g., five business days)?
t:J:j
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Are the current technologies that we discuss available to all issuers? Are they prohibitively costly?
Would they provide all investors with sufficient access? Are there other methods of public disclosure
that might be as effective as a press release or an open press conference? Should these methods be
specified in the Rule? Would an open press conference alone provide adequate dissemination of
information in all circumstances (e.g., for smaller companies with less media or analyst coverage)?
Should we require that information be posted on an issuer's website, if it has one, in addition to the
other methods of publicizing the information?

6. Issuers Covered by Ihe Regultll;o"
Regulation FD would apply to all issuers with securities registered under Section 12 ofthe Exchange
Act, and all issuers required to file reports under Section IS(d) of the Exchange Act, including
closed-end investment companies but not including other investment companies. Are there any
categories of issuers that should not be included? Should we have different and/or modified rules for
small business issuers? If so, what modifications are warranted?
We are proposing to apply Regulation FD to foreign private issuers that are subject to the reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act, although these foreign issuers would be permitted to make filings
under the Regulation on Form 6-K rather than Form 8-K.51 The vast majority oftbese issuers have •
subjected themselves to such reporting requirements by their election to access U.S. markets. Most of
the issuers have a class of securities listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges. or are
admitted to trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market. The listing standards of these markets make no
distinction between domestic and foreign issuers in requiring timely disclosure of material
information.5~

The content and timing of submissions on Form 6-K currently are based on a foreign private issuer's
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disclosure obligations and practices in its home jurisdiction and in any other jurisdiction where its
securities are listed. We recognize that this Rule proposes for the first time to add a substantive
disclosure requirement to Form 6-K, thereby changing the fundamental character of the form. We
understand that some foreign issuers may view Regulation FD as requiring a change in what they
consider to be normal communications with major shareholders, analysts, the press, labor unions, and
other constituencies. In many cases, the disclosure requirements of Regulation FD also will impose a
translation requirement on the information disclosed to the public and/or filed on Form 6-K. On the
other hand, the benefits of the proposal to shareholders in all markets, not just the U.S. capital
markets, may warrant the additional steps required offoreign issuers.
Regulation FD permits issuers to use other means for publicly disseminating non-intentional selective
disclosures as alternatives to Forms 8-K or 6-K. Under current Form 6-K requirements, however,
foreign private issuers are required to submit a Form 6-K containing any material information that is
disseminated publicly, promptly after the dissemination. As proposed, foreign private issuers would
not have to file a Form 6-K if they use one of the alternative means of disclosure permitted by
Regulation FD.
We note that Forms 6-K are not currently required to be filed on EDGAR. which may impede
investor access to information. Does this limitation make the requirement to file on Form 6-K less
useful? If so, how should we address this issue?
We request comment on the proposed coverage of Regulation FD. Would it be appropriate to exempt
all foreign private issuers from compliance with Regulation FD? If so, what would be the basis for
this exemption and how would we address the impact on U.S. investors of having different
requirements for selective disclosures by U.S. issuers and foreign private issuers? Would it be more
appropriate to limit the application of Regulation FD to only certain foreign private issuers. such as
those issuers with equity securities listed on a registered national securities exchange or the Nasdaq
Stock Market National Market System, or foreign private issuers whose number of U.S. shareholders
or volume of trading in our capital markets exceeds certain levels? If so, what levels should trigger
the application of Regulation FD? Are there other ways the proposal could be modified to reduce the
burden on foreign private issuers? Should foreign and domestic issuers be treated similarly with
respect to the application of Section 18 to Regulation FD disclosure?
We are proposing to apply Regulation FD to closed-end investment companies, but not other types of
investment companies. Investment companies that are continually offering their securities to the
public already are required to update their prospectuses to disclose material changes subsequent to the
effective date of the registration statement or any post-effective amendment, and are not permitted to
sell, redeem, or repurchase their securities except at a price based on their securities' net asset value.
While we believe that Regulation FD would offer little additional protection to investors in these
types of investment companies and therefore they should be excluded from its coverage, these
considerations do not apply in the case of closed-end investment companies. We are thus proposing
to include closed-end investment companies within the requirements of Regulation FD.
Al'present, no form used by registered closed-end investment companies is equivalent to Form 8-K.
In order to provide closed-end investment companies with the same disclosure options under
Regulation FD available to operating companies, we propose to permit registered closed-end
investment companies to file on Form 8-K for the sole purpose of making the public disclosure
required by Regulation FD. The Commission does not intend by this rule proposal to otherwise
require registered investment companies to file on Form 8-K.5~

L.....

..

t.-

I.-

'--

L-.

L..-

L-.

L--

........, ......., -, -, -, .......,

......,

--. --.

~

We request comment on whether any investment companies should be covered by Regulation FD,
and if so, which types of investment companies should be covered. Commenters should address
whether there arc specific types of information relating to investment companies that could be the
subject of problematic selective disclosure (e.g., the impending departure ofa portfolio manager who
is primarily responsible for day-to-day management of the fund, or information relating to the fund's
portfolio investments). We also request comment on whether it is appropriate for closed-end
investment companies to file on Form 8-K for purposes of making disclosure under Regulation FD,
and whether there should be a separate Item II for closed-end investment companies making
disclosure on Form 8-K, so that members of the public can easily distinguish filings by closed-end
investment companies from those ofoperating companies. Commenters that oppose the use of Form
8-K by closed-end investment companies should discuss other methods for obtaining equivalent
disclosure from those companies.
7. Liability Issun alfd Securities Act Implicatiolfs
Regulation FD is an issuer disclosure rule that is designed to create duties only under Sections 13(a)
and IS(d) ofthe Exchange Act and Section 30 of the Investment Company Act. It is not an antifraud
rule, and unlike other Section 13(a) and IS(d) reporting requirements, it is not intended to create
duties under Section 100b) of the Exchange Act or any other provision of the federal securities laws.
As a result, no private liability will arise from an issuer's failure to file or make public disclosure.S_~
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Ifan issuer fails to comply with Regulation FD, however, it will be subject to an SEC enforcement
action.5.l! We could bring an administrative action seeking a cease and desist order, or a civil action
seeking an injunction and/or civil money penalties§! In appropriate cases, we could also bring an
enforcement action against the individual(s) at the issuer responsible for the violation, either as "a
cause of' the violation in a cease and desist proceeding.~J or as an aider and abetter of the violation in
an injunctive action. S!
In addition, Regulation FD does not affect or undermine any existing bases ofliability under Rule
10b-S. Thus, for example, liability for "tipping" under Rule 10b-S may still exist ifa selective
disclosure is made in circumstances that meet the Dirks "personal benefit" test. 60 In addition, an
issuer's failure to make a public disclosure still may give rise to liability under a "duty to correct" or
"duty to update" theory in certain circumstances.61 And in other cases, an issuer's contacts with
analysts may lead to liability under the "entanglement" or "adoption" theories.~2
Moreover, ifan issuer's filing or public disclosure made under Regulation FD contained false or
misleading information, or omitted material information, the issuer could incur liability for those
misstatements or omissions. Rule IOb-S would apply to any materially false or misleading statements
made to the public, and ifan issuer had filed a Form 8-K containing false or misleading information,
Section 18 of the Exchange AcW~ would apply as well. Ifa Form 8-K filed under Regulation FD was
required to be incorporated into an issuer's registration statement, it would be subject to liability
under Section II of the Securities Act.~ If the public disclosure is not filed on a Form 8-K, it may
nevertheless be subject to Section II liability ifthe information is otherwise required to be included
in a registration statement subject to Section II.
As noted above, Regulation FD applies only to issuers that have securities registered under Section
12 of the Exchange Act or that are required to file reports under Section IS(d) of that Act.
Accordingly, the Regulation would not apply during an issuer's initial public offering (IPO) of its

--..

--, --, .-' --,

::-'I

--, --,

.....,

.

securities prior to effectiveness of the registration statement.6S
The proposed Regulation would, however, apply to disclosures made by reporting issuers while they
have pending registration statements for securities offerings. For example, the Regulation would
apply to statements made in a "roadshow" for a reporting issuer's offering. In that situation, if an
issuer made oral selective disclosure of material information, Regulation FD would require the issuer
also to make public disclosure of the same information. This would be a departure from current
distinctions in the Securities Act between oral and written communications around the time ofan
offering.~

The required public disclosure could also be considered an "offer" of the securities for purposes of
Section S of that Act,~ and when made by writing or broadcast could be considered a "prospectus"
for purposes of Section 2(a)(10) of the Act.~ This creates the possibility that an issuer may violate
Sections S(c) or S(b)(l) of the Securities Act by making the public disclosures required by Regulation
FD.
To permit an issuer that has already filed a registration statement to make the required public
disclosure without violating Section S(b)(l) of the Securities Act, we arc proposing new Rule 181
under the Securities Act. Under this Rule, any public disclosure required by Rule 100(a) of
Regulation FD would not be required to satisfy the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act~
for a prospectus, as long as the disclosure was made in compliance with Regulation FD. We request
comment on whether this Rule should apply only to non-intentional disclosures. Should we place
other conditions on the use of this Rule - for example, requiring the material information to be
included in the registration statement at the time it is declared effective?
A more difficult situation arises when a reporting company is planning an offering. but has not yet
filed a registration statement. A company may find itself in the position of being required by
Regulation FD to disclose to the public information which could constitute an "offer" of its securities
prior to the filing ofa registration statement. contrary to Section S(c). While companies are not
supposed to make offers to anyone prior to filing a registration statement, an inadvertent disclosure of
material nonpublic information to one person could result in an obligation to disclose information to
the public, thus resulting in offers being made to many persons. If the company complies with the
Regulation FD requirement in that situation, its disclosure would violate Section S(c), and subject it
to liability under Section 12(a)(l) ifit proceeds with its offering. The public disclosure also could
constitute a general solicitation and therefore preclude the company from undertaking a private
exempt offering.
Ifthe Commission were to adopt an exemption from Section S(c) for Regulation FD-required
disclosure, however, companies could abuse that exemption to make public communications that
hype an offering before filing a registration statement with the Commission. In that event. the
balanced full disclosure, against which to test the hyping information, would not be available. The
protections of Section S could thus be eroded. While we have published proposals that, if adopted.
would allow offers to be made prior to the filing of a registration statement in some offerings, those
proposals did not extend to offerings by unseasoned companies to less sophisticated investors. 70 We
proposed to retain the pre-filing prohibition on offers in those cases because of the continued need for
this aspect ofinvestor protection.
We request comment on whether we should also adopt an exemption from liability under Section 5(c)
of the Securities Act for communications made before the filing ofa registration statement If we do

so, should the exemption apply only to non-intentional disclosures? Do the same reasons for
providing a Section S(bXI) exemption also apply to Section S(c), either for all issuers, or for
offerings made by very large issuers or to more sophisticated investors? Or could a Section S(c)
exemption provide issuers with such freedom to make public disclosures prior to filing a registration
statement that issuers could engage in the hyping ofan offering that Section S( c) is designed to
prevent?

markets and thereby promote investor confidence."~
Neither we nor Congress have expressly defined insider trading in a statute or rule. Instead, insider
trading law has developed on a case-by-case basis under the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, primarily Section IO(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule IOb-S. As a result, from time
to time there have been issues on which various courts have disagreed. With the Supreme Court's
O'Hagan decision, the fundamental issues in insider trading law are now settled. Today's proposals
address two issues on which disagreement remains.

With respect to the interplay between Regulation FD and the Securities Act, we request comment on
the proposed approach described above. Should the Regulation also apply to issuers engaged in IPOs?
Alternatively, given the liability questions under the Securities Act for these disclosures and the
pending proposals in the Securities Act Refonn release, should the Regulation not cover
communications made as part of securities offerings under the Securities Act?

A. Rule lObS-I: Trading "On the Basis of' Material Nonpublic Information
I. Background

In our recent release on business combinations,n we adopted non-exclusive exemptions under the
Securities Act, proxy rules, and tender offer rules that pennit communications with respect to
business combinationsI2 for an unrestricted length of time without a cooling-off period between the
end of communications and the filing ofdefinitive disclosure documents. Those communication
exemptions apply regardless of materiality, so long as the conditions to the exemption are satisfied.
All written communications must be filed on the date of first use. Those communications must
contain a prominent legend advising investors to read the registration, proxy, or tender offer
statement, as applicable, when it becomes available. Under those rules, oral statements are not
required to be reduced to writing and filed.
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One unsettled issue in insider trading has been what, ifany, causal connection must be shown
between the trader's possession of inside infonnation and his or her trading. In enforcement cases, we
have argued that a trader may be liable for trading while in "knowing possession" of the infonnation.
The contrary view is that a trader will not be liable unless it is shown that he or she "used" the
infonnation for trading.
Until recent years, there has been little case law discussing this issue. Although the Supreme Court
has variously described an insider's violations as involving trading "on"1~ or "on the basis of'I7
material nonpublic infonnation, it has not addressed the use/possession issue. Three recent court of
appeals cases address the issue. but have reached different results.

Proposed Regulation FD would impose requirements on material communications, written and oral,
that are in addition to the filing and legend requirements of the new business combination rules. Any
material infonnation disclosed to the public, whether oral or written, would be required to be publicly
disseminated by filing, press conference, news release, or otherwise. n Issuers may use confidentiality
agreements to protect communications in the context of business combinations or other transactions
which the issuers expressly mean. to reserve from public disclosure. Early discussions among parties
negotiating a transaction that are subject to confidentiality agreements among the parties and are kept
confidential generally would not be subject to disclosure requirements of Regulation FD or the
communications exemptions. Similarly, discussions between a party to a transaction and a security
holder regarding a possible "lock-up" or other agreement generally would not be subject to these
requirements so long as a confidentiality agreement is in effect.

The three court of appeals cases recognize the practical difficulty of divorcing a trader's knowing
possession, or awareness, of inside infonnation from its "use" in a trade. In United States v.
Teicher,7_B the Second Circuit suggested that "knowing possession" is sufficient to trigger insider
trading liability, for precisely this reason.ICJ In SEC v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit held that "use" was
the ultimate issue, but that proofof "possession" provides a "strong inference" of "use" that suffices
to make out a prima/acie caseJQ In United Stutes v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit required that "use" be
proven in a criminal case.!!!
The Adler court suggested that we could adopt a new rule or amend existing Rule IOb-S to adopt a
presumption approach or to provide for liability for trading while in "knowing possession" of material
nonpublic information.'~ In view of the differing opinions expressed in the three cases discussed
above, we agree that it would be useful to define the scope of Rule IOb-S, as it applies to the
use/possession issue.

Under current practice, parties negotiating a transaction do not always enter a confidentiality
agreement, so Regulation FD may effect a change to current practice. Does this provide a practicable
solution for parties seeking to negotiate transactions or to discuss "lock-ups"?

In our view, the goals of insider trading prohibitions - protecting investors and the integrity of
securities markets - are best accomplished by a standard closer to the "knowing possession" standard.
Whenever a person purchases or sells a security while aware of material nonpublic infonnation that
has been improperly obtained, that person has the type of unfair infonnational advantage over other
participants in the market that insider trading law is designed to prevent.'3 As a practical matter, in
most situations it is highly doubtful that a person who knows inside infonnation relevant to the value
ofa security can completely disregard that knowledge when making the decision to purchase or sell
that security. In the words of the Second Circuit, "material infonnation can not lay idle in the human
brain."'" Indeed, even if the trader could put forth purported reasons for trading other than awareness
of the inside infonnation, other traders in the market place would clearly perceive him or her to

III. Insider Trading Issues
The prohibitions against insider trading in our securities laws play an essential role in maintaining the
fairness, health, and integrity ofour markets. We have long recognized that the fundamental
unfairness of insider trading hanns not only individual investors, but also the very foundations ofour
markets, by undennining investor confidence in the integrity of the markets. Congress, by enacting
two separate laws providing enhanced penalties for insider trading,74 has expressed its strong suppon
for our insider trading enforcement program. And the Supreme Court in United States \'. O'Hagilll has
recently endorsed a key component of insider trading law, the "misappropriation" theory, as
consistent with "an animating purpose" of the federal securities laws: "to insure honest securities
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possess an unfair advantage.
On the other hand, we recognize that an absolute standard based on knowing possession, or
awareness, could be overbroad in some respects. Sometimes a person may reach a decision to make a
particular trade without any awareness of material nonpublic information, but then come into
possession of such information before the trade actually takes place. A rigid "knowing possession"
standard would lead to liability in that case. We believe, however, that for many cases of this type, a
reasonable standard would not make such trading automatically illegal.
The Adler case attempted to balance these considerations by means of a "use" test with a strong
inference of use from "possession." We propose a somewhat different approach today: a general rule
based on "awareness" of the material nonpublic information, with several carefully enumerated
exceptions. We believe our proposed Rule would lead to the same outcome as Adler in almost all
insider trading cases, but will provide greater clarity and certainty than a presumption or "strong
inference" approach. Our proposed approach will better enable insiders and issuers to conduct
themselves in accordance with the law.

1. Proposed Rule IObS-1
Proposed Rule lObS-I is designed to address only the use/possession issue in insider trading cases
under Rule 10b-S. As the Preliminary Note states, the Rule does not modify or address any other
aspect of insider trading law, which has been established by case law under Rule 10b-S.
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Paragraph (a) sets forth the general prohibition ofinsider trading contained in existing case law.
Under existing law, it is illegal to trade a security "on the basis of material nonpublic information
about that security or issuer, in breach ofa duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly,
or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person
who is the source of the material nonpublic information."~ This language incorporates all theories of
insider trading liability under the case law - classical insider trading, temporary insider theory, tippee
liability, and trading by someone who misappropriated the inside information.'~
Paragraph (b) defines trading "on the basis of' material nonpublic information. A trade is on the basi s
of material nonpublic information if the trader "was aware of' the information when he or she made
the purchase or sale. Thus, the general rule is that "awareness" of the inside informationinevitably
leads to use of the information, and provides a sufficient basis for liability.
Paragraph (c) provides specific affirmative defenses against liability. A purchase or sale is not "on the
basis of' information when a person can establish that one offour exclusive situations is true. These
four defenses cover situations in which a person can show that the information he or she possessed
was not a factor in the trading decision.
First. an affirmative defense is available if, before becoming aware of material nonpublic
information, a person had entered into "a binding contract" to trade "in the amount" and "at the price"
and on the date at which he or she ultimately tradedJ7 This defense permits persons to carry out preexisting contracts to purchase or sell a specified number (or dollar amount) of shares of a particular
security at a specified price (or at the market price), as long as the person was not aware of material
nonpublic information when he or she entered into the contract.~
Second, an affirmative defense is similarly available if, before becoming aware of material nonpublic

information, a person "had provided instructions to another person to execute" a trade for the
instructing person's account, "in the amount, at the price, and on the date" at which that trade was
ultimately executed.'!' This defense would apply, for example, to an insider who instructs his or her
broker to execute a plan to sell stock in accordance with Rule 144 at the expiration of a required
holding period. If the insider provides the instructions without awareness of any material nonpublic
information, the Rule would permit him or her to complete the previously instructed sales plan even
if he or she later became aware of inside information.
Third, the Rule provides an affirmative defense if, before becoming aware of material nonpublic
information, a person "[h]ad adopted, and had previously adhered to, a written plan specifying
purchases or sales of the security in the amounts, and at the prices, and on the dates at which the
person purchased or sold the security."2Q This provision is designed to apply in the case of an insider
who wishes to establish a regular, pre-established program of buying or selling his or her company's
securities. If the plan is established before the insider is aware of material nonpublic information, and
provides for specified trades at specified times, the insider will be permitted to engage in those trades
even if he or she later becomes aware of material nonpublic information. As discussed below, plans
of this type must be entered into in good faith, and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade insider
trading prohibitions.~
Fourth, the Rule provides an affirmative defense for purchases or sales that result from a ""Titten plan
for trading securities that is designed to track or correspond to a market index, market segment, or
group of securities. 9;! This defense would permit trading by an index fund, for example, where the
fund's trading strategy was pre-established by the fund or its manager, even if the manager later
became aware of material nonpublic information regarding one of the securities in the index. The
defense would be available if the plan was sufficiently circumscribed to prevent trading decisions
from being affected by the manager's later awareness of material nonpublic information.
The Rule provides one important limitation on the availability of all of the affirmative defenses.
Paragraph (c)(1 )(ii) states that a defense would be available only if a contract, plan, or instruction to
trade relied on for a defense was entered into in good faith, and not as part of a plan or scheme to
evade the prohibitions of this Rule. If a person changes a previous contract, plan, or instruction in any
respect after becoming aware of material nonpublic information, he or she will lose any defense
against liability. Thus, for example, if an insider enters into a contract or plan to sell 1,000 shares of
his or her company's stock without being aware of material nonpublic information, then learns
negative material nonpublic information and doubles his or her planned sale to 2, 000 shares. he or
she will lose the defense for the entire sale of2, 000 shares. Similarly, if the insider accelerates the
timing of a planned sale in order to complete it before the release of negative corporate news that he
or she has recently learned, he or she will have no defense for the transaction.
Paragraph (c)(l)(ii) also specifies that a person will lose any defense for a trade ifhe or she enters
into or alters a "corresponding or hedging transaction or position" with respect to the planned
securities trade. This requirement is designed to prevent persons from devising schemes to exploit
inside information by setting up pre-existing hedged trading programs, and then canceling execution
of the unfavorable side of the hedge, while permitting execution of the favorable transaction. By
altering the corresponding position, the insider would lose any defense for the transaction that he or
she permitted to be executed. 91
The Rule provides an additional, separate affirmative defense designed solely for entities that trade. 94
This defense is derived from the defense against liability currently provided in Exchange Act Rule

14e-3(b)9S regarding insider trading in a tender offer situation. To meet this defense, an entity must
demonstrate two things: first, that the individual(s) making the decision on behalfof the entity was
not aware of the inside information; and second, that the entity had implemented reasonable policies
and procedures (e.g., informational barriers, restricted lists) to prevent insider trading.

fiduciary relationship.tO~ It stated that in the absence ofan "express agreement of confidentiality. "or
a "pre-existing fiduciary-like relationship between the parties" to a family relationship. there is not a
sufficient basis for establishing the necessary duty to support a fraud conviction under the
misappropriation theory J!U

J. Reqllestfor Comments

CMstman makes clear that its narrow approach, in contrast to the "elastic" definition of confidential
relations employed by courts of equity in the civil context, was influenced by the criminal context of
the case before it.!!!'!ln our view, however, the CMstman majority's approach does not fully
recognize the degree to which parties to close family and personal relationships have reasonable and
legitimate expectations of confidentiality in their communications.lM For this reason, we believe the
Chestman majority view does not sufficientlyprotect investors and the securities markets from the
misappropriation and resulting misuse of inside information.

We request comments on all aspects of proposed Rule lObS-I. Is the approach we propose - a general
standard of "awareness" of the information, with specific affirmative defenses - the appropriate one?
Are the proposed affirmative defenses appropriate? Should we provide additional defenses to
liability, and if so, what should they be? Are the provisions defining the "amount" and "price" of preplanned trades specific enough to permit plans to be made? Should we require written plans or
instructions in all cases? Should we require that contracts, instructions, or trading plans be approved
by counsel?

We have investigated and prosecuted a large number of insider trading cases that involved trading by
friends or family members of insiders. In many of these cases, the evidence supports the claim that
the insider intended to give the information to the friend or family member for trading.tC!~ The
evidence in such cases supports liability under a classical tipper-tippee theory. 1(17

We also request comment on whether the defense for institutional traders is appropriate and adequate.
Has this provision worked effectively for entities subject to Rule 14e-3? Is there any reason the same
type of provision would not be adequate for this Rule?

In other circumstances, however, the evidence does not support the view that the disclosing insider
intended or expected that the recipient of the inside information would trade. Instead, the evidence
indicates that the insider confided the material nonpublic information to the friend or relation with the
reasonable expectation that the recipient of the information would maintain the confidence. In those
situations, a classical tipper-tippee theory of liability would probably not be available under the Dirks
analysis. The misappropriation theory ofliability would fit the facts better, because the trader
breached a duty ofconfidentiality to the disclosing insider when he or she traded on the basis of the
inside information. However, misappropriation liability is very difficult to establish in these
situations under the restrictive analysis of Chestman, because Chestman appears to require either an
express agreement ofconfidentiality, or a pre-existing fiduciary-like relationship that included the
prior sharing of business confidences. Stated differently. under Chestman, it is not sufficient that the
disclosing insider had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality based on his or her prior
relationship with the trader.

B. Rule IOb5-2: Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation Insider Trading Cases
1. Background
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In Uniled Slates v. O'Hagan' the Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation theory of insider
trading.?!! Under that theory, a person commits fraud in violation of Section 100b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule IOb-S by misappropriating material nonpublic information for securities trading
purposes, in breach ofa duty of loyalty and confidence.
Certain types of businessrelationships by themselves provide the duty of trust or confidence necessary
in a misappropriation theory case. In O'Hagan' for example, the attorney-client relationship
established the duty ofconfidence. In other cases. the agency relationship inherent in an employeremployee relationship provides the duty.'!~ It is not as settled, however, under what circumstances
certain non-business relationships, such as family and personal relationships, may provide the duty of
trust or confidence required under the misappropriation theory.

Cheslman thus leads to the following anomalous result. A family member who receives a
"tip" (within the meaning of Dirks) and then trades violates Rule IOb-S. A family member who trades
in breach ofan express promise of confidentialityalso violates Rule IOb-S. A family member who
trades in breach ofa reasonable and legitimate expectation ofconfidentiality, however, does not
necessarily violate Rule t Ob-S.

Two courts have considered this issue in criminal cases: United Slates v. Chestman'!J and United
States v. Reed·'!'!. Although Cheslman and Reed took into account common law notions of fiduciary
and confidential relationships, they both took a relatively narrow view of when a duty ofconfidence
exists in the context ofcriminal liability for insider trading.

We think that this anomalous result harms investor confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
nation's securities markets. The family member's trading has the same impact on the market and
investor confidence in the third example as it does in the first two examples. In all three examples the
trader's informational advantage "stems from contrivance, not luck, " and the informational
disadvantage to other investors "cannot be overcome with research or skill."IOS We believe that
permitting the trader in the third example to trade legally is inconsistent with investors' expectations
about what types of informational advantages can be properly exploited. Moreover. this result
provides all trading family members - including those in the classical tipper-tippee exampic - with a
roadmap for concocting a story that could provide a lawful explanation for the trading. Finally. the
need to distinguish between the three types ofcases may require an unduly intrusive examination of

In Reed, the court did not find a father-son relationship sufficient in itself to provide the required duty
of confidence. But it stated that if family members have a prior history of sharing confidences, such
that one family member has a reasonable expectation that the other will keep those confidences. thcre
may be a sufficient relationship of trust and confidence. The final determination is left to the fact
finder.!OQ
In Chestman, a narrow majority of the Second Circuit en bane' while not overruling Reed. took a
more restrictive view.Htl The Chestman majority held that marriage alone does not suffice to create a
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Accordingly, we believe that there is good reason for the broader approach we propose today for
detennining when family or personal relationships create "duties of trust or confidence" under the
misappropriation theory. Our proposed approach is not designed to interfere with particular family or
personal relationships; rather. our goal is to protect investors and the fairness and integrity of the
nation's securities markets against improper trading on the basis of inside infonnation.

c. Enumerated Family Relationships

Paragraph (a) states that the Rule applies to any cases based on the misappropriation theory of insider
trading, whether involving trading or tipping. Paragraph (b) enumerates a non-exclusive list of
circumstances under which a "duty oftrust or confidence" shall exist.t09
a. Agreement Between the Parties

W
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Should other factors be relevant to the analysis as well?

Proposed Rule IObS-2 sets forth a non-exclusive definition ofcircumstances in which a person has a
duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the "misappropriation" theory ofinsider trading under
Section 100b) of the Exchange Act and Rule IOb-S thereunder. As stated in the Preliminary Note to
the Rule. the law ofinsider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions interpreting Rule IOb-S,
and this Rule is not intended to address or modify the scope of insider trading law in any other
respecL
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the details of particular family relationships.

2. Proposd Rule 1065-2
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First. whenever a person agrees to maintain infonnation in confidence. a duty of trust or confidence
exists. I,Ill This reflects the common-sense notion, acknowledged in Reed and Chestman. that
reasonable expectations ofconfidentiality. and corresponding duties, can be created by an agreement
between two parties. Although sometimes, most commonly in a business context. the parties will sign
an express, written confidentiality agreement. the Rule does not require either a written or an express
confidentiality agreement. This approach recognizes the fact that in everyday personal interactions.
individuals frequently rely on reasonable, implicit understandings of confidentiality. In some
situations, it may not be realistic or socially acceptable to insist that a close friend or relative execute
a signed confidentiality agreement, or expressly consent to an oral agreement.
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Third, paragraph (b)(3) sets forth a bright line liability rule for certain enumerated close family
relationships. but allows for an affinnative defense. Spousal, parent-child,U~ and sibling
relationships would be sufficient in themselves as a basis for misappropriation theory liability.
Ourenforcement experience demonstrates that these are the relationships in which family members
most commonly share infonnation with alegitimate expectation of trust or confidentialityJ 1l These
also are nonnally the types ofclose familial relationships in which the parties have a history. pattern,
or practiceofsharing confidences that would lead to a reasonable expectation ofconfidentiality.
Paragraph (b)(3) pennits the person receiving or obtaining the infonnation to assert an affinnative
defense by demonstrating that under the facts and circumstances of that particular family relationship,
no duty of trust or confidence existed. To demonstrate this, the person must establish that the
disclosing family member did not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality because the parties
had neither: (a) a history, pattern, or practice ofsharing confidences; nor (b) an agreement or
understanding to maintain the confidential ity of the infonnation. If the person receiving or obtaining
the infonnation can satisfy the requirements of the affinnative defense set forth in paragraph (b)(3),
he or she would not be liable under Rule IObS-2.
Paragraph (b)(3) does not reach non-traditional relationships (e,g., domestic partners) or more
extended family relationships. However. paragraphs (b)( I) and (b)(2) could reach these relationships,
depending on the factual context of the relationship. We request comment on whether this is an
appropriate distinction.
Are the family relationships enumerated in paragraph (b)(3) the proper ones to cover, or is the list too
narrow or too broad? Should the list ofenumerated relationships be limited to family members
residing in the same household? Should it expressly encompass step-parents and step-children?
Should it expressly encompass non-traditional relationships, and if so, which ones? Should it include
additional family relationships. such as the list of family relationships covered in our Section 16
rules?

b. Relationships With A History, Pattern, Or Practice Of Sharing Confidences

J. Request/of' Comments

Second, the Ruleprovides that a duty of trust or confidence exists when two people have a "history.
pattern. or practice ofsharing confidences, such that the person communicating the material
nonpublic infonnation has a reasonable expectation that the other person would maintain its
confidentiality."iH This part of the Rule does not use a bright line test that enumerates specific
relationships. but instead sets forth a "facts and circumstances" analysis derived from Reed· This
standard recognizes that in some circumstances a past pattern of conduct between two parties will
lead to a legitimate, reasonable expectation ofconfidentiality on the part of the confiding person. This
analysis does not requirethat the history. pattern, or practice of sharing confidences include the
sharing of business confidences for there to be a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of
misappropriation liability. However, evidence about the type of confidences shared in the past might
be relevant to detennining the reasonableness of the expectation of confidentiality.

We request comment on all aspects of Proposed Rule IObS-2. For non-enumerated relationships. does
paragraph (b)(2) focus on the proper factors for detennining whether a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality exists? Is the approach of paragraph (b)(3) - a per se rule with an affinnative defense
for certain enumerated family relationships - the most suitable one, or should a different standard be
employed?

We request comments on the approach proposed in paragraph (b)(2). Does the requirement ofa prior
"history. pattern, or practice" of sharing confidences provide a sufficiently well-defined standard?

IV. General Request for Comments
We invite you to submit comments on proposed Regulation FD. Rule IOb5-I, and/or Rule IOb5-2. If
you have empirical data relevant to proposed Regulation FD, Rule IOb5-1. or Rule IOb5-2, please
include it with your comments. Please submit three copies of your comment letter to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N. W.• Washington.
D.C. 20549-0609. You may also submit comments electronically to the following e-mail address:
rule-comments@sec.gov. Refer to File No. S7-31-99. If you are commenting bye-mail. include this

',.,

file number on the subject line. We will make comments available for public inspection and copying
in the Commission's public reference room at 4S0 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20S49. In
addition, we will post electronically submitted comment letters on our Internet Website
(http://www.sec.gov).

V. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions ofRegulation FD, and the related amendments to Form 8-K and Form 6-K under
the Exchange Act, contain "collections of information" requirements within the meaning of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of I 99S,!H and the Commission has submitted the proposal to the Office
ofManagement and Budget ("OMB") for review in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3S07(d) and S CFR
1320.1 1. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a currently valid control number.
Form 8-K (OMB Control No. 323S..()()6()ill was adopted pursuant to Sections 13, IS, and 23 of the
Exchange Act. Form 8·K prescribes information, such as material events or corporate changes. that a
registrant must disclose. Form 6-K (OMB Control No. 323S-0116)U~ was adopted pursuant to
Sections 13 and IS of the Exchange Act. Form 6-K prescribes information that foreign private issuers
subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act must disclose. The Commission is also
proposing to create a new information collection entitled "Reg. FD· Other Disclosure Materials."
This information collection will encompass press releases, webcasts, announcements, conference
calls, etc. that are conducted pursuant to Regulation FD, which is proposed pursuant to Sections 13,
IS, 23, and 36 of the Exchange Act, and that are not filed under cover of Form 8·K or Form 6·K.
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The Commission currently estimates that Form 8-K results in a total annual compliance burden of
140, SOO hours. The burden was calculated by multiplying the estimated number of Form 8-K filings
annually (approximately 28, 100) by the estimated average number of hours each entity spends
completing the form (approximately S hours). The Commission based the number ofentities that
would complete and file each of the forms on the actual number of filers during the 1999 fiscal year.
The staffestimated the average number of hours each entity spends completing each of the forms by
contacting a number of law firms and other persons regularly involved in completing the forms.
The Commission currently estimates that Form 6-K results in a total annual compliance burden of91,
848 hours and $S I S, 000 non-labor burden costs. This was calculated by multiplying the estimated
number of Form 6-K filings annually (approximately 11,481) by the estimated average number of
hours each entity spends completing the form (approximately 8 hours) and adding the non·labor
burden costs. The Commission based the number ofentities that would complete and file each of the
forms on the actual number of filers during the 1999 fiscal year. The staffestimated the average
number of hours each entity spends completing each of the forms by contacting a number of law
firms and other persons regularly involved in completing the forms.
We believe that the proposed Regulation is necessary to provide for fairer and more effective
disclosure of issuer information to all investors and thereby bolster investor confidence in the
securities markets. Under the proposed Regulation, issuers would be required to simultaneously (or.
in some instances, promptly), upon first disclosure of material, nonpublic information, publicly
disclose the information broadly. The disclosure could be made by filing a Form 8-K or Form 6-K
with the Commission, disseminating a press release to a widely circulated news or wire service. or
disseminating the information through any other method ofdisclosure that is reasonably designed to
provide broad public access to the information and does not exclude any members of the public from
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access.
We estimate that, on average, completing and filing a Form 8·K under proposed Regulation FD
would require the same amount of time currently spent by entities completing the Formapproximately S hours. We estimate that, on average, completing and filing a Form 6-K under
proposed Regulation FD would require the same amount of time spent completing Form 6-Kapproximately 8 hours. As noted, however, under the proposed Regulation, companies are exempt
from the requirement to file a Form 6-K or Form 8-K if they disseminate a press release to a widely
circulated news or wire service or disseminate the information through any other method of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the information and does not
exclude any members of the public from access. We estimate that other methods of disclosure, such
as press releases and press conferences, will require no more than the preparation time of Form 8-Kless than S burden hours.
We anticipate that, under Regulation FD, companies will make fiveUl disclosures per year.Us Since
there are approximately 14,000 companies affected by this Regulation, we estimate that there will be
70,000 additional disclosures per year under Regulation FD. Based on a burden hour estimate of five
hours, we anticipate that companies will incur 3S0, 000 additional burden hours under Regulation
FD.m

Compliance with the disclosure requirements is mandatory. There would be no mandatory retention
period for the information disclosed, and responses to the disclosure requirements will not be kept
confidential.
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3S06(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits comments to: (i) evaluate whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (ii) evaluate the accuracy of the
Commission's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (iii) determine
whether there are ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
and (iv) evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on
those who are to respond. including through the use ofautomated collection techniques or other
forms of information technology.
Persons submitting comments on the collection of information requirements should direct the
comments to the Office of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington. D.C. 20S03. and
should send a copy to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 4S0 Fifth
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20S49-o609, with reference to File No. S7-31-99. Requests for
materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard to these collections of information
should be in writing, refer to File No. S7-31-99, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Records Management, Office of Filings and Information Services. OMB is required to
make a decision concerning the collection of information between 30 and 60 days after publication of
this release. Consequently, a comment to OMB is assured of having its full effect ifOMB receives it
within 30 days of publication.

VI. Cost-Benefit Analysis
A. Regulation FD: Selective Disclosure
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Proposed Regulation FD would require that when an issuer intentionally discloses material nonpublic
information to any person outside the issuer, it must simultaneously make public disclosure, and
when it unintentionally discloses material nonpublic information, it must promptly make public
disclosure.
Proposed Regulation FD is intended to produce several imponant benefits to investors and the
securities markets as a whole. First, Regulation FD will inhibit current practices of selective
disclosure, which damage investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the markets. One recent
study indicates that analysts and institutional investors immediately use information received in
conference calls to tradeJ~!! Traders on the other side of these transactions, who are excluded from
the conference calls, do not have the same information as the more informed analysts and selected
investors. Numerous individual investors have complained about this practice. By addressing
selective disclosure of material information, the proposed Regulation will foster fairer disclosure of
information to all investors, and thereby increase investor confidence in market integrity.
By enhancing investor confidence in the markets, we believe the proposed Regulation will encourage
continued widespread investor panicipation in our markets, which will enhance market efficiency and
liquidity, and foster more effective capital raising.
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Second, we believe that issuers may also benefit from more open and fair disclosure practices. One
study concluded that companies that more liberally disclose information have a larger analyst
following, a narrower consensus in earnings estimates, and a low stock price volatility, which likely
leads to a lower cost of equity capital.!l1 Proposed Regulation FD would encourage these beneficial
disclosure practices.
Third, the proposed Regulation likely will also provide benefits to securities analysts and others in the
market for information. This Regulation will place all analysts on equal competitive footing with
respect to access to material information. As well, this Regulation will allow analysts to express their
honest opinions without fear of being denied access to valuable corporate informationJ2~ Analysts
will continue to be able to use and benefit from superior diligence or acumen, without facing the
prospect that other analysts will have a competitive edge based solely on better access to corporate
insiders.
We do not currently have sufficient information to quantify these or other benefits. We therefore
request your comments, including supponing data, on the benefits of the Regulation.
The proposed Regulation would impose some costs on issuers. First, there will be some additional
cost to publicly disclose material nonpublic information on a non-selective basis. This proposal gives
issuers three options for making public disclosure. The issuer can: (I) file a Form 8-KJ)3 or Form 6K;124 (2) disseminate a press release containing the material nonpublic information through a widely
circulated news or wire service; or (3) disseminate the information through any other method of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the information and does not
exclude any members of the public from access (e.g., teleconference, web-conference).
Because the Regulation does not require issuers to disclose material information (just to make any
disclosure on a non-selective basis), we cannot predict with cenainty how many issuers will actually
make disclosures under this Regulation. For purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act. however. we
estimate that issuers will make fivel2~ public disclosures under Rcgulation FD per year. 126 Since
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there are approximately 14,000 issuers affected by this Regulation, we estimate that the total number
of disclosures under Regulation FD per year will be 70, 000.
If an issuer files a Form 8-K, we estimate that the issuer would incur, on average. five burden hours
per filing. This estimate is based on current burden hour estimates under the Paperwork Reduction
Act for filing a Form 8-K and the staffs experience with such filings. We believe that approximately
75% of the burden hours are expended by the company's internal professional staff, and the remaining
25% by outside counsel. Assuming a cost of $85lhour for in-house professional staff and $1 25lhour
for outside counsel, we believe the total cost is $475 per filing.
If an issuer files a Form 6-K, we estimate that the issuer would incur, on average, eight burden hours
per filing and other miscellaneous costs 0($45 per filing. This estimate is based on estimates under
the Paperwork Reduction Act for filing a Form 6-K and the staffs experience with such filings. We
believe that approximately 75% of the burden hours are expended by the issuer's internal professional
staff, and the remaining 25% by outside counsel. Assuming a cost of$85lhour for in-house
professional staff and $1251hour for outside counsel, we believe the total cost is $805 per filing.
We have no hard data on which to base estimates of the costs of other disclosure options. However,
we anticipate that other methods of disclosure, such as press releases, may require less preparation
time than a Form 8-K.lfthe costs of the other methods of disclosure are less than the cost of filing
the Form 8-K, we presume issuers will choose the other methods of public disclosure. Issuers may,
however, choose to use methods of dissemination with higher out-of-pocket costs, presumably
because they believe these methods provide additional benefits to the issuer or investor.
Given that we estimate that there will be 70, 000 disclosures under Regulation FD per year at a cost
of approximately $475 per disclosure, 127 we estimate that the total paperwork burden of preparing
the information for disclosure per year will be approximately $33, 250, 000.
We request your comments, including supponing data, on our estimates of the costs of each
disclosure option, the number of times a company will make a disclosure in a year, and which method
companies are likely to use.
The proposed Regulation may also lead to some increased costs for issuers resulting from new or
enhanced systems and procedures for disclosure practices. We believe that many, if not most. issuers
already have intemal procedures for communicating with the public; for many issuers, therefore. new
procedures to prevent selective disclosures will not be needed. There might be a cost to these issuers,
however, for enhancing and strengthening existing procedures to ensure that nonpublic material
information is not inadvenently disclosed and for disclosing inadvenently released materials
promptly. We do not have data to quantify the cost of enhancing and strengthening existing internal
monitoring procedures, and we seek your comments and supponing data on these costs.
We are sensitive to the concern that the proposed Regulation might "chill" corporate disclosures to
analysts, investors, and the media. Issuers may speak less often out of fear of a post hoc assessment
that disclosed information was material. If the Regulation has such a chilling effect. there would be a
cost to overall market efficiency. However, there are numerous practices that issuers may employ to
continue to communicate freely with analysts and investors, while becoming more careful in how
they disclose information. Moreover, the Regulation only covers the selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information; the level of "soft" or non-material information available to the market need
not decrease. As well, we believe issuers have strong reasons to continue releasing information. given

costs to this aspect of the proposed Rule. We seek comments and data on any costs that this Rule
would impose.

the market demand for information and a company's desire to promote its products and services.
Further, we note that, in light ofexisting SRO rules and disclosure practice guidance provided by
organizations such as NIRI, many issuers are currently conducting their disclosure practices in a
manner consistent with the proposed Regulation. In light of these factors, we request your comments
on the effect the proposed Regulation will have on information flow. Please support your comments
and conclusions with data.

VII. Consideration orthe Burden on Competition, and Promotion or Effic:iency,
Competition, and Capital Formation
For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act of 1996,128 the
Commission is requesting information regarding the potential impact of the proposals on the
economy on an annual basis. Commenters should provide empirical data to support their views.

Today's proposal is designed to create duties only under Sections l3(a) and IS(d) of the Exchange
Act, and the Regulation does not create new duties under Section 100b) of the Exchange Act. We
nevertheless request comments on liability exposure, including the underlying case law if applicable,
and we request your estimates of any costs that may result from increased risk of liability.

Section 23(a) of the Exchange Actl.2~ requires the Commission, when adopting rules under the
Exchange Act, to consider the anti-competitive effects of any rule it adopts. Because we do not
believe the rules would affect companies differently, we do not believe that the proposals would have
any anti-competitive effects. We request comment on any anti-competitive effects ofthe proposals.

Are there other costs we have not identified? Please supply data to help us estimate the cost.
B. Proposed Rule lObS-I: Trading "On the Basis of' Material NonpublIc Information

In addition, Section 3(f) of the Exchange ActlJ.Q requires the Commission, when engaging in
rulemaking that requires it to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in
the public interest, to consider whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation. We believe that the proposals would bolster investor confidence in the securities markets
by improving both the actual and perceived equity of the information available to investors from all
companies. Accordingly, the proposals should promote capital formation and market efficiency. We
anticipate no impact on competition. We request comment on these matters.

Proposed Rule lObS-I would define when a sale or purchase of a security occurred "on the basis of'
material nonpublic information. Under the proposed Rule, a person trades "on the basis of' material
nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic
information at the time of the purchase or sale. However, the proposed Rule provides affirmative
defenses to liability when a trade resulted from a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction that was
made in good faith.
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We anticipate two significant benefits arising from proposed Rule lObS- I. First, the Rule should
increase investor confidence in the integrity and fairness of the market because it clarifies and
strengthens existing insider trading law. Second, the proposed Rule will benefit corporate insiders by
providing greater clarity and certainty on how they can plan and structure securities transactions. The
Rule provides specific guidance on how a person can plan future transactions at a time when he or
she is not aware of material nonpublic information without fear ofincurring liability. We believe that
this guidance will make it easier for corporate insiders to conduct themselves in accordance with the
laws against insider trading. We seek your comments and supporting data on these or other benefits
that we have not identified.

VIII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
This Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis has been prepared in accordance with S U.S.C. 603. It
relates to proposed new Regulation FD, Rule lObS-I, and Rule IObS-2 under the Exchange Act. as
amended. The proposed Regulation and Rules address the selective disclosure of material information
and clarify two unsettled issues under current insider trading law.
A. Reasons for the Proposed Action
The proposed Rules address three separate issues. Regulation FD addresses the problem of issuers
making selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to analysts or particular investors
before making disclosure to the investing public. Rules lObS-I and IObS-2 address two unsettled
issues in insider trading case law: (I) whether the Commission needs to show that a defendant "used"
material nonpublic information in an insider trading case, or merely that the defendant traded while in
"knowing possession" ofthe information; and (2) when a family or other non-business relationship
can give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. By addressing these
issues, t1te proposals will enhance investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities
markets.

The Rule does not require any particular documentation or recordkeeping by insiders, although it
would, in some cases, require a person to document a particular plan, contract, or instruction for
trading if he or she wished to establish an affirmative defense that his or her trading was not "on the
basis of' material nonpublic information. We therefore do not attribute any f:osts to this aspect of the
proposed Rule. We seek comments and data on any costs that this Rule would impose.
C. Rule IOb5-2: Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation Insider Trading Cases
Proposed Rule I ObS-2 would enumerate three non-exclusive bases for determining when a person
receiving information was subject to a duty "of trust or confidence" for purposes of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading. Two principal benefits are likely to result from this Rule.
First, the Rule will provide greater clarity and certainty to the law on the question of when a family
relationship will create a duty of trust or confidence. Second. the Rule will address an anomaly in
current law under which a family member receiving material nonpublic information may exploit it
without violating the prohibition against insider trading. By addressing this potential gap in the law.
the Rule would enhance investor confidence in the integrity of the market. We do not attribute any
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B. Objectives
Proposed Regulation FD would require that when an issuer intentionally discloses material nonpublic
information it do so through public disclosure, not selective disclosure. When an issuer has made a
non-intentional selective disclosure, Regulation FD would require the issuer to make prompt public
disclosure thereafter. The proposed Regulation provides for several alternative methods by which an
issuer can make the required public disclosure. We believe that this proposal will provide for fairer
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and more effective disclosure of important information by issuers to the investing public.

engage in securities trading while aware of inside information.

Proposed Rule lObS· I would resolve the unsettled case law on whether the Commission must prove
that a defendant "used" or traded while in "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information in
order to prove insider trading liability. The proposal would provide a general rule that liability arises
when a person trades while "aware" of material nonpublic information. It provides four defenses
against liability, in cases where a trade resulted from a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction that
was made in good faith. It also provides a defense against liability for trading by entities, including
small entities, when the individual making the trade was not aware of the information, and the entity
had implemented reasonable procedures to prevent insider trading. We believe this proposed Rule
would clarify an important issue in insider trading law, and thereby enhance investor confidence in
market integrity.

E. Reporting, Recordkeeping, And Other Compliance Requirements

Proposed Rule IObS·2 would define when a non-business relationship, such as a family or personal
relationship, may provide the duty of trust and confidence required under the misappropriation theory
of insider trading. This issue currently is also unsettled in the case law. Moreover, we believe that the
main case on the issue, which arose in a criminal prosecution, does not fully recognize the degree to
which parties to close family and personal relationships have reasonable and legitimate expectations
of confidentiality in their communications, and leads to anomalous results in certain situations.
Accordingly, the proposed Rule defines the scope of "duties of trust and confidence" for purposes of
the misappropriation theory in a manner that more appropriately serves the purposes ofinsider
trading law. Proposed Rule IObS·2 will have no direct effect on small entities.
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We are proposing Regulation FD, Rule 181, the amendments to Forms 6-K and
8-K, Rule 10bS·I, and Rule IOb5·2 under the authority set forth in Sections 10, 19(a) and 28 of the
Securities Act,lll Sections 3, 9,10, 13, 15,23, and 36 of the Exchange Act,tn and Section 30 of the
Investment Company ActJ3)
D. Small Entities Subject to tbe Proposed Regulation and Rules
Proposed Regulation FD would affect issuers and closed-end investment companies that are small
entities..I~~ As of July 31, 1999, the Commission estimated that there were approximately 830
issuers, other than investment companies, that may be considered small entities.U~ As of December
14, 1999, the Commission estimated that there are approximately 62 closed-end investment
companies that may be considered small entities subject to Regulation FD. mi
Proposed Rule IOb5·1 would apply to any small entities that engage in securities trading while aware
of inside information and therefore are subject to existing insider trading prohibitions of Rule IOb-5.
This could include issuers, broker-dealers,137 investment advisers,!}. and investment companies. As
of July 31, 1999, the Commission estimated that there were approximately 830 issuers. other than
investment companies, that may be considered small entities. As of December 31. 1998. the
Commission estimated that there were approximately 970 broker-dealers that may be considered
small entities. 13'? As of December 15,1999, the Commission estimated that there were approximately
2, 000 investment advisersthat may be considered small entities. 140 As of December 14, 1999. the
Commission estimated that there are approximately 227 investment companies that may be
considered small entities. The Commission cannot estimate with certainty how many small entities
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1. R~gula'ion FD
When an issuer, large or small, discloses material nonpublic information. proposed Regulation FD
would require it to do one of the following: (I) file a Form 8·K or, in the case of a foreign private
issuer, a Form 6·K; (2) disseminate a press release containing the information through a widely
circulated news or wire service; or (3) disseminate the information through any other method of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the information and does not
exclude any members of the public from access (i.e., a press conference to which the public is granted
access such as by a teleconference or other electronic transmission).
The Regulation's "public disclosure" requirement would give small entity issuers flexibility in how to
disseminate information (such as telephonic or Internet conference calls). This flexible performance
element enables small entity issuers the freedom to select the method of public disclosure that best
suits their business operations, and makes it unlikely that this "public disclosure" requirement would
have a disproportionate affect on small entity issuers.

2. Ru/~ /ObS·/
Proposed Rule lObS· I does not directly impose any recordkeeping or compliance requirements on
any small entities. To the extent that an entity engaged in securities trading wished to rely on one of
the defenses against liability provided in the Rule. it might be required to take certain steps. For
example, to assert the affirmative defense in paragraph (c)(1 )(i)(D) for trades that result from a
written plan for trading securities designed to track or correspond to a market index, market segment,
or group of securities, an entity, large or small, would have to maintain a written record of the trading
plan. More generally, any entity, large or small, that sought to rely on the affirmative defense in
paragraph (c)(2) for institutional traders would be required to comply with the specific provisions of
that defense, including implementing reasonable policies and procedures to prevent insider trading.
We believe that most entities to whom this defense would be relevant - i.e.' broker-dealers and
investment advisers - already have the required procedures in place, because of existing statutory
requirements.HJ

J. Rule /065-2
Proposed Rule IOb5-2 affects individuals and not entities. Accordingly, we believe that proposed
Rule IObS-2 would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number ofsmall entities.
F. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflieting Federal Rules
The Commission believes that there are no rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict with proposed
Regulation FD, Rule 10bS·I, or Rule IObS·2.
G. Significant Alternatives
The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs the Commission to consider significant alternatives that would
accomplish the stated objective, while minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entity
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issuers. In connection with proposed Regulation FD and Rule 10bS-1 we considered the following
alternatives: (a) the establishment of differing compliance or reponing requirements or timetables that
take into account the resources available to small entities; (b) the clarification, consolidation, or
simplification ofcompliance and reponing requirements under the Rule for small entities; (c) the use
of performance rather than design standards; and (d) an exemption from coverage of the Regulation
or Rule, or any pan thereof, for small entities.
With respect to proposed Regulation FD, we believe that different compliance or reponing
requirements or timetables for small entities would interfere with achieving the primary goal of
protecting investors. For the same reason, we believe that exempting small entities from coverage of
proposed Regulation FD, in whole or pan, is not appropriate. In addition, we have concluded
preliminarily that it is not feasible to funher clarify, consolidate, or simplify the proposed Regulation
for small entities. We have used performance elements in proposed Regulation FD in two ways.
Regulation FD does not require that an issuer satisfy its obligations in accordance with any specific
design, but rather allows each issuer, including small entities, flexibility to select the method of
compliance that is most efficient and appropriate for its business operations. First, each issuer can
select what methodes) to use to avoid selective disclosure (e.g., by designating which authorized
official(s) will speak with analysts). Second, each issuer can choose what methodes) to use for "public
disclosure" (e.g., filing a Form 8-K, issuing a press release, holding a conference call transmitted
telephonically or over the Internet, etc.). We do not believe different performance standards for small
entities would be consistent with the purpose of the proposed Regulation.
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With respect to proposed Rule lObS-I, we believe that different compliance requirements for small
entities would interfere with achieving the primary goal of protecting investors. For the same reason.
we believe that exempting small entities from coverage of proposed Rule lObS-I, in whole or pan. is
not appropriate. In addition, we have concluded that it is not feasible to funher clarify, consolidate, or
simplify the proposed Rule for small entities. First. the aspects of proposed Rule lObS-I that
indirectly involve compliance requirements are affirmative defenses that are not required to comply
with the proposed Rule. Second, we have used performance elements for the affirmative defenses
based on an index trading plan or an institutional investor implementing proper informational barriers
set fonh in paragraphs (c)(l)(i)(D) and (c)(2) of proposed Rule IObS-l.Ifan entity decides to assen
either of these affirmative defenses, proposed Rule 10bS-1 does not require that it satisfy its
obligations under either of the affirmative defenses in accordance with any specific design. but rather
allows it flexibility to select which measure(s) it wants to put in place to satisfy the elements ofeach
affirmative defense. We do not believe different performance standards for small entities would be
consistent with the purpose of the proposed Rule.

IX. Statutory Bases
We are proposing Regulation FD, Rule 181, the amendments to Forms 6-K and
8-K, Rule IObS-1 and Rule IObS-2 under the authority set fonh in Sections 10, 19(a), and 28 of the
Securities Act. Sections 3. 9, 10, 13, IS, 23, and 36 of the Exchange Act, and Section 30 of the
Investment Company Act.
List ofsubjects
17 CFR Part 230
Securities, Reponing and recordkeeping requirements. Investment companies.
17 CFR Part 240
Fraud, Reponing and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
17 CFR Pans 243 and 249
Securities. Reponing and recordkeeping requirements.
Text of Proposed Rules and Rule Amendments
For the reasons set out in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations is
proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 230 - GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
I. The authority citation for Part 230 continues to read in pan as follows:
Authority: IS U.S.C. 77b, 77f, 77g, 77h. 77j, 77r, 77s, 77sss, 78c. 78d, 781, 78m. 78n, 780, 78w. 7811
(d);-79t,80a-8, 80a-24, 80a-28, 80a-29, 80a-30, and 80a-37, unless otherWise noted.

•••••

H. Solicitation of Comments

2. Section 230.181 is added to read as follows:

We encourage the submission ofcomments with respect to any aspect of this Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis. In particular, we request comments regarding: (i) the number of small entity
issuers that may be affected by the proposed Regulation and Rules; (ii) the existence or nature of the
potential impact of the proposed Regulation and/or Rules on small entity issuers discussed in the
analysis; and (iii) how to quantify the impact of the proposed Regulation and Rules. Commentators
are asked to describe the nature ofany impact and provide ernpirical data supponing the extent of the
impact. Such comments will be considered in the preparation of the Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, if the proposed Regulation and/or Rules are adopted. and will be placed in the same public
file as comments on the proposed Regulation and Rules themselves.

§ 230.181 Public disclosures required under Regulation FD.
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Notwithstanding Section S(b)(l) of the Act (I S U.S.C. 77e(b)(I», any public disclosure that
constitutes a prospectus need not satisfy the requirements of Section 10 (IS U.S.C. 77j) of the Act if
the prospectus is used only as required under Rule lOO(a) of Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.1 OO(a» and
the registrant otherwise complies with the requirements of Regulation FD.
PART 240 - GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934
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3. The authority citation for Part 240 continues to read, in part, as follows:
Authority: IS U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 17s, 17z~2, 17eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 17tn, 78c, 78d, 78f,
78i~78J,-78j-l, 78k, 78k-I, 781, 78m, 78n, 780, 78p, 78q, 78s, 78u-S, 78w, 78x, 7811(d), 78mm, 79q,
79t, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, and 80b-II, unless otherwise noted.

•••••
4. Section 240.l0bS-1 is added to read as follows:

§ 240.IObS-1 Trading "on the basis of' material nonpublic information in insidertrading cases.
Preliminary Note to § 240.1 ObS-1 : This provision defines when a purchase or sale constitutes trading
"ontliebllslsiiI"-material nonpublic information in insider trading cases brought under Section IO(b)
of the Act and Rule IOb-S thereunder. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial
opinions construing Rule IOb-S, and Rule lObS-I does not address or modifY the scope of insider
trading law in any other respect.

ttl
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(a) General rule. The "manipulative and deceptive devices· prohibited by Section 100b) of the Act (1 S
U.S.C:-78j) ana § 240.l0b-S thereunder are defined to include, among other things, the purchase or
sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or
issuer, in breach ofa duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to
the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source
of the material nonpublic information.
(b) Definition of "on the basis of." Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this section,
a purchase-orsaleora-securityol'an issuer is "on the basis of' material nonpublic information about
that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic
information when the person made the purchase or sale.
(c) ~ffirmati~c:..defenses.
(I)(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(l)(ii) ofthis section, a purchase or sale is not "on the basis of' material
nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale demonstrates that, before becoming
aware of the information, the person:
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to track or correspond to a market index, market segment, or group of securities, and the amounts,
prices, and timing of the purchases or sales actually made were the result of following the previously
adopted plan.
(ii) The defenses provided in paragraph (c)(1 )(i) of this section shall be available only when the
contract, plan, or instruction to purchase or sell securities was entered into in good faith, and not as
part ofa plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this section. For example, if, after becoming
aware of material nonpublic information, a person alters a previous contract, plan, or instruction to
purchase or sell securities (whether by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale),
or enters into or alters a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those
securities, the person shall not be able to assert the contract, plan, or instruction as a defense to
liability.
(iii) For purposes of paragraph (c), the following definitions shall apply:

(A) In the amount(s). A contract, plan, or instruction for a purchase or sale of securities in specified
·amouni(s)" miistspecifY either the aggregate number of shares or other securities to be purchased or
sold, or the aggregate dollar amount ofsecurities to be purchased or sold.
(B) At the price(s). A contract, plan, or instruction for a purchase or sale of securities at specified
"price(s)" ilidlidis one that specifies a purchase or sale at the market price for a particular date.
(2) In the case ofa person other than a natural person, a purchase or sale ofsecurities is not "on the
basis of' material nonpublic information if the person demonstrates that;
(i) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalfof the person to purchase or sell the
securities was not aware of the information; and
(ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into consideration the
nature of the person's business, to ensure that individuals making investment decisions would not
violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. These policies
and procedures may include those that restrict any purchase, sale, and causing any purchase or sale of
any security as to which the person has material nonpublic information, or those that prevent such
individuals from becoming aware of such information.
S. Section 240.l0bS-2 is added to read as follows:

(A) Had entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security in the amount, at the price, and
on the date which the person purchased or sold the security;
(B) Had provided instructions to another person to execute a purchase or sale of the security for the
instructing person's account, in the amount, at the price, and on the date which that purchase or sale
was executed;

(C) Had adopted, and had previously adhered to, a written plan specifying purchases or sales of the
security in the amounts, and at the prices, and on the dates at which the person purchased or sold the
security; or
(D) Had adopted, and had previously adhered to, a \\Titlen plan for trading securities that is designed

§ 240.IObS-2 Duties of trust or confidence in misappropriat.ion insider trading~~~.
Preliminary Note to § 240.IObS-2: This section provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances
tn:'wliich'ii per500liasa duty of iiiist or confidence for purposes of the "misappropriation" theory of
insider trading under Section IO(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-S. The law of insider trading is otherwise
defined by judicial opinions construing Rule IOb-S, and this section is not intended to address or
modify the scope of insider trading law in any other respect.
(a) Scope of Rule. This section shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.c. 78j
(b)fand§ 240.IOb-S thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of. or
the communication of, material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence.

(b) Enumerated "duties of trust or confidence." For purposes ofthis section, the circumstances under
which "dutyofTriistorconfidencc"exfsl"sllaJl include, among others, the following:

a

(I) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom
it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information has a reasonable expectation that the other person
would maintain its confidentiality; or

(a) Intentional. A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is "intentional" when the
indfvwuiriiiliking the disclosure either knew prior to the disclosure, or was reckless in not knowing,
that he or she would be communicating information that was material and nonpublic.
(b) Issuer. Every issuer having securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act-ciffi34 (15 U.S.C. 781), or which is required to file reports under Section IS(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (lS·U.S.C. 780(d», including closed-end investment companies (as defined in
Section S{a)(2) ofthe Investment Company Act of 1940) (15 U.S.C. 80a-S(a)(2» but not including
other investment companies, shall be subject to this Regulation.

(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from the person's spouse,
parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information
may demonstrate that noduty·ortrust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by
establishing that the spouse, parent, child, or sibling that was the source of the information had no
reasonable expectation that the person would keep the information confidential, because the parties
had neither a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, nor an agreement or understanding
to maintain the confidentiality of the information.

(c) Person acting on behalfofan issuer. Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, who
disclOses materillfilOnpiibTic information while acting within the scope of his or her authority, shall
be considered to be a "person acting on behalfof the issuer." An officer, director, employee, or agent
ofan issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to
the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalfof the issuer.

6. Part 243 is added to read as follows:

(d) ~romptly.

PART 243 - REGULATION FD

(I) "Promptly" shall mean disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event more than 24
hours) after a senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end investment company, a
senior official of the issuer's investment adviser) knows, or is reckless in not knowing, of the nonintentional disclosure.
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243.1 00 General rule regarding selective disclosure.

o

For purposes of this Regulation FD (§ 243.10I), the following definitions shall apply:

243.101 Definitions.
~l,I.t~ori!~

15 U.S.C. 78c, 78i, 78j, 78m, 780, 78w, 78mm, and 80a-29, unless otherwise noted.

§ 243.100 General rule regardinl selective disclos'.l~:

(2) For purposes of paragraph (d)(I) of this section, a "senior official" means any director, any
executive officer (as defined in § 240.3b-7 of this chapter), any investor relations or public relations
officer, or any other person with similar functions.
(e) Public ~~!~~~.
(I) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, an issuer shall make the "public disclosure"

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its
behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
person or persons outside the issuer, the issuer shall:

of information required by § 243.100(a) of this chapter by filing with the Commission a Form 8-K
(17 eFR 249.308) disclosing that information, or if the issuer is a foreign private issuer it shall file a
Form 6-K (I7 CFR 249.306).

(I) In the case of an intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that information
simultaneously; and

(2) An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to file a Form 8-K or Form

(2) In the case of non-intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that information promptly.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply when a disclosure is made to a person who owes a
duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (including, for example, an outside consultant such as an
attorney, investment banker, or accountant) or to a person who has expressly agreed to maintain such
information in confidence.

§ 243.101 Definiti()ns.

6-K ifit instead does one of the following:
(i) Disseminates a press release containing that information through a widely circulated news or wire
service; or
(ii) Disseminates the information through any other method ofdisclosure that is reasonably designed

to provide broad public access to the information and does not exclude any members of the public
from access, such as announcement at a press conference to which the public is granted access (e.g.,
by personal attendance or by telephonic or other electronic transmission).
-
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PART 249 - FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
7. The authority citation for Part 249 is amended by adding the following citations:
~~thority:

IS U.S.C. 78a,et seq:, unless otherwise noted;
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8. Fonn 6-K (referenced in § 249.306) is amended by revising the phrase "and any other infonnation
which the registrant deems of material importance to securityholders" in the second paragraph of
General Instruction B to read "infonnation required to be publicly disclosed under Regulation FD (17
CFR 243.100) except infonnation publicly disclosed in accordance with Rule 101 (e)(2) of Regulation
FD (17 CFR 243.10 I(e)(2»; and any other infonnation which the registrant deems of material
importance to securityholders".

t:C
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10. Fonn 8-K (referenced in § 249.308) is amended:

•••••
INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REPORT

• ••••
Item 10. Regulation FD Disclosure.
Report under this item the material nonpublic infonnation required to be disclosed by Regulation FD
(17 CFR 243.100 and 243.101).

• ••••
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Dated: December 20, 1999

a. in General Instruction A, by revising the phrase "Rule 13a-11 or Rule lSd-II" to read "Rule 13a-11
or Rule lSd-II, and for reports of material nonpublic infonnation required to be disclosed by
Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.100 and 243.10 I)".

Footnotes

b. by adding a sentence to the end of paragraph I ofGeneral Instruction B;

I 17 CFR243.100 and 243.101.

c. in General Instruction B.4.• by revising the phrase "other events of material importance pursuant to
Item 5. "to read "other events of material importance pursuant to Item 5 and of reports pursuant to
Item 10, ";

217CFR230.181.
3 17 CFR 240.IOb5-1.

d. by adding a new Item 10 under "Infonnation To Be Included in the Report" to read as follows:

4 17 CFR 240.1 Ob5-2.

(No~

517 CFR 249.308.

Fonn 8-K does not and the amendments will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.]
FORM8-K

•••••
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

•••••

".,_.,

I. • • • A report on this fonn pursuant to Item 10 shall be filed in accordance with the requirements
of Rule 1000a) of Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.100(a».

(Note: Fonn 6-K does not and the amendments will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.]
9. Section 249.308 is amended by revising the phrase "Rule 13a-l1 or Rule 15d-11 (§ 240.13a-11 or
§ 240.15d-11 of this chapter)" to read "Rule 13a-I I or Rule lSd-II (§ 240.l3a-11 or § 240.l5d-11 of
this chapter) and for reports of material nonpublic infonnation required to be disclosed by Regulation
FD (§ 243.100 and § 243.101 of this chapter)".

.., --, -,

B. Events to be Reported and Time for Filing of Reports

Section 249.308 is also issued under IS U.S.C. 80a-29.

•••••

~--'1

6 17 CFR 249.306.

? S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 68 (1934).
8 "The idea ofa free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of
buyers and sellers as to the fair price ofa security brings about a situation where the market price
renects as nearly as possible a just price.... [T]he hiding and secreting of important infonnation
obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value." H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383. at II (1934).

See also S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 10-11, 19-20 (1934).
9 See Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092 (Oct.

ls, 1970)(35 FR 16733).
I~ See, e.g.' NYSE Listed Company Manual, para. 202.05 (Timely Disclosure of Material News
Developments); NASD Rules 431 O(cX 16), 4320(eX14), and IM-4120-1 (Disclosure of Material
Information).

.!..! See, e.g.' Susan Pulliam and Gary McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticized/or How It Disclosed PC
Troubles, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at C I; Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy
Over Possible Leak o/Sluggish Sales Data' Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at CI; Randall Smith,
Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hung Up' Wall St. J., June 21,1995, at
C I; George Anders and Robert Berner, Webvan to Delay IPO in Respanse to SEC Concerns, Wall St.

J., Oct. 7,1999, at CI6 (disclosure to institutional investors in road-show presentations). In addition,
a recent study ofcorporate disclosure practices by the National Investor Relations Institute reported
that 26% of responding companies stated that they engaged in some types of selective disclosure
practices. National Investor Relations Institute, A Study o/Corporate Disclosure Practices, Second
Measurement' 18 (May 1998) (NIRI Corporate Disclosure Study).
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United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).

.1.3/d (citing Brudney, InSiders, Outsiders, and In/ormational Am'antages Under the Federal
Securities Laws' 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 356 (1979».

!4 Raymond L. Dirks, 47 S.E.C. 434, 441(1981). This concern about protecting the legitimate
functions of securities analysts was a basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC. 463
U.S. 646 (1983), which addressed an analyst'S liability under Rule 10b-5 insider trading law. See also
Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Im'estment Analysts: An Economic Analysis 0/ Dirks ".
Securities and Exchange Commission- 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 127, 142 (1984). But see Donald C.
Langevoort, Imoestment Analysts and The Lawo/lnsider Trading, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1044 (1990)
(stating that the argument favoring special treatment for analyst disclosures is "substantially
overstated"). We discuss the Dirks case in greater detail at infra pp. 12-13.
!~ See Richard Frankel, Marilyn Johnson, and Douglas J. Skinner, An Empirical Examination 0/
Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium, 37 J. Acct. Res. 133 (Spring 1999). This study

revealed that, during and immediately following teleconference calls between analysts and issuers,
trading volume in the issuers' stock increased, average trade size increased, and stock price volatility
increased. This led the researchers to conclude that material information is released during these
selective disclosure periods, which is immediately filtered to a subset of large investors who are able
to trade on the information before it is fully disseminated to the market.

~.~ Fred Barbash, Companies, Analysts A Little Too Cozy. Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1999, at HI
("Companies coddle analysts to obtain the most favorable coverage, which is critical to their stock
price. Analysts covet their access to companies, because special knowledge is the only thing they
have to offer clients."); Andrew Hill, Let the buyer beware, Fin. Times, Oct. 27, 1999, at 14 ("The
death of the 'sell' note is perhaps the clearest signal that big securities houses are suppressing or
toning down negative analysis ofcompanies that are clients or potential clients. In a snapshot of 27,
700 individual analyst reports, taken at the beginning of this month, First CallfThomson Financial,
the research company, found nearly 70 per cent recommended that investors buy the stock, and just
under I per cent advised they should sell."); Gretchen Morgenson, The Earnings Waltz: Is the Music
Stopping?' N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,1999, at 3 ("As quarterly eamings numbers became paramount,
analysts grew more dependent upon company management for 'guidance' to the correct earnings
forecast. The more help they received, the less work they did."); Robert McGough, One Analyst
Anticipated IBM News, Wall St. J., Oct. 22,1999, at CI ("Too often, analysts rely on executives at
the companies they cover to let them know what's going on in the business."); Jonathan Weil, In
Stock Ratings, Many Analysts Say 'Sell' Is a Four-Letter Word, Wall St. 1., May 6, 1998, at T2
(attributing analysts' "speak no evil" motto to fact that "most analysts don't want to risk offending
corporate executives, who have been known to retaliate by restricting access to information or
selecting competitors' corporate-finance departments to do lucrative investment-banking deals. So
analysts issue watered-down critiques, and shareholders have to read between the lines for
suggestions on when to get out ofa stock."); Jeffrey M. Laderman, Who Can You Trust? Wall Street's
Spin Game, Stock Analysts Often Have a Hidden Agenda' Bus. Wk., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148 (referencing
a recent survey of Wall Street research, sales, and trading practices in which nearly one-third of the
272 responding large U.S. companies said that in response to an analyst'S sell recommendation they
would "'reduce communications and reduce access'.... The great fear of the analyst when he or she
goes calling on a company is to find the door shut.").
~~ John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selectil'e Disclosure Now Lauful?, N.Y.LJ., July 31, 1997, at 5. Professor
Coffee also argues that selective disclosure may impair market efficiency in one other respect. If
market efficiency is measured by the width ofbidlasked spreads, market makers will widen spreads
to protect themselves if they fear that others possess and will exploit asymmetric informational
advantages. See also Amitabh Dugar, Siva Nathan, Analysts' Research Reports: Caveat Emptor' 5 J.
Investing 13 (1996) ("Analysts depend on corporate management for accurate and timely information
about the companies they follow. It is no secret that companies wield restriction of access as a
weapon against analysts who issue a negative research report on their stock. Retribution ranges from
refusing the analyst's calls for information, to barring the analysts from mailings, conference calls,
and meetings, and even threats oflegal action and physical harm." (citations and footnote omitted».

~~ See supra note 10.
~~

National Investor Relations Institute, Standards 0/ Practice for Im'estor Relations' 30 (Apr. 1998).

22 Association for Investment Management and Research, Standards ofPractice Handbook. 232 (8th

16 The NIRI Corporate Disclosure Study indicates that a higher percentage of issuers engaged in
possible selective disclosure practices in 1995 than in 1998. See NIRI Corporate Disclosure Study,
supra note II at 18.
~? See SEC v. PhiilipJ. Stel'ens, Litigation Release No. 12813 (Mar. 19, 199\).
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ea. 1999).

~ See, e.g.'

National Investor Relations Institute, Executive Alert, Im'estor Relations Officers Report
Dramatic Change in Ways Companies Communicate With Key Audiences (Junc 18. 1999); Lynn
Cowan, Internet Broadcast o/Conference Calls Creates 8u== and Niche for Businesses. Wall SI. J.•
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employees or agents.

24 We also have greater flexibility and improved technology for widespread dissemination of
Iriformation. The Commission's EDGAR system permits investors to access issuer information almost
as soon as it is filed with us.

36 TSC Industries,lnc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see Basic v. Lel'inson, 485 U.S.
224,231 (1988); see also Securities Act Rule 405,17 CFR 230.405; Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17
CFR 240.12b-2; Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12, 1999) (64 FR 45150) (discussing
materiality for purposes ofh'iiiilciiifstatemeniS)."'

976(1969).

26 See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.' 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). At the same time, however, issuers
encouraged to divulge tidbits of non-material information to analysts to help them piece
together more informed opinions. Id The couns reasoned that although giving analysts direct,
nonpublic, material information was prohibited, the law should permit "[a) skilled analyst with
knowledge of raj company and the industry [toJ piece seemingly inconsequential data together with
public information into a mosaic which reveals material non-public information." Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers. Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). This theory is known as the "mosaic theory." The
resulting tension between prohibited material disclosures and acceptable non-material disclosures led
one judge to compare the corporate official's encounter with an analyst to a "fencing match conducted
on a tightrope." Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 9.

were

~?

See NIRI Corporate Disclosure Study, supra note II.

38 Ifa person receives material nonpublic information subject to such a confidentiality agreement,

ilie use or disclosure of the information for securities trading purposes will lead to insider trading
liability under Rule 10b-5.
39 See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854; In re Investors Management Co" 44 S.E.C. 633,

643 (1971).
~

Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 255 (1973). Thus, for purposes of insider trading law, insiders must
wait a "reasonable" time before trading. What constitutes a reasonable time prior to trading depends
on the circumstances of the dissemination.ld. citing Texas Gul/SlIlphur, 401 F.2d at 854.

27445 U.S. 222 (1980).

±! See, infra Section II.B.5.

28463 U.S. 646 (1983).

42 "Classical" insiders - an issuer's officers, directors, or employees - are ofcourse also subject to
aiities of trust and confidence and to Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability if they trade or tip.

ttl
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May,24,1999,atB9D.

~~ SEC v. Texas Glll/Sulphllr Co.' 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), art. denied, 394 U.S.

.....:I

_', ,
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29 In Dirlcs, a securities analyst had been informed about a major fraud at Equity Funding of America
bya former officer of the company. Although Dirks made an effon to make the fraud public, he also
told his clients, enabling them to sell their Equity Funding securities and avoid losses when the fraud
became publicly known. The Commission charged that Dirks was a "tippee" of the insider, and in
tum tipped his clients.
30463 U.S. at 663. On the facts of the case, the Coun found that Dirks' source did not breach a duty

iii' disclosing information to Dirks because he did not receive a personal benefit from the disclosure
and was clearly motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. Because a tippee's duty is "derivative" from
the duty of the tipper, and the insider source did not breach a duty, the Coon held that Dirks did not
violate Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5.
~I SEC v. Phillip). Stevens. sllpra note 17 (allegation of personal benefit based on corporate

official's desire to protect and etthance his reputation).
3,~ See. e.g.• Paul P. Brountas Jr., Note: Rille IOb-S and Volllntary Corporate Disclosllres to
Secllrities Analysts> 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1517, 1529 (1992).

33 15 U.S.C. 78m(a) and 780(d).
3~

See Proposed Rule IOI(b).

35 The proper response in this type of case is to hold the employee or agent responsible for illegal
insider trading, not to force the issuer to make a public disclosure due to the misconduct of one of its

~

United States v. O'Hagan' 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirlcs, 463 U.S. at 655 n.l4.

44 Proposed Rule IOI(d)(I). Although requirements for "prompt" disclosure exist elsewhere in the
securities laws - e.g.' the requirement that amendments to Schedules 130 be filed "promptly" Proposed Rule 10 I(d)(1) defines "prompt" disclosure for purposes of Regulation FD. This definition
is not meant to apply in any other contexts.
45 See Proposed Rule 101(d)(2). For closed-end investment companies that are subject to Regulation
I'D, the term "senior official" would also cover directors, officers, and employees of the fund's
investment adviser.
46 Ofcourse, a pattern of "mistaken" selective disclosures would make less credible the claim that
iiily particular disclosure was not intentional.
47 For example, a senior official may become aware of his mistake when he sees a significant change
iii'the market price and/or trading volume of his company's securities. Alternatively, a senior official
might learn that a lower-level employee mistakenly disclosed material information, because an
'analyst or investor who received the information called the officer to confirm the information.
48 Proposed Rule 101(d)(l) states that the required public disclosure must be made no later than 24
hours after the issuer or a senior official of the issuer knows (or is reckless in not knowing) of the
selective disclosure. The 24-hour period takes into account the issuer's potential difficulty in making
the disclosure any sooner because of the need to marshal all the information necessary. and reach the

appropriate persoMel. In other cases, however, the issuer may well be able to make public disclosure
before the maximum allowable 24-hour disclosure period. In such cases, the requirement to disclose
"as soon as reasonably practicable" means that the issuer should act sooner than 24 hours later.
~

~~ See. e.g., Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc.• 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); In the Matter ofPresslek.
Inc.• Exchange Act Release No. 39472 (Dec. 22, 1997).

Proposed Rule IOI(e)(I).

50 See NIRI Corporate Disclosure Study, supra note II. at 9,21 (finding that 82% of responding
Issuers used their websites to post disclosures of quarterly financial results).
51 Despite the rapid expansion oflnternet access, a significant number of households do not have
access. Moreover, simply putting information on a website does not alert investors that it is available.
52 As is the case currently. Form 6-K used to make Regulation FD disclosure would not be deemed

to be "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or subject to liability under that section.

54 Business development companies ("BOCs"), a category of closed-end investment companies not
required to register under the Investment Company Act, are already required to file reports on Form
8-K. Under this proposal. BDCs would continue to be subject to Form 8-K filing obligations.
including those imposed by Regulation FD.

--J
~

63 15 U.S.C. 78r.
64 15 U.S.C. 17k. This proposal is not intended to change existing liability for forms incorporated by
reference.
65 After the registration statement for the IPO becomes effective, however, and the issuer becomes
subject to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, it would be subject to Regulation FD.
66 Our staff is currently engaged in a more comprehensive review of the regulatory issues raised by
"roadshows."

~ See supra note 10.

ttl

~! See generally Backman v. Polaroid Corp.• 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990); In re Phillips Petroleum
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236 (300 Cir. 1989).

55 Courts have held that there is no implied private right of action under Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act. Lamb v. Phillip Morris. Inc.• 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cerr. denied, 498 U.S.
1086 (1991); J.s. Service Center Corp. v. General Electric Technical Services Co., 937 F. Supp. 216
(S.D.N.Y.1996).
56 In addition. eligibility to file on a number of "short-form" Securities Act registration statements
requires. in part. that the registrant be timely in filing its Exchange Act reports. The obligation to be
timely in these filings includes the filing of a required Form 8-K. As such, any required Form 8-K
filing under proposed Item 10 would have to be made in a timely manner for the registrant to be
eligible to file such a short-form registration statement. If. under today's proposals. the registrant
would not be required to file under Item 10 of Form 8-K because it uses an alternative means of
public dissemination. the failure to file an Item 10 Form 8-K would not affect that registrant's form
eligibility.
57 Regulation FD does not expressly require issuers to adopt policies and procedures to avoid
Violations. but we expect that most issuers will consider implementing appropriate disclosure policies
to guard against selective disclosure. We are aware that many. ifnot most. issuers already have
policies and procedures regarding disclosure practices, the dissemination of material information, and
the question of which issuer persoMel are authorized to speak to analysts, the media, or investors.
The existence of this type of policy. and the issuer's general adherence to it. may often be relevant to
determining the issuer's intent with regard to a selective disclosure.

6715 U.S.C. 17e.
6815 U.S.C. 17b(a)(IO).
~

15 U.S.C. 17j.

70 The Regulation of Securities Offerings. Securities Act Release No. 7606A (Nov. 13, 1998) (63 FR
(7174). As discussed below. we also have adopted rules tnaiiillowofTeiSiiilhe business combination
context to be made before filing a registration statement.
71 Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Securities Act Release No. 7760
----- --(Oct. 22,1999) (64 FR 61408) (effective date Jan. 24, 2000).
~ The proxy rule amendments are not limited to communications concerning business combinations.

73 Written information must be disseminated by filing in order to satisfy the communication
eXemptions. A news release or other means of dissemination would not meet the requirements of the
business combination rules.
74 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264; Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704. 102 Stat. 4677.
~ O'Hagan. 521 U.S. at 658.
~ See Dir/cs, 463 U.S. at 654.

58 Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-3.

?2 See O'Hagan. 521 U.S. at 651-52.

59 Section 20(e) ofthe Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. 78t(e).

~ 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir). cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993).

~ See SEC v. Phillip J. Stel'ens. supra note 17.
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79 Teicher was a criminal case premised on the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The court
reasoned, in dicta, that the simplicity ofa "knowing possession" standard recognizes the
informational advantage that a trader with inside information has over other traders. "Unlike a loaded
weapon which may stand ready but unused, material information can not lay idle in the human brain."
/d at 120.

80 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). Adler was a civil action under "classical" insider trading theory.
The court stated that trading while "in possession of' the material nonpublic information gives rise to
a "strong inference" that the defendant "used" the information in trading, thereby allowing the
Commission to establish a prima/acie case based on possession of the information. The court
reasoned that this inference addresses the Commission's proofdifficulties by allowing the
Commission to make out a prima facie case without establishing direct proofofa causal cOMection
between possession of the information and its use./d at 1337-38. The defendant, however, has the
opportunity to rebut this inference by introducing evidence to establish that the information was not
used in making the trade. It is left to the fact finder to weigh the evidence to determine whether the
information was used. Jd. at 1337.
81 155 FJd 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), cm. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804 (1999). Smith was a criminal case
ooder "classical" insider trading theory. The court expressed no view on whether the Adler
presumption could be permitted in a civil enforcement case. Jd at 1069 &. n.27.

OJ
~

82 "We note that ifexperience shows that this approach unduly frustrates the SECs enforcement
efforts, the SEC could promulgate a rule adopting the knowing possession standard, as the SEC has
done in the context of tender offers ... or a rule adopting a presumption approach in which proof that
an insider traded while in possession of material nonpublic information would shift the burden of
persuasion on the use issue to the insider." Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337 n.33 (citation omitted).
83 Under the classical theory, there is an additional argument why trading in "possession" of inside
information is fraudulent. A "classical" insider has a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders.
The insider violates this duty, and thereby commits fraud, ifhe or she trades in the company's
securities while in possession of inside information without disclosing the information to the other
party. The insider violates this duty regardless of whether he or she "uses" the insider information.
See Briefofthe Securities and Exchange Commission at 22-24, SEC v. Soroosh (9th Cir. 1998) (No.
98-35006); Briefof the Securities and Exchange Commission at 18, SEC v. Adler (II th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-6084).
~ Teiche,.,
~
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!? Proposed para. (c)(I)(i)(A).
88 Proposed para. (c)(I)(iii) defines the terms "[iln the amount(s)" and "[altthe price(s)" for purposes
olall of paragraph (c)(l)(i)'s affirmative defenses. These definitions are designed to ensure that a
contract, plan, or instruction is sufficiently defined to foreclose the use ofany inside information of
which the person later becomes aware. A trade specified "in an amount" must specify either the
number of securities to be traded or the total monetary proceeds to be realized from or spent on the
securities to be traded. Thus, a person could plan a sale of, for example, either I, 000 shares or SI0,
000 worth of stock; however, the person could not plan a trade within a range - for example, a sale of
between 1,000 and 2, 000 shares. The term "at the price(s)" includes a purchase or sale at the market
price for a particular date. Therefore, persons would not be required to commit to trading at a
particular price, but could merely contract, plan, or provide instructions to trade at the market price
on the date of the trade.
Under the Rule, a defense would not be available for a contract, plan, or instruction to trade that used
a limit order. By using a limit order, the person would not firmly be committing to make a trade,
because if the market price at the relevant date exceeded the limit order price, the trade would not be
made. We request comment on whether this restriction on the use of limit orders is necessary.
~

Proposed para. (c)(IXi)(B).

~

Proposed para. (c)(l)(i)(C).

91 This exception does not cover trading for a person's account through a "blind trust." We have not
Included any express defenses for blind trust trading, because we do not believe this trading creates
difficulties under existing insider trading law. When a person places securities in a blind trust. by
definition he or she does not make the decisions to purchase or sell securities in that account.
Therefore, those trading decisions (which are made by the trustee of the blind trust) should not be
allributed to the person for purposes of potential insider trading liability.
~

Proposed para. (cXI )(i)(D).

93 As a general matter, the Rule requires that any wriuen plan specifying trading at a particular time
must be made in good faith. Similarly, paragraph (c)(l)(i)(C) requires that a person have "previously
adhered to" the written plan, as a means ofdemonstrating its bona fides.
~

Proposed para. (c)(2).

~

17 CFR 240.t4e-3(b).

987 F.2d at 120.

Proposed Rule IOb5-I(a).

~6 See United States v. O'Hagan- 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirlcs v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella

v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court recognized that under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, the fraud is consummated when the defendant,
without proper disclosure to the source, "uses the information to purchase or sell securities."
Proposed Rule lObS-I is consistent with this view in that it provides for no liability when a trader can
meet one of the stated defenses in paragraph (c) demonstrating lack of use.

._',

96 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
~~ See e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1986), affd. 484 U.S. 19
(1987); SECv. Materia, 745 F.2d 197,203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985);
United States v. Newman· 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 198\), affd after remand. 722 F.2d 729, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

infonnation about a particular matter even ifhe or she is not personally working on that matter.

u.s. 1004 (1992).

~.~

947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503

~

601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985).

101 Although the facts alleged in Reed were that the father and son had a prior history of sharing
business confidences, 60IF. Supp at 690 n.6, the Reed court's analysis stated, without limitation to
business confidences, that "[t]he repeated disclosure of secrets by the parties or by one party to the
other" or a "pre-existing confidential relationship" could be sufficient to establish a duty of trust and
confidence./d at 717-18. The Chestman majority, however,limited Reeds holding in a criminal
context to its facts - that the repeated sharing of business confidences between family members
could be the basis ofa finding ofa relationship of trust and confidence, the functional equivalent of a
fiduciary relationship. Chestman, 947 F.2d. at 569.

!:.i§!..a

tion Release~o. 15377 (May 30,1997) (spouse); SEC
~ See e.g., SECv. Judy Hockett, et 01.,
v. Linda Lou Taylor, et 01., Litigation Release No. 14775 (Jan. 4, 1996) (spouse); SEC v. Robert J
YOllng, et 01., Litigation Release No.14661 (Sept. 29, 1995) (brother); SEC v. Jonathan J Sheinberg,
et 01., Litigation Release No. 13465 (Dec. 10. 1992) (son-father); SEC v. Thomas C. Reed. et 01.,
Litigation Release No. 9537 (Dec. 23, 1981) (son-father).
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq'

II 5 17 CFR 249.308.

103/d. at 571.
104 Chestman recognized that although concern about the "rule oflenity" did not pennit the use of

"an elastic and expedient definition of confidential relations" in criminal cases, such an approach may
be useful in the civil context. /d at 570. See also O'Hagan' 521 U.S. at 679 (concurring and
dissenting opinion of Scalia, J.) (noting applicability of "principle of lenity" in criminal insider
trading prosecution, and potential distinction between criminal and civil construction of Rule IOb-5).
!~5 Cf Chestman, 947 F.2d at 580 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Winter, J.) (calling
majority's view "unrealistic· in that "it expects family members to behave like strangers to each
other"). Nor does Chestman consider the recognition ofa fiduciary duty between family members as a
matter of common law or statutory enactments.

106 See. e.g., SEC v. Michelle Nguyen, et 01., ~i~iil~!i~n~~te~e No. 16199 (June 29,1999); SEC v.
Sharat Kotecha, et 01., ~§!ation Release No. 16151 (May 18, 1999); SEC v. Hahn Trllong, et 01.,
~~!il..a.t.ion Release No. 16080 (Mar. 9,1999); SECv. Roger H. Licht, etal.' Litig~!ion Release N~.
!5781 (June 15, 1998); SEC v. Eugene Dines, et 01., Litigation Release No. 13900 (Dec. 10, 1993);
SEC v. Ste\'en L Glauberman, et 01., Litigation Release No. 12574 (Aug. 9, 1990).
107 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (noting that tipping liability can exist "when an insider makes a gift of

confidential infonnation to a trading relative or friend").
108 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59.

109 Proposed para. (b) does not enumerate relationships that existing case law already recognizes as
providing a clear basis for misappropriation liability: for example, lawyer-client, O'Hagan;
employee-employer, Carpenter; psychiatrist-patient, United States \'. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed. 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N,Y. 1991). As the O'Hagan case
demonstrates, an individual working at a professional finn may be liable for misappropriating

... ..

112 We do not intend to limit this to minor children. Our enforcement cases in this area typically
Involve communications between parents and adult sons or daughters.

!~

102 /d at 568.

-:l
0\

Proposed para. (b)(I).

!.IJ Proposed para. (b)(2).

100 Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 717-18.
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116 17 CFR 249.306.
I 17 In many cases, infonnation disclosed under Regulation FD would be infonnation that an issuer

was ultimately going to disclose to the public. Under Regulation FD, that issuer likely will not make
any more public disclosure than it otherwise would, but it may make the disclosure sooner and now
would be required to file or disseminate that infonnation in a manner reasonably designed to provide
broad public access to the infonnation and which does not exclude any members of the public from
access,
118 We anticipate that issuers will make one disclosure each quarter under Regulation FD. We also
assume that issuers will, on average, make one additional disclosure per year.
119 Although eight burden hours are incurred by issuers filing a Fonn 6·K, we assume that. since
issuers have the option of how to make disclosure under Regulation FD, they will make disclosure
under the least burdensome option. Therefore, our burden number for estimation purposes is five
burden hours.
120 See supra Section II.A. and note IS,

!~~ See National Investor Relations Institute, Standards ofPractice for Im'estor Relations' 7 (I st ed.
Apr. 1998) (citing Russell Lundholm and Mark Lang, "The Benefits of More Forthcoming Disclosure
Practices, • University of Michigan School of Business Administration, Ann Arbor, MI, 1994).
122 See supra Section t1.A. and notes 18 & 19.

12317 eFR 249.308.
124 17 CFR 249.306.
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125 We anticipate that issuers will make one disclosure each quarter under Regulation FD. We also
asSUme that issuers will, on average, make one additional disclosure per year.
126 In many cases, information disclosed under Regulation FD would be information that an issuer
ultimately going to disclose to the public. Under Regulation FD, that issuer is not going to make
any more public disclosure than it otherwise would, but it may make the disclosure sooner and now
would be required to file or disseminate that information in a manner reasonably designed to provide
broad public access to the information and does not eXclude any members of the public from access.
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140 The Commission bases its estimate on information from the Commission's database of
registration information.
141 See Section 15(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 780(1); Section 204A of the Investment
Advisers Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-4a).

purposes, we are not accounting for this slightly higher cost in estimating the cost ofother disclosure
options.
128 Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 857.

to
-....l
-....l

~

15 U.S.C. 77j, 77s(a), and 77z-3.

~,~

15 U.S.C. 78c, 78i, 78j, 78m, 780, 78w, and 78mm.

133 15 U.S.C. 80a-29.
134 Exchange Act Rule O-IO(a) defines an issuer, other than an investment company, to be a "small
business" or "small organization" ifit had total assets oU5 million or less on the last day of its most
recent fiscal year. 17 CFR 240.0-10(a).lnvestment Company Act Rule O-IO(a) defines an investment
company as a "small business· or ·small organization· if it, "together with other investment
companies in the same group ofrelated investment companies, has net assets of 550 million or less as
of the end of its most recent fiscal year." 17 CFR 270.0-IO(a).
135 The Commission bases its estimate on information from the Insight database from Compustat, a
diVIsion of Standard and Poors.
136 The Commission bases its estimate on information from Lipper Directors' Analytical Data,
ripper Closed-End Fund Performance Analysis Service, and reports investment companies file with
the Commission on Form N-SAR.
137 Exchange Act Rule D-IO(c) defines a broker-dealer as a small entity ifit had total capital (net
worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than 5500, 000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of
which its audited financial statements were prepared and it is not affiliated with any person (other
than a natural person) that is not a small entity. 17 CFR 240.0-IO(c).
138 Advisers Act Rule 0-7 defines an investment adviser as a small entity ifit (i) manages less than
$25 million in assets, (ii) has total assets ofless than 55 million on the last day ofits most recent
fiscal year, and (iii) is not in a control relationship with another investment adviser that is not a small

,."

I]~ The Commission bases its estimate on information from FOCUS Repons.

127 While, as discussed, the staffestimates that filing a Form 6-K costs slightly more than filing a

13015 U.S.C. 78c(1).

·'''-'1

entity. 17 CFR 275.0-7.

F'orm 8-K, fewer than I, 000 issuers filed Forms 6-K in fiscal 1999. Therefore, for estimation

12915 U.S.C. 78w(a).

,

http://www.sec.gov/ru/es/proposedlJ4-42259.htm
Last update: 0//10/2000
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SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN No. 99 -- MATERIALITY

e

entitled "Materiality," provides guidance in applying materiality thresholds to the preparation of
financial statements tiled with the Commission and the perfonnance ofaudits of those financial
statements.

SEC StatT Aeeounting Bulletin:

No. 99 - Materiality

STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETINS
TOPIC I: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 99J
StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99

•••••
M. Materiality

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission

I. Assessing Materiality

ACTION: Publication ofStaffAccounting Bulletin

Facts: During the course of preparing or auditing year-end financial statements, financial
management or the registrant's independent auditor becomes aware of misstatements in a registrant's
financial statements. When combined, the misstatements result in a 4% overstatement of net income
and a $.02 (4%) overstatement ofeamings per share. Because no item in the registrant's consolidated
financial statements is misstated by more than 5%, management and the independent auditor
conclude that the deviation from generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") is immaterial
and that the accounting is pennissible.l

SUMMARY: This staffaccounting bulletin expresses the views of the staffthat exclusive reliance
on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality in preparing financial statements and
perfonning audits of those financial statements is inappropriate; misstatements are not immaterial
simply because they fall beneath a numerical threshold.
DATE: August 12, 1999

t::tl
~

'"

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W. Scott Bayless, Associate Chief Accountant, or
Robert E. Bums, ChiefCounsel, Office of the Chief Accountant (202-942-4400), or David R.
Fredrickson, Office ofGeneral Counsel (202-942-0900), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450
Firth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549-1103; electronic addresses: BaylessWS@sec.gov;
BumsR@sec.gov; FredricksonD@sec.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFOR.\1ATlON: The statements in the staff accounting bulletins are not
rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published as bearing the Commission's
official approval. They represent interpretations and practices followed by the Division of
Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure
requirements of the Federal securities laws.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Date: August 12, 1999

Part 211 - (AMEND) Accordingly, Part 211 of Tide 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended by adding StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99 to the table found in Subpart B.
STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN NO. 99
The staff hereby adds Section M to Topic 1 of the Staff Accounting Bulletin Series. Section M.

Question: Each Statement of Financial Accounting Standards adopted by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB") states, "The provisions of this Statement need not be applied to
immaterial items." In the staffs view, maya registrant or the auditor of its financial statements
assume the immateriality of items that fall below a percentage threshold set by management or the
auditor to detennine whether amounts and items are material to the financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. The staff is aware that certain registrants, over time, have developed
quantitative thresholds as "rules of thumb" to assist in the preparation of their financial statements,
and that auditors also have used these thresholds in their evaluation of whether items might be
considered material to users ofa registrant's financial statements. One rule of thumb in particular
suggests that the misstatement or omissioM ofan item that falls under a 5% threshold is not material
in the absence of particularly egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by
senior management. The staff reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial statements that
exclusive reliance on this or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the accounting
literature or the law.
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide the basis for a preliminary
assumption that - without considering all relevant circumstances - a deviation of less than the
specified percentage with respect to a particular item on the registrant's financial statements is
unlikely to be material. The staff has no objection to such a "rule of thumb" as an initial step in
assessing materiality. But quantifying, in percentage tenns, the magnitude ofa misstatement is only
the beginning ofan analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full
analysis ofall relevant considerations. Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users of a
registrant's financial statements. A matter is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable person would consider it important. In its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No.2, the FASB stated the essence of the concept of materiality as follows:

>
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http://www.sec.gov/ruleslacctrepslsab99.htm
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The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if. in the light of
surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the
judgment ofa reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed or
influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.:!.

Evaluation of materiality requires a registrant and its auditor to consider allthe relevant
circumstances. and the staff believes that there are numerous circumstances in which misstatements
below 5% could well be material. Qualitative factors may cause misstatements of quantitatively small
amounts to be material; as stated in the auditing literature:

This formulation in the accounting literature is in substance identical to the formulation used by the
courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if
there is-

As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in materiality
judgments. misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the auditor's attention
could have a material effect on the financial statements.!]

a substantial likelihood that the ... fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.

Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small misstatement of a
financial statement item are -

~

Under the governing principles, an assessment of materiality requires that one views the facts in the
context of the "surrounding circumstances," as the accounting literature puts it, or the "total mix" of
information. in the words of the Supreme Court. In the context of a misstatement of a financial
statement item, while the "total mix" includes the size in numerical or percentage terms of the
misstatement, it also includes the factual context in which the user of financial statements would view
the financial statement item. The shorthand in the accounting and auditing literature for this analysis
is that financial management and the auditor must consider both "quantitative" and "qualitative"
factors in assessing an item's materiality.~ Court decisions, Commission rules and enforcement
actions. and accounting and auditing Iiteratur~ have all considered "qualitative" factors in various
contexts.
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• whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa

• whether the misstatement affects the registrant's compliance with loan covenants or other
contractual requirements
• whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management's compensation - for
example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive
compensation

The FASB noted that, in certain limited circumstances, the Commission and other authoritative
bodies had issued quantitative materiality guidance, citing as examples guidelines ranging from one
to ten percent with respect to a variety of disclosures'- And it took account of contradictory studies.
one showing a lack of uniformity among auditors on materiality judgments, and another suggesting
widespread use of a "rule of thumb" of five to ten percent of net income.? The FASB also considered
whether an evaluation of materiality could be based solely on anticipating the market's reaction to
accounting information. H!

.. ..

• whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus expectations for the
enterprise

• whether the misstatement affects the registrant'S compliance with regulatory requirements

The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be made only by those
who have all the facts. The Board's present position is that no general standards of
materiality could be formulated to take into account all the considerations that enter into
an experienced human judgment. 1

[MJagnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circumstances in
which the judgment has to be made. will not generally be a sufficient basis for a
materiality judgment.!.~

• whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends

• whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant's business that
has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations or profitability

The FASB has long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a numerical formula. In its
Concepts Statement No.2. the FASB noted that some had urged it to promulgate quantitative
materiality guides for use in a variety of situations. The FASB rejected such an approach as
representing only a "minority view," stating-

The FASB rejected a formulaic approach to discharging "the onerous duty of making materiality
decisions" JJ in favor of an approach that takes into account all the relevant considerations. In so
doing, it made clear that -

• whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or whether it
arises from an estimate and, if so. the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimateH

• whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the materiality ofa quantitatively
small misstatemenl.ll Among other factors, the demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant's
securities in response to certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors
regard quantitatively small misstatements as material. Consideration of potential market reaction to
disclosure of a misstatement is by itself "too blunt an instrument to be depended on" in considering
whether a fact is material.Hi When, however, JIl8Ilagement or the independent auditor expects (based,
for example. on a pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a
significant positive or negative market reaction. that expected reaction should be taken into account
when considering whether a misstatement is material.ll
For the reasons noted above. the staff believes that a registrant and the auditors of its financial
statements should not assume that even small intentional misstatements in financial statements, for
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example those pursuant to aetions to "manage" earnings, are immateriaU8 While the intent of
management does not render a misstatement material, it may provide significant evidence of
materiality. The evidence may be particularly compelling where management has intentionally
misstated items in the financial statements to "manage" reported earnings. In that instance, it
presumably has done so believing that the resulting amounts and trends would be significant to users
ofthe registrant's financial statements.~ The staff believes that investors generally would regard as
significant a management practice to over- or under-state earnings up to an amount just short of a
percentage threshold in order to "manage" earnings. Investors presumably also would regard as
significant an accounting practice that, in essetlCe, rendered all earnings figures subject to a
management-directed margin of misstatement.
The materiality ofa misstatement may tum on where it appears in the financial statements. For
example, a misstatement may involve a segment of the registrant's operations. In that instance, in
assessing materiality ofa misstatement to the financial statements taken as a whole, registrants and
their auditors should consider not only the size of the misstatement but also the significance of the
segment information to the financial statements taken as a whole.~ "A misstatement of the revenue
and operating profit ofa relatively small segment that is represented by management to be important
to the future profitability of the entity"~ is more likely to be material to investors than a misstatement
in a segment that management has not identified as especially important. In assessing the materiality
of misstatements in segment information - as with materiality generally-
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situations may arise in practice where the auditor will conclude that a matter relating to
segment information is qualitatively material even though, in his or her judgment, it is
quantitatively immaterial to the financial statements taken as a whole.~
A"rqating and Nrtting Misstatrmrnn

In determining whether multiple misstatements cause the financial statements to be materially
misstaled, registrants and the auditors of their financial statements should consider each misstatement
separately and the aggregate effect ofall misstatements.~J A registrant and its auditor should evaluate
misstalements in light ofquantitative and qualitative factors and "consider whether, in relation to
individual line item amounts, subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially misstate
the financial statements taken as a whole. "2~ This requires consideration of the significance of an item to a particular entity (for example, inventories to a
manufacturing company), the pervasiveness of the misstatement (such as whether it
affects the presentation of numerous financial statement items), and the effect of the
misstatement on the financial statements taken as a whole ....21
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overstated, the financial statements taken as a whole will be materially misleading even if the effect
on earnings is completely offset by an equivalent overstatement ofexpenses.
Even though a misstatement ofan individual amount may not cause the financial statements taken as
a whole to be materially misstated, it may nonetheless, when aggregated with other misstatements,
render the financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading. Registrants and the
auditors of their financial statements accordingly should consider the effect of the misstatement on
subtotals or totals. The auditor should aggregate all misstatements that affect each subtotal or total
and consider whether the misstatements in the aggregate affect the subtotal or total in a way that
causes the registrant's financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading.~
The staff believes that, in considering the aggregate effect of multiple misstatements on a subtotal or
total, registrants and the auditors oftheir financial statements should exercise particular care when
considering whether to offset (or the appropriateness ofoffsetting) a misstatement ofan estimated
amount with a misstatement ofan item capable of precise measurement. As noted above, assessments
of materiality should never be purely mechanical; given the imprecision inherent in estimates, there is
by definition a corresponding imprecision in the aggregation of misstatements involving estimates
with those that do not involve an estimate.
Registrants and auditors also should consider the effect of misstatements from prior periods on the
current financial statements. For example, the auditing literature states,
Matters underlying adjustments proposed by the auditor but not recorded by the entity
could potentially cause future financial statements to be materially misstated, even
though the auditor has concluded that the adjustments are not material to the current
financial statements.ll
This may be particularly the case where immaterial misstatements recur in several years and the
cumulative effect becomes material in the current year.
2. Immaterial Misstatements That are Intentional
Facts: A registrant's management intentionally has made adjustments to various financial statement
items in a manner inconsistent with GAAP. In each accounting period in which such actions were
taken, none of the individual adjustments is by itself material, nor is the aggregate effect on the
financial statements taken as a whole material for the period. The registrant's earnings "management"
has been effected at the direction or acquiescence of management in the belief that any deviations
from GAAP have been immaterial and that accordingly the accounting is permissible.

Registrants and their auditors first should consider whether each misstatement is material,
irrespective of its effect when combined with other misstatements. The literature notes that the
analysis should consider whether the misstatement of "individual amounts" causes a material
misstatement of the financial statements taken as a whole. As with materiality generally, this analysis
requires consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors.

Question: In the stafl's view, maya registrant make intentional immaterial misstatements in its
financial statements?

If the misstatement ofan individual amount causes the financial statements as a whole to be
materially misstated, that effect cannot be eliminated by other misstatements whose effect may be to
diminish the impact of the misstatement on other financial statement items. To take an obvious
example, ifa registrant's revenues are a material financial statement item and if they are materially

Considrrations ofth~ Books and Records Prollisions Under thr £Xc/lange Act

Interpretive Response: No. In certain circumstances, intentional immaterial misstatements are
unlawful.

Even if misstatements are immaterial,2~ registrants must comply with Sections l3(b)(2) - (7) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"P.? Under these provisions. each registrant

.~.,

with securities registered pursuant to Section 12 ofthe Exchange Act,~Q or required to file reports
pursuant to Section 15(d),U must make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of assets of the registrant and
must maintain internal accounting controls that are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that,
among other things, transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial
statements in conformity with GAAP.~~ In this context, determinations of what constitutes
"reasonable assurance" and "reasonable detail" are based not on a "materiality" analysis but on the
level of detail and degree of assurance that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own
affairs.31 Accordingly, failure to record accurately immaterial items, in some instances, may result in
violations of the securities laws.
The staff recognizes that there is limited authoritative guidanceH regarding the "reasonableness"
standard in Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act. A principal statement of the Commission's policy
in this area is set forth in an address given in 1981 by then Chairman Harold M. Williams.~~ In his
address, Chairman Williams noted that, like materiality, "reasonableness" is not an "absolute standard
of exactitude for corporate records. ":!§ Unlike materiality, however, "reasonableness" is not solely a
measure of the significance of a financial statement item to investors. "Reasonableness," in this
context, reflects a judgment as to whether an issuer's failure to correct a known misstatement
implicates the purposes underlying the accounting provisions of Sections 13(b)(2) • (7) of the
Exchange Act.n
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In assessing whether a misstatement results in a violation of a registrant'S obligation to keep books
and records that are accurate "in reasonable detail," registrants and their auditors should consider, in
addition to the factors discussed above concerning an evaluation of a misstatement's potential
materiality, the factors set forth below.
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• The significance or the misstatement. Though the staff does not believe that registrants need
to make finely calibrated determinations of significance with respect to immaterial items,
plainly it is "reasonable" to treat misstatements whose effects are clearly inconsequential
differently than more significant ones.
• How the misstatement arose. It is unlikely that it is ever "reasonable" for registrants to record
misstatements or not to correct known misstatements - even immaterial ones - as part of an
ongoing effort directed by or known to senior management for the purposes of "managing"
earnings. On the other hand, insignificant misstatements that arise from the operation of
systems or recurring processes in the normal course of business generally will not cause a
registrant'S books to be inaccurate "in reasonable detail."~
• The cost or correcting the misstatement. The books and records provisions of the Exchange
Act do not require registrants to make major expenditures to correct small misstatements.3?
Conversely, where there is little cost or delay involved in correcting a misstatement. failing to
do so is unlikely to be "reasonable."
• The clarity or authoritative accounting guidance with respect to the misstatement. Where
reasonable minds may differ about the appropriate accounting treatment of a financial
statement item. a failure to correct it may not render the registrant's financial statements
inaccurate "in reasonable detail." Where, however, there is little ground for reasonable
disagreement, the case for leaving a misstatement uncorrected is correspondingly weaker.
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There may be other indicators of "reasonableness" that registrants and their auditors may ordinarily
consider. Because the judgment is not mechanical. the staff will be inclined to continue to defer to
judgments that "allow a business. acting in good faith, to comply with the Act's accounting provisions
in an innovative and cost-effective way."~

The Auditor's Response to Intentionlll Misstlltements
Section 1OA(b) of the Exchange Act requires auditors to take certain actions upon discovery of an
"illegal act."~ The statute specifies that these obligations are triggered "whether or not [the illegal
acts are Jperceived to have a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer ...." Among
other things. Section 1OA(b)( I) requires the auditor to inform the appropriate level of management of
an illegal act (unless clearly inconsequential) and assure that the registrant's audit committee is
"adequately informed" with respect to the illegal act.
As noted. an intentional misstatement of immaterial items in a registrant's financial statements may
violate Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act and thus be an illegal act. When such a violation occurs,
an auditor must take steps to see that the registrant's audit committee is "adequately informed" about
the illegal act. Because Section IOA(b)( I) is triggered regardless of whether an illegal act has a
material effect on the registrant's financial statements, where the illegal act consists of a misstatement
in the registrant's financial statements, the auditor will be required to report that illegal act to the audit
committee irrespective of any "netting" of the misstatements with other financial statement items.
The requirements of Section lOA echo the auditing literature. See, for example, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. ("SAS") 54, "Illegal Acts by Clients," and SAS 82, "Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit." Pursuant to paragraph 38 of SAS 82. if the auditor determines there
is evidence that fraud may exist, the auditor must discuss the matter with the appropriate level of
management. The auditor must report directly to the audit committee fraud involving senior
management and fraud that causes a material misstatement of the financial statements. Paragraph 4 of
SAS 82 states that "misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements to deceive financial
statement users. "4~ SAS 82 further states that fraudulent financial reporting may involve falsification
or alteration of accounting records; misrepresenting or omitting events, transactions or other
information in the financial statements; and the intentional misapplication of accounting principles
relating to amounts. classifications, the manner of presentation, or disclosures in the financial
statements.~ The clear implication of SAS 82 is that immaterial misstatements may be fraudulent
financial reporting. ~
Auditors that learn of intentional misstatements may also be required to (I) re-evaluate the degree of
audit risk involved in the audit engagement, (2) determine whether to revise the nature, timing, and
extent of audit procedures accordingly, and (3) consider whether to resign.~
Intentional misstatements also may signal the existence of reportable conditions or material
weaknesses in the registrant's system of internal accounting control designed to detect and deter
improper accounting and financial reporting.4Ji As stated by the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, in its 1987 report,
The tone set by top management· the corporate environment or culture within which

financial reporting occurs· is the most important factor contributing to the integrity of
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the financial reporting process. Notwithstanding an impressive set of written rules and
procedures, if the tone set by management is lax, fraudulent financial reporting is more
likely to occur.~
An auditor is required to report to a registrant's audit committee any reportable conditions or material
weaknesses in a registrant's system of internal accounting control that the auditor discovers in the
course ofthe examination of the registrant's financial statements. ~
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-[3]- FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information ("Concepts Statement No.2"), 132 (1980). See also Concepts Statement No.
2, Glossary ofTerms - Materiality.
-[4]- TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
4gS·U.S. 224 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, determinations of materiality require "delicate
assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him ...." TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450.

GMP Precdence Over industry P'tlctice

Some have argued to the staff that registrants should be permitted to follow an industry accounting
practice even though that practice is inconsistent with authoritative accounting literature. This
situation might occur ifa practice is developed when there are few transactions and the accounting
results are clearly inconsequential, and that practice never changes despite a subsequent growth in the
number or materiality of such transactions. The staffdisagrees with this argument. Authoritative
literature takes precedence over industry practice that is contrary to GAAP.~
Gene'tI' Comments
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This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting or auditing Iiterature.tQ
This SAB and the authoritative accounting literature cannot specifically address all of the novel and
complex business transactions and events that may occur. Accordingly, registrants may account for,
and make disclosures about, these transactions and events based on analogies to similar situations or
other factors. The staff may not, however, always be persuaded that a registrant's determination is the
most appropriate under the circumstances. When disagreements occur after a transaction or an event
has been reported, the consequences may be severe for registrants, auditors, and, most importantly,
the users of financial statements who have a right to expect consistent accounting and reporting for,
and disclosure of, similar transactions and events. The staff, therefore, encourages registrants and
auditors to discuss on a timely basis with the staff proposed accounting treatments for, or disclosures
about, transactions or events that are not specifically covered by the existing accounting literature.

-[5]- See, e.g., Concepts Statement No.2, 123-124; AU § 312.10 (" '" materiality judgments are
mlide in light ofsurrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative
considerations. H); AU § 312.34 ("Qualitative considerations also influence the auditor in reaching a
conclusion as to whether misstatements are material."). As used in the accounting literature and in
this SAB, "qualitative" materiality refers to the surrounding circumstances that inform an investor's
evaluation offinancial statement entries. Whether events may be material to investors for nonfinancial reasons is a matter not addressed by this SAB.
-(6)-See, e.g., Rule 1-02(0) of Regulation SoX, 17 CFR 210.1-02(0), Rule 405 of Regulation C, 17
eFR 230.405, and Rule 12b-2, 17 CFR 240.l2b-2; AU §§ 312.10 - .II, 317.13, 411.04 n. I, and
508.36; In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation, 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Parnes v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d
696 (3d Cir. 1996); In the Matter ofW.R. Grace &. Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. ("AAER") 1140 (June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Eugene Gaughan, AAER 1141 (June
30,1999); In the Matter of Thomas Scanlon, AAER 1142 (June 30,1999); and In re Sensormatic
Electronics Corporation, Sec. Act ReI. No. 7518 (March 25, 1998).
:F)-Concepts Statement No.2, 131 (1980).
-[81: Concepts Statement No.2, 131 and 166.
-(9)- Concepts Statement No.2, 167.

Footnotes
-[1]- American Institute ofCertified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), Codification of Statements on
Auaiting Standards ("AU") § 312, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit," states that
the auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning and setting the scope for the
audit and (b) evaluating whether the financial statements taken as a whole are fairly presented in all
material respects in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The purpose of this
Staff Accounting Bulletin ("SAB") is to provide guidance to financial management and independent
auditors with respect to the evaluation ofthe materiality of misstatements that are identified in the
audit process or preparation of the financial statements (i.e., (b) above). This SAB is not intended to
provide definitive guidance for assessing "materiality" in other contexts, such as evaluations of
auditor independence, as other factors may apply. There may be other rules that address financial
presentation. See, e.g., Rule 2a-4, 17 CFR 270.2a-4, under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
-[2]-As used in this SAB, "misstatement" or "omission" refers to a financial statement assertion that
would not be in conformity with GMP.

-[10]- Concepts Statement No.2, 168-69.
-[II )- Concepts Statement No.2, 170.
-(12): Concepts Statement No.2, 125.
-[13)- AU § 312.11.
-(14)- As stated in Concepts Statement No.2, 130:
Another factor in materiality judgments is the degree of precision that is attainable in
estimating the judgment item. The amount ofdeviation that is considered immaterial
may increase as the attainable degree of precision decreases. For example, accounts
payable usually can be estimated more accurately than can contingent liabilities arising
from litigation or threats of it, and a deviation considered to be material in the first case
may be quite trivial in the second.

This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting literature regarding
accounting estimates. See, e.g., Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes
10, 11,31-33 (July 1971).
-[15J- The staff understands that the Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force ("Task Force") was
convened in March of 1998 and has made recommendations to the Auditing Standards Board
including suggestions regarding communications with audit committees about unadjusted
misstatements. See generally Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force, "Materiality in a Financial
Statement Audit - Considering Qualitative Factors When Evaluating Audit Findings" (August 1998).
The Task Force memorandum is available at www.aicpa.org.

:130J- 15 U.S.C. § 781-

-[16J- See Concepts Statement No.2, 169.

-[3IJ-15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).

-[17J- If management does not expect a significant market reaction, a misstatement still may be
miilenal and should be evaluated under the criteria discussed in this SAB.

-[32]- Criminal liability may be imposed if a person knowingly circumvents or knowingly fails to
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies books, records or accounts.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(4) and (5). See also Rule 13b2-1 under the Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.l3b2-I,
which states, "No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record
or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act."

-[18J- Intentional management of earnings and intentional misstatements, as used in this SAB, do not
rnchiile insignificant errors and omissions that may occur in systems and recurring processes in the
normal course of business. See notes 38 and 50 infra.
-[19J- Assessments of materiality should occur not only at year-end, but also during the preparation of
eacnquarterly or interim financial statement. See, e.g., In the Matter of Venator Group, Inc., AAER
1049 (June 29,1998).
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-[28J·FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards ("Standards" or "Statements") generally
proviile that "[tJhe provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items." This SAB is
consistent with that provision of the Statements. In theory, this language is subject to the
interpretation that the registrant is free intentionally to set forth immaterial items in financial
statements in a manner that plainly would be contrary to GAAP if the misstatement were material.
The staff believes that the FASB did not intend this result.

-[20]- See, e.g., In the Matter ofW.R. Grace & Co., AAER 1140 (June 30,1999).

.j::>.

-[21 ]- AUI § 326.33.

-[29J- 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2) - (7).

-[33J- 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). The books and records provisions of section l3(b) of the Exchange Act
oiijfiially were passed as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). In the conference
committee report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, the committee stated,
The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to clarify that
the current standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision.
The concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of
relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.

:122]: Id.

Congo Rec. H2116 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).

-[23]- The auditing literature notes that the "concept of materiality recognizes that some matters,
eitJier individually or in the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." AU § 312.03. See also AU § 312.04.

-[34J- So far as the staff is aware, there is only one judicial decision that discusses Section 13(b)(2) of
thiExchange Act in any detail, SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), and the courts generally have found that no private right of action exists under the
accounting and books and records provisions of the Exchange Act. See e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris
Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) and JS Service Center Corporation v. General Electric Technical
Services Company, 937 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

-[24J- AU § 312.34. Quantitative materiality assessments often are made by comparing adjustments
to revenues, gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, stockholders' equity, or individual line
items in the financial statements. The particular items in the financial statements to be considered as a
basis for the materiality determination depend on the proposed adjustment to be made and other
factors, such as those identified in this SAB. For example, an adjustment to inventory that is
immaterial to pretax income or net income may be material to the financial statements because it may
affect a working capital ratio or cause the registrant to be in default of loan covenants.

-[35J- The Commission adopted the address as a formal statement of policy in Securities Exchange
A:CiRelease No. 17500 (January 29,1981),46 FR 11544 (February 9,1981),21 SEC Docket 1466
(February 10, 1981).
-[36J- Id. at 46 FR 11546.

-[25J.: AU § 508.36.

-[37J: Id.

-[261.: AU § 312.34

:[38]- For example, the conference report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA stated,

-[27]- AU § 380.09.
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The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
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enforcement policy that penalties not be imposed for insignificant or technical infractions
or inadvertent conduct. The amendment adopted by the Conferees [Section 13(b)(4)]
accomplishes this by providing that criminal penalties shall not be imposed for failing to
comply with the FCPA's books and records or accounting provisions. This provision
(Section 13(b)(5») is meant to ensure that criminal penalties would be imposed where
acts ofcommission or omission in keeping books or records or administering accounting
controls have the purpose offalsifying books, records or accounts, or ofcircumventing
the accounting controls set forth in the Act. This would include the deliberate
falsification of books and records and other conduct calculated to evade the internal
accounting controls requirement.
Cong. Rec. H211 5 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
-[39J- As Chairman Williams noted with respect to the internal control provisions of the FCPA, "[t]
Iiousands ofdollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds." 46 FR 11546.
:[40]-ld., at 11547.
-(41)- Section IOA(t) defines, for purposes of Section lOA, an "illegal act" as "an act or omission that
vfcilliies any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law." This is broader than the definition
of an "illegal act" in AU § 317.02, which states, "Illegal acts by clients do not include personal
misconduct by the entity's personnel unrelated to their business activities."
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-(42]- AU § 316.04. See also AU § 316.03. An unintentional illegal act triggers the same procedures
Inllconsiderations by the auditor as a fraudulent misstatement if the illegal act has a direct and
material effect on the financial statements. See AU §§ liOn. 1,316 n. 1,317.05 and 317.07.
Although distinguishing between intentional and unintentional misstatements is often difficult, the
auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements
are free of material misstatements in either case. See AU § 316 note 3.
-[43]- AU § 316.04. Although the auditor is not required to plan or perform the audit to detect
rnlsstatements that are immaterial to the financial statements, SAS 82 requires the auditor to evaluate
several fraud "risk factors" that may bring such misstatements to his or her attention. For example, an
analysis of fraud risk factors under SAS 82 must include, among other things, consideration of
management's interest in maintaining or increasing the registrant's stock price or earnings trend
through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices, whether management has a practice of
committing to analysts or others that it will achieve unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic forecasts,
and the existence ofassets, liabilities. revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that
involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties. See AU §§ 316.17a and .17c.
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auditors should refer to the discussion in Part I of this SAB.
-[45]- AU §§ 316.34 and 316.36. Auditors should document their determinations in accordance with
AO~§ 316.37, 319.57, 339, and other appropriate sections.
:[46]- See, e.g., AU § 316.39.
-[47]- Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting at 32 (October 1987).
see also Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (February 8, 1999).
-[48]- AU § 325.02. See also AU § 380.09, which, in discussing matters to be communicated by the
iiiiariOr to the audit committee, states,
The auditor should inform the audit committee about adjustments arising from the audit
that could, in his judgment, either individually or in the aggregate, have a significant
effect on the entity's financial reporting process. For purposes of this section, an audit
adjustment, whether or not recorded by the entity, is a proposed correction of the
financial statements....
-[49]- See AU § 41 LOS.
-[50]- The FASB Discussion Memorandum, Criteria for Determining Materiality, states that the
financial accounting and reporting process considers that "a great deal of the time might be spent
during the accounting process considering insignificant matters .... Ifpresenlations of financial
information are to be prepared economically on a timely basis and presented in a concise intelligible
form, the concept of materiality is crucial." This SAB is not intended to require that misstatements
arising from insignificant errors and omissions (individually and in the aggregate) arising from the
normal recurring accounting close processes, such as a clerical error or an adjustment for a missed
accounts payable invoice, always be corrected, even if the error is identified in the audit process and,
known to management. Management and the auditor would need to consider the various factors
described elsewhere in this SAB in assessing whether such misstatements are material, need to be
corrected to comply with the FCPA, or trigger procedures under Section lOA of the Exchange Act.
Because this SAB does not change current law or guidance in the accounting or auditing literature,
adherence to the principles described in this SAB should not raise the costs associated with
recordkeeping or with audits of financial statements.

-[44]- AU §§ 316.34 and 316.35, in requiring the auditor to consider whether fraudulent
misstatements are material, and in requiring differing responses depending on whether the
misstatement is material, make clear that fraud can involve immaterial misstatements. Indeed, a
misstatement can be "inconsequential" and still involve fraud.
Under SAS 82, assessing whether misstatements due to fraud are material to the financial statements
is a "cumulative process" that should occur both during and at the completion of the audit. SAS 82
further states that this accumulation is primarily a "qualitative matter" based on the auditor's
judgment. AU § 316.33. The staff believes that in making these assessments, management and
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hup://www.sec.govlru/es/acctrps/sab99.htm
Last update: 081/3//999

..

"

,
-

F.... -

I
Co

-1'·-

I
I
I
I
.'!

'

I.

I

B - 86

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

--,

"-'

'1

'~.

--, -,

--, --. -, --, --, -,

~'

.•' 1

...,

-,

."

~'-,

"

,

REFERENCES TO SELECTED SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETINS

Selected Staff Accounting Bulletins
Staff Accounting Bulletins reflect the Commission stairs views regarding accounting-related
disclosure practices. They represent interpretations and policies followed by the Division of
Corporation Finance and the Office of the ChiefAccountant in administering the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws.

accounted for as a pooling-of-interests (March 19, 1996). (File name: sab96.txl)
• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 95. This Staff Accounting Bulletin rescinds StaffAccounting
Bu//etin 57 (Contingent Stock Purchase Warrants) (December IS, 1995). (rile name:
sab95.txt).

Bulletins currently available include:
• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101. Summarizes certain of the stall's views in applying
generally accepted accounting principles to revenUe recognition in financial statements, The
staff is providing this guidance due. in part, to the large number of revenue recognition issues
that registrants encounter. (December 3, 1999) (File name: sabl Ol.htm)
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• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 100. Expresses views of the stafTregarding the accounting for
and disclosure ofcenain expenses commonly reponed in connection with exit activities and
business combinations. including accrual ofexit and employee termination costs pursuant to
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issues No, 94-3 and No. 95·3, and the recognition of
impairment charges pursuant to Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 17 and
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No, 121 (November 24, 1999). (Fi Ie
name: sabIOO.hlm)

• StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 94. The interpretations in this staff accounting bulletin express
the views of the stafT regarding the period in which a gain or loss is recognized on the early
extinguishment ofdebt (April 18. 1995). (File nal11e: sah94.txl)
http://www.sec.gov/rules/acctindx.htm
Last update: /2/03/1999

• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99. Expresses the views of the staff that exclusive reliance on
cenain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality in preparing financial statements and
performing audits of those financial statements is inappropriate; misstatements are not
immaterial simply because they fall beneath a numerical threshold (August 13, 1999). (File
name: sab99.hlm)
• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 98. Revises the views of the stafTcontained in cenain topics
oflhe stafTaccounting bulletin series to be consistent with the provisions ofcenain accounling
standards recently adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, including Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 128, Earnings per Share (February 3. 1998). (File
namc: sab98.lxtJ
• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 97. Expresses the views of the staff regarding (I) the
inappropriate application of StqfJAccounting Bu//etin No, -/8 (Transfers of Nonmonetary
Assets by Promoters or Shareholders) to purchase business combinations consummated just
prior to or concurrent with an initial public offering, and (2) the identification of an accounting
acquirer in accordance withAPB Opinion No. 16 (Business Combinations) for purchase
business combinations involving more than two entities (July 31, 1996). (ril... n1lme: ,;..b97. 1.\ 1)

~
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• Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 96. This StafT Accounling Bulletin indicates the views of lhe
staff with regard to treasury stock acquisitions following a business combination that is
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SEC LITIGATION RELEASES

Seturities and [llthange Commission
Litigation Release No. 16399/ January 5, 2000

S.Le. v. Yun Soo Oh Puk alkla Tok)'o Joe and Tok)'o Joe's Societe Anon)'me Corp., (N.D.lL.,
Case No. OOC 0049, filed January 5, 2000)
On January 5, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed an action charging that
Yun Soo Oh Park a/kIa Tokyo Joe (Park), and Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme Corp. (Societe
Anonyme), a corporation under Park's control, engaged in a scheme to defraud members of his
Internet stock recommendation service and the investing public by, among other things, his
undisclosed trading ahead of shares he recommended over the Internet for purchase, posting of false
performance results, and recommending the stock of an issuer without disclosing that he had
indirectly received compensation from that issuer.
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relief in the form of disgorgement of Park's ill golten gains plus prejudgment interest and the
imposition of civil monetary penalties.

hllp://www.sec.gov/enforcellitigrell/r/6399.htm
Last update: 0//05/2000

Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Park, a resident of New York, New York and the sole
shareholder of Societe Anonyme, provides investment advice over the Internet, including stock picks,
to his clients. largely members of an Internet day trading community who pay $\00 to $200 per
month to Societe Anonyme for the privilege of receiving his advice. Park provides such advice via
his own web site, known as "Tokyo Joe's", via e-mails to subscribers of his stock recommendations,
and via a real time chat room within his web site where he discusses his picks and other investment
mailers in more detail.
The Complaint alleges that Park has engaged in a scheme to defraud by trading ahead of his
recommendations and has obtained substantial profits from such activity. The Complaint alleges that
Park regularly buys shares of a stock before recommending that Societe Anonyme members buy the
same stock. He then pumps up his members interest in his upcoming recommendations by sending
messages typically describing his picks as a sure thing or something he expects to double. When he
identifies his pick of the day, many Societe Anonyme members purchase the stock, driving up the
stock's price and volume. Park then quickly sells the same stock during this buying flurry at a profit.
often entering sell limit orders within minutes of his buy recommendation. Park fails to adequalely
disclose his prior o....'Rership of a recommended stock, and his intent to sell his shares while he
simultaneously recommends the purchase of such shares.
The Complaint funher alleges that Park altracts new Societe Anonyme members and recruits current
members to follow his recommendations by posting numerous effusive testimonials as well as false
and misleading performance data on his web site. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that his
performance data includes winning trades he did not actually make, erroneously repons his actual
trading profits or losses and fails to include losing trades and other trades necessary to make such
performance data not misleading. Finally, the Complaint alleges that, in at least one instance, Park
indirectly received compensation from the issuer of a stock he recommended without disclosing his
receipt of that compensation.
Based on the foregoing, the SEC filed a Complaint in the United States District Coun for the
Nonhern District of Illinois against Park and Societe Anonyme charging violations of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule IOb-5thereunder. Section 17(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933. and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Complaint
seeks the entry of an order of permanent injunction against Park and Societe Anonyme. and ancillary
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Release No. 33-7756 / October 20, 1999

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 7756/ October 20, 1999

Davis' Offer of Mlndhunt.com Securities

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-10080
In the Matter of
RICHARD L. DAVIS

ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS.
MAKING FINDINGS. AND IMPOSING A
CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

I.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate that a public ceaseand-desist proceeding be, and hereby is, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act") to determine whether Richard L. Davis ("Davis" or "Respondent") violated
Sections 17(a)(I). 17(a)(3) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

II.
In anticipation of the institution of this proceeding, Davis has submitted an Offer of Settlement
("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of this proceeding
and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission or in which the Commission is
a party, and without admitting or denying the findings contained herein, except that Respondent
admits the jurisdiction of the Commission over him and over the subject matter of this proceeding,
Davis consents to the issuance of this Order Instituting Public Proceedings, Making Findings, and
Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order") and to the entry of the findings and the imposition of
the relief set forth below.

III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer. the Commission finds the following:
Respondent
A. Davis. age 28, resides in Duncanville, Texas and is the founder ofa company known as
Mindhunt.com. Mindhunt.com purports to be in the process of creating an Internet web site geared to
children 16 years old and younger. Mindhunt.com was incorporated in the state of Texas on June 24,
1999. Mindhunt.com has never made any filings with the Commission.
Introduction

B. Davis violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, set forth in Sections 17(a)(I) and 17
(a)(3) of the Securities Act. by offering Mindhunt.com securities over an Internet auction site run by
eBay, Inc. ("eBay"), while making material misrepresentations about Mindhunt.com. Davis also
violated the registration provisions of the securities laws, set forth in Section 5(c) of the Securities
Act, by offering Mindhunt.com securities over the eBay Internet site. Davis failed to register this
offering with the Commission, and there were no applicable exemptions from registration.

C. eBay runs an Internet auction site (http://www.ebay.com) that permits users to buy and sell items
24 hours a day, seven days a week, through on-line auctions. Sellers post descriptions of items they
wish to sell on the site. Potential buyers may, in tum, access these descriptions. Over the course of the
next several hours or days. potential buyers may bid on the items on-line. At the close of each
auction, the highest bidder wins and must purchase the item. eBay receives a flat fee from the seller
for posting the item on its site and a percentage of the final sale price.
D. On May 5, 1999. Davis posted an offer to sell a 5% interest in Mindhunt.com on the eBay Internet
auction site. The posting stated that Davis had "purchased a public shell" and that Mindhunt.com
would "be public within 4 to 5 months." Davis offered the 5% interest for $250,000. There were no
bids in response to Davis' offer during the ten days it ran on the eBay auction site.
E. The term "public shell" that Davis used in his posting refers to a company that typically has no
current business operations and few, if any, assets and liabilities, but whose shares have been
registered with the Commission. In some instances, rather than go through the process of registering
shares ....ith the Commission, a privately-held company may look to purchase, or merge with, a public
shell in order to take advantage of the shell company's ability to issue new stock to the public.
F. At the time of his posting on the eBay auction site, Davis had not purchased a public shell and
there was no reasonable basis for his claim that Mindhunt.com would "be public within 4 to 5
months."
Davis' Violation of Sections 17(a)(I) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act
G. Section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act prohibits. in the offer or sale of securities, the use, with
scienter. ofany device, scheme or artifice to defraud. Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act prohibits,
in the offer or sale of securities, any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. No scienter is required for violations of
Section 17(a)(3).
H. In offering the Mindhunt.com securities, Davis claimed that he had "purchased a public shell"
when, in fact. he had not done so. In addition, Davis claimed that Mindhunt.com would "be public in
4 to 5 months." Because Davis knew that he had not yet purchased a public shell, he also knew that
he had no reasonable basis for the claim that Mindhunt.com would be public in 4 to 5 months.

I. Because he made material misstatements of fact in the offer of the Mindhunt.com securities, with
scienter, Davis violated Sections 17(a)(l) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act.
Davis' Violation of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act
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Release No. 33-77571 October 20,1999

J. Davis also violated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act. Section 5(c), in part, prohibits any offer to
sell securities through the mails or by making use of the means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce, unless a registration statement for the securities has been
filed with the Commission.
K. In this case, at the time of Davis' offer, no registration statement for the Mindhunt.com securities
had been filed with the Commission. By offering the securities over the Internet, Davis made use of
the means or instruments ofcommunication in interstate commerce.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 77571 October 20, 1999
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-10081

L. There is no exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5(c) available for the offer of
the Mindhunt.com securities. Because Davis offered the Mindhunt.com securities over the Internet,
Davis engaged in a general solicitation. As a result, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act and the
exemptions under Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation 0 are inapplicable.
M. Rule 504 exempts certain offerings that do not exceed an aggregate amount ofSl million and.
until recently, permitted general solicitations and advertising. Effective April 7, 1999, the
Commission amended Rule 504 to limit the circumstances where general solicitation is permitted to
transactions: (I) registered under state law requiring public filing and delivery ofa disclosure
document to investors before sale; or (2) exempted under state law permitting general solicitation so
long as sales are made only to accredited investors.

ttl

N. Davis offered the Mindhunt.com securities nationwide over the Internet without making any of the
requisite state filings or disclosures. As a result, Davis' offer, which commenced on May 5, 1999,
fails to qualifY for exemption from registration under amended Rule 504.

In the Matter of
JOHN R. HOFF

ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC
PROCEEDINGS, HAKING FINDINGS,
AND IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate that a public ceaseand-desist proceeding be, and hereby is, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act") to determine whether John R. Hoff ("Hoft" or "Respondent") violated Section
5(c) of the Securities Act.

II.
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O. Accordingly, Davis violated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act by offering to sell Mindhunt.com
securities over the Internet.

IV.
On the basis of this Order and the Offer submitted by Respondent, the Commission finds that Davis
violated Sections l7(a)(I), l7(a)(3) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

V.

In anticipation of the institution ofthis proceeding, Hoff has submitted an Offer of Settlement
("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of this proceeding
and any other proceedings brought by or on behalfofthe Commission or in which the Commission is
a party, and without admitting or denying the findings contained herein, except that Respondent
admits the jurisdiction of the Commission over him and over the subject matter of this proceeding.
Hoff consents to the issuance of this Order Instituting Public Proceedings, Making Findings, and
Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order") and to the entry of the findings and the imposition of
the relief set forth below.

III.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered, pursuant to Section 8A of the Exchange Act, that Davis cease and
desist from committing or causing any violation, and any future violation, ofSections 17(a)( I), 17(a)
(3) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds the following:
Respondent

By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary

A. HolT, age 24, resides in Hudson, Wisconsin and is a co-owner ofa company known as
AmeriGa.net. AmeriGa.net, an Internet service provider, has never made any filings with the
Commission.
Introduction
B. Hoffviolated the registration provisions of the securities laws. set forth in Section 5(c) of the
Securities Act, by offering AmeriGa.net securities over an Internet auction site run by eBay. Inc.

..

"

("eDay"). Hoff failed to register this offering with the Commission, and there were no applicable
exemptions from registration.
Hoff's Offer of AmeriGa.Net Securities
C. eBay runs an Internet auction site (http://www.ebay.com) that permits users to buy and sell items
24 hours a day, seven days a week, through on-line auctions. Sellers post descriptions of items they
wish to sell on the site. Potential buyers may, in tum, access these descriptions. Over the course of the
next several hours or days, potential buyers may bid on the items on-line. At the close ofeach
auction, the highest bidder wins and must purchase the item. eBay receives a flat fee from the seller
for posting the item on its site and a percentage of the final sale price.

violated Section 5(c) ofthe Securities Act.

V.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered, pursuant to Section 8A of the Exchange Act, that Hoffcease and
desist from committing or causing any violation, and any future violation, of Section S(c) of the
Securities Act.
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary

D. On April 28, 1999, Hoffposted offers to sell 1,000 shares in AmeriGa.net on the eBay Internet
site. In response to the postings, several bids were made. No sale of AmeriGa.net shares was
consummated.
Hoff's Violation of Section 5(c) of the Securities Ad
E. Hoffviolated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act. Section 5(c), in part, prohibits any offer to sell
securities through the mails or by making use of the means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce, unless a registration statement for the securities has been
filed with the Commission.
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F. In this case, at the time of Hoft's offer, no registration statement for the AmeriGa.net securities had
been filed with the Commission. By offering the securities over the Internet, Hoff made use of the
means or instruments ofcommunication in interstate commerce.
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G. There is no exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5(c) available for the offer of
the AmeriGa.net securities. Because Hoffoffered the AmeriGa.net securities over the Internet. Hoff
engaged in a general solicitation. As a result, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act and the exemptions
under Rules 50S and 506 of Regulation D are inapplicable.
H. Rule 504 exempts certain offerings that do not exceed an aggregate amount ofSl million and,
until recently, permitted general solicitations and advertising. Effective April 7, 1999, the
Commission amended Rule 504 to limit the circumstances where general solicitation is permitted to
transactions: (I) registered under state law requiring public filing and delivery ofa disclosure
document to investors before sale; or (2) exempted under state law permitting general solicitation so
long as sales are made only to accredited investors.
.
I. Hoffoffered the AmeriGa.net securities nationwide over the Internet without making any of the
requisite state filings or disclosures. As a result, Hoft's offer, which commenced on April 28, 1999,
fails to qualify for exemption from registration under amended Rule 504.
J. Accordingly, Hoffviolated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act by offering to sell AmeriGa.net
securities over the Internet.

IV.
On the basis of this Order and the OtTer submitted by Respondent. the Commission finds that Hoff
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Introduction
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 77S8/ October 20, 1999
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-10082
In the Matter of

LOUIS SITARAS

ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC
: PROCEEDINGS, MAKING FINDINGS.
AND IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate that a public cease·
and-desist proceeding be, and hereby is, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act") to determine whether Louis Sitaras ("Sitaras" or "Respondent") violated
Section S(c) of the Securities Act.

tx:l

II.
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In anticipation of the institution of this proceeding, Sitaras has submitted an Offer of Settlement
("Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of this proceeding
and any other proceedings brought by or on behalfof the Commission or in which the Commission is
a party, and without admitting or denying the findings contained herein, except that Respondent
admits the jurisdiction of the Commission over him and over the subject matter of this proceeding.
Sitaras consents to the issuance of this Order Instituting Public Proceedings, Making Findings, and
Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order") and to the entry of the findings and the imposition of
the relief set forth below.

III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds the following:
Respondent
A. Sitaras, age 37, resides in Jupiter, Florida.
Other Relevant Entity
B. Metropolitan Health Networks. Inc. ("MHN") is a Florida-based provider of health care services.
Its common stock is registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act
and trades on the NASDAQ SmallCap Stock Market.

C. Sitaras violated the registration provisions of the securities laws, set forth in Section S(c) of the
Securities Act, by offering MHN restricted stock over an Internet auction site run by eBay, Inc.
("eBay·). The restricted MHN stock Sitaras offered was not registered with the Commission, and
there were no applicable exemptions from registration.
Sitans' OfTer of Metropolitan Health Networks Securities
D. eBay runs an Internet auction site (http://www.ebay.com) that permits users to buy and sell items
24 hours a day, seven days a week, through on-line auctions. Sellers post descriptions of items they
wish to sell on the site. Potential buyers may. in tum. access these descriptions. Over the course of the
next several hours or days, potential buyers may bid on the items on-line. At the close of each
auction, the highest bidder wins and must purchase the item. eBay receives a flat fee from the seller
for posting the item on its site and a percentage of the final sale price.
E. On May S. 1999, Sitaras posted an offer to sell 2,000 restricted shares in MHN on the eBay
Internet site. The posting stated that the stock certificate was dated September II, 1998 and that the
stock could not "be sold publicly until 9-11-99."
F. In response to the postings, several bids were made. No sale of the MHN shares was
consummated.
Sitans' Violation of Section S(c) of the Securities Act
G. Sitaras violated Section S(c) of the Securities Act. Section S(c), in part, prohibits any offer to sell
securities through the mails or by making use of the means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce, unless a registration statement for the securities has been
filed with the Commission.
H. In this case, at the time of Sitaras offer. no registration statement for the MHN restricted stock had
been filed with the Commission. By offering the securities over the Internet. Sitaras made use of the
means or instruments ofcommunication in interstate commerce.
I. There is no exemption from the registration requirements of Section S available for the offer of the
restricted MHN securities. Because Sitaras offered the restricted MHN securities over the Internet,
Sitaras engaged in a general solicitation. As a result, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act and the
exemptions under Rules S05 and S06 ofRegulation D are inapplicable.
J. Rule 144 exempts certain sales of restricted stock where: (I) adequate information about the issuer
is available to the public at the time ofsale (17 C.F.R. § 230.l44(c»; (2) a one year holding period is
met for all restricted securities (17 C.F.R. §230.144(d»; (3) the amount of securities sold by a control
person in each three month period does not exceed the greater of 1% of the outstanding volume of
trading during the month prior to the sale (17 C.F.R. § 230.1 44(e»; (4) sales are made in transactions
directly with a "mlllket maker" (as defined in Section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act) or in "brokers'
transactions· (within the meaning ofSection 4(4) of the Securities Act) (17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (I)-(g»;
and (S) where the seller intends to sell more than SOO shares, or any number of shares for an amount
greater than SI0,000, he files a notice ofintention to sell with the Commission (17 C.F.R. § 230.144

(h».
K. Sitaras did not satisfY Rule 144's one year holding period. Also, in offering the restricted stock
directly to investors, Sitaras did not employ a market maker or engage in a brokers' transaction to sell
the MHN securities. Finally, Sitaras failed to file the required notice of intention to sell securities
with the Commission. As a result, Sitaras' offer fails to qualifY for exemption from registration under
Rule 144.
L. Accordingly, Sitaras violated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act by offering to sell MHN securities

over the Internet.

IV,
On the basis of this Order and the Offer submitted by Respondent, the Commission finds that Sitaras
violated Section 5(c) of the Securities Act.

v,
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered, pursuant to Section 8A of the Exchange Act, that Sitaras cease
and desist from committing or causing any violation, and any future violation, of Section 5(c) of the
Securities Act.
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
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NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 202
- MATERIAL INFORMATION NYSE Listed Company Manual

Last Modified 07101192

Last Modified 07/01192

202.00 Material Information

202.00 Material Information

202.01 Internal Handling of Confidential Corporate Matters

202.02 Relationship between Company Officials and Others

Unusual market activity or a substantial price change has on occasion occurred in a company's securities
shortly before the announcement of an important corporate action or development. Such incidents are
extremely embarrassing and damaging to both the company and the Exchange since the public may quickly
conclUde that someone acted on the basis of inside information,

(A) Security Analysts, Institutions/Investors, Etc.
Security analysis play an increasingly important role in the evaluation and interpretation of the financial affairs
of listed companies. Annual reports, quarterly reports, and interim releases cannot by their nature provide all of
the financial and statistical data that Should be available to the investing public. The Exchange recommends
that companies observe an "open dool" policy in their relations with security analysts, financial writers,
shareholders, and others who have legitimate inveslmentinterest in the company's affairs.

Negotiations leading to mergers and acquisitions, stock spills, the making of arrangements preparatory to an
exchange or tender offer, changes in dividend rates or eamings, cans for redemption, and new contracts,
products, or discoveries are the type of developments where the risk of untimely and inadvertent disclosure of
corporate plans are most likely to occur. Frequently, these matters require extenSive discussion and study by
corporate offICials before final decisions can be made. Accordingly, extreme care must be used in order to
keep the information on a confidential basis.
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Where it is possible to confine formal or Informal discussions to a smaN group of the top management of the
company or companies involved, and their individual confidential advISors where adequate security can be
maintained, premature public announcement may properly be avoided. In this regard, the market action of a
company's securities should be closely watched at a time when consideretion is being given to important
corporate matters. If unusual market activity should arise, the company should be prepared to make an
immediate pubrlC announcement of the mailer.
•
At some point it usually becomes necessary to involve other persons to conduct preliminary studies or assist in
other preparations for contemplated transactions, e.g., business appraisals, tentative financing arrangements,
attitude of large outside holders, availability of major blocks of stock, engineering studies and market analyses
and surveys. Experience has shown that maintaining security at this point is virtually impossible. Accordingly,
faimess requires that the company make an immediate public announcement as soon as disclosures relating
to such important matters are made to outsiders.
The extent of the disclosures will depend upon the stage of discussions, studies, or negotiations. So far as
possible, public statements should be definite as to price, ratio, timing and/or any other pertinent information
necessary to permit a reasonable evaluation of the matter. As a minimum, they should include those
disclosures made to outsiders. Where an initial announcement cannot be specific or complete, it will need to
be supplemented from time to time as more definitive or different terms are cflSCUSsed or determined.
Corporate employees, as well as directors and officers, should be regularly reminded as a matter of policy that
they must not disclose confidential information they may receive in the course of their duties and must not
allemplto take advantage of such information themselves.
In view of the importance of this mailer and the potential difficulties involved, the Exchange suggests that a
periodic review be made by each company of the manner In which confidential information is being handled
within its own organization. A reminder notice of the company's policy to those in sensitive areas might also be
helpful.
A sound corporate disclosure policy is essential to the maintenance of a fair and orderly securities market. It
should minimize the occasions where the Exchange finds it necessary to temporarily halt trading in a security
due to information leaks or rumors in connection with signifICant corporate transactions.
While the procedures are directed primarily at situations involving two or more companies, they are equally
applicable to major corporate developments involving a single company.

A company should not give information to one inquirer which it would not give to another, nor should it reveal
information it would not willingly give or has not given to the press for publication. Thus, for companies to give
advance eamings, dividend, stock split, merger, or tender information to analysts, whether representing an
institution, brokerage house, investment advisor, large shareholder, or anyone else, would clearly violate
Exchange policy. On the other hand, it should not withhold Information in which analysis or other members of
the Investment pUblic have a warrantable interest.
If during the course of a discussion with analysis substantive material not previously published is disclosed,
that material should be simultaneously released to the public. The various securlty analysts societies usually
have a regular procedure to be followed where formal presentations are made. The company should follow
these same precautions when dealing with groups 01 industry analysis In small or closed meetings.
(B) Member Firm Personnel Serving as Directors or Advisors to the Company
Every director has a fiduciary obligation not to reveal any privileged information to anyone not authorized to
receive it. Not until there is full public disclosure of such data, particUlarly when the information might have a
bearing on the market price of the securities, is a director released from the necessity of keeping information of
this character to himself.

Any director of a company who is a partner, officer, or employee of a member organization should recognize
that his first responsibility In this area is to the company on whose board he serves. ThUS, a member firm
director must meticulously avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners. employees of the firm, his
customers or his research or trading departments.
Where a representative of a member organization is not a director but acts in an adVisory capacity to a
company, the rules regarding confidential mailers should be substantially the same as those that apply to a
director. Should any mailer require consultation with other personnel of the organization, adequate measures
should be taken to guard the confidential nature of the information to prevent its misuse within or outside the
member organization.
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202.00 Material Information

202.00 Material Information

202.03 Dealing with Rumors or Unusual Market Activity

202.04 Exchange Market Surveillance

The market activity of a company's securities should be closely watched at a time when consideration is being
given to significant corporate mailers. If rumors or unusual market activity indicate that informatiOn on
impending developments has leaked out, a frank and explicit aMouncemenl is dearly required. If rumors are
in fact false or inaccurate, they should be promptly denied or clarified. A statement to the effect that the
company knows of no corporate developments to account for the unusual market activity can have a salutary
effect. It is obvious that If such a public statement Is contempleted, management should be checked prior to
any public comment so as to avoid any embarrassment or potential criticism. If rumors are correct or there are
developments, en Immediate candid statement to the public as to the state of negotiatiOns or of development
of corporate plans in the rumored area must be made directly and openly. Such statements are essential
despite tha business inconvenience which may be caused and even though the mailer may not as yet have
been presented to the company's Board of Directors for consideration.

The Exchange maintains a continuous market surveillance program through its Market Surveillance and
Evaluation DivisiOn. An "on-line" computer system has been developed which monitors the price movement of
every listed stock-on a trade-to-trade basis-throughout the trading sesslon. The program is designed 10 closely.
review the markets in those securities in which unusual price and volume changes occur or where there is a
large unexplained innux of buy or sell orders. If the price movement of a stock exceeds a predetermined
guideline, it Is immediately "nagged" and review of the situation is Immediately undertaken to seek the causes
of the exceptional activity. Under these circumstances, the company may be called by its Exchange
representative to inquire about any company developments which have not been publicly announced but which
could be responsible for unusual market activity. Whera the market appears to reflect undisclosed information,
the company will normally be requested to make the informatiOn public Immediately. Occasionally it may be
necessary to carry out a review of the trading after the fact, and the EXchange may request such information
from the company as may be necessary to complete the inquiry.

The Exchange recommends thatlls listed companies contact their Exchange representative If they become
aware of rumors circulating about their company. Exchange Rule 435 provides that no member, member
organization or allied member shall circulate in any manner rumors of a sensatiOnal character which might
reasonably be expected to affect market conditions on the Exchange. Information provided concerning rumors
will be promptly investigated.

\0
0"\

The Listing Agraement provides that a company must furnish the Exchange with such information concerning
the company as the Exchange may reasonably require.
Speciallnllial Margin and Capital ReqUirementsOccaSiOnally, a listed issue may be placed under special initial margin and capital requirements. Such a
reslriclion in no way renects upon the quality of corporate management, but, rather indicates a determination
by the Floor Officials of the Exchange that the market in the Issue has assumed a speculative tenor and has
become volatile due to the Innuence of credit, which, If ignored, may lead to unfair and disorderly trading.
The determination to impose restrictions is based on a careful inspection of the trading for the latest one week
period, defined as the previous Friday through subsequent Thursday, matched against various criteria. Other
factors, such as the capitalization tumover, the ratio of last yea~s average weekly volume to the volume for the
period considered, arbitrage, stop order bans, short position, earnings and recent corporate news are also
raviewed.
The restrictiOn Itself is aimed primarily at eliminating the extension of credit to those who buy a security and sell
it the same day seeking a short term profit. Such customers must have the full purchase value in the account
prior to the entry of an order. Concomitantly, a broader requirement is usually imposed on all other margin
customers in that they must put up the full purchase price within five business days, rather than only the
percentage required by the Federal Reserve Board. Cash customers, of course, must in all instances put up
100% of the cost in seven days.
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202.05 Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments

202.06 Procedure for Public Release of Information

A listed company Is expected to release quickly to the public any news or Information which might reasonably
be expected to materially affect the market for its securities. This Is one of the most important and fundamental
purposes of the Hsting agreement which the company enters Into with the Exchange.

(A) Immediate Release Policy
The normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a press release. This may be
either by telephone or In written form. Any release of information that could reasonably be expected to have an
impact on the market for a company's securities should be given to the wire services and the press "For
Immediate Release.·

A listed company should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which result In unusual market actlvily
or price variations.
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The spirit of the Immediate release policy Is not considered to be violated on weekends where a "Hold for
Sunday or Monday A.M. 'SO is used to obteln a broad public release of the news. This procedure facilitates the
comblnatlon of a press release with a mailing to shareholders.
Annual and quarterly earnings, dividend announcements, mergers, acquisitions. tender offers. stock splits.
major management changes, and any substantive items of unusual or non-recurrent nature are examples 01
news items that should be handled on an immediate release basis. News of major new products. contract
awards. expansion plans, and discoveries very often fall into the same category. Unfavorable news should be
reported as promptly and candidly as favorable news. Reluctance or Unwillingness to release a negative story
or an attempt to disguise unfavorable news endangers managemenfs reputation for integrity. Changes In
accounting methods to mask such occurrences can have a similar impact.
It should be a company's primary concern to assure that news will be handled in proper perspective. This
necessitates appropriate restraint, good judgment, and careful adherence to the facts. Any projections 01
financial data, for instance, should be soundly based, appropriately qualified, conservative and factual.
Excessive or misleading conservatism should be avoided. Likewise. the repetitive release of essentially the
same information Is not appropriate.
Few things are more damaging to a company's shareholder relations or to the general public's regard for a
company's securities than Information improperly withheld. On the other hand, a volume of press releases is
not to be used since important items can become conlused with trivia.
Premature announcements of new products whose commercial application cannot yet be realistically evaluated
should be avoided, as should overly optimistic forecasts. exaggerated claims and unwarranted promises.
Should subsequent developments indicate that performance will not match earlier projections. this too should
be reported and explained.
Judgment must be exercised as to the timing of a public release on those corporate developments where the
immediate release policy is not Involved or where disclosure would endanger the company's goals or provide
information helpful to a competitor. In these cases, the company should weigh the fairness to both present and
potential shareholders who at any given moment may be considering buying or selling the company's stock
(B) Telephone Alert to the Exchange
When the announcement of news of a material event or a statement dealing with a rumor which calls for
immediate release is made shortly before the opening or during market hours (presently 9:30 A.M. to 5:00
P.M., New York time)·, it is recommended that the company's Exchange representative be notified by
telephone at least ten minutes prior to release of the announcement to the news media. If the Exchange
receives such notification in time, it will be in a position to consider whether. in the opinion of the Exchange.
trading in the security should be temporarily halted. A delay in trading after the appearance 01 the news on the
Dow Jones, Reuters or Bloomberg news wires provides a period of calm for public evaluation 01 the
announcement. The halt also allows customers to revise the terms 01 limit orders on the specialist's book ,n
view of the news announcement. Even il limit orders are not canceled or changed during the halt. the laclthat

-,
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202,00 Material Information
202.07 Trading Halt Procedures

Whenever the Exchange determines that trading in a listed security should be halted or delayed pending the
release of a material news announcement

trading is hatted results In the reopening being considered a new opening, thereby enabling limit orders to
participate at the new opening price regardless of the previously entered limit. A longer delay in trading may be
necessary if there is an unusual inllux of orders. The Exchange attempts to keep such interruptions in the
continuous auction market to a minimum. However, where events transpire during market hours, the overall
Importance of faimess to all those participating In the market demands that these procedures be followed.

'Implementation of the halt or delay will be announced and the reason for the halt or delay will be stated "news
pending";
"Thereafter, the Exchange will monitor the situation closely and will commence the opening or reopening of
trading In the listed Security in accordance with its normal procedures as soon as the material news
announcement has been made. If the announcement is not made within a reasonable time after the halt or
delay Is Implemented, trading in the listed security may be opened or reopened In the Interests of providing a
fiquld markel While the time period may vary from case to case as a result of the particular circumstances
Involved, normally if the announcement is not made within approximately 30 minutes after the delay or halt is
Implemented, the Exchange may commence the opening or reopening of trading in the listed security. Such
action will be preceded by an announcement to the effect that trading is resuming even though the material
naws announcement has not been released.

, Effective June 13, 1991 the New York stock Exchange Off-hours trading sessions became operational. The
facUity offers the opportunity to trade at NYSE closing prices after the NYSE's 4:00 P.M. close until 5:00 P.M.
(C) Release to Newspapers and News Wire Services
News which ought to be the subject of immediate publlcily must be released by the fastest available means.
The fastest available means may vary in individual cases and according to the time of day. Ordinarily, this
requires a release to the public press by telephone, facsimile, or hand delivery, or some combination of such
methods. Transmittal of such a release to the press solely by mail is not considered satisfactory. Similarly,
release of such news exclusively to local press would not be su1ficient for adequate and prompt disclosure to
the investing public.

t:t1

To insure adequate coverage, releases requiring immediate publicity should be given to Dow Jones &
Company, Inc., Reuters Economic Services and Bloomberg Business News.

'"co

Companies are also encouraged to promptly distribute their releases to Assoclated Press and United Press
Intemational as well as to newspapers in New York City and in cities where the company is headquartered or
has plants or other major facilities.
A copy of any press release which may significantly impact on trading should also be sent promptly to the
attention of the company's Exchange representative, by facsimile.

The New York City addresses and telephone numbers of these national news wire services are:
Associated Press, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, (212) 621-1500 24 Hours
Fax· (212) 621·7520
Bloomberg Business News, 499 Park Avenue, (212) 318-2300
Fax· (212) 893-5999
Fax - (609) 497-6577
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2, Harborside Financial Center, 600 Plaza, Jersey City, N.J. 07311, (212) 416·
2000 or (201) 938-5400
Fax - (201) 938-5600
Reuters Economic Services, 1700 Broadway, (212) 859-1700
Fax - (212) 859-1717
United Press Intemational, 2 Penn Plaza, (212) 564-8815 24 Hours.
(212) 643-8480 (9-5)
Fax - (212) 564-8621
Every news release should include the name and telephone number of a company official who will be available
if a newspaper or news wire service desires to confirm or clarify the release.
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NEWS ARTICLES

The Wall Street Journal
The Wall Street Journal, December 29,1999

Compromised Analysts? The SEC Is Shocked.

to
\0
\0

By M.wt HIIUIIIlT
The S«urIUes and Bllcllanp 0JmmIIslon has proposed new regulations to deal
with the ways COIIIpan!es talk to WaD
Street analysts. Is this reaJJy a problem 10
serious that It demands regulation? Not
that I can discover. In fact, I am amazed
how quietly the problem evaporates under
even the mildest Im1tlny.
As best as I wi make out, the supposed
problem Is that companies have developed
a chummy relationship with certain analysis and not others, and that both parties
take advantage of this arrangement. It
seems that companies selectively release
information to lavored analysis In return
lor a more agreeable rating.
But what exactly Is the hann that this
creates? With a straight lace, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt WOITIes that this
arrangement compromises analYSis' DbjecUvity. Since when has anyone taken analysts' pronouncemenls at lace value?
savvy Investors always have been aware
tbat Wall Street analysis operate under serious connicls oIlnterest and compromised
objectivity.
.
The market already Is handling this
problem quite well on lis own. One inducement lor analysis to stay on tbe stralgbt
and nalTOllJ Istbls newspaper. Since 1993
The Wall Street Journal has been rating
the predictive prowess 01 Wall Street ana·
lysis, belplng readers detennlne which
ones deserve to be listened to, I doubt tbat
an analyst with a top rating would be Will·
Ing to compromise It merely lor short·tenn
gain.
Then there Is tbe advisory newsleller
Industry, which I've been monitoring

since 1980. It's been thriving lor decades
precisely because mllllOllS of Investors are
aware that Wall Street analysis are c0mpromised by not wanting to alienate c0mpanies wbo already are, or who may ~
come. InYestment-banking clients, The
number 01 Web-based advisory services Is
musbroomlng, In large part lor lhe same
reason. Astudy 01 two such Web sites this
past summer showed that, on average.
they bave provided significantly more accurate earnings estimates 01101 blgh·tech
companies than Wall Street analysts btve.
It's even possible to benefit lrom the
worthlessness 01 most analysts' opinions.
By studying the timing or eacb analyst's
earnings loreeasts, Barclays Global Investors discovered that most analysts
merely 100Iow the lead 01 the select lew 01
their peers whose opinions they genuinely
respect (witb a couple 01 weeks lag time, of
course, so that they can avoid appearing to
be merely 100Iowing someone else's lead).
The BGI mutual lunds that are based on
this research have beaten the market over
the past 15 years simply by paying atten·
tlon to the earnings revisions 01 the lew
analysis who are genuine leaders. In a
lairly predictable lashlon, a string 01 other
analysts wllllollow sull alter a rew weeks.
tbereby pusblng the underlying stocks
even further In the direction Indicated by
the original analysts' revisions. As this ex·
ample demonstrates, any Investor who
takes an analyst's report at lace value has
no one but himself to blame.
SUpporters 01 the proposed SEC rule
have Identified another potential hann 01
the current cozy relationship between com·
panies and analysts: Initial public oller-

lags.' systemaUc underpricing, wblch robs
lIeWc:ompaaIesofneeded capital while enrIcbInr the Investment bankers. But here
apia there Is 110 reason 10 think the martet Is unable 10 ClII1'ett any problem that

exIstI.

Noone forces a company going public to
sign up with a Wall Streetltnn tbat under'
prices 1POs. That company Instead can
choose to raise capital via a direct public
offering-an alternative the Internet Is
making easier and easier. Rather than
more regulations. I'd much rather see the
relaxation of various current regulations
that make direct oIIerlngs more dilflcuJt
than they should be.
In any case, It's not at all clear that
IPOs are systematically underpriced.
Like the visitor 10 the casino who only remembers the jackpots, It's all too easy for
commentators to locus on the small minority 011POs that go up hundreds 01 percent on their first day of trading. Most
don't. In lact, according to Jay Riller 01
the University of Florida, IPOs' average
flrst-day return between 1990-98 was just
J4'l>. And most IPOs decline alter their
first day. 01 1998's 374 IPOs, according to
Mr. Ritter. by the end or that year 207 of
them were trading below their respective
ollerlng prices.
The problems idenUlled by the SEC can
resolve themselves wilhout any additional
regulations. Analysts with compromised
objeclivity already are being marginal'
lzed, And, I can confldenlly predict, the Internet will only accelerate tbis process.
Mr. lIulbm is milor of the III1I1J<'rl Fi·
nanriol Digest.

Hershey Will Miss
Its Lowered ,Ta.rget
For 4th Quarter.

.'

.\

" By SHBu.y BRANCH
StJJI1~oITta

WALL STIlEI!:T JOURNAL

Hershey Foods Corp., and Its shareholders. should be happy to Idss 1999 good-,

bye.
'
.'
Citing continued tecImoIogy and orderfulfiJlment problems, .the maker of Hershey's ,KIsses ehocoIates and Reese'.
Peanut Butter Cups sald It would mIsS aI-·
ready lOwered fourth~uarter earnings eaUrnates by as much as 10 cents a share.
The quarter Will be the' sixth time 1ft.
leven perlodithat the oompany has missed
ea'rnings foreeasts. The latest warning
drove Hershey shales down. $2.3125 to
$41.8125 at 4 p.m:on the New York Stock
Exchange. near their S2-week low of $47.50
and well offthe$6U75 high for the year.

Hershey blamed Jower-than-expected
sales In December for the earnings shortfaIl. Inll. statement, the company sald the'
strong customer demand that it experienced In October ''was not sustained
throughout the fourth quarter." It added:
"ThIs slowdown In customerorderdemand
appears to be In part a consequence of the
earlier customer-senice and order-fulfUlment Issues." .
.
The company declined to elaborate on
the statemenL .
.
"The big question now," said Jeffrey
Kantor. an analyst with PrUdential Securities. "Is how much of these customer-service and ortIer-fulfWment Issues Will spill
over Into 2000. and could that Impact
Easter orders?"
.Prudential lowered Its fourth.quarter
estimates for Hershey by seven cents after
the announcement yesterday.
Hershey's explanation of lower sales for
the earnings pullback Sl1Jllrised analysts
as Hershey had already predicted they
would be 0(( by as much as $ISO million for
thf!vear.

Hershey's troubles began in earnest in
September. when the company said It
would miss thlrd~uarter earnings rore·
casts due to the problems rolllng out new
systems designed to take customer orders
and make store deliveries. That particularly hurt Hershey during the Halloween
season, when it sacrlliced some market
share to competitors such as closely held
Mars lite.
',
Since then, the candy maker had said
demand for Its product had been healthy,
tJtouih It hlld admitted It was struggling
still to get orden to customers on time and
complete.'
.
On Monday, CraIg Albert, an analyst
with sanford C. Bernstein, lowered his
fourtb-quarter estimate on the stock to 70
cents from 73 tents. He noted that the oom·
pany was lmprovtng its on-tlme deliveries
at considerable cost. . ,
Hershey's December woes are someWbat lroDlo; The candy maker, back In the
''inld-I990s, ;maitaged to boost Its ChrIstmas
sales considerably; It Was Qne of the first to
employ an aggressive seasonal' strategy,
.using festive red and. green foil wraps for
lis Kisses, as well as Special In-5tore dis·
plays•.
Following this year's Halloween debacle, analysts say the company likely lost
ftIuable retail shelf space for future holidays. WhIle Valentlne's Day Isn't consid;
ered a major sales stimulus for Hershey.
Baster; which falls on April 23, Is a vital
selling period.

Mars. and Nestle SA's Nestle USA,
which also has benefited from Hershey's
inability to fulfill orders. wouldn't com·
menton plans-if any-they might have to
.exploit Hershey's problems. A spokeswoman _for Mars said the company's
Easter orders appear very strong, and
added that promotional efforts for the sea'
son begin more than a year In advance.
making "reactive planning" difficult.
Hershey will report final 1999 earnings
on or around Jan. 31.
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Dell's warning spurs hardware sell-off
"Anytime there's component constraints,
regardless of what area that's in, it's going to
disproportionately impact the direct companies
like Dell and Gateway," said Art Russell, a
technology analyst at Edward Jones in SI.
Louis. "They operate on such lean inventories.
They just don't have any excess supply of those
components to fall back on if somebody doesn't
deliver on time or if there's a problem with the
components."

By Janet Haney, CBS MarketWatch
LQ$I Ui!!!ale: 5:2/ PMET Jan 27.2000

NEW YORK (CBS.MW) -- A late-day turnaround spurred by Dell
Computer's earnings warning tainted most hardware stocks Thursday,
though Intel and Rambus bucked the downward trend in the chip
group.
The Philadelphia
Semiconductor Index
($SOX: news, msgs) fell 0.6
percent. The Goldman Sachs
Computer Hardware Index
($GHA: news, msgs)
shed 2.6 percent.
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Russell added that this is a one-time event for
Dell.

38'/2

38

100

"Dell made it very clear that they based on one
difficult and challenging product transition, they weren't about to
abandon their loyalty to Intel and rush out and do anything dramatic,"
he said.

j

PC maker Dell warned late
'!lO
i
Wednesday that it will report
101112123
weaker-than-expected sales ----...-"-_.....
·:'Ui;~(:h.llr,:. ~ ".
and earnings for the fout1b
quarter. See full story. Its shares fell 2 13/16, or 7 percent, to 37 9116.

Hewlett-Packard (HWP: news, msgs) soothed investors' worries and
said late Wednesday that its quarter was "on track."

A few Wall Street analysts, though, showed support for the company.
Robertson Stephen'S analyst Dan Niles upgraded Dell to "buy" from
"long-term attractive," saying the shortfall was as expected and on
strong growth prospects. Merrill Lynch and Chase H&Q also
followed with upgrades.

"In view of recent announcements by some ofour competitors, we
felt it was appropriate to reaffirm revenue and earnings growth
guidance in the 12 to 15 percent range for the full year and that our
first quarter is in good shape," said Robert P. Wayman, H-P's CFO.
H-P shares slipped 114 to 108 1/2.

The company (DELL: news, msgs) blamed an
"inconsistent flow" of key semiconductor
components and a slower-than-expected
rebound in sales to corporate and institutional
customers related to the Y2K rollover.

Intel (INTC: news, msgs), which has been
blamed for chip shortages, climbed by I 5/8 to
98118. Rambus (RMBS: news, msgs)jumped
2 13/16, or 3.8 percent, to 77 112.
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In the chip sector, National Semiconductor (NSM: news, msgs) was
down I 7/8 to 48 and KLA-Tencor(KLAC: news, msgs) shed 17/16
to 56 15/16. Chip ti=j"t maker Novellus (NVLS: news, msgs)
lost 3 to 46 13/16. : ~
Janet Hemey is a reporter for CBS MarketWatch.
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By Drenon Daly,
CBS MarkelWalch
Lasll!I!!!£[£;_~: j j PM ETJan

26, 2000

NEW YORK (CBS.MW) -- Dell shares initially slipped in evening
trading Wednesday after the PC maker warned that a chip shortage
and soft business demand will leave fourth-quarter earnings below
analysts' profit expectations.
Dell (DELL: news, msgs) joins rival Gateway
(GTW: news, msgs) in reporting soft results for
the most recent quarter.

tx:1

Dell said it expects to earn 5430 million, or 16
cents per share. That includes a l-cent-pershare gain from the sale of investments. The
consensus analyst estimate caned for 21 cents
per share. See related story. The stock finished
Nasdaq trading off I 3/4 at 40 3/8 and traded
down to 38 after hours. Most other boxmakers
were also weaker in evening trading.
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MP3.com, the online music service provider,
posted a pro forma loss of $1 0.6 million, or 17
cents, excluding charges in the quarter. In the
same period a year earlier, the company
(MPPP: news, msgs) broke even. Analysts
polled by First Call had projected a loss of23
cents a share. Revenue shot up to $15.2 million
from 5613,116 in last year's fourth quarter and
54 million in the previous quarter. The stock dipped I to 30 ahead of
the release.
Shares of BroadVision rose in after-hours trading after the company
exceeded the consensus profit estimate on Wall Street. Fourth-
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quarter net income totaled 58.1 million, or 9 cents a share, on
revenue of $43.7 million. That was up from 52.1 million, or 3 cents a
share, on revenue ofSI6 million in the year-ago quarter. Analysts
polled by First Call expected a profit of 6 cents a share. Shares in the
company (BVSN: news, msgs) closed down 4 1/2 to 152 1116 but
moved to 157 on Island.
Computer AssocIates (CA: news, msgs) said third-quarter earnings
carne in at $424.8 million, or 76 cents a share, compared with $355
million, or 66 cents, in the year-ago period. The consensus estimate
was 75 cents a share. Revenue reached 51.81 billion, compared with
51.36 billion in the year-ago period. Shares closed down 1/8 to 74
9/16 and weren't active after hours.
Informix shares rose after the database company (IFMX: news,
msgs) doubled fourth-quarter earnings. The company posted fourthquarter net income ofS45.4 million, or 21 cents a share. That's up
from last year's 520.5 million, or II cents. Analysts surveyed by First
Call had expected a profit of 17 cents. The stock closed at 13 11116
but moved up to 15 on Island. See related story.
Shares of Exodus
EXDS Dall",2/10/00
Communications
140'
held their closing
120
level in the evening
session Wednesday
after the Internet
hosting company
1 20
reported a narrower- 'it Aitj j A' ~ 6
00~!
-_._-"--than-expected loss.
Exodus (EXDS:
news, msgs) said it lost $44 million, or 25 cents per share, excluding
one-time items. That was 2 cents closer to the break-even point than
analysts expected, according to First Call. In the fourth quarter last
year, the company lost 521.9 million, or 14 cents per share. Ahead of
the release, shares fell 9 3/8 to 120. They changed hands at 119 on
Island. See related story.
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JDS Uniphase (JDUS: news, msgs) posted better-than-expected
earnings of 566 million, or 18 cents a share, excluding merger-related
charges, in the second quarter. Analysts polled by First Call had
projected a profit of 15 cents. In the same quarter a year earlier, the
company earned $27 million, or 8 cents. Sales soared to 5282 million
from 563.8 million a year ago. Shares closed down 15 1/4, or 6.6
percent, at 216 3/4 ahead of the announcement.
Reader's Digest Association (RDA: news, msgs) posted earnings of
90 cents a share for second quarter, up 61 percent from 56 cents in
the year-ago period. Analysts expected a profit of 68 cents a share.
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year. Shares closed up 1/16 at 337/16 and weren't active after hours.
Shares of Beyond.com (BYND: news, msgs) edged higher on the
heels of the company's beUer-than-expected fourth-quarter report.
Revenue totaled S35.3 million, a 169 percent increase over last year,
while the net loss was S22.4 million, or 62 cents a share. Analysts
expected a loss of 67 cents a share. Last year, the company recorded
a fourth-quarter loss ofSl3.9 million, or 51 cents a share. Shares fell
5/16 to 6 3/16 in the regular trading day but moved to 6 3/4 after
hours.
Anchor Gaming said it earned S15.3 million, or SI.25 per diluted
share. In the second quarter last year, the company (SLOT: news,
msgs) earned S16.6 million, or SI.34 per diluted share. Analysts
surveyed by First Call expected Anchor to earn SI.24 per share.
Ahead of the release, Anchor shares slipped 518 to 43 114.
HNC Software said IflCS Do"1'2/llYOO
it lost S8.4 million, or
120
12 cents per share,
lOS
excluding one-time
90
75
items. Analysts
60
surveyed by First Call
45
expected the software ----------VOI .... company (HNCS:
news, msgs) to lose
20 cents per share in
,of • , . ,
Sep
Oct
_
Doc
00
F".b
the fourth quarter. In
",·!lI ... CIl,H~
the same quarter last
year, HNC Software
earned SIO.5 million, or 27 cents per share. Sales edged up to S53
million from S52.6 million. Shares closed ofT 4 1116 at 93318 in a
late-day slide. The stock wasn't active after hours. ~
Brenon Daly;s an online reporterfor CBS MarlcetWatch.
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8K Office Depot Release date 8/30/99
- Pre-Release, Earnings Warning-
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On August 30, 1999, Office Depot, Inc. issued a press release
commenting on earnings in the second half of 1999, and announced a stock
repurchase plan which was adopted by Office Depot's Board of Directors. A copy
of
the press release is attached as Exhibit 99.1 and incorporated by reference
herein.

ITEM 7. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND EXHIBITS
99.1 Press Release dated August 30, 1999

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(0) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

SIGNATURE

DATE OF REPORT AUGUST 30 , 1999

ttl

COMMISSION FILE NUMBER 1-10948
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OFFICE DEPOT, INC.

o

\JJ

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned thereunto duly authorized .

(EXACT NAME OF REGISTRANT AS SPECIFIED IN ITS CHARTER)
DELAWARE

59-2663954

(STATE OR OTHER JURISDICTION OF
INCORPORATION OR ORGANIZATION)

OFFICE DEPOT, INC.
Date:

August 30, 1999

By: lSI DAVID C. FANNIN

(I.R.S. EMPLOYER
IDENTIFICATION NO.)

2200 OLD GERMANTOWN ROAD, DELRAY BEACH, FLORIDA 33445

David C. Fannin
Senior Vice President and
General Counsel

(ADDRESS OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICES) (ZIP CODE)
(561) 438-4800
(REGISTRANT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER, INCLUDING AREA CODE)
FORMER NAME OR FORMER ADDRESS, IF CHANGED SINCE LAST REPORT: NIA

Investor Contact: Eileen Dunn
VP, Investor Relations
(561) 438-4930
Media Contact:

",EM 5.

OTHER EVENTS

Gary Schweikhart
VP, Public Relations
(561) 438-4399

OFFICE DEPOT COMMENTS ON EARNINGS IN SECOND HALF or 1999
QUARTERLY AND FULL YEAR EARNINGS TO BE BELOW EXPECTATIONS
Q3 CHARGE FOR ACCELERATED STORE RELOCATIONS AND INVENTORY WRITE-DOWN
BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPROVES $500 MILLION STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAM
DELRAY BEACH, FL (August 30, 1999) - Office Depot, Inc. INYSE:ODP) announcej
today that based on sales and margin trends during the Company's back-to-schco!

season and a revised forecast of results for the second half of 1999, it
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anticipates that earnings per share in the second half of 1999 will be in the
range of SO.38 to SO.40 versus investment community consensus expectations of
SO.50 - SO.52 per share. These estimates exclude the one time charge being
announced today and any merger and restructuring costs relating to the Viking
acquisition.

INVENTORY WRITE-DOWN
Because of rapid changes in office technologies and management's decision to
consolidate warehouses and to accelerate relocations and closings of
underperforming stores, the Company has identified $34.2 million, net of tax
benefits, of slow moving products to be liquidated. This inventory, which is
currently occupying existing store and warehouse space, has been identified as
merchandise that will not be replenished, either because of newer, more
innovative technology products or the rationalization of the merchandise
assortment in the combined Viking and Office Depot warehouses. The inventory
write-down will be included in cost of goods sold for financial reporting
purposes.

Secondly, in addition to announcing the expected earnings shortfall, the Company
also announced that it expects to take a $ 28.3 million charge, net of income
taxes, in the third quarter of 1999 to reflect the Company's decision to
accelerate its store relocation and closing program for older and
underperforming stores and a write-down of certain fixed assets. The Company
also plans to take a $34.2 million writedown, net of income taxes, of slow
moving inventories in its warehouses and stores. The inventory write-downs are
primarily related to slow moving technology related products that have been
adversely affected by accelerated rates of change in new technology, and a
rationalization of the warehouse inventory assortments in conjunction with the
Viking warehouse consolidation. The total anticipated size of the charge against
third quarter 1999 earnings in these categories is $62.5 million, net of income
taxes, or approximately $0.16 per share.

ODP BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPROVES STOCK BUYBACK
Earlier today, Office Depot's Board of Directors authorized a $500 million stock
repurchase program, effective immediately. Commenting on the repurchase program,
Mr. Fuente stated, "Despite the fact that our second half results will not meet

Finally, the Company announced that its Board of Directors today voted to
approve a $500 million repurchase of the Company's stock. The stock repurchase
program will include open market purchases as well as negotiated block
transactions.

our expectations or the expectations of the investment community, we remain very
confident in our longer term prospects and our ability to grow earnings and
shareholder value. As a result, notwithstanding today's disappointing news, we
feel our current stock price represents a significant value. Our Board of
Directors today authorized management to implement a $500 million stock
repurchase program. This authorization is open-ended, and we will be
opportunistic purchasers of Office Depot stock either in the open market or
through negotiated purchases."

EARNINGS SHORTFALL
Commenting on the shortfall in earnings per share, David I. Fuente, Chairman and
CEO of Office Depot, stated: "As we indicated in our quarterly release and
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He continued, "As a result of our strong balance sheet and cash flow, our
position as an industry leader and the growth opportunities that lie ahead, our
Board of Directors felt the best return on our excess cash at this point in ti~e
is the purchase of our stock. And while the investment of $500 million is
substantial, Office Depot will continue to maintain a very strong balance

conference call at the end of the second quarter, we needed to generate a
significant improvement in sales momentum in the second half of the year in
order to meet our financial objectives for the full year. We have not seen the
level of improvement we need to reach our earnings target. In our stores, sales
of lower margin technology related products continue to outpace sales of basic
office supplies, negatively affecting gross margins. In the Business Services
Group, sales are slightly short of expectations. However, contract sales are
growing more rapidly than commercial sales, which also negatively affects
margins. In all our divisions, paper costs are rising without a corresponding
lift in retail prices, further increasing margin pressures. We will also incur
increased expenses related to a higher number of new store openings and
consolidation of warehouse operations in the balance of the year. On the
positive side, we now anticipate that we will open approximately 140 new stores
in 1999, while closing 15 older stores. Other increases in expenses for the
balance of 1999 include the commencement of a major data warehouse initiative,
expanded technology projects, expansion of our Internet capabilities, both
domestically and internationally, increased Internet advertising and steps to
strengthen our international infrastructure. As a result of these sales and
expense trends, we will not meet earnings expectations for the year."

sheet."

As of August 30, 1999, the Company operated 768 office supply superstores in the
United States and Canada, in addition to a national business-to-business
delivery network supported by 30 delivery centers, more than 60 local sales
offices and seven regional call centers. Furthermore, the Company owned and
operated 22 office supply stores in France and five stores in Japan; had mail
order and delivery operations in 10 countries outside of the United States and
Canada; and under joint venture and licensing agreements, had 74 additional
stores under the Office Depot name in six foreign countries. The Company also
operates an award-winning U.S. Internet business at www.officedepot.com where
customers can access Office Depot's low competitive prices seven days a week,
twenty-four hours a day. Office Depot's common stock is traded on the New York
Stock Exchange under the symbol ODP and is in the S&P 500 Index •
CAUTIONARY STATEMENT REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION: Except for
historical information, the matters discussed in this press release are, and
should be considered to be, forward-looking statements within the meaning of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as amended. Forward-looking
statements, including any and all projections and anticipated levels of
performance, involve risks and uncertainties, which may cause actual results to
differ materially from those discussed herein. These risks and uncertainties are
detailed from time to time by Office Depot, Inc. in its filings with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). You are urged to review such
filings - including without limitation our Annual Report on Form lO-K, filed
March 22, 1999 - for a more detailed discussion of the risks and uncertainties

S62.5 MILLION CHARGE, NET OF INCOME TAXES, TO THIRD QUARTER 1999 EARNINGS
Commenting on the one time charge, Mr. Fuente stated, "Our management has
targeted apprOXimately 41 older or underperforming stores to be relocated or
closed. As a result of our aggressive new store expansion program, we feel that
this is also the appropriate time to take a hard look at our real estate
portfolio, and in particular underperforming stores. In an increasingly
competitive retail environment, we have taken action to close or relocate
out-dated and underperforming stores. Our stores need to be in the best possible
locations and reflect our most up to date store models."
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8K The Kro2er Company Release date 12/6/99
- Issuing Earnings Release and Comments by CEO -

which are specific to the businesses conducted by Office Depot, Inc.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

IN ADDITION TO THE CAUTIONARY STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN OUR PRIOR FILINGS WITH THE
SEC, Office Depot notes the following additional risks and uncertainties
associated with the information contained in this press release: (1) The
expenditures to be incurred by the Company and the effect of the charge to
earnings referred to in this Press Release may not have the intended effects of
making the Company more competitive in the marketplaces in which it competes,
and the anticipated benefits of these steps may not be fully realized or
realized at all. (2) Remodeling and relocation of certain of the Company's
retail stores may not be sufficient to improve top line performance as the
competitive environment may change in ways not anticipated by the Company or in
other ways that limit the effectiveness of these steps aimed at improving
performance. (3) Statements that the Company considers its stock to be a good
value at current levels may not be realized, as the price of the Company's stock
may decline in the near term, or over time, rather than increasing.

tx:1

Washington, DC 20549

FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT

Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

PRE-RECORDED MESSAGE: Office Depot's management will make available a
pre-recorded message, which can be accessed at approximately 4:30 p.m. today at
1-800-633-8284.

Date of Report: January 12, 2000

I

......
o

Ul

THE KROGER CO.

(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
An Ohio Corporation
(State or other jurisdiction
of incorporation)

No. 1-303
(Commission File
Number)

1014 Vine Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201
(Address of principal
executive offices)
Registrant's telephone number:

(513) 762-4000

31-0345740
(IRS Employe<
Number)
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Item 5.
Attached as Exhibit 99.1 hereto are detailed income statements
for the first three quarters of 1999, excluding costs related

Other Events

to mergers, which statements were furnished to analysts on

On January 12, 2000, representatives of the Company met with
analysts. During those meetings, the Company advised that it
continues to remain comfortable with its fourth quarter
earnings per share estimate of SO.37-0.40, representing a
19-29\ increase over the estimated pooled fourth quarter 1998
earnings per share, and its targeted 16-18\ EPS growth rate
for the fiscal years 2000- 2002, and that its fourth quarter
1999 sales-to-date currently are running slightly ahead of
bUdget. The Company also reaffirmed its belief that it will
meet or exceed the previously announced synergy savings from
the prior Fred Meyer mergers and the Kroger/Fred Meyer merger
of S155 million in fiscal year 1999; S260 million in fiscal
year 2000; S345 million in fiscal year 2001; and S380 million
in fiscal year 2002.

January 12, 2000.

Item 7.

(c)
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For purposes of completing models, the
analysts its best estimates, excluding
reasonable assumptions for fiscal year
containing an extra week in the fourth

Exhibits:
99.1 Detailed income statements.

Our ability to achieve the expected increases in sales and earnings could be
adversely affected by the increasingly competitive environment in which we
operate. In addition any labor dispute, delays in opening new stores, or changes
in the economic climate could cause us to fall short of our sales and earnings
targets. Our capital expenditures could fall outside of the expected range if we
are unsuccessful in acquiring suitable sites for new stores, if development
costs exceed those budgeted, or if our logistics and technology projects are not
completed in the time frame expected or on budget. Square footage growth is
dependent upon our ability to acquire desirable sites for construction of new
facilities, as well as the timing of completion of projects. Our ability to
increase same store sales could be adversely affected by increased competition
and sales shifts to other stores that we operate. Depreciation and amortization
may vary from our estimates due to the timing of new store openings. ,Interest
expense will vary with changes in capital markets and the amount of debt that we
have outstanding. LIFO will be affected by vendor promotions and changes in the
cost of inventory. While we expect to achieve benefits through logistics and
technology, development of new systems and integration of systems due to our
merger with Fred Meyer carry inherent uncertainties, and we may not achieve the
expected benefits. Unforeseen difficulties in integrating Fred Meyer with
Kroger, or any other acquired entity could cause us to fail to achieve the
anticipated synergy savings, and could otherwise adversely affect our ability to
meet our other expectations.

In its Current Report on Form 8-K dated December 6, 1999, the
Company estimated that its sales for the fourth quarter 1998,
taking into account the change in its fiscal year and the
merger with Fred Meyer would have been approximately S11.1
billion. In its Current Report on Form 8-K dated September 14,
1999, the Company estimated that its earnings per share for
that same quarter, and on the same basis, would have been
approximately SO.34. Adjusting for the 53rd week calendar in
1998 for pre-merger Kroger, and the normalization of Ralphs'
depreciation and amortization adjustment during the fourth
quarter of 1998, sales would have been approximately SlO.6
billion and earnings per share would have been approximately
SO.31. Fred Meyer made the adjustments to depreciation and
amortization in the fourth quarter of 1998 in connection with
its accounting for the acquisition of Ralphs.

ttl

Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information and
Exhibits

Company furnished to
acquisitions, of
2000, a 53 week year
quarter:

Square footage growth - 4.5-5.0\
Identical store sales growth goal - at least 1\ over
food cost
inflation

SIGNATURE

Capital expenditures - Sl.6 billion

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereto duly authorized.

Depreciation - S925-940 million
Amortization of goodwill - SlOO million

THE KROGER CO.

Interest expense - S620-640 million, based on current
rates

By:

January 12, 2000
Tax rate - 40\ (including amortization of goodwill)
38.5\ (excluding amortization of goodwill I

(Paul Heldman I
Paul Heldman

Senior Vice President, Secretary
and General Counsel

Average shares outstanding - 862 million
LIFO charge - $25 million

l._

l ... ,

l . "".

I .....

L,

l.

l . ~,

I.,

i ......,

I

l.

I

I_N

L"

l~

L

1

l

L

-,

-, -, -, --, -,

--.

-..., -,

EXHIBIT INDEX

Exhibit No.

....

-, --, '--, -,

-,

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
BASIC FROM OPERATIONS ........•.•....•..•..••.
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM
.

Detailed income statements.

Exhibi t 99. 1
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SALES ..........• '" '" .••....•.•.•...........
COSTS AND EXPENSES:
MERCHANDISE COSTS, INCLUDING WAREHOUSING
AND TRANSPORTATION •••...•..•.......•.....
OPERATING GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE •......
RENT .•.....•...•......••..•..•....•..•.....
DEPRECIATION ••......•..............•..•....
AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL •.......•.•..•.....
DIVIDEND AND INTEREST INCOME ..•.••.........
INTEREST EXPENSE INCL. CAPITAL LEASES
.
TOTAL

.

--------------

827,303,506

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
DILUTED FROM OPERATIONS •.•.•..•..•.....•.....
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM •.•..••.................•.

0.21
0.00

NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ....•....•••....

0.27

NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION .••.•.......••.•....

863,349,210

2Q YTD

%
TO SLS

13,493,100,231

-------------9,956,846,538
2,469,533,284
199,339,407
251,483,029
29,473,000
(2,733,694 )
201,609,559

--------------

13,105,551,123

--------------

0.28
..===:11:=--=......

NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION •...•••...•.•.•....•

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF EARNINGS
YEAR TO DATE
1999

73.79%
18.30%
1. 48%
1. 86%
0.22%
-0.02%
1. 49%
97.13%

--1

0.28
0.00

Exhibit

NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE .............••.
99.1

-, -,

%

TO SLS

SALES ...••••..•.••.••.•..••..•.......•..•.•••

23,181,998,816

COSTS AND EXPENSES:
MERCHANDISE COSTS,INCLUDING WAREHOUSING
AND TRANSPORTATION •.•..••••..............
OPERATING GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE •..••••
RENT ...••••••........••.••.••.•..........•.
DEPRECIATION .....••.••••...........•.....•.
AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL •..•.•.•......•••..
DIVIDEND AND INTEREST INCOME .•..•..•.....••
INTEREST EXPENSE INCL. CAPITAL LEASES .••..•

11,534,342,141
4,333,561,480
342,114,480
449,284,493
52,661,000
(5,324,390)
352,245,904

73.13%
18.22%
1.44%
1.89%
0.22%
-0.02%
1. 48%

.

23,058,897,108

96.96%

EARNINGS H~FORE TAX EXPENSE AND
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM ..•...••.................

123,101,708

3.04%

TAX EXPENSE

.

290,086,225

1.22%

EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .•.••.•....

433,015,483

1.82%

TOTAL

EARNINGS BEFORE TAX EXPENSE AND
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .•.••....•.......•••••••.

381,549,.108

TAX EXPENSE ........•.....••...•....•..•...••.

156,569,845

1.16%

EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .•.•....•...••.•••.•....•..

230,919,263

1.11%

NET EARNINGS ................................

423,118,849

1. 78%

EBITDA •...•.........••.......• " .... " .. " ...
LIFO •..•....•..••....••...•..................
NET INTEREST ...........•...•...........•.•...

1,583,914,715
12,000,000
346,921,514

6.66%
0.05%
1. 46%

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
BASIC FROM OPERATIONS •.......................
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .............•............

0.52
-0.01

-------------EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .•.......•.
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM •.•....•...................
NET EARNINGS .•..•..••.•........•.•..•....••.

(19,000)

--------------

EBITDA .........•..•.....•...•........•...•.. ,
LIFO ......•.....................•............
.

0.00%

230,960,263

1.11%

819,381,002
12,000,000
198,815,865

6.52%

--..........-_..._=

NET INTEREST

2.81%

0.09~

1. 47%

(9,836,634)

-0.04%

--,

NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ........•.......
NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION ....•••..•.........•
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
DILUTED FROM OPERATIONS .••......•.....•.••••.
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM
.
NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ••.•.......•.•..
NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION ...•.••.•......•..•.

0.51
..........
827,870,690
0.50
-0.01

-----------

SALES .•.••••••....•••.•....••.•••.•••.•....••
COSTS AND EXPENSES:
MERCHANDISE COSTS, INCLUDING WAREHOUSING
AND TRANSPORTATION .........•..•....•...•.
OPERATING GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ....•.•
RENT
.
DEPRECIATION ..•...••.••••.••.•.•.•.......•.
AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL ....•......•.....••
DIVIDEND AND INTEREST INCOME .......•.•...••
INTEREST EXPENSE INCL. CAPITAL LEASES •.....

25,122,097,191
6,216,454,746
497,987,560
647,311,887
76,002,205
(8,493,327)
503,340,788

TOTAL

.

o

NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ..........•.....

0.73

NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION ..•.....•...•...•..•

860,028,747

0.74

861,422,505

-------------34,111,157,542

......

-0.01

0.49
.... _-_ ... _--_
..

3Q YTD

ttl

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
DILUTED FROM OPERATIONS .•..•..........•.•....
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM ......•................•..

%
TO SLS

--------------

-------------33,054,701,050
--------------

73.65%
18.22%
1. 46%
1.90%
0.22%
-0.02%
1. 48%
96.90%

00

EARNINGS BEFORE TAX EXPENSE AND
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM .•••.•..•...•.•.....•.••.
TAX EXPENSE •...•.....•••........•...•...•....

EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEM ..•.•••..••
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM ..•••.••.••.•.....•........

l

3.10%

421,526,140

1.24%

634,930,352

1. 86%

--------------

(9,836,634)

--------------

-0.03%

NET EARNINGS •.••..•.•••••.••.•.•.•......•..•

625,093,718
............
_-

1. 83%

EBITDA .•.•.•....••.••••.••.•.•••..•.••.•.•...
LIFO
.
NET INTEREST ..•.••••••..•...•.....•••..•.....

2,280,118,045
5,500,000
494,847,461

6.68%
0.02%
1. 45%

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE:
BASIC FROM OPERATIONS ••••...•............•..•
EXTRAORDINARY ITEM
.

0.77
-0.01

NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ...•..•.•.......

0.76

NUM9ER OF COMMON SHARES USED IN
PER SHARE CALCULATION
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8K The Kroger Company Release date 1112/00
- Commenting on Statements Made to Analysts -
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hereto as Exhibit 99.1 is the text of that release.
B. On December 6. 1999, the Company conducted an investor conference
call. Attached hereto as Exhibit 99.2 is the text of the prepared
remarks for that call. The Company also indicated that. excluding its
Fry's division. its identical store sales increase thus far for the
fourth quarter 1999 was exceeding the 1.9% reported for third quarter
1999.
C. On September 14. 1999. the Company disclosed its estimate of sales
and diluted earnings per share for third and fourth quarters 1998,
adjusted to take into account the merger with Fred Meyer and the
Company's change in its fiscal year. The Company is revising its
estimate of what sales would have been for those two quarters. taking
into account the merger with Fred Meyer and the change in its fiscal
year. to approximately $9.8 billion in the third quarter 1998. and
approximately $11.1 billion in the fourth quarter 1998.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington. DC 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT

Sales as shown above have not been adjusted to account for divested
stores. These estimates include the effect of the Company's merger with
Fred Meyer, which was accounted for as a pooling-of-interests. and the
change in Kroger's fiscal year end that was disclosed in its Current
Report on Form 8-K dated January 15, 1999.

Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report: December 6, 1999
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99.2 Text of prepared remarks for investor conference call.
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31-0345740
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Cincinnati. OH 45201
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Registrant's telephone number:

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. the
Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereto duly authorized.
(513) 762-4000
THE KROGER CO.

Item 5.

Other Events

By: (Paul Heldman)
Paul Heldman
Senior Vice President. Secretary
and General Counsel

December 6. 1999

A. On December 6. 1999. the Company released its earnings for the third
quarter of 1999. separately announcing management changes. Attached

EXHIBIT INDEX

Exhibit No.

Exhibit

99.1

Earnings release for third quarter 1999.

99.2

Text of prepared remarks for investor conference call.

acquired 104 stores. Overall square footage, excluding divested stores,
increased 5.9% over the prior year. Capital expenditures for the quarter totaled
$625 million. Net total debt increased by $247 million to $8.7 billion from a
year ago, largely as a result of the Company's decision to build inventory in
anticipation of a strong holiday selling season. Net total debt also was
affected by the change in Kroger's fiscal calendar.
Exhibit 99.1

For the first three quarters of 1999, Kroger reported earnings of $0.74
per diluted share, before an extraordinary item and excluding merger costs. On
that basis, these results represent an increase of approximately 25% over
estimated combined earnings of $0.59 per diluted share for the first three
quarters of 1998. The prior-year estimate includes the actual results of Fred
Meyer before merger costs and an estimate of Kroger's pre-merger results,
excluding one-time expenses, to reflect the change to a new fiscal calendar. The
1999 figures also include a full 40 weeks of results from Ralphs, which was
acquired by Fred Meyer on March 10, 1998, thus contributing only 35 weeks of
results during the 1998 period.

From:
[KROGER LOGO]
NEWS

Corporate Affairs Department
The Kroger Co.
1014 Vine Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-1100

Media Contact:
Investor Contact:

Gary Rhodes, The Kroger Co. (5131 762-1304
Kathy Kelly, The Kroger Co. (513) 762-4969

Adjusting for these changes, and excluding sales from divested stores,
total sales in the first three quarters of 1999 increased approximately 5.7%.
EBITDA totaled $2.3 billion for the first three quarters of 1999.

KROGER REPORTS RECORD EARNINGS, BEFORE MERGER COSTS,
FOR THIRD QUARTER OF 1999

Mr. Pichler said the integration of the Kroger and Fred Meyer
organizations is moving forward smoothly. "We are delighted with the progress we
have made in combining these two organizations. By consolidating suppliers

RESULTS KEYED BY MERCHANDISING PROGRAMS,
PRIVATE-LABEL PRODUCTS AND SYNERGY SAVINGS; SEPARATELY,
ROBERT MILLER RESIGNS FROM KROGER TO JOIN RITE AID

tx:l
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.....
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CINCINNATI, OH, December 6, 1999 -- The Kroger Co. (NYSE: KR) today
reported record earnings of $0.24 per diluted share, excluding costs related to
mergers, for the third quarter ended November 6, 1999.

2

and centralizing our purchasing, we have been able to leverage our size to
obtain better costs for a wide variety of items, including produce, holiday
candy, grocery bags and plastic pharmacy vials, just to name a few. In addition,
our new three-tier, private-label strategy has led to the introduction of
hundreds of new products that will help strengthen our regional store brands

These results represent an increase of approximately 33% over estimated
combined earnings of $0.18 per diluted share, before an extraordinary item, for
the third quarter of 1998. The prior-year estimate includes the actual results
of Fred Meyer before merger costs and an estimate of Kroger's pre-merger results
to reflect the change to a new fiscal calendar last January.

across the country."

Including merger-related costs of $93 million pre-tax, Kroger earned
$0.15 per diluted share in the third quarter of 1999.

Looking ahead, Mr. Pichler said the Company remains comfortable with
achieving the projected $155 million in combined synergy savings for the 1999
fiscal year from the Kroger-Fred Meyer merger and from Fred Meyer's previous
mergers. He also said the Company expects combined synergy savings to total $260
million in fiscal 2000, $345 million in fiscal 2001 and $380 million in fiscal
2002.

After adjusting for the change in Kroger's fiscal calendar and
excluding sales from divested stores, total sales for the third quarter of 1999
increased 6.6% to $10.3 billion. Identical food store sales grew 1.6%.
Comparable food store sales, which include relocations and expansions, rose 2.5.
for the quarter. Identical and comparable sales include divisions with stores
that changed names during the past year. Excluding the Fry's division, which has
converted 35 former Smith's stores to the Fry's banner, identical food store
sales grew 1.9% and comparable food store sales rose 2.8%.

During the third quarter, the Company announced plans to purchase 74
Winn-Dixie stores in Texas and Oklahoma, subject to Federal Trade Commission
review. Kroger also added the Jay C Stores chain in southern Indiana and has
converted 38 stores in northern California that were acquired from Albertson's,
Inc. In addition, the Company last week announced plans to merge with Pay Less
Super Markets Inc., a privately owned chain of eight grocery stores in Indiana.
For the fiscal fourth quarter, which ends
estimates earnings per share to be in the range of
merger-related costs. Mr. Pichler said the Company
achieving previously announced annual earnings per
beginning in fiscal 2000.

EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization,
LIFO and unusual items) for the third quarter of 1999 totaled $696 million, an
increase of approximately 12.4% over estimated results from the previous year.
"We are very pleased with our sales and earnings performance in the
third quarter of 1999," said Joseph A. Pichler, Kroger chairman and chief

Separately, Kroger announced that Robert G. Miller, vice chairman and
chief operating officer, resigned from the Company, effective December 3, 1999.
Mr. Miller has accepted an offer to join Rite Aid Corp. (NYSE, PSE: RAD). In
addition, Kroger announced that Kenneth A. Thrasher has been appointed president
and chief executive officer of Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. Mr. Thrasher, who

executive officer. "Our merchandising programs continued to generate positive
results, including the introduction of more than 325 new private-label products.
Our manufacturing operations also turned in another outstanding performance."

During the third quarter of 1999, Kroger opened, expanded, relocated or
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January 29, 2000, Kroger
$0.37 to $0.40, excluding
remains comfortable with
share growth of 16%-18.

previously served as a senior vice president of The Kroger Co., has held a
variety of management positions with Fred Meyer, Inc. since joining the company
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in 1982. He replaces Mary F. Sammons, who also has resigned to join Rite Aid.
3

Mr. Pichler said, "Kroger has a very strong management team throughout
the organization that is firmly committed to building our business and achieving
the synergy goals set by the Company."
Mr. Pichler will assume the responsibilities of chief operating officer
on an interim basis while the Company's board of directors considers an
appropriate organizational structure.
Headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, Kroger is the nation's largest
retail grocery chain. The Company operates 2,268 supermarkets and
multi-department stores in 31 states under more than a dozen banners, including
Kroger, Fred Meyer, Ralphs, Smith's, King Soopers, Dillon, Fry's, Food 4 Less
and Quality Food Centers. Kroger also operates 794 convenience stores, 383 fine
jewelry stores and 42 food processing plants.

-I

This press release contains certain forward-looking statements about
the future performance of the Company. These statements are based on
management's assumptions and beliefs in light of the information currently
available to it. We assume no obligation to update the information contained
herein. These forward-looking statements are subject to uncertainties and other
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from such
statements including, but not limited to, material adverse changes in the
business or financial condition of Kroger and other factors affecting the
businesses of the Company which are described in filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Certain 1998 information included in this release has been estimated in
order to present the 1998 information as if the decision to change Kroger's
fiscal year had been made at the beginning of 1998. The 1998 information
included in the Company's Forms 10-Q filed with the SEC during 1999 will be for
different periods than those in the newly adopted fiscal year and may not agree
with certain 1998 estimated information included in this release.

THE KROGER CO.
SALES AND EARNINGS
WITHOUT ONE-TIME EXPENSES
(in millions, except per share amounts)

23

$

23

Pre-tax earnings earnings
before extraordinary item

$

333

$

289

$ 1,056

Tax expense

$

131

$

119

$

421

202

$

170

$

635

$
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$

625

$

0.74

Earnings before extraordinary item

$

Extraordinary item (2)

$

Net earnings

$

202

$

164

From operations

$

0.24

$

0.20

From extra-ordinary item (2)

$

1999

$

Number of shares used in diluted
per share calculation

(6)

$

$ (0.01)

$ (0.01)

$

$

$
(e

0.24

857

0.19

0.73

860

855

(1) EBITDA, as defined in our credit agreements, represents earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, LIFO and one-time items.
(2) From the early retirement of debt.
(3) The information for the third quarter of 1998 includes the results of
operations of The Kroger Co. for the 16 weeks ended October 3, 1998, its wholly
owned subsidiary, Dillon Companies Inc., for the 13 weeks ended September 26,
1998, its wholly owned subsidiary, Fred Meyer, Inc., for the 12 weeks ended
November 7, 1998.

Sales
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$34,111
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EBITDA (1)
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THE KROGER CO.
SALES AND EARNINGS
WITH ONE-TIME EXPENSES
(in millions, except per share amounts)

1998

1998(3)

9

$

76

$

Diluted net earnings per
common share

3 Quarters

3rd Quarter

$

$

(4) The information for the first three quarters of 1998 includes the results of
operations of The Kroger Co. for the 40 weeks ended October 3, 1998, Dillon
Companies Inc., for the 39 weeks ended September 26, 1998, and Fred Meyer, Inc.,
for the 40 weeks ended November 7, 1998.

1999
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Diluted earnings per common share:
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Interest

$

148

$

170

$

495

Depreciation

$
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$

200

$
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Amorti zation

$

23

$

23

$

76

One-time Items (5)

$

93

$

34

$

363

Pre-tax earnings earnings
before extraordinary item

$

240

$

255

$

693

Tax expense

$

III

$

105

$

301

129

$

150

$

392

$

$

(10)

$

Good morning and welcome to Kroger's third quarter investor conference call.
Thanks for joining us. With me today are Dave Dillon, Kroger's President and
Rodney McMullen, our Chief Financial Officer.

$

This morning Kroger released the results of our outstanding third quarter. I am
very pleased by the strong sales and EBITDA that our operators achieved.

Earnings before extraordinary item

$

Extraordinary item (2)

$

$

KATHY KELLY: Good morning. Before we begin tOday's call, I must inform you that
the discussion today will include forward looking statements. We wish to caution
you that such statements are predictions, and actual events or results can
differ materially. A detailed discussion of the many factors that we believe may
have a material effect on our business on an ongoing basis is contained in our
SEC filings.

-------

-------

(6)

COMMENTS BY: JOE PICHLER

-------

Net earnings
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$

$

$
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382
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Diluted earnings per common share:

to
I
......
......
N

The release also states that Bob Miller and Mary Sammons have resigned to become
Rite Aid's CEO and COO respectively.

From operations

$

0.15

$

0.18

From extra-ordinary item (2)

$

-

$

(0.01)

$

0.46

$

$ (0.01)

-------

We are very pleased to announce that Ken Thrasher, SVP of Kroger. has been
appointed president and CEO of Fred Meyer Stores. replacing Mary Sammons. Ken is
a 17 year associate of Fred Meyer stores who has earned the respect of our
entire organization for his professional expertise. understanding of the
multi-department stores and leadership.

$ (C

Diluted net earnings per
common share

$

0.15

---""---

0.17
.-...
-

$ 0.45
......0::=-==

857

855

860

$

Number of shares used in diluted
per share calculation

I will now review Kroger's third quarter results and update you on the
integration activities. Rodney will discuss synergy savings. We will then be
happy to answer your questions.
TOTAL SALES WERE $10.3 BILLION DOLLARS - AN INCREASE OF 6.6% over the comparable
period in 1998. FOOD STORE SALES ROSE 6.3%. In order to calculate the 1998 sales
figure, we adjusted Kroger sales to coincide with the new fiscal year and
excluded sales from divested stores. ON THE SAME BASIS. IDENTICAL FOOD STORE
SALES rose a strong 1.6%.

(1) EBITDA, as defined in our credit agreements, represents earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, LIFO and one-time items.
(2) From the early retirement of debt.

The identical store sales calculation excludes expansions and relocations.
(3) The information for the third quarter of 1998 includes the results of
operations of The Kroger Co. for the 16 weeks ended October 3, 1998, its wholly
owned subsidiary, Dillon Companies Inc., for the 13 weeks ended September 26,
1998, its wholly owned subsidiary, Fred Meyer, Inc., for the 12 weeks ended
November 7, 1998.

COMPARABLE STORE SALES - which include expansions and relocations, rose 2.5%,
another good number. Excluding the Fry's division, which converted 35 former
Smith's stores to the Fry's banner, identical food store sales increased 1.9!
and comparable store sales rose 2.8%. I am very pleased with the continued
strength of our sales.

(4) The information for the first three quarters of 1998 includes the results of
operations of The Kroger Co. for the 40 weeks ended October 3, 1998, Dillon
Companies Inc .• for the 39 weeks ended September 26. 1998. and Fred Meyer, Inc.,
for the 40 weeks ended November 7. 1998.
EBITDA:

(5) The one-time items in 1999 are costs related to mergers. The one-time items
in the third quarter of 1998 are costs related to mergers. The one-time items in
the first three quarters of 1998 are costs related to mergers ($246 million),
logistics initiatives ($41 million), accounting and operations consolidations in
Texas ($11 million), and charges related to an accounting change ($90 millionl.
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THIRD QUARTER EBITDA totaled $696.1 million dollars - an increase of
approximately 12.4% over estimated results for the third quarter 1998. This was
an outstanding performance by our operators.
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Excluding all costs related to the merger, THE GROSS PROFIT RATE was 26.54% of
sales. The gross profit rate improvement over the first half of 1999 reflects
the reduction in product costs generated by our corporate wide purchasing
program; a strong increase in private label profitability; excellent
manufacturing results; and the benefits being generated by logistics
initiatives.
EXCLUDING COSTS RELATED TO THE MERGER, OG&A expense was 18.2% of sales which is
flat as compared to the first half of 1999. Kroger remains committed to reducing
ALL costs - as a percent of sales, year over year.
COMBINED SYNERGY SAVINGS at the end of the quarter totaled
S135 million dollars. The incremental savings were primarily attributable to
PURCHASING, MANUFACTURING, AND REDUCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. We are well on
our way to achieving the S155 million of synergy savings targeted for fiscal
1999.
COSTS RELATED TO THE MERGER TOTALED S93 million in the quarter. We expect to
incur additional costs related to the merger in the next two years. However, the
majority of these costs will occur during the first year after the merger
closed.
EARNINGS PER DILUTED SHARE, before all costs related to the merger, totaled 24
cents, an increase of 33% over estimated results for the third quarter 1998 . We
estimate that 1998 diluted earnings per share would have been approximately 18
cents on a comparable basis.
There were 857.4 MILLION DILUTED SHARES outstanding at the end of the third
quarter.
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I am DELIGHTED by Kroger's strong performance during the quarter especially in
light of all the integration activities that are underway across the company and
the mergers we are able to identify and complete on a fill-in basis in addition
to achieving the merger synergies at Fred Meyer. And I continue to be impressed
by the way our operators are working together as one team.
This merger is off to a solid start and I continue to feel good about our
ability to generate EARNINGS PER SHARE GROWTH AT THE TARGETED RATE OF 16 - 18%
BEGINNING NEXT YEAR.
FOR THE 4TH QUARTER, WE EXPECT EARNINGS TO BE WITHIN THE RANGE OF
37 - 40 CENTS. Let me explain. The Phoenix integration is taking longer than we
expected and sales have been soft at QFC and Smiths since the date of the
merger. We expect to achieve the Phoenix synergies in 2000. And we have replaced
the leadership at Smith's and QFC with two strong executives, Russ Dispense and
Darrell Webb. Both are solid merchants and operators.
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merchants. We will begin to fix those after the year 2000--we want to make sure
we get past the Y2K date.
ACQUISITIONS
Kroger continues to take advantage of strategic acquisition opportunities.
During the quarter, we completed our merger with the John C Groub Co. (Jay C
stores in Indiana) and the acquisition of 38 Albertsons stores in northern
California. Sam Duncan and the Ralphs team are doing a great job of integrating
those northern California stores. I might add that Ralphs had a wonderful
quarter. We also announced plans to purchase 74 Winn-Dixie stores in Texas and
Oklahoma and, last week, announced plans to merge with Pay Less Super Markets
Inc., a privately owned chain of eight grocery stores in Indiana. A very busy
quarter.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT:
Kroger invested S625 MILLION IN CAPITAL PROJECTS in the third quarter. Excluding
acquisition costs associated with the Albertsons stores and the Jay C stores,
cap ex was S 468 million. For the year, we expect to invest approximately Sl.95
billion which includes S100 million of merger related capital.
We plan to grow square footage by 4.5 - 5% year over year, excluding
acquisitions. Net square footage growth in fiscal 1999 will be in the 4.0 - 4.5%
range because of the large number of operational closings this year. We
continually review under performing assets and are moving more quickly to turn
them around or dispose of them.
During the quarter Kroger opened, acquired, expanded, or relocated 104 stores
versus 51 in the comparable period of 1998. We had 11 operational closings and
completed 40 within the wall remodels.
Square footage, excluding divested stores, increased 5.9% over 3rd quarter 1998
to 118.1 million square feet. Excluding divested stores and acquisitions, net
square footage grew 3.9% over 3rd quarter 1998.
KROGER ENDED THE QUARTER WITH 2268 FOOD STORES, 794 CONVENIENCE STORES, AND 383
JEWELRY STORES.

LIFO posted a S6.5 million dollar CREDIT for the quarter compared to a S9
million dollar charge last year. This is directly attributable to better buying
as a result of our centralized procurement program; the stable grocery cost
environment in which we are currently operating; and the synergy savings that we
are beginning to achieve.
WORKING CAPITAL:

We also experienced some information systems issues since the date of the merger
at Smith's, QFC and Fry's. These are not control issues but they do affect
in-store operations and some of the purchasing. On the in-store systems there
were some hardware problems early on as the systems were changed at Smith's and
QFC. That changeover began before the merger and some of those problems were
identified in the hardware. Those have been fixed. There are still some issues
that are targeted for improvement in 2000.
On the purchasing systems side, at the time that Smith's and QFC were acquired
by Fred Meyer, the purchasing systems were non-compliant with the year 2000. The
decision was made, and I think appropriately, to introduce the Fred Meyer
purchasing system, which is a compliant system. That system is designed for
multi-department stores and there are some features that are cumbersome for food

Working capital for the quarter increased S313 million to a level of S354
million. Inventory build was primarily responsible for the increase. Kroger
divisions have increased inventory for the holiday season in anticipation of our
customers' needs for the millennium. The increase in working capital also
reflects the change in the new fiscal calendar, and the effect of the newly
acquired stores.
Working capital reduction is a high priority going forward. We expect to take at
least S500 million out of working capital over the next 5 years.
DEBT/INTEREST EXPENSE:

-,

quarter, we have achieved combined synergies of S135 million, an incremental $15
million over the 2nd quarter 1999. As Joe mentioned before, the areas producing
the synergies are administrative cost reductions, purchasing (especially in the
private label areas and other purchasing areas), manufacturing, and the offset
of some of the negative synergies in Arizona that are reflected in those
numbers. We are comfortable that we will meet or beat the projected $155 million
in combined synergy savings for the 1999 fiscal year. In addition, we will meet
or beat combined synergies of S260 million in fiscal 2000, $345 million in
fiscal 2001 and S380 million in fiscal 2002.

NET TOTAL DEBT increased S247 million dollars to S8.7 billion dollars. The
increase is due to the inventory build.
NET INTEREST EXPENSE totaled S148 million. Interest expense for the full year
should be in the S650 million range, plus or minus S10 million. This increase of
S25 million is due to the recent acquisitions, funding out some of the Fred
Meyer bank debt to a longer maturity and the inventory build.
We continue to make dramatic progress in integrating the Kroger and Fred Meyer
organizations. There are two specific areas that I would like to highlight:
1.

Each quarter the finance support team along with each of the transition
committee teams updates the synergies and we continue to feel very comfortable
with our ability to achieve these numbers.

ARIZONA

In addition, this morning we announced a stock repurchase program using option
proceeds and the tax deduction from those options. If you look through the end
of 2001 we have 5.1 million options that will expire that we would expect to be
exercised. By using the proceeds from options and the tax deduction, we would
expect to repurchase about half that number of shares going forward.

As you recall, Kroger and Fred Meyer only had overlap in Arizona. All 35 former
Smith's stores in Phoenix and Tucson have been converted to the Fry's banner. As
I mentioned earlier, we are not happy with the results in Phoenix and we have a
plan of action to achieve the full synergies.
The Fry's stores, as well as the Fred Meyer Arizona stores, are now receiving
all grocery and perishable items from the Tolleson warehouse which formerly
served the Smith's and Fred Meyer stores in Arizona. The former Fry's warehouse
is still being used for outside storage during the transition, but there is no
order assembly being done at that facility. The warehouse conversion was more
difficult than we anticipated but service levels have now improved. And the
Fry's dairy has been sold.

Now back to Joe.

COMMENTS BY: JOE PICHLER
THE SECOND AREA I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT IS PRIVATE LABEL.
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Kroger's three tier private label strategy is beginning to generate incremental
sales and enhanced profit margins. Our "good, better, best" approach to private
label will enable us to serve a much

Thanks Rodney. I am extremely pleased
divisional operators kept their focus
increase in sales and earnings while,
corporate leadership to implement the
of synergies.

with Kroger's third quarter results. Our
on customer service to produce a strong
at the same time, working closely with
strategies that will generate $380 million

broader consumer base. Pre-merger Kroger's private label sales accounted for 25%
of grocery dollar sales, and 31\ of unit sales during the 3rd quarter. Private
label sales are about 16-18\ of grocery sales in the former Fred Meyer
divisions.

The "new Kroger" is building on the strength of our combined companies: leading
market shares in some of the nation's largest and fastest growing metro markets;
solid managers throughout the company; sophisticated technology and logistics
systems that support retail operations effectively and efficiently; a powerful
group of manufacturing plants that provide a strategic advantage in private
label categories; and a clarity of purpose throughout the organization

I am confident that we can raise the private label sales penetration at the Fred
Meyer divisions to the level that the pre-merger Kroger divisions have achieved
and that we will continue to grow private label market share across the entire
company. We are rolling out the Private Selections premium tier and now have
over 70 sku's currently in the stores, with 30 more scheduled to be in place by
year end.

These assets form a solid base for generating the economies of scale made
possible by our merger. We are off to a great start. Our team is heavily
incentified to achieve the full value of our merger and will be handsomely
rewarded as we build shareholder value through our projected EPS growth rate of
16 - 18\ beginning next year.
We will now be happy to take your questions.

We are very pleased with the early results and the incremental sales these
premium products are generating.
So far this year, Kroger has introduced 726 new private label products. You can
really see the emphasis we are placing on this area. We continue to be very
pleased with our three tier strategy and the product cost reductions we are
achieving. This is an area of substantial growth potential.
With that, I would like to ask Rodney to update us on synergy savings.
Rodney, . • .
COMMENTS BY: RODNEY MCMULLEN
Thanks Joe and good morning. As Joe mentioned earlier, at the end of the third
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Item 5.

Other Events
Except as expressly indicated or unless the context otherwise requires,

"Cendant",

"we",

"our",

or

"us"

means

Cendant

Corporation,

a

Delaware

Corporation, and its subsidiaries.
Form 8-K
CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Preliminary Agreement to Settle Cornmon Stock Securities Class Action.
On December 1, 1999, we announced that we reached a preliminary agreement to
settle the principal securities class action pending against us in the U.S.
District Court in Newark, New Jersey. Under the agreement, we would pay the
class members S2.83 billion in cash. The class action was initiated following
the discovery in April 1998 of accounting irregularities at former cue
International business units.

to
I

.....
.....
VI

December 1, 1999 (December 1, 1999)
(Date of Report (date of earliest event reported))

We will

Cendant Corporation

(Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter)
Delaware
(State or other jurisdiction
of incorporation or
organization)
9 West 51th Street
New York, NY

1-10308
(Commission File No.)

06-0918165
(I.R.S. Employer
Identification Number)

10019

continue to pursue our claims

against

CUC's former

auditor,

Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y") in relation to the accounting irregularities of the
former CUC business units, including claims for professional malpractice, breach
of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and claims seeking contribution from
E&Y in connection with our settlement of the PRIDES litigation. As part of the
settlement agreement with lead plaintiffs, the class they represent will receive
50\ of any recovery by us from E&Y.
With respect to the settlement, we will record a non-cash after-tax
charge of approximately Sl.8 billion, or S2.39 per share in the fourth quarter
of 1999.
Based upon the assumption that district court approval of a definitive
settlement agreement will occur at the end of the first quarter of 2000, we
currently estimate that the settlement may reduce 2000 earnings per share by
between $0.12 and SO.16. The pro forma 12-month earnings impact, assuming the
settlement occurred on January I, 2000, is currently estimated at SO.15 to SO.21
cents per share.
The impact on
include the following:

o

o

earnings

per share

will vary

based on

factors

that

First, while we expect to resume share repurchase activity, our
repurchase may not equal the Sl billion in stock we originally
intended to acquire in the fourth quarter of 1999.
Second,

the exact date on which we may make the actual settlement

payment is uncertain,

order and

whether

based on the date of final

this order is

appealed.

district

court

From the date of the

-,

final district court order, we will accrue interest on the unpaid
settlement amount. While any appeals are pending, we will deposit
a letter or credit or similar security in the amount of the
settlement.

o

Third,
the timing and impact of any securities
issued to
ultimately finance the settlement payment will depend on market
conditions at the time.

o

Fourth, while we expect to generate significant tax benefits form
the ultimate settlement payment, these will only be recovered on a
cash basis over time as we generate taxable income that can be
offset against the loss generated by the settlement. Thus, we may
only be able to recover the tax deduction over several years. The
speed with which we can utilize the tax benefits will affect the
EPS impact of the settlement.

SIGNATURE

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

CENDANT CORPORATION

By:

The proposed settlement will have no impact on the balance sheet,
earnings or cash flow of our independent finance subsidiary, PHH Corporation.
The proposed settlement resolves all class actions brought on behalf of
purchasers of securities issued by CUC,
HFS Incorporated or us, other than
certain remaining claims relating to the FELINE PRIDES securities. The proposed
settlement does not encompass all pending litigation asserting claims associated
with the CUC accounting irregularities. However, in our opinion, the potential
impact of all such unresolved litigation outside of the proposed settlement
should not be material.

Date: December 7, 1999

The timing and manner of distribution of the settlement to members of
the class will be subject to a plan of distribution to be developed by
plaintiffs' counsel subject to approval by the Court. Questions concerning the
terms of the settlement agreement should be directed to lead plaintiffs'
counsel: Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, 3300 Two Commerce Sq., Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215)
963-0600 or Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann LLP, 1258 Avenue of
the Americas, New York, NY 10019 (212) 554-1400.
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CENDANT CORPORATION
CURRENT REPORT ON FORM 8-K
Report Dated December 7, 1999 (December 7, 1999)

Corporate Governance Initiatives. We also announced that we are
undertaking additional initiatives in the area of corporate governance, and we
expect those initiatives to make an important contribution toward further
building shareholder value. These actions include meeting a very strict
definition of independence for a majority of our directors: continuing to
maintain a compensation committee comprised of only independent directors:
continuing to maintain an audit committee comprised of only independent
directors and including at least one director with accounting or financial
expertise: the establishment of a nominating committee comprised entirely of
independent directors; requiring shareholder approval prior to any re-pricing of
employee stock options: and asking shareholders to approve a motion by our next
annual meeting to elect all directors on an annual basis.

EXHIBIT INDEX
Exhibit
No.
99.1

~

Press Release: Cendant Reaches Preliminary Agreement to Settle
Common Stock Securities Class Action for S2.83 Billion, dated December
7, 1999.

Exhibits

Exhibit
No.

l

Description

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Reference is made to Exhibit 99.1 for the full text of the press
release relating to the preliminary settlement, which is incorporated herein by
reference in its entirety.
Item 7.

/s/ James E. Buckman
James E. Buckman
Vice Chairman and General Counsel

Description

99.1

Press Release: Cendant Reaches Preliminary Agreement to Settle
Common Stock Securities Class Action for S2.83 Billion, dated December
7, 1999.
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comprised of at least three independent directors and inclUding at least one
director with accounting or financial expertise; the establishment of a
nominating committee comprised entirely of independent directors; requiring
shareholder approval prior to any re-pricing of employee stock options; and
asking shareholders to approve a motion by the Company's next annual meeting to
elect all directors on an annual basis.
The Company has engaged Chase Securities and Goldman Sachs as financial advisors
in connection with the funding of the settlement. Bank of America provided
credit advisory services to Cendant in connection with the settlement.

EXHIBIT 99.1
Cendant Reaches Preliminary Agreement To Settle
Common Stock Securities Class Action for S2.83 Billion

With respect to the settlement, Cendant will record a non-cash after-tax charge
of approximately Sl.8 billion, or S2.39 per share in the fourth quarter of 1999.

Cendant to Record Sl.8 Billion Non-Cash, After-Tax Charge in 4Q 1999
Settlement Expected to Reduce 2000 EPS by SO.12 to SO.16
Cendant to Resume Share Repurchase Activity

Based upon the assumption that district court approval of the settlement will
occur at the end of the first quarter of 2000, the Company currently estimates
that the settlement may reduce 2000 earnings per share by between SO.12 and
SO.16. The pro forma l2-month earnings impact, assuming the settlement occurred
on January I, 2000, is currently estimated at SO.15 to SO.21 cents per share.

Company to Expand Corporate Governance Initiatives
The impact on earnings per share in 2000 will vary based on factors that include
the following:
Cendant announced today that it has reached a preliminary agreement to settle
the principal securities class action pending against Cendant in the U.S.
District Court in Newark, New Jersey. Under the agreement, Cendant would pay the
class members S2,83 billion in cash. The class action was initiated following
the discovery in April 1998 of accounting irregularities at former CUC
International (CUC) business units.
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First, while the Company expects to resume share repurchase activity,
its
repurchases may not equal the Sl billion in stock the Company originally
intended to acquire in the fourth quarter of 1999.

o

Second,
the exact date on which Cendant may make the actual settlement
payment is uncertain, based on the date of final district court order and
whether this order is appealed.
From the date of the final district court
order, Cendant will accrue interest on the unpaid settlement amount. While
any appeals are pending, Cendant will deposit a letter of credit or similar
security in the amount of the settlement.

o

Third, the timing and impact of any securities issued to ultimately finance
the settlement payment will depend on market conditions at the time.

"By eliminating what was by far our largest rema1n1ng uncertainty,
the
settlement effectively brings closure to this most unfortunate event," said
Henry R. Silverman, Cendant Chairman,
President and CEO.
"The resolution
announced today will discharge substantially all of our remaining financial
exposure from the former CUC. Further action lies in the hands of the U.S.
Attorney and the SEC, each of which we believe is aggressively pursuing the
responsible parties. While we will continue to actively cooperate, we expect
that these matters will not affect the Company or its current officers and
directors.

o

Fourth, while Cendant expects to generate significant tax benefits from its
ultimate settlement payment,
these will only be recovered on a cash basis
over time as Cendant generates taxable income that can be offset against
the loss generated by the settlement. Thus,
Cendant may only be abl~ to
recover its tax deduction over several years. The speed with which it can
utilize the tax benefits will affect the EPS impact of the settlement.

"Cendant can again be valued based on the performance of our businesses, without
the overhang of this litigation," continued Silverman.
"This settlement allows
the fruits of our efforts to again belong to our shareholders,
customers and
employees.

The proposed settlement resolves all class actions brought on behalf of
purchasers of securities issued by CUC, HFS Incorporated or Cendant, other than
certain remaining claims relating to FELINE PRIDES securities. The proposed
settlement does not encompass all pending litigation asserting claims associated
with the CUC accounting irregularities. However, in the opinion of the Company,
the potential impact of all such unresolved litigation outside of the proposed
settlement is not material.

Cendant will continue to pursue its claims against CUC's former auditor, Ernst &
Young LLP (E&Y) in relation to the accounting irregularities of the former CUC
business units,
including claims for professional malpractice, breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and claims seeking contribution from E&Y
in connection with Cendant's settlement of the PRIDES litigation. As part of its
settlement agreement with lead plaintiffs, the class they represent will receive
501 of any recovery by Cendant from E&Y.

"The structure of the settlement and our plans to finance it preserve
significant flexibility for Cendant," concluded Silverman.
"We will enter the
year 2000 with significant discretionary cash and the financial resources to
pursue shareholder value wherever it lies. Now that we have reached this
preliminary agreement, we will resume share repurchase activity."
The Company also announced that it is undertaking additional initiatives in the
area of corporate governance, and it expects those initiatives to make an
important contribution toward further building shareholder value. These actions
include meeting a very strict definition of independence for a majority of the
Company's directors; continuing to maintain a compensation committee comprised
of only independent directors; continuing to maintain an audit committee

The proposed settlement will have no impact on the balance sheet,
earnings or
cash flow of Cendant's independent finance subsidiary, PHH Corporation.

The timing and manner of distribution of the settlement to members of the class
will be subject to a plan of distribution to be developed by plaintiffs' counsel
subject to approval by the Court. Questions concerning the terms of the
settlement agreement should be directed to lead plaintiffs' counsel: Barrack,
Rodos & Bacine, 3300 Two Commerce Sq., Philadelphia,
PA 19103 (215) 963-0600 or
Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann LLP, 1285 Avenue of the ~~ericas, New
York, NY 10019 (212) 554-1400.
Statements

about

future

results
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may
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8K Compaq Computer Corporation Release date 1/26/00
- Issuing Earnings Release _

forward-looking
statements within the meaning of the Private Securities
Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.
These statements are based on current
expectations and the current economic environment. The Company cautions that
these statements are not guarantees of future performance. They involve a number
of risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict including the outcome
of litigation. Actual results could differ materially from those expressed Or
implied in the forward-looking statements. Important assumptions and other
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statements are specified in the Company's Form
10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 1998, including completion of the
settlement of the class action litigation.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
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ITEM 5. Other Events.
In a releast dated January 25. 2000. Compaq Computer Corporation (NYSE: CPQ) announced worldwide revenue of
S10.5 billion for the fourth quarter ended December 31. 1999. a deereast of4 percent (I percent at conSlant currency)
compared with the fourth quarter of 1998 and an increast of 14 percent sequentially. Compaq reported fourth quarter
1999 net income tOlaling S332 million. or SO.19 per diluted common share. compared with S758 million, or S0.43 per
diluted common share. in the year-earlier period. The news releast is attached as Exhibit 99.

Compaq Announces Fourth
Quarter,
Full Year 1999 Results
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ITEM 7. Exhibit..
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Exhibit 99 News Releast dated January 25, 2000 is attached.
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SIGNATURES
Pursuanlto the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be
signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

COMPAQ COMPUTER CORPORATION

Dale<!: January 26, 2000

By: lsi Lil:!!!llS~Auwers

Linda S. Auwers

HOUSTON, Jan. 25, 2000- Compaq Computer Corporation (NYSE:
CPQ) today announced worldwide revenue oU10.5 billion for the fourth quarter ended
December 31, 1999, a decrease of 4 percent (l percent at constant currency) compared
with the fourth quarter of 1998 and an increase of 14 percent sequentially. Compaq
reported fourth quarter 1999 net income totaling $332 million, or $0.19 per diluted
common share, compared with $758 million, or $0.43 per diluted common share, in the
year-earlier period.
In the fourth quarter, the company began to realize the benefits from its strategic
investment portfolio. These benefits included a net gain of$50 million (after tax) in other
income.
"During the second half of this year we took aggressive action to return Compaq
to profitable growth, and fourth quarter results reflect our initial success where it matters
most - in the marketplace," said Michael Capellas, Compaq President and Chief
Executive Officer.

Vice President, Associate General
Counsel and Secretary

"At the same time, we focused the company on a clear strategy to secure our
global leadership in providing Internet infrastructure, access, services, and solutions. We
are beginning to see significant progress in the implementation of that strategy, including
the launch of innovative products like our new iPaq access device, partnerships in new
areas such as our global alliance with Cable & Wireless, and major account wins with
companies like America Online, Merrill Lynch, and Volkswagen. We also took steps to

Compaq's Consumer Group posted record revenue of$2 billion, up 24 percent
from fourth quarter 1998 and 34 percent sequentially. Segment operating income was $69
million, compared to $64 million in the fourth quarter of 1998, and $65 million in the
third quarter. The consumer business represented 19 percent of the company's revenue in
the fourth quarter.

increase our direct capabilities by agreeing to acquire key custom configuration and direct
delivery assets from Inacom," said Capellas. "While we have much work to do, the
positive response from customers and partners, coupled with the renewed energy of our
employees, clearly indicates we are building positive momentum."
Business Overview

In the fourth quarter, the Consumer business achieved unit growth of40 percent
year over year. Compaq's continued strategy ofexpansion into overseas markets resulted
in notable performances in Latin America, which grew 98 percent, and the Asia Pacific
region, which grew 85 percent.

In the Enterprise Solutions and Services Group (ESSG), revenue was $5.3
billion, down 3 percent year over year and up 8 percent sequentially. Segment operating
income was $714 million, a decrease of 17 percent year over year, and an increase of 19
percent sequentially. Overall, fourth quarter ESSG operating income was 13 percent of
revenue. The enterprise business represented 51 percent of Compaq's revenue in the
fourth quarter.

In addition, the Consumer Group continued to drive "beyond the box" revenue
through Internet access and traffic, with fourth quarter revenue from these sources up 50
percent sequentially.

Enterprise product revenue was approximately $3.5 billion, a decline of 5 percent
year over year, and an increase of7 percent sequentially. On a sequential basis, the
Industry Standard Server Division showed revenue growth of 13 percent. Storage
products grew 6 percent, underscored by a growing external storage business, and the
Business Critical Server Division grew 5 percent.
ttl
I

......

"These results, coupled with consistent number one market share position, further
reinforce Compaq as the undisputed leader in consumer Internet PCs," said Capellas.
Other revenue and operating losses generated by business activities not included
in the three global business groups' results are comprised primarily of Compaq Financial
Services and AltaVista Company. Revenue and operating losses generated by AltaVista
are included in the fourth quarter 1998 results, as Compaq sold a majority interest in
AltaVista during the third quarter of 1999. The three global business groups' results also
do not include corporate and unallocated shared expenses of$268 million in the fourth
quarter of 1999, $325 million in the third quarter of 1999 and $177 million in the fourth
quarter of 1998.

Service revenue was $ 1.8 billion, an increase 00 percent year over year, and 9
percent sequentially.

N

o

"We experienced strong sequential growth in the fourth quarter in all segments of
our enterprise business," said Capellas. "This clearly indicates the growing market
acceptance of Compaq's high end systems, solutions, and services which customers are
demanding to build non-stop, 24x7 Internet computing environments."

Business Outlook
The Commercial Personal Computing Group's revenue was $3.1 billion, a
decrease of I9 percent from the fourth quarter 1998 and an increase of 15 percent
sequentially. The Commercial PC Group reported an operating loss 0£$79 million for the
fourth quarter, compared to a loss of$169 million in the third quarter, and an operating
profit of $157 million in the fourth quarter of 1998. Commercial PC products accounted
for 30 percent of Compaq's revenue in the fourth quarter.

"During the fourth quarter, we made great strides in defining a clear strategy,
realigning for success, getting our cost structure in order, and re-energizing employees. In
particular, we were able to leverage more than $1 billion in increased revenue from the
previous quarter while bringing down operating expenses. We upped the pace in
launching new innovative products, signing strategic partnership deals and alliances, and
securing major customer wins," said Capellas. "We do not underestimate the challenges
ahead, but are confident of our strategy and we are committed to accelerating our
progress and delivering steadily increasing value for our shareholders."

"We made significant progress in our Commercial PC business, cutting the loss in
halffrom the previous quarter, and taking several steps to reposition the group for
profitable growth, including our recent agreement with Inacom," said Capellas. "The
Inacom assets will enable Compaq to accelerate our direct programs, especially in the
important major account and small and medium business markets. With this recent
agreement to purchase key Inacom assets, the introduction of our iPaq Internet device,
and the forthcoming launch of Microsoft's Windows 2000 operating system, I am
confident that our Commercial PC group is well positioned to return to profitable growth
this year."
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Full Year 1999 Results
Net income for the year ended December 31, 1999 was $569 million, or $0.34 per
diluted common share, compared with a net loss of $2.7 billion, or $1.71 per diluted
common share, in 1998. Revenue in 1999 totaled $38.5 billion, an increase of24 percent
over the prior year. Compaq's results for 1998 reflect Digital Equipment Corporation
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network of authorized Compaq marketing partners. Customer support and infonnation
about Compaq and its products are available at http://www.compaq.com.

Compaq's full-year 1999 results include a $1.2 bil1ion (pre-tax) gain from the sale
of businesses, partially offset by an $868 mil1ion (pre-tax) charge for restructuring and
related charges. Included in full year 1998 results is a one-time charge for purchased inprocess technology of$3.2 billion related to the acquisition of Digital and a $393 million
(pre-tax) charge for restructuring and asset impairments in connection with the Digital
acquisition and the closing ofcertain Compaq facilities.

Compaq, Registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Product names mentioned herein may be
trademarks and lor registered trademarks of their respective companies. This release contains
forward-looking statements based on current expectations that involve a number of risks and
uncertainties. The potential risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially
include the failure to close the contemplated transaction with Inacom; failure of systems associated
with order fulfillment; the failure to close certain contemplated sales; changes in product mix;
inventory risks due to shifts in market demand; continued competitive factors and pricing pressures;
and market responses to pricing actions and promotional programs. Further infonnation on the factors
that could affect Compaq's financial results are included in its SEC filings, including the annual
report on Fonn 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998, and the latest quarterly report on Fonn
10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 1999.

Enterprise product revenue was $13.5 bil1ion, an increase of26 percent year over
year. Service revenue was $6.6 billion, an increase of74 percent over the prior year.
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operations after June 1998, the date of acquisition, while 1999 results reflect Digital
operations for the entire year.

In the Enterprise Solutions and Services Group, full year revenue was $20.1
billion, an increase of 39 percent. Segment operating income for the year was $2.3
billion, an increase of36 percent. The enterprise business represented 52 percent of
Compaq's revenue in 1999.
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The Commercial Personal Computing Group reported full year revenue of
$12.2 billion, an increase of 3 percent. The Commercial PC group reported an operating
loss of$448 mil1ion for the year, versus a loss of$46 million in the prior year. The
Commercial PC group accounted for 32 percent ofCompaq's revenue in 1999.

For further information, c:ontad:
Compaq Media Relations Jim Finlaw 281-514-6137 jim.finlaw@c:ompaq.c:om
Compaq Media Relations Alan E. Hodel 281-518-8932 alan.hodel@c:ompaq.c:om
Compaq Investor Relations 281-514-9549 OR 800-433-2391 investor.relations@c:ompaq.c:om

Compaq's Consumer Group posted record revenue of$6 bil1ion in 1999, an
increase of22 percent. Segment operating income for the year was $262 mil1ion, an
increase of43 percent. The consumer business represented 16 percent of the company's
revenue in 1999.
Other revenue and operating losses generated by business activities not included
in the three global business groups' results are comprised primarily ofAltaVista and
Compaq Financial Services. The three business groups' results also do not include
corporate and unallocated-shared expenses of $1.3 billion for the full year 1999 and $819
mil1ion for the full year 1998.
Company Background
Compaq Computer Corporation, a Fortune Global 100 company, is the secondlargest computer company in the world and the largest global supplier of computer
systems. Compaq develops and markets hardware, software, solutions, and services,
including industry-leading enterprise computing solutions, fault-tolerant business-critical
solutions, enterprise and network storage solutions, commercial desktop and portable
products, and consumer PCs. The Company is an industry leader in environmentally
friendly programs and business practices.

Compaq CompUler Corporalion
Consolidaled Balance Sheel
(Unaudiled)

Oectmbl:r 31 (In mill'ons. except par value)

1998

ASSETS
Currenl asselS:
Cash and cash equivalenlS
Shon-Ierm inveslmenls

S

S

2,666

4,091

636

Accounls receivable, net

6,685

6,998

Inventories

2,008

2.005

Deferred income laxes

1,460

1,602

39~

~71

Other assels

Compaq products are sold and supported in more than 100 countries through a

1999

-------Toral current assets

Compaq Computer Corporallon

15,161

13,849

Consolidated StalOment of Income
Property, plant and equipment, net

3,249

Olher assets, net

(UnaudIted)

2.902

10,119 _ _4_,982
$
21,211

$
23,051
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DttrmberJI.
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1'1I1ft1llOlt"lnded
Dftelllber 31.

(In millions. except per shire amounrs)
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LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current liabilities:

Revenue:
$

Short-term borrowings

---

Products

$
8.115

$ 9,145

4,380

4.231

Services

~

3.191

845

~

1.114

912

38.525
----

31,169

1,110

10.418
---

10.859

1.002
5.031

4,541

11.838

10,133

Products

6.915

6,801

Services

~

1.181

605

545

8.150

1,988

29.198

- -23,980
--

-

1.511

1,561

6,341

4,978

422

389

429

1.660

453

Accounts payable
Deferred income

$

Total revenue
Accrued restructuring costs
Olher current liabilities
Total current liabilities

ttl
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N

Poslretiremenl and other postemployment benefits

$ 31,902

$ 21,312

Cost of sales:

I

.....

1m

Total cost of sales

25,263

~

21.383
2,591

Commitments and contingencies
Minority interesl

Selling, general and administrative expense
Research and development costs

---_.

Purchased in-process technology

Stockholders' equity:

Restructuring and relaled charges

Preferred stock, $.0 I par value

Gain on sale of businesses

(authorized: 10 million shares; issued: none)

---

.....JQl

Other (income) expense. net

Common stock and capital in excess on.o I par value

(38 )

(authorized: 3 billion shares; issued and outstanding:

1,353

--

3,196

868

393

--.

(1,182 )

(13 )

106

~

(69 )

1,893

1.939

Income (loss) before provision for income taxes

435

932

934

(2,662 )

Provision for incomeraxes

103

114

365

81

9,851

1,115 and 1.694 million shares. respectively. at December 31.1999; and
1.621

1.210

Retained earnings

4,948

4.501

Accumulaled comprehensive income (loss)

2,919

1.698 and 1.681 million shares. respectively. at December 31.1998)

(36 )
Net income (loss)

(384 )

(660 )

Treasury stock

$

$

158

$

569

$ (2.143)

l.~.

1....

332
Total stockholders' equity
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l.

1

14.834

11,351
-----

$
21,211

S

1 ...'

23,051

l"".,",~.

Earnings (loss) per common share:

l".... ~

1-.. .

1

.

l,.......

l .." ..

L.

L~.

L

-,

-,

--,

--,

-,

Basic

"'

"-1

'~

S

S

0.4S

S

0.3S

S

(1.71 )

S

0.34

S

(1.71 )

0.20

Diluted

S

S

0.43

0.19

Shares used in computing earnings (loss) per
common share:
Basic
Diluted

--,

~

1,682

1,693

1,608

~

1,742

1,73S

1,608

Compaq Computer Corpontlon
Segmentlnformallon
(Unaudited)
nrft
........
t"fIIChd
31.
_

I:t1

(In millions)

.....

--!!!!.- ...!!!!...

Tw,h-I' 1II",'1ts t.dfod

_bodl,

-!Z!!.....

1'191

N

tAl

Enterprise Solutions and Services
Revenue
Operating income

S,326

S,473

20,136

14,488

714

862

2,349

1,724

3,133

3,87S

12,I8S

IS7

(448 )

Commercial Personal Computing
Revenue
Operating income (loss)

(79)

11,846
(46 )

Consumer
Revenue
Operating income

1,966

I,S82

S,994

4,932

69

64

262

183

S3

(71 )

(I)

(12 )

210
(281 )

(lIS )

Other
Revenue
Operating loss

(97 )

Consolidated segment totals
Revenue
Operating income

10,478
703

IO,8S9

38.S2S

31,169

1,071

1,882

1,746

A reconciliation of the company's consolidaled segment operating income to consolidated income (loss) before
provision for income laxes follows:

'-'

"'"

-,

--""I

-,

Consolldaled sqmcnl optl'1tin. income
Corponle and unaflocaled shared expenses
Purchased in-procns Iechnolol)'

-."

~,

703
(261 )

-

"-'

1.071
(177)

38

Reslructunn,lnd rell1ed chlf'JeS
aain Oft sale ofbusinesses

--------

Income (loss) before provision for income taxes

-43S

932

1.882
(1.262 )

(868 )

-, -,
1.746

(819)
(3.196 )
(393 )

~

934

----

Certain prior period amounts have been reclassified in order to confonn to the current presentation.

(2,662 )

ITEM 5.

Other Events

Reference is made to the press release issued to the public by
the Registrant on December 9, 1999, the text of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit 99.1, for a description of the events reported pursuant to this Form
8-K.

8K Tyco International Ltd. Release date 12/9/99
- Disclosing SEC "Non-Public Informal Inquiry -

ITEM 7.

Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information and Exhibits
(c)

Exhibits.

Exhibit Number

Title
Press Release dated December 9, 1999

99.1

SIGNATURES
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by
the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD.

FORM 8-K
By: lsi Mark H. Swartz

CURRENT REPORT

I

.....

Mark H. Swartz

PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR l5(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

to
Dat~_.of

Executive Vice President and

Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Accounting and
Financial Officer)

Report (Date of earliest event reported) December 9, 1999

N

001-13836
(Commission File Number)

~

Date:

December 9, 1999
Exhibit Index

TYrO INTERNATIONAL LTp.

(Exact name of reg1strant as specified in its charter)
Title

Exhibit Number
Bermuda
(State of Incorporation)

Not applicable
(IRS Employer
Identification Numberl

Press Release dated December 9, 1999

99.1

The Gibbons Building, 10 Queen Street, Suite 301, Hamilton, HMll, Bermuda
(Address of registrant's principal executive office)
441-292-8674(Registrant's telephone number)

Exhibit 99.1
Tyco International Ltd.
The Gibbons Building
10 Queen Street, Suite 301
Hamilton HMll, Bermuda

·The executive offices of Registrant's principal United States subsidiary, Tyco
International (US) Inc., are located at One Tyco Park, Exeter, New Hampshire
03833. The telephone number there is (603) 778-9700.

CONTACT:
J. Brad McGee
Tyco International (US) Inc.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Senior Vice President
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(603) 778-9700
Hamilton,
Bermuda,
December 9, 1999 - Tyco International Ltd,
(NYSE-TYC, LSE-TYI, BSX-TYC) said today that it was advised yesterday that the
staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is conducting a "nonpublic,
informal inquiry" relating to charges and reserves taken in connection with the
company's acquisitions. Pursuant to this inquiry, Tyco will be providing
information and documents to the staff on a voluntary basis.

8K Tyco International Release date 12/10/99
- Disclosing Filings ofStockholder Putative Class Action Lawsuits
ami Intent to Vigorously Defend -

"In light of the recent market activity in our stock, which is not
justified by any development at the company, we welcome the opportunity to
respond to this request. We remain confident of our accounting methodology, our
public disclosures and the continuing strength of our business," said L. Dennis
Kozlowski, Chairman and CEO of Tyco.
The company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the 1999 fiscal year will
be filed on December 13, 1999 as scheduled.

UNITED STATES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

~~CURITIES ,~P

Tyco International Ltd., a diversified manufacturing and service
company, is the world's largest manufacturer and servicer of electrical and
electronic components and undersea telecommunications systems, the world's
largest manufacturer, installer, and provider of fire protection systems and
electronic security services, has strong leadership positions in disposable
medical products, plastics, and adhesives, and is the largest manufacturer of
flow control valves. The Company operates in more than 80 countries around the
world and has expected fiscal 2000 revenues in excess of $25 billion.

ttl
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FORWARD LOOKING INFORMATION

Vl

Comments in this release concerning expected fiscal 2000 and Tyco's
expectations for continuing business strength are forward-looking statements,
which are based on management's good faith expectations and belief concerning
future
developments.
Actual results may
materially
differ from these
expectations as a result of many factors, relevant examples of which are set
forth in the "Management Discussion and Analysis" section of the Tyco's 1998
Annual Report to Shareholders, Tyco's 1998 Annual Report on Form 10-K, Tyco's
Current Report on Form 8-K filed on June 3, 1999.

tv
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FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported) December 9, 1999
001-13836
(Commission File Number)

TYrO INIERNATI9NA~ LTp.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Bermuda
(State of Incorporation)

Not applicable
(IRS Employer
Identification Number)

The Zurich Centre, Second Floor, 90 Pitts Bay Road, Pembroke, HM 08, Bermuda
(Address of registrant's principal executive office)
441-292-8674"
(Registrant's telephone number)

8K Sunbeam Corporation Release date 8/12/99
- Announcing Settlement ofDispute with Share/wider -

<The executive offices of Registrant's principal United States subsidiary, Tyco
International (US) Inc., are located at One Tyco Park, Exeter, New Hampshire
03833. The telephone number there is (603) 778-9700.

ITEM 5.

Other Events

On the evening of December 9, 1999, Tyco International Ltd.
(the
"Company" or "Tyco") read wire reports that six purported damage actions on
behalf of putative classes of persons who purchased Tyco common shares at
various times since 1998 had been commenced in federal courts in New Hampshire
and Florida, alleging violations of federal and state securities laws and the
common law, against the Company and certain of its officers and directors. The
complaints reportedly allege that these defendants published materially false
and misleading statements concerning Tyco's financial condition and future
growth prospects and that insiders sold stock to the public prior to the
disclosure of the adverse alleged facts at artificially inflated prices.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13
15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

or

As of this time, the Company has not received the complaints in such
actions nor does it know whether they were the only such actions filed; this
disclosure is based solely on wire reports.

t:O

Date of report (Date of earliest event reported):

The Company and the individual defendants intend to vigorously defend
against all such actions. The Company cannot predict whether additional suits
will be filed.

August 12, 1998

Sunbeam Corporation

I

......

-2-

Exact Name of Registrant Specified in Charter

N
0\

Delaware

0001-000052

(State or Other Jurisdiction
of Incorporation)

(Commission
File Number)

SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by
the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.

(Address of Principal Executive Offices)

ITEM 5. OTHER EVENTS.
On August 12, 1998, Sunbeam Corporation ("Sunbeam") entered into
a settlement agreement with MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. The
agreement releases Sunbeam from any claims MacAndrews & Forbes may have
against Sunbeam arising out of Sunbeam's acquisition of MacAndrews &
Forbes' interest in The Coleman Company, Inc.: enables Sunbeam to retain

December 10, 1999

L.

l~....

(561) 243-2100

(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)

Mark H. Swartz
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Accounting and
Financial Officer)

L

33445
(Zip Code)

Registrant's telephone number, including area code:

By: lsI Mark H. Swartz

L~

(IRS Employer
Identification No.)

1615 South Congress Avenue, Suite 200, Delray Beach, Florida

TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD.

Date:

25-1638266
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the services of MacAndrews , Forbes executive personnel who have been
managing Sunbeam since mid-June 1998, including Jerry W. Levin, the
Company's Chief Executive Officer; and provides for MacAndrews , Forbes to
continue to give other management support to Sunbeam.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, MacAndrews , Forbes will
receive from Sunbeam five-year warrants to purchase an additional 23
million Sunbeam shares at an exercise price of $7.00 per share and
containing customary anti-dilution provisions.
A copy of the settlement agreement and copies of the press
release and letter to Sunbeam shareholders, each dated August 12, 1998,
announcing the execution of the settlement agreement are filed as exhibits
hereto and are incorporated by reference herein.

ITEM 7.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, PRO FORMA FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND
EXHIBITS.

(a)

Not applicable.

(b)

Not applicable

(c)

Exhibits.
99.1

Settlement Agreement, dated as of August 12, 1998, by and
between Sunbeam Corporation and Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.

t:C

99.2

Press Release issued by Sunbeam Corporation on August 12, 1998.
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99.3

Letter to Sunbeam shareholders dated August 12, 1998.

I

-:J

--,

.~,

EXHIBIT 99.1
EXECUTION COpy
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, dated as of August 12, 1998, by and between
Sunbeam Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("Sunbeam" or the "Company"),
and Coleman (Parent) Holdings Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Coleman
Parent").
For the purposes of this Agreement, Sunbeam, together with each direct
or indirect parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliated corporation or
entity, and each employee, agent, attorney, representative, administrator,
executor, receiver, officer, director, or stockholder of any such
corporation or entity, and any other person, firm, corporation or entity
now or hereafter affiliated in any manner with any of them or claiming
through or in the right of any of them and all of their respective
predecessors, successors, assigns, heirs, executors and administrators (but
excluding for all purposes under this Agreement, Mr. Albert J. Dunlap,
former Chief Executive Officer of Sunbeam, Mr. Russell A. Kersh, former
Executive Vice President of Sunbeam, Arthur Andersen LLP, Sunbeam's
independent auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, consultants to Sunbeam, and
any financial advisor to Sunbeam, and each employee, agent, attorney,
representative, administrator, executor, receiver, officer, director, or

stockholder of any such corporation or entity, and any other person, firm,
corporation or entity now or hereafter affiliated in any manner with any of
them or claiming through or in the right of any of them and all of their
respective predecessors, successors, assigns, heirs, executors and

administrators), are collectively hereinafter referred to as the "Sunbeam
Group"; and Coleman Parent, together with each direct or indirect parent,
subsidiary, division, or affiliated corporation or entity, and each
employee, agent, attorney, representative, administrator, executor,

SIGNATURE
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf
by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
SUNBEAM CORPORATION

receiver, officer, director, or stockholder of any such corporation or
entity, and any other person, firm, corporation or entity now or hereafter
affiliated in any manner with any of them or claiming through or in the
right of any of them and all of their respective predecessors, successors,
assigns, heirs, executors and administrators, are collectively hereinafter
referred to as the "Coleman Group".
WIT N E SSE T H

By: lsI Janet G. Kelley
Vice President, General Counsel
and Assistant Secretary

August 14, 1998

EXHI BIT INDEX
99.1

Settlement Agreement, dated as of August 12, 1998, by and between
Sunbeam Corporation and Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.

99.2

Press Release issued by Sunbeam Corporation on August 12, 1998.

99.3

Letter to Sunbeam shareholders dated August 12, 1998.

WHEREAS, CLN Holdings Inc., a Delaware corporation ("CLN Holdings"),
was the indirect beneficial owner of approximately 82% of the outstanding
common stOCk, par value $.01 per share (the "Coleman Common Stock"), of The
Coleman Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Coleman"); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of
February 27, 1998 (the "Holdings Merger Agreement"), by and among Sunbeam,
Laser Acquisition Corp., a Delaware corporation and, as of such date, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Sunbeam ("Laser Acquisition"), cLN Holdings, as
of such date, a wholly owned subsidiary of Coleman Parent, and Coleman
Parent, CLN Holdings was merged with and into Laser Acquisition (the
"Holdings Merger"), with the surviving corporation becoming an indirect
wholly owned subsidiary of Sunbeam, and pursuant to which Coleman Parent
received certain shares of common stock, par value $.01 per share, of
Sunbeam ("Sunbeam Common Stock"); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of

.~,

February 27, 1998 (the "Coleman Merger Agreement"), by and among Sunbeam,
Camper Acquisition Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned
sUbsidiary of Sunbeam ("Camper Acquisition"), and Coleman, Camper
Acquisition is to be merged with and into Coleman (the "Coleman Merger"),
with the surviving corporation becoming an indirect wholly owned sUbsidiary
of Sunbeam; and

whether or not asserted in litigation, including court costs and attorneys'
fees (each an "Action and Liability" and collectively, "Actions and
Liabilities"), which any member of the Coleman Group controlling,
controlled by or under common control with Coleman Parent (such persons,
together with Coleman Parent, the "Coleman Controlled Group") may have
against any member of the Sunbeam Group and which any member of the Sunbeam
Group controlled by Sunbeam (such persons, together with Sunbeam, the
"Sunbeam Controlled Group") may have against any member of the Coleman
Group as of the effective date hereof or prior thereto in any manner
arising out of or relating to the Coleman Acquisition, irrespective of any
present lack of knowledge on the part of either of them of any such
possible Action and Liability, but excluding any claim for breach of this
Agreement or the agreements and documents entered into or delivered

WHEREAS, as a result of the Holdings Merger, Sunbeam acquired an
indirect approximately 82\ interest in Coleman (the "Coleman Acquisition");
and
WHEREAS, Sunbeam and Coleman Parent are parties to a Registration
Rights Agreement, dated as of March 29, 1998 (the "Registration Rights
Agreement"), pursuant to which Sunbeam agreed to provide certain
registration rights to Coleman Parent; and

pursuant hereto;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the respective covenants,
agreements and conditions hereinafter set forth and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, and intending to be bound hereby, the parties hereto agree as
follows:

WHEREAS, following the dismissal by Sunbeam of certain of its
executive officers in mid-June 1998, Coleman Parent has made available to
Sunbeam certain senior officers employed by members of the Coleman Group to
serve as senior executive officers of Sunbeam (the "Senior Executives") and
has provided certain other management support to Sunbeam, and Sunbeam
desires to continue the service of the Senior Executives and such
management support; and

1.

la) On the basis of the representations, warranties, covenants
and agreements and subject to the satisfaction or waiver Ito the
extent permitted) of the applicable conditions expressly set forth
herein, at the closing of the transactions contemplated by this
Section 1 (the "Closing"):

WHEREAS, Coleman Parent and Sunbeam believe it is desirable that
Sunbeam put in place as promptly as possible a permanent management team to
prevent jeopardizing the ongoing operations and financial viability of
Sunbeam; and

ttl
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WHEREAS, Coleman Parent believes that it possesses legal and equitable
claims against Sunbeam arising out of the Coleman Acquisition and out of
what it contends were certain breaches of contract and fraudulent and
negligent or other misrepresentations and omissions made to Coleman Parent
and its representatives in connection therewith (the "Claims"), and Sunbeam

(i) Sunbeam shall issue to Coleman Parent certain warrants
to purchase shares of Sunbeam Common Stock (the "Warrants") by
duly executing and delivering to Coleman Parent a Warrant
Agreement in the form attached as Exhibit A hereto (the "Warrant
Agreement");

disputes such Claims; and

(ii) Sunbeam and Coleman Parent shall enter into an
amendment to the Registration Rights Agreement, in the form
attached as Exhibit B hereto (as so amended, the "Amended
Registration Rights Agreement");

WHEREAS, there are also now pending or may be filed putative class
actions in which Sunbeam is named as a defendant and in which Coleman
Parent is a class member (the "Class Actions"), and Sunbeam denies
liability with respect to and intends to contest the claims that have been
asserted in the Class Actions; and

(iii) Sunbeam and Coleman Parent agree to be bound by the
releases and covenants set forth in Section 2 of this Agreement;

WHEREAS, the accountants who audited Sunbeam's 1997 financial
statements, assisted by another firm of accountants, are in the process of
reviewing those financial statements, and believe, as has been publicly
announced, that it will be necessary to restate those financial statements
by reflecting a variety of adjustments the magnitude of which has not yet
been determined; and

liv) Coleman Parent agrees to supply management services of
the Senior Executives, and to the covenants and provisions of
Section 3 of this Agreement; and
(v) Sunbeam and Coleman Parent agree to be bound by the
provisions regarding the restrictions on transfer on the shares
of Sunbeam Common Stock received by Coleman Parent in the
Holdings Merger and the Warrants set forth in Section 4 of this
Agreement.

WHEREAS, Sunbeam and Coleman Parent desire to terminate the disputes
between them, and desire to assure one another that Coleman Parent will not
prosecute the Claims or any related or potential claims arising out of or
relating to the Coleman Acquisition, directly or indirectly in any
capacity, against the Sunbeam Group, so as to avoid the substantial burdens
and expense of litigation and the interference with the business and
operations of Sunbeam and with the work of its management and employees and
to obtain the continued services of certain executives and employees of the
Coleman Group, and in accordance with the terms and provisions hereof, that
Coleman Parent and Sunbeam each forever release, waive and discharge any
and all manner of actions, causes of action, proceedings, suits, claims,

(b) The Closing shall take place on the first day when all
conditions thereto set forth herein shall be satisfied or waived or
such other date as Sunbeam and Coleman Parent may agree in writing
(the "Closing Date"), but in no event sooner than the tenth day
following the mailing of the letter to Sunbeam shareholders
contemplated by Section 7. The Closing shall take place on the
Closing Date at 10:00 a.m., New York City time, at the offices of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen , Katz, 51 West 52nd Street, New York, New
York and shall be deemed effective as of the opening of business on
the Closing Date.

demands, liens, debts, accounts, obligations, rights, costs, contracts,
agreements, promises, controversies, judgments, expenses, demands, damages
and liabilities, of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, whether or
not now foreseen, known, suspected, matured, accrued or claimed, and
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Issuance of Warrants; Closing.
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(c) At the Closing, Sunbeam shall deliver or cause to be
delivered to Coleman Parent, in addition to the Warrant Agreement,
such other instruments or documents as Coleman Parent may reasonably
request.
2.

Granting of Releases and Indemnification.

(al At the Closing, simultaneously with receipt by Coleman
Parent of the Warrants, and without any further action by any of the
parties hereto, each of the following shall be fully and legally
effective:

t:d
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(i) Coleman Parent shall, on behalf of itself and on behalf
of each other member of the Coleman Controlled Group, remise,
release and forever discharge the Sunbeam Group of and from all
debts, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, accounts,
covenants, contracts, agreements, damages, and any and all
claims, demands and liabilities whatsoever of every name and
nature, both in law and in equity, against any of the Sunbeam
Group or any of their predecessors, successors or assigns, which
Coleman Parent or any other member of the Coleman Controlled
Group has or ever had from the beginning of the world to the
Closing with respect to or arising out of the Coleman Acquisition
or any alleged misrepresentations and omissions and/or breach of
contract by any member of the Sunbeam Group and parties acting on
behalf of any member of the Sunbeam Group in connection with the
Coleman Acquisition, including with respect to the Actions and
Liabilities; provided that neither the foregoing release nor the
dismissals or withdrawals described in this Section 2(a) shall
apply to the rights of Coleman Parent and any other member of the
Coleman Controlled Group under Article IX of the Holdings Merger
Agreement, any breach or failure to comply with this Agreement,
the Warrant, the Amended Registration Rights Agreement or the
transactions contemplated hereby or thereby, the transactions
contemplated by the Coleman Merger Agreement (including the
Coleman Merger), which shall not be terminated or amended in any
respect hereby, or shall otherwise affect Coleman Parent's right
to enforce this Agreement, the Warrant or the Amended
Registration Rights Agreement in accordance with its or their
terms.
(ii) In the event any member of the Coleman Controlled Group
pursues a claim against any person(s) not released hereby
involving the matters that are the subject of the release set
forth in Section 2(a) (i) and it is finally judicially determined
that such person(s) are entitled directly or indirectly to
indemnification or contribution from any member of the Sunbeam
Controlled Group for any amounts they are required to pay to any
member of the Coleman Controlled Group in connection with such
claims, or to reimbursement of litigation expenses solely
attributable to such claims of any member of the Coleman
Controlled Group (each a "Sunbeam Group Indemnification
Obligation"), Coleman Parent will indemnify and hold harmless
each member of the Sunbeam Controlled Group against such Sunbeam
Group Indemnification Obligation. No member of the Sunbeam
Controlled Group will enter into any settlement of a Sunbeam
Group Indemnification Obligation without the prior written
consent of Coleman Parent. which shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Any amounts so paid by a member of the Sunbeam
Controlled Group in a settlement so consented to by Coleman
Parent shall be treated for purposes hereof as a Sunbeam Group
Indemnification Obligation.
(iii)

Sunbeam, on behalf of itself and on behalf of each
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other member of the Sunbeam Controlled Group, shall remise,
release and forever discharge the Coleman Group of and from all
debts, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, accounts,
covenants, contracts, agreements, damages, and any and all

claims, demands and liabilities whatsoever of every name and
nature, both in law and in equity, against any of the Coleman
Group or any of their predecessors, successors or assigns, which
Sunbeam or any member of the Sunbeam Controlled Group has or ever
had from the beginning of the world to the Closing with respect,
to or arising out of the Coleman Acquisition or any alleged
misrepresentations and omissions and/or breach of contract by any
member of the Coleman Group and parties acting on behalf of any
member of the Coleman Group in connection with the Coleman
Acquisition, including with respect to the Actions and
Liabilities; provided that neither the foregoing release nor the
dismissals or withdrawals described in this Section 2(a) shall
apply to the rights of Sunbeam and any other member of the
Sunbeam Controlled Group under Article IX of the Holdings Merger
Agreement, any breach or failure to comply with this Agreement,
the Warrant, the Amended Registration Rights Agreement or the
transactions contemplated hereby or thereby, the transactions
contemplated by the Coleman Merger Agreement (including the
Coleman Merger), which shall not be terminated or amended in any
respect hereby, or shall otherwise affect Sunbeam's right to
enforce this Agreement, the Warrant or the Amended Registration
Rights Agreement in accordance with its or their terms.
(iv) In the event any member of the Sunbeam Controlled
Group pursues a claim against any person(s) not released hereby
involving the matters that are the subject of the release set
forth in Section 2(a) (iii) and it is finally judicially
determined that such person(s) are entitled directly or
indirectly to indemnification or contribution from any member of
the Coleman Controlled Group for any amounts they are required to
pay to any member of the Sunbeam Controlled Group in connection
with such claims, or to reimbursement of litigation expenses
solely attributable to such claims of any member of the Sunbeam
Controlled Group, (each, a "Coleman Group Indemnification
Obligation"I, Sunbeam will indemnify and hold harmless each
member of the Coleman Controlled Group against such Coleman Group
Indemnification Obligation. No member of the Coleman Controlled
Group will enter into any settlement of a Coleman Group
Indemnification Obligation without the prior written consent of
Sunbeam, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any amounts
so paid by a member of the Coleman Controlled Group in a
settlement so consented to by Sunbeam shall be treated for
purposes hereof as a Coleman Group Indemnification Obligation.
(v) Sunbeam, on behalf of itself, and on behalf of each
other member of the Sunbeam Controlled Group, and Coleman Parent,
on behalf of itself and on behalf of each other member of the
Coleman ContrOlled Group, agree to indemnify and hold harmless
one another from and against any and all Actions and Liabilities
arising from, or in connection with, any action or proceeding,
brought by, or prosecuted by, or on the initiative of, either of
them, or by any of their predecessors, successors or assigns,
contrary to the provisions of this Agreement. It is further
agreed that this agreement of indemnity shall be deemed breached
and a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued thereon
immediately upon the commencement of any action contrary to this
Agreement, and that in any such action this Agreement may be
pleaded by either of them as a defense, or either of them may
assert this Agreement by way of counterclaim or cross-claim in
any such action.
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mattersi and

(vi) This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall
be binding upon Sunbeam and Coleman Parent, and to the benefit of
and shall be binding upon each person or entity in the Sunbeam
Group and the Coleman Group.

(v) compliance, litigation, insurance, regulatory and other
legal matters.
4.
Restrictions on Transfer of Securities. Coleman Parent
hereby agrees not to, directly or indirectly, for a period of three
(3) years from the date hereof, Transfer (as such term is defined in
Section 7.1 of the Holdings Merger Agreement) (A) any shares of
Sunbeam Common Stock received pursuant to the terms of the Holdings
Merger Agreement or (B) any of the warrants or the Warrant Shares (as
defined in the Warrant Agreement), in either case in whole or in part,
other than to one of its Affiliates (as such term is defined in the
Holdings Merger Agreement) who agrees in writing to be bound by the
terms of this Section 4, except that (A) the holder or holders of such
shares of Sunbeam Common Stock may at any time or from time to time
Transfer so many of such shares of Sunbeam Common Stock as represent
in the aggregate seventy-five percent (75%) of such shares of Sunbeam
Common Stock, and (B) the holder or holders of the Warrants or the
Warrant Shares may at any time or from time to time Transfer so many
of the Warrants or the Warrant Shares as represent in the aggregate
fifty (50%) of the Warrant Shares Amount (as defined in the Warrant
Agreement). The provisions of this Section 4 shall not be applicable,
and Coleman Parent shall be free to Transfer any and all shares of
Sunbeam Common Stock, Warrants and Warrant Shares, (i) following any
change of control of Sunbeam or (ii) in connection with any
transaction in which the holders of all of the outstanding shares of
Sunbeam Common Stock have the opportunity to Transfer at least 50% of
their shares of Sunbeam Common Stock on the same terms. The
provisions of this Section 4 shall supersede any and all other
restrictions on Transfer that Coleman Parent or any of its Affiliates
may have agreed to with Sunbeam or any of its Affiliates.

(b) Coleman Parent agrees that it shall opt out, as to and only
as to any claims against any member of the Sunbeam Group, of any class
that may be certified in any of the Class Actions or in any other
action that may be certified as a class action with respect to or
arising out of any other matter released hereby.
3.

Provision of Management Services.

(a) The parties hereto acknowledge that Coleman Parent has
caused other members of the Coleman Group to make available to Sunbeam
the services of certain employees and Senior Executives and has
encouraged such persons to continue to provide services to Sunbeam as
employees of Sunbeam.
(b) Coleman Parent agrees that it shall, and it shall use its
reasonable efforts to cause the other members of the Coleman Group to,
continue to, for a minimum period of 36 months from the date hereof,
make available to Sunbeam the services of Coleman Group's employees
who are Senior Executives, or who become Senior Executives, for so
long as they remain employees of a member of the Coleman Group and
otherwise to continue to provide advice and assistance to Sunbeam in
connection with the business and operations of Sunbeam consistent with
that provided to date; provided, however, that, other than pursuant to
the employment arrangements currently in place between such employees
and members of the Coleman Group, no member of the Coleman Group shall
be required bear any incremental expense with respect to any Senior
Executive in order to comply with the foregoing.
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5.
Representations and Warranties of Sunbeam. Sunbeam hereby
represents and warrants to Coleman Parent as follows:

(c) Sunbeam agrees to pay the compensation of any such persons
who become employees of Sunbeam in accordance with the terms of the
employment arrangements entered into by Sunbeam with such persons.
This Agreement shall not prevent any of the Senior Executives from
continuing to perform services for members of the Coleman Group to the
extent that the provision of such services does not materially
interfere with the performance of services by the Senior Executive for
Sunbeam under his employment arrangements with Sunbeam.

o

(a) Due Authorization. This Agreement has been duly authorized
by all necessary corporate action on the part of Sunbeam, and no other
corporate actions or proceedings on the part of Sunbeam (including any
action on the part of its stockholders) are necessary to authorize
this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby. This
Agreement has been duly executed by a duly authorized officer of
Sunbeam and constitutes a valid and binding agreement of Sunbeam
enforceable against it in accordance with its terms. The Audit
Committee of the Board of Directors of Sunbeam (the "Audit Committee")
has expressly approved the transactions contemplated hereby as
contemplated by Paragraph 312 ("Paragraph 312") of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") Listed Company Manual and has determined that delay
in securing shareholder approval of the transactions contemplated
hereby would seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the
Company. Upon application duly made by Sunbeam, the NYSE has advised
that it has accepted Sunbeam's reliance on the exception to the
shareholder approval policy of Paragraph 312 as contained therein in
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby (the
"Exception").

(d) Coleman Parent agrees to use its reasonable efforts to cause
the other members of the Coleman Group to continue, for a period of 36
months from the date hereof, to provide assistance and support to
Sunbeam on a basis consistent with the manner in which such assistance
and support are generally provided to other companies in which members
of the Coleman Group have a substantial interest (and without the
payment of additional consideration by Sunbeam to Coleman Parent,
other than with respect to the reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses
paid to third parties) and of a similar nature to those which have
been so provided to Sunbeam from time to time from mid-June 1998
through the date hereof, including as to the following matters:
(i) financings, and dealings with financing sources and the
capital markets;

(b) Due Organization. Sunbeam is a corporation duly organized,
validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Delaware and has the requisite corporate power to enter into and
perform this Agreement and to carryon its business as it is now being
conducted.

(ii) investor and public relations;
(iii) acquisitions, divestitures and other extraordinary
transactions;
(iv)
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necessary for the consummation by Sunbeam of the transactions
contemplated hereby, other than as may be required under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act with respect to the exercise
of the Warrants. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement
by Sunbeam nor the consummation by Sunbeam of the transactions
contemplated hereby, nor compliance by Sunbeam with any of the
provisions hereof, will (i) conflict with or result in any breach of
any provisions of the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of
Sunbeam: (ii) result in a violation or breach of, or constitute (with
or without due notice or lapse of time or both) a default (or give
rise to any right of termination, cancellation or acceleration) under,
any of the terms, conditions or provisions of any material contract or
of any material license, franchise, permit, concession, certificate of
authority, order, approval, application or registration of, from or
with any governmental authority to which Sunbeam is a party or by
which it or any of its properties or assets may be bound; or (iii)
violate any order, writ, injunction, decree, statute, rule or
regulation applicable to Sunbeam or any of its properties or assets.
(d) Validity of Warrants and Underlying Shares. At the Closing,
the issuance of the Warrants will have been duly authorized and, upon
their issuance pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, the Warrants
will be validly issued and will not be subject to any preemptive or
similar right other than the rights and obligations under the Warrant
Agreement. All shares of Sunbeam Common Stock to be issued upon the
exercise of the Warrants, when issued, will be duly authorized and
validly issued, fUlly paid and nonassessable and will not be subject
to any preemptive or similar right.
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(e) Capitalization. The authorized capital stock of Sunbeam
consists of 500,000,000 shares of Sunbeam Common Stock, and 2,000,000
shares of preferred stock, par value $.01 per share, of Sunbeam. As
of the date hereof, (i) 100,860,129 shares of Sunbeam Common Stock
were issued and outstanding (excluding any shares of Sunbeam Common
Stock issued upon the exercise of Sunbeam Stock Options (as defined
below) since August 6, 1998); (ii) 7,199,452 shares of Sunbeam Common
Stock were issuable upon the consummation of the Coleman Merger
Agreement; (iii) 13,242.050 shares of Sunbeam Common Stock were
issuable in accordance with the terms of the Zero Coupon Convertible
Senior Subordinated Debentures due 2018 of the Company; and (iv) no
shares of Sunbeam preferred stock were issued and outstanding. As of
the date hereof, not more than 9,000,000 shares of Sunbeam Common
Stock were issuable upon exercise of vested and unvested employee and
non-employee stock options (the "Sunbeam Stock Options") outstanding
under all stock option plans of Sunbeam or granted pursuant to
employment agreements (although Sunbeam is contesting the validity of
certain of such Sunbeam Stock Options). As of the date hereof, no
shares of Sunbeam Common Stock were held as treasury shares. All of
the issued and outstanding shares of Sunbeam Common Stock are validly
issued, fully paid and nonassessable and free of preemptive rights.
As of the date hereof, except as set forth above, there are no shares
of capital stock of Sunbeam issued or outstanding or, except as set
forth above, any options, warrants, subscriptions, calls, rights,
convertible securities or other agreements or commitments obligating
Sunbeam to issue, transfer, sell, redeem, repurchase or otherwise

acquire any shares of its capital stock or securities, or the capital
stock or securities of Sunbeam. There are no notes, bonds, debentures
or other indebtedness of Sunbeam having the right to vote (or
convertible into or exchangeable for securities having the right to
vote) on any matters upon which stockholders of Sunbeam may vote.
(f) Brokers. Other than Blackstone financial Group, which has
acted as financial advisor to the Special Committee of the Sunbeam
Board, no broker, investment banker or other person is entitled to
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broker's, finder's or other similar fee or commission in connection

with the transactions contemplated by this Agreement based upon
arrangements made by or on behalf of Sunbeam or any member of the
Sunbeam Group.
6.
Representations and Warranties of Coleman Parent.
hereby represents and warrants to Sunbeam as follows:

Coleman Parent

(a) Due Authorization. This Agreement has been duly authorized
by all necessary corporate action on the part of Coleman Parent, and
no other corporate actions or proceedings on the part of the Coleman
Parent (including any action on the part of its stockholders) are
necessary to authorize this Agreement or the transactions contemplated
hereby. This Agreement has been duly executed by a duly authorized
officer of Coleman Parent and constitutes a valid and binding
agreement of Coleman Parent enforceable against it in accordance with
its terms.
(b) Due Organization. Coleman Parent is a corporation duly
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of
State of Delaware and has the requisite corporate power to enter into
and perform this Agreement.
(c) No Conflicts. No filing with, and no permit, authorization,
consent or approval of, any governmental or regulatory authority is
necessary for the consummation by Coleman Parent of the transactions
contemplated hereby, other than as may be required under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act with respect to the exercise
of the Warrants. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement
by Coleman Parent nor the consummation by Coleman Parent of the
transactions contemplated hereby. nor compliance by Coleman Parent
with any of the provisions hereof, will (i) conflict with or result in
any breach of any provisions of the certificate of incorporation or
by-laws of Coleman Parent; (ii) result in a violation or breach of, or
constitute (with or without due notice or lapse of time or both) a
default (or give rise to any right of termination, cancellation or
acceleration) under, any of the terms, conditions or provisions of any
material contract or of any material license, franchise, permit,
concession, certificate of authority, order, approval, application or
registration of, from or with any governmental authority to which
Coleman Parent is a party or by which it or any of its properties or
assets may be bound; or (iii) violate any order, writ, injunction,
decree, statute, rule or regulation applicable to Coleman Parent or
any of its properties or assets.
(d) Acquisition of Warrants for Investment. Coleman Parent is
acquiring the Warrants (and will acquire any Warrant Shares upon
exercise of the Warrants) for its own account for investment purposes
only and not with a view toward or for a sale in connection with, any
distribution thereof, or with any present intention of distributing or
selling any of such in violation of federal or state securities laws.
(e) Brokers. No broker, investment banker or other person is
entitled to any broker's, finder's or other similar fee or commission
in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Agreement
based upon arrangements made by or on behalf of Coleman Parent or any
member of the Coleman Group.
7.

Covenants.

(a) Within one day following the date hereof, Sunbeam shall
cause to be mailed to all shareholders of Sunbeam a letter informing
them of the transactions contemplated hereby as contemplated and
required by Paragraph 312 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual and

efforts to take, or cause to be taken, all action, and to do, or cause to
be done, all things necessary, proper or advisable under applicable laws
and regulations to consummate and make effective the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement. In case at any time after the Closing any
further action is necessary or desirable to carry out the purposes of this
Agreement, the proper officers and directors of each corporation which is a
party to this Agreement shall take all such necessary action.

indicating that the Audit Committee has expressly approved the
Exception in light of the Audit Committee's determination that delay
in securing shareholder approval of the transactions contemplated
hereby would seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the
Company and that the NYSE has accepted the Company's reliance on the
Exception •
(b) The anti-dilution provisions of the Warrant shall be given
retroactive effect to the date hereof.

14. Parties in Interest; Assignments. This Agreement is binding upon
and is solely for the benefit of the parties hereto, the Sunbeam Group and
the Coleman Group and their respective successors and legal
representatives.

8.
Specific Performance. The parties acknowledge that money damages
are an inadequate remedy for breach of this Agreement. Therefore, the
parties agree that each of them has the right, in addition to (and not in
lieu of) any other right they may have under this Agreement or otherwise,
to specific performance of this Agreement in the event of any breach hereof
by any other party.

15. Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the agreements to be
entered into and delivered pursuant hereto constitutes the entire agreement
between Sunbeam and Coleman Parent with respect to the subject matter
hereof, and it is expressly understood and agreed that this Agreement may
not be altered, amended, modified, or otherwise changed in any respect or
particular whatsoever, except by a writing duly executed by authorized
representatives of both Sunbeam and Coleman Parent. No party to this
Agreement has relied upon any representation or warranty, written or oral,
except as expressly included herein.

9.
Conditions to the Obligations of both Parties. The obligations
of each of Sunbeam and Coleman Parent to effect the transactions
contemplated hereby shall be conditioned on the non-existence of any order,
decree or injunction of a court of competent jurisdiction which restrains
the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
10. Termination.
to the Closing:

16. Amendments. This Agreement may not be modified, amended, altered
or supplemented except upon the execution and delivery of a written
agreement executed by the parties hereto.

This Agreement may be terminated at any time prior

(a) by mutual agreement of the Boards of Directors of Coleman
Parent and Sunbeam; or
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17. Notices. All notices, requests, claims, demands and other
communications hereunder shall be in writing and shall be given (and shall
be deemed to have been duly given upon receipt) by delivery in person, by
telecopy or other standard form of telecommunication, or by registered or
certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed as
follows:

(b) by Coleman Parent if the Warrants to be issued to Coleman
Parent pursuant hereto have not been issued or will not be issued at
the Closing or if there has been a material violation or breach by
Sunbeam of any agreement, representation or warranty contained in this
Agreement which has rendered the satisfaction of any condition to the
obligations of Coleman Parent impossible and such violation or breach
has not been waived by Coleman Parent; or

If to Coleman Parent:
Coleman (Parent) Holdings Inc.
c/o MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.
35 East 62nd Street
New York, New York 10021
Attention: Barry F. Schwartz, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 572-5056

Ic) by Sunbeam if there has been a material violation or breach
by Coleman Parent of any agreement, representation or warranty
contained in this Agreement which has rendered the satisfaction of any
condition to the obligations of Sunbeam impossible and such violation
or breach has not been waived by Sunbeam.

with a copy to:

In the event of termination and abandonment of this Agreement by
Coleman Parent or Sunbeam or both of them pursuant to the terms of this
Section 10, written notice thereof shall forthwith be given to the other
party and this Agreement shall terminate and the transactions contemplated
hereby shall be abandoned, without further action by any of the parties
hereto.

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019
Attention: Adam O. Emmerich, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 403-2000

11. Expenses. All costs and expenses incurred in connection with
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby will be paid by the
party incurring such costs and expenses.

If to Sunbeam:
Sunbeam Corporation
1615 South Congress Avenue, Suite 200
Delray Beach, Florida 33445
Attention: Corporate Secretary
Facsimile: (561) 243-2191

12. Tax Matters. Coleman Parent shall in good faith provide to
Sunbeam information concerning the tax treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. as amended (the "Code"), of the transactions contemplated
hereby. Sunbeam shall report such transactions for all tax purposes
consistent with such information and take no position with any taxing
authority inconsistent therewith. Coleman Parent and Sunbeam shall report
the Holdings Merger as a reorganization within the meaning of Code Section
368(a) for all tax purposes.
13.
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with copies to:
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Each of the parties hereto agrees to use its best
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Facsimile:
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Blaine V. Fogg, Esq.
(212) 735-3597
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By:

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10152
Attention: Stephen E. Jacobs, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 310-8007

19. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original but all of
which together shall constitute but one agreement.
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SUNBEAM CORPORATION
WARRANT FOR THE PURCHASE OF SHARES OF
COMMON STOCK OF SUNBEAM CORPORATION
ISSUE DATE: AUGUST__, 1998

Governing Law; Forum.

(b) The parties hereto irrevocably and unconditionally consent
to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of
Delaware and/or of the United States of America located in the State
of Delaware for any actions, suits or proceedings out of or relating
to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby.

20. Effect of Headings. The descriptive headings contained herein
are for convenience only and shall not affect in any way the meaning or
interpretation of this Agreement.
21. Interpretation. When a reference is made in this Agreement to an
Article or Section, such reference shall be to an Article or Section of
this Agreement unless otherwise indicated. Whenever the words "inclUde",
"includes" or "inclUding" are used in this Agreement, they shall be deemed
to be followed by the words "without limitation". The words "hereof",
"herein" and "hereunder" and words of similar import when used in this

/s/ Howard Kristol

EXHIBIT A

or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the other
parties in writing in accordance herewith.

(a) This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without regard to
its conflict of law rules.

-,

'-'

Name: Howard Kristof
Title: Chairman of the Special
Committee

and

18.

.,

WARRANT NO. W-l

23,000,000 WARRANT SHARES

THIS WARRANT AND THE SHARES OF COMMON STOCK PURCHASEABLE
HEREUNDER HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933, AS AMENDED, OR UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF ANY STATE OR
OTHER JURISDICTION AND MAY NOT BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE TRANSFERRED
OR DISPOSED OF UNLESS REGISTERED OR QUALIFIED UNDER SAID ACT AND
APPLICABLE STATE SECURITIES LAWS OR UNLESS SUCH REGISTRATION,
QUALIFICATION OR OTHER SUCH ACTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED UNDER ANY
SUCH LAWS.
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, SUNBEAM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that Coleman (Parent) Holdings Inc., its
successor or permitted assigns (the "Holder"), is entitled, subject to the
provisions of this Warrant, to purchase from the Company, at the times
specified herein, a number of the fully paid and non-assessable shares of
Common Stock of the Company, par value $.01 per share (the "Common Stock"),
equal to the Warrant Share Amount (as hereinafter defined) at a purchase
price per share equal to the Exercise Price (as hereinafter defined).
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.
have the following meanings:

(a)

The following terms, as used herein,

Agreement shall refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any
particular provision of this Agreement. The definitions contained in this
Agreement are applicable to the singular as well as the plural forms of
such terms and to the masculine as well as to the feminine and neuter
genders of such term. References to a person are also to its permitted
successors and assigns and, in the case of an individual, to his heirs and
estate, as applicable.

"BUSINESS DAY" means any day except a Saturday, Sunday or other day on
which commercial banks in The City of New York are authorized by law to
close.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to be duly
executed on the day and year first above written.

"CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION" means the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of the Company.

COLEMAN (PARENT) HOLDINGS INC.
By:

/s/ Barry F. Schwartz
Name: Barry F. Schwartz
Title: Executive Vice President
and General Counsel

SUNBEAM CORPORATION

"AFFILIATE" shall have the meaning given to such term in Rule l2b-2
promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

"CLOSING PRICE" on any day means (1) if the shares of Common Stock
then are listed and traded on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"),
the Closing Price on such day as reported on the NYSE Composite
Transactions Tape; (2) if shares of Common Stock then are not listed and
traded on the NYSE, the Closing Price on such day as reported by the
principal national securities exchange on which the shares of Common Stock
are listed and traded; (3) if the shares of Common Stock then are not
listed and traded on any such securities exchange, the last reported sale
price on such day on the National Market of The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Automated Quotation System ("NASDAQ"); or (4) if
the shares of Common Stock then are not traded on the NASDAQ National
Market, the average of the highest reported bid and the lowest reported
asked price on such day as reported by NASDAQ.

'~-,

"COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENT" means, with respect to any security of the
Company and as of a given date, a number which is, (i) in the case of a
share of Common Stock, one, (ii) in the case of all or a portion of any
right, warrant or other security which may be exercised for a share or
shares of Common Stock, the number of shares of Common Stock receivable
upon exercise of such security (or such portion of such security), and
(iii) in the case of any security convertible or exchangeable into a share
or shares of Common Stock, the number of shares of Common Stock that would
be received if such security were converted or exchanged on such date.

on the next succeeding day that shall be a Business Day. To exercise this
Warrant, the Holder shall deliver to the Company this Warrant, including
the Warrant Exercise Subscription Form forming a part hereof duly executed
by the Holder, together with payment of the applicable Exercise Price.
Upon such delivery and payment, the Holder shall be deemed to be the holder
of record of the number of Warrant Shares equal to the Warrant Share Amount
(or, in the case of a partial exercise of this Warrant, a ratable number of
such shares), notwithstanding that the stock transfer books of the Company
shall then be closed or that certificates representing such shares shall
not then be actually delivered to the Holder.

"COMMON STOCK" shall have the meaning set forth in the first paragraph
hereof.

(b) At the option of the Holder, the Exercise Price may be paid in
cash (including by wire transfer of immediately available funds) or by
certified or official bank check or bank cashier's check payable to the
order of the Company or by any combination of such cash or check. At the
option of the Holder, the Exercise Price may in the alternative be paid in
whole or in part by reducing the number of shares of Common Stock issuable
to the Holder by a number of shares of Common Stock that have a Fair Market
Value equal to the Exercise Price which otherwise would have been paid (so
that the net number of shares of Common Stock issued in respect of such
exercise shall equal the number of shares of Common Stock that would have
been issuable had the Exercise Price been paid entirely in cash, less a
number of shares of Common Stock with a Fair Market Value equal to the
portion of the Exercise Price paid in kind); provided that this option
shall be available only with respect to the exercise of this Warrant with
respect to not more than one-half of the total number of Warrant Shares.
The Company shall pay any and all documentary, or similar issue or transfer
taxes payable in respect of the issue or delivery of the Warrant Shares.
The Company shall not, however, be required to pay any transfer tax which
may be payable in respect of any transfer involved in the issue or delivery
of Warrants or Warrant Shares (or other securities or assets) in a name
other than that in which the Warrants so exercised were registered, and no
such issue or delivery shall be made unless and until the person requesting
such issue has paid to the Company the amount of such transfer tax or has
established, to the satisfaction of the Company, that such transfer tax has
been paid.

"COMPANY" shall have the meaning set forth in the first paragraph
hereof.
"CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES" shall have the meaning set forth in Section
7 (d).

"DETERMINATION DATE" shall have the meaning set forth in Section 7(f).
"EXERCISE PRICE" means a price per Warrant Share equal to $7.00.
"EXPIRATION DATE" means 5:00 p.m. New York City time on August
,
2003 [the fifth anniversary of the date of this Warrant).
--
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"FAIR MARKET VALUE" as at any date of determination means, as to
shares of the Common Stock, if the Common Stock is publicly traded at such
time, the average of the daily Closing Prices of a share of Common Stock
for the ten (10) consecutive trading days ending on the most recent trading
day prior to the date of determination. If the shares of Common Stock are
not publicly traded at such time, and as to all things other than the
Common Stock, Fair Market Value shall be determined in good faith by an
independent nationally recognized investment banking firm selected by the
Company and acceptable to a majority of the Holders and which shall have no
other substantial relationship with the Company.
"HOLDER" shall have the meaning set forth in the first paragraph
hereof.

(c) If the Holder exercises this Warrant in part, this Warrant shall
be surrendered by the Holder to the Company and a new Warrant of the same
tenor and for the unexercised number of Warrant Shares shall be executed by
the Company. The Company shall register the new Warrant in the name of the
Holder or in such name or names of its transferee pursuant to Section 6 as
may be directed in writing by the Holder and deliver the new Warrant to the
Person or Persons entitled to receive the same.

"OPTIONS" shall have the meaning set forth in Section 7(d).
"PERSON" means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited
liability company, trust, joint stock company, association, joint venture,
or any other entity or organization, including a government or political
subdivision or an agency or instrumentality thereof.

(d) Upon surrender of this Warrant in conformity with the foregoing
provisions, the Company shall, subject to the expiration of any applicable
waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
transfer to the Holder of this Warrant appropriate evidence of ownership of
the shares of Common Stock or other securities or property (including any
money) to which the Holder is entitled, registered or otherwise placed in,
or payable to the order of, the name or names of the Holder or such
transferee as may be directed in writing by the Holder, and shall deliver
such evidence of ownership and any other securities or property (including
any money) to the Person or Persons entitled to receive the same, together
with an amount in cash in lieu of any fraction of a share as provided in
Section 5, subject to any required withholding.

"SECURITIES ACT" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
"SUBSIDIARY" means, with respect to any Person, any corporation or
other entity of which a majority of the capital stock or other ownership
interests having ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the board of
directors or other persons performing similar functions are at the time
directly or indirectly owned by such Person.
"WARRANT SHARE AMOUNT" means 23,000,000 (Twenty Three Million) shares
of Common Stock as such number may be adjusted pursuant to Sections 7 and
8.

"WARRANT SHARES" means the shares of Common Stock deliverable upon
exercise of this Warrant, as adjusted from time to time.

SECTION 3. RESTRICTIVE LEGEND. Each certificate representing shares
of Common Stock issued pursuant to this Warrant, unless at the time of
exercise such shares are registered under the Securities Act, shall bear a
legend substantially in the form of the legend set forth on the first page
of this Warrant.

SECTION 2. EXERCISE OF WARRANT.
(a) The Holder is entitled to
exercise this Warrant in whole or in part at any time, or from time to
time, until the Expiration Date or, if such day is not a Business Day, then
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SECTION 4. RESERVATION OF SHARES. The Company hereby agrees that at
all times there shall be reserved for issuance and delivery upon exercise
of this Warrant such number of its authorized but unissued shares of Common
Stock or other securities of the Company from time to time issuable upon
exercise of this Warrant as will be sufficient to permit the exercise in
full of this Warrant. The Company hereby represents and agrees that all
such shares shall be duly authorized and, when issued upon such exercise,
shall be validly issued, fully paid and non-assessable, free and clear of
all liens, security interests, charges and other encumbrances or
restrictions on sale and free and clear of all preemptive or similar
rights, except to the extent imposed by or as a result of the status, act
or omission of, the Holder.
SECTION 5. FRACTIONAL SHARES. No fractional shares or scrip
representing fractional shares shall be issued upon the exercise of this
Warrant and in lieu of delivery of any such fractional share upon any
exercise hereof, the Company shall pay to the Holder an amount in cash
equal to such fraction multiplied by the Fair Market Value thereof;
provided, however, that, in the event that the Company combines or
reclassifies the outstanding shares of its Common Stock into a smaller
number of shares, it shall be required to issue fractional shares to the
Holder if the Holder exercises all or any part of its Warrants, unless the
Holder has consented in writing to such reduction and provided the Company
with a written waiver of its right to receive fractional shares in
accordance with this Section 5.
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SECTION 6. TRANSFER, EXCHANGE OR ASSIGNMENT OF WARRANT.
(a) Each
taker and holder of this Warrant by taking or holding the same, consents
and agrees that the registered holder hereof may be treated by the Company
and all other persons dealing with this Warrant as the absolute owner
hereof for any purpose and as the person entitled to exercise the rights
represented hereby.
(b) Subject to the requirements of state and federal securities laws,
the Holder of this Warrant shall be entitled, without obtaining the consent
of the Company to assign and transfer this Warrant, at any time in whole or
from time to time in part, to any Person or Persons. Subject to the
preceding sentence, upon surrender of this Warrant to the Company, together
with the attached Warrant Assignment Form duly executed, the Company shall,
without charge, execute and deliver a new Warrant in the name of the
assignee or assignees named in such instrument of assignment and, if the
Holder's entire interest is not being assigned, in the name of the Holder
and this Warrant shall promptly be canceled.
(c) Upon receipt by the Company of evidence satisfactory to it (in
the exercise of its reasonable discretion) of the loss, theft, destruction
or mutilation of this Warrant, and (in the case of loss, theft or
destruction) of indemnification or security reasonably required by the
Company, and upon surrender and cancellation of this Warrant, if mutilated,
the Company shall execute and deliver a new Warrant of like tenor and date.
(d) The Company shall pay all expenses, taxes (other than transfer
taxes) and other charges payable in connection with the preparation,
issuance and delivery of Warrants hereunder.
SECTION 7. ANTI-DILUTION PROVISIONS. So long as any Warrants are
outstanding, the Warrant Share Amount shall be subject to change or
adjustment as follows:
(a) Common Stock Dividends, Subdivisions, Combinations. In case the
Company shall (i) payor make a dividend or other distribution to all
holders of its Common Stock in shares of Common Stock, (ii) subdivide or
split the outstanding shares of its Common Stock into a larger number of
shares, or (iii) combine the outstanding shares of its Common Stock into a
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smaller number of shares (which shall not in any event be done without the
express written approval of Holders of a majority of the outstanding
Warrants), then in each such case the Warrant Share Amount shall be
adjusted to equal the number of such shares to which the holder of this
Warrant would have been entitled upon the occurrence of such event had this
Warrant been exercised immediately prior to the happening of such event or,
in the case of a stock dividend or other distribution, prior to the record
date for determination of shareholders entitled thereto. An adjustment
made pursuant to this Section 7(a) shall become effective immediately after
the effective date of such event retroactive to the record date, if any,
for such event.
(b) Reorganization or Reclassification. In case of any capital
reorganization or any reclassification of the capital stock of the Company
(whether pursuant to a merger or consolidation or otherwise), or in the
event of any similar transaction, this Warrant shall thereafter be
exercisable for the number of shares of stock or other securities or
property receivable upon such capital reorganization or reclassification of
capital stock or other transaction, as the case may be, by a holder of the
number of shares of Common Stock into which this Warrant was exercisable
immediately prior to such capital reorganization or reclassification of
capital stock; and, in any case, appropriate adjustment (as determined in
good faith by the Board of Directors of the Company) shall be made for the
application of the provisions herein set forth with respect to the rights
and interests thereafter of the Holder of this Warrant to the end that the
provisions set forth herein shall thereafter be applicable, as nearly as
reasonably practicable, in relation to any shares of stock or other
securities or property thereafter deliverable upon the exercise of this
Warrant. An adjustment made pursuant to this Section 7(b) shall become
effective immediately after the effective date of such event retroactive to
the record date, if any, for such event.
(c) Distributions of Assets or Securities Other than Common Stock.
In case the Company shall, by dividend or otherwise, distribute to all
holders of its Common Stock shares of any class of its capital stock (other
than Common Stock), or other debt or equity securities or evidences of
indebtedness of the Company, or options, rights or warrants to purchase any
of such securities, cash or other assets, then in each such case the
Warrant Share Amount shall be adjusted by multiplying the Warrant Share
Amount immediately prior to the date of such dividend or distribution by a
fraction, of which the numerator shall be the Fair Market Value per share
of Common Stock at the record date for determining shareholders entitled to
such dividend or distribution, and of which the denominator shall be such
Fair Market Value per share less the Fair Market Value of the portion of
the securities, cash, other assets or evidences of indebtedness so
distributed applicable to one share of Common Stock. An adjustment made
pursuant to this Section 7(c) shall become effective immediately after the
effective date of such event retroactive to the record date, if any, for
such event.
(d) Below Market Issuances of Common Stock and Convertible
Securities. In case the Company shall issue Common Stock (or options,
rights or warrants to purchase shares of Common Stock (collectively,
"Options") or other securities convertible into or exchangeable or
exercisable for shares of Common Stock (such other securities,
collectively, "Convertible Securities"») at a price per share (or having an
effective exercise, exchange or conversion price per share together with
the purchase price thereof) less than the Fair Market Value per share of
Common Stock on the date such Common Stock (or Options or Convertible
Securities), is sold or issued (provided that no sale of securities
pursuant to an underwritten public offering shall be deemed to be for less
than Fair Market Value), then in each such case the Warrant Share Amoun~
shall thereafter be adjusted by multiplying the Warrant Share Amount
immediately prior to the date of issuance of such Common Stock (or Options
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or Convertible Securities) by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be
(x) the sum of (i) the number of Common Share Equivalents represented by
all securities outstanding immediately prior to such issuance and (ii) the
number of additional Common Share Equivalents represented by all securities
so issued multiplied by (y) the Fair Market Value of a share of Common
Stock immediately prior to the date of such issuance, and the denominator
of which shall be (x) the product of IA) the Fair Market Value of a share
of Common Stock immediately prior to the date of such issuance and (B) the
number of Common Share Equivalents represented by all securities
outstanding immediately prior to such issuance plus (y) the aggregate
consideration received by the Company for the total number of securities so
issued plus, (z) in the case of Options or Convertible Securities, the
additional consideration required to be received by the Company upon the
exercise, exchange or conversion of such securities; provided that no
adjustment shall be required in respect of issuances of Common Stock (or
options to purchase Common Stock) pursuant to stock option or other
employee benefit plans in effect on the date hereof, or approved by the
Board of Directors of the Company after the date hereof. Notwithstanding
anything herein to the contrary, (1) no further adjustment to the Warrant
Share Amount shall be made upon the issuance or sale of Common Stock
pursuant to (x) the exercise of any Options or (y) the conversion or
exchange of any Convertible Securities, if in each case the adjustment inO
the Warrant Share Amount was made as required hereby upon the issuance or
sale of such Options or Convertible Securities or no adjustment was
required hereby at the time such Option or Convertible Security was issued,
and (2) no adjustment to the Warrant Share Amount shall be made upon the
issuance or sale of Common Stock upon the exercise of any Options existing
on the original issue date hereof, without regard to the exercise price
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no adjustment to the Warrant Share
Amount shall be made pursuant to this paragraph upon the issuance or sale
of Common Stock, Options, or Convertible Securities in a bona fide arm'slength transaction to any Person or group that, at the time of such
issuance or sale, is not an Affiliate of the Company (including any
possible issuance of Common Stock, Options, or Convertible Securities to
the public stockholders of The Coleman Company, Inc. ("Coleman") in
connection with the acquisition of their shares of Coleman common stock
pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of February 27, 1998
(the "Coleman Merger Agreement"', by and among Sunbeam, Camper Acquisition
Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Sunbeam, and
Coleman, or otherwise). An adjustment made pursuant to this Section 7(d)
shall become effective immediately after such common Stock, Options or
Convertible Securities are sold.

immediately prior to the date of such issuance minus (y) the difference
between (1) the aggregate Fair Market Value of such preferred stock (or
other security) and (2) the aggregate consideration received by the Company
for such preferred stock (or other security). Notwithstanding the
foregoing, no adjustment to the Warrant Share Amount shall be made pursuant
to this paragraph upon the issuance or sale of preferred stock (or other
securities of the Company other than common Stock or Options or Convertible
Securities) in a bona fide arm's-length transaction to any Person or group
that, at the time of such issuance or sale, is not an Affiliate of the
Company (including any possible issuance of preferred stock (or other
securities of the Company other than common Stock or Options or Convertible
Securities) to the public stockholders of Coleman in connection with the
acquisition of their shares of Coleman common stock pursuant to the Coleman
Merger Agreement, or otherwise). An adjustment made pursuant to this
Section 7(e) shall become effective immediately after such preferred stock
(or other security) is sold.
(f) Above Market Repurchases of Common Stock. If at any time or from
time to time the Company or any Subsidiary thereof shall repurchase, by
self-tender offer or otherwise, any shares of Common Stock of the Company
(or any Options or Convertible Securities) at a purchase price in excess of
the Fair Market Value thereof, on the Business Day immediately prior to the
earliest of (i) the date of such repurchase, (ii) the commencement of an
offer to repurchase, or (iii) the public announcement of either (such date
being referred to as the "Determination Date"), the Warrant Share Amount
shall be determined by multiplying the Warrant Share Amount immediately
prior to such Determination Date by a fraction, the numerator of which
shall be the product of (1) the number of Common Share Equivalents
represented by all securities outstanding immediately prior to such
Determination Date minus the number of Common Share Equivalents represented
by the securities repurchased or to be purchased by the Company or any
Subsidiary thereof in such repurchase and (2) the Fair Market Value of a
share of Common Stock immediately prior to such Determination Date, and the
denominator of which shall be (x) the product of (A) the number of Common
Share Equivalents represented by all securities outstanding immediately
prior to the Determination Date and (B) the Fair Market Value of a share of
Common Stock immediately prior to such Determination Date minus (y) the sum
of (1) the aggregate consideration paid by the Company in connection with
such repurchase and (2) in the case of Options or Convertible Securities,
the additional consideration required to be received by the Company upon
the exercise, exchange or conversion of such securities. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, no adjustment to the Warrant Share Amount shall be made
pursuant to this paragraph upon the repurchase, by self-tender offer or
otherwise, of Common Stock (or any Options or Convertible Security) in a
bona fide arm's-length transaction from any Person or group that, at the
time of such repurchase, is not an Affiliate of the Company.

(e) Below Market Distributions or Issuances of Preferred Stock or
Other Securities. In case the Company shall issue non-convertible and nonexchangeable preferred stock (or other debt or equity securities or
evidences of indebtedness of the Company (other than Common Stock or
Options or Convertible Securities) or options, rights or warrants to
purchase any of such securities) at a price per share (or other similar
unit) less than the Fair Market Value per share (or other similar unit) of
such preferred stock (or other security) on the date such preferred stock
lor other security) is sold (provided that no sale of preferred stock or
other security pursuant to an underwritten public offering shall be deemed
to be for less than its fair market value), then in each such case the
Warrant Share Amount shall thereafter be adjusted by multiplying the
Warrant Share Amount immediately prior to the date of issuance of such
preferred stock (or other security) by a fraction, the numerator of which
shall be the product of (i) the number of Common Share Equivalents
represented by all securities outstanding immediately prior to such
issuance and (ii) the Fair Market Value of a share of Common Stock
immediately prior to the date of such issuance, and the denominator of
which shall be (x) the product of (A) the number of Common Share
Equivalents represented by all securities outstanding immediately prior to
such issuance and (B) the Fair Market Value of a share of the Common Stock
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(g) Above Market Repurchases of Preferred Stock or Other Securities.
If at any time or from time to time the Company or any Subsidiary thereof
shall repurchase, by self-tender offer or otherwise, any shares of nonconvertible and non-exchangeable preferred stock (or other debt or equity
securities or evidences of indebtedness of the Company (other than Common
Stock or Options or Convertible Securities) or options, rights or warrants
to purchase any of such securities), at a purchase price in excess of the
Fair Market Value thereof, on the Business Day immediately prior to the
Determination Date, the Warrant Share-Amount shall be determined by
multiplying the Warrant Share Amount immediately prior to the Determination
Date by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the product of Ii) the
number of Common Share Equivalents represented by all securities
outstanding immediately prior to such Determination Date and (ii) the Fair
Market Value of a share of Common Stock immediately prior to such
Determination Date, and the denominator of which shall be (x) the product
of (A) the number of Common Share Equivalents represented by all securities
outstanding immediately prior to such Determination Date and (81 the Fair
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Market Value of a share of Common Stock immediately prior to such
Determination Date minus (y) the difference between (1) the aggregate
consideration paid by the Company in connection with such repurchase and
(2) the aggregate Fair Market Value of such preferred stock (or other
security). Notwithstanding the foregoing, no adjustment to the Warrant
Share Amount shall be made pursuant to this paragraph upon the repurchase,
by self-tender offer or otherwise, of non-convertible and non-exchangeable
preferred stock (or other securities of the Company other than Common Stock
or Options or Convertible Securities) in a bona fide arm's-length
transaction from any Person or group that, at the time of such repurchase,
is not an Affiliate of the Company.
(h) Readjustment of Warrant Share Amount. If (i) the purchase price
provided for in any Option or the additional consideration, if any, payable
upon the conversion or exchange of any Convertible Securities or the rate
at which any Convertible Securities, in each case as referred to in
paragraphs (b) and (f) above, are convertible into or exchangeable for
Common Stock shall change at any time (other than under or by reason of
provisions designed to protect against dilution upon an event which results
in a related adjustment pursuant to this Section 7), or (ii) any of such
Options or Convertible Securities shall have irrevocably terminated, lapsed
or expired, the Warrant Share Amount then in effect shall forthwith be
readjusted (effective only with respect to any exercise of this Warrant
after such readjustment) to the Warrant Share Amount which would then be in
effect had the adjustment made upon the issuance, sale, distribution or
grant of such Options or Convertible Securities been made based upon such
changed purchase price, additional consideration or conversion rate, as the
case may be (in the case of any event referred to in clause (il of this
paragraph (h» or had such adjustment not been made (in the case of any
event referred to in clause (ii) of this paragraph (h».
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(i) Exercise Price Adjustment. Upon each adjustment of the Warrant
Share Amount pursuant to this Section 7, the Exercise Price of each Warrant
outstanding immediately prior to such adjustment shall thereafter be equal
to an adjusted Exercise Price per Share determined (to the nearest cent) by
multiplying the Exercise Price for the Warrant immediately prior to such
adjustment by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the Warrant Share
Amount in effect immediately prior to such adjustment and the denominator
of which shall be the Warrant Share Amount in effect immediately after such
adjustment.
(j) Consideration. If any shares of Common Stock, Options or
Convertible Securities shall be issued, sold or distributed for cash, the
consideration received in respect thereof shall be deemed to be the amount
received by the Company therefor, before deduction therefrom of any
reasonable, customary and adequately documented expenses incurred in
connection therewith. If any shares of Common Stock, Options or
Convertible Securities shall be issued, sold or distributed for a
consideration other than cash, the amount of the consideration other than
cash received by the Company shall be deemed to be the Fair Market Value of
such consideration, before deduction of any reasonable, customary and
adequately documented expenses incurred in connection therewith. If any
shares of Common Stock, Options or Convertible Securities shall be issued
in connection with any merger in which the Company is the surviving
corporation, the amount of consideration therefor shall be deemed to be the
Fair Market Value of such portion of the assets and business of the nonsurviving corporation as shall be attributable to such Common Stock,
Options or Convertible Securities, as the case may be. If any Options
shall be issued in connection with the issuance and sale of other
securities of the Company, together comprising one integral transaction in
which no specific consideration is allocated to such Options by the parties
thereto, such Options shall be deemed to have been issued without
consideration.
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Ik) No Impairment. The Company will not, by amendment of its
Certificate of Incorporation or through any reorganization, transfer of
assets, consolidation, merger, dissolution, issue or sale of securities or
any other voluntary action, avoid or seek to avoid the observance or
performance of any of the terms to be observed or performed hereunder by
the Company, but will at all times in good faith assist in the carrying out
of all the provisions of this Section 7 and in the taking of all such
action as may be necessary or appropriate in order to protect the
conversion rights of the Holder against impairment. Without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the Company will not increase the par value
of any shares of Common Stock receivable on the exercise of the Warrants
above the amount payable therefor on such exercise.
(1) Certificate as to Adjustments. Upon the occurrence of each
adjustment or readjustment of the Warrant Share Amount pursuant to this
Section 7, the Company at its expense shall promptly compute such
adjustment or readjustment in accordance with the terms hereof and furnish
to the Holder a certificate setting forth such adjustment or readjustment
and showing in detail the facts upon which such adjustment or readjustment
is based. The Company shall, upon the written request at any time of the
Holder, furnish or cause to be furnished to Holder a like certificate
setting forth (1) such adjustments and readjustments and (2) the number of
shares of Common Stock and the amount, if any, of other property which at
the time would be received upon the exercise of this Warrant.
(m) Proceedings Prior to Any Action Requiring Adjustment. As a
condition precedent to the taking of any action which would require an
adjustment pursuant to this Section 7, the Company shall take any action
which may be necessary, including obtaining regulatory approvals or
exemptions, in order that the Company may thereafter validly and legally
issue as fully paid and nonassessable all shares of Common Stock which the
Holders are entitled to receive upon exe rcise thereof.
(n) Notice of Adjustment. Upon the record date or effective date, as
the case may be, of any action which requires or might require an
adjustment or readjustment pursuant to this Section 7, the Company shall
forthwith file in the custody of its Secretary or an Assistant Secretary at
its principal executive office and with its stock transfer agent or its
warrant agent, if any, an officers' certificate showing the adjusted number
of Warrant Shares determined as herein provided, setting forth in
reasonable detail the facts requiring such adjustment and the manner of
computing such adjustment. Each such officers' certificate shall be signed
by the chairman, president or chief financial officer of the Company and by
the secretary or any assistant secretary of the Company. Each such
officers' certificate shall be made available at all reasonable times for
inspection by the Holder or any Holder of a Warrant executed and delivered
pursuant to Section 6(b) and the Company shall, forthwith after each such
adjustment, mail a copy, by first-class mail, of such certificate to the
Holder or any such holder.
(0)
Payments in Lieu of Adjustment. The Holder shall, at its option,
be entitled to receive, in lieu of the adjustment pursuant to Section 7(c)
otherwise required thereof, on (but not prior to) the date of exercise of
the Warrants, the evidences of indebtedness, other securities, cash,
property or other assets which such Holder would have been entitled to
receive if it had exercised its Warrants for shares of Common Stock
immediately prior to the record date with respect to such distribution.
The Holder may exercise its option under this Section 7(0) by delivering
to the Company a written notice of such exercise simultaneously with its
notice of exercise of this Warrant.

SECTION 8. CONSOLIDATION, MERGER OR SALE OF ASSETS. In case of any
consolidation of the Company with, or merger of the Company into, any other
Person, any merger of another Person into the Company (other than a merger
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which does not result in any reclassification, conversion, exchange or
cancellation of outstanding shares of Common Stock) or any sale or transfer
of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company to the Person
formed by such consolidation or resulting from such merger or which
acquires such assets, as the case may be, the Holder shall have the right
thereafter to exercise this Warrant for the kind and amount of securities,
cash and other property receivable upon such consolidation, merger, sale or
transfer by a holder of the number of shares of Common Stock for which this
Warrant may have been exercised immediately prior to such consolidation,
merger, sale or transfer. Adjustments for events subsequent to the
effective date of such a consolidation, merger, sale or transfer of assets
shall be as nearly equivalent as may be practicable to the adjustments
provided for in this Warrant. In any such event, effective provisions
shall be made in the certificate or articles of incorporation of the
resulting or surviving corporation, in any contract of sale, merger,
conveyance, lease, transfer or otherwise so that the provisions set fort,
herein for the protection of the rights of the Holder shall thereafter
continue to be applicable; and any such resulting or surviving corporation
shall expressly assume the obligation to deliver, upon exercise, such
shares of stock, other securities, cash and property. The provisions of
this Section 8 shall similarly apply to successive consolidations, mergers,
sales, leases or transfers.

Each such
telecopy,
specified
telecopy,
specified

(i) appoint a warrant agent to act as agent for the Company in
connection with the issuance, transfer and exchange of the Warrants
and shall enter into an agreement with such warrant agent
reflecting the terms and conditions of such appointment, which
terms and conditions shall be customary for such appointments, and
such other matters as are customarily included in such agreements
so as to facilitate the transfer and registration of the Warrants:
and
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with copies to:

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Attention: Blaine V. Fogg, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 735-3597

and to:

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
Attention: Stephen E. Jacobs, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 310-8007
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Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019
Attention: Adam O. Emmerich, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 403-2000

notice, demand or delivery shall be effective (i) if given by
when such telecopy is transmitted to the telecopy number
herein and the intended recipient confirms the receipt of such
or (ii) if given by any other means, when received at the address
herein.

SECTION 13. AMENDMENTS: WAIVERS. Any provlslon of this Warrant may
be amended or waived if, and only if, such amendment or waiver is in
writing and signed, in the case of an amendment, by the Holder and the
Company, or in the case of a waiver, by the party against whom the waiver
is to be effective. No failure or delay by either party in exercising any
right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof nor
shall any single or partial exercise thereof preclUde any other or further
exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege.
The rights and remedies herein provided shall be cumulative and not
exclusive of any rights or remedies provided by law.

SECTION 10. NOTICES. Any notice, demand or delivery authorized by
this Warrant shall be in writing and shall be given to the Holder or to the
Company, as the case may be, at its address (or facsimile number) set forth
below, or such other address (or facsimile number) as shall have been
furnished to the party giving or making such notice, demand or delivery:
Sunbeam Corporation
1615 South Congress Avenue, Suite 200
Delray Beach, Florida 33445
Attention: Corporate Secretary
Facsimile: (561) 243-2191

with copies to:

SECTION 12. GOVERNING LAW. THIS WARRANT AND ALL RIGHTS ARISING
HEREUNDER SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNAL
LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, AND THE PERFORMANCE THEREOF SHALL BE
GOVERNED AND ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH LAWS.

(ii) use its reasonable best efforts to cause the Warrants to be
eligible to be publicly traded, including, without limitation,
amending this Warrant to provide terms and conditions necessary and
appropriate for the Warrants to be publicly traded.

If to the Company:

Coleman (Parent) Holdings Inc.
c/o MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.
35 East 62nd Street
New York, New York 10021
Attention: Barry F. Schwartz, Esq.
Facsimile: (212) 572-5056

SECTION 11. RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER. Prior to the exercise of any
Warrant, the Holder shall not, by virtue hereof, be entitled to any rights
of a shareholder of the Company, including, without limitation, the right
to vote, to receive dividends or other distributions, to exercise any
preemptive right or to receive any notice of meetings of shareholders or
any notice of any proceedings of the Company except as may be specifically
provided for herein.

SECTION 9. WARRANT AGENT. At the written request of the Holders of a
majority of the outstanding Warrants, the Company shall as soon as is
reasonably practicable:
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If to the Holder:

SECTION 14. Interpretation. When a reference is made in this Warrant
to a Section such reference shall be to a Section of this Warrant unless
otherwise indicated. Whenever the words "include", "includes" or
"including" are used in this Warrant, they shall be deemed to be followed
by the words "without limitation". The words "hereof", "herein" and
"hereunder" and words of similar import when used in this Warrant shall
refer to this Warrant as a whole and not to any particular provision of
this Warrant. The definitions contained in this Warrant are applicable to
the singular as well as the plural forms of such terms and to the masculine
as well as to the feminine and neuter genders of such term. References to
a person are also to its permitted successors and assigns and, in the case
of an individual, to his heirs and estate, as applicable.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has duly caused this Warrant to be
signed by its duly authorized officer and to be dated as of the date first
above written.
SUNBEAM CORPORATION
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Securities and/or check to be issued to:
Please insert social security or identifying number:
Name:

ATTEST:
Street Address:
By:==

_

Name:
Title:

City, State and Zip Code:
Any unexercised portion of the Warrant evidenced by the
within Warrant to be issued to:

ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED:
COLEMAN (PARENT) HOLDINGS INC.

Please insert social security or identifying number:
By:~-----------Name:
Title:

Name:
Street Address:

WARRANT EXERCISE SUBSCRIPTION FORM

to
I

--

W
10

City, State and Zip Code:

(To be executed only upon exercise of the Warrant
after delivery of the Warrant Exercise Notice)
WARRANT ASSIGNMENT FORM

To: Sunbeam Corporation
The undersigned irrevocably exercises the Warrant for the purchase of
shares (the "Shares") of Common Stock, par value $.01 per share,
of Sunbeam Corporation (the "Company") ("Common Stock") at an exercise
price of $
per Share and herewith makes payment of $
(such
payment being made in cash or by certified or official bank or bank
cashier's check payable to the order of the Company or by any permitted
combination of such cash or check or by the reduction of the number of
shares of Common Stock that otherwise would be issued upon this exercise by
the number of shares of Common Stock that have a value equal to such
exercise price). all on the terms and conditions specified in this Warrant,
surrenders this Narrant and all right. title and interest therein to the
Company and directs that the Shares deliverable upon the exercise of this
Narrant be registered or placed in the name and at the address specified
below and delivered thereto.

Dated
FOR VALUE RECEIVED,

_

hereby sells, assigns and
(the "Assignee"),

transfers unto

(please type or print in block letters)
(Insert address)
its right to purchase up to
shares of Common Stock represented by
this Warrant and does hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint
~=-~=====-__~~~~~--Attorney. to transfer the same on the books of
the Company. with full power of substitution in the premises.

Signature:

Date:
(Name - Please Print)
(SIgnature of Owner)

EXHIBIT B
(Street Address)
AMENDMENT TO REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT
(City) (State) (Zip Code)

AMENDMENT, dated as of August __ ' 1998 (this "Amendment"l. to

The definition of the term "Agreement" is amended and restated

the REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT, dated as of March 29, 1998 (the
"Registration Rights Agreement"), by and among SUNBEAM CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation ("Laser" or "Sunbeam"), and COLEMAN (PARENT) HOLDINGS
INC., a Delaware corporation ("Parent Holdings"). Capitalized terms used in
this Amendment have the meanings ascribed to them in the Registration
Rights Agreement unless otherwise defined herein. References to Articles
and Sections shall, unless otherwise stated, be to the Articles and
Sections of the Registration Rights Agreement. In all respects not
inconsistent with the terms and provisions of this Amendment, the
Registration Rights Agreement shall continue to be in full force and effect
in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof, and is hereby
ratified, adopted, approved and confirmed. From and after the date hereof,
each reference to the Registration Rights Agreement therein or in any other
instrument or document shall be deemed a reference to the Registration
Rights Agreement as amended hereby, unless the context otherwise requires,
and this Amendment and the Registration Rights Agreement shall for all
purposes and matters be considered as one agreement, including that all of
the ministerial and miscellaneous provisions of the Registration Rights
Agreement shall apply equally thereto as so amended and to this Amendment.

in its entirety to mean the Registration Rights Agreement as amended by
this Amendment.
The definition of the term "Registrable Securities" is amended
and restated in its entirety to mean (i) the Holdings Merger Stock, (ii)
the Warrants, and (iii) any shares of Laser Common Stock issued pursuant to
the Warrants, and, in each case, any other securities issued or issuable
upon or in respect of such securities by way of conversion, exchange,
dividend, split or combination, recapitalization, merger, consolidation,

other reorganization or otherwise. As to any particular Registrable
Securities, such securities shall cease to be Registrable Securities when
such securities have been sold or otherwise transferred by Parent Holdings
pursuant to the Shelf Registration Statement or pursuant to Rule 144 under
the Securities Act.
The following defined term shall be added to the list of
definitions in their respective alphabetically ordered positions:
The term "Holdings Merger Stock" shall mean the shares of Laser
Common Stock issued to Parent Holdings in the Holdings Merger.

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Holdings Merger Agreement, by and
among Sunbeam, a subsidiary of Sunbeam, CLN HOLDINGS INC., a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Parent Holdings ("Holdings"),
and Parent Holdings, the Holdings Merger was consummated on March 30, 1998
and Holdings became an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Sunbeam; and
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The term "Warrants" shall mean the warrants to purchase

23,000,000 (Twenty-Three Million) shares of Laser Common Stock issued to
Parent Holdings pursuant to Warrant No. W-l dated August
,1998.

WHEREAS, following consummation of the Holdings Merger, the
shares of Holdings Common Stock issued and outstanding immediately prior to
the effective time of the Holdings Merger were converted into an aggregate
of (A) 14,099,749 fully paid and nonassessable shares of common stock, par
value $.01 per share, of Sunbeam ("Laser Common Stock") and (8)
$159,956,756 in cash, without interest thereon; and

ARTICLE II
REQUIRED REGISTRATION
Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II are amended and
restated to read in their entirety as follows:

WHEREAS, following the dismissal by Sunbeam of certain of its
executive officers in mid-June 1998, Sunbeam retained certain senior
officers employed by Affiliates of Parent Holdings as executive officers of
Sunbeam; and

Section 2.1

WHEREAS, Sunbeam and Parent Holdings have entered into a
Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") pursuant to which Sunbeam
will issue to Parent Holdings certain warrants to purchase shares of Laser
Common Stock (the "Warrants") and has agreed to enter into this Agreement;
and
WHEREAS, in order to induce Parent Holdings to enter into the
Settlement Agreement, Sunbeam has agreed to amend the Registration Rights
Agreement and modify the registration rights with respect to the shares of
Laser Common Stock issued to Parent Holdings in the Holdings Merger and to
provide for registration rights with respect to the Warrants and Laser
Common Stock issuable upon exercise of the Warrants.
NOW, THEREFORE,
agreements set forth herein
the receipt and sufficiency
to be legally bound hereby,

(b) Effectiveness. Laser shall use reasonable best efforts to
keep the Shelf Registration Statement continuously effective under the
Securities Act until the date that is the earliest to occur of (i) the date
by which all Registrable Securities have been sold and (ii) the date by
which all Registrable Securities are eligible for immediate sale to the
public without registration under Rule 144 under the Securities Act, with
such sale not being limited by the volume restrictions thereunder or
otherwise.

in consideration of the mutual covenants and

and for other good and valuable consideration,
of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending
the parties agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS

(c) Amendments/Supplements. Laser shall amend and supplement
the Shelf Registration Statement and the prospectus contained therein if
required by the rules, regulations or instructions applicable to the
registration form used by Laser for such Shelf Registration Statement. if

Section 1.1 is amended with respect to certain of the
definitions therein as follows:
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Required Registration.

(a) Form S-3. Promptly following a demand to such effect from
any holder of Registrable Securities, Laser shall prepare and file with the
SEC a registration statement (the "Shelf Registration Statement") on an
appropriate form permitting registration of the Registrable Securities so
as to permit the resale of the Registrable Securities pursuant to an
offering on a delayed or continuous basis under the Securities Act and
shall use reasonable best efforts to (i) cause the Shelf Registration
Statement to be declared effective by the SEC as promptly as practicable
thereafter and (ii) permit the Shelf Registration Statement to be used by
Affiliates of Camper for resales of shares of Laser Common Stock held by
such Affiliates ; provided, however, that any such Affiliate using the
Shelf Registration Statement shall agree in writing to be bound by all of
the restrictions, limitations and obligations of Parent Holdings contained
in this Agreement.
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required by the Securities Act.
(d) Offerings. At any time from and after the date on which the
Shelf Registration Statement is declared effective by the SEC (the
"Effective Date"), Parent Holdings, subject to the restrictions and
conditions contained herein and in the Merger Agreement and the Warrants to
the extent applicable, and subject further to compliance with all
applicable state and federal securities laws, shall have the right to
dispose of all or any portion of the Registrable Securities.
Section 2.2

Holdback Agreement.

From and after the Effective Date, upon the request of Laser,
Parent Holdings shall not effect any public sale or distribution (including
sales pursuant to Rule 144) of Registrable Securities that are equity
securities of Laser, or any securities convertible into or exchangeable or
exercisable for such securities, including the Warrants, (other than any
such sale or distribution of such securities pursuant to registration of
such securities on Form SB-8 or any successor form) during the period
commencing on the date on which Laser commences a Laser Offering through
the sixty (60l-day period immediately following the closing date of such
Laser Offering; provided, however, that Parent Holdings shall not be
obligated to comply with this Section 2.2 on more than two (2) occasions in
any twelve (12)-month period; and provided, further, that notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in this Section 2.2 or Section 2.3, in no event
shall Parent Holdings be disabled from effecting offers or sales of
Registrable Securities for more than one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days
during any twelve (12)-month period.
Section 2.3
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Blackout Provisions.

In the event that, at any time while the Shelf Registration
Statement remains effective, Laser determines in its reasonable judgment
and in good faith that the sale of Registrable Securities would require
disclosure of material information which Laser has a bona fide business
purpose for preserving as confidential, Parent Holdings shall, upon
receiving written notice from Laser of such good faith determination,
suspend sales of the Registrable Securities for a period beginning on the
date of receipt of such notice and expiring on the earlier of (i) the date
upon which such material information is disclosed to the public or ceases
to be material or (ii) forty-five (45) days after the receipt of such
notice from Laser; provided, however, that Parent Holdings shall not be
obligated to comply with this Section 2.3 on more than two (2) occasions in
any twelve (12) month period; and provided, further, that notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in this Section 2.3 or Section 2.2, in no event
shall Parent Holdings be disabled from effecting offers or sales of
Registrable Securities for more than one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days
during any twelve (12l-month period.
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ARTICLE III
TRANSFERS OF REGISTRABLE SECURITIES
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of Article III are amended and restated to
read in their entirety as follows:
Section 3.1 Transferability of Registrable Securities.
(a)

Parent Holdings may not Transfer the Registrable

Securities, other than

(1)

pursuant to Rule 144;

(2)

pursuant to the Shelf Registration

Statement; or

(3) in any other Transfer exempt from registration under
the Securities Act, and as to which Laser has received an

opinion of counsel, reasonably satisfactory to Laser, that such

Transfer is so exempt;

and shall in no event Transfer any Registrable Securities in violation of
the Settlement Agreement.
Section 3.2

Restrictive Legends.

Parent Holdings hereby acknowledges and agrees that, during the
term of this Agreement, all of the Registrable Securities shall include the
legend set forth in Section 7.2 of the Holdings Merger Agreement, the
legend set forth on the Warrants or as provided in the Warrants or as may
otherwise be reasonably appropriate to reflect the fact that such
Registrable Securities have not been issued in transactions registered
under the Securities Act, unless at the time such Registrable Securities
have been registered under the Securities Act.
ARTICLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS
Sections 4.5 and 4.11 of Article IV are amended and restated in
their entirety to read as follows:
Section 4.5

Binding Effect; Assignment.

This Agreement and all of the provisions hereof shall be
binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their
respective heirs, executors, successors and permitted assigns, but, except

Section 2.4(a) of Article II is hereby amended by deleting the
word "and" from the end of paragraph (12) thereof, replacing the period at
the end of paragraph (13) thereof with "; and" and adding the following
additional paragraph:
(14) will enter into customary agreements (including an
underwriting agreement in customary forml and take such actions as are
reasonably required in order to expedite or facilitate the sale of such
Registrable Securities, including, without limitation, cooperation, and
causing its officers, employees and advisors to cooperate, with the sellers
of such Registrable Securities and the underwriter(s), if any, including
participation in meetings and road shows held in connection with such sale.

as expressly contemplated herein, neither this Agreement nor any of the
rights, interests or obligations hereunder shall be assigned, directly or
indirectly, by Laser or Parent Holdings without the prior written consent
of the other (except in the case of any assignment in whole or in part by
Parent Holdings to any Affiliate, as to which no such consent shall be
required); provided, that in connection with a bona fide pledge of any
Registrable Securities to secure indebtedness or other obligations, Parent
Holdings may assign its rights, interests and obligations hereunder to the
beneficiary of such pledge in whole or in part. Upon any permitted
assignment (other than in connection with any such bona fide pledge), this
Agreement shall be amended to substitute or add the assignee as a party
hereto in a writing reasonably acceptable to the other party.
Section 4.11

Termination; Restrictive Legend.

~.,

EXHIBIT 99.2

This Agreement shall terminate only following such time as
Sunbeam shall have no further obligation under Section 2.1(b) to use its
reasonable best efforts to keep the Shelf Registration Statement effective;
provided, however, that the provisions of Section 2.6 hereof shall survive
termination of this Agreement. It is understood and agreed that any
restrictive legends set forth on any Registrable Securities shall be
removed by delivery of substitute certificates without such legends and
such Registrable Securities shall no longer be subject to the terms of this
Agreement or upon the resale of such Registrable Securities in accordance
with the terms of this Agreement.

Contacts:

Investment Community
Marc R. Shiffman
Sunbeam Corporation
(561) 243-2142

Media
George Sard/Maureen Bailey
Sard Verbinnen & Co.
(212) 678-8080

SUNBEAM TO ISSUE 5-YEAR WARRANTS TO MACANDREWS
& FORBES TO SETTLE ITS CLAIMS RELATING TO COLEMAN
ACQUISITION AND TO SECURE CONTINUING SERVICES OF
SUNBEAM'S TOP OFFICERS

ARTICLE V
DELRAY BEACH, FL, AUGUST 12, 1998 -- Sunbeam Corporation (NYSE: SOC)
today announced it has entered into a settlement agreement with MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. The agreement releases Sunbeam from any claims
MacAndrews & Forbes may have against Sunbeam arising out of Sunbeam's
acquisition of MacAndrews & Forbes' interest in The Coleman Company, Inc.;
enables Sunbeam to retain the services of MacAndrews & Forbes executive
personnel who have been managing Sunbeam since mid-June 1998, including
Jerry W. Levin, the Company's Chief Executive Officer; and provides for
MacAndrews & Forbes to continue to give other management support to
Sunbeam.

OTHER
The following provisions shall also apply to this Amendment:
Section 5.1 Effectiveness of this Amendment. The provisions of
this Amendment shall be effective as of the date hereof.
Section 5.2 Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.
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MacAndrews & Forbes currently owns approximately 14 million Sunbeam
shares, or approximately 14% of Sunbeam's presently outstanding shares,
which it received in the Coleman transaction in March 1998 when Sunbeam was
trading at prices above $40 per share. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, MacAndrews & Forbes will receive from Sunbeam five-year warrants
to purchase an additional 23 million Sunbeam shares at an exercise price of
$7.00 per share and containing customary anti-dilution provisions.

Section 5.3 Governing Law. This Amendment shall be governed by
the laws of the State of New York, without regard to the principles of
conflicts of law thereof.
Section 5.4 No Waiver. The execution, delivery and performance
of this ~~endment shall not operate as a waiver of any condition, power,
remedy or right exercisable in accordance with the Registration Rights
Agreement, and shall not constitute a waiver of any provision of the
Registration Rights Agreement, except as expressly provided herein.

In connection with the agreement, Levin and certain other Sunbeam
executives are signing three-year employment agreements with Sunbeam. The
others include Paul Shapiro, Executive Vice President and Chief
Administrative Officer, and Bobby Jenkins, Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer.

Section 5.5 Descriptive Headings. The article and section
headings contained in this Amendment are solely for the purpose of
reference, are not part of the agreement of the parties and shall not in
any way affect the meaning or interpretation of this Amendment.

The settlement agreement with MacAndrews & Forbes, including the terms
of the warrants, was negotiated and approved on behalf of Sunbeam by a
Special Committee of four outside directors, none of whom has any
affiliation with MacAndrews & Forbes. The members of the Special Committee
are Howard Kristol (Chairman), Charles Elson, Peter Langerman, and Faith
Whittlesey. They were assisted by an independent financial advisor, The
Blackstone Group, and independent legal counsel, Weil, Gotshal & Manges.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hereby agree to be bound by
the terms and provisions of this Amendment as of the date first above
written.
SUNBEAM CORPORATION

The transaction normally would require shareholder approval under New
York Stock Exchange policy. However, the Audit Committee of Sunbeam's
Board of Directors determined that the delay that would be necessary to
secure shareholder approval prior to the issuance of the warrants would be
extensive, particularly in light of the ongoing investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Sunbeam's accounting practices and
policies and the Company's previously disclosed intention to restate its
historical financial statements; would inhibit Sunbeam's ability to reach a
settlement with MacAndrews & Forbes and to retain and hire senior
management essential to Sunbeam's business; and thus would seriously
jeopardize the financial viability of the Company. Accordingly, the Audit
Committee, pursuant to an exception provided in the NYSE shareholder
approval policy for such a situation, expressly approved the Company's

By:
Name:
Title:
COLEMAN (PARENT) HOLDINGS INC.
By:
Name:
Title:
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omission to seek the shareholder approval that would otherwise have been
required under that policy. The NYSE has accepted the Company's
application of the exception.
In reliance on the NYSE exception, Sunbeam is mailing to all
shareholders a letter notifying them of its intention to issue the warrants
without seeking their approval. Ten days after such letter is mailed, the
Company will consummate the transaction and issue the warrants.
"The Special Committee unanimously determined that this settlement
agreement is in the best interest of all Sunbeam shareholders," said Peter
Langerman, Chairman of Sunbeam. "It will immediately give Sunbeam a strong
senior management team that knows the business, will eliminate the risk of
protracted legal proceedings, as well as the costs, burdens and substantial
potential liability inherent in any such litigation, and will position
Sunbeam to move ahead."
"We are fully committed to helping Sunbeam succeed. Our interests are
aligned with all other Sunbeam shareholders because these warrants will
only have value if Sunbeam shares appreciate from current levels," said
Howard Gittis, Vice Chairman of HacAndrews , Forbes.
"I am very pleased that this complex issue has been satisfactorily
resolved and our senior management team can devote its full attention to
completing the new organization and revitalizing Sunbeam's business. We
will have more to announce shortly, concerning our new strategy,
organizational structure and senior management team," said Jerry W. Levin.
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Sunbeam Corporation is a leading consumer products company that
designs, manufactures and markets, nationally and internationally, a
diverse portfolio of consumer products under such world-class brands as
Sunbeamregistered trademark, Osterregistered trademark,
Grillmasterregistered trademark, Colemanregistered trademark, Hr .
Coffee registered trademark, First Alertregistered trademark,
Powermateregistered trademark, Health 0 meterregistered trademark,
Eastpakregistered trademark and Compingazregistered trademark.

EXHIBIT 99.3
SUNBEAM LETTERHEAD

August 12, 1998
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support to Sunbeam.
MacAndrews , Forbes currently owns approximately 14 million Sunbeam shares,
or approximately 14% of Sunbeam's presently outstanding shares, which it
received in the Coleman transaction in March 1998 when Sunbeam was trading
at prices above $40 per share. Pursuant to the settlement agreement,
MacAndrews , Forbes will receive from Sunbeam five-year warrants to
purchase an additional 23 million Sunbeam shares at an exercise price of
$7.00 per share and containing customary anti-dilution provisions.
In connection with the agreement, Jerry W. Levin and certain other Sunbeam
executives are signing three-year employment agreements with Sunbeam. The
others include Paul Shapiro, Executive Vice President and Chief
Administrative Officer, and Bobby Jenkins, Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer.
The transaction normally would require shareholder approval under New York
Stock Exchange policy. However, the Audit Committee of Sunbeam's Board of
Directors determined that the delay that would be necessary to secure
shareholder approval prior to the issuance of the warrants would be
extensive, particularly in light of the ongoing investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Sunbeam's accounting practices and
policies and the Company's previously disclosed intention to restate its
historical financial statements; would inhibit Sunbeam's ability to reach a
settlement with MacAndrews , Forbes and to retain and hire senior
management essential to Sunbeam's business; and thus would seriously
jeopardize the financial viability of the Company. Accordingly, the Audit
Committee, pursuant to an exception provided in the NYSE shareholder
approval policy for such a situation, expressly approved the Company's
omission to seek the shareholder approval that would otherwise have been
required under that policy. The NYSE has accepted the Company's
application of the exception.
In reliance on the NYSE exception, Sunbeam is mailing to all shareholders a
letter notifying them of its intention to issue the warrants without
seeking their approval. Ten days after such letter is mailed, the Company
will consummate the transaction and issue the warrants.
The settlement agreement with MacAndrews , Forbes, including the terms of
the warrants, was negotiated and approved on behalf of Sunbeam by a Special
Committee of four outside directors, none of whom has any affiliation with
MacAndrews 'Forbes. The Committee - Howard Kristol (Chairman), Charles
Elson, Faith Whittlesey and myself - was assisted by independent financial
advisors (The Blackstone Group) and legal counsel (Weil, Gotshal , Manges).
The Special Committee unanimously determined that this settlement agreement
is in the best interest of all Sunbeam shareholders. It will immediately
give Sunbeam a strong senior management team that knows the business,
eliminate the risk of protracted legal proceedings, as well as the costs,
burdens and substantial potential liability inherent in any such
litigation, and position Sunbeam to move ahead.

Dear Fellow Sunbeam Shareholder:
I am writing to let you know about an important development announced today
concerning Sunbeam.
I am pleased to report that Sunbeam has entered into a settlement agreement
with MacAndrews , Forbes Holdings, Inc. The agreement releases Sunbeam
from any claims HacAndrews , Forbes may have against Sunbeam arising out of
Sunbeam's acquisition of HacAndrews , Forbes' interest in The Coleman
Company, Inc: enables Sunbeam to retain the services of MacAndrews , Forbes
executive personnel who have been managing Sunbeam since mid-June 1998,
including Jerry W. Levin, the Company's Chief Executive Officer; and
provides for MacAndrews & Forbes to continue to give other management

As you know, the Sunbeam Board initially turned to MacAndrews , Forbes,
Jerry Levin and their team shortly after dismissing Albert Dunlap as Chief
Executive Officer and Russell Kersh as Chief Financial Officer in mid-June
1998. We felt it waS essential to act quickly to secure their services and
continued support as the Company seeks to resolve the serious problems it
currently faces and to eliminate any uncertainty that might result from the
continued pendency of claims by MacAndrews , Forbes arising out of the
Coleman acquisition. Therefore, the Special Committee concluded it was
advisable to settle and obtain a release of the MacAndrews , Forbes claims
and give them and their team a real incentive to work to turn around the

Company.
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8K The Coca-Cola Company Release date 1/26/00
- Announcing Earnings for Quarter
and Also t!tat Future Earnings will be Impacted
by Organizational Realignment -

We believe MacAndrews & Forbes is fully committed to helping Sunbeam
succeed. Their interests are aligned with all other Sunbeam shareholders
because these warrants will only have value if Sunbeam shares appreciate
from current levels. In addition. Sunbeam's new senior management team can
devote its full attention to completing the new organization and
revitalizing Sunbeam's business.
Sincerely,
Peter Langerman
Chairman of the Board

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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of Report (Date of earliest event reported):
January 26, 2000

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
(Exact name of Reg1strant as specified in its charter)

Delaware
(State or other
jurisdiction
of incorporation)

001-02217
(Commission
File Number)

One Coca-Cola Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia
(Address of principal executive offices)

58-0628465
(IRS Employer
Identification No.)

30313
(Zip Code)

Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (404)676-2121

L_

1_",""

L~ ..

L_

L ...

L".""

L>c,~Y

L".

L_

L-..

L;~. .

L;..~

L-,.,

L"",,*,

L-.

L-~

L"$'~

L_~c

l.~.~..

~

'-'

--, --,

,

......

",

'

--, --,

~-,

~'-'

-,

...., --,

-..,

'--'

-,

'.."

~,

'.

Exhibit Index
Item 5,

Other Events
On January 26, 2000, The Coca-Cola Company (the
'Company") issued a press release announcing its financial
results for the fourth quarter of 1999 and for the full
fiscal year 1999, The press release is filed as Exhibit
99.1 hereto and is incorporated herein by reference.
On January 26, 2000, the Company also issued a press
release announcing a major organizational realignment and
reduction in the Company's workforce. The press release is
filed as Exhibit 99.2 hereto and is incorporated herein by
reference.

Item 7.

99.1

Press release of The Coca-Cola Company issued
January 26, 2000: The Coca-Cola Company Announces
Fourth Quarter and Full Year Volume and Earnings
Per Share Results

99.2

Press release of The Coca-Cola Company issued
January 26, 2000: The Coca-Cola Company Announces
Major Organizational Realignment

Financial Statements and Exhibits
lc)

Exhibits:
99.1

to

Exhibit No.

99.2
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Press release of The Coca-Cola Company
issued January 26, 2000: The Coca-Cola
Company Announces Fourth Quarter and
Full Year Volume and Earnings Per Share
Results

EXHIBIT 99.1
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT:
Rob Baskin
(404) 676-2683

Press release of The Coca-Cola Company
issued January 26, 2000: The Coca-Cola
Company Announces Major Organizational
Realignment

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY ANNOUNCES
FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR
VOLUME AND EARNINGS PER SHARE RESULTS
Fourth-quarter worldwide unit case volume increased 6 percent.
Comparable unit case volume increased 4 percent and approximately 2
points of growth was attributable to brands acquired from Cadbury
Schweppes.

2

SIGNATURES
Fourth-quarter diluted earnings per share were SO.31, before
considering non-recurring items. Non-recurring items in the quarter
included certain asset write-downs, the continued impact of the
European product withdrawal, and one-time charges by certain equity
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on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized,

investees.
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Date:

January 26, 2000

The Company commented that its 2000 earnings will be impacted by an
organizational realignment and its plans to reduce concentrate
inventory levels at selected bottlers.

By:/s/ Gary P, Fayard
Gary P. Fayard
Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer

ATLANTA, January 26, 2000 -- The Coca-Cola Company reported another year
of record volume with annual worldwide unit case volume exceeding 16 billion
unit cases for the first time in the Company's history. This reflects the 45th
consecutive year that the Company has increased unit case volume,
- more -

3

Page 2

-,

focused on improving retail soft drink prices in order to increase the overall
returns for the entire value chain. As consumers are adjusting to these

"We are currently in a period of economic recovery in many parts of the
world," commented Douglas N. Daft, president and chief operating officer.

slightly higher price points, unit case volume demonstrated improving trends
in the second half of the year. In addition, non-carbonated beverages continued
to exhibit strong double-digit growth led by Dasani, Fruitopia, POWERaDE and
Nestea products.

"During this year of recovery, our business system will remain focused on
creating long-term value for our customers, our bottling partners, and

The Coca-Cola Company."
"Our management team is performing an on-going assessment of our
worldwide operations to ensure that our organization is appropriately
structured to capture the vast opportunities in front of us. By challenging
how we look at the business, we will be able to ensure we meet consumer and
customer needs at a local level and that we are best able to maximize value

Fourth-quarter unit case volume increased 3 percent in North America and
3 percent in the United States. North America gallon shipments of concentrates
and syrups grew 1 percent in 1999 and increased 5 percent in the fourth
quarter versus the prior year.

for our share owners and our partners within the Coca-Cola system."

- more -

Mr. Daft continued, "Throughout this Company's great history, our success
has been achieved through the magic of our great brands and through our
ability to bring refreshment and enjoyment to consumers allover the world.
Going forward, we plan to continue connecting with consumers and customers at
a local level to ensure we are engrained in the fabric of all communities."

Page
In the LATIN AMERICA GROUP, unit case volume increased 3 percent and
gallon shipments declined 1 percent for the year on a reported basis. On a
comparable basis. full year unit case volume increased 2 percent for the
Group, with growth of 6 percent in Mexico, 2 percent in Argentina. 4 percent
in the Central America and Caribbean division and 1 percent in Brazil. These
results reflect the difficult economic environments that the Company faced in
many parts of Latin America throughout the year. As the year progressed. the
Company continued to see increasing levels of economic stabilization in most
countries. while a few areas such as Venezuela and Colombia continue to be
extremely challenging. In markets not impacted by the economic challenges, the
Company continued to see solid growth.

EARNINGS RESULTS
For the fourth quarter, reported diluted loss per share was $0.02. This
amount includes $0.31 per share after tax related to asset write-downs in
certain countries, approximately $0.01 per share after tax related to the
impact of the European product withdrawal, and $0.01 per share after tax
associated with one-time charges by certain equity investees.
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For the full year, diluted earnings per share were $0.98. The full year
results include $0.31 per share after tax related to asset write-downs in
certain countries, approximately $0.06 per share after tax related to the
impact of the European product withdrawal, and $0.01 per share after tax
associated with one-time charges by certain equity investees. The overall
impact of the European product withdrawal reflects the loss of sales in
several key markets in Europe. the resulting impact on

Fourth-quarter unit case volume in the Latin America Group grew 8 percent
on a reported basis and 6 percent on a comparable basis. Reported gallon
shipments in the fourth quarter increased 8 percent.
In the MIDDLE AND FAR EAST GROUP, unit case volume increased 1 percent
and gallon shipments declined 1 percent in 1999 on a reported basis. For the
year, comparable unit case volume grew 1 percent for the Group. with gains of
6 percent in Japan. 2 percent in China, 9 percent in India and 4 percent in
the Middle East and North Africa division. Japan achieved its third straight
quarter of strong unit case growth and the overall business environment is
showing improving trends. While many Asian markets are improving economically.
the Company is continuing to see difficult conditions in markets such as the
Philippines. During the year, extensive flooding. negative American sentiment
and slightly slower economic trends hampered growth in China.

- more -

Page
equity income, and incremental marketing expenses associated with maintaining
brand strength in Europe. In 1998. diluted earnings per share were $1.42,
including net $0.02 per share driven primarily by bottling transactions.

In the fourth quarter in the Middle and Far East Group. unit case volume
increased 4 percent on a reported basis and 2 percent on a comparable basis.
Reported gallon shipments increased 6 percent in the fourth quarter. Beginning
in

VOLUME RESULTS
For the full year. reported worldwide unit case volume grew nearly 2
percent and comparable worldwide unit case volume increased 1 percent. In the
fourth quarter, reported worldwide unit case volume grew 6 percent. Of this
amount. comparable worldwide unit case volume increased 4 percent and
approximately 2 points of growth were attributable to brands acquired from
Cadbury Schweppes. Reported worldwide gallon shipments for the full year were
even with the prior year and increased 8 percent in the fourth quarter.
(References to "comparable" changes in unit case volume are computed based on
the exclusion of brands acquired from Cadbury Schweppes during the third
quarter of 1999.)

- more -
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2000, this Group will no longer include the Middle East and North Africa
Division and will be known as the Asia Pacific Group.
In the GREATER EUROPE GROUP, reported unit case volume was even with the
prior year and gallon shipments declined 1 percent in 1999. For the year,

In the NORTH AMERICA GROUP, full-year unit case volume advanced 1 percent
including growth of 1 percent in the United States. Throughout the year. unit
case growth in the industry was below historic growth levels as bottlers were
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comparable unit case volume declined 1 percent for the Group with increases of
9 percent in Spain, 4 percent in CCE Europe territories, 2 percent in Ger~3ny

and a decline of 16 percent in the Nordic and North Eurasia division. Full
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year results for the group were negatively impacted by difficult economic
conditions in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe, the European product
withdrawal, and events such as the earthquakes in Turkey and the war in
Kosovo. Countries such as Spain that were not impacted by these factors
delivered solid growth for the year.
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impairment of certain
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Fourth-quarter unit case volume in the Greater Europe Group grew 6 percent
on a reported basis and 3 percent on a comparable basis. Reported gallon
shipments in the fourth quarter increased 11 percent.
In the AFRICA GROUP, full-year unit case volume increased 5 percent and
gallon shipments increased 2 percent on a reported basis. Comparable full-year
unit case volume increased by 1 percent for the Group with a 2 percent
increase in the Northern Africa Division and flat volume in the Southern
Africa Division. Growth continued to be hampered throughout the year by
difficult economic conditions in Southern Africa and political instability in
Northern Africa.
Unit case volume in the Africa Group increased 15 percent in the fourth
quarter on a reported basis and 5 percent on a comparable basis. Reported
gallon shipments increased 25 percent in the fourth quarter. Beginning in
2000, this Group will include the Middle East and North Africa Division and
will be known as the Africa and Middle East Group.
At THE MINUTE MAID COMPANY, full-year volume increased 4 percent as a
result of continued strong growth by Minute Maid Premium ready-to-drink orange

- more Page 6
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juice, especially calcium-fortified varieties. Minute Maid Premium was the
fastest-growing national brand of ready-to-drink orange juice in U.S.
supermarkets during 1999, with sales up nearly 22 percent. During the quarter,
an alliance with J&J Snack Foods Corp. was announced to increase U.S.
distribution of Minute Maid and Hi-C brand frozen snacks. Total fourth-quarter
volume increased 2 percent for The Minute Maid Company.
GLOBAL MARKETING ACTIONS
The Company continues to focus on increasing the value of its brands to
customers and consumers around the world to ensure long-term brand relevance
and to maximize profitable growth opportunities. The Company recently unveiled
a new marketing campaign for Coca-Cola designed to reconnect every day with
people around the world. Over the next year, many new marketing initiatives
will be introduced throughout the world to take full advantage of the magical
qualities of Coca-Cola and connecting those to the values that people care
most deeply about in their everyday lives.
Mr. Daft commented, "Our strategy is designed to renew the passion for
the world's greatest brand. We sell one drink at a time, to one person at a
time, more than a billion times a day. Our continued success will be based on
our ability to connect our brands in relevant ways to every local community.
Throughout the year, we will remind consumers how Coca-Cola adds a little
magic to the real moments in people's everyday lives."
ASSET WRITE-DOWNS
During the quarter, the Company recorded a charge of S813 million in
selling, administrative and general expenses to primarily reflect the

bottling assets and the streamlining of manufacturing facilities in Russia,
the Baltics, Japan and various other countries around the world.
Mr. Daft commented, "Despite these accounting write-downs, we remain

fully committed to growing our business in these countries and believe the
regions offer tremendous opportunity for per capita growth."
The fourth quarter charge associated with the impairment of the Company's
Russian and Baltic bottling operations resulted from the extremely challenging
economic environments the Company has faced in these countries over the last
year and a half. The impairment of certain assets in the Japanese vending
business resulted from a comprehensive review and the strong steps taken by the
Company to streamline these operations to position them for the future.
Nearly all of the asset write-downs recorded in the fourth quarter do not
generate a tax benefit for financial reporting purposes in 1999. As a result,
the Company's effective tax rate increased to 36% for the full year. Looking
forward, the Company expects its effective tax rate on operations to remain
31%.

Over the past several years, the Company acquired numerous local bottling
franchises in India for the purposes of establishing the appropriate
infrastructure for sustainable long-term growth. The Company expects to
complete a comprehensive review of these operations during the first quarter
of this year with the intent of streamlining the business. Based on this
review, as well as the current excise tax levels in India, the Company will be
evaluating the carrying value of these assets.
INCOME STATEMENT REVIEW
Revenues increased 5 percent in 1999 reflecting structural change in the
bottling system and selective price increases, partially offset by the
negative impact of a stronger U.S. dollar. Full year gross margins declined
slightly from the prior
- more -

Page
year as the Company began consolidating bottling operations in India and
Company-owned vending operations in Japan.
On a reported basis, operating income declined 20 percent for the year.
This amount includes the previously disclosed fourth-quarter charges
associated with certain asset write-downs and the estimated impact of the
European product withdrawal. Operating income, excluding unusual items (asset
write-downs and the impact of the European product withdrawal), declined 1
percent for the year reflecting the challenging economic conditions in many
markets throughout the world, structural changes, the negative impact of
foreign currencies, and the continued investment in long-term brand building
activities. The impact of currencies on operating income for the year was an

approximate negative 4 percent.

--,

Equity income for the year was also negatively impacted by global economic
conditions, as well as continued structural change and non-recurring charges
within the global Coca-Cola bottling system. During the fourth quarter, equity
income was impacted by $0.01 per share after tax associated with one-time
charges by our equity investees in countries such as Venezuela and the
Philippines.

- more -
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This news release contains forward-looking statements concerning long-term
volume and EPS objectives and should be read in conjunction with cautionary
statements contained in Exhibit 99.1 in the Company's most recent Form 10-K.

As disclosed during the year, other income includes a foreign currency
gain to reflect the economic benefit received by hedging the Company's
resources in Brazil. As the Brazilian Real depreciated during the year, the
Company entered into financial instruments to protect its resources. From an
economic standpoint, the amount offsets the impact of converting local
Brazilian operating results into U.S. dollars at lower rates.

I I I

During 1998, the Company's results included net $0.02 per share of
after-tax gains resulting primarily from bottling transactions in Italy and
Germany.

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES
(In Millions, except per share data)

Over the past year, the Company did not repurchase any of its shares due
to pending brand acquisitions. However, the Company remains committed to its
consistent long-term program of using excess cash to repurchase its shares.
Since

Fourth Quarter
1999
NET OPERATING REVENUES

- more -

$

Cost of Goods Sold

4,931
1,464

-

% Change
-----

11

1,299

13

--------

Page 9

t::t:1

1998

4,458

-------$

the initiation of its first share repurchase program in 1984, the Company has
repurchased 32 percent of its common shares then outstanding, or a cumulative
total of over 1 billion shares, at an average cost of approximately $12.46 per
share.

GROSS PROFIT

3,467

3,159

Selling, Administrative and General Expenses

2,305

2,222

10

Other Operating Charges Primarily Asset Write-downs

813

OPERATING INCOME

349

Interest Income

70

48

46

Interest Expense

93

68

37

(112 )

(71)

~

00

OUTLOOK FOR THE YEAR 2000
The Company commented that year 2000 reported results will be impacted by
the financial effect of the separately announced organizational realignment
and an intent to reduce concentrate inventory levels at selected bottlers.
Throughout the past several months, The Coca-Cola Company has worked with
bottlers around the world to determine the optimum level of bottler inventory
levels. Based on this review, management of the Coca-Cola system determined
that opportunities exist to reduce the level of concentrate inventory carried
by bottlers in selected regions of the world, such as Eastern Europe, Japan,
and Germany. As such, bottlers in these regions have indicated that they
intend to reduce their inventory levels during the first half of the year
2000. This reduction in bottler inventory levels will result in the Company
shipping less concentrate and is therefore expected to reduce the Company's
diluted earnings per share by approximately $0.11 - $0.13 after tax during the
first half of the year 2000.

Equity Income (Loss)
Other Income - Net

Mr. Daft commented, "These steps are designed to ensure we have the
strongest and most efficient bottling system in the world. With an even
tighter management of inventory levels, our bottlers will free up additional
working capital as they continue to take steps to increase their returns on
invested capital."
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INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES

230

865

Income Taxes

275

268
597

NET INCOME (LOSS)

$

(45 )

DILUTED NET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE"

$

(0.02)

Average Shares Outstanding - Diluted"

The Coca-Cola system first proactively reduced the worldwide bottler
inventory levels in the third quarter of 1996. At that time, average days of
inventory in the worldwide bottling system exceeded 45 days. This move is
intended to take the average bottler inventories to the optimal worldwide
level of 34 days.

937

2,487

$

(63)

(73)

0.24
2,489

" For the fourth quarter, "Basic Net Income (Loss) Per Share" was 150.02) for
1999 and $0.24 for 1998 based on "Average Shares Outstanding - Basic" of 2,471
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CONTACT:
Rob Baskin
(404) 676-2683

and 2.465 for 1999 and 1998, respectively.

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY ANNOUNCES
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES
(In Millions, except per share data)
Twelve Months Ended December 31
1998

1999

----------------$ 18,813
$ 19,805

NET OPERATING REVENUES

6,009

Cost of Goods Sold

---------

13,796

13,251

9,001

8,211

813

73

Selling, Administrative and
General Expenses
Other Operating Charges Primarily Asset Write-downs

----------------4,967
3,982

OPERATING INCOME
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Focus on Localization Puts More Responsibility, Accountability and
Resources in Hands of Local Business Units

10

(20)

Interest Income

260

219

19

Interest Expense

337

277

22

Equity Income (Loss)
Other Income - Net
INCOME BE,ORE INCOME TAXES

(184 )

32

98

257

----------------5,198
3,819

(27)

1,665

(17)

1,388

Income Taxes

---------

----_..--

$

NET INCOME

$

DILUTED NET INCOME PER SHARE'
Average Shares Outstanding Diluted'

2,431

0.98
2,487

$

--------3,533
--_....--

(31)

$

1. 42

(31)

Specifically, this realignment will reduce the Company's workforce
around the world while transferring responsibilities from corporate to
revenue-generating operating units, fueling further investment in profitdriving activities by reducing costs, and enhancing effectiveness by
establishing greater role clarity and accountability between corporate and
field offices.
Said Doug Daft, president and chief operating officer and chairman-elect.
The Coca-Cola Company: "Today's announcement is the culmination of a careful
review during the past six months of each of our business functions. The world
in which we

Page 2

2,496
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ATLANTA, January 26, 2000 -- The Coca-Cola Company today announced a
major organizational realignment that will put more responsibility.
accountability and resources in the hands of the local business units in the
more than 200 countries where the Company does business.

- more -

• ,or the full year, "Basic Net Income Per Share" was $0.98 for 1999 and $1.43
for 1998 based on "Average Shares Outstanding - Basic" of 2,469 and 2,467 for
1999 and 1998, respectively.

operate has changed dramatically, and we must change to succeed. This
realignment will better enable the Company to serve the changing needs of
its customers and consumers at the local level and ensure that Coca-Cola
complements the local culture in every community where it is sold.
"Together with our bottling partners. we've spent years building the
brands, infrastructure and technology needed to be successful at the local
level," said Daft. "The actions we announced today will effectively align our
corporate resources, support systems and business culture to fully leverage
the local capabilities of our system.
"As we enter the 21st century, we need to build on the greatness and
historic strengths of the company and be sure it is optimally positioned for
the changing world. We must also take our business to where our business is.
Now is the time for us to take those steps."

EXHIBIT 99.2
,OR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Will Result in Annual Expense Reductions of $300 Million; Net Job
Reductions-Voluntary and Involuntary-of approximately 6,000,
Pre-Tax Charge to Earnings of approximately $800 Million During the
Year 2000

5,562

---------

GROSS PROFIT

% Change
--------

Under the realignment, approximately 6,000 positions will be reduced
during the current year through early retirement, outsourcing or job
eliminations. Of these, approximately 2,500 are located in Atlanta. 800 are
located in U.S. cities outside of Atlanta, and another 2,700 are based
outside the U.S.

"As necessary as this realignment is, it carries with it the most
difficult decision a management team can make: job reductions," Mr. Daft
said. "This is painful both for those within the Company who will be
directly affected and for those responsible for making this decision. But
this management team is committed to doing what is necessary to ensure a
strong future for The Coca-Cola Company.

8K The Coca-Cola Company Release date 12/21/99
- Announcing tllat S&P Lowerel/ Its Debt Ratings.for tile Company -

- more -

Page 3
"We are equally committed to proceeding with care and sensitivity,"
Mr. Daft continued. "Ensuring that all associates are treated fairly and
with dignity and respect is a top priority for me, personally, and the
Company, and we've put processes in place to ensure that happens."

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

Employees separating from the Company as a result of the realignment
will be offered severance packages, outplacement and counseling services,
and other assistance to help with the transition.

FORM 8-K
<;URRENT REPORT

The Company estimates this initiative will yield annual expense
reductions of $300 million following full implementation of the new
organizational structure. As a result of the realignment, the Company will
take a pre-tax charge of approximately $800 million during the year 2000.
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Pursuant to Section 13 or l5(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported
December 21, 1999

Following the structural changes, roles and responsibilities within
the Company will be redefined. The Company's corporate headquarters will
retain responsibility for setting policy and strategy for the Company as a
whole; the Company's revenue-generating units will assume all other
responsibilities.

THE COCA-COLA COMfANX
(Exact name of Reg,strant as specified in its charter)

Said Mr. Daft: "No matter where we operate around the world, we're a
local business. Our success depends on our ability to make billions of
individual connections each day in every community around the world. With
the pace of change in global markets increasing every day, we have to
redouble our efforts to remain close to the customers and consumers we serve.

Delaware
(State or other
jurisdiction
of incorporation)

"One thing that won't change is the significant opportunity before us,"
added Mr. Daft. "And we view the future's tremendous growth opportunities
with great

001-02217
(Commission
File Number)

One Coca-Cola Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia
(Address of principal executive offices)

- more -

58-0628465
(IRS Employer
Identification No.)

30313
(Zip Code)

Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (404)676-2121
Page 4

c

anticipation and excitement. With our strong new marketing platform for
Coca-Cola, the right people in the right places around the world, and our
intensified focus behind serving customers and consumers at the local level,
we have in place the necessary elements to more fully realize the promise of
this great Company today and for years to come."

Item 5.

Other Events

On December 21, 1999, Standard & Poor's lowered its ratings for The
Coca-Cola Company, among other entities, as described in a press
• I I
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release of Standard & Poor's attached as Exhibit 99.

Item 7.

Financial Statements and Exhibits
(c) Exhibits:

99

Press release of Standard & Poor's issued
December 21, 1999
- 2 -

SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed
on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY

Date:

By:/s/ Gary P. Fayard

December 21, 1999

Gary P. Fayard
Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
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Ltd., and Coca-Cola Amatil (Australia) Pty Ltd. (see list).
These ratings are removed from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with negative implications Sept. 9, 1999, following Coke's
announcement that its third-quarter earnings were expected to
fall below earlier expectations. In its Sept. 9 press release,
Standard & Poor's indicated its expectation that recovery of
already weakened credit measures for the Coke system would be
slower than anticipated.
The short-term ratings for CCE, CCA, and related entities
were affirmed, as listed below. These ratings were not
previously on CreditWatch.
About S6.3 billion of total debt was outstanding at Coke and
about Sll.2 billion at CCE as of Sept. 30, 1999, and about
Australian dollar (AS) 2.9 billion of total debt was outstanding
at CCA as of July 2, 1999.
Standard & Poor's views Coke and its bottlers as a system
and analytically reconsolidates key bottlers, including CCE and
CCA, as well as Coca-Cola Beverages pIc (the former European
bottling system of CCA). The Coke bottling system has been
active in pursuing acquisitions in recent periods, which has
raised consolidated debt levels. In particular, Coke's debtfinanced acquisition of the Cadbury Schweppes brands in 155
countries outside of the U.S. raised system net debt levels by
close to Sl billion, and additional Cadbury acquisitions are
still pending in several countries. Increased debt levels, along
with weaker-than-expected operating performance at Coke and its
key bottlers in 1999 due to weak global economies and European
product recalls, have weakened creditor protection measures for
the system below ranges considered appropriate for the former
ratings (these measures included pretax interest coverage in the
6.5 times (x) - 7.5x range).
Global operating performance began to show signs of
improvement in the third quarter of 1999, and the European
product recall problems appear to be largely behind Coke and its
bottlers. However, Standard & Poor's does not believe credit
measures are likely to improve to levels consistent with the
previous double-'A'-minus rating for Coke or the previous single'A' -plus rating for CCE and CCA over the next two years, while

Exhibit Index

Exhibit No.
99

Press release of Standard & Poor's issued
December 21, 1999

EXHIBIT 99
S&P: Coke Rtgs, CCE , CCA Long-Term Rtgs Lwrd; Off Watch
NEW YORK (Standard' Poor's CreditWire) Dec. 21, 1999 -Standard' Poor's today lowered its ratings for The Coca-Cola Co.
(Coke), as indicated in the table below. In addition, Standard
Poor's lowered its long-term ratings for Coca-Cola Enterprises
Inc. (CCE), Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd. (CCA), Coca-Cola Amatil N.Z.

leaving enough financial flexibility for further system
acquisitions, investments, and/or share repurchases.
The ratings reflect Coke's position as the world's largest
manufacturer of soft-drink concentrates and syrups, as well as
its geographic diversification, which translates into strong
profitability and cash flow. Strong brand awareness has
contributed to Coke's leading 45% share in the more mature U.S.
market, and growth to a 51% worldwide market share. While Coke
has no legal obligation for the debt of CCE, CCA, or Coca-Cola
Beverages, Standard & Poor's ratings for CCE and CCA are based on
Coke's significant incentive to keep these bottlers viable
because of their strategic importance, Coke's ownership
positions, the size of its investmen~s, and its unique
customer/supplier relationship.
OUTLOOK: STABLE
Standard' Poor's expects the Coke system to maintain credit
measures appropriate for the revised rating categories, despite
anticipated continued bottler consolidation, investment, and
share repurchases, -- CreditWire

.~-,

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH
Coca-Cola Co.
Corporate credit rating
Senior unsecured debt
Shelf registration (preliminary)
Commercial paper
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. (CCE)
Long-term corporate credit rating
Senior unsecured debt
Shelf registration (preliminary)
Coca-Cola Enterprises (Canada) Bottling
Finance Ltd.
Medium-term note program (Gtd: CCE)
Coca-Cola Arnatil Ltd. (CCA)
Long-term corporate credit rating
Senior unsecured debt
Subordinated debt
Bank loan rating
Coca-Cola Arnatil (Australia) Pty Ltd.
Bank loan rating (Gtd: CCAI
Coca-Cola Arnatil N.Z. Ltd.
Senior unsecured debt

To

From

A+/A-l
A+
A+
A-I

AA-/A-l+
AAAAA-l+

A
A
A

A+
A+
A+

A

A+

A
A
AA

A+
A+
A
A+

A

A+

A

A+

8K The Coca-Cola Company Release date 1216/99
- Announcing Board's Acceptance ofResignation ofCEO -

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

RATINGS AFFIRMED
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Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc.
Short-term corporate credit rating
Commercial paper
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THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
(Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter)

Coca-Cola Arnatil Ltd.
Short-term corporate credit rating
Commercial paper
Coca-Cola Arnatil (Australia) Pty Ltd.
Commercial paper (Gtd: Coca-Cola Arnatil Ltd.)
Coca-Cola Arnatil N.Z. Ltd.
Commercial paper (Gtd: Coca-Cola Arnatil Ltd.)
Contact:
CUSIP:
191210

Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):
December 5, 1999

A-I
A-I

A-I
A-I
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
M. DOUGLAS IVESTER ANNOUNCES PLAN TO RETIRE
FROM THE COCA-COLA COMPANY IN APRIL 2000;
BOARD ELECTS DOUGLAS N. DAFT PRESIDENT, COO
AND ANNOUNCES INTENTION TO ELECT DAFT CHAIRMAN, CEO IN APRIL

SIGNATURES

Atlanta, December 6, 1999 - M. Douglas Ivester, chairman of
the Board and chief executive officer of The Coca-Cola Company,
has informed the Company's Board of Directors of his intention to
retire in April 2000, following the Company's annual meeting of
share owners.
Yesterday, at a special meeting, the Board elected Douglas
N. Daft president and chief operating officer, effective
immediately. The Board also indicated that it intends to elect
Mr. Daft chairman of the Board and chief executive officer
following Mr. Ivester's retirement in April.
"Doug has informed the Board of his desire to retire as
chairman and chief executive officer in April, a decision the
Board has reluctantly accepted," said James B. Williams, a member
of the Board. "Over the last 20 years, The
Coca-Cola Company has been fortunate to have someone of Doug's
wisdom and dedication in its leadership ranks. We are pleased

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed
on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
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Item 7.

Financial Statements and Exhibits
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Exhibits:
99

Press release of The Coca-Cola Company issued
December 6, 1999
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Other Events

As disclosed in the press release attached as Exhibit 99.1,
at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of
The Coca-Cola Company held December 5, 1999, the Board
accepted the decision of M. Douglas Ivester, the Company's
chairman of the board and chief executive officer, to retire
in April 2000; elected Douglas N. Daft president and chief
operating officer, effective immediately; and indicated that
it intends to elect Mr. Daft chairman of the board and chief
executive officer upon Mr. Ivester's retirement in April.

tX1

',...,

I

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
(REGISTRANT)
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Date:

December 6, 1999

By: Is/ JOSEPH R. GLADDEN, JR.
Joseph R. Gladden, Jr.
Senior Vice President and
General Counsel
Page 3 of 7
Exhibit Index

Exhibit No.
99

Press release issued December 6, 1999
Page 4 of 7

EXHIBIT 99

that he has agreed to stay on until April to assist the Company
in this change."
"After extensive reflection and thought, I have concluded
that it is time for me to move on to the next stage of my life
and, therefore, to put into place an orderly transition for this
great Company," said Mr. Ivester.
"During the past two years, against the backdrop of an
unprecedented downturn in the global economy, we have put into
place systems necessary to redesign the organization going
forward. The Company has weathered the economic storm extremely
well and I believe the customers and share owners of Coca-Cola
have been well served," Mr. Ivester said.
"One of the great strengths of The Coca-Cola Company is the
depth of its management team," he added. "Doug Daft brings 30
years of experience in the Company's global business to the role
of chief operating officer. He is perfectly suited to lead this
Company in its continuing efforts to build value for all its
share owners."
Mr. Daft, 56, began his career with the Company in 1969 in
his native Australia. For much of his career, he served in
planning, marketing and operations positions in Asia. In 1984,
he was named president of the Central Pacific Division, which
included responsibility for China, Indonesia, and Thailand.
In 1988, he was named president of the North Pacific
Division and president of Coca-Cola (Japan) Company. In 1991, he
moved to the Company's Atlanta headquarters to assume the
responsibility of president of the Pacific Group. He was named

-,
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Press Release Dell Computer Corporation Release date 1/26/00

to his previous position as head of the Middle and Far East and
Africa Groups, as well as the Schweppes Beverages Division, in
October of this year.

DELL
Contact:

Randy Donaldson
(404) 676-3853

38 1/4 • - 17/32

News

Dell Fourth-Quarter Revenue, Earnings Will Be Lower Than Expected;
Supply Constraints, Y2K Held Back Growth

Page 7 of 7

Wednesday, January 28, 2000 04:25 PM

ROUND ROCK, Texas-(BUSINESS WIRE)-Jan. 26, 200o-Desp~e revenue that is again
expected to rise two to three limes faster than the rate of the worldwide computer systems market,
Dell Computer Corporation (Nasdaq:DEll, news, msgs) announced today that it will report lowerthan-anticipated revenue and earnings for the fourth fiscal quarter ending Jan. 28.
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The company said an inconsistent flow of key semiconductor components and a slower-thanexpected rebound in sales to corporate and insmutional customers related to the Y2K rollover
were primary reasons for the shortfall.

Vl

~

The company announces its full financial results on Feb. 10.
Dell said it expects to report revenue of about $6.7 billion for the fourth quarter, which would be up
30 percent from the prior-year period. Un~ volumes are expected to increase more than 30
percent on a fiscal-quarter basis, and 50 percent on a calendar-quarter basis, which is the way
industry analysts report rankings.
Earnings are expected to be about 5430 million, or 16 cents per share, including a per-share gain
of about1-cent from the sale of investments. The consensus of analysts' earnings estimates for
the quarter was 21 cents per share.
For the full year, Dell expects to report revenue of more than $25 billion, which would be an
increase of 38 percent over the prior year. Annual earnings are expected to be about $1.8 billion,
or 68 cents per share. up 28 percent over prior-year earnings of 53 cents per share.
Current-year per-share earnings exclude a previously announced 7-cent charge associated with
the third-quarter acquis~ion of ConvergeNet Technologies Inc.
Dell said that a significant factor behind the revised outlook was an uneven and constrained supply
of semiconductor components during the quarter. This caused $300 million in lost sales, primarily
of newly introduced consumer products. Revenue from the worldwide consumer and smallbusiness segment is still expected to be more than 50 percent higher than the prior-year quarter, a
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growth rate of better than three times the level of Dell's nearest direct competitor.
Additionally, corporate demand following the Y2K rollover was lower than anticipated, reducing
expected revenue by about $500 million. The company nonetheless expects its global fourthquarter sales to corporate and institutional accounts to increase more than 20 percent from the
year-ago period, which the company believes is a multiple of the Industry rate.
Healthy Environment and Outlook Going Forward
"While we're clearly disappointed with our operating results, our overall business is healthy and we
believe Dell will continue to significantly outpace the revenue and profrt growth of our major
competitors and of the indUStry at large," said Tom Meredith, Delrs chief financial offICer.
"Our consumer and small-business unit now has significantly improved component supplies and
shorter lead-limes, and is achieving record days In orders and shipments. Excellent growth and
profitability in sales to small businesses are helping to fuel that rise. And our enterprise business
continues to be strong, with sales of network servers, storage products and workstations expected
to rise more than 50 percent in the fourth quarter from the previous year."
Meredith said that server sales benefited from an upsurge in demand from "dot com" companies
and Intemet service providers, and added that Dell is well positioned to capture a signifteant share
of the estimated $180 billion that companies are expected to spend for server and storage
hardware over the next six years as they build their Internet infrastructures.
According to Meredith, revenue from notebook computers and sales of all types of products via
www.dell.comcontinuetogrowrobustly.So. too, does the level of profits from "beyond-the-box"
revenue such as from Irrtemet access, financing and warranty services.
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Appropriate financial goals for Dell In the new fiscal year would be annual revenue growth in the
low 3D-percent range, with net margins in the low to mid 7-percent range, Meredith said.
Ranked No. 78 among the Fortune 500 companies and No. 210 in the Fortune Global 500, Dell
Computer Corporation is the world's leading direct computer systems company, based on
revenues of $23.6 billion for the past four quarters. Dell designs, manufactures and customIZes
products and services to customer reqUirements and offers an extensive selection of software and
peripherals. Information on Dell and its products can be obtained through its toll-free number
8001388·8542 or by accessing the Dell World Wide Web site at www.dell.com.
Dellis a registered trademark of Dell Computer Corporation.
Fortune and Fortune 500 are registered trademarks and Fortune Global 500 is a trademark of
Time Inc.
Dell disclaims any proprietary interest in the marks and names of others.
SPECIAL NOTE: This press release contains forward-looking statements, Including statements
concerning the company's expected financial results for its fourth fiscal quarter, statements
conceming the outlook and prospects for the company and the industry and statements
concerning the company's financial goals for the upcoming fiscal year. These and other
statements that relate to future results and events are based on the company's current
expectations. Actual results in future periods may differ materially from those currently expected or
desired because of a number of risks and uncertainties, including the level of demand for the
company's products; the intensity of competition; currency fluctuations; the cost and availability of
key components; and the company's ability to effectively manage product transitions, to minimize
excess and obsolete inventory and to continue to expand and improve its infrastructure (including
personnel and systems) to meet the demands of its growth. These and other factors affecting the
company's business and prospects are discussed in the company's periodic filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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CONTACT: Dell Computer Corporation, Round Rock
Media Contacts:
T.R. Reid, 512/728-7977
tr_reid@de11.com
or
Elizabeth Allen, 512/728-7188
elizabeth_allen@dell.com
or
Investor Contacts:
Don Collis, 512/728-8671
don_collis@dell.com
or
Robert Williams, 512/728-7570
robert_wi11iams@de11.com
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8K Tyco International Limited Release date til 7/00
- Re: Business Development -

fOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT:
J. Brad McGee
Senior Vice President
Tyco International (US) Inc.
(603) 778-9700

Press Release Dell Computer Corporation
- Conference Call Advisory, January 26, 2000-

TYCO INTERNATIONAL TO BUILD LARGEST, MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY
ADVANCED GLOBAL UNDERSEA FIBER OPTIC NETWORK
Hamilton, Bermuda, January 17, 2000 -- Tyco International Ltd.
(NYSE-TYC, LSE-TYI, BSX-TYC), a diversified manufacturing and service company,
announced today that its undersea fiber optics business will design, build,
operate and maintain its own global undersea fiber optic communications
network. Upon its completion, the system, to be known as the TyCom Global
NetworkTM (TGN). will be the largest and most advanced global undersea
telecommunications fiber optic network.

383116. -19132

DELL
News

ADVISORY/Dell Computer Corporation Announces Analyst Conference Call

Phase 1 of TGN will offer a minimum capacity of 2.56 terabits over a
fully integrated system that will span more than 85,000 undersea kilometers
and connect 25 major telecommunications cities around the globe, including:
New York, London, Tel Aviv, St. Petersburg, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Guam, Hawaii,
Seattle, Los Angeles and 15 other major European cities. Tyco will utilize its
own state-of-the-art technology to design and manufacture all the cable,
optical amplifiers and terminal equipment needed for Phase 1. Tyco will also
design, build and equip the requisite network operating centers, telehouses
and cable stations which route the bandwidth traffic flowing over TGN.
Finally, Tyco's own fleet of 13 ships will install and maintain TGN. Tyco
Submarine Systems Ltd. (TSSL), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tyco, has begun
the implementation of the first phase of TGN construction.

Wednesday. January 26. 2000 04:32 PM

ADVISORY...for Wednesday (Jan. 26)
-(BUSINESS WIRE)-

WHAT:

Dell Computer Corporation analyst conference call to
discuss the current outlook for the company's fiscal
fourth quarter

WHO:

Hosted by Tom Meredith, Dell's chief financial officer, and
Michael Dell, chairman and chief executive officer

WHEN:

TODAY, Wednesday, Jan. 26, at 4:30 P.M. (Central Daylight
Time)

WHERE:

Webcast "live" via the Internet, at www.dell.com. Analysts
and reporters may also access the call by dialing
913/981-4900. For telephone access, we recommend connecting
15 minutes prior to the scheduled start time.
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The Transatlantic portion of the first phase will be completed and
operational by the end of 2001. The remainder of the first phase, consisting
of the Transpacific and European systems, will be completed and operational by
the end of 2002. The timing and sequence of implementing additional phases of
the network will be based on future requirements of global and regional
demand.

0'1

"Undersea cable has been a contributor of strong earnings and cash
flow to Tyco for nearly 30 years," said L. Dennis Kozlowski, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of Tyco. "In recent years, due to both growing demand
and Tyco's market leadership, the undersea fiber optics business has
significantly increased its backlog of undersea contracts; developed and
implemented several breakthrough technologies in undersea telecommunications,
primarily related to increasing undersea cable capacity; partnered with key
customers through equity participations; and created innovative long-term
maintenance contracts such as the previously announced SEAHORSE (TM) global
operation and maintenance program. The TyCom Global Network will enable Tyco
to realize additional value for our shareholders by putting our expertise to
work not just as a designer, builder and maintainer of systems, but also as an
owner and seller of undersea cable bandwidth to the telecommunications
carriers of the world."

CONTACT: Dell Computer Corp.

"The concept of building our own global network has intrigued us
since the creation of Tyco Submarine Systems two years ago. Our undersea fiber
optics business is ideally positioned for this undertaking based on its
knowledge of the market, expertise in designing, building, installing and
maintaining successively advanced undersea fiber optic networks, and its
relationships with the world's telecommunications carriers. Recent and planned
capacity additions now enable us to devote resources to the construction of
TGN, as well as to continue serving our customers' current and projected
needs," he continued.
The decision to commit Tyeo's undersea fiber optics business to
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implement TGN was based on the demand for undersea fiber optic networks to
serve the growing worldwide communication needs. The integration of the
Internet into the daily lives of the world's population, combined with the
burgeoning needs

of global commerce and industry for data and other broadband applications,
continue to drive growth and demand. As broadband terrestrial fiber optic
networks are completed, they require the availability of undersea systems to
connect with the rest of the world. Tyco's current position as the premier
independent, fully integrated supplier and maintainer of the newest
technologies for undersea fiber optic networks provides it with a unique set
of abilities to meet the current and ongoing needs of a true global
telecommunications network.
TGN will be constructed in a number of phases. Construction
scheduling has been designed to offer global telecommunication connectivity to
those hubs around the world where voice, data and Internet demand for
bandwidth are growing the fastest. The TSSL Labs in Eatontown, New Jersey will
direct the deployment of emerging fiber optic technology on TGN. Installation,
operation and maintenance of TGN will be provided within the expanded SEAHORSE
global operation and maintenance programs developed and offered by TSSL. When
complete, TGN will be the largest independent, open-access undersea fiber
optic network, linking more than 90' of the world's population.

IJ:l
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In addition to TGN, Tyco will continue to provide its technology and
services for the design, development, construction and maintenance of
telecommunication systems for customers around the world.
Tyco intends to offer up to 20' percent of its undersea fiber optic
cable business for sale in an initial public offering. Tyco expects that a
registration statement will be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the first calendar quarter of 2000 and to complete the offering
by mid-year, SUbject to market conditions. The new company will continue to be
managed by the Tyco and TSSL management team that has been responsible for the
market achievements of its undersea fiber optics business, including Mr.
Kozlowski, who will serve as Executive Chairman.
Tyco acquired Simplex in 1974 and combined it with the Submarine
Systems division of AT&T in 1997 to create TSSL, the premier fully integrated
supplier of undersea fiber optic telecommunications and services. TSSL
manufactures cable, repeater and transmission equipment at facilities located
in New Hampshire, New Jersey and Virginia. Its internationally distinguished
TSSL Labs, located in Eatontown, New Jersey, provide leading edge fiber optic
technology. Additionally, TSSL owns and operates 13 world class cable ships
for the installation and maintenance of undersea communication network
systems. TSSL has successfully completed 85 undersea fiber optic networks,
consisting of more than 350,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable and connecting
over 100 countries.
Tyco International Ltd., a diversified manufacturing and service
company, is the world's largest manufacturer and servicer of electrical and
electronic components and undersea telecommunications systems, the world's
largest manufacturer, installer, and provider of fire protection systems and
electronic security services, has strong leadership positions in disposable
medical products, plastics, and adhesives, and is the largest manufacturer of
flow control valves. The Company operates in more than 80 countries around the
world and has expected fiscal 2000 revenues in excess of 526 billion.
This release is not an offering of securities, which will be made
only by a prospectus.
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FORWARD LOOKING INFORMATION
Certain comments in this release including, but not limited to, the
growth in worldwide demand for undersea teleco~~unications bandwidth; the
timing, size, and capacity of Phase 1; the timing and potential for additional
phases; the ability to secure funding for Phase 1 and any additional phases;
the timing, size and implementation of an initial public offering; and
expected fiscal 2000 revenue are forward-looking statements within the meaning
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which are based on
management's good faith expectations and belief concerning future
developments. Actual results may materially differ from these expectations as
a result of many factors, relevant examples of which are set forth in the
*Management Discussion and Analysis* section of the Company's 1999 Annual
Report on Form 10-K and the Company's 1999 Annual Report to Shareholders.

[TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD. LOGO]
Tyco International Ltd.
The Gibbons Building
10 Queen Street, Suite 301
Hamilton, HMll, Bermuda
Tele: 441-292-9674

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT:
J. Brad McGee
Senior Vice President
Tyco International (USI Inc.
(603) 778-9700

TYCO INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 48 PERCENT FIRST QUARTER
EARNINGS PER SHARE INCREASE

EARNINGS PER SHARE RISE TO 46 CENTS FROM 31 CENTS

Hamilton, Bermuda, January 18, 2000 -- Tyco International Ltd.
(NYSE-TYC, LSE-TYI, BSK-TYC), a diversified manufacturing and service company,
reported today that diluted earnings per share, before non-recurring charges
and credits and extraordinary item, for its first quarter of fiscal 2000 ended
December 31, 1999 were 46 cents per share, a 48 percent increase over last
year's 31 cents per share. Net income rose to 5784.3 million, an increase of
54 percent over last year's 5509.3 million. Sales for the quarter rose 27
percent to 56.64 billion compared with last year's 55.21 billion. Last year's
results have been restated to reflect the merger with AMP, which occurred on
April 2, 1999 and was accounted for as a pooling of interests, and are before
non-recurring charges and extraordinary ite~. After giving effect to
acquisition related and other non-recurring charges and credits, diluted
earnings per share were 46 cents in 2000 compared to a loss of 7 cents in
1999.
"Organic growth across each of our four business segments and all

..,."

December 31, 1999
geographies drove Tyco's performance in the first quarter," said L. Dennis
Kozlowski, Tyco's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. "Free cash flow was
improved as well. The strength of our core businesses combined with strong
cash flows are indicative of another strong year for Tyco," he added.

Sales
Operating profits
Operating margins

The quarterly operating profits and margins for the Company's four
business segments that are presented in the discussions below are stated
before charges and credits for merger, restructuring and other non-recurring
charges, charges for impairment of long-lived assets, and goodwill
amortization. All dollar amounts are in millions.

$
$

December 31, 1998

1,449.7
244.1
16.8%

$
$

1,259.7
196.9
15.6%

Tyeo Fire and Security Services achieved a 15% increase in sales as

compared with the same quarter last year, resulting primarily from organic
growth in both the fire and security divisions within the segment. Service
revenues and contract backlog continues to increase in the fire protection
division around the world.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

Operating profits rose 24% as the security business continues to
enjoy healthy incremental margins on new monitoring accounts and fire

December 31, 1999
Sales
Operating profits
Operating margins

$
$

protection benefitted from its efforts at increasing its service and
maintenance business. Cost reduction programs in both fire and security
contributed as well.

December 31, 1998

2,739.2
571. 7
20.9%

$
$

1,804.0
257.9
14.3%

FLOW CONTROL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
December 31, 1999

December 31, 1998

2

tx::l
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Sales
Operating profits
Operating margins

The 52% increase in sales resulted from both acquisitions and strong
organic growth. Acquisitions included Temasa and Raychem in Fiscal 1999 and
Siemens Electromechanical Components and Praegitzer in Fiscal 2000. In
addition, Tyco Electronics, which includes AMP, Tyco Submarine Systems Ltd.
(TSSL) and Tyco Printed Circuit Group (TPCGl, achieved significant organic
growth quarter over quarter. Demand remains especially strong for TSSL.

$
$

886.1
170.7
19.3%

$
$

807.0
129.2
16.0%

Sales figures for the first quarter of fiscal 2000 include the
acquisitions of Glynwed, the heat tracing business of Raychem, Central
Sprinkler and AFC Cable, which were acquired after the first quarter of fiscal
1999. Sales figures for the first quarter of 2000 exclude the revenues of
Mueller and Grinnell Supply Sales, which were divested in August 1999.
Excluding the impact of these items, sales for Flow Control experienced low
double digit growth. Allied, EarthTech and Tyco Valves and Controls continue
to enjoy increased demand.

Operating profits more than doubled due to improved margins at AMP
and Raychem, increased service and maintenance revenues at TSSL, increased
sales at TPCG, and the acquisitions noted above. Margin improvements at AMP
and Raychem were driven by increased volume, improved pricing and continuing
cost reduction programs.
HEALTHCARE AND SPECIALTY PRODUCTS

Operating profits increased 32% as a result of organic growth from
December 31, 1999
Sales
Operating profits
Operating margins

$
$

December 31, 1998

1,563.8
362.1
23.2%

$
$

cost reduction programs, efficiency improvements and an increase in the
component of service work, as well as, the acquisitions noted above. These

increases are net of a reduction in operating profits as a result of the sale
of Grinnell Supply Sales and Mueller, which was partially offset by royalty
and licensing fee income from certain intellectual property associated with
these divested businesses.

1,342.8
293.2
21. 8~

Healthcare and Specialty Products sales increased almost 17% over
the prior year, principally as a result of organic growth in both Tyco
Healthcare and Tyco Plastics. Of particular note was Tyco Healthcare's
especially strong growth outside the U.S. Additionally, Tyco Healthcare
experienced strong organic growth in the U.S. Surgical product lines resulting
from the combined sales efforts and bundling of products with the Kendall and
Sherwood lines. Tyco Plastics sales benefited from both increased volume and

FREE CASH FLOW
Tyco management refers to the net amount of cash generated from
operating activities less capital expenditures and dividends as "free cash
flow." Free cash flow was in excess of $400 million in the first quarter of
fiscal 2000, compared with negative cash flow of $617 million in the first
quarter of fiscal 1999, resulting in an improvement of over $1 billion.
Included as a reduction of operating cash flows is $58 million in the first
quarter of fiscal 2000 as compared to $207 million in the first quarter of
fiscal 1999 related to cash spending on restructurings. Historically, the
first fiscal quarter is the lowest generator of free cash flow, primarily due
to the payment of year end cash bonuses to employees based on the results of
the fiscal year just ended.

an increase in resin prices as compared to the same quarter last year.

The 24% increase in operating profits at Tyco Healthcare was driven
by volume and cost savings from the consolidation of facilities. Tyco Plastics
and ADT Automotive also had significant increases in operating profit as
compared to the same period a year ago.
FIRE AND SECURITY SERVICES
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In addition, the Company paid out Sl13 million in the first
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of fiscal 2000, compared to $51 million in first quarter of fiscal 1999, in
cash related to purchase accounting spending. This amount is not included in
the calculation of free cash flow.
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Telecommunications and Electronics
Hea1thcare and Specialty Products
fire and Security Services
flow Control Products and Services

$ 2,739.2
1,563.8
1,449.7
886.1

$ 1,804.0

$ 6,638.8

$ 5,213.5

571.7
362.1

$ 257.9

1,342.8
1,259.7
807.0

SHARE BUYBACK
Total Sales

The Company also announced that the Board of Directors of the
Company has approved the expenditure of up to an additional $2.0 billion to
repurchase shares of the Company. The exact timing and amount of the
repurchases will be subject to market conditions and other factors.

OPERATING PROfITS
Telecommunications and Electronics
Healthcare and Specialty Products
fire and Security Services
flow Control Products and Services

Tyco International Ltd., a diversified manufacturing and service
company, is the world's largest manufacturer and servicer of electrical and
electronic components and undersea telecommunications systems, the world's
largest manufacturer, installer, and provider of fire protection systems and
electronic security services, has strong leadership positions in disposable
medical products, plastics, and adhesives, and is the largest

170.7

Total operating profits

1,348.6
(54.3)

Corporate
Expenses
Goodwill amortization
expense

Interest expense, net
manufacturer of flow control valves. The Company operates in more than 80
countries around the world and has expected fiscal 2000 revenues in excess of
$26 billion.
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Income before income taxes

INCOME BEfORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEM

fORWARD LOOKING INfORMATION

EARNINGS PER SHARE:
BASIC

Certain comments in this release including, but not limited to, the
current year outlook for Tyco and expected fiscal 2000 revenues are
forward-looking statements within the. meaning of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which are based on management's good faith
expectations and belief concerning future developments. Actual results may
materially differ from these expectations as a result of many factors,
relevant examples of which are set forth in the "Management Discussion and
Analysis" section of the Company's 1999 Annual Report on form 10-K and the
Company's 1999 Annual Report to Shareholders.

DILUTED (3)

817 .2
(19.0)

(83.9)

(44.4)

(164.7)

(101.3)

1,045.7

Income taxes

The company will discuss first quarter results on a conference call
for investors today at 11:00 am (EST). The conference call can be accessed at
the following website: investors.tycoint.com/medialist.cfm

293.2
196.9
129.2

244 .1

712.5

(261.4)
$

784.3

.,..*=-====.... _-

(203.2)
$

509.3

$

0.46

$

$

0.46

SO.31

0.31

WEIGHTED AVERAGE COMMON
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TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD.
RESULTS Of OPERATIONS (1) (2)
(in millions, except per share data)

SALES

(1)
Three Months
Ended

Three Months
Ended

12131/1999

12131/1999

Three months ended December 31, 1999 are before credits associated with
the revision of estimates of restructuring costs of S137.6 million (S92.6
million, after tax) and restructuring and impairment charges of S113.4
million (S85.5 million, after tax) associated primarily with the exiting
of the interventional cardiology business. Including these credits and
charges, income before extraordinary item is SO.46 per diluted share.
Three months ended December 31, 1999 are before extraordinary losses of
SO.2 million after tax relating to the early extinguishment of debt.
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Washington, D.C. 20549

Other Events

Reference is made to the press release issued by the
Registrant on January 17, 2000, the text of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit 99.1, and to the press release issued by the Registrant
on January 18, 2000, the text of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.2, for
descriptions of the events reported pursuant to this Form 8-K.
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Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
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undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
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TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD.
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Executive Vice President and

Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Accounting and
Financial Officerl

-The executive offices of Registrant's principal United States subsidiary,
Tyco International (US) Inc., are located at One Tyco Park, Exeter, New
Hampshire 03833. The telephone number there is (603) 178-9700.
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Press Release
Consumer Product Safety Commission and Black & Decker Corporation
Release date April 1998
- Announcing Settlement ofAdministrative Complaint Over Alleged Inadequacy
OfRemedy amI Disclosure By tlte Company -

NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office ofinformation and Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 23, 1998

Washington, DC 20207
CPSC CONTACT: Russ Rader
(301) 504-0580 Ext. 1166
BLACK & DECKER CONTACT: Suzanne Jones
(203) 926-3447

Release # 98-097

CPSC, Black & Decker Settle Toaster Lawsuit; Improve Recall
Remedy
t:C

-0\

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and The Black &
Decker Corp. announced today the resolution ofCPSC's administrative Complaint against Black &
Decker and an improved nationwide recall of the Spacemaker Optima Model TI 000 Type I
Horizontal Toasters. In its Complaint, CPSC alleged that Black & Decker's unilateral recall
announcement of October 27, 1997, did not go far enough in notifying the public of the recall or the
potential fire hazard associated with the toasters, and the consumer remedy was not adequate. In its
Answer. Black & Decker denied the allegations contained in the administrative Complaint. After the
Complaint and Answer were filed, CPSC and Black & Decker began working cooperatively to
modify and improve Black & Decker's original recall program.

This "OPEN" button is located on the right side of the control panel. The words "Black &
Decker...Spacemaker...Horizontal Toaster...Optima" appear on the toaster door. "MODEL NO.
TI000 TY I" is stamped on the back of the toaster. Date codes 405 through 504 appear on the outer
prong of the plug blade.
Consumers should stop using these toasters immediately, and contact Black & Decker at (800) 7462159 between 7 a.m. and midnight EDT Monday through Friday and between 9 a.m. and 10 p.m.
EDT Saturday and Sunday.
Black & Decker is expanding its efforts to notify consumers by mailing letters directly to consumers,
purchasing advertising, providing retailers with new safety notices for in-store displays and posting
recall information on its web site. Black & Decker is issuing this press release to media outlets
nationwide and broadcasting video by satellite so that local television stations can report on this recall
announcement by showing the product and the potential fire hazard.
To ensure that the improved recall runs smoothly, Black & Decker also has set up and staffed a
special toll-free hotline for consumers to call to participate in this recall.
CPSC believes that for a recall to be effective, people need to know about it and be moved to act on
it. CPSC asks companies to use appropriate resources to make sure the public is aware of the hazard
associated with a recalled product. With this program, CPSC believes that Black & Decker is now
being more aggressive in its attempt to obtain an effective recall. CPSC and Black & Decker, by this
modified and improved recall program announced today, strive to ensure that the public is well aware
of the risk associated with the toaster. They urge consumers to act quickly and call Black & Decker to
participate in the improved recall.

Black & Decker is improving its recall by offering consumers their choice of a free Spacemaker
Optima Toaster or other selected replacement product instead ofa coupon toward the purchase of a
product. Consumers who have already contacted Black & Decker about the toaster recall and used a
coupon to purchase another product will now be able to select from a list of replacement Black &
Decker products, also for free. Extensive measures are underway to get word of the risk and new
remedy to consumers.

',,-

,,,,,.

The toasters are being recalled because they can allow food to catch on fire, and when the toaster
door automatically opens and the food rack extends beyond the door, flames from the food can escape
the unit and expose kitchen cabinets and their contents to the fire. When the unilateral recall was first
announced. the firm reported 242 incidents. Now Black & Decker has received 1,066 food fire
complaints involving these toasters; 656 of these involved property damage ranging from kitchen
cabinet damage to one kitchen fire. Eight bum injuries have been reported.
Of approximately 234,000 toasters sold, to date only about 19,000 consumers have participated in the
unilateral recall announced last October.
~ i ~

The Black & Decker Spacemaker Optima TlOOO Type I Horizontal Toasters were sold through retail
stores nationwide from 1994 through 1996 for about $50 to $64. Consumers can easily identify these
recalled toasters because they are the only Spacemaker Optima Toasters that have an "OPEN" button.

i ,~lll:IDl&IEtllB"~.~; i -~

jJ
'

.

U

_

, ,,,,,Un.... . . . ... . tt ti/5E-.\

••I

0" .... ~.l -~

~u

L.-J

'-,

J
J
J
J
J
J

J
J
J
J
J

J
J
.J
j

B -162

J
J
J
J

-,

~

...., -.

-., -, -, .-' - ' --,
..

.,

.

-,

-,

-,

-,

....., --,

.

--,

~

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
For Analysts and Other Persons Afforded Access to
executives and Infonnatlon of [Company Name]

nonetheless, in the written opinion of legal counsel, legally compelled to disclose the
Nonpublic Information to any tribunal or else stand liable for contempt or suffer other
censure or penalty, then you may, without liability hereunder, disclose to such
tribunal only that portion of the Nonpublic Information which such counsel advises
you is legally required to be disclosed, and you shall exercise your best efforts to
preserve the confidentiality of the balance of such Nonpublic Information

In connection with your being granted interview or other access to executives of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (the "Company"), you hereby agree to the following:
1. While the Company does not intend to disclose to you material nonpublic information
("Nonpublic Information"), both you and the Company recognize that such Nonpublic
Information may be inadvertently disclosed to you by the Company or discerned by
you from information which is not in itself material, but which may, in context with
other non-material information, lead you to conclusions that may constitute Nonpublic
Information about the Company.

2. You agree that at least two persons from the Company shall be in attendance at all
times during your interview of, or discussions with, designated executives of the
Company (herein an "Interview"). If the Company elects, it may take complete notes,
make a tape recording or other recording of the Interview. If it does so, it agrees to
provide you with a copy of such recording.

ttl
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3. You agree that for a period of forty-eight (48) hours following the Interview you will
not publish any analyst's report or update any eXisting report or otherwise disclose
any information from the Interview to any other person without the prior written
consent of the Company.
4. If the Company determines during such 48 hour period that any information disclosed
or discernible from the Interview may constitute Nonpublic Information, and so
notifies you in writing (the "48 Hour Notice"), identifying in reasonable detail the
content of such information, then you hereby agree that you shall retain such
information in strictest confidence and shall neither use the information so identified
in the 48 Hour Notice in preparing or updating any analyst's report or for any other
purpose without the prior written consent of the Company.
5.

In the event the Company does not provide the 48-Hour Notice within 48 hours
following an Interview, then you are free to use all information from the Interview, and
the restrictions and limitations set forth herein shall terminate and cease when such
48-hour period concludes.

6. In the event that you are requested or required (by oral questions, interrogatories,
requests for information or documents in legal proceedings, subpoena, civil
investigative demand or other similar process) to disclose any of the Nonpublic
Information to any governmental agency or in the course of any litigation, you shall
provide the Company with prompt written notice of any such request or requirement
so that we may seek a protective order or other appropriate remedy andlor waive
compliance with the provisions of this agreement. If, in the absence of a protective
order or other remedy or the receipt of a waiver from the Company, you are

7. In the event we provide you with any documentary or written materials in connection
with the Interview, such materials shall be treated the same as the content of the
Interview, and the 48 Hour Notice may require you to return or destroy such written
materials, and you hereby agree to abide by any such directive in the 48 Hour
Notice.
8. The laws of the State of

shall govern this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Agreement as of the date written
below.
Date:
NAME:

NAME:

By:

By:
Name:
Title:

Name:
Title:

Accepted by Company Name
Oate'

_

By

_

IIs

_

>
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Quality-Tomorrow and Today
Lynn E. Turner
Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

(Originally presented November 9, 1999)
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those
of Mr. Turner and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of other members of
the Commission's staff.

Today, over 65 years after the Securities and Exchange Commission was created, our
objective continues to be the protection of investors through the fair and orderly operation
of the markets. In satisfying its objective, the SEC has long relied upon transparent
financial reporting, based on full and fair disclosure, to promote honest and efficient
markets and allow for informed investment decision making. Transparency in financial
reporting-that is, the extent to which financial information about a company or bank is
visible and understandable to investors, other market participants, and regulators-has
played a fundamental role in making our markets the most efficient, liquid, and resilient
in the world.
As the financial services industry evolves and becomes more complex, I believe that
transparent financial reporting will take on an even greater role in the regulation of
financial institutions. I'm not alone in this view. The Federal Reserve Board's Director
of Supervision and Regulation recently stated:
"[T]he key to effective supervision in the next millennium...seems to me to depend on...
[s]ubstantial improvement in public disclosures by banks and greater reliance on financial
markets to discipline and 'regulate' bank risk-taking."
Transparency in a Changing World
The global world we live in today is quickly transforming how business is conducted,
how markets react to economic events, how investors trade, and how regulators regulate.
From a manufacturing-based economy, we have spawned the service and high technology
industries, including the explosive growth in e-commerce. In banking, we have seen the
introduction of drive-up banking, automated teller machines, electronic banking, and now
Internet banking.
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The lines dividing commercial banks, thrifts, investment banks, brokerages, insurance
companies and finance companies are fading. Going forward, these lines will continue to
blur and even to disappear. Many believe that the convergence that we have seen in the
past year in the financial services industry will accelerate as a result of the financial
reform legislation.
Clearly, advancements in technology have also contributed to the evolution of the
banking industry. For example, in today's financial markets, modem technology allows
institutions to move funds anywhere in the world at lightning speed, more than $1.5
trillion every day-a sum equal to world trade for four months. New breakthroughs in
technology have fundamentally changed the ways in which banks and financial services
companies communicate with customers, competitors, investors and regulators.
And with these changes, we have also come to see some of the accompanying
transformations such as greater product and investment risks, use of greater leverage by
some institutions, increased volatility in the worldwide capital markets, and markets
where liquidity can disappear overnight, creating international financial instability.
I believe that with these changes in business, we must continue to explore ways to
improve the transparency of our public disclosures and business reporting model. We
need to focus on understanding what are the key drivers of value in a business. We need
to be identifying the significant risks affecting businesses today as well as into the future.
And we need to convey this information in a transparent way to investors, markets, and
regulators on a timely basis.
This will certainly be a guiding light to the staff as we consider ways to improve our
current disclosures in Guide 3 and address allowances for loan losses. We also expect it
will provide the framework for the AcSEC task force. For example, we will be asking if
appropriate risks, such as in the credit quality of the loan portfolio, those resulting from
products and leverage, and those resulting from securitizations all have been made
transparent to investors in a meaningful manner.
In October of 1999, Chairman Levitt asked Professor Jeffrey Garten, Dean of Yale's
School of Management, to assemble a group of leaders from the financial community to
examine, in an expeditious manner, whether and how our current business reporting
framework can more effectively capture these momentous changes in our economy. This
group, and others that have been convened, will continue to address innovations in
accounting and reporting to match innovations in business so that we can maintain
transparency. Accounting standards must continue to evolve-standards and disclosure
requirements that may have been acceptable in the past decade may no longer serve well
in the future.
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Quality of Financial Reporting Today
But let's move back from the future to today, and look at the status of financial reporting.
A little over a year ago, Chairman Levitt highlighted the need to improve the quality of
financial reporting. Chairman Levitt feared that emerging trends, if not reversed, would
lead to a lack of investor confidence in the "numbers" they have come to rely on for
making investment decisions.
Oprah Winfrey said that "Lots of people want to ride with you in the limo, but what you
want is someone who will take the bus with you when the limo breaks down." Well, that's
just what we have found in fellow Commissioners, staff, and many in the business
community who have taken up the charge against abusive practices that include not only
fraud, but also financial reporting in what I label the "gray zone." These practices mask
economic reality. Rather than managing the business and letting the numbers reflect
reality, some are managing the numbers to reflect an imaginary business. This is a battle·
about doing what is right for investors and markets, and ultimately the American
economy.
Audit Committees
Since we began our initiative to address the "Numbers Game" concerns, the results have
been extremely encouraging. First of all, many in the financial community have joined
together in a partnership that is improving the quality of financial reporting.
In one instance, a group of investors, business executives, CEOs in the accounting
profession, and leading legal experts formed the "Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving
the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees." In just four months, this Committee
produced ten recommendations. Those recommendations, and just as important, the best
practices included in the report, are beginning to be used by audit committees. The stock
exchanges have proposed changes to their listing standards as recommended to them by
the Blue Ribbon Committee, with some minor modifications.
The Auditing Standards Board ("ASB") recently issued a very good proposal in response
to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee to the auditing profession. I
strongly support this proposal which would require a discussion between the auditor, the
audit committee, and management regarding the quality of the Company's financial
reporting. These discussions, which I believe must involve all three members of what I
call the "three legged stool," will provide an open dialogue amongst its participants that
cannot be anything but healthy. The ASB and its hard-working staff also have issued an
outstanding toolkit on revenue accounting and auditing issues that every CFO, controller,
and auditor should read. Additionally, the ASB is preparing a revenue audit guide and is
undertaking to provide further guidance on auditing loss accruals-that is, "reserves."
At the SEC, the Commission has issued proposed rules to implement certain of the
recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Committee. The proposals follow the
Committee's recommendations with a couple of exceptions. First, we did not include a
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proposal to require the audit committee to disclose whether it had complied with its
charter. We were concerned that such a requirement would lead to watered-down,
meaningless charter provisions. Second, we modified the requirement to have the audit
committee, based on input from internal and external financial professionals, report on
whether the financial statements were in compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP"). We heard the concerns of those who wondered whether an audit
committee had the expertise to make such a report. As a result, we met with members of
the legal, accounting, and financial management communities. We asked them for their
best thinking on alternative approaches. We received some very good input from the
legal community as well as from the accounting profession. The legal profession
supplied us with an idea for a negative assurance type report that we had already been
thinking about internally. In addition, Ernst & Young prepared a very good survey of
audit committee practices and worked with other members of the profession on this issue.
They met with us and suggested an alternative type of report. This proactive leadership
and participation has assisted us in crafting what we put into the final rule proposal. I
want to thank those who have shown such leadership on this critical issue.
We also heard concerns about the possibility of increased exposure for audit committee
members. We share that concern. Accordingly, we have included a safe harbor in our
rule proposal. In addition, I am told that a good process-one that properly informs the
board-goes a long way in providing insulation from liability under both the business
judgment rule and traditional duties of care. As a result, an audit committee that follows
a reasonable process, based on the best practices and recommendations set forth in the
Blue Ribbon Committee's recommendations, should enjoy less, rather than more, liability
exposure.
Materiality
In addition to the rule proposal on audit committees, the staff recently issued Staff
Accounting Bulletin ("SAB") No. 99 on materiality. That SAB reiterates, and brings into
a retrievable format, the guidance currently found in legal case law, and in accounting
and auditing literature. We hope it will level the playing field for those of you who work
hard to prepare high quality financial reports.
As noted in the SAB and in existing guidance, both qualitative and quantitative factors
must be considered when assessing materiality. The SAB also notes that intentional
errors made to manage earnings are not considered appropriate and are unlikely to
comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") requirements to maintain
books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect
transactions.
One question I often am asked is whether any adjustment that is not booked is an illegal
act. The answer to that question is no. As a former CFO, I clearly understand that there
are adjustments that arise as a result of the normal closing process which, depending on
the facts and circumstances, may not always be recorded. As noted in footnotes 18 and
50 of the SAB, insignificant errors and omissions that may occur in systems and recurring
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processes in the normal course of business would need to be assessed against the various
factors and criteria set forth, such as those on aggregating and netting, in determining
whether such adjustments would need to be recorded.
While we have made some initial progress towards improved financial reporting, there
are still troublesome issues we continue to confront. Let me address a few of those that
relate specifically to financial institutions.

Effective Internal Controls
For the past couple of years, the SEC staff and banking regulators have identified issues
and expressed concerns particular to the banking industry. Our three interagency
announcements issued during this past year highlight a number of our joint concerns.
One of the specific concerns expressed by the banking regulators is the need for
appropriate underwriting standards and internal controls related to the accounting for and
financial reporting of the allowance for loan losses. I must strongly echo those views and
also note that we have recently seen questions raised in the press regarding other
activities such as money laundering, basic account reconciliations, and misappropriation
of funds to manage earnings. These press accounts raise fundamental questions about the
adequacy and effectiveness of an institution's internal accounting controls and the quality
of work being performed by the independent auditors.
An institution's internal accounting controls for loan loss allowances should assure
compliance with the authoritative accounting guidance contained in accounting and
auditing pronouncements, including Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
("SFAS") 5 and 114, and the recent FASB Staff Viewpoints article included in Emerging
Issues Task Force ("EITF") Topic D-80. The accounting controls should assure timely
and accurate reporting for financial reporting purposes including for losses and changes
in the credit quality of the loan portfolio in accordance with GAAP. Auditors should also
assure that there has been compliance with Statement of Auditing Standards ("SAS") 54,
Illegal Acts by Clients, and SAS 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement
Audit, the FCPA, and Section IDA of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In the course of reviewing registrant filings in the past year, the staff noted certain
instances in which creditors did not appear to have adequate controls in place to assure
that loan loss allowances and provisions were determined and reported in accordance
with GAAP. In some cases, institutions did not have adequate documentation and clear,
concise internal communication of their policies and procedures related to loan loss
allowances. As an example, we noted instances where there was a distinct disconnect
between an institution's credit administration function and its financial reporting group in
the accounting for loan loss allowances.
I encourage financial institutions and their auditors to put renewed focus and emphasis on
the existence and effectiveness of internal controls to assure compliance with the FCPA
and on the determination of loan loss provisions and allowances in accordance with
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GAAP. Additionally, institutions, and their auditors, should assure that appropriate
supporting documentation exists for the policies, procedures, and methodologies used, as
well as for the amounts in the financial statements.
I would also remind you of particular disclosures the staff expects to see in filings by
financial institutions which are set forth in the letter on this topic at our website,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/banklla.txt.

Seement Disclosures
SFAS 131 requires companies to report financial and descriptive information about their
reportable operating segments. Operating segments are defined as components of an
enterprise about which separate financial information is available, and that is evaluated
regularly by the "chief operating decision maker" in deciding how to allocate resources
and to assess segment performance.
In some cases, however, financial statements of public companies have not conformed
with these requirements. We have seen instances where: (I) the internal reporting
package included operating information on more segments than were disclosed in the
financial statements; (2) those additional segments were discussed in MD&A or analysts'
reports; and (3) the company's executives also discussed the additional segments in press
releases or business periodicals.
When reviewing segment information as part of its normal filing review and comment
process, the staff is not reticent to ask registrants for a copy of the internal reports or other
materials supplied to the "chief operating decision maker" of the company, as well as
analysts' reports and press releases. Assuring quality implementation of SFAS 131 on
segment disclosures is clearly in the interest of investors. Consequently, if the segment
information provided in the financial statements does not reflect a similar breakdown of
company segments as is evident in the internal reports and other materials, the staff will
seek amendment of the registrant's filings.

Special Purpose Entities
Another example of an area in which we have seen problems in financial reporting is the
use of special purpose entities ("SPEs"). SPEs have legitimate uses and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") and the EITF have issued guidance to account for
certain transactions involving SPEs. For example, SFAS 125 and EITF Issue 96-20
provide the relevant accounting guidance for qualifying special purpose entities
("QSPEs"). The appropriate accounting guidance for other SPEs is provided in EITF
Topic D-14 and Issues 90-15 and 96-21.
While we know that legitimate SPE transactions exist, we have also become aware of
SPE transactions that have not complied with all of the relevant accounting requirements
specified in EITF Topic D-14 and Issues 90-15 and 96-21. We have seen what appear to
be contrived, structured transactions that defy transparency, and we are prepared to
challenge registrants in instances where they have not complied with the appropriate
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accounting and reporting guidance. For example, there is specific and very clear
guidance in Issue 90-15 that discusses the minimum substantive amount of real equity
needed by an SPE. SPEs that do not comply with these rules, such as when they use
subordinated debt rather than equity, or do not have the minimum amount of equity as
discussed in the staffs announcement in Issue 90-15, will be required to be consolidated.
In an effort to improve the guidance in this area, we have asked the FASB to address the
consolidation of SPEs in its consolidation project. In the interim, those who do not
comply with existing rules may be feeling like a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking
chairs.
Implementation of SFAS 133
In 1998, I challenged financial management and the accounting profession to take the
high road in implementing new accounting standards, and I specifically mentioned SFAS
133. As you know, the FASB deferred the effective date of SFAS 133 for one year, and
this standard will now be effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2000. This
deferral should help assure a high quality implementation of this standard. Both the
Financial Executives Institute ("FEI") and the American Bankers Association ("ABA")
noted in press releases announcing the deferral that the additional year would be used to
prepare for implementation of the standard, make necessary systems changes, and allow
for an orderly transition to the new accounting requirements. As a result, we do not
expect any further deferral of the effective date of this pronouncement. In this context,
we continue to encourage registrants and the accounting profession to bring issues and
questions to the Derivatives Implementation Group ("the DIG") on a proactive and timely
basis to help promote an effective implementation.
The SEC staff will also continue to closely monitor the implementation of this standard in
its review of filings with the Commission. During this past year we have observed that
certain early adopters of SFAS 133 have not complied with the relevant requirements of
this standard and, as a result, we have requested restatement. In particular, the standard
requires contemporaneous documentation for transactions that are to be accounted for
using hedge accounting. I emphasize that the documentation must be prepared
contemporaneously on the date of initial adoption or, if later, at the inception of the hedge
and not at a later date, such as at the end of a subsequent quarter or at year-end.
Accordingly, I urge companies to assure that the policies, procedures, and internal
controls they put in place to implement SFAS 133 are appropriate. In addition, auditors
will need to assure that their audit programs include appropriate and timely tests related
to SFAS 133 implementation. I once again challenge auditors and management to take
the high road in helping achieve a quality implementation of this standard.
Intercompany Derivatives
The last issue I want to touch upon is hedging with intercompany derivative instruments.
In December 1998, the SEC staff advised registrants that, under GAAP, an intercompany
derivative designated as a hedging instrument should be supported by documentation,
prepared contemporaneously, which demonstrates that the notional amount, duration,
interest rate risk, currency risk, commodity risk, and other risks associated with such
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intercompany derivative contracts have been laid off to unrelated third parties. The staff
indicated that for hedging instruments designated after January 1, 1999, the staff expects
registrants to comply with GAAP. The SEC staff has become aware that, in some
instances, practice may continue to diverge from GAAP; the staff intends to challenge the
appropriateness of the accounting in these instances. In such instances, a registrant will
be required to eliminate the impact of intercompany derivative contracts in preparing
consolidated financial statements in accordance with ARB No. 51. Additionally, in
accordance with SFAS No. 80, these intercompany derivative contracts may not qualify
as hedging instruments in the consolidated financial statements.

Conclusion
Lord Kelvin, a noted English scientist and president of the Royal Society who lived from
1824 to 1907, once said: "Radio has no future; heavier-than-air flying machines are
impossible; X-rays will prove to be a hoax. I have not the smallest molecule of faith in
aerial navigation other than ballooning." So here we are today, a century older and wiser.
The dawn ofa new millennium is upon us. Ifwe are to succeed, to accomplish what
those before us could not foresee, we must be willing to think beyond the outer limits that
serve as a glass wall to what no doubt lies beyond.
Today, I challenge those of you who comprise the accounting profession and who reap
the benefits of the world's greatest capital markets to seek out ways we can improve the
quality of financial reporting. In that regard, I've outlined a number of important issues.
We need to maintain and adjust our high quality accounting standards as technology
changes business activities. Managers and audit committees need to work together to
assure that financial statements provide full and fair disclosure to investors and others.
And auditors need to work to maintain the public's confidence in their integrity and in the
credibility of the financial statements that they audit. By working together, we can
continue to enjoy the rewards of our collective endeavor-new and expanded business
opportunities, more jobs, and a better future for those who invest their hard-earned dollars
for a child's college education, for retirement, or for a rainy day.
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In addition to this outline, several other sources ofinfonnationabout issues involving the Division of
Corporation Finance are available in the uCurrent SEC Rulemaking"section of the Securities and Exchange Commission's web site, http://www.sec.gov:
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•

Releases, Staff Legal Bulletins, Staff Accounting Bulletins

•

Division of Corporation Finance.: Frequently Requested Accounting
and Financial Reporting Interpretations and Guidance

•

Division of Corporation Finance: Manual of Publicly Available
Telephone Interpretations (including updates)

A number of the forms and regulations administered by the Division are available in the "Small
Business Information" section of the web site.
I.

DIVISION ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
The Division's organizational structure follows:

Division Director - Brian Lane (202) 942-2929
Deputy Director - Michael McAlevey (202) 942-2810
Operations
Associate Director (Disclosure Operations)
- Martin P. Dunn (202) 942-2890
Associate Director (Disclosure Operations)
- Shelley Parratt (202) 942-2830
Associate Director (Small Business)
- (vacant) (202) 942-2880
Disclosure Support
Associate Director (Legal)
-(vacant) (202) 942-2820
Associate Director (Regulatory Policy, Mergers & Acquisitions)
- Mauri Osheroff (202) 942-2840
Associate Director (International)
- (vacant) (202) 942-2870
Associate Director (Chief Accountant)
- Robert Bayless (202) 942-2850
Senior Counsel to the Director
- Anita Klein (202) 942-2980
Assistant Directors
Health Care and Insurance
- Jeffrey P. Riedler (202) 942-1840
Consumer Products
- H. Christopher Owings (202) 942-1900
Computers and Office Equipment
- James Daly (202) 942-1800
Natural Resources
- Roger Schwall (202) 942-1870
Transportation and Leisure
- William L. Tolbert, Jr. (202) 942-1850
Manufacturing and Construction
- Steven Duvall (202) 942-1950
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Financial Services
- Todd Schiffman (202) 942-1760
Real Estate and Business Services
- Paula Dubberly (202) 942-1960
Small Business
- Richard Wulff (202) 942-2950
Electronics and Machinery
- Peggy Fisher (202) 942-1880
Telecommunications
- Barry Summer (202) 942-1990
Structured Finance and New Products
- Mark W. Green (202) 942-1940

J
J

Other Offices
Office of Chief Counsel
- Catherine Dixon, Chief (202) 942-2900
Office of Mergers and Acquisitions
- Dennis O. Garris, Chief (202) 942-2920
Office of International Corporate Finance
- Paul Dudek, Chief (202) 942-2990
Office of EDGAR and Information Analysis
- Herbert Scholl, Chief (202) 942-2930

J

Division Employment Opportunities for Accountants and Attorneys
Accountants
The Division has about 100 staff accountants with specialized expertise in the various industry
offices. The Division provides a fast-paced, challenging work environment for accounting professionals. Our staff works on hot IPOs and current and emerging accounting issues. We influence accounting
standards and practices and interact with the top professionals in the securities industry.
A staff accountant's responsibilities include examining financial statements in public filings
and finding solutions to the most difficult and controversial accounting issues. A minimum of three
years' experience in a public accounting firm or public company dealing with SEC reporting is required. If you want to experience a unique learning opportunity and explore the depth and breadth of
accounting theory, principles, and practices, call (202) 942-2960 for information on employment opportunities in the Division.
Attorneys
From time to time, the Division of Corporation Finance has positions available for law school
graduates with solid legal skills and experience. Applicants should demonstrate an ability to accept
major responsibilities. We prefer applicants who have had extensive experience in securities transactions involving public companies. It is also helpful, but not necessary, if applicants have accounting
and/ or business training.
Responsibilities include analyzing and commenting on disclosure documents in public offerings. The positions involve working directly with companies, their executives, underwriters, outside
counsel and outside accountants. Working on transactions in today's market requires people that are
dynamic and fast-paced. The work involves innovative cutting-edge financing and business structures.
Interested persons should send a resume to Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549.
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II.

REGULATION OF SECURITIES OFFERINGS PROPOSING RELEASE <the "AIRCRAFT
CARRIER")

A.

Backiround

The Commission for the past several years has been actively reevaluating the current registration system. Recent Commission steps in that process have included:
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•

the Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (March 1996);

•

the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Process (July 1996); and
-

•

the Securities Act Concept Release (July 1996).

In 1996, Congress for the first time granted the Commission broad general exemptive authority. Thereafter the Commission began to consider more broadly how to improve the present system using this
new authority. On November 13, 1998 the Commission published a proposing release (Securities Act
Release No. 7606A) that would modernize the regulation of capital formation. These proposals would
provide significant benefits to issuers of securities, securities professionals and public investors. The
public comment period has been extended to June 30,1999.
Briefly, the proposals cover five major topics. First, the proposals would create a three-tiered
registration system that would extend the some of the advantages of private offerings - timing and
disclosure flexibility - to many registered offerings. The registration proposals also would permit more
issuers to take advantage of the streamlined small business requirements by increasing the small business issuer threshold. Second, the proposals would lift many of the restrictions on communications
around the time of an offering and provide certainty and clarity in the areas of "gun jumping" and the
"quiet period." Accordingly, the current limitations on free writing would be loosened and the current
safe harbors for research reports would be significantly expanded. Third, the proposals would re-focus
prospectus delivery requirements to ensure that investors receive prospectus information when they
need it most: before their investment decisions. Today, only delivery of final prospectuses is usually
required and they are typically delivered with the confirmation. Fourth, the proposals would provide
issuers with integration safe harbors so that they could convert a private offering to a public offering (or
vice versa) in response to changing market conditions. This flexibility also would permit "testing the
waters" for all issuers, while maintaining investor protection. Finally, to reduce concerns about selective disclosure, the proposals seek better and more timely disclosure in Exchange Act reports.
B.

The Reiistration System

We now have a number of forms for registration of securities offerings under the Securities Act.
All of these forms require issuers to file specified disclosure. The proposed system would eliminate
Forms 5-1,5-2,5-3,5-4,5-11, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4. In their place the proposed system would add Forms
A, B and C. Forms A, B and C would be available for offerings by both foreign and domestic issuers.
Form A would be available for smaller or unseasoned issuers. Form B would be available for offerings
by larger, seasoned well followed issuers and for offerings made to informed or sophisticated investors.
Form C would be available for business combinations.
C.

Communications

The current system imposes certain restrictions on communications before and during the time
an issuer is"in registration." In the pre-filing period, no offers may be made and, during the waiting
period, written offers may be made only through a mandated-content prospectus. The net effect of
these existing restrictions is to inhibit communications by the issuer and underwriter around the time of
an offering. The proposals would lift these restrictions for many offerings.
1.

FOnD B Offerinis

In Form B offerings, there would be no restrictions on communications. Issuers would be
permitted to make offers, orally or in writing, before filing a registration statement. Communications
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during the offering period would have to be filed, either as offering information or free writing materials. The offering period would be defined as the period beginning 15 days before the first offer was
made, by or on behalf of the issuer, and ending at the completion of the offering. Offering information
would be filed as part of the registration statement and be subject to Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) as well as
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Free writing materials would be filed under
proposed Rule 425 and be subject to Section 12(a)(2) and the antifraud provisions. Offering information
and free writing used in the 15 days before filing the registration statement would be filed at the time
the registration statement is filed; such materials used after the filing of the registration statement would
be filed at the time of first use.
2.

During the 30 day pre-filing period, free writing would remain restricted. The proposals, however, do permit certain communications during the 30 day pre-filing period: factual business communications and, for reporting companies, regularly released forward looking information.
The proposals would eliminate all restrictions on free writing after the filing of a registration
statement if the issuer complies with the prospectus delivery requirements in proposed Rule 172, files
the free writing used during the offering period pursuant to proposed Rule 425 and files a final prospectus before the first sale. Free writing materials would be filed at the time of first use and would be
subject to Section 12(a)(2) and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
The proposed communications exemptions do not apply to business combinations. A separate
regulatory scheme addressing communications involving business combinations has been adopted in
rulemaking on Takeovers and Security Holder Communications (see Section IV.A of this outline).
Research Reports

The communications exemptions for research reports currently contained in Rules 137, 138 and
139 would be significantly expanded to provide for greater communications during the offering period.
D.

Prospectus Delivery Requirements

Currently, all issuers must send a final prospectus to purchasers. A preliminary prospectus is
required to be delivered only in limited situations. The proposed prospectus delivery requirements
contemplate that the investor receives information when it needs it most, prior to its investment decision. As with other reforms, what prospectus information is required to be delivered, and when, will
depend on the nature of the issuer and the offering.
1.

Form B Offerings

In Form B offerings, a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 would not be required
to be delivered. A term sheet would be required to be delivered. These reforms also apply to seasoned
Schedule B filers registering an offering of more than $250 million that is underwritten on a firm commitment basis and is registered more than a year after the effective date of its IPO.

2.
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Other Offerings

The proposals include a bright line communications exemption that would permit any communication made by or on behalf of the issuer more than 30 days before a Form A registration statement is
filed. The Form A issuer must take reasonable steps to prevent distribution of communications made
before the 30 day pre-filing period from being distributed during this time.

3.

J
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Offerings by Small or Unseasoned Issuers

For other offerings, a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 must be delivered
before the investment decision is made. For an IPO or offerings registered within one year of the IPO,
the proposals require delivery 7 calendar days before the securities are priced (in a firm commitment
offering) or before the investor makes a purchase commitment (in a best efforts offering). For offerings
by more seasoned issuers, a prospectus must be delivered 3 calendar days before pricing or commitment. If a material change has occurred that was not described in the delivered prospectus, the issuer
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must disclose the information about the change at least 24 hours before either pricing or the purchase
commitment. Smaller, unseasoned Schedule B filers would be treated like Form A issuers.

I

3.
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There is no delivery requirement for final prospectuses in most offerings, although final prospectuses would still be filed with the Commission. Pursuant to proposed Rule 173, most issuers
would be exempt from delivering a final prospectus if the following conditions are met: the issuer files
a Section lO(a) prospectus (minus Rule 430A price-related information) before confirmations are sent;
investors are informed before confirmation where they may obtain a final prospectus, free of charge;
and a prospectus is delivered pursuant to proposed Rule 172. Final prospectuses still would be required to be delivered in business combinations on Forms C, SB-3, F-B and F-BO.
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4.

Final Prospectuses

Aftermarket Prospectus Delivery

Dealers are currently required to deliver prospectuses in certain offerings for a specified period
of time after effectiveness of a registration statement. They are subject to this requirement even though
they may not have participated in the offering. Proposed revisions to Rule 174 would extend dealers'
aftermarket delivery obligation to all offerings. This aftermarket delivery obligation would exist for 25
calendar days after the later of the effectiveness of a registration statement or the first date on which the
securities were offered. The proposals, however, would deem the aftermarket delivery obligation to be
satisfied if the final prospectus (excluding Rule 430A price-related information) is on file with the Commission and the dealer informs the investor, before or at confirmation, where it may obtain the final
prospectus, free of charge. The proposals would also repeal Rule 153, which deems the prospectus
delivery requirement to be met by delivery to an exchange.
E.

Integration of Public and Private Qfferin~s

The proposals permit issuers flexibility in determining whether to proceed on a registered or
unregistered basis, provided that key investor protections are maintained. The revisions eliminate many
of the uncertainties while permitting testing the waters. Safe harbors would be provided for converting
public offerings to private offerings and vice versa.
Proposed revisions to Rule 152 would provide guidance on when a private placement is considered completed. Proposed Rule 159 would codify the current staff position concerning lock-up agreements before business combinations.

F.

Exchan~e

Act Reporting Revisions

In order to provide better and more timely disclosure and prevent selective disclosure, the
Exchange Act proposals expedite the reporting of certain information and add requirements to report
certain material events. These proposals would:

•

require risk factor disclosure in Exchange Act annual reports and
registration statements with quarterly updates in Forms lO-Q and 10QSB;

•

accelerate the due dates for most Forms B-K from 15 days to 5 days;

•

require the filing of Form B-K for additional events including:
-material defaults on senior securities;

r
}

-material modifications to the rights of security holders;

r
r
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-departure of CEO, CFO, COO or President;

r
I

-company name change;

-notification that reliance on prior audit is no longer permissible, or
that auditor will not consent to use of its report in a Securities Act filing;
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require the filing of Form 8-K in one business day for certain items;

•

require the filing of Form 8-K for selected financial information as
specified in Item 301 of Regulation 5-K (60 days after the end of the
fiscal year and 30 days after the end of the quarter); and

•

accelerate the filing of Form 20-F from 6 months to 5 months.

The proposals also solicit comment on:
•

accelerating the Form 10-K filing period from 90 days to 60 or 70 days;

•

accelerating the Form 10-Q filing period from 45 days to 30 or 35 days;
and

•

revising Form 6-K to mandate reporting of Form 8-K events if the
information is disclosed under applicable foreign requirements.

The Exchange Act proposals also would:
•

treat information set forth in Part I of Forms lO-Q and ID-QSB as filed
for purposes of Section 18;

•

require the principal executive officers and a majority of the board of
directors to sign Exchange Act reports;

•

require signers of Exchange Act filings to certify that they have read
the filing and that, to their knowledge, the filing does not contain an
untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances in which they were made, not misleading; and

•

III.

permit concurrent registration under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act by checking a box on the Securities Act registration
statement.

PLAIN ENGLISH INITIATIVE

In August 1995, Chairman Arthur Levitt created a staff Task Force on Disclosure Simplification
to review rules and forms relating to capital raising transactions, periodic reporting pursuant to the
Exchange Act, proxy solicitations, and tender offers and beneficial ownership reporting under the Williams Act. On March 5, 1996, the Commission published the Report of the Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification.

One of the Task Force's major concerns was the lack of readability of prospectuses and other
disclosure documents. The report noted that issuers, underwriters and their lawyers draft defensively
written documents that place a premium on legal jargon and over-inclusive disclosures. The Task Force
recommended requiring plain English disclosure to improve the readability of the prospectus.
To implement the Task Force recommendations, the SEC issued proposed rules for public comment (Securities Act Release No. 7380 Uanuary 14, 1997)). On January 22,1998, the Commission adopted
the final plain English rules (Securities Act Release No. 7497). These rules apply to public companies
and mutual funds. The Division of Corporation Finance issued Staff Legal Bulletin No.7 on the new
rules, and updated it on June 7, 1999.
1.

New Rule 421Cd) • The Plain English Rule

This rule requires public companies and mutual funds to prepare the front portion of their
prospectuses in plain English. They must use plain English principles in the organization, language,
and design of the front and back cover pages, the summary, and the risk factors section. Also, when
writing these portions of the prospectus, they must comply substantially with six basic principles:
•

Short sentences;
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•

Definite, concrete, everyday language;

r

•
•

Active voice;

r

•

No legal jargon or highly technical business terms; and

•

No multiple negatives.
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In addition, public companies and mutual funds must design the cover pag~~ summary, and
risk factors section to make them easy to read. They must format the text and design the document to
highlight important information for investors. The rule also permits them to use pictures, charts, graphics,
and other design features throughout the prospectus to make it easier to read.
2.

Amended Rule 42l<b) • The Clear, Concise. and Understandable Rule

Rule 421(b) currently requires that the entire prospectus be clear, concise, and understandable.
To provide guidance on this rule, we adopted amendments that set out four general writing techniques
that public companies and mutual funds must use throughout their prospectuses:

r
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•

Present information in clear, concise sections, paragraphs, and
sentences. Whenever possible, use short explanatory sentences and
bullet lists;

•
•

Use descriptive headings and subheadings;

r

r

•

r

,

r
r

Avoid frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as the primary
means of explaining information in the prospectus. Define terms in a
glossary or other section of the document only if the meaning is unclear
from the context. Use a glossary only if it facilitates understanding of
the disclosure; and
Avoid legal and highly technical business terminology.

We also added a new note to Rule 421(b) that lists writing conventions to avoid because they
make prospectuses harder to read:

r

r

Tabular presentation or bullet list for complex materiat whenever
possible;

3.

•

Legalistic or overly complex presentations that make the substance of
the disclosure difficult to understand;

•

Vague boilerplate explanations that are readily subject to differing
interpretations;

•

Complex information copied directly from legal documents without
any clear and concise explanation of the provision(s); and

•

Repetitive disclosure that increases the size of the document but does
not enhance the quality of the information.

Amendments to Regulation S·K and Regulation S·B

To implement the changes we made to Rule 421, we also adopted amendments to Regulations
s-K and s-B.
4.

Plain English Handbook

A Plain English Handbook-How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents/' issued by the
Office of Investor Education and Assistance, is now available in final form. You can download a copy
from our web site at lltfp://www.sec.gov or request a paper copy by calling I-BOO-sEC-0330.
1/

r

r
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MERGERS AND ACOUISITIONS

In addition to the matters in this section, see Section XLG below, "Financial Statements in Hostile Exchange Offers."
A.

Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications

On October 22, 1999, the Commission adopted a new regulatory scheme for business combination transactions and security holder communications (Securities Act Release No. 7760). The new rules
and amendments are effective January 24, 2000. The amendments significantly update the existing regulations to meet the realities of today's markets while maintaining important investor protections. Specifically, the amendments reduce restrictions on communications, balance the regulatory treatment of
cash and stock tender offers, and update, simplify and harmonize the disclosure requirements.
1.

Reduce Restrictions on Communications

Currently, the Securities Act, as well as the proxy and tender offer rules, restrict communications. The new rules and amendments relax these restrictions by permitting the dissemination of more
information on a timely basis without triggering the need to file a mandated disclosure document.
Under the new scheme, a complete disclosure document still must be provided before a security holder
may vote or tender securities, but other communications regarding the transaction are permitted. This
should permit more informed voting and tendering decisions. The content of communications is not
restricted, but anyone relying on the new rules must file written communications relating to the transaction on the date of first use, so that all security holders have access to the information. In particular,
the amendments permit more communications:

•

before the filing of a registration statement relating to either a stock
merger or a stock tender offer transaction;

•

before the filing of a proxy statement (regardless of the subject matter
or contested nature of the solicitation); and

•

regarding a proposed tender offer without "commencing" the offer
and requiring the filing and dissemination of specified information.

The amendments also harmonize the various communications principles applicable to business combination transactions under the Securities Act, tender offer rules and proxy rules. Confidential
treatment of merger proxy statements is retained, but only under limited circumstances. Under the new
scheme, if parties to a transaction publicly disclose information beyond that specified in Rule 135, the
proxy statement must be filed publicly. If a proxy statement is filed confidentially, but later the parties
disclose information beyond Rule 135, then the proxy statement must be re-filed publicly.
2.

Balance the Regulatory Treatment of Cash and Stock Tender Offers

Currently, registered stock tender offers (exchange offers) are subject to regulatory delays not
imposed on cash tender offers. A cash tender offer may commence as soon as a tender offer schedule is
filed and the information disseminated to security holders while an exchange offer may not commence
before a registration statement is filed and becomes effective. The delay associated with exchange offers
may cause some bidders to favor cash over stock as consideration in a business combination transaction. In addition, the different regulatory treatment can give a bidder offering cash a timing advantage
over a competing bidder offering stock. The amendments adopted will balance the regulatory treatment of cash and stock tender offers to the extent practicable.
Under the new rules third-party or issuer exchange offers may commence as early as the filing
of a registration statement, or on a later date selected by the bidder, before effectiveness of the registration statement. As a result, a bidder offering securities will not need to wait until effectiveness to commence an exchange offer. Early commencement is not mandatory, but rather at the election of the bidder. A bidder may file a registration statement, wait for staff comments, if any, and then decide to
commence its offer. Any securities tendered in the offer could not be purchased until after the registration statement becomes effective, the minimum 20 business day tender offer period has expired, and all
material changes are disseminated to security holders with adequate time remaining in the offer to
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review and act upon the information. A bidder need not deliver a final prospectus to security holders.
Security holders may withdraw tendered securities at any time before they are purchased by the bidder.

I

3.

r

Currently, the procedural and disclosure requirements for business combination transactions
vary depending upon the form of the transaction. Many of the differences can be minor and unnecessary. The amendments clarify and harmonize many of the requirements. The amendments also make
the requirements easier to understand and facilitate compliance with the regulations.

r

The substantive disclosure requirements for tender offers, going-private transactions and other
extraordinary transactions remain substantially the same, but are moved to one central location within
the rules, called "Regulation M-A." In some cases, harmonization reduces the disclosure requirements.
The amendments also update the rules in several respects. The more significant amendments will:

r
r
r

r

r
r

r
rt

r
r
r

r

r

B.

Updating. Simplifying and Harmonizing the Disclosure Requirements

•

combine the existing schedules for issuer and third-party tender offers
into one new schedule available for all tender offers, called "Schedule
TO";

•

require a plain English summary term sheet in all tender offers, mergers
and going-private transactions, except when the transaction is already
subject to the plain English requirements of the Securities Act rules;

•

update and generally reduce the financial statements required for
business combinations;

•

require pro forma and related financial information in negotiated cash
tender offers when the bidder intends to engage in a back-end securities
transaction;

•

permit an optional subsequent offering period after completion of a
tender offer during which security holders can tender their shares
without withdrawal rights;

•

revise Rule 13e-l, which requires issuers to report intended repurchases
of their own securities once a third-party tender offer has commenced,
so that the required information need not be disseminated to security
holders and to provide an exclusion from the rule for certain periodic,
routine purchases;

•

conform the current security holder list requirement in the tender offer
rules with the comparable provision in the proxy rules so that the list
will include non-objecting beneficial owners; and

•

clarify the rule that prohibits purchases outside a tender offer (Rule
10b-13), codify prior interpretations of and exemptions from the rule;
add several new exceptions to the rule, and redesignate it as new Rule
14e-5.

Cross Border Tender Offers. Rights Offers and Business Combinations

The Commission has adopted exemptive provisions to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. investors
in tender and exchange offers, business combinations and rights offerings for the securities of foreign
companies. (Securities Act Release No. 7759, October 22,1999).
1.

Reasons for the Exemptions

Although it is very common for U.S. persons to hold securities of foreign companies, they often
are unable to participate fully in tender offers, rights offerings and business combinations involving
those securities. Offerors often exclude U.S. security holders due to conflicts between U.s. regulation
and the regulation of the home jurisdiction or the perceived burdens of complying with multiple regulatory regimes.
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In tender offers where the bidder is offering its own securities and rights offers where existing
shareholders are offered the opportunity to buy more stock, in the absence of an exemption (such as the
new exemptions contained in the release), inclusion of U.S. holders would require registration under
the Securities Act. Registration requires the issuer to provide to shareholders financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. accounting standards. Also, the issuer would incur an ongoing reporting
obligation in the United States.
2.

Harmful Effects of Excluding U.S. Inyestors

U.s. investors often are unable to receive the full benefits offered to other investors in these
types of offshore transactions. When bidders exclude the U.S. security holders from tender or exchange
offers, the U.S. investors are denied the opportunity to receive the full value of the premium offered for
their shares. (In some cases, these holders may eventually have their securities acquired in a compulsory acquisition when the offeror completes the acquisition.) Similarly, when issuers exclude their U.S.
security holders from participation in rights offerings, the U.s. investors lose the opportunity to retain
their relative ownership position or possibly to purchase at a discount. (In some instances, they may be
able to receive the cash value of their rights.)
These offshore transactions may affect the interests of the U.S. investors in the foreign securities, regardless of whether they receive information about the transaction or are able to participate
directly in the offer. For example, market activity in the stock after announcement of a tender offer may
affect the price of the stock. Even though U.S. investors cannot participate in the tender offer, they must
react to the event by deciding whether to sell, hold, or buy additional securities. Offerors will often take
affirmative steps to prevent their informational materials from being disseminated in the United States
as a means to avoid triggering U.S. regulatory requirements. U.S. investors, therefore, must make this
decision without the benefit of information required by either U.S. or foreign securities regulation.
3.

The Exemptions

The new exemptions balance the need to promote the inclusion of U.s. investors in these types
of cross-border transactions against the need to provide U.S. investors with the protections of the U.S.
securities laws. The U.S. anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules and civil liability provisions will continue to apply to these transactions. The rule changes are effective January 24, 2000.
New provisions in the tender offer rules exempt:
•

•

•

tender offers for the securities of foreign private issuers from most
provisions of the Exchange Act and rules governing tender offers when
U.S. security holders hold 10 percent or less of the foreign company's
securities that are subject to the offer (the "Tier I exemption").
tender offers from certain limited provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and rules governing tender offers when U.S. security holders
hold 40 percent or less of a foreign private issuer's securities that are
subject to the offer (the "Tier II exemption"). The Tier II exemption
represents a codification of current exemptive and interpretive positions
that eliminate frequent areas of conflict between U.S. and foreign
regulatory requirements.
tender offers for the securities of foreign private issuers from Rule 10b13 of the Exchange Act (redesignated Rule 14e-5 in the Regulation MA rulemaking), which will permit purchases outside the tender offer
during the offer when U.S. security holders hold 10 percent or less of
the subject securities.

In addition, two new exemptions from the Securities Act registration and Trust Indenture Act
provisions exempt:
•

under new Rule 801, rights offerings of equity securities by foreign
private issuers from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
when U.S. security holders hold 10 percent or less of the securities.
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under new Rule 802, securities issued in an exchange offer, merger or
similar transaction for a foreign private issuer from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act and the qualification requirements
of the Trust Indenture Act when U.S. security holders hold 10 percent
or less of the subject class of securities.

Some of the more significant changes from the November 1998 proposals include:

r
r

•

The U.S. ownership thresholds for the Rule 801 and Rule 802 registration
exemptions have been increased from five to 10 percent.

•

Under a "cash-only alternative" for Tier I tender offers, bidders will be
permitted to offer cash in the United States while offering securities
offshore without violating the equal treatment requirements of the
tender offer rules. The bidder must have a reasonable basis to believe
that the cash being offered to U.S. security holders is substantially
equivalent to the value of the consideration being offered to non-U.S.
holders.

•

holders in both rights offerings and exchange offers would receive
restricted stock under Rule 144 only to the extent their existing holdings
were restricted. We had proposed treating all securities issued in rights
offerings as restricted.

•

In determining U.S. ownership, an offeror would be required to "look
through" the record ownership of certain brokers, dealers, banks or
nominees holding securities for the accounts of their customers. Ten
percent holders, foreign or domestic, are excluded from the calculation,
rather than just foreign 10 percent holders as had been proposed.
Securities held by the bidder also are excluded from the calculation.

r

C.

r

On January 12, 1998, the Commission adopted amendments to its beneficial ownership disclosure rules under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934 to reduce the reporting obligations of certain
investors. See Exchange Act Release No. 39538 (January 12, 1998). The rules had been published for
comment in Exchange Act Release No. 37403 (July 3, 1996). The new provisions include the following:

r
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Amendments To Beneficial Ownership Reporting Under Exchanse Act Section 13Cd)

•

Unless they were qualified institutional investors, most investors
previously were required to file a long-form Schedule 13D disclosing
detailed information about the "investor and the purpose and
background of the acquisitions. The revised rules now allow passive
investors (those that do not have the purpose or effect of changing or
influencing control of the issuer) to report their greater than 5%
ownership on the short-form Schedule 13G if they do not own 20% or
more of the outstanding securities.
The initial schedule must be filed within 10 days.
The schedule must be amended annually to reflect any changes
in the information.
The schedule must be amended promptly if ownership
increases by more than 10% and thereafter promptly upon
increasing or decreasing by more than 5%.
If the reporting person no longer has a passive investment
purpose or increases his or her ownership to 20% or more, a
Schedule 13D must be filed within ten days. Upon those events,
the person may not vote the securities or acquire additional
equity securities of the issuer until 10 days after the Schedule
13D is filed.
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A reporting person may re-establish its Schedule 13G-eligibility
and switch from Schedule 13D to Schedule 13G once it becomes
a passive investor and its ownership decreases below 20%.
The list of qualified institutional investors who are eligible to
file on Schedule 13G, regardless of their percentage ownership,
is expanded to include the following:
employee benefit plans maintained primarily for the benefit
of state or local government employees;
savings associations;
church employee benefit plans;
control persons of qualified institutional investors who have a
passive investment purpose and do not own directly, or
indirectly through an ineligible entity, more than 1% of the
issuer's stock;
investment advisers prohibited from registering under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 pursuant to Section 203A of
that Act.
Copies of Schedule 13G are no longer required to be sent to
the exchanges on which the securities trade.
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Under interpretive guidance provided by the Commission in
adopting the amendments, the Commission clarified that
beneficial ownership by a subsidiary or other business unit
may not have to be attributed to the subsidiary's parent entity
if the voting and investment powers over the subsidiary's
shares are exercised independently from the parent. This
determination is based on the facts and circumstances.
One circumstance in which beneficial ownership may not be
required to be attributed to the parent is when these entities
have in place certain informational barriers that ensure that
the voting and investment powers are exercised independently.
If informational barriers are relied upon, written policies and
procedures should be used, annual independent assessments
of the informational barriers should be made, and the entities
should not share common officers, directors or employees that
are involved in the exercise of the voting and investment
powers.

The Commission also provided guidance regarding the impact of soliciting activities by a shareholder
with respect to shareholder proposals on the use of Schedule 13G by that shareholder. Soliciting activity that does not have the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control does not prevent the use
of Schedule 13G. That determination is based on the facts and circumstances. The release highlights
five relevant factors to consider in assessing the purpose and effect of the proposal and related soliciting
activity.

D.

Current Issues

1.

Disclosure Issues Arising in Tender Offers for Limited Partnership Units

Several tender offers for limited partnership interests have commenced where the price offered
is significantly below the amount originally paid for the units, prices paid for the interests in the secondary markets, and/ or recent appraisals of the assets owned by the partnership. Some of these tender
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offers have been conducted by the general partner of the limited partnership, while others have been
conducted by unaffiliated parties.
Since most of these transactions have been structured as cash offers for less than all of the
outstanding limited partnership units, these transactions generally have not been subject to the roll-up
or going private rules, both of which require enhanced disclosure regarding the fairness of the transaction and any conflicts of interests presented by the party making the transaction. However, many of the
same concerns that led to the development of a specialized regulatory scheme for roll-ups of limited
partnerships are raised by these transactions - notably the conflict of interest presented by the participation of affiliated entities in purchasing the limited partnership interests and the inability of these
investors to realize fair market value for their interests through a trading market, as opposed to accepting what is perceived as an "inadequate offer."

In preparing disclosure documents for these transactions, bidders are advised to remember
that the 1991 release adopting the roll-up provisions specifically addresses transactions which, although
by definition not roll-ups, raise similar Concerns. The release states that the disclosure required by the
roll-up rules must be considered from an antifraud perspective (Securities Act Release No. 6922 (October 30/ 1991». Bidders are also advised to provide balanced disclosure as required by Securities Act
Release No. 6900 Gune 17/ 1991)/ including describing risks of the transaction in bullet form on the cover
page, providing a detailed table of contents and writing the document in "plain English."
The staff is closely reviewing the disclosure in these transactions and expects that bidders,
whether or not affiliated with the general partner, will provide investors with sufficient disclosure to
consider adequately the conflicts presented by any affiliation between the bidder and the general partner and disparities between the value of their interests and the consideration offered, including whether
any reports or appraisals that are materially related to the transaction have been prepared by a third
party. Financial information relating to the partnership also should be provided, such as selected financial data required by Item 301 of Regulation S-K. If the target partnership is a real estate limited partnership/ disclosure comparable to that required by Items 14 (description of real estate) and 15 (operating
data) of Form S-l1 should be provided. An unaffiliated bidder is required to disclose only information
that is otherwise publicly available unless it has received non-public information from the target, in
which case the non-public information also would need to be disclosed. Soliciting dealer fees or any
other payments to brokers, dealers or agents for soliciting tenders should be prominently disclosed in
the offering documents.
2.

Investment BankinG Firm Disclaimers

Boards of directors of companies soliciting shareholder voting and/ or investment decisions in
connection with mergers and other extraordinary transactions often retain investment banking firms as
financial advisors, in many cases to render an opinion on the financial fairness of the transaction. In
connection with its review of proxy statements, Securities Act registration statements and other Commission filings made in this context, the staff increasingly has observed the appearance of disclaimers
by or on behalf of the financial advisor regarding shareholders' right to rely on a fairness opinion that
the advisor has furnished to the registrant's board, a special committee of the board, and/ or the registrant. Examples of such disclaimers include the following:
•

"No one other than the Board of Directors [or the Special Committee
and/or the Company] has the right to rely on this opinionj"

•

"This opinion is provided solely / only to the Board of Directors [or the
Special Committee and/or the Company];"

•

"This opinion is solely/only for the benefit of the Board of Directors
[or the Special Committee and/ or Company]j"

•

"No one may rely on this opinion without the prior consent of the
Financial Advisor;" and

r

r
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"This opinion is addressed [solely / only] to the Board of Directors
[Special Committee and/or the Company] and is not intended to be
relied upon by any shareholder."

During the review and comment process, the staff has objected to such statements as inconsistent with the balance of the registrant's disclosure addressing the fairness to shareholders of the proposed transaction from a financial perspective. Specifically, the staff has requested that any such direct
or indirect disclaimer of responsibility to shareholders, whether made by or on behalf of the financial
advisor, be deleted from any portion of the disclosure document in which it appears (including exhibits). Alternatively, the registrant may add an explanation that clarifies:

3.

(a)

the basis for the advisor's belief that shareholders cannot rely on its
opinion, including (but not limited to) whether the advisor intends to
assert the substance of the disclaimer as a defense to shareholder claims
that might be brought against it under applicable state law;

(b)

whether the governing state law has addressed the availability of such
a defense to the advisor in connection with any such shareholder claim;
if not, a statement must be added that the issue necessarily would have
to be resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; and

(c)

that the availability or non-availability of such a defense will have no
effect on the rights and responsibilities of the board of directors under
governing state law, or the rights and responsibilities of the board or
the advisor under the federal securities laws.

Securities Act Registration Issues Arising in Connection With Mergers and Other Extraordinary Transactions
[Note: These procedures will change after effectiveness of the new regulatory
scheme for business combinations discussed in Section IV. A.]

Third parties often urge shareholders to vote against a pending merger on the basis that the
third party is proposing its own competing acquisition proposal. When the competing acquisition
proposal involves the use of the third party's securities as consideration (through an exchange offer or
merger), communications by the third party to shareholders regarding its competing bid may, depending on the facts and circumstances, be an "offer to sell" or "solicitation of an offer to buy" the third
party's securities. As a result, the opposition solicitation triggers the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act, as well as the proxy disclosure and dissemination requirements.
Generally speaking, a third party's written communications in connection with its solicitation
in opposition to a pending merger or business combination would not raise Section 5 concerns if the
communications fall within the safe harbor provisions of Securities Act Rules 145(b) and 135. Parties
should consider the following matters in order to avoid Section 5 concerns.
Under Rule 145(b)(1) of the Securities Act, a written communication would not be deemed an
offer to sell if it contains no more than: (i) the name of the third party or other person or entity that
might be issuing securities in the potential competing transaction, as well as the names of any other
parties to such transaction, (ii) a brief description of the potential competing transaction and the basis
upon which such transaction will be made, and (iii) any legend or similar statement required by State or
federal law or administrative authority. See also Rule 135 of the Securities Act.
Under Rule 145(b)(2) of the Securities Act, any written communication that is subject to and
meets the requirements of Exchange Act Rule 14a-12, and is filed in accordance with paragraph (b) of
that rule, would not be deemed an "offer to sell" under Section 5. Rule 14a-12 provides that a solicitation (other than one subject to Rule 14a-11, which pertains to election contests) may be made before
furnishing security holders a written proxy statement meeting the requirements of Rule 14a-3(a) if:
(1) the solicitation is made in opposition to a prior solicitation or an invitation
for tenders or other publicized activity, which if successful, could reasonably
have the effect of defeating the action proposed to be taken at the meeting;
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(2) no form of proxy is furnished to security holders before the written proxy
statement required by Rule 14a-3(a) is furnished to security holders;

t

(3) the identity of the "participants" in the solicitation and a description of
their interests, direct or indirect, by security holdings or otherwise, are set forth
in each communication published, sent or given to security holders in connection with the solicitation, and
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(4) a written proxy statement meeting the requirements of Regulation 14A is
sent or given to solicited security holders at the earliest practicable date.
However, the safe harbor provisions of Securities Act Rules 145(b) and 135 only protect written
communications made before a registration statement is filed. Accordingly, oral communications made
before a registration statement is filed may still raise Section 5 concerns. If a person is relying on Rule
14a-12 and Rule 145(b)(2) to disseminate information to shareholders before filing a registration statement, the information must be in written form and filed with the Commission when first disseminated.
These issues arise often in meetings and conference calls with analysts or shareholders before filing a
registration statement.
The staff also notes that Rule 14a-12 only applies to solicitations that are made before furnishing
security holders a written proxy statement meeting the requirements of Rule 14a-3(a). The proxy statement is required to be sent or given to solicited security holders "at the earliest practicable date." The
safe harbor cannot be relied upon if the soliciting person challenging a proposed merger does not intend to file and deliver a Rule 14a-3 proxy statement within a reasonable period of time.
Where the third party's proxy solicitations trigger the need for compliance with the registration
and prospectus delivery provisions of the Securities Act, the third party should file promptly a registration statement to cover the securities offering to target shareholders.
In view of the number of communications the third party may disseminate in opposition to the
"friendly" transaction during the "waiting period," the staff will not object if the "core" proxy statement/prospectus is not redelivered with each additional communication, so long as:

•

Before dissemination of additional communications, the preliminary
proxy statement/prospectus (without a proxy card containing a
proposal directed to the third party's competing package) is sent or
given to all target company shareholders eligible to vote at the
shareholders' annual or special meeting at which shareholders will
consider and vote on the "friendly" proposal.

•

Each additional communication is filed as a pre-effective amendment
to the registration statement. In lieu of filing a pre-effective amendment,
a registrant eligible to use Form S-3 or F-3 may file the additional
communications under cover of a Form 8-K that is incorporated by
reference into the proxy statement/prospectus, which is part of the
registration statement.

•

Each additional communication used after delivery of the preliminary
prospectus includes a statement to the effect that the third party has
filed a registration statement, that the preliminary prospectus has been
sent or given to all shareholders eligible to vote at the meeting at which
the "friendly" transaction will be considered, and that the proxy
statement/prospectus is incorporated by reference into the
communication.

r
r

The staff's procedures outlined above are limited solely to the dissemination of additional communications and are not applicable to the dissemination of revisions to the "core" document.

r
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Securities Act registration issues also may arise in connection with the announcement of a negotiated, stock-for-stock merger by one or both of the parties to the prospective transaction. Such an-

j
nouncements, which typically are accompanied or followed by various other market communications
regarding the planned transaction, frequently are made by the parties' senior management, their respective investment bankers and/ or other representatives before the filing of the required Securities
Act registration statement. While issuers in these circumstances may have obligations under federal
securities antifraud and stock exchange rules to make timely disclosure of the impending transaction,
they should remember that such pre-filing communications may go beyond what arguably is necessary
and appropriate for compliance with applicable antifraud and SRO provisions and, as such, could be
deemed to constitute market conditioning that violates section 5. Whatever its content, moreover, the
information conveyed in these pre-filing communications must be reflected in the offering documents
subsequently filed with the Commission and delivered to shareholders.
4.

Identifying the Bidder in a Tender Offer

Rule 14d-1(c)(1) of Regulation 14D defines "bidder" in a tender offer as "any person who makes
a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender offer is made." The term bidder, for Regulation 14D purposes, does not include an issuer that makes a tender offer for its own securities. Each bidder in a
tender offer subject to Regulation 14D must file a Schedule 14D-1 (Schedule TO after the Regulation MA rules become effective) and disseminate the information required by that schedule.
The determination of who is the bidder does not necessarily stop at the entity used to make the
offer and purchase the securities. Rule 14d-1(c)(1) also requires persons "on whose behalf" the tender
offer is being made to be included as bidders. For instance, where a parent company forms an acquisition entity for the purpose of making the tender offer, both the acquisition entity and the parent company are bidders even though the acquisition entity will purchase all securities tendered. The staff
views the acquisition entity as the nominal bidder and the parent company as the real bidder. They
both should be named bidders in the Schedule 14D-1. Each offer must have at least one real bidder, and
there can be co-bidders as well.
The fact that the parent company or other persons control the purchaser through share ownership does not mean that the entity is automatically viewed as a bidder. Instead, we look at the parent's
or control person's role in the tender offer. Bidder status is a question that is determined by the particular facts and circumstances of each transaction. A similar analysis of bidder status is made in a tender
offer subject only to Regulation 14E. When we analyze who is the bidder, some relevant factors include:
•

Did the person playa significant role in initiating, structuring, and
negotiating the tender offer?

•

Is the person acting together with the named bidder?

•

To what extent did or does the person control the terms of the offer?

•

Is the person providing financing for the tender offer, or playing a
primary role in obtaining financing?

•

Does the person control the named bidder, directly or indirectly?

•

Did the person form the nominal bidder, or cause it to be formed?, and

•

Would the person beneficially own the securities purchased by the
named bidder in the tender offer or the assets of the target company?

One or two of these factors may control the determination, depending on the circumstances.
These factors are not exclusive.
We also consider whether adding the person as a named bidder means shareholders will receive material information that is not otherwise required under the control person instruction, Instruction C to Schedule 14D-1. However, this issue is not dispositive of bidder status. A person who qualifies as a bidder under Rule 14d-1(c)(1) must be included as a bidder on the Schedule 14D-l even if the
disclosure in the Schedule 14D-1 will not change as a result. Instruction C elicits information about the
control persons of the bidder. Merely disclosing the Instruction C information does not eliminate the
requirement that the real bidder sign the Schedule 14D-l and take direct responsibility for the disclosure. Where the real bidder does not sign the Schedule 14D-1 and does not prOVide the required disclo-
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sure, the parties run the risk of having to extend the offer to provide a full 20 business day period for
shareholders to consider the new information.
If a named bidder is an established entity with substantive operations and assets apart from
those related to the offer, the staff ordinarily will not go further up the chain of ownership to analyze
whether that entity's control persons are bidders. However, it still would be possible for other parties
involved with the offer to be co-bidders. The factors listed above would be used in the analysis. In
addition, we would consider the degree to which the other party acted with the named bidder, and the
extent to which the other party benefits from the transaction.

5.

Schedule 13E-3 Filing Obligations of Issuers or Affiliates Engaged in a Going-Private
Transaction

Generally, Exchange Act Rule 13e-3 requires that each issuer and affiliate engaged, directly or
indirectly, in a going-private transaction file a Schedule 13E-3 with the Commission and furnish the
required disclosures (e.g., the statement of "reasonable belief" as to the fairness or unfairness of the
proposed transaction) directly to the holders of the class of equity securities that is the subject of the
transaction. A joint filing may be permissible in this situation, provided each filing person individually
makes the required disclosures and signs the Schedule 13E-3.
Two separate but related issues may be raised with respect to the determination of "filingperson" status in situations where a third party proposes a transaction with an issuer that has at least
one of the requisite "going-private" effects: first, what entities or persons are "affiliates" of the issuer
within the scope of Rule 13e-3(a)(1) and, second, when should those affiliates be deemed to be engaged,
either directly or indirectly, in the going-private transaction. Resolution of both issues necessarily turns
on all relevant facts and circumstances of a particular transaction. The following considerations should
be noted:
(a) The staff consistently has taken the position that members of senior management of the issuer that is going private are affiliates of that issuer. Depending on
the particular facts and circumstances of the transaction, such management also
might be deemed to be engaged in the transaction. As a result, such management-affiliates may incur a Schedule 13E-3 filing obligation separate from that of
the issuer. For example, the staff has taken the position that members of senior
management of an issuer that will be going private are required to file a Schedule 13E-3 where the transaction will be effected through merger of the issuer
into the purchaser or that purchaser's acquisition subsidiary, even though:
(i)

such management's involvement in the issuer's negotiations
with the purchaser is limited to the terms of each manager's
future employment with and/or equity participation in the
surviving company; and

(ii)

the issuer's board of directors appointed a special committee
of outside directors to negotiate all other terms of the
transaction except management's role in the surviving entity.
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An important aspect of the staff's analysis was the fact that the issuer's management ultimately
would hold a material amount of the surviving company's outstanding equity securities, occupy seats
on the board of this company in addition to senior management positions, and otherwise be in a position to "control" the surviving company within the meaning of Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 (i&, "possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.").
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(b) Questions have arisen regarding the nature and scope of the Schedule 13E-3
filing obligation of an acquiring person, or "purchaser," in a merger or other
going-private transaction. In the situation described in (a) above, where management of the issuer-seller that will be going private is essentially "on both
sides" of the transaction, the purchaser also may be deemed to be an affiliate of
the issuer engaged in the transaction and, as a consequence, required to file on
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Schedule 13E-3. See Exchange Act Release No. 16075 (August 2,1979) (noting
that"affiliates of the seller often become affiliates of the purchaser through means
other than equity ownership, and thereby are in control of the seller's business
both before and after the transaction. In such cases the sale, in substance and
effect, is being made to an affiliate of the issuer ...."). Accordingly, the issuerseller, its senior management and the purchaser may be deemed Schedule 13E-3
filing persons in connection with the going-private transaction. Where the purchaser has created a merger subsidiary or other acquisition vehicle to effect the
transaction, moreover, the staff will "look through" the acquisition vehicle and
treat as a separate, affiliated purchaser the intermediate or ultimate parent of
that acquisition vehicle. Accordingly, l2Q!h the acquisition vehicle and the entity
or person who formed it to acquire the issuer would have separate filing obligations (although, as noted, a joint filing may be permitted by the staff).

v.

ELECTRONIC FILING AND TECHNOLOGY

A.

EDGAR

The Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval ("EDGAR") system has
been operational since 1992, with mandated electronic filing by those subject to the Division's review
beginning in April 1993. Electronic filings are publicly available on a 24-hour delayed basis in the
"EDGAR Database" area of the Commission's website, http://www.sec.gov.This area also contains other
information about EDGAR, including an outline entitled "Electronic Filing and the EDGAR System: A
Regulatory Overview." The following events are of current interest:

1.

-

-

EDGAR Modernization and Related Rule Amendments

On June 22, 1998, the Commission awarded to TRW, Inc. a three year contract for the modernization of the EDGAR System, with options for contract extensions for up to five years. The EDGAR
architecture will be converted to an Internet-based system using Hyper Text Markup language ("HTML")
as the filing format, and also will support the attachment of graphical files. The new system is expected
to reduce costs and efforts of preparing and submitting electronic filings, as well as permit more attractive and readable documents.
On May 17, 1999, the Commission issued Securities Act Release No. 7684 adopting new rules
and amendments to existing rules and forms in connection with the first stage of EDGAR modernization. The rules become effective June 28,1999.

j

On June 28, the Commission began accepting live filings submitted in HTML, as well as documents submitted in the currently required American Standard Code for Information Interchange
("ASCII") format. Filers have the option of accompanying their required filings with unofficial copies
in Portable Document Format ("PDF"). Filers also are encouraged to submit test filings that include
documents in HTML and PDF format.
2.

Paper Filings No Longer Accepted

The Commission has adopted a new electronic filing rule (Rule 14 of Regulation 5-T) to make it
clear that it will no longer accept filings made in paper that should have been filed electronically. See
Release No. 33-7472 (October 24,1997). The rule became effective January 1, 1998. If a filer submits a
paper document required to be filed electronically, and does not follow the appropriate procedures for
a temporary or continuing hardship exemption outlined in Rules 201 and 202 of Regulation 5-T, the
filing will not be accepted or processed. If the filing desk receives a document by courier it will be given
back to the courier, and if received through the mail or other delivery service, it will be returned by mail.
B.

Electronic Delivery of Information

The Commission has issued interpretive releases and rules addreSSing the use of electronic
media to deliver or transmit information under the federal securities laws. These initiatives reflect the
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Commission's continuing recognition of the benefits that electronic technology provides to the financial
markets. These releases are premised on the belief that the use of electronic media should be at least an
equal alternative to the use of paper delivery.
The first interpretive release (Securities Act Release No. 7233 (October 6,1995)) provides guidance to issuers who use electronic media in complying with the applicable delivery requirements of the
federal securities laws. Information distributed through electronic means may be viewed as satisfying
the delivery requirements of the federal securities laws if it results in the delivery to the intended recipients of substantially equivalent information as they would have had if the information were delivered
in paper form. The interpretive release advises issuers to consider the following:
•

Has timely and adequate notice been provided to the investor that the
information is available?

•

Does the investor have access to the information? Specifically:
is it practically accessible?
is it available on-line for as long as a delivery requirement
applies?

r

does the investor have the opportunity to retain the information
or have ongoing access equivalent to personal retention?
is it available in paper upon request?
•

r
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Does the selected distribution method provide reasonable assurance
that it will result in delivery? Examples for consideration by persons
with delivery obligations include:
an investor has given an informed consent to receive the
information through a particular electronic medium and been
provided appropriate notice and access;
there is evidence that the investor actually received the
information (~ electronic mail return receipt or confirmation
of downloading);
the information is provided by facsimile to an investor who
has provided a fax machine number;
the investor has accessed an electronic document with
hypertext linking to a document required to be delivered; or
an investor returns an order form available only through an
electronically delivered document.

The release also contains numerous examples applying these concepts to specific fact situations.
On May 9, 1996, the Commission issued a second interpretive release primarily addressing
issues associated with the electronic delivery of information by broker-dealers, transfer agents, and
investment advisers under certain Exchange Act and Advisers Act rules (Securities Act Release No.
7288). This release also contains a section following up the 1995 release with additional examples. A
third interpretive release issued in 1998 is discussed below.
On May 9, 1996, the Commission also adopted a number of technical amendments to its rules
and forms intended to codify some interpretations set out in the interpretive release (Securities Act
Release No. 7289). Most changes relate to rules that require distribution of information by mail, or rules
that require presentation of information in a specified type size or font, or in red ink or bold-face type.
For example, if a rule requires presentation of a legend using a specified type size and font, the rule now
provides that if an electronic medium is used, the legend must be presented using any means reasonably calculated to draw attention to it.
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Guidance in this area also is provided by interpretive letters addressing particular issues regarding electronic dissemination. See Section XII. In addition, the staff has issued two letters addressing the identification of an issuer's web site in a prospectus: lIT Corporation (December 6,1996) and
Baltimore Gas and Electric CompanY (January 6, 1997).
C.

J
j

Interpretive Release Belatina to Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit
Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore

The Commission issued an interpretive release on March 23,1998, that provides guidance on
the application of the registration requirements of the U.S. securities laws to offers of securities or investment services made on Internet Web sites by foreign issuers, investment companies, investment
advisers, broker-dealers and exchanges. In the release (Securities Act Release No. 7516), the Commission expresses its views on when the posting of offering or solicitation materials on Internet Web sites
would not be considered to be an offering "in the United States."

J

The release states that, for purposes of the registration requirements only, offshore Internet
offers and solicitation activities would not be considered to be made"in the United States" if Internet
offerors implement measures that are reasonably designed to ensure that their offshore Internet offers
are not targeted to the United States or to U.S. persons. In the Commission's view, offshore Internet
offers that are not targeted to the United States would not trigger the registration requirements of the
u.s. securities laws, even if U.S. persons are able to access the Web site offers.
The interpretation suggests measures that Web site offerors could implement to guard against
targeting their offers to the United States. The measures outlined in the release are not exclusive. Other
procedures may suffice to guard against sales to U.S. persons. Under the interpretation's general approach, a foreign offeror could post an offer on its Web site without registering the offer, if: i) the offeror
puts a meaningful disclaimer on the Web site that would specify intended offerees by identifying the
jurisdictions in which the offer is or is not being made; and ii) the offeror implements measures reasonably designed to prevent sales to U.S. persons.
The release explains that the measures suggested under the general approach may not be adequate for U.S. offerors making offshore Internet offers. Because domestic offerors are very likely to
have significant contacts with the United States, and because investors may reasonably assume SEC
regulation of the Internet offers of domestic entities, the Commission believes that U.s. offerors making
offshore Internet offers should, in addition to following the general approach, password protect their
Web sites to ensure that only non-U.S. persons may access their unregistered Web site offers.
Offerors may wish to post their offerings on third-party Internet sites or communicate with
offerees through forms of Internet communication that are more directed than through an Internet Web
site posting. Depending on the activities and status of the offerors, implementation of the measures
described under the general approach may not be adequate to guard against targeting the United States.
For example:
•

If an offeror seeks to have its offshore offer posted on the Web sites of
third parties that are acting on its behalf, such as Web site service
providers or underwriters, the offeror should only use third parties
that employ at least the same level of precautions against targeting the
United States as would be adequate for the offeror to employ.

•

If, to generate interest in their offshore Internet offers, offerors use the
services of investment-oriented Web site sponsors that have a significant
number of U.S. clients or subscribers, then those offerors should employ
measures to ensure that only non-U.S. persons may access the offering
materials on their Web sites.

•

Offerors that address or direct communications, such as e-mail, about
their offers to particular U.S. persons or groups must assume the
responsibility of determining when their offering communications are
being sent to persons in the United States, and must fully comply with
U.S. securities laws.
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The release discusses issues that arise under the Securities Act of 1933 when foreign issuers
make offshore Internet offers at the same time they make other offers in the United States. Offerors of
concurrent offerings should consider whether, in addition to following the general approach, they should
implement more restrictive measures to avoid targeting the United States. The release indicates that:

r

•

Offerors of concurrent offshore Internet and U.S. private offers may
not use their Web site offers as a means to solicit investors for their U.S.
private offerings. The release suggests two non-exclusive ways to reach
that result. These offerors could either: i) allow unrestricted access to
their offshore Internet offers, but implement procedures to identify
respondents to their Web site offers and restrict them from participating
in their U.S. private offers; or ii) limit access to their offshore Internet
offers to only those respondents who first provide the offerors with
information indicating that they are not U.S. persons.

•

Offerors of concurrent offshore Internet and U.s. registered offers
should keep in mind U.S. securities laws limitations on pre-filing and
waiting period communications.
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In addition to addressing issues under the Securities Act of 1933, the release provides guidance
on the application of the general approach to the registration obligations under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the broker-dealer and exchange registration
provisions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

D.

Year 2000 Interpretive Release and Frequently Asked Questions

The "Year 2000 problem" arose because many existing computer programs use only the last
two digits to refer to a year. Therefore, these computer programs do not properly recognize a year that
begins with "20" instead of the familiar "19." If not corrected, many computer applications could fail or
create erroneous results. The extent of the potential impact of the Year 2000 problem is not yet known,
and if not timely corrected, it could affect the global economy.
On July 29,1998, the Commission issued an interpretive release on Year 2000 disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7558 (effective August 4). This release is meant to elicit more. meaningful Year
2000 disclosure from public companies, investment advisers, investment companies and municipal securities issuers.
For public companies that make filings with the Division of Corporation Finance, the
Commission's authority basically is directed toward eliciting disclosure. The disclosure framework
requires companies to disclose material information that enables investors to make informed investment decisions. The interpretive release provides specific guidance for public companies making disclosure called for by Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations ("MD&A"), financial statement requirements and other rules and regulations.
MD&A (Item 303 of Regulation 5-B and 5-K) is the regulation that requires companies to disclose known events, trends, and unceI:tainties - forward-looking information. Most discussions of
Year 2000 issues contain forward-looking elements. Under the release's interpretation of MD&A, a
company would provide Year 2000 disclosure if:
(1)

its assessment of its Year 2000 issues is not complete, or

(2)

management determines that the consequences of its Year 2000 issues
would have a material effect on the company's business, results of
operations, or financial condition, without taking into account the
company's efforts to avoid those consequences.

r

The Commission believes that the vast majority of companies have material Year 2000 issues,
and therefore expects them to address this topic in their MD&A. In almost all cases, this disclosure
should be updated in each quarterly and annual periodic report.

r
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When a company has a Year 2000 disclosure obligation, the release states that full and fair
disclosure includes:
(1)

the company's state of readiness;

(2)

the costs to address the company's Year 2000 issues;

(3)

the risks of the company's Year 2000 issues; and

4)

the company's contingency plans.

Each company must consider if its own Year 2000 circumstances require disclosure of other
matters to meet their disclosure obligations. The release provides suggestions for some of these other
matters.
To encourage companies to provide meaningful disclosure, the release provides interpretive
guidance on the application of the statutory safe harbors for forward-looking information provided by
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These safe harbors provide protection for forwardlooking information accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements. The safe harbors provide protection from class action lawsuits in federal court.
The release also addresses investment advisers and investment companies. The Commission,
which has direct regulatory authority over these entities, has concluded that the best approach to monitor the year 2000 readiness of investment advisers and investment companies is to require the investment advisers to provide publicly available reports to the Commission. In June 1998, the Commission
proposed to require these reports. The release also discusses the importance of disclosure by investment
companies and investment advisers if the Year 2000 issue is material to their operating results or financial conditions, and provides guidance for such disclosure.
The Commission's regulatory authority over disclosure by issuers of municipal securities is not
as broad as its authority over disclosure by public and investment companies. Generally, municipal
securities offerings are, by statute, exempt from registration and municipal securities issuers are exempt
from the reporting provisions of the federal securities law, including line-item disclosure rules. Under
an anti-fraud standard, the release provides guidance to municipal securities issuers on how to disclose
their Year 2000 issues.
On November 9,1998, the Commission gave additional guidance on the interpretive release by
publishing Frequently Asked Questions to clarify some recurring issues (Securities Act Release No.
7609).
VI.

SMALL BUSINESS ISSUES

A.

Recent Small Business Initiatives

J
J

J
J
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J

J

The Commission has undertaken several initiatives to help small businesses, including the following:
•

A special Corporation Finance headquarters unit specializes in small
company filings and the needs of small businesses, including crafting
rules to lessen the burden of Commission's regulation on these issuers.
The telephone number for the unit is (202) 942-2950.

•

The Commission's Internet site (lzttp://www.sec.gov) has been enhanced
to provide information specifically designed for small business and
access to such Commission publications as "Q & A: Small Business
and the SEC."

•

The Division has added a new section to the Small Business Information
page on the Commission's Internet site. The new section, Small
Business Forms and Associated Regulations, will provide guidance to
small businesses as they prepare their SEC filings under the Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The new section
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contains the text of a number of forms and regulations of interest to
small businesses. Hypertext links between the forms and the
regulations are provided, and updates will be made to reflect the
adoption of new rules or changes to existing rules. More forms and
rules will be added in the future.

•

Since 1996, a number of town hall meetings between the Commission
and small businesses have been conducted throughout the United
States. These town hall meetings convey basic information to small
businesses about fundamental requirements that must be addressed
when they wish to raise capital through the public sale of securitie~ In
addition, the Commission hopes to learn more about the concerns and
problems facing small businesses in raising capital so that programs
can be designed to meet their needs, consistent with the protection of
investors. The most recent town hall meeting was held in Albuquerque,
New Mexico on October 21,1999.

•

The 18th annual Government-Business Forum on Small Business
Capital Formation was held in Washington, D.C. on September 13-14,
1999. This platform for small business is the only governmentallysponsored national gathering for small business, which offers annually
the opportunity for small businesses to let government officials know
how the laws, rules and regulations are affecting their ability to raise
capital. Next year's Government-Business Forum will be in Texas in
September.
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B.

Small Business Rulemaking

1.

Rule 504 of Regulation D

On February 25,1999, the Commission issued a release (Securities Act Release No. 7644) adopting amendments to Rule 504, the limited offering exemption under Regulation D. Rule 504 permits
non-reporting issuers to offer and sell securities to an unlimited number of persons without regard to
their sophistication or experience and without delivery of any specified information. The aggregate
offering price of this exemption is limited to $1 million in any 12-month period, and certain other offerings must be aggregated with the Rule 504 offering in determining the available sales amount. Before
these amendments were adopted, general solicitation and advertising was permitted and the securities
sold under this exemption could be resold freely by non-affiliates of the issuer.
Unfortunately, there have been some recent disturbing developments in the secondary markets
for some securities initially issued under Rule 504, and to a lesser degree, in the initial Rule 504 issuances themselves. These offerings generally involve the securities of "microcap" companies. Recent
market innovations and technological changes, most notably, the Internet, have created the possibility
of nation-wide Rule 504 offerings for securities of non-reporting companies that were once thought to
be sold locally.
As part of the Commission's comprehensive agenda to deter registration and trading abuses,
particularly by microcap issuers, in May 1998, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 504 to
eliminate the freely tradable nature of the securities issued under the exemption (Securities Act Release
No. 7541). Under the proposals, these securities could only have been resold only after the one-year
holding period of Rule 144, through registration, or through another exemption (such as Regulation A)
if available. The Commission also solicited comment on an alternative to revise Rule 504 so it would be
substantially similar to its pre-1992 format, permitting public offerings only where the issuer complies
with state registration processes that require the preparation and delivery of a disclosure document to
investors before sale of the securities. Comment also was solicited on the appropriate treatment for
offerings made under certain state exemptions, such as the one recently developed for sales to accredited investors (~., the Model Accredited Investor Exemption).

r

Almost all commenters objected to the proposal to make all securities issued in a Rule 504
transaction restricted, since it would require issuers to offer a substantial liquidity discount in all Rule

r
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504 issuances, even fully state registered ones, causing a significant reduction of capital. Commenters
believed that the alternative approach, which was to reinstitute the rule largely as it had been in effect
for a number of years before 1992, would be equally, if not more, effective. If an issuer goes through
state registration and must deliver a disclosure document to investors, sufficient information ought to
be available in the markets to permit investors to make more informed investmeI1t decisions and thus
deter manipulation of Rule 504 securities.
After consideration of the comments, the Commission decided to return to the pre-1992 approach, which should deter microcap fraud without unduly penalizing small businesses. As amended,
Rule 504 establishes the general principle that securities issued under the exemption, just like the other
Regulation D exemptions, will be restricted, and prohibits general solicitation and general advertising,
unless the specified conditions permitting a public offering are met. These conditions are:
•

•

the transactions are registered under a state law requiring public filing
and delivery of a substantive disclosure document to investors before
sale. For sales to occur in a state without this sort of provision, the
transactions must be registered in another state with such a provision
and the disclosure document filed in the state must be delivered to all
purchasers before sale in both states; or
the securities are issued under a state law exemption that permits
general solicitation and advertising, so long as sales are made only to
accredited investors as that term is defined in Regulation D.

Most Rule 504 offerings are private. Private Rule 504 offerings are still permitted for up to $1
million in a 12-month period, under the same terms and conditions, except for the specific disclosure
requirements, as offerings under Rules 505 and 506. Securities in these offerings would be restricted,
and these offerings would no longer involve general solicitation and advertising.
The amendments became effective on April 7, 1999. Rule 504 offerings that begin on or after
this date will have to comply with the new rule. With respect to Rule 504 offerings that are ongoing on
the effective date, issuers will have to discontinue offers and register under a state law requiring the
preparation and delivery of a disclosure document to investors before sale in order to issue freely tradable securities.

In response to questions the staff has received about the Rule 504 amendments, we would like
to point that for public offerings registered under the provisions of a complying state registration system (New York and the District of Columbia do not have such a system), such offerings must be made
exclusively to the citizens of the state(s) of registration. Registration in one state and attempted sale to
the citizens of another state (except for New York and the District of Columbia) would not meet the
public offering requirements and also may violate the law of the state where registration was not effected. Registration under a state law with sales to citizens of a foreign jurisdiction would not meet the
standards for a public offering under revised Rule 504.
2.

Rule 701

On February 25, 1999, the Commission issued a release (Securities Act Release No. 7645) adopting amendments to Rule 701 under the Securities Act of 1933, which allows private companies to sell
securities to their employees without the need to file a registration statement, as public companies do.
Rule 701 provides an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act for offers and
sales of securities under certain compensatory benefit plans or written agreements relating to compensation. The exemptive scope covers securities offered or sold under a plan or agreement between a nonreporting company (or its parents or majority-owned subsidiaries) and the company's employees, officers, directors, partners, trustees, consultants and advisors Before these amendments were adopted, the
total amount of securities that could be offered in the preceding 12 months could not exceed the greater
of $500,000 or an amount determined under one of two formulas (Le., 15% of the issuer's total assets or
15% of the outstanding securities of the class being offered), but in no event more than $5 million.

In February 1998, the Commission proposed a number of revisions to increase the flexibility
and usefulness of Rule 701, as well as to simplify and clarify the rule (Securities Act Release No. 7511).
On February 25,1999, the Commission issued an adopting release that:
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-$1 million (rather than the current $500,000);

rI

-15% of the issuer's total assets; or
-15% of the outstanding securities of the class;

r

•

requires issuers to provide specific disclosure if more than $5 million
worth of securities are to be sold (i.e., a copy of the compensatory benefit
plan or contract; a copy of the summary plan description required by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), or if
the plan is not subject to ERISA, a summary of the plan's material terms;
risk factors associated with investment in the securities under the plan
or agreement; and the financial statements required in an offering
statement on Form I-A under Regulation A);

•

does not count offers for purposes of calculating the available exempted
amounts;

•

harmonizes the definition of consultants and advisors permitted to use
the exemption to the narrower definition of Form S-8, thereby
narrowing the scope of eligible consultants and advisors;

•

amends Rule 701 to codify current and more flexible interpretations;
and

•

simplifies the rule by recasting it in plain English.
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removes the $5 million aggregate offering price ceiling and, instead,
sets the maximum amount of securities that may be sold in a year at
the greatest of :

Non-reporting foreign private issuers will be required to provide the same disclosure as nonreporting domestic issuers if sales under Rule 701 exceed $5 million in a 12-month period. When, and if,
the Commission accepts international accounting standards or guidelines for filing and reporting purposes, Rule 701 will be amended to allow theses standards to satisfy Rule 701's financial statement
disclosure obligations for foreign private issuers. For issuers making smaller offerings, the foreign
companies may continue to follow the rule as they have in the past, which means that "home country"
reports may be used, as necessary, to satisfy the antifraud standards. However, both domestic and
foreign private issuers that cross the $5 million barrier will have to provide the disclosure required
under Regulation A, which includes unaudited financial statements. Where financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP are not provided by the foreign private issuer, a reconciliation to
such principles must be attached.
These amendments to Rule 701 became effective on April 7, 1999. The changes to the rule are
not retroactive. Offers and sales made in reliance before the effective date will continue to be valid if
they meet the conditions of the rule before its revision.
Because of errors in the Federal Register version of the adopting release, a different way of
calculating the amount of the exempt offering appears in the Code of Federal Regulations than that
approved by the Commission. On November 5,1999, the Secretary of the Commission issued a release
(Securities Act Release No. 7645A) to correct the errors. The correction deletes a reference to the necessity of only making calculations based upon an annual balance sheet. The original intention was to
permit calculations to be made on the basis of interim balance sheets as long as they were no older than
the issuer's most recent fiscal year end.
VII.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

A.

Foreign Issuers in the U.S. Market

Foreign companies raising funds from the public or having their securities traded on a national
exchange or the Nasdaq Stock Market are generally subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act and the registration and reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. The Commission has
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provided a separate integrated disclosure system for foreign private issuers that provides a number of
accommodations to foreign practices and policies. These accommodations include:
interim reporting on the basis of home country and stock exchange
practice rather than quarterly reports;
exemption from the proxy rules and the insider reporting and short
swing profit recovery provisions of Section 16;
aggregate executive compensation disclosure rather than individual
disclosure, if so permitted in an issuer's home country;

J
j

acceptance of three International Accounting Standards relating to cash
flow statements (lAS # 7), business combinations (lAS # 22) and
operations in hyperinflationary economies (lAS # 21);

J

offering document financial statements updated principally on a semiannual, rather than a quarterly basis; and

J
J

an exemption from Exchange Act registration under Section 12(g) for
foreign private issuers that have not engaged in a U.S. public offering
or whose securities are not traded on a national exchange or the Nasdaq
Stock Market.
Additionally, the Commission staff has implemented procedures to review foreign issuers' disclosure documents on an expedited basis and in draft form, if requested by the issuer. This helps to
facilitate cross-border offerings and listings in light of potentially conflicting home-country schedules
and disclosure requirements.
Over the last five years, the number of foreign companies accessing
the U.s. public markets has increased dramatically. As of June 30, 1999 there were over 1200 foreign
companies from 57 countries filing periodic reports with the Commission.
In addition to the topiCS discussed below in this "Internationalization" section, the Commission has issued an interpretive release on offshore Internet offerings; see Section v.c.
B.

j

Abusive Practices under Regulation S and Amendments to the Rule

The Commission adopted Regulation S in 1990 to clarify the applicability of the Securities Act
registration requirements to offshore transactions. Since the adoption of Regulation 5, a number of
abusive practices have developed involving unregistered sales of equity securities by U.S. companies
purportedly in reliance upon Regulation S. These transactions have resulted in indirect distributions of
those securities into the United States without the investor protection provided by registration.
Regulation 5 has been used as a means of perpetrating fraudulent and manipulative schemes.
In these schemes, the securities are being placed offshore temporarily to evade U.S. registration requirements, but the ownership of the securities never leaves the U.S. market, or a substantial portion of the
economic risk is left in or is returned to the U.S. market during the restricted period, or there is no
reasonable expectation that the securities could be viewed as coming to rest abroad.
In June 1995, the Commission issued an interpretive release that described certain abusive practices under Regulation 5 and requested comment on whether the regulation should be revised to limit
its vulnerability to abuse, Securities Act Release No. 7190 aune 27,1995). To address continued abuses
of this rule, the Commission published for comment a proposal to amend Regulation S, Securities Act
Release No. 7392 (February 20, 1997). In February 1998, the Commission adopted most of these proposed amendments, Securities Act Release No. 7505 (Feb. 17,1998).
The amendments are designed to eliminate abusive practices under Regulation 5, while preserving the benefits of the rule for capital formation. As a result of these amendments, securities sold by
domestic issuers pursuant to the Regulation 5 exemption will be treated in a manner similar to securities sold under the Regulation D exemption from registration.
The amendments to Regulation 5 affect offshore offerings of equity securities, including convertible securities, by U.s. companies. The amendments are as follows:
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•

Equity securities of domestic issuers placed offshore pursuant to
Regulation S are classified as "restricted securities" within the meaning
of Rule 144, so that resales without registration or an exemption from
registration will be restricted;

r

•

To avoid confusion between the holding period for "restricted
securities" under Rule 144 and the "restricted period" under Regulation
S, the term "restricted period" is renamed the "distribution compliance
period;"

r
r
r

•

The distribution compliance period for these securities is lengthened
from 40 days to one year;

•

Certification, legending and other requirements, which were applicable
only to sales of equity securities by non-reporting issuers, are imposed
on these equity securities;

•

Purchasers of these equity securities are required to agree that their
hedging transactions with respect to these securities will be conducted
in compliance with the Securities Act, such as Rule 144 thereunder; and

•

Domestic issuers are able to report sales of equity securities pursuant
to Regulation S on a quarterly basis, rather than on Form 8-K. This
change in reporting requirement was not effective until January 1, 1999,
to allow Commission staff to monitor developments under the new
amendments.
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In addition, the amendments codify an existing Commission interpretive position that resales
of these equity securities offshore do not "wash off" the restrictions applicable to these securities.
e.

International Accounting Standards

The Commission has been working with the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) through the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) since 1987 in an
effort to develop a set of accounting standards for cross-border offerings and listings. The IASC is an
independent, private sector body that was formed in 1973 by the professional accounting bodies in the
U.S. and eight other industrialized countries to improve and harmonize accounting standards.
In July 1995, IOSCO and the IASC joined in an announcement that the IASC had developed a
work program focusing on a core set of standards previously identified by IOSCO as being the necessary components of a reasonably complete set of accounting standards. The announcement noted that
completion of comprehensive core standards that are acceptable to the IOSCO Technical Committee
would allow the Technical Committee to recommend endorsement of the standards for cross-border
capital raising and listing purposes in all global markets.
In April 1996, the IASC announced that it had accelerated its work program, and the Commission responded with a press release expressing support for the lASe's objective. The Commission's
statement noted that the standards should include a core set of accounting pronouncements that constitute a comprehensive, generally accepted basis of accounting; that the standards be of high quality, i&,
they must result in comparability and transparency, and they must provide for full disclosure; and that
the standards must be rigorously interpreted and applied. In October 1997, the Commission published
a report to Congress that discussed the progress of the lASe. The report is available on the Commission's
web site.
The IASC has completed substantially all the components of its core standards project, and
both IOSCO and the Commission currently are engaged in a detailed assessment of the completed
standards.
D.

International Disclosure Standards-Amendments to Form 20-F

On September 28,1999, the Commission adopted changes to its non-financial statement disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers, to conform those requirements more closely to the Inter-
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national Disclosure Standards endorsed by IOSCO in September 1998 (Securities Act Release No. 7745).
The changes are intended to harmonize disclosure requirements on fundamental topics among the securities regulations of various jurisdictions.
1.

Background

The Commission has long supported the concept of a harmonized international disclosure system, and for a number of years has been working with other members of IOSCO to develop a set of
international standards for non-financial statement disclosures that could be used in cross border offerings and listings. The International Disclosure Standards developed by IOSCO reflect a consensus among
securities regulators in the major capital markets as to the types of disclosures that should be required
for cross border offerings and listings. The Standards cover fundamental disclosure topics such as the
description of the issuer's business, results of operations and management and the securities it plans to
offer or list.
2.

Changes to Foreign Integrated Disclosure System

The Commission amended Form 20-F, the basic Exchange Act registration statement and annual report form used by foreign issuers, to incorporate the International Disclosure Standards. The
Commission also revised the Securities Act registration forms designated for use by foreign private
issuers, and related rules and forms, to reflect the changes in Form 20-F. The amendments do not
change the financial statement reconciliation requirements for foreign issuers, and the Commission will
continue to require disclosure on topics not covered by the International Disclosure Standards, such as
disclosures relating to market risk and specialized industries such as banks. Unlike the IOSCO International Disclosure Standards, which were intended to apply only to offerings and listings of common
equity securities and only to listings and transactions for cash, the amendments to Form 20-F apply to
all types of offerings and listings and to annual reports. The Commission also revised the definition of
"foreign private issuer," which determines an issuer's eligibility to use certain Commission forms and
benefit from certain accommodations under Commission rules, to clarify how issuers should calculate
their U.s. ownership for purposes of the definition.
The changes to Form 20-F, the Securities Act registration forms and the "foreign private issuer"
definition become effective beginning in September 2000, but foreign registrants are encouraged to use
the new forms before that date.
VIII.

OTHER PENDING RULEMAKING AND RECENT RULE ADOPTIONS

A.

Proposed Amendment to Options Disclosure Document Rule

On June 25,1998, the Commission issued a release soliciting comments on a proposal to revise
Rule 135b (Securities Act Release No. 7550). The proposal provides that an options disclosure document prepared in accordance with Rule 9b-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not a prospectus, and accordingly is not subject to civil liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. The
proposal is intended to codify a long-standing interpretive position that was issued immediately after
the Commission adopted the current registration and disclosure system applicable to standardized options. The proposed revision is intended to eliminate any legal uncertainty in this area.
B.

Amendments Regarding Segment Disclosure

On January 5, 1999, the Commission adopted technical amendments to conform its rules with
the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (Securities Act Release No. 7620). The amendments harmonize the narrative disclosure rules "With recently
revised GAAP financial reporting standards by requiring disclosure of a business enterprise's "operating segments," rather than its "industry segments," as previously required.
C.

Final and Proposed Amendments to FOrm S-8

Form 5-8 is the short-form Securities Act registration statement that is available for offers and
sales of securities to employees. Unlike other Securities Act registration forms, Form S-8 does not con-
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tain a separate prospectus. Instead, Form 5-8 relies on employee benefit plan disclosure documents
otherwise provided by the employer to satisfy the disclosure obligations of the Securities Act. This
abbreviated disclosure is available for offers and sales of securities to employees because of the compensatory nature of these offerings and employees' familiarity with the company's business due to the
employment relationship. In 1990, the Commission revised the Form S-8 definition of "employee" to
permit the form to be used for offers and sales of securities to consultants or advisors who provide
legitimate services to the issuer that do not involve the offer or sale of securities in a capital-raising
transaction.
Since adoption of the 1990 revisions, some companies have used Form 5-8 improperly to compensate consultants whose primary service to the company is promotion of the company's securities.
This practice has been used in fraudulent promotions of microcap and other securities. In other cases,
Form 5-8 has been used to distribute securities to public investors through so-called "consultants" whose
service to the issuer is selling the securities into the market. This practice, which deprives public investors of the disclosure and liability protections of the Securities Act, has been the subject of Commission
enforcement action. On February 25, 1999, the Commission issued Securities Act Release No. 7646
("Adopting Release"), adopting amendments to Form 5-8 and related rules designed to deter these
abuses. The Adopting Release:
•

amends Form S-8 and the definition of "employee benefit plan" in
Securities Act Rule 405 so that the form is not available for sales to
consultants and advisors who directly or indirectly promote or maintain
a market for the company's securities; and

•

amends Securities Act Rule 401(g) so that registration statements, such
as Form 5-8, that become effective automatically upon filing will not
be presumed to be filed on the proper form.

The Adopting Release also includes interpretive guidance regarding the types of consulting
activities that may - or may not - be compensated with securities registered on Form 5-8.
Form S-8, of course, is used primarily for legitimate employee benefit plans. The Adopting
Release also amends Form S-8 to simplify the registration of securities underlying stock options issued
under employee benefit plans. Because stock options have become an increasingly important component of employee compensation, employees are more likely to face circumstances - such as estate planning and property settlements in connection with divorce - that may require the transfer of options to
their family members.
These amendments permit employees' family members, as well as the employees themselves,
to use Form 5-8 to exercise options issued under employee benefit plans. "Family members" are defined to include persons with specified relationships to the employee, and specified entities that either
benefit or are controlled by these persons. A corresponding amendment to General Instruction I.B.4 to
Form S-3 makes Form 5-3 equally available for the offer and sale of securities underlying both warrants
and options, without regard to whether either class of derivative security is transferable.
The Adopting Release also amends the executive compensation disclosure requirements of Item
402 of Regulations S-K and S-B to clarify that an option issued as executive compensation remains
reportable, even if the executive subsequently transfers it.
In Securities Act Release 7647 ("Proposing Release"), also issued February 25,1999, the Commission proposed additional amendments to Form 5-8 designed to further deter abuse of this form
without imposing undue burdens on companies more likely to be operating legitimate employee benefit plans. The new proposal would require, before filing a registration statement on Form 5-8, that:
•

any company be timely in its Exchange Act reports during the 12
calendar months and any portion of a month before the Form 5-8 is
filed; and

•

a company formed by merger of a nonpublic company into an
Exchange Act reporting company with only nominal assets at the time
of the merger (a "shell" company) wait until it has filed an annual report
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on Form 10-K or Form 10-KSB containing audited financial statements
reflecting the merger.
The Proposing Release requests comment on other potential amendments, such as requiring
Exchange Act reports to disclose aggregate issuances of securities registered on Form 5-8 during the
preceding 12 months in excess of a specified percentage of the number of securities of the same class
outstanding.

J

J

Finally, the Proposing Release also extends the comment period on some of the proposed amendments to Form 5-8 and requests for comment that were issued in Securities Act Release 7506 (February
17,1998). These are:
•

•

the proposed disclosure in Part II of Form 5-8 of the names of any
consultants or advisors to whom the company will issue securities
under the registration statement, as well as the amount of securities to
be offered to each and the nature of the consulting or advisory services;
and
the requests for comment:
whether companies should be required to disclose Form 5-8
sales of securities to consultants or advisors in their Exchange
Act reports - either in Form 10-K and Form 10-Q, or on Form
8-K;
whether the aggregate percentage of securities that may be sold
to consultants and advisors on Form 5-8 during the company's
fiscal year should be limited to a specified percentage of the
number of securities of the same class outstanding;
whether the existing requirement thatthe company certify "that
it has reasonable grounds to believe that it meets all of the
requirements for filing on Form 5-8" should be expanded also
to require the company to certify that any consultant or advisor
who receives securities registered on the form does not, and
will not, engage in capital-raising or promotional activities;
and
whether the Form 5-8 cover page should include a box that
the company would be required to check if any securities
registered on the form are offered and sold to consultants and
advisors.

The Commission will consider these ideas along with those proposed or discussed in the Proposing Release.
D.

J

Shareholder Proposals

On September 18, 1997, the Commission issued a release (Exchange Act Release No. 39093)
proposing amendments to Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, and related amendments to Rules
14a-4, 14a-5, 14a-2 and 13d-5. The proposals represented a package of reforms to address a range of
concerns raised by both shareholder and corporate participants in the proposal process. The Commission adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8 and related amendments to Rules 14a-4 and 14a-5 on May 21,
1998 (Exchange Act Release No. 40018). The revisions:
•

recast Rule 14a-8 into a plain English question and answer format;

•

reverse the Cracker Barrel interpretive position so that employmentrelated shareholder proposals raising social policy issues are not
automatically excludable on ordinary business grounds;

•

amend Rule 14a-4 to provide shareholders and companies with clearer
guidance on companies' exercise of discretionary voting authority.The
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suggested in the proposing release, such as:
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E.

•

increasing the percentage of the vote a proposal must receive before it
can be resubmitted;

•

implementing an override mechanism to permit the inclusion of certain
proposals if sufficient shareholder interest was demonstrated;

•

streamlining the exclusion for matters considered irrelevant to corporate
business;

•
•

modifying the personal grievance exclusion; and
requiring a separate box on a company's proxy card permitting
shareholders to withhold discretionary authority from management
on a non-rule 14a-8 proposal.

Financial Statements and Periodic Reports For Related Issuem and Guarantors

On February 26,1999, the Commission proposed rules concerning the financial statement and
Exchange Act reporting requirements for subsidiary guarantors and subsidiary issuers of guaranteed
securities (Securities Act Release No. 7649). These proposals include revisions to Rule 3-10 of Regulation S-X and new Rule 12h-5 under the Exchange Act.
The proposed amendments to Rule 3-10 would, with one principal difference, codify the staff's
current positions as articulated in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 53 and the interpretive positions that
the staff has taken with respect to SAB 53. The principal difference between the proposed financial
statement requirements and existing practice is that the proposal would eliminate the presentation of
summarized financial information. Rather, it would require companies to present condensed consolidating financial information in all situations in which they currently may present summarized financial
information about their subsidiaries.
Proposed Rule 12h-5 eliminates the need for subsidiaries to request an exemption from Exchange Act reporting and removes uncertainty regarding the availability of an exemption from Exchange Act reporting. As proposed, Rule 12h-5 would exempt from Exchange Act reporting any subsidiary issuer or subsidiary guarantor permitted to omit financial statements by proposed Rule 3-10.
F.

Delivery of Disclosure Documents to Households

On November 4,1999, the Commission issued two releases concerning the delivery of a single
disclosure document to two or more investors sharing the same address ("householding"). The first
release sets forth final rules regarding the householding of prospectuses, annual reports and, in the case
of investment companies, semiannual reports (Securities Act Release 33-7766). New Rule 154 permits
issuers and broker-dealers to satisfy the Security Act's prospectus delivery requirements by sending a
single prospectus to two or more investors residing at the same address if the investors have consented
to householding on a written or implied basis. Consent can be implied if four conditions are met:
•

the investors have the same last name or are reasonably believed to be
members of the same family;

•

investors are given advance notice of householding and an opportunity
to opt out;

•

the investors do not opt out of householding; and

•

the prospectus or shareholder report is delivered to a residential street
address or a post-office box.

The second release proposes similar changes to the proxy rules to permit the householding of
proxy and information statements (Securities Act Release 33-7767). A separate proxy card still would
need to be delivered to each shareholder in the household. This release also proposes some modifications to new Rule 154 and the adopted requirements pertaining to householding of annual reports.
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Among other things, the proposing release would amend Rule 154 to permit the householding of combined proxy statement -prospectuses.
The adopted and proposed householding amendments are intended to reduce the amount of
duplicative information that investors receive, and to lower printing and mailing costs to companies
that ultimately are borne by investors.
IX.

STAFF LEGAL BULLETINS FOR DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE

The Division of Corporation Finance publishes Staff Legal Bulletins to provide advice to the
public on frequently recurring issues. Copies of the bulletins may be obtained from the Commission's
web site (http://www.sec.gov) or by writing to, or making a request in person at, the Public Reference
Room, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 5th Street, N.W., Room 1024, Washington, DC, 20549
«202) 942-8090). These are the Staff Legal Bulletins the Division has issued to date:

•
•

Staff Legal Bulletin No.1 (CF) - Confidential Treatment Requests
Staff Legal Bulletin No.2 (CF) - Modified Exchange Act Reporting for
Companies in Bankruptcy

•

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3 (CF) - Reliance on the Section 3(a)(10)
exemption from the Securities Act of 1933 registration requirements
(Updated October 20,1999)

•
•

Staff Legal Bulletin No.4 (CF) - Spin-Offs

J
J
J

J
J
J

J

Staff Legal Bulletin No.5 (CF11M) - Year 2000 Disclosure Issues.
[This Staff Legal Bulletin is superseded by the Year 2000 interpretive
release, Securities Act Release No. 7558. See Section Y.D of this outline.]

•

Staff Legal Bulletin No.6 (CF IMR/IM) - Euro Conversion Issues

•

Staff Legal Bulletin No.7 (CF) - Plain English (Updated June 7, 1999)

X.

CURRENT DISCLOSURE, LEGAL AND PROCESSING ISSUES

A.

Disclosure Issues

1.

Third-Party Derivative Securities

In Morgan Stanley & Co.. Inc. (June 24, 1996), the Division addressed disclosure issues relating
to Securities Act Section 5 registered offerings of securities that are exchangeable, on either an optional
or a mandatory basis ("Exchangeable Securities"), for the equity securities (or the cash value thereof) of
another issuer ("Underlying Securities").
The Division took the view that complete disclosure regarding the issuer of the Underlying
Securities is material to investors at the time of both the initial sale of the Exchangeable Securities and
on a continuous basis thereafter until the Underlying Securities (or the cash value thereof) have been
exchanged for the Exchangeable Securities and other payment obligations on the Exchangeable Securities, if any, have been satisfied. The Division also took the view that this complete disclosure is not
required to be set forth in the filings of the issuer of the Exchangeable Securities where there is sufficient
market interest and publicly available information regarding the issuer of the Underlying Securities.
The Division stated that sufficient market interest and publicly available information exists
where the issuer of the Underlying Securities (i) has a class of equity securities registered under Exchange Act Section 12; and (ii) is either (a) eligible to use Securities Act Form 5-3 or F-3 for a primary
offering of non-investment grade securities pursuant to General Instruction B.1 of such forms; or (b)
meets the listing criteria that an issuer of the Underlying Securities would have to meet if the class of
Exchangeable Securities was to be listed on a national securities exchange as equity linked securities,
such as American Stock Exchange Rule 107.B.
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The Division also stated that where there is sufficient market interest and publicly available
information, as described above, the issuer of the Exchangeable Securities may include abbreviated
disclosure about the issuer of and terms of the Underlying Securities in its Securities Act registration
statement and Exchange Act periodic reports. Abbreviated disclosure in a report is adequate only where
there is sufficient market interest and publicly available information at the time the report is filed.
Finally, the Division stated that the abbreviated disclosure would include at least: (i) a brief
discussion of the business of the issuer of the Underlying Securities; (ii) disclosure about the availability
of information with respect to the issuer of the Underlying Securities similar to that required by Regulation S-K Item 502(a); and (iii) information concerning the market price of the Underlying Securities
similar to that called for Regulation 5-K Item 201(a).
EITF Issues Nos. 86-28 and 96-12 address certain aspects of the accounting for third-party derivative securities.

2.

Manasement's DisclQsure OblisatiQn Resardins NQn-Manasement NQminees fQr ElectiQn
Qf DirectQrs

In connection with the preparation of proxy material for an annual meeting, an issues has arisen
that concerns the obligation of a company to disclose information about non-management nominees of
a shareholder who has provided adequate notice pursuant to a company by-law regarding his or her
intention to nominate certain persons as candidates for the election of directors. An interpretive issue
arises as to whether Item 7 of Schedule 14A and Items 401 and 404 of Regulation 5-K, whose requirements are incorporated into the schedule through Item 7, obligate the company to furnish line-item
disclosure about those shareholder nominees. Similarly, an issue arises as to whether the company is
required to place the shareholder nominees on its form of proxy.

Under these circumstances, the staff has taken the position that Note B to Schedule 14A obligates the company to provide line-item disclosure only with respect to proposals made by or on behalf
of the company, including the election of the company's nominees for directors. In addition, a soliciting
party is required under Exchange Act Rule 14a-4 to include on its proxy card only the names of nominees for which the soliciting party is seeking proxy authority. In rendering this advice, the staff did not
address the issue of the disclosure otherwise necessary in the proxy statement, pursuant to the proxy
antifraud provisions of Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, with respect to the existence of opposition candidates
for election to the board.
B.

Lesal and PrQcessins Issues

1.

CQQrdinatiQn with Other GQvernment Asencies

On occasion, the staff communicates with other government agencies when disclosure indicates
that the rules and regulations enforced by that government entity may materially effect the issuer's operations. For example, the staff continues to have an informal understanding with the staff of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") whereby the Commission staff receives from the EPA lists of companies identified as potentially responsible parties on hazardous waste sites; companies subject to cleanup
requirements under Resource Conservi;ltion and Recovery Act; and companies named in criminal and
civil proceedings under environmental laws. The staff uses this information in its review process.

2.

MQnitQr Qf FQrm 12b-25 Notices
."

The staff has implemented procedures to strengthen its monitoring efforts of all Forms 12b-25
notices of late filing. Notices are being monitored, with appropriate action taken depending upon the
issuer's reason for delay and whether the subject filing is subsequently filed during the extension period. Possible staff action includes referral to the Division of Enforcement and prioritization of the
subject report for staff review.

r
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3.

Related Public and Private Qfferinss

Some companies with pending registration statements have advised the staff that they intend
to withdraw the registration statement and shortly thereafter complete the offering without registration
in reliance upon the Section 4(2) private offering exemption. This appears to be proposed for both
timing and disclosure reasons. In the staff's view, this procedure ordinarily would not be consistent
with Section 5 of the Securities Act. The filing of a registration statement for a specific securities offering
(as contrasted with a generic shelf registration) constitutes a general solicitation for that securities offering rendering Section 4(2) unavailable for the same offering. In addition, the procedure raises significant integration issues under the traditional five factor test and the staff's integration policy positions
since the subsequent private offering does not appear to be a separate offering.
A related issue arises when a company files a registration statement to register issuances of
securities to purchasers who committed to purchase securities from the issuer prior to the filing of the
registration statement on the condition that the securities be registered prior to issuance. It appears that
the purpose of this procedure is to provide the purchasers with registered (rather than restricted) securities. The staff does not believe that this procedure is consistent with the registration provisions of the
Securities Act, which cover offers and sales of securities, not issuances. In this situation, it appears that
the offers were made and the commitments obtained prior to filing in reliance upon the Section 4(2)
private placement exemption. If so, the registration statement should cover resales by the purchasers,
not issuances to the purchasers.
The use of "lock-up agreements" in business combination transactions is common. What is not
common or consistent is the extent to which these agreements are now used to lock up target shareholders beyond key executives and "blocking" shareholders of the target. While the signing of a lock-up
agreement may constitute the making of an investment decision, the staff, noting the realities of these
transactions, traditionally has not raised issues with respect to these agreements in connection with
acquisitions of public companies. However, the staff has raised issues concerning recently filed acquisition registration statements where 100% of the target shares are locked up or the "lock-up" group is
expanded to include non-traditional "members" such as middle management.
4.

Equity Swap Arransements

Equity swap arrangements (including the related equity security) and similar devices typically
shift some or all of the economic interests and risks of an equity security. These arrangements raise a
number of legal and regulatory issues under the federal securities laws. Application of Exchange Act
Section 16 to these arrangements is addressed in Exchange Act Releases No. 34514 and 37260. Those
releases stated that equity swaps and similar transactions are subject to Section 16, and discussed the
manner in which they should be reported. The staff continues to consider the issues raised by equity
swaps and other risk-shifting transactions in other areas, including disclosure of security holdings and
executive compensation, Schedule 13D reporting and transactions subject to Rule 144, Rule 144A and
Regulation S. The treatment of these transactions under Rule 144 is addressed in Securities Act Release
No. 7391. The treatment of these transactions under Regulation S is addressed in Securities Act Release
Nos. 7392 and 7505; see Section VII.B.

5.

Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans

A typical non-qualified deferred compensation plan permits an employee to defer compensation over a set dollar amount. Those monies are retained by the employer. The employee will then
either receive a fixed rate of return on the deferred monies or the employer may permit the employee to
index the return on those monies off of a number of investment return alternatives.
In a number of no-action positions, the Division has indicated that it would not recommend
enforcement action if transactions in non-qualified deferred compensation plans were not registered.
The requests in those instances set forth two bases for the determination that registration under the
Securities Act was not required. First, those requests set forth the argument that the offer and sale of
interests in the deferred compensation plan did not involve the offer or sale of a security because the
decision to participate in those plans was based primarily on tax management, not investment, purposes. Second, the requests contained the argument that the employees participating in the plan were
top-level executives who did not need the protections provided by registration under the Securities Act.
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In providing the no-action position requested, the Division's responses state that, while not agreeing
with the analysis in the request, it would not recommend enforcement action if transactions under the
plans were not registered. The Division has not taken such a no-action position since 1991.
Due to a number of market and regulatory factors, non-qualified deferred compensation plans
have greatly proliferated, both with respect to the number of employers offering such plans and the
number of employees participating. At this time, the Division is not prepared to disregard the argument that the debt owing to plan participants is analogous to investment notes, which typically are
viewed as debt securities. Further, the staff is not persuaded that there is a meaningful distinction
between those plans that offer returns tied to different investment alternatives and those that offer only
a fixed rate. The Division, therefore, will not grant requests for no-action with respect to any nonqualified deferred compensation plan, including those that have an interest only return. The Division
has not stated affirmatively, however, that all interest only deferred compensation plans involve securities. Instead, the Division currently is leaving that question for counsel's analysis of the facts and circumstances. To the extent that interests in a non-qualified deferred compensation plan are securities,
registration would be required unless the offerings under the plan would qualify for an exemption, ~
Section 4(2).
Form S-8 would be available when an employer registers the offer and sale of interests in the
deferred compensation plan under the Securities Act. The filing fee should be based on the amount of
compensation being deferred, not on the ultimate investment return. As the "deferred compensation
obligations" to be registered are obligations of the issuer/employer, not interests in the plan, the registration of the "deferred compensation obligations" would not result in a requirement that a deferred
compensation plan file a Form 11-K with respect to those securities. Further, based on the unique terms
of the "deferred compensation obligations" (both with respect to interest and maturity), compliance
with the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 has not been required.
6.

Trust Indenture Act Issues Arisins in Certain Transactions Exempt from Securities Act
Registration

Offerings exempt from registration under Sections 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act and
Section 1145(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are not exempt from qualification under the Trust Indenture
Act. Like Section 5 of the Securities Act, Section 306 of the Trust Indenture Act works transactionally.
Unless the indenture for a debt security is qualified under Section 305 of the Trust Indenture Act, which
covers registered offerings, or exempt from qualification under Section 304, the sale of the debt security
violates Section 306 of the statute. Section 306(c) forbids any offer of the debt security until an application for qualification of the related indenture has been filed with the Commission.
The Division has recently noted a number of offerings of debt securities for issuers in Chapter
11 proceedings where the applications for qualification on Form T-3 were not filed until after approval
of the plans of reorganization by both creditors and other claimants and the bankruptcy courts. The
Division's view is that the offering event in bankruptcy is the solicitation of plan approval from creditors and other claimants. Accordingly, the application for qualification in these cases should be filed
before such approval is sought.
7.

Legality Opinion Issues

It is customary practice for counsel drafting legality opinions regarding securities whose issuer
is incorporated in Delaware to limit their opinion to "the Delaware General Corporation Law." In these
situations, we ask that counsel revise its opinion to make clear that the law covered by the opinion
includes not only the Delaware General Corporation Law, but also the applicable provisions of the
Delaware Constitution and reported judicial decisions interpreting these laws.

Recently, we discussed this limitation with the Ad Hoc Committee on Legal Opinions in SEC
Filings of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the Business Law Section of the American
Bar Association. In those discussion, the Ad Hoc Committee emphasized that the reference to the "Delaware General Corporations Law" was an opinion drafting convention and that the practicing bar understood this phrase to mean the Delaware General Corporation Law, the applicable provisions of the
Delaware Constitution, and reported judicial decisions interpreting these laws.
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Based on these discussions, we have revised our procedures for reviewing a legality opinion
filed as an exhibit to a registration that includes a statement that it is "limited to the Delaware General
Corporation Law." Our new procedures are as follows:
•

•

We will issue a comment asking counsel to confirm to us in writing
that it concurs with our understanding that the reference and limitation
to "Delaware General Corporate Law" includes the statutory provisions
and also all applicable provisions of the Delaware Constitution and
reported judicial decisions interpreting these laws. As part of this
standard comment, we will ask that counsel file this written
confirmation as correspondence on the EDGAR system. As such, it
will be part of the Commission's official file regarding the related
registration statement.
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Once we receive this written confirmation from counsel, we will not
comment further on the inclusion of this language in the opinion for
that registration statement.

C.

Industry-Specific Issues

1.

Real Estate

a.

Review of Filings

The Division has issued three releases regarding real estate disclosure in the last few years. On
June 17, 1991, the Commission issued an interpretive release relating to partnership offerings and reorganizations (Securities Act Release No. 6900); on October 30,1991, final rules concerning disclosure of
roll-up transactions were issued (Securities Act Release No. 6922). On December 1,1994, the Commission adopted amendments to its roll-up rules (Securities Act Release No. 7113). The staff considers the
disclosure guidelines of each of these releases in connection with its reviews of registration statements
and proxy statements filed by limited partnerships and real estate investment trusts.
Current real estate filings relate primarily to real estate investment trusts (REITs) and, to a lesser
extent, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. Frequently, REIT filings contain an UPREIT
structure which includes an Umbrella Operating Partnership formed by the sponsor and affiliated partnerships to contribute properties or partnership interests to the REIT. In connection with REIT initial
public offerings, the staff considers the availability of any claimed exemption from Securities Act registration for the pre-formation roll-up transactions undertaken to form the operating partnership.
Primary offerings by Operating Partnerships must comply with appropriate form requirements.
Operating Partnerships may use Form 5-3 if the applicable requirements are met, specifically, Instruction I.e., but since the Operating Partnership is unlikely to be able to meet the requirements of Staff
Accounting Bulletin 53, separate financial statements and related disclosure must be provided either in
the registration statement or through incorporation by reference of a voluntary Form 10. Following the
offering, applicable reports must be filed by the Operating Partnership.
Reviews of limited partnership offerings and proxy solicitation materials continue to focus on
prior performance and on claims made by sponsors concerning investment obligations and future performance. These reviews also focus on changes to partnership objectives and structure. Finally, the
staff continues to examine the practices and disclosure associated with the solicitation of proxies and
registration statements related to roll-ups, pursuant to the revised rules. See also Section IV.D.1 for a
discussion of the disclosure required in tender offers for limited partnership units.
b.

I

Sales Literature Used in Connection with the Offering of Limited Partnerships

Item 19 of Industry Guide 5 requires that sales literature used in the offering of limited partnership units, including material marked for "Broker Dealer Use Only," be submitted for staff review.
These materials should prOVide a balanced presentation of the risks and rewards involved in the offering. All information must be consistent with the information and representations contained in the
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prospectus and the sales literature should not be presented in a manner which obscures the prospectus
cover page. Registrants should contact the staff before using submitted sales materials.
C.

LQW IncQme
~

HQusin~.

RehabilitatiQn. and HistQric Tax Credit Real Estate Limited Partner-

Certain real estate limited partnership offerings indicate the spQnsor's intention to invest in
low income housing or other programs eligible for federal or state income tax credits. Most of these
offerings highlight the percentage returns to the investor of the tax credits on a simple annualized basis.
Since the tax credits are available for only 10 years and the enabling statutes require a IS-year holding
period for the property, the rate of return disclosure should include the effects of the time value of money.
Further, since it is possible that the property may have no or little residual value at the end of the IS-year
holding period, the disclosure of the rate of return should assume a zero resale value of the property.
Further, prior performance disclosure of the results of earlier tax credit offerings by the sponsor
should be included. Disclosure of the total amount of tax credits generated for each year should be
included as should the amount of tax credits per $1000 invested.
2.

ExemptiQn frQm

Re~istratiQn

fQr Bank and Thrift HQldins CQmpany FQrmatiQns

Section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from registration for securities
issued in connection with the formation of a bank or savings association holding company where shareholders maintain the same proportional interest in the holding company as they had in the bank or
savings association; the rights and interests of the shareholders are substantially the same after the
transaction as before it; and the holding company has substantially the same assets and liabilities, on a
consolidated basis, as the bank or savings association had before the transaction. The staff has informally taken the position that the exemption would not be available if the new holding company's corporate charter contained antitakeover provisions that were not in the governing documents of the predecessor bank or thrift.
3.

Structured Financin~s

In fall 1992, the Commission extended the benefits of Rule 415 "shelf" registration through the
expansion of the availability of Form S-3 to investment grade asset-backed securities offerings (Securities Act Release No. 6964 (October 22, 1992)(the "Shelf Release"». Shortly thereafter, the Commission
adopted Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 excluding from the definition of "investment company" structured financings that meet the rule's conditions (Investment Company Act Release No. 19105 (November 19, 1992». These changes appear to have precipitated, or at least coincided
with, a movement in the structured finance market toward securitization of assets in the public markets
that previously were offered in the private markets. Significant disclosure and eligibility issues continue to come up as a result of market developments.
a.

Asset CQncentratiQn

The Shelf Release expressly does not adopt a specific asset concentration test. Instead, asset
concentration questions have been addressed through existing disclosure rules. While an asset concentration test was not included, the release indicates that the definition of asset-backed security does not
encompass securities issued in structured financings for one obligor or group of related obligors.

j

(i)

r

r
r
r
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Multiple CQre PrQspectuses

Another issue involving asset concentration arises in the context of pooling several different
types of underlying assets. The staff permits issuers to register on a single shelf registration statement
asset-backed securities supported by more than one category of underlying assets without specifying
the amount of each type to be offered. The registration statement must specifically identify the various
asset categories and include a separate core prospectus for each such category. In considering whether
a separate core prospectus is required, the staff will consider whether the assets described are intended
to be pooled together or securitized separately. If the latter, separate core prospectuses ordinarily would
be required.
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(ii)

Commercial Mortiages

For securitization of commercial mortgages and leases, where the mortgage loan is a non-recourse obligation of the mortgagor, disclosure related to the operating property(ies) will be required
where concentration exists. The staff applies the standards described in Staff Accounting Bulletin 7l I
7lA ("SAB 7l 17lA"). SAB 71 17lA generally employs a 20% asset concentration test to determine whether
audited property financial statements are required. At concentration levels between 10-20%, financial
and other information regarding the underlying properties is required. In determining whether these
concentration thresholds are crossed, loans to the same obligor, group of related obligors, or loans on
related properties may be aggregated.

In addition, where a mortgage loan or loans of a single obligor, or group of related obligors,
accounts for more than 45% of the pool assets, one or more co-issuers may exist. See FBC Conduit Trust
I. First Boston Mortgage Securities Corporation (October 6,1987).

b.

Securitizing Outstanding Securities

(i)

Corporate Debt Securities

The pooling and securitization of outstanding corporate debt securities of other issuers may be
registered on Form 5-3 if the requirements of the Form for asset-backed securities offerings are met,
provided that the depositor would be free to publicly resell the securities without registration. Thus, a
depositor generally cannot include restricted securities (i&., privately-placed securities where the Rule
144(k) two-year holding period has not run) nor can it include registered securities if the securitization
is part of the original distribution. To provide certainty in deciding what is part of the original distribution in resecuritizations by affiliates of underwriters involved in the original offering, the staff has used
a bright line test (i&., securities purchased in the secondary market and at least three months after the
depositor had sold out any unsold allotment are not viewed as part of the original dispatch).
Where 20% or more of the pool consists of the securities of a single issuer, the staff requires
audited financial statements of such issuer to be included in the prospectus. However, if the underlying
issuer is eligible to use Form 5-3 for a primary common stock offering, and the depositor's transaction
in the securities is purely secondary (~ there is no tie to the issuer or the issuer's distribution), the
staff would accept a reference in the prospectus to the issuer's periodic reports on file with the Commission. Of course, the prospectus must include a description of the material terms of the pooled securities.
In connection with Exchange Act reporting, reference to the 5-3 eligible underlying issuer's
periodic reports on file with the Commission will be accepted in lieu of direct disclosure of this information. In addition, the staff generally requires the depositor to undertake to provide financial and other
information relating to such underlying issuer directly in its reports in the event such underlying issuer
terminates reporting after the pooling transaction.
(ii)

Asset-Backed Securities

Securitization of outstanding asset-backed securities is treated similarly if the underlying trust
has outstanding securities held by non-affiliates in excess of $75 million and files periodic reports with
the Commission. The securities of government-sponsored enterprises ("GSE") which have a comparable market float and which make information publicly available comparable to that of Exchange Act
reporting entities are treated similarly.
(iii)

Municipal Securities

The offering of asset-backed securities supported by pools of municipal bonds where asset
concentration exists, in general, requires that financial statements and other information relating to the
underlying municipal issuer be provided. This information must be included directly in the prospectus, must be current, and must otherwise satisfy fully the disclosure requirements under the federal
securities regulations.
While there may be instances where financial statements of the municipal issuer are not material to the investor in the asset-backed security, such instances would appear to be rare and the staff will
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require appropriate legal opinions and other documentation necessary to support the conclusion that
financial and other information relating to the municipal issuer is not material to investors.
c.

Often the payment terms of asset-backed securities are tailored to meet the particular investment needs of the investor. Prior to effectiveness of the registration statement, investors often ask the
underwriter for various computational materials so as to analyze prepayment and other assumptions
affecting yield. These computational materials are not permissible prospectuses under the Securities
Act and the Commission's rules and regulations. However, recognizing the realities of the asset-backed
market, the staff has issued three no-action letters that recognize the industry's practice of providing
written information (other than the statutory prospectus) to prospective purchasers of asset-backed
securities when negotiating and structuring the securities to meet purchasers' investment criteria. These
letters generally permit the provision of limited information outside the preliminary prospectus to purchasers, provided that the final information is filed as part of the registration statement.
d.

,.
i
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Delinquent Assets

The definition of "asset-backed security" in Form 5-3 states that the assets must "by their terms
convert into cash within a finite time period." The staff issued a no-action letter in which it acknowledged that an offering that includes a concentration of delinquent assets may be eligible to be offered on
Form S-3 so long as the concentration is less than 20% of the assets. A concentration of 20% or more
would not appear to be eligible to be offered on Form 5-3 because foreclosure on an asset is not converting to cash by its terms. See The Bond Market Association (Oct. 16,1997), described in Section XII.K.

4.

r

Structuring the Offering

Credit Linked Secyrities of Bank Subsidiaries
Recently, a number of banks proposed the following transaction structure:
•

the bank forms a limited purpose finance subsidiary;

•

the bank transfers mortgages or asset-backed securities to the
subsidiary;

•

the bank owns all of the subsidiary's common stock; and

•

the subsidiary registers the sale of its preferred stock to the public.

The source of funds for dividend payments on the preferred stock would be limited to the
income generated by the finance subsidiary's assets. The banks proposed this structure because the
preferred securities of the subsidiary may, under relevant risk based capital guidelines, qualify as capital of the bank.
Under bank regulations, if a financial regulatory event occurs, banks must retrieve, or "claw
back," the assets of these subsidiaries. Because the assets of these subsidiaries are subject to this claw
back, this structure raises significant registration and disclosure issues.
Under one structure, the preferred securities of the subsidiary automatically convert into securities of the bank. Therefore:
•

the bank and the subsidiary must be co-registrants on the registration
statement for the initial sale of the preferred stock since the bank is
also offering preferred stock;

•

the full audited financial statements of the bank must be included in
this registration statement; and

•

if the bank's financial statements are not in US GAAP, they must be
reconciled to US GAAP.

If the bank regulators can require the bank to claw back the subsidiary's assets, the financial condition

of the bank is material to the subsidiary preferred stockholder at all times. Therefore:
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•

the full audited financial statements of the bank must be in the
registration statement and in the subsequent periodic reports of the
subsidiary; and

•

if the bank's financial statements are not in US GAAP, they must be

reconciled to US GAAP.
XI.

ACCOUNTING ISSUES

A.

Initiative to Address Improper Earnings Management

Many in the financial community have expressed concern that market pressures are driving
more public companies to use improper earnings management tricks. In remarks made to the NYC
Center for Law and Business in September 1998, Chairman Levitt identified several areas where accounting rules have been abused by some companies to manage earnings: "big bath" restructuring
charges, "creative" acquisition accounting, miscellaneous "cookie jar" reserves, intentional "immaterial" errors, and manipulative revenue recognition. The Chairman outlined a plan to address the threat
to the integrity of financial reporting posed by improper earnings management. The Chairman's speech
can be found at www.sec.gov/news/spchindx.htm.
The Division of Corporation Finance established an Earnings Management Task Force that focused staff resources on the review of filings where potential improper earnings management issues
could be present. A primary objective of the reviews has been to elicit improved disclosure in financial
statements and MD&A about charges involving asset impairments, restructuring charges, purchased
in-process research and development, and similar items. Disclosure sought by the staff has included
explanation of the types and amounts of restructuring liabilities and valuation reserves, the timing and
amount of increases and decreases in these accounts, and the nature and amount of any changes in
estimates. The Task Force also examined filings for indicia of earnings management and other accounting abuses involving revenue recognition, unreasonable valuations of purchased in-process research
and development, and manipulation of loss allowances and estimated liabilities. Also, as part of its
proactive disclosure program, the Division of Corporation Finance sent letters alerting companies, before their filing 1998 annual reports, of disclosures that are often needed to give transparency to significant charges. Samples of those letters are available at the SEC web site.
In further response to the Chairman's earnings management initiative, the AIPCA published

Issues in Revenue Recognition, available at www.aicpa.org, to help auditors evaluate assertions about revenue. The Office of the Chief Accountant is working closely with the FASB to establish clearer standards
concerning liability recognition. The Public Oversight Board has established a distinguished committee to review the way audits are performed today and assess the impact of recent trends in business and
the accounting profession on the effectiveness of the audit. Other actions taken in connection with the
Chairman's earnings management initiative include issuance of staff interpretive guidance and
rulemaking proposals discussed elsewhere in this outline.
B.

Materiality in the Preparation or Audit of Financial Statements

On August 12, 1999, the staff published Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99. That SAB expressed
the staff's view that exclusive reliance on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality in preparing or auditing financial statements is inappropriate. The SAB states that the staff has no objection
to the use of a percentage threshold as an initial assessment of materiality, but exclusive use of such
thresholds has no basis in law or in the accounting literature. The staff stresses that evaluations of
materiality require registrants and auditors to consider all of the relevant circumstances, and that there
are numerous circumstances in which misstatements below that percentage threshold could be material. Some of the circumstances listed in the SAB that should be considered are:
•

whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends,

•

whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus
expectations for the enterprise,

•

whether a misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa,
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•

whether the misstatement concerns a segment of the registrant's
business that plays a significant role in the registrant's present or future
operations or profitability,

•

whether the misstatement affects compliance with loan covenants or
other contractual requirements,

•

whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management's
compensation.

The SAB observes that managers should not direct or acquiesce to immaterial misstatements in
the financial statements for the purpose of managing earnings. The SAB indicates that investors generally would consider significant an ongoing practice to over- or understate earnings up to an amount just
short of some percentage threshold in order to manage earnings.
The SAB also notes that even though a misstatement of an individual amount may not cause
the financial statements to be materially misstated, it may, when aggregated with other misstatements,
render the financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading. The SAB, therefore, provides guidance on when and how to aggregate and net misstatements to see if they materially misstate
the financial statements.
The SAB advises that, even if management and auditors find that a misstatement is immaterial,
they must consider whether the misstatement results in a violation of the books and records provisions
in Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act. Section 13(b) requires that public companies make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect transactions and
the disposition of assets of the registrant, and that they maintain internal accounting controls that are
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that financial statements are prepared in conformity with
GAAP. In this context, what constitutes "reasonable assurance" and "reasonable detail" are not based
on a "materiality" standard but on the level of detail and degree of assurance that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.
The SAB sets forth various factors, in addition to those used to evaluate materiality, that a company may consider in deciding whether a misstatement violates its obligation to keep books and records
that are accurate "in reasonable detaiL" Some of these factors are:

•
•
•
•

,.
;
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r
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the significance of the misstatement,
how the misstatement arose,
the cost of correcting the misstatement, and
the clarity of the authoritative accounting guidance with respect to the
misstatement.

Finally, the SAB reminds auditors of their obligations under Section lOA of the Exchange Act
and auditing standards to inform management and, in some cases, audit committees of illegal acts, such
as violations of the books and records provisions of the Exchange Act, coming to the auditor's attention
during the course of an audit.
C.

Proposals ImplementiDi~Blue Ribbon Committee's Recommendations RegardinK Audit
Committee Effectiveness

The Commission has proposed new rules to improve disclosure about the functioning of corporate audit committees and to enhance the reliability and credibility of financial statements of public
companies (Securities Act Release No. 7754 (October 14, 1999)). The proposed disclosures will help
inform investors about the role audit committees play in overseeing the preparation of financial statements and underscore the importance of their participation in the financial reporting process. In addition, by requiring companies to have their auditors review interim financial statements, the proposals
should facilitate early identification and resolution of significant accounting issues.
The proposals are part of the Commission's continuing efforts to improve the quality of financial reporting. In his September 1998 speech entitled The Numbers Game, Chairman Arthur Levitt set

r
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forth an action plan to address certain abuses in financial reporting, better known as "earnings management." These proposals represent further progress on that plan.
The Commission's proposals are part of a broader effort by the securities exchanges and the
accounting profession to improve the oversight of financial reporting by corporate boards. Proposals
for action by each of the different groups were set forth in the Report and Recommendations of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. The Blue Ribbon
Committee was a prestigious group of business, accounting, and securities professionals led by John
Whitehead and Ira Millstein. These proposals coincide with proposed rule changes by the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers. The
proposed rule changes by the securities markets would:
•

define "independence" more rigorously for audit committee members;

•

require audit committees to include at least three members and be
comprised solely of "independent" directors who are financially literate;

•

require companies to adopt written charters for their audit committees;
and

•

require at least one member of the audit committee to have accounting
or financial management expertise.

Recently, the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board proposed to require independent auditors to
discuss with the audit committee the auditors' judgment about the quality, and not just the acceptability
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, of the company's accounting principles as applied in
its financial reporting.
The Commission's rule proposals would require, among other things, that:

D.

•

companies' interim financial statements be reviewed by independent
auditors before companies file their Forms lO-Q and lO-QSB with the
Commission;

•

companies provide in their proxy statements a report from the audit
committee that discloses whether the audit committee reviewed and
discussed certain matters with management and the auditors, and
whether anything came to the attention of audit committee members
that caused them to believe that the audited financial statements contain
any materially misleading statements or omit any material information;

•

companies disclose in their proxy statements whether the audit
committee has a written charter, and file a copy of their charter every
three years; and

•

companies whose securities are listed on the NYSE or AMEX or are
quoted on Nasdaq disclose certain information about any audit
committee member who is not "independent" within their proposed
definition. (All other companies must disclose, if they have an audit
committee, whether the members are "independent" based on the
definition proposed by the SROs.)

Mandatorily Redeemable Securities of Subsidiaries Boldinl Debt of Relistrant

Registrants should consider the adequacy of disclosures about mandatorily redeemable securities issued by a finance subsidiary of a parent company when the financial subsidiary holds only debt
instruments issued by the parent, particularly if the outstanding security of the finance subsidiary is
guaranteed by the parent and mirrors the cash flows of the debt of the parent held by the finance subsidiary. The staff believes that disclosures in these situations often must be expanded to provide investors
with a fair and balanced picture of the registrant's effective capitalization and leverage. Inclusion of the
outstanding public security in minority interest with minimal disclosure of its characteristics is not
adequate, particularly when Section 12(h) reporting relief is requested by registrants for the finance
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subsidiary. In those situations, the parent should disclose the subsidiary's outstanding securities as a
separate line item in the parent's balance sheet captioned "Company-obligated mandatorily redeemable security of subsidiary holding solely parent debentures," "Guaranteed preferred beneficial interests in Company's debentures," or similar descriptive wording. Notes to the financial statements should
describe fully the terms of the securities and explain that those terms parallel the terms of the company's
debentures which comprise substantially all of the assets of the consolidated trust or subsidiary.
E.

Accountant's Refusals to Re-issue Audit Reports

Some accounting firms have adopted risk management policies that lead them to refuse to reissue their reports on the audits of financial statements that have been included previQusly in Commission filings. In some cases, accountants whose reports on acquired businesses were included in a
registrant's Form 8-K have declined to permit that report to be included in a registrant's subsequent
registration statement. In other cases, accountants have declined to reissue their reports on the registrant's
financial statements after the registrant engaged a different auditor for subsequent periods. The
Commission's staff is not in a position to evaluate the reasons for an accountant's refusal to re-issue its
report and will not intervene in disputes between registrants and their auditors. Moreover, the staff
will not waive the requirements for the audit report or the accountant's consent to be named as an
expert in filings. If a registrant is unable to re-use the previously issued audit report in a current filing,
the registrant must engage another accountant to re-audit those financial statements. A registrant that
is unable to obtain either re-issuance of an audit report or a new audit by a different firm may be precluded from raising capital in a public offering.
When registrants engage an accountant to perform audit services, they should consider the
need for the accountant to re-issue its audit report in future periods. It may be appropriate to address in
the audit services contract the registrant's expectations regarding the use of the audit report in filings
that it or its successors may make under either the Exchange Act or the Securities Act and the circumstances under which the accountant may decline to permit its re-use.
F.

Market Risk Disclosures

On January 28, 1997, the Commission adopted amendments to Regulation S-K, Regulation S-X,
and various forms (Securities Act Release No. 7386) to clarify and expand existing requirements for
disclosures about derivatives and market risks inherent in derivatives and other financial instruments.
Derivative financial instruments are defined in FASB Statement No. 119 to include futures, forwards,
swaps, and options. Derivative commodity instruments are defined in the Release to be commodity
contracts that are permitted by contract or business custom to be settled in cash or with another financial instrument (~ commodity futures, commodity forwards, commodity swaps, and commodity
options). Other financial instruments are defined in FASB Statement No. 107 to include, for example,
investments, including structured notes, loan receivables, debt obligations, and deposit liabilities. The
requirements for quantitative and qualitative information about market risk apply to all registrants
except registered investment companies and small business issuers.

In general, the release:
(i) requires enhanced descriptions of accounting policies for derivatives in the
footnotes to the financial statements;
(ii) requires quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk inherent in derivatives and other financial instruments outside the financial statements;and
(iii) provides a reminder to registrants to supplement existing disclosures about
financial instruments, commodity positions, firm commitments, and other anticipated transactions with related disclosures about derivatives.
On July 31, 1997, the staff released Questions and Answers about the New "Market Risk" Disclosure Rules. The interpretive answers were prepared by the staffs of the Office of the Chief Accoun-
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tant and the Division of Corporation Finance. This publication is posted at the Commission's Internet
site; llttp:l/w1Vw.sec.gov.
Based on the Division's reviews of filings by some registrants required to provide the disclosures about derivatives and market risks inherent in derivatives and other financial instruments, we
have the following suggestions:
Accounting policies for derivatives
Remember to provide all of the disclosures regarding accounting policies for certain derivative
financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments, to the extent material, as required by
Rule 4-08(n) of Regulation S-X and SFAS 119. Include clear disclosure of the method used to account for
each type of derivative financial instrument and derivative commodity instrument.
General
Remember to cite the new Item specifically (e.g. Item 7A for Form 10-K or Item 9A for Form 20F) in the form. Registrants can include the quantitative and qualitative disclosures under the Item
reference, cross-reference from the Item reference to the disclosures elsewhere in the filing, or indicate
under the Item reference that the disclosures are not required (See Rule 12b-13).
Registrants may need to discuss a material exposure under the Item even though they do not
invest in derivatives. For example, registrants that have investments in debt securities or have issued
long-term debt should discuss risk exposure if the impact of reasonably possible changes in interest
rates would be material. Likewise, registrants that have invested or borrowed amounts in a currency
different from their functional currency should discuss risk exposure if the impact of reasonably possible changes in exchange rates would be material.
The market risk disclosures can refer to the financial statements but disclosures required by the
new rules should be furnished outside the financial statements. The "safe harbor" established under
the new rules does not extend to information presented in the financial statements.
Quantitative disclosures

Tabular presentation. Include all relevant terms of the related market sensitive instruments. In
addition, disclose the method and assumptions used to determine estimated fair value, cash flows and
future variable rates. In addition, segregate instruments by common characteristics and by risk classification.
Sensitivity analysis and Value at Risk WAR). Disclose the types of instruments (~., derivative
financial instruments, other financial instruments, derivative commodity instruments) included in the
sensitivity analysis and VAR analysis and provide an adequate description of the model and the significant assumptions used, such as the magnitude and timing of selected hypothetical changes in market
prices, method for determining discount rates, or key prepayment or reinvestment assumptions. Indicate whether other instruments are included voluntarily, such as certain commodity instruments and
positions outside the required scope of the rule, cash flows from anticipated transactions, etc.
Qualitative disclosures
Explain clearly how the company manages its primary market risk exposures, including the
objectives, general strategies and instruments, if any, used to manage those exposures. Explain clearly
the changes in how the company manages its exposures during the year in comparison to the prior year
and any known or expected changes in the future.
G.

Financial Statements in Hostile Exchange Offers

In registration statements that require financial statements of a company other than the registrant (such as when the registrant acquires or will acquire another entity), the audit report of the target's
independent accountants must be included in the registration statement. The consent of the target's
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auditor to the inclusion of its report in the registration statement is required pursuant to Rule 436 of
Regulation C.
A registrant offering its own securities in a hostile exchange offer for the target's stock may seek
and not be able to obtain the target's cooperation in providing either its audited financial statements or
the target auditor's consent to the use of its report in the required registration statement. In this situation, the registrant should follow the guidance in SAB Topic lA. If the target is a public company, SAB
Topic lA requires that any publicly filed financial information of the target, including its financial statements, be included in the registrant's filing or incorporated by reference into, and therefore made a part
of, that filing.
The acquirer/registrant should use its best efforts to obtain the target's permission and cooperation for the filing or incorporation by reference of the target's financial statements, and the target
auditor's consent to including its report on the financial statements. At a minimum, a registrant is
expected to write to the target requesting these items and to allow a reasonable amount of time for a
response prior to effectiveness of the filing. The target may, however, fail to cooperate with the registrant.

r
r

Under Rule 437 of Regulation C, a registrant may request a waiver of the target auditor's consent by filing an affidavit that states the reasons why obtaining a consent is impracticable. The affidavit
should document the specific actions taken by the registrant to obtain the cooperation of the target for
the filing of its financial statements as well as the efforts made to obtain the target auditor's consent. As
stated in SAB Topic lA, the staff will request copies of correspondence between the registrant and the
target evidencing the request for and the refusal to furnish financial statements.

r.

If the registrant uses its best efforts but is still unsuccessful in obtaining the target's permission
and cooperation on a timely basis, the staff will generally agree to waive the requirement to include or
incorporate by reference the target auditor's audit report, but not the target's financial statements. If
target financial statements are incorporated by reference into the acquirer's registration statement from
the target's public filings, disclosure should be made that, although an audit report was issued on the
target's financial statements and is included in the target's filings, the auditor has not permitted use of
its report in the registrant's registration statement. The auditor should not be named. Any legal or
practical implication for shareholders of either the registrant or the target of the inability to obtain the
cooperation of the target or consent of the target's auditor should be explained. No disclosure in the
registration statement should expressly or implicitly purport to disclaim the registrant's liability for the
target's financial statements. In the event that circumstances change, for example, if the deal turns
friendly, the registration statement should be amended to include the audited financial statements and
the auditor's consent required by the form.
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Restructuring Charges. Impairmgnts. and Related Issues (SAD 100)

On November 24, 1999, the staff published Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 100, which provides
guidance on the accounting for and disclosure of certain expenses and liabilities commonly reported in
connection with restructuring activities and business combinations, and the recognition and disclosure
of asset impairment charges.

The Emerging Issues Task Force addressed Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit an Activity (including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring) in Issue No. 94-3. Generally, that consensus limits costs that may be recognized solely pursuant to
management's plan to incur them to those costs which result directly from an exit activity, are not associated with and do not benefit continuing activities, and for which there is appropriate authorization,
specification, and commitment to execute. SAB 100 discusses the EITF criteria and related disclosure
requirements in particular circumstances encountered by the staff in its review of filings by public companies. The SAB expresses the staff's view that a company's exit plan should be at least comparable in
its level of detail and precision of estimation to the company's other operating and capital budgets, and
should be accompanied by controls and procedures to detect and explain variances and adjust accounting accruals. The SAB discusses disclosures in financial statements and MD&A that are often necessary
to make the effects of restructuring activities on reported results sufficiently transparent to investors.
SAB 100 also addresses issues that arise in the application of FASB Statement No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of. The SAB
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reminds registrants that the operational requirement to continue to use an asset disallows accounting
for the asset as held for sale. If the asset is held for use, its carrying value must be systematically
amortized to its salvage value over its remaining economic life. If management contemplates the removal or replacement of assets more quickly than implied by their depreciation rates, the useful lives of
the assets and rates of depreciation must be re-evaluated. The SAB also provides the staff's views regarding the assessment and measurement of any impairment of enterprise level goodwill, and it specifies the accounting policy disclosures that should be provided.
The SAB also highlights the staff's concerns when a registrant records liabilities assumed in a
business combination at amounts materially greater than historically reported by the acquired company. That circumstance could indicate that costs incurred before or after the merger were not properly
recognized in the reported results of one or the other combining company. The SAB reminds registrants
that, if the acquired company's historical accounting for a liability is based on reasonable estimates of
undiscounted future cash flows, the estimated undiscounted cash flows underlying the liability recorded by the acquiring company would not be expected to differ materially from those estimates unless the acquirer intends to settle the liability in a manner demonstrably different from that contemplated by the acquired company.
I.

Interpretive Guidance on Revenue Recognition (SAB 101)

On December 3,1999, the staff published Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 to provide guidance on
the recognition, presentation and disclosure of revenue in financial statements. The SAB draws on the
existing accounting rules and explains how the staff applies those rules, by analogy, to other transactions that the rules do not specifically address. The SAB spells out basic criteria that must be met before
registrants can record revenue.

Specific fact patterns discussed in the SAB include bill-and-hold transactions, long-term service
transactions, refundable membership fees, contingent rental income, and up-front fees when the seller
has significant continuing involvement. The SAB also addresses whether revenue should be presented
at the full transaction amount or on a fee or commission basis when the seller is acting as a sales agent
or in a similar capacity. Finally, the SAB provides guidance on the disclosures registrants should make
about their revenue recognition policies and the impact of events and trends on revenue.
Registrants may need to change their accounting policies to comply with the SAB. Provided
the registrant's former policy was not an improper application of GAAP, registrants may adopt a change
in accounting principle to comply with the SAB no later than the first fiscal quarter of the fiscal year
beginning after December 15, 1999.
XII.

SIGNIFICANT NO-ACTION AND INTERPRETIVE LETTERS THROUGH OCTOBER
l222

A.

Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act
American Stock Exchange - NASD -July 10.1998

The Division expressed the view that the American Stock Exchange (the "Exchange") memberships, or "seats," described in the letter are not securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(l) under
the Securities Act. The Division also expressed the view that the described transaction, in which substantially all of the assets and liabilities of the Exchange would be transferred to a limited liability
company (the "LLC") in exchange for i) an interest in the LLC and ii) contractual obligations of the
NASD under the agreement governing the transaction, would not involve a distribution of the securities issued by the LLC under Securities Act Rule 145(a)(3).
B.

Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act
First Mutual Savings Bank - October 8. 1999

The Division stated that it no longer responds to requests for no-action advice under Sections
2(a)(3) and 5 for holding company formations structured to occur without a vote of shareholders.
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Yanderkam & Sanders - IanuaIY 27. 1999:
Simplystocks.com - FebruaIY 4. 1999
In each of these letters, the Division expressed the view that the issuance of securities in consideration of a person's registration or visit to an issuer's internet site would be an event of sale within the
meaning on Section 2(a)(3), and would violate Section 5 of the Securities Act unless it were the subject of
a registration statement or a valid exemption from registration.

c.

Section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act
Net Roadshow, Inc. - July 30. 1997

The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if Net Roadshow
transmits roadshows via the Internet:
•

for the purposes and according to the procedures described in the
request; and

•

in reliance on counsel's opinion that the transmissions are not
prospectuses within the meaning of Securities Act Section 2(a)(lO).

Some of the key procedures described in the request include:
(1)

an entire "live" roadshow, including any questions and answers, will
be transmitted on the Internet and editing (except in limited
circumstances) and staging are not permitted;

(2)

transmissions of the roadshow will not be available until a registration
statement has been filed with the Commission for the subject offering;

(3)

r

transmissions will not be made widely available; access is passwordprotected and limited only to those "qualified" investors who
customarily are invited to attend a "live" roadshow (~ registered
broker-dealers and investment advisers);

(4)

,.

the roadshow may be viewed for one day only by each person or entity
given password access;

(5)

viewers must agree not to copy, download or further distribute the
transmissions (Net Roadshow has also installed technology to prevent
copying, downloading or printing of transmissions other than the filed
prospectus);

(6)

each transmission will include visual statements or "crawls"
emphasizing the prohibition on copying, downloading or further
distributing;

(7)

a copy of the filed prospectus will be available on-line before and during
each roadshow transmission, and will be able to be downloaded by
the viewer in its entirety; and

(8)

issuers and underwriters will be required to take reasonable steps to
ensure that information disclosed in the transmission is not inconsistent
with the filed prospectus.

r
#

r
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Private Financial Network ("PEN") - March 12. 1997
The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if PFN transmits by satellite, telephone or cable a video of an issuer's road show presentation to PFN's subscribers
for the purposes and pursuant to the procedures described in reliance on counsel's opinion that the
transmissions are not prospectuses within the meaning of Securities Act Section 2(a)(1O).

r

r
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The procedures described in the request include: (1) transmissions will be available only to
PFN's subscribers who agree not to videotape, copy or further distribute the transmissions; (2) before a
transmission, each of PFN's subscribers will receive a filed prospectus, from the issuer or the underwriter; (3) issuers and underwriters will be required to take reasonable steps to ensure that information
disclosed in the road show is not inconsistent with the filed prospectus; and (4) each transmission will
include visual statements or "crawls" emphasizing the prohibition on videotaping, copying or further
distributing.
Dissemination of Research Materials Relating to Asset-Backed Securities - February 7. 1997
The Division stated that, under the conditions specified, the publication or distribution by a
broker or dealer (collectively, "Broker/Dealer") of information, an opinion or a recommendation as to
investment grade asset-backed securities (as defined for Securities Act Form 5-3 eligibility purposes)
("ABS") will not be deemed, for purposes of Securities Act Sections 2(a)(10) and 5(c), to be an offer of
ABS registered or proposed to be registered under the Securities Act ("Registered Securities") whether
or not the Broker/Dealer is or will be a participant in the distribution of the Registered Securities.
The conditions relate to (i) the Broker/Dealer's previous publication or distribution of opinions
or recommendations on specified types of ABS collateral; (ii) the sufficiency of public information to
provide a basis for the Broker/Dealer's expressed view; (iii) relationships between the Broker/Dealer
and a participant in the offering; (iv) whether the Broker/Dealer makes a specific recommendation on a
specific ABS of a specific issuer; and (v) whether the Broker/Dealer recommends ABS backed by collateral substantially similar to that backing the Registered Securities.
In addition, the Division stated that more conditions must be met if the Registered Securities
have not yet been offered or are part of an unsold allotment or subscription. The Division also stated
that, in the case of a multi-tranche offering of ABS, each tranche, as described, is treated as a different
Registered Security. Finally, the Division stated that its position may be modified or withdrawn if the
Commission or the Division determines that this is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
otherwise in furtherance of the federal securities laws,
..

D.

Section 3(aH2) of the Securities Act
State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street") - August I, 1996

The Division (as well as the Divisions of Investment Management and Market Regulation) addressed State Street's proposal to offer units ("Units") in specified collective trust funds ("Funds") it
maintains to plans ("457 Plans") meeting the definition of "eligible deferred compensation plan" in
Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code where specified restrictions are imposed on the ability of
employers to withdraw assets from the 457 Plans. The Divisions also addressed past no-action letters as
to 457 Plans,
The Division stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if State Street, in reliance
on an opinion of counsel that the exemptions under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Section
3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act are available, offers Units to 457 Plans without registration under these
Acts. The Division of Market Regulation concurred with the Division as to the Exchange Act. The
Division of Investment Management stated.that it would not recommend enforcement action if State
Street offers and sells Units to 457 Plans without registering the Funds as investment companies in
reliance on Section 3(c)(1l) of the Investment Company Act.
The Divisions noted that they previously had issued a number of no-action letters relating to
457 Plans based largely on the general representation that plan assets would not be used for any purpose other than the exclusive benefit of participants except to the extent that plan assets must remain
subject to the claims of general creditors of the employer to preserve the plan's qualification under
Section 457. The Divisions also noted, however, that they now believe that this general representation
no longer provides an adequate basis for no-action relief without specific additional restrictions on the
ability of an employer to withdraw assets similar to those specified by State Street.
An agreement ("Agreement") between State Street and a 457 Plan would, among other things,
specifically prohibit an employer from withdrawing 457 Plan assets except for the following purposes:
(1) to transfer 457 Plan assets to a trustee in bankruptcy in the event of the employer's insolvency or
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bankruptcy, or to any other agent independent of the employer authorized to act in such proceedings;
(2) to satisfy the claims of the employer's general creditors in the event of the employer's insolvency or
bankruptcy; (3) to pay benefits to an employee participating in a 457 Plan; (4) to transfer assets to a 457
Plan's custodian or other person designated by a sponsoring employer in case the Agreement is terminated or a withdrawal is made for the purpose of using another investment manager or investment
arrangement; (5) to distribute 457 Plan assets to participating employees in the event a 457 Plan is
terminated pursuant to a plan of liquidation; or (6) to reimburse an employer for any 457 Plan benefits
that the employer may have paid out of its other assets, or to correct an excess deferral or other mistaken
investment in a Fund.
The Divisions concluded that, consequently, the prior no-action letters no longer represent the
Divisions' position on enforcement action in the 457 Plan area. The Divisions stated, however, that to
facilitate an orderly transition to their current position, they will not recommend enforcement action for
a period of 12 months from the date of the response if persons continue to rely on prior letters. Finally,
the Divisions took the position that at the end of that period, however, banks and insurance companies
wishing to continue including 457 Plans in their collective trust funds or separate accounts should, for
new contracts, enter into an agreement similar to the Agreement with the sponsor of each such 457 Plan,
and for existing contracts, use reasonable efforts to amend plan documents and/or supporting contracts to conform to the Agreement (or an agreement similar to the Agreement).
E.

Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act
Food Lion. Inc. - lanuary 13. 1999

The Division stated that it would not object if / based on counsel/s opinion that the exemption
from registration provided by Section 3(a)(1O) is available, the described exchange of securities traded
on the Nasdaq National Market were conducted as proposed.
In reaching its position, the Division noted the recent enactment of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (105 P.L. 353/ 112 Stat. 3227)/ which amended Section 18(b)(4)(C) of the
Securities Act to include a reference to Section 3(a)(10). Section 18 of the Securities Act creates an exemption from state securities law registration requirements for "covered securities", and defines "covered security" to include any security listed on the Nasdaq National Market System. As amended,
Section 18(b)(4)(C) removes securities that are otherwise covered securities from the definition if they
are offered and sold in reliance on certain federal exemptions, including Section 3(a)(1O). The Division
expressed the view that, as a result of the amendment, state securities law provisions authorizing the
approval of certain exchanges of securities may be used to perfect an exemptive claim under Section
3(a)(1O) where the security is otherwise a "covered security". The Division stated that, because of this
Congressional action, statements to the contrary in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3/ as published on July 25/
1997/ are no longer valid.
The Division also addressed other questions raised with respect to the proposed exchange.
Maverick Networks -lanuary 25.1999
The Division expressed the view that an exemptive claim under Section 3(a)(1O) for securities
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the Nasdaq Market System in
a transaction reviewed under Section 25142 of the California Corporations Code would not be impaired by Section 18(b) of the Securities Act. The Division noted that through the recent amendment to
Section 18(b)(4)(C) of the Securities Act, such securities, which otherwise would be "covered securities"
exempted by Section 18 from state securities law regulatory requirements, are removed from the definition of covered securities if they are offered and sold in reliance on Section 3(a)(1O). As a result, the
Division stated, state securities law provisions (such as the California provision at issue) authorizing
the approval of certain exchanges of securities may again be used to perfect exemptive claims under
Section 3(a)(1O) with respect to securities that otherwise would be covered securities.
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F.

Section 5 of the Securities Act
Wit Capital- July 14. 1999

The Division, without concurring in counsel's analysis, agreed not to recommend enforcement
action to the Commission under section 5(a) or 5(b) against Wit Capital for its conduct of initial public
offerings using the procedures described in Wit's request.
Under the procedures, Wit circulates an e-mail notice conforming to rule 134 after preliminary
prospectus in a segregated area within Wit's web site. The segregated area in Wit's web site, the "cuI de
sac," separates information concerning the IPO from other information on Wit's web site. A person
entering the cuI de sac cannot link other sites on the Internet, such as the issuer's web site. The cuI de
sac includes only a notice conforming to rule 134, the preliminary prospectus, and information on Wit's
general account and subscription procedures.
A person visiting the cuI de sac who does not hold accounts with Wit must open the account
before submitting an offer to buy shares in the IPO. A minimum of $2,000 must be deposited to open the
account. The amount deposited is independent of the amount that may be required to purchase shares
and remains in the control of the investor. Persons holding accounts who wish to participate in the
offering may make offers to buy through the subscription documents included in the cuI de sac. Offers
to buy may specify the price the investor is willing to pay. Offers to buy that do not specify a price are
treated as limit orders at the maximum estimated public offering price disclosed in the prospectus.
Approximately 48 hours before the anticipated effectiveness of the registration statement, Wit
sends an e-mail notice requesting reaffirmation of the offers to buy. Persons who do not confirm their
earlier offers will not receive allocations. The confirmation will be valid for a maximum of seven business days from this e-mail notice. A further reconfirmation will be required at any time the public offering price deviates from the estimate and at any time the preliminary prospectus is recirculated.
After the registration statement is effective and shortly before the IPO is priced using rule 430A
procedures, Wit will send an e-mail notice to each bidder stating that the offering is about to price and
that unless the bidder withdraws the offer to buy within a brief period (the minimum is an hour), Wit
may accept the offer. Notices of acceptance are sent to persons who have received allocations. The
notice will be followed by a confirmation that satisfies Exchange Act rule lOb-10 and the final prospectus required by section 5(b)(2).
American Be Cor.poration (the "Company") - May 15. 1998
The Division addressed the Company's Charter Partners insurance program (the "Program").
The Program was to involve (i) the sale of insurance policies to members of associations or other organizations (each an "Association") of smaller and middle sized commercial businesses with similar
business risks, and (ii) the reinsurance of a portion of the liabilities arising from those policies by a
Bermudan "rent-a-captive."
Under the Program, each Association would act as settlor of a trust ("Trust") for the benefit of
its members who purchase insurance through the Program ("Policyholders"). Each Trust would purchase, for a nominal amount, one share of non-voting preferred stock in the holding company ("Holding Company") that owns the rent-a-captive. The Company or one of its affiliates would hold all of the
common stock in the Holding Company. Should an Association have an overall positive result because
of its favorable loss experience, the rent-a-captive would pay dividends to the Holding Company with
respect to that Association's policies. The Holding Company would then pay a dividend to the Trust on
the preferred stock. Any distribution from the rent-a-captive to the Holding Company, and from the
Holding Company to the Trust, would be made pursuant to a predetermined formula set forth in a
shareholder agreement between the Holding Company and the Trust. After deduction of certain administrative expenses, all of the dividends paid by the rent-a-captive to the Holding Company would
then be distributed to the Policyholders. The distributions to the Policyholders would be based on a
separate formula that took into account each Policyholder's premium volume and loss experience.
The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if, in reliance upon counsel's opinion that registration was not required, the Program were
operated without registration of the Trust interests or the Holding Company preferred stock under the
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Securities Act. In reaching this position, the Division noted, among other things, that (1) no Policyholder would ever be liable for any dollar amount in excess of the premium paid by the Policyholder for
insurance; and (2) any dividends distributed to a Policyholder would be allocated pursuant to a predetermined formula and based primarily upon the Policyholder's own loss experience.

!.

r
r

r

Net Roadshow. Inc. ("Net Roadshow") - Ianuary 30. 1998
The Division stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if Net Roadshow transmits road shows over its Internet website solely to "qualified institutional buyers" ("QIBS") within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144A(a)(1) on behalf of a QIB (or person acting on its behalf) that purchases securities from an issuer for resale to other QIBS under Rule 144A ("Seller"). The Division noted
counsel's opinion that the activities described would be consistent with Rule 144A(d)(1) and conditioned its position on Net Roadshow's compliance with the following conditions in connection with
each road show.
(1)

r

r
r

Net Roadshow will deny access to its website for viewing a particular
road show (including any notice of the road show posted on Net
Roadshow's website) to all but:
(A)

New Roadshow's or the Seller's employees or authorized
agents for that road show; and

(B)

the institutions for which the Seller has confirmed its reasonable
belief regarding their QIB status.

(2)

The confidential password assigned to QIBS for a particular road show
will be unique to that road show, and will expire no later than the date
the related offering terminates.

(3)

Each Seller's confirmation to Net Roadshow will include the follOWing:

r

(A)

a representation that the Seller is a QIB;

(B)

an adequate basis for the Seller's representation of its
"reasonable belief" that:

r

(i) each entity to which the Seller has assigned a confidential
password is a QIB; and

i

(ii) the offering to which the particular road show relates is
not subject to Securities Act registration.

r

(4)

r
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(5)

Net Roadshow otherwise has no actual knowledge or reason to believe,
that:
(A)

the Seller is not a QIB;

(B)

any of the entities to which the Seller has assigned a confidential
password is not a QIB; or

(C)

the securities offering to which a particular road show relates
is subject to Securities Act registration.

Net Roadshow is not an affiliate of any Seller or issuer of a security
that is the subjectof a particular road show.

Finally, the Division stated that the Commission or staff may reevaluate this no-action position
in the future because regulatory responses to legal issues raised by technological developments may
evolve.
Internet Capital COI1'oration. ("ICC") - December 24.1997
The Division (as well as the Division of Market Regulation) addressed ICC's electronic posting
and delivery of prospectuses and other offering materials for unaffiliated issuers.

D-51

ICC will provide this service in connection with Securities Act registered offerings, Securities
Act Regulation A offerings and SCOR offerings. ICC will not provide this service in connection with
offerings under Securities Act Regulation D Rules 505 and 506. For example, as to registered offerings,
ICC will post on its website notices that comply with Securities Act Rule 134 and related preliminary
prospectuses that comply with Securities Act Rule 430 and final prospectuses.
The Division stated that it would not recommend enforcement action as a result of the electronic posting and delivery. The Division expressly disclaimed providing a view on whether:
•

ICC, in engaging in the activities described, would be an "underwriter"
within the meaning of Securities Act Section 2(a)(1l); and

•

the prospectus delivery procedures described would satisfy the
standards set forth in Securities Act Release Nos. 7233 (October 6, 1995)
and/or 7288 (May 9, 1996).

The Division of Market Regulation took the position that it would not recommend enforcement
action under Exchange Act Section 15(a) if ICC establishes and operates the described Internet web site
without registering as a broker-dealer under Exchange Act Section 15(b). The Divisions noted that their
positions were based in part on the oral representation that no ICC affiliate will do business with an
issuer or assist an issuer in connection with the issuer's offering of its securities on ICC's web site.
Finally, the Divisions noted that their no-action positions may be reevaluated in the future because
regulatory responses to ongoing technological developments may evolve.
The Securities Transfer Association. Inc. - October 24. 1997
The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if, in reliance
on an opinion of counsel that registration under the Securities Act is not required, a bank or issuer uses
its Internet Web site in connection with an open-market stock purchase plan ("Plan") as described in the
request and without compliance with the Securities Act's registration provisions.
The uses described in the request include the following:
•

an issuer places on its Web site a notice of Plan availability and a
hypertext link to the bank Plan sponsor's Web site; and

•

a bank Plan sponsor places on its Web site a list of issuers for which it
sponsors Plans and the related Plan materials.

Brown & Wood LLP - February 7. 1997
The Division addressed the resale by specified holders ("Holders") of securities ("Exchange
Capital Securities") acquired in a Securities Act registered exchange offer ("Exchange Offer") for substantially similar privately placed financing trust issued securities ("Capital Securities").
The Division concluded that a Holder may resell the Exchange Capital Securities without compliance with Securities Act registration and delivery requirements where the Holder acquires the Exchange Capital Securities in the ordinary course of its business and has no arrangement or understanding with any person to participate in the distribution of the Exchange Capital Securities.
In reaching this position, the Division particularly noted (1) the described characteristics of the
Capital Securities; and (2) the described actions to be taken in connection with the Exchange Offer.
Dissemination of Research Materials Relating to Asset-Backed Securities - February 7.

1m
The Division addressed the publication or distribution by a broker or dealer of information, an
opinion or a recommendation as to asset-backed securities. See Section xn.C for a discussion of this letter.
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IPONET - July 26. 1996
With respect to public offerings, the Division addressed the application of Securities Act Rule
134 to an electronic coupon or card. The Division stated that the reference in Rule 134(d) to "an enclosed
or attached coupon or card, or in some other manner" would be equally applicable to the acceptance of
indications of interest via electronic coupon or card as well as paper coupon or card. In this regard, the
Division noted the representation that Rule 134(d)'s other requirements will be satisfied in connection
with the acceptance of such indications of interest.
The Division also addressed, in the electronic context, the definitions of "general solicitation" and
"general advertising" under Securities Act Regulation D Rule 502(c). The Division took the position that
the initial qualification of accredited or sophisticated investors by means of a generic questionnaire, followed by the subsequent posting of a notice of a private offering in a password-protected page of IPONET
accessible only to IPONET members who previously qualified as accredited investors, would not involve
any form of "general solicitation" or "general advertising" within the meaning of Rule 502(c).
In reaching this conclusion, the Division noted that (i) both the invitation to complete the questionnaire used to determine whether an investor is accredited or sophisticated and the questionnaire
itself will be generic in nature and will not reference any specific transactions posted or to be posted on
the password-protected page of IPONET; (ii) the password-protected page of IPONET will be available
to a particular investor only after the supervisor of IPONET has made the determination that the particular potential investor is accredited or sophisticated; and (iii) a potential investor could purchase
securities only in transactions that are posted on the password-protected page of IPONET after that
investor's qualification with IPONET. In this regard, the Division stated that it took no position as to
whether the information obtained by the supervisor is sufficient to form a reasonable basis for believing
an investor to be accredited or sophisticated.
Real Goods Trading Corporation (the "Company") - June 24. 1996
The Division (as well as the Divisions of Investment Management and Market Regulation) addressed the Company's proposed trading system ("System") that would provide information about
prospective buyers and sellers (the "Participants") of the Company's common stock ("Common Stock").
The Division took the position that the Company's activities in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of the System would not require that offers or sales made through the System be registered
under the Securities Act. The Division of Investment Management took the position that the Company
may engage in the activities specified without registering under the Investment Advisers Act. The
Division of Market Regulation took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action under Exchange Act Section 5, 6 or 15 if the Company operates the System in the manner specified without
registration as a national securities exchange under Section 6 or as a broker-dealer under Section 15 of
the Exchange Act.
In reaching these positions, the Divisions noted that (i) the Company will provide specified notices regarding operation of and participation on the System that will be set forth or contained on the
screens and/or hard copy by which System information is provided; (ii) the Company is an Exchange Act
Section 12 registrant and will retain that status or, if it should cease to be a Section 12 registrant, otherwise
undertake to make publicly available the information required by Exchange Act Section 13(a) in the same
manner that Participants will obtain access to the System (g,g., electronic mail, facsimile, mail, the Company's
World-Wide Web site, etc.); (iii) the Company will keep records of all quotes entered into the System and
make those records available to the Commission and the Pacific Stock Exchange (or any other regulated
market on which Company securities are listed) upon reasonable request; (iv) the Company's advertising
will comply with specified representations; (v) neither the Company nor any affiliate of the Company will
use the System, directly or indirectly, to offer to buy or sell securities, except in compliance with the securities laws, including any applicable registration requirements (absent an available exemption therefrom);
and (vi) neither the Company nor any affiliate of the Company will (a) receive any compensation for
creating or maintaining the System; (b) receive any compensation for the use of the System; (c) be involved
in any purchase or sale negotiations arising from the System; (d) provide information regarding the advisability of buying or selling Common Stock or any other securities; or (e) receive, transfer or hold funds or
securities as an incident of operating the System.
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G.

Rules 144, 145, and 144A
Mandatorily Exchangeable Issuer Securities October 25, 1999

The Division addressed the eligibility of a security for resale under Rule 144A, where that security, itself eligible to be resold in reliance on Rule 144A(d)(3), is exchangeable at the issuer's election for
securities of unrelated issuers. The securities of the unrelated person could be resold by the issuer of the
overlying security in reliance on Section 4(1), either because they were not restricted securities within
the meaning or Rule 144(a)(3) or because they could be sold in reliance on Rule 144(k). The Division
expressed the view that, under the circumstances described, the overlying security would be eligible for
resale under Rule 144A. The Division expressed no view on the application of the conversion premium
test of Rule 144A(d)(3) to securities of this description.
Verio Inc. ("Vedo") • May 25, 1999
The Division expressed the view that, once Verio has fully and unconditionally guaranteed a
debt security of its wholly owned subsidiary, holders of warrants to purchase Verio common stock who
pay the warrant exercise price by surrendering the guaranteed debt instrument may use their holding
periods on the warrants and debt securities to calculate their holding periods for the common stock
received on exercise. In reaching its position, the Division particularly noted that the addition of the
Verio guarantee would allow Verio and its wholly owned subsidiary to be considered the same issuer
for purposes of Rule 144(d)(3)(ii). The Division noted that warrant holders paying the exercise price
with any consideration other than the guaranteed debt securities or other Verio securities would use the
date of exercise of the warrant and payment of its exercise price as the beginning of the holding period
for the Verio common stock received upon exercise. The Division stated that Amdahl Corp. (February 27,
1999) and American Telephone and Telegraph Company (May 1, 1999) no longer represent the Division's
view on this issue.
CommScan, LLC • February 3, 1999
The Division expressed the view that sellers may rely on the Company's qualified institutional
buyers list ("QIB List"), which would be published on an Internet web site accessible only by registered
broker / dealers, as a method for establishing a reasonable belief that a prospective purchaser is a "qualified institutional buyer" within the meaning of Rule 144A(a)(I) under the Securities Act. Information
underlying inclusion of an entity in the QIB List must be as of a date within 16 months before the date of
sale of securities in the case of a United States purchaser, and within 18 months before such date of sale
for a foreign purchaser.
Elliott Associates, L.p, and Westgate International. L.P. -January 18, 1999
The Division expressed the view that that the Rule 144(d) holding period for common shares
issuable to holders of described outstanding debt of the issuer, in satisfaction of terms in the Trust Deed
governing the debt providing for contingent issuance of the common shares, would be identical to the
holding period for the debt securities themselves. The Division noted that the obligation to issue the
common shares is subject only to conditions outside the control of the parties, and that the issuances
will not be made against the payment of any new consideration.
The Petersen Companies, Inc. ("Company") - July 16, 1998
The Division expressed the view that the Rule 144(d) holding period for shares of Company
common stock exchanged for limited liability company interests in Petersen Holdings, L.L.C. ("Petersen")
began on October 1, 1997, the date of the exchange. The Division stated that the holding period could
not "tack" to an earlier date because the agreement Petersen interest holders signed when Petersen was
formed, granting the Company (in its capacity as Petersen's manager) the right to control all aspects of
any initial public offering, did not expressly contemplate conversion from a limited liability company to
corporate form in advance of a public offering of securities, with holders of Petersen units retaining no
veto or other voting power with respect to the conversion. The Division referred specifically to Peapod,
Inc. (Nov. 10, 1997).
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Peapod. Inc. ("Peapod") - November 10. 1997
The Division took the position that limited partners of a partnership and the shareholders of its
corporate general partner could "tack," under Securities Act Rule 144(d), their holding periods for their
limited partnership interests and shares, respectively, onto their holding periods for the shares of Peapod
received in a conversion (and, in the case of the general partner's shareholders, the general partner's
subsequent liquidation).

In the conversion,
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•

all the equity interests in the partnership were exchanged for Peapod
shares;

•

the partnership was dissolved; and

•

all of the partnership's assets and liabilities were transferred to Peapod.

In reaching this conclusion, the Division noted in particular specified agreements and their
contemplation of the partnership's conversion to corporate form in advance of, and to facilitate, the
new corporation's public offering.
Rite Aid Corporation - October 20. 1997
The Division expressed the view that, where securities originally issued in a Securities Act Rule
145(a) transaction are transferred as gifts to third parties by a person Rule 145(c) deems an underwriter,
the donees in the transfers who are not the issuer's affiliates may make unregistered public resales of
the securities in the same manner and to the same extent as the donor.
Nextel Communications. Inc. - August 19. 1997
The Division stated that, where securities originally issued in a Securities Act Rule 145(a) transaction are privately sold by a person deemed an underwriter by Rule 145(c) (other than an affiliate of
the issuer), an unaffiliated purchaser of the securities may make unregistered public resales of the securities to the same extent and in the same manner as the private seller.
First Bank System. Inc. - July 30. 1997
The Division stated that when an affiliate pledgor defaults on a loan that is collateralized by
securities that are not "restricted" in the hands of the pledgor, and the pledgee bank forecloses on the
pledge, the pledgee bank may sell those securities without regard to the holding period requirement of
Securities Act Rule 144.
H.

Rule 701
Morgan. Lewis & Bockius - November 3. 1999

The Division provided further guidance for issuers when transitioning from former Rule 701 to
the new version. The Division expressed these views concerning the treatment of options:
•

an issuer could rely on the grant date method for options granted in
the 12 months before effectiveness of the revised rule up to the ceiling
permitted under the old rule. Excess options - option grants over the
ceiling in the old rule - could be considered against the available ceiling
under the revised rule either when the excess options become
exercisable or when they are actually exercised, whichever is most
advantageous;

•

the disclosure required by the revised rule where the $5 million ceiling
is exceeded must be provided to investors a reasonable time before the
exercise of options, even if those options were granted long before the
rule revision; and
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•

the "clean slate" method is appropriate only if the available ceiling
under the revised rule is not exceeded when offers and sales under the
former rule are combined with sales under the revised rule.

Occidental Petroleum Corporation - August 3. 1999
The Division expressed the view that a private subsidiary of Occidental, a publicly reporting
company, may use Rule 701 to offer or sell its securities to its employees.
American Bar Association - August 3. 1999
The Division stated that, subject to preliminary note 5 to Rule 701, a private subsidiary of a
publicly reporting company may use Rule 701 to offer or sell its securities, including deferred compensation arrangements whether guaranteed or not guaranteed by the parent, to its employees, officers,
directors, partners, trustees, consultants or advisors, or those of its parents or other majority-owned
subsidiaries of its parent.
American Bar Association - August 3. 1999
With respect to issues of transition from the former Rule 701 to the new version, the Division
expressed the view that the grant date method, the effective date method and the exercisable date method
described, each appear to be appropriate ways of handling unexercisable options under the new provision. The Division also concurred with the view that options issued in reliance upon the prior version
of Rule 701 regardless of their exercisability would not be subject to the new disclosure requirements at
the time of the option grants.
I.

Regulation S
Initial Public Offerings of V.S. Companies on EASDAO - July 27. 1999

The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if equity securities of non-reporting, U.S. companies are offered and sold in initial public offerings offshore pursuant
to Regulation S in connection with a listing on EASDAQ without implementation of the stop-transfer
and other provisions set forth under Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(B), Rule 903(b)(3)(iv) and Rule 904(b)(1)(ii). In
reaching its position, the Division relied on counsel's opinion that the alternative restrictions and arrangements described in the request provide reasonable procedures to prevent public distribution of
these equity securities in the United States. The Division also noted that U.S. firms are not permitted to
participate in the EASDAQ market, either as brokers or market-makers, and that no EASDAQ trading
screens will be placed in the United States.
Sales of Convertible Securities Under Regulation S - August 26. 1998
The Division stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if convertible securities of
U.S. reporting companies that are eligible for resale under Rule 144A and that are held in global certificated from (as either registered or bearer securities) by a depository for a book-entry clearance facility
are offered and resold pursuant to Regulation S without implementation of the stop-transfer provisions
or other procedures set forth under Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(~) of Regulation S, as long as certain procedures are followed during the applicable distribution compliance period. The Division stated that its
view was limited to convertible securities offered or resold under Regulation 5, and would not affect the
applicability of Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(~) to any equity securities issued upon the conversion of the convertible securities during the distribution compliance period.
The Division also indicated that debt securities convertible into the equity securities of a person
other than the issuer ("exchangeable" securities) would be considered convertible securities for Regulation 5 purposes.
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Section 18(b)(4)(A) of the Securities Act
Dayid M. Katz. Esq. - April 24. 1997

The Division addressed one of the definitions of "covered security" provided by Securities Act
Section 18(b). Section 18(b)(4)(A) states that a security is a "covered security" as to a transaction that is
exempt from Securities Act registration under Securities Act Section 4(1) or 4(3), provided that the issuer "files reports" with the Commission under Exchange Act Section 13 or 15(d). The Division stated
that an issuer "files reports" for purposes of Section 18(b)(4)(A) if it has completed a registered initial
public offering under the Securities Act, but has not yet been required to file any reports under Section
13 or 15(d).

r
r

K.

r

The Division stated that post-effective amendments to deregister unsold shares are not required
in fee transfers from Securities Act registration forms other than Form 5-8 or in fee transfers from Form
S-8 solely of fees paid pursuant to Rule 457(h)(3) with respect to additional securities offered for resale.

r,

The Division also stated that the filing of the Securities Act registration statement to which the
fee is transferred is deemed to deregister the unsold shares for which the transferred fee originally was
paid.

r
r

Finally, the Division stated that registrants who wish to transfer Securities Act registration fees
also should consult the Rule 429 interpretations in the latest version of the Division of Corporation
Finance Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, which is available on the Commission's
Internet web site (http://www.sec.gov), and Securities Act ReI. 7168 (May 11, 1995).
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Securities Act Founs
Ropes & Gray - October 30.1997

The Bond Market Association - October 16. 1997
The Division provided its views on the availability of Securities Act Form 5-3 to asset-backed
securities.
The Division stated that an asset-backed security will not fail to meet the definition of "assetbacked security" in Form S-3, General Instruction I.B.5, solely because the security is supported by
assets having total delinquencies (as described in the request) of up to 20% at the time of the proposed
offering.
The Division also stated that, regardless of whether an asset-backed security meets the definition of "asset-backed security" in General Instruction I.B.5, the security may nevertheless be eligible for
registration on Form S-3 as long as the issuer satisfies General Instruction 1.A.'s registrant requirements
and General Instruction I.B.2.'s transaction requirements.
Merrill Lynch & Co.. Inc. <the "Company") - May 16. 1996
The Division stated that it wouid not object if the Company uses Form S-8 under the Securities
Act in connection with exercises of transferable stock options ("Transferable Stock Options") subject to
specified transfer restrictions by former employees and by executors, administrators and beneficiaries
of estates of employees or former employees, provided that the Transferable Stock Options being exercised have never been transferred by the original grantees and are only exercisable by executors, administrators and beneficiaries of their estates due to such grantees' deaths.
In reaching this position, the Division noted in particular that a Transferable Stock Option is not
transferable by any person other than the original grantee or the estate of the original grantee (which is
permitted to transfer such Transferable Stock Option only to the beneficiaries of such estate).

f;
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L.

SectiQns 13 and lS(d) Qf the Exchanse Act
TIme Warner Inc. <the "CQmpany") - June 10. 1998

The Division stated that it would not object if each of two Company subsidiaries (each a "Subsidiary") did not file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Exchange Act with respect to its securities guaranteed i) by the Company and ii) by the other Subsidiary (a "Cross Guarantee"). In reaching
its conclusion the Division noted, among other factors, that the Company had fully and unconditionally
guaranteed the Cross Guarantees. The Division's position was conditioned on the inclusion of certain
narrative and financial statement disclosure in the Company's Exchange Act reports.
PiQneer Americas AcquisitiQn CQrp. - April 3. 1998
The Division stated that it would not object if an issuer (the "Issuer") of securities guaranteed
by its parent (the "Parent Guarantor") and by other wholly-owned subsidiaries of its parent (the"Affiliate Guarantors") did not file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Exchange Act with respect to the
guaranteed securities. The Division also stated that it would not object if the Affiliate Guarantors did
not file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) with respect to the guarantees. In reaching its conclusion
the Division noted, among other factors, that the Parent Guarantor and the Affiliate Guarantors had
fully and unconditionally guaranteed the Issuer's securities on a joint and several basis. The Division's
position was conditioned on the inclusion of certain narrative and financial statement disclosure in the
Parent Guarantor's Exchange Act reports.
M.

Proxy Rules
Johnson Controls. Inc. ("Johnson") - October 26.1999

The Division addressed whether a proposal recommending certain disclosure in the financial
statements included in Johnson's Commission-prescribed documents could be omitted from Johnson's
proxy material under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), as relating to Johnson's ordinary business operations. In expressing its view that the proposal could be omitted, the Division stated that it has determined that proposals
requesting additional disclosures in Commission-prescribed documents should not be omitted under
the" ordinary business" exclusion solely because they relate to the preparation and content of documents filed with or submitted to the Commission. This interpretive approach reverses the Division's
prior approach to such proposals. Beginning With]OJ111S071 Controls, when evaluating such proposals the
Division will consider whether the subject matter of the additional disclosure sough in a particular
proposal involves a matter of ordinary business. Where it does, the Division believes the proposal may
be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
ChevrQn Corporation - March 4. 1999
The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if Chevron
omitted a shareholder proposal requesting the board of directors to review and report on Chevron's
code of business conduct under Rule 14a-8(i)(12)(ii). The Division noted that the current proposal,
when viewed together with the proposals submitted in 1996 and 1997, all appear to focus on Chevron's
operations in Nigeria. Furthermore, changing circumstances are not a consideration under Rule 14a8(i)(12). On this basis, the Division continued to follow the precedent established by a prior staff noaction letter issued to Florida Progress Corporation on January 8, 1997.
General pataComm Industries. Inc.• December 9. 1998
The Division stated that it did not believe that General DataComm could rely on Rule 14a8(i)(7) as a basis to exclude a shareholder proposal mandating a bylaw amendment on stock option
repricing from its proxy materials. The Division noted that in view of the widespread public deate
concerning option repricing and the increasing recognition that this issue raises significant policy issues, its view is that proposals relating to option repricing no longer can be considered matters relating
to a registrant's ordinary business. This letter reverses a prior staff no-action letter issued to Shiva
Corporation on March 10, 1998.
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Tenet Healthcare Corporation <the "Company") - July I. 1998
The Division was unable to concur in the Company's view that Rule 14a-8(c)(7) provides a basis for the
Company to omit from its proxy material a proposal requesting that the board of directors prepare a
report regarding the status of the Company's computer system preparedness for the Year 2000. The
Division expressed the view that the proposal raises significant policy issues that are beyond the ordinary business operations of the Company.
Merrill !¥nch. Pierce. Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("Company") - October 24. 1997
The Division took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action if the Company prepares and disseminates research reports in accordance with Securities Act Rule 138 or 139 in
connection with registered securities transactions, without compliance with the filing, disclosure and
dissemination requirements of the proxy rules under Exchange Act Section 14(a).

,.

The Division stated that its position was conditioned on the research report referring, as required by law or applicable rules, to any relationship that may exist between the Company, as issuer of
a particular research report, and any participant in a relevant proxy solicitation. The Division also
stated that its position did not address the applicability of the federal securities laws' anti-fraud provisions to the activities described in the request.

r
r

Finally, the Division stated that it may re-evaluate its no-action position in the future because
the request raises issues in an evolving area of the federal securities laws.

r

The staff addressed the application of Rule 16b-3(c) to open market stock purchase plans that,
under the standards of Securities Act Release No. 4790, are not required to be registered under Section
5 of the Securities Act. The Division said that the acquisition of issuer stock pursuant to accumulated
payroll deductions under such a plan is a transaction with "an employee benefit plan sponsored by the
issuer" for purposes of Rule 16b-3(a) where:
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N.

Section 16 Rules
American Bar Association - October 15. 1999

•

the issuer deducts funds from compensation;

•

deducted funds accumulate for a regular, specified interval no shorter
than a pay period;

•

accumulated funds are invested in issuer stock; and

•

the open market plan restricts participation to employees of the issuer
and its parents or subsidiaries who would be eligible to purchase
securities of the issuer under a registration statement on Form S-8.

Such an acquisition is exempt under Rule 16b-3(c) if the open market plan meets the conditions of Rule
16b-3(b)(5), the definition of a Stock Purchase Plan. Because subsequent sales or transfers of the securities so acquired would be outside the plan, these transactions would not be exempt under Rule 16b-3.
Acquisitions pursuant to additional voluntary contributions, although not exempt under Rule 16b-3,
would not make the exemption unavailable for acquisitions pursuant to payroll deductions.
Select Sector SPDR Trust <the ''Trust'') - May 6. 1999
In a joint letter with the Division of Investment Management, the Division addressed the application of Section 16(a) to shares issued by the Trust, a registered open-end management investment
company, in its nine separate investment portfolios (the "Funds"). The Divisions stated that, having
expressed in this letter and in PDR Services Corporation (December 14,1998) their views as to whether
insiders and five percent beneficial owners of exchange-traded products, such as the shares issued by
the Funds, must file ownership reports under Sections 16(a) and 13(d), respectively, the Divisions will
no longer respond to requests for no-action relief in this area unless the request presents a novel or
unusual issue.
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American Bar Association - February 10, 1999
The Division addressed the application of Exchange Act Rule 16b-3 to transactions occurring in
the following contexts:
•
A transaction in issuer securities by the issuer's officer or director with the issuer's majorityowned subsidiary (or an employee benefit plan sponsored by a majority-owned subsidiary) will be
considered a transaction with the issuer for purposes of Rule 16b-3(a). However, the approval requirements of Rule 16b-3(d) and 16b-3(e) must be satisfied at the issuer-rather than the subsidiary-level.
The following salary limitations implement "benefit or contribution limitations set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code" for purposes of Rule 16b-3(b)(2): (a) the annual compensation limit in Internal Revenue
Code Section 401(a)(17); and (b) the Internal Revenue Code Section 415 exclusion from taxable compensation of salary that has been deferred into a non-qualified plan. A supplemental plan that permits
employer contributions that otherwise would have been made to the related qualified plan but for
either of these limitations will be an Excess Benefit Plan.
•

The following plans are not Excess Benefit Plans because the amount
of issuer securities acquired will be determined based on the amount
of salary the officer or director chooses to defer: (a) a non-qualified
deferred contribution plan; and (b) a supplemental plan that provides
an employer matching contribution based on the employee's deferral
of salary into a non-qualified plan.

•

Periodic acquisitions of phantom stock under a non-qualified deferred
compensation plan or a supplemental plan that is not an Excess Benefit
Plan that are exempted by Rule 16b-3(d) may be reported on an
aggregate basis on Form 5.

•

Rule 16b-3 is available to exempt an officer's or director's indirect
interest in transactions, reportable by the officer or director, between
the issuer and the following entities if the approving entity for purposes
of Rules 16b-3(d) and 16b-3(e) knows (and the document evidencing
approval specifies) the existence and extent of the officer's or director's
indirect interest and that the approval is granted for purposes of Rule
16b-3:
a partnership or corporation;
a member of the officer's or director's immediate family; and
a trust.

Skadden. AlpS. Slate. Meagher & Flom LLP - Ianuary 12.1999
The Division addressed the application of Exchange Act Rule 16b-3 to transactions occurring in
the context of corporate mergers.
Where the conversion or cancellation is simultaneous with or immediately before the related
merger, each of the following transactions constitutes a disposition to the issuer of target equity securities eligible for exemption under Rule 16b-3(e), even if the acquiror pays the merger consideration directly to target equity security holders:
•

the conversion of target nonderivative equity securities into acquiror
equity securities, debt, cash or a combination of different forms of
merger consideration; and

•

the conversion of target derivative securities into acquiror derivative
securities or acquiror nonderivative equity securities, or the cancellation
of target derivative securities for cash.

The approval conditions of Rule 16b-3(e) may be satisfied only by the target.
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The acquisition of acquiror equity securities (including acquiror derivative securities) by officers and directors of the acquiror through the conversion of target equity securities in connection with a
merger constitutes an acquisition from the acquiror eligible for exemption under Rule 16b-3(d). This
position applies equally to employees and directors of the target who become officers and/ or directors
of the acquiror before, or at the time of, the merger ("New Acquiror Insiders"). The approval conditions
of Rule 16b-3(d) may be satisfied only by the acquiror.
In the case of both dispositions and acquisitions, the approval conditions of Rule 16b-3 may be
satisfied at the same time as, or following, approval of the merger agreement by the respective issuer's
board of directors, as long as they are satisfied before consummation of the merger. Guidance is provided as to the specificity required if approval is granted by the full board or a committee of two or
more Non-Employee Directors. Approval of an acquisition may be granted before a New Acquiror
Insider becomes an officer or director of the acquiror.
Peter I, Kight - October 16, 1997

f

r
r
r

r
r

r

The Division addressed the application of Exchange Act Section 16 to transactions involving an
irrevocable grantor retained annuity trust ("GRAT").
A grantor ("Grantor"), subject to Section 16 because an officer of a company ("Company") with
common stock registered under Exchange Act Section 12, proposes to create a GRAT for estate planning
purposes. Grantor proposes to transfer ("Transfer") to the GRAT shares of Company common stock
Grantor now owns ("Shares") that constitute less than ten percent of the Company's outstanding common stock.
The GRAT will make a series of fixed annuity payments ("Annuity Payments") to Grantor,
payable in either cash or Shares, over a specified time period ("Annuity Period"). During the Annuity
Period, Grantor is the GRAT's trustee and beneficiary. After the Annuity Period, Grantor's minor children who share Grantor's household ("Children") are the GRAT's beneficiaries. The dollar amount of
the Annuity Payments is established at the time of the Transfer. The present value of the Annuity
Payments does not exceed the fair market value of the Shares at the time of the Transfer.
The Division took the position that Rule 16a-13 (exempting changes in form of ownership from
Section 16) applies to the Transfer and any Annuity Payments paid in Shares. The Division stated that
other transactions in the Shares by the GRAT during the Annuity Period are considered the Grantor's
transactions. The Division also stated that the Annuity Period's termination effects a gift of Shares to
the Children eligible both for exemption under Rule 16b-5 (exempting bona fide gifts from Section
16(b)) and deferred reporting on Form 5. Finally, the Division stated that after the Annuity Period ends,
under Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(A) Grantor continues to report the Shares the Children hold as beneficially
owned by Grantor as long as the Children share Grantor's household

r
r
r

r
r

r
r

D-61

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r

MIDWESTIMIDSOUTH
SECURITIES LAW CONFERENCE

- 2000 GUEST LUNCHEON SPEAKER _

r
r
r

r

John A. Byrne
Senior Writer - Business Week
New York, New York

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
h

SECTIONE

r

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r

r
r
r
r

Chainsaw : The Notorious Career of AI Dunlap in the Era of
Profit-At-Any-Price
by John A. Byrne

The Principal Players
Prologue
Mean Business (the Nonfiction Version)
"I So Love Them"
"Strip Me Naked!"
Pirates and Tribes
Another Downsizing
Coping with the Al Dunlaps
Rambo
The Blanket with a Brain
A Quiet Rebellion
The Secret Room
The Ditty Bag
"Don't You Think I'm a Bargain?"
"A Triple!"
Indecent Disclosure
An Analyst's Call
"Excuse Me, I'm Not a Cook!"
"I'll Come Back at You Twice as Hard"
"Too Rich and Famous"
,,You Want to Quit?"
A Matter of Conscience
What Goes Around, Comes Around
"I Screwed the Pooch!"
Epilogue
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About the Author

John A. Byrne is a senior writer for Business Week. He has written extensively on Al Dunlap's
career over the years. Byrne is the author of Informed Consent and The Whiz Kids and the
co-author, with John Sculley, of Odyssey.
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The author, .1ohn A. Byrne, October 1, 1999
Why I wrote Chainsaw

A confession: I have never been one of Albert J. Dunlap's favorite journalists. There were far
too many other reporters and writers who won his favor over the years. Not me. As a senior
writer at Business Week magazine, I first encountered "Chainsaw AI," the 1990's champion of
downsizing, in late 1995 shortly after Kimberly-Clark Corp. had purchased Scott Paper Co. I
had closely watched his widely celebrated "turnaround" of stodgy Scott from the sidelines,
growing increasingly skeptical as Dunlap became ever more boastful. I found it odd that a
man who virtually based his career on laying off people could do so without expressing regret
or sympathy for those he fired. Indeed, I found it appalling that an executive could layoff
hundreds of thousands of people and speak almost gleefully about the experience. My
subsequent cover story for Business Week, "The Shredder," wasn't one that Dunlap would
paste in his scrapbook. It reported that Dunlap was largely an opportunist who simply prettied
up Scott Paper for a quick sale. He cut muscle along with the fat, sacrificed the long-term
future of a once-great company and its people for a quick buck, and took credit for the
achievements and hard work of others. Though he claimed a turnaround and too many
journalists believed him, Scott had lost market share in all three of its major product areas
during Dunlap's tenure. He and his executives reaped tens of millions in gains while
thousands of his employees lost their jobs and their livelihoods. Yet, Dunlap, $100 million
richer himself from his 18-month stint at Scott, received an avalanche of acclaim. He was
worshiped on Wall Street, elevated to hero status by many shareholders who profited from his
handiwork. His fame and popularity helped to make his vainglorious Mean Business,
part-biography, part-advice book, a bestseller. I would like to think that Chainsaw is
something of an antidote to Dunlap's own Mean Business, which might best be described in
CEO biography terms as laccoca on steroids. Chainsaw is, in some way, the non-fiction
version ofa book that is sadly at home on the shelves of too many people in business. The
readers of Chainsaw will find themselves laughing out loud at how absurd things became at a
billion-dolIar-plus public corporation. They'll also find a storehouse of amusing and shocking
anecdotes to entertain friends and guests for weeks and months. And if I've done my job right,
they'll also come away with an important lesson or two about leadership and management that
they will never forget.
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Al Dunlap was so ruthless in downsizing corporations for
short-term shareholder profit that he earned nicknames such as
"Chainsaw AI" and "Rambo in Pinstripes." Wall Street loved
Dunlap at Scott Paper, where he laid off thousands, but then hated him at Sunbeam, where he
himself was finally fired. Chainsaw, by Business Week writer John A. Byrne, dramatically
documents the rise and fall of Dunlap, the havoc he wreaked on companies and people's lives,
and how he came to power in the first place.
"Chainsaw Al was a creation of the Street and its ceaseless lust for profit at any cost. He came
of age when the market routinely rewarded layoffs with lofty stock prices. The more people he
tossed out in the street, the higher stock values went," writes Byrne, who cites "cutthroat
investors" such as Michael Price and Ronald Perelman for helping Dunlap's rise. Superbly
written and researched, the book vividly describes characters and scenes, and reveals the
fictions that Dunlap told about himself. How cold was Chainsaw AI? Byrne writes that
Dunlap never even attended the funerals for his mother and father. Byrne also tells the story of
the questionable accounting and business practices that ultimately brought down Sunbeam
and Dunlap, and the investigations that led to a restatement of the company's finances.
Dunlap, unhappy about Byrne's reporting, once said of the Business Week writer, "Ifhe were
on fire, I wouldn't piss on him." It's a quote that Byrne uses to kick off his last chapter.
Chainsaw is a compelling read for those interested in the inner workings of Wall Street and
business. or just a well-told story. --Dan Ring
From Booklist November 1 1999

Al Dunlap, catled "Chainsaw" because of his propensity for, even love of, corporate
downsizing, made himself a legend when heading up the in-need-of-resuscitation Sunbeam
Corporation. He displayed the disposition of a dictator, sitting at conference tables like "an
imperial demagogue." He was a product of his times: the 1980s and early 1990s, when
investors rewarded companies for going lean and mean. "To enhance profits and boost stock
prices, American corporations shed millions of employees and thousands of plants." But
Dunlap could not deliver the goods; despite his draconian measures, he did not turn Sunbeam
around in terms of profits, and, as the French Revolution finally consumed its own engine,
Robespierre, the downsizing trend finally consumed the downsize king. Dunlap fell because
of hubris, and his story told here, based largely on Byrne's several Business Week articles on
the subject, leaves us not only with a fascinating inside look at business but also a moral
lesson about getting too big for one's britches. Brad Hooper
Copyright© J999, American Library Association. All rights reserved
Washington MonthJy

"Byrne's rendition of Dunlap's year-and-a-halftantrum is remarkable.enriched by interviews
with most of the top players in thedrama...Byme does an excellent job of chronicling the
human tormentresulting from plant closures where experienced and efficient
life-timeemployees of Sunbeam were suddenly thrown onto unemployment rolls."·
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-Tom Peters, author of Thriving on Chaos and Liberation Management

"John Byrne is simply the best investigative business journalist in the land. Byrne rightfully
nails an executive who sorely deserves nailing. The documentation is powerful and chilling.
Moreover, this extraordinary yam also provides a cautionary tale that should be read closely
on Wall Street as well as in the boardroom."
-Noel Tichy, author with Eli Cohen of The Leadership Engine, and University of
Michigan professor

"From Greek Tragedy through Shakespearean tragedy, we have learned important human and
leadership lessons. John Byrne has written a business history tragedy. The Al Dunlap failure
is a must read for its lessons in leadership. Through detailed story telling, Byrne not only
gives us the story but provides a set of tragic lessons on how bad leadership ultimately
destroys shareholder value and people's lives."
-Bob Waterman, coauthor, In Search of Excellence

"I haven't been consciously searching for the antithesis of excellence, but I think I've found it
anyway. In this extremely well-researched and well written book, Byrne shows us how the
American system of market capitalism can be completely perverted. Under the banner (false
as it turns out) of shareholder value, Chainsaw Al has repeatedly destroyed people,
companies, and ultimately, himself.
-Gerard R. Roche, chairman, Heidrick & Struggles Inc.

"This is a captivating book that deserves to be a mOVIe. Chainsaw is to the nineties what
Barbarians at the Gate was to the eighties. It is a riveting story filled with compelling
characters who wrestle with one of today's most important business issues: The enduring
value of the long-term versus what is simply short-term and expedient. Never before has this
question been more dramatized than in this remarkable tale."
-James C. Collins, coauthor of Built to Last

"A superbly written book. John Byrne provides a riveting and frightening tale of how egos
and greed can destroy a company and people's lives. Every person who cares about the
long-term health of American business should read this book, and shudder at its implications."
-Warren Bennis, University of Southern California Distinguished Professor of
Business Administration and coauthor of Organizing Genius

"John Byrne has done us a great favor with his magnificent book on 'Chainsaw Al.' It is a
fitting tribute for a CEO who has defined for our age the worst of Corporate Darwinism and
brutal short-termism. This book will serve as a template every senior executive and corporate
ethicist will use to evaluate the responsibilities and consequences of leadership in Corporate
America."
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AAAAA Sad commentary on our business culture
Reviewer: Srikumar S. Rao Mn from Long Island, New York

Al Dunlap was so lionized by Wall Street that the market capitalization of Sunbeam went up
by billions of dollars simply because of the announcement that he was taking charge. The
subsequent fiasco is well documented. Byrne takes us behind the scenes and shows us what
exactly happened, and when and why. Based on exhaustive interviews and examination of
public and private records, the tale is both gripping and revealing.
Accounting norms were stretched to the point of outright fraud. Those who tried to sound
alarms were silenced by various means ranging from firing to being bought off with options.
Characters are finely drawn to the extent that you feel you know each one personally. Telling
incidents reveal the essence of each player. During a major crisis, for example, Dunlap
dispatches his major henchman to adjudicate a minor dispute with his club. The movers and
shakers of business - Michael Price, Ron Perelman and others of that ilk - are shown to have
poor judgment coupled with incredible arrogance, the same traits amply displayed by Dunlap.
All have overwhelming greed. There are no heroes in this book.
The author documents that Dunlap's "successes" had much less substance than media
accounts would lead you to believe. It was luck that prevented Scott Paper, for example, from
being the first debacle. This is no hatchet job despite Dunlap's visceral hate for the author.
The author does not reveal many damaging tidbits in this book which he has recounted
elsewhere - such as the fact that Dunlap refused to contibute to the medical expenses of a
niece suffering from cancer.
Far from being a "leader" or even "manager", Dunlap was a tyrant who preyed on the weak,
fawned on the strong and endlessly feathered his nest. Media and Wall Street colluded in his
successful-for-too-Iong image building. Byrne has the courage to point this out.
It is a sad commentary on our business culture that Dunlap flourished for so long despite so
many people knowing what was really going on.

Read this book to understand what is going on behind the scenes in too many companies.
Dunlap did not grow in a vacuum.

r

r
r

January 17, 2000

John Byrne has taken a non fiction theme and turned it into a gripping page turner. Virtually
everyone I know has read this book in one or two sittings. There is a bright future for him in
thrillers!

E-5

r
r

r
r

r

UPDATE ON

r

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION

r
r
r
r

Plaintiff Views:
"What News From the Front?"
The Litigation Experience of Four Years Under
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

r
r

r
r
r

Kevin P. Roddy
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP
Los Angeles, California

r

r

r
r

Copyright 2000, Kevin P. Roddy

SECTIONF

-

-

..

r

r

r
r
r
r

r
r

UPDATE ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
- PLAINTIFF VIEWS TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

D.
E.
II.

III.

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

IV.

V.

Elimination of So-Called "Professional Plaintiffs"
Small vs. Institutional Shareholders

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
A.
B.

r

r
r
r

INTRODUCTION
A.
Supposed Purpose of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
B.
Effectiveness of Statutory Reforms of Securities Litigation
C.
Effective Date of PSLRA

Plaintiff's Sworn Certification
Notice Provisions
1.
Application of notice provisions
2.
Statutory text
3.
Obligation to give notice
4.
TIming and content of notice

.
.
.
.

F-l
F-l
F-2
F-3

.
.

F-4

.

F-6

.
.
.
.
.
.

F-6

F-5

F-7
F-7
F-7
F-8
F-8

5.

Publication of notice

.

F-9

6.

Effect of failure to give notice

.

F-9

APPOINTMENT OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS
A.
Outline of Procedures

.
.

F-ll

B.
C.

Purpose of Lead Plaintiff Provisions
TIme Periods

.
.

F-12
F-13

D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

Statutory Provisions
Rebutting the Presumption
Combinations of Persons or Entities
Discovery Regarding Most Adequate Plaintiff(s)
What Do Defendants Have to Say?
Criteria for Determining Most Adequate Plaintiff

.
.
.
.
.
..

F-14

APPOINTMENT OF LEAD COUNSEL
Statutory Text
A.
B.
Multiple Lead Counsel

.
.
.

RULE 9(b) PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENTS

.

F-ll

F-14

F-15
F-18

F-19
F-20
F-21
F-21
F-21

A.

Level of Particularity Required

.

F-22
F-22

B.

Allegations Based on Information and Belief

.

F-23

e.

Allegations Based on Investigation of Attorney

..

F-23

SECTIONF

VI.

PLEADING SECTION 10(b) VIOLATIONS
A.

Primary Violators Only: No Aiding or Abetting Liability

F-24

B.

"Secondary" Actor's Misconduct May Lead to Primary Liability

F-24

C.

The Elements Plaintiff Must Allege to State a Claim
1.
Falsity
2.
Materiality

F-24
F-25
F-25

3.
D.

VII.

F-25

Pleading Scienterunder<the PSLRA

C.

F-26

1.

Introduction

F-26

2.

Second Circuit: "motive and opportunity"

F-27

3.

The Third Circuit follows the Second Circuit

F-29

4.

Other formulations of scienter pleading requirement................................

F-30

Specific Allegations of Accounting Fraud Supporting Strong Inference of
Scienter under the PSLRA
1.
2.

IX.

Duty to disclose

ACCOUNTING FRAUD: PLEADING SCIENTER UNDER THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
A.
SEC Focus on Accounting Fraud
B.

VIII.

F-24

.
.

F-33

.

F-33

F-33

Earnings/revenue misrepresentations
Violations of GAAP can form part of the basis supporting
strong inference of scienter

.

F-33

.

F-34

3.

Improper revenue recognition of a significant portion of revenues

.

F-35

4.

Pleading that accountant had motive and opportunity

.

F-35

Standard of "Recklessness" for Accountant's Liability

.

F-35

1.

Plaintiff's burden

.

F-35

2.

Ignoring "red flags" of accounting fraud

.

F-36

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY

F-37

A.

Primary Liability

F-37

B.

Secondary Actor', Conduct May Constitute Primary Liability

F-37

C.

Fraudul~nt Schem~

Liability

F-37

D.

"Group Publiahrd" Doctrine

F-37

THE SAFE HARBOR FOR "FORWARD-LOOKING" STATEMENTS AND THE
"BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE

F-38

When Forward.Looking Statements Are Protected

F-38

B.

When Forward·Looking Statements Are Not Protected............................................

F-39

C.

The "Bespeaks Caution" doctrine: When Cautionary Language
Protects Misleading Statements

F-40

Cases in which Cautionary Disclosures Were Insufficient to
Bespeak Caution

F-41

E.

Boilerplate Warnings Are Insufficient to Bespeak Caution

F-42

F.

The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine Is Not Applicable when
Misrepresentations or Omissions Concern
Historical/Hard or Current Facts

F-43

A.

D.

SECTIONF

...

-

r
r
r

I

r

r

r
r

x.

LIABILITY OF SECURITIES ISSUERS AND THEIR OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS FOR SECURITIES ANALYSTS' STATEMENTS
A.
The Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine
B.
The Important Role Played by Securities Analysts
C.
Liability of Securities Issuers for Statements and Projections
Disseminated by Securities Analysts

.
.
.

F-44
F-44

.

F-46

Introduction

.

2.

PressTek
The "Entanglement" Theory

.
.

E.
F.

The "Conduit" Theory
Securities Issuer's Review, Correction and/or Dissemination of
Securities Analysts' Reports

.

F-46
F-47
F-48
F-52

G.

"No Comment" Policies

.

H.

"Adoption" or "Ratification" of Analysts' Reports

.

1.
D.

r
r
I

r
r
r
r
I

r
r
I
I

.r
I

r
r
r

SECTIONF

.

F-44

F-56
F-58
F-59

-

...

..
...
i

-

r
t

r

"What News From The Front?n
The Litigation Experience Of Four Years Under
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Of 1995

r
r
r

r

r

..
t

r

r
I

r

r,.
r

r
r
r
I

i

r

Kevin P. Roddy l
Milberg Weiss Bershad HYnes & Lerach LLP
Los Angeles, California

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Supposed Purpose Of PSLRA

Several district courts have stated that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") was enacted
by Congress on December 22, 1995 over President Clinton's veto
in order "to combat the filing of abusive and meritless
lawsuits." Carson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smi th,
No. 97-5147, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *10 (W.D. Ark.
Mar. 30, 1998)
(citing Conference Report on Securities
Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1995), reprinted in, 1995 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News
730»; see also In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187
F.R.D. 165, 174 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Congress enacted the PSLRA to
remedy perceived abuses in private securities class action
litigation. II) (citing, inter alia, In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 145 (D.N.J. 1998».
While reasonable people could endlessly debate the need
for securities litigation "reform," compare Harvey L. Pitt, et
al., Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical Implications
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33
San Diego L. Rev. 845 (1996) ("Pitt, Promises Made") with
Leonard B. Simon and William S. Dato, Legislating on a False
Foundation: The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 San Diego
L. Rev. 959 (1996), it cannot be disputed that since December
1995 the procedural skirmishing in class actions brought under
the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") has been
more intense and time-consuming than that experienced under
the prior statutory scheme, adding time and expense to the
burdens inherent in such cases.
See generally Sherrie R.
Savett, The Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing
Landscape Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 525, 531 (1997)
("Savett,
Observations") (observing that the PSLRA "produces great delay
in getting the case moving to the merits") (emphasis omitted) .

Member, California and Virginia bars. Member, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP. B.A., University of North Carolina,
1977; J.D., University of North Carolina School of Law, 1980.
1
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Effectiveness Of Statutory Reforms Of
Securities Litigation

If, as several commentators have asserted, the purpose of
the PSLRA was to remedy perceived securities litigation
"abuses" by empowering "institutional investors" with the
incentive and ability to control such cases, then the
statutory
purpose
has
gone
unfulfilled
because
such
institutions have shown limited interest in becoming involved
as lead plaintiffs. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Class Action
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
533, 537-50 (1997) ("Fisch, Class Action Reform").
As one
commentator concluded:
[T] he [PSLRA] has not yet brought the dramatic
revolution in the leadership of these actions
Congress intended.
According to several studies,
institutional
investors
have
remained
passive
observers in securities litigation, volunteering to
serve as lead plaintiff only infrequently.
The
institutional default has allowed the traditional
plaintiffs bar to consolidate its control over these
cases ....
Moreover,
institutional investors have not
maximized their influence over the actions in which
they have intervened ....

...

What must be most disappointing to reform
proponents ... is that the historic indifference of
institutional investors has continued ....
Seth Goodchild, Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained: Ten Lessons

for

Insti tutional

Investors

From

the 1995 Reform Act,

4

Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 583, 583-84 (Feb.-Mar.
1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Peter M. Saparoff & Adam
L. Sisitsky, The Role of Insti tutional Investors in Class

Actions Under the PSLRA - Are They Walking on a Slippery
Slope? Two Years Later, Securities News 9 (ABA Sec. of Litig.
Winter 1999) ("Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two Years Later") ("The
predicted trend of institutional investors hesitating to
assume the role of lead plaintiff in class action lawsuits in
the wake of the [PSLRA' s] enactment continues.") (footnote
omitted); Paul Paradis, Appointing Lead Plaintiff, Counsel:
Securities Class Action Background, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 23, 1998)
at S3 ( "While Congress purportedly intended to encourage
institutional investors to step forward and serve as lead
plaintiffs, for a variety of reasons this has largely failed
to materialize.").

-

Indeed, the SEC has drawn the same conclusion:
Congress' efforts to encourage
participation by institutional and
investors has not yet taken hold....
F-2
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cases filed in the first year after passage of the
[PSLRA], we have found only eight cases in which
institutions have moved to become lead plaintiff.
SEC Office of the General Counsel, Report to the President and
the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 51 (Apr. 15, 1997),
reprinted in 3 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 27, 56 (May
1998); see also Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 16, In re Oxford Health Plans,
Inc. Sec. Litig., MDL Docket No. 1222 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Few
institutions have instituted securities fraud class actions
after passage of" the PSLRA) .
As another commentary has stated:
The jury appears still to be out on the question
of whether institutions will take advantage of the
invitation presented by the [PSLRA] to participate
actively as a plaintiff in securities fraud actions.
To date, only a handful of institutions have sought
appointment as lead plaintiff, and it is too early
to tell whether this provision will have its
intended effect.
Richard L. Jacobson & Joshua R. Martin, The Private Securities
Li tigation Reform Act of 1995: A Survey of the First Two
Years, 5 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 168, 173 (May
1998) ("Jacobson & Martin, Survey").
It
is
also
unclear
that
the
presence
of
such
institutional investors as plaintiffs in securities class
actions will increase the size of the recoveries obtained for
the class relative to claimed damages.
See Savett,
Observations, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 531-32; but see Richard
Schmitt, Pension Fund Plans Crucial Role in Suit, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 17, 1998, at B19 (lead plaintiff State of Wisconsin
Investment Board agreed to $14.6 million settlement of
CellStar securities litigation; settlement reportedly amounted
to more than 40% of estimated damages incurred by investors) .

c.

Effective Date Of PSLRA

The PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995),
which amended the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77bbbb, and
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78111, applies to private
securities actions brought pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
See 15 U.S.C. §77z-1(a) (1); Lax v. First
Merchants Accep. Corp., No. 97-C-2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11866, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997).

r
r

The PSLRA does not apply to actions commenced before and
pending on its effective date - December 22, 1995.
See Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758, §108; compare Stevens v.
O'Brien Environ. Energy, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-4577, 1999

r
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u.s.

Dist. LEXIS 6660, at *3 n.1, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(E.D. Pa. May 10, 1999) (PSLRA IIdo[es] not apply to
this action because it was commenced before the Reform Act
became effective ll ) (citation omitted); Lyons v. Scitex Corp.,
987 F. Supp. 271, 273 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (PSLRA did not apply
to securities class action IIcommenced on December 14, 1995 11 )
~90,475

with Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group,

985 F. Supp. 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The PSLRA applies here
because SDG' s complaint, which asserts claims under the
Exchange Act, was filed on September 5, 1997, and related to
events which occurred in 1997."); In re Westinghouse Sec.
Litig., 982 F. Supp. 1031,1036 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (samebecauss dismissed securities class action complaint was filed
after enactment of PSLRA, district court was required to make
findings regarding whether plaintiff has complied with
requirements of Rule 11{b»; see also Wilson Land Corp. v.
Smith Barney, Inc., No. 5:97-CV-519-BR(2), 1999 u.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12879, at *46 (E.D.N.C. May 17, 1999) (PSLRA applied to
case filed in 1997) .
What if the securities class action was filed after
December 22, 1995, but concerns alleged wrongdoing predating
the PSLRA's effective date? In one case, In re Stratosphere
Corp. Sec. Li tig. , 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D. Nev. 1998),
plaintiffs' securities fraud claims arose out of a secondary
stock offering commenced on December 19, 1995, and the alleged
class period continued until July 1996, thereby "straddling"
the effective date of the PSLRA.
Judge Pro held that the
PSLRA could be applied retroactively to encompass defendants'
alleged wrongdoing in connection with that securities
offering, reasoning that retroactive application would not
result in the impairment of any rights because intentional
material misstatements of the type alleged by plaintiffs were
actionable before and after enactment of the PSLRA.
Id. at
1.104-06.
D.

i;'

Elimination Of So-Called "Professional
Plaintiffs"

One supposed problem confronting private securities
litigation when the PSLRA was enacted was the so-called
"professional plaintiff," defined by one court as "persons who
purchase a nominal number of securities and then bring
[complaints alleging] violations of the federal securities
laws in the hope that defendants will quickly settle to avoid
the expense of litigation."
Carson, 1998 U. S. Dist. LEXIS
6903, at *11 (citing 1995 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 73132); see also Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 54344 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
In this regard, the PSLRA clearly changed the rules of
the game, requiring plaintiffs who bring securities class
act~o~s to
comply with certain procedural requirements
codJ.fJ.ed at 15 U.S.C. §§77z-1 (a) and 78u-4 (a) .
Since the
statute's enactment, research does not reveal any reported
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cases addressing the problem of
plaintiffs" or "repeat players."

E.

so-called

"professional

Small vs. Institutional Shareholders

Judge Coar has asserted: ". The manifest intent of the
[PSLRA] is determining the plaintiff most capable of pursuing
the action and representing the interests of the class. I II
Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *5 (quoting Fischler v.
Amsouth Bancorp., No. 96 -1567-CIV-T-17A, 1997 u. S. Dist. LEXIS
2875, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 1997».
Judge Black has stated that the PSLRA lIappears to reflect
a congressional intent to transfer power from counsel who win
the race to the courthouse to those shareholders who possess
a sufficient financial interest in the outcome to maintain
some supervisory responsibility over both the litigation and
their counsel."
In re Horizon/CMS Heal thcare Corp. Sec.
Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1212 (D.N.M. 1998) (citing Michael
Y. Scudder, Comment, The Implications of Market-Based Damages
Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 435, 437
(1997), and Note, Investor Empowerment Strategies in the
Congressional Reform of Securities Class Actions, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 2056, 2058 (1996». Once again citing these law review
articles, Judge Black stated that "Congress appears to have
harbored the hope that substantial institutional investors ...
would advance their resources and expertise to fulfill this
responsibility. "
Horizon/CMS, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 n. 5
(citations omitted).
See also Pitt, Promises Made, 33 San
Diego L. Rev. at 882-83 (IIPart of Congress' intent in adopting
the [PSLRA] was to ... attempt [] to encourage, but not
require,
institutional
shareholders
to
supervise
this
litigation, and to select their own counsel whom these
institutions would monitor and supervise. II); Fisch, Class
Action Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 537-41 (same).
Given the passage of more than four years since the
enactment of the PSLRA and the filing of more than 1,000
securities class actions during that period, it should be
conceded that this supposed salutary purpose of the statute
has largely gone unfulfilled; however, Professor Weiss has
stated:
It is far too early to draw many definitive - or
even tentative-conclusions. Indeed, given the pace
at which securities class actions typically had
proceeded, and the slower pace at which they seem to
be proceeding under the [PSLRA], it probably will be
five years or more before we have enough data to
reach more than very tentative conclusions as to how
the lead plaintiff provisions have affected the
conduct of securities class actions.
Elliott J. Weiss, The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff
Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39
F-5
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Ariz. L. Rev. 561, 563 (1997)

("Weiss, The Impact to Date") .

In his law review article, Professor Weiss could point to
only one reported case in which a "major institutional
investor has moved successfully to be appointed lead plaintiff
and has appointed new lead counsel," ide at 565 (referring to
Judge' Buchmeyer's
August
1997
decision
in
CellStar
litigation), and he acknowledged that Professor Jill Fisch has
identified a number of factors which may well preclude
institutional investor participation in securities class
actions.
Id. at 563 n.16; see also Fisch, Class Action
Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 541-50; Pitt, Promises Made, 33
San Diego L. Rev. at 882-90
(discussing institutional
investors' motivations vis-a-vis participating in securities
litigation) .

-

I

.J

J

As two securities practitioners have stated:
The number of institutional investors who have
sought
to participate as
lead plaintiffs
in
securi ties
class
actions
has
still
remained
relatively few. In recent cases where institutional
investors have undertaken to participate, however,
courts have refrained from automatically conferring
lead plaintiff status upon them, in some cases
ordering that the role be shared instead.
Such
judicial resistance likely will only continue the
trend of institutional investors "shying away" from
pursuing the role of lead plaintiff in class
actions, thus undermining one of the important
purposes of the PSLRA.
Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two Years Later, Securities News at 11.

II.

PSLRA DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

A.

Plaintiff's Sworn Certification

The PSLRA imposes strict disclosure requirements upon
plaintiffs in securities fraud actions, requiring that a
plaintiff "seeking to serve as a representative party on
behalf of a class shall provide a sworn certification" with
the complaint. 15 U.S.C. §§77z-1 (a) (2) (A) and 78u-4 (a) (2) (A) .
The sworn statement must certify that the plaintiff (1)
reviewed and authorized the filing of the complaint; (2) did
not purchase the securities at the direction of counselor in
order to participate in a lawsuit; and (iii) is willing to
serve as the lead plaintiff on behalf of the class.
Id.
In
addition, the statement must also identify any of the
plaintiff's transactions in the security that is at issue.
Id.; see Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *11-12
(explicating disclosures required in securities class action
complaints under PSLRA); Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 544 (same).
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It
would
appear
that
the
PSLRA' s
certification
requirement has not
impeded the filing or effective
prosecution of securities class actions. Moreover, it can and
should be argued that a plaintiff's filing of a sworn
certification obviates the need for expensive and timeconsuming II class certification discoveryll that defendants'
counsel often seek to engage in once plaintiffs have filed a
motion for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
In Epstein v. MeA, 54 F.3d 1422,1423 (9th Cir. 1995), a
tender offer case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court's
order that plaintiff investors and their counsel be held in
contempt for refusal to comply with irrelevant discovery
requests.
Defendants had sought discovery of what the
appellate court described as II detailed information II about
whether plaintiffs owned MCA shares, how they invested their
tender offer proceeds, whether their investment history made
it likely they would have elected to receive preferred stock
instead of cash and whether they would pay taxes on cash
proceeds they received.
As the Ninth Circuit stated:
"The
first piece of information Matsushita sought to obtain through
discovery - whether plaintiffs owned MCA stock - is without
doubt relevant to the subject matter of this litigation. The
other information Matsushita sought to discover however, is
not. II). See also Schlagal v. Learning Tree In t ' 1, No. CV 986384 ABC (Ex), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2157, at *14-18, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,435 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999) (granting
plaintiffs' class certification motion and denying defendants'
request to conduct discovery of proposed lead plaintiffs and
class representatives).
B.

Notice Provisions

1.

Application Of Notice Provisions

The PSLRA amended the Exchange Act by adding Section 21D,
which is codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-4. Section 21D(a) (i), 15
U.S.C. §78u-4(a) (1), entitled IIPrivate class actions," states
that the provisions of that subsection IIshall apply in each
private action arising under this chapter that is brought as
a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." See Simon DeBartolo Group, 985 F. Supp. at
430 (express language means that Congress intended to limit
application of §21D(a) to class actions).
2.

Statutory Text

Section 21D(a) (3) sets forth procedures for early notice
to potential class members of the filing of a securities class
action. The relevant notice provision states:
Not later than 20 days after the date on which the
complaint is filed, the plaintiff or plaintiffs
shall cause to be published, in a widely circulated
national business-oriented publication or wire
F-7

J
service, a notice advising members of the purported
plaintiff class -

-

(I) of the pendency of the action, the claims
asserted therein, and the purported class period;
and
(II)
that, not later than 60 days after the
date on which the notice is published, any member of
the purported class may move the court to serve as
lead plaintiff of the purported class.
15 U.S.C.

§§77z-1 (a) (3) (A) (i)

and 78u-4 (a) (3) (A) (i) .
See
70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (detailing notice procedures under PSLRA);
see also Pitt, Promises Kept, 33 San Diego L. Rev. at 883
(discussing notice provision); Weiss, The Impact to Date, 39
Ariz. L. Rev. at 564-65 (lauding notice provisions of PSLRA) .
Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin

3.

Co~.,

Obligation To Give Notice

If multiple actions are filed on behalf of a class
asserting substantially the same claim or claims arising under
either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, only the
plaintiff
or plaintiffs
who filed first shall be
required to cause notice to be published. See id.; Julia C.
Kou, Note, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securi ties
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 253, 265-66
(1998) ("Kou, Closing the Loophole") (explicating notice
provisions of PSLRA).
4.

Timing And Content Of Notice

Under these statutory provisions, the named plaintiff in
the first filed action must file notice within twenty days of
filing suit in order to inform potential class members of
their right to move to be appointed lead plaintiff. See 15
U.S.C. §§77z-1 (a) (3) (A) (i) and 78u-4 (a) (3) (A) (i); Kou, Closing
the Loophole, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 265-66.
This notice must identify the claims alleged in the
lawsuit and the purported class period, and inform potential
class members that within sixty days, they may move to serve
as the lead plaintiff. See Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866,
at *10-16 (explicating notice requirements of PSLRA); accord
In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civil Action MDL No. 1219, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12546, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1999); see
also Kou, Closing the Loophole, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 265-66.
Judge Waters has stated: "The notice requirement was included
in the PSLRA to provide a method for determining the most
adequate plaintiff." Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at
*12 (citing 1995 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 732).

...
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s.

Publication Of Notice

Such notice must be published in a "widely circulated
national business publication or wire service. II
See Kou,
Closing the Loophole, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 265-66.
In Lax,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *15, Judge Coar rejected the
contention that publication of notice in Investor's Business
Daily failed to satisfy the statutory requirement:
The PSLRA does not define "widely circulated. II
Thus, the court must make its own interpretation as
to what the term means.
In this case, the court
finds that, while Investor's Business Daily might
not have as large a circulation as the Wall Street
Journal, it is nevertheless widely circulated and,
more importantly, apparently read by sophisticated
investors.
The likelihood of a First Merchants'
investor actually seeing a notice in the Investor's
Business Daily II~S arguably as great as finding such
information by skimming the back pages of the Wall
Street Journal."

Id. (quoting Greebel v. FTP Software, 939 F. SUpp. 57, 63 (D.
Mass. 1996}). Accord In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D.
206, 216 & n.8 (D.N.J. 1999); see also D'Hondt v. Digi Int'l,
No. 97-5 (JRT/RLE), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *5 (D.
Minn. Apr. 2, 1997)
(IIDefendants do not challenge the
sufficiency of the Notice provided by means of Business Wire
and, in fact, at least one Court has held that this wire
service adequately seeks to provide notice to potential class
members, including institutional investors, of pending class
claims that are subject to the provisions of the [PSLRA] II)
(citing Greebel, 939 F. SUpp. at 64); Yousefi, 70 F. SUpp. 2d
at 1067 (IISince the passage of the [PSLRA], district courts,
including this Court, have repeatedly recognized that the
Business Wire as a 'widely circulated national businessoriented ... wire service,' as required by the [PSLRA]. II)
(citations omitted); cf. In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189
F.R.D. 91, 105 n.10 (D.N.J. 1999) (liThe PR Newswire appears to
be a business-oriented wire service within the meaning of the
PSLRA.") (citations omitted).
6.

Effect Of Failure To Give Notice

In Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, where plaintiff
brought a purported class action on behalf of a class of
persons who purchased warrants from a Merrill Lynch offering,
plaintiff failed to comply with the disclosure and notice
provisions of the PSLRA.
Id. at *10. Granting plaintiff's
motion to amend his complaint, Judge Waters held that the
failure to comply with the provisions of the PSLRA is not
fatal to the maintenance of a securities class action:

F-9

The PSLRA does not direct a court to dismiss a
complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with
either the certification requirement or the notice
provisions .... [I]f Congress had wanted the courts
to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff failed to
file a sworn certification or publish timely notice,
then Congress could have included such language in
the PSLRA.
Id. at *16.

Accordingly, in Carson Judge Waters distinguished as
dicta language to the contrary in Chief Judge Tauro's opinion
in Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60, where the district court
stated that II [f] ailure of the named plaintiff to file a
certification with the complaint and to serve notice to class
members are fatal to maintenance of the putative class
action. II As Judge Waters explained:

...,
,

.J

Defendants contend that Greebel stands for the
proposition that the complaint must be dismissed
when the plaintiff fails to comply with either the
certification or the notice requirements of the
PSLRA. We disagree. The court in Greebel was simply
stating in dicta that if a plaintiff never complies
with the provisions of the PSLRA, then the class
action cannot go forward.
The court did not state
that a" named plaintiff could not correct such a
failure to comply by filing a certification with an
amended complaint and serving such notice within 20
days of the amended complaint.
Therefore, we
conclude that nothing under the PSLRA prohibits the
court from allowing a plaintiff to file a sworn
certification with an amended complaint and to
publish belated notice to the other purported class
members.
Carson,

1998

omitted) .

U. S.

Dist.

LEXIS

6903,

at

*16-17

(footnote

..

Judge Waters also stated:
The facts in Greebel are also dissimilar to the
facts in the present case. In Greebel, the parties
had already reached the stage in the lawsuit where
notice had been published and other class members
had come forward and moved the court to be appointed
lead plaintiff. Thus, the court was in the process
of determining which plaintiff should be appointed
lead plaintiff. At that point, it is important that
a
plaintiff
has
properly complied with
the
certification and notice provisions of the PSLRA, so
that the court can determine the most adequate
plaintiff to represent the class.
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The PSLRA' s notice requirement has, according to one
commentary, provided unexpected benefits for plaintiffs'
counsel:

r

One clearly unintended effect [of the PSLRA's
notice provision] has been that the notices issued
by law firms announcing the filing of class actions
and providing notice of the opportunity to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff have served as public
relations material for the plaintiffs' bar in
soliciting ne'" business.
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Rptr. at 176 n.S.
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One plaintiffs' lawyer has similarly observed that lithe
plaintiff's counsel publishing the notice may attract other
shareholders who consult with and retain him, thus enhancing
his position and enabling that law firm to become lead
counsel. II Savett, Observations, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 529.
APPOINTMENT OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS

III.

r

Survey,

A.

Outline Of Procedures

The PSLRA establishes new rules requiring (and governing)
the appointment of lead plaintiff{s).
Professor Weiss has
stated that the statute's lead plaintiff provisions "actually
comprise four elements, II the first of which - notice to class
members - has been discussed above:

First,
the Act requires any person filing a
securities class action to provide early notice to
members of the purported class of the filing of the
action, the nature of the claims made, and the
purported class period.
Second, the Act instructs
courts (a) to provide an opportunity for members of
the purported class to seek appointment as lead
plaintiff and (b) to appoint to that position the
"most adequate plaintiff," which a court must
presume is the aspiring plaintiff "with the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the
class. II
Third, the Act directs courts to allow
other members of the purported class to engage in
discovery relating to appointment of the lead
plaintiff only if they "first demonstrate []
a
reasonable
basis
for
a
finding
that
the
presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable
of adequately representing the class. II Finally, the
Act authorizes the most adequate plaintiff, subject
to court approval, to "select and retain counsel to
represent the class. II

"

r
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Weiss, The Impact to Date, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 563-64
(emphasis added; footnotes omitted); see also Pindus v.
Fleming Cos., 146 F.3d 1224, 1225 n.1 (lOth Cir. 1998) (under
PSLRA, lIwithin 110 days of the date a class action is filed,
the district court must resolve any outstanding motions from
putative class members who wish to be appointed as lead
plaintiff.
As a result, §78u-4(a) effectively requires the district
court to appoint a lead plaintiff and lead counsel at the very
beginning of a class action litigation"); Christman v. Brauvin
Realty Advisors, Inc., No. 96 C 6025, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS
929, at *32 (N. D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1999) ("The PSLRA contemplates
that a lead plaintiff will be appointed early in the
litigation. The PSLRA requires that notice be filed within 20
days after the complaint is filed,
that motions for
appointment as lead plaintiffs be filed within 60 days after
the notice is published, and that the court consider any such
motions within 90 days after the notice is published.");
Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 146-47 (outlining procedures for
selection of lead plaintiff(s) and lead counsel); Chill v.
Green Tree Fin. Co~., 181 F.R.D. 398, 407 (D. Minn. 1998)
(same); see also Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (same).

B.

Purpose Of Lead Plaintiff Provisions

In
Greebel,
Chief
Judge
Tauro
stated
that
the
lIinspiration" for the PSLRA's lead plaintiff provisions was a
law review article that Professor Weiss co-authored with
Professor John S. Beckerman.
939 F. Supp. at 58 n.2.
Professor Weiss claims in a subsequent law review article that
"[o]ur goal in proposing a notice requirement· was to provide
institutional and other investors with early notice of the
pendency of a class action that had the potential to affect
their rights." Weiss, The Impact to Da te, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at
564 (citing Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the
Money Do the Moni toring: How Insti tutional Investors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securi ties Class Actions, 104 Yale L. J.
2053, 2108-09 (1995)); see also Fisch, Class Action Reform, 39
Ariz. L. Rev. at 537-39.

-

-

...,

-

-

In a recent case, Judge Green commented on the procedures
for selecting lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA:
The PSLRA env~s~ons a mixed inquisitorial/
adversarial model for developing a record to make
the Lead Plaintiff decision.
In a case where more
than one group vies for Lead Plaintiff status, the
Court
usually
receives
the
benefit
of
the
adversarial process to have the merits developed
before
rendering
a
decision
[W] here
no
opposition has been noted, Congress envisioned that
the courts still would play an independent,
gatekeeping role to implement the PSLRA.
At the
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same time, Congress envisioned that the Court would
do this with dispatch.
In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., No. 98-2465 (JHG), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5219, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1999) (footnote
omitted) .
C.

Time Periods

In several cases where the appointment of lead plaintiffs
has been contested, the time periods prescribed by Congress
have not been met. As Magistrate Judge Lefkow commented:
Because the issue of appointment of lead plaintiffs
has been contested, the statutory requirement to
appoint the lead plaintiff within 90 days after the
pUblication of early notice to class members of the
litigation has not been accomplished.
See SEC
Report to President and Congress on the First Year
of Practice Under the [Reform Act] at 43 (Part VI,
C. 3, "The Lead Plaintiff Provision Has Added Delay
and Expense II ) •
In light of the inevitable delay
necessitated by the motions, including an effort to
launch discovery under §78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iv), the
court has appointed the Minnesota State Board of
Investment (MSBI), the plaintiff which it has
preliminarily concluded is the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff to represent the class, to act as
interim lead plaintiff. The court has also approved
MSBI's counsel, Heins, Mills & Olson, to serve as
interim lead counsel in order that this bottleneck
not prevent the litigation from moving forward.
Rafte~ v. Mercury Fin. Co., No. 97 C 624, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12439, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997).

In a similar vein, one plaintiff's lawyer has asserted:
The [PSLRA] produces great delay in getting the
case moving to the merits.
Under the [PSLRA], the
early notice to potential class members must be
filed twenty days after the first complaint is
filed.
The
notice
allows
sixty
days
for
applications to be made for lead plaintiff, and the
lead plaintiff, once selected, hires lead counsel
subj ect to court approval.
The [PSLRA] provides
that the court should select lead plaintiff and lead
counsel by ninety days, provided consolidation has
occurred.

It often takes even longer than ninety days for
the court to select lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel,
especially
if
there
are
competing
applications.
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Savett, Observations,
omitted) .

D.

39 Ariz.

L.

Rev.

at

531

(footnotes

-

Statutory Provisions

Section 21D of the Exchange Act establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff, II for purposes
of appointment as lead plaintiff, is lithe person or group of
persons" that

-

(aa)
has either filed the complaint or made
a motion [seeking appointment as lead plaintiff] ;
ebb)
in the determination of the court, has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought
by the class; and
(cc)
otherwise satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure.
§78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I) .
See Reiger v. Altris
Software, No. 98cv0528J{JFS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at

15 U.S.C.

*5-6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (outlining lead plaintiff
app.ointment procedure); Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1066
(same); Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 146-47 (same).

E.

Rebutting The Presumption

As
Judge
Buchmeyer has
explained
the
applicable
procedures governing appointment of lead plaintiffs:
The court is directed to consider all motions made
by purported class members seeking to be appointed
Lead Plaintiff and to determine the "member or
members of the purported plaintiff class that the
court determines to be most capable of adequately
representing the interests of class members. II
15
U.S.C. §78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (i) .
In so determining the
"most adequate plaintiff, II the court is directed to
adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
is the person or group of persons that filed a
motion, that "has the largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class, II and that "otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. II
15 U.S.C.
§78u4{a) (3) (B)
(iii) (I).
This presumption may be
rebutted only by proof of another member of the
purported plaintiff class that the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff
"will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class II or
II is
subj ect to unique defenses that render such
plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the
class. II 15 U.S.C. §78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (II) .

Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 544.
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Thus, a member of the purported plaintiff class who
wishes to challenge the appointment of a presumptively most
adequate plaintiff must present proof that the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff "either (i) will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class or (ii) is
subject to unique defenses that render that plaintiff
incapable of adequately representing the class." Id. at 547
(citing 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (II»; see also Reiger,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *14-15.

F.

Combinations Of Persons Or Entities

The district courts remain somewhat divided as to whether
members of the class or a group of persons (or entities) may
combine to constitute the "largest financial interest" and
thereby jointly serve as the "most adequate plaintiff";
however,
the great majority of cases hold that such
combinations are proper. See Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1067
("[T]he majority of courts addressing this issue have
permitted the aggregation of claims.") (citing In re Advanced
Tissue Sciences Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 353 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (allowing aggregation of six plaintiffs); In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 45-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (appointing three plaintiffs as lead plaintiffs); and
Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 409 (aggregating six plaintiffs».
In one case, however, Judge Cedarbaum rejected the
appointment of six lead plaintiffs in a securities class
action, asserting that it would defeat the purpose of the
PSLRA:
To allow an aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs to
serve as lead plaintiffs defeats the purpose of
choosing a lead plaintiff.
One of the principal
legislative purposes of the PSLRA was to prevent
lawyer-driven litigation. Appointing lead plaintiff
on the basis of financial interest, rather than on
a "first come, first serve" basis, was intended to
ensure that institutional plaintiffs with expertise
in the securities market and real
financial
interests in the integrity of the market would
control the litigation, not lawyers. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 104-369, at 31-35 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730, 730-34. To allow lawyers to
designate unrelated plaintiffs as a "group" and
aggregate their financial stakes would allow and
encourage
lawyers
to
direct
the
litigation.
Congress hoped that the lead plaintiff would seek
the lawyers, rather than having the lawyers seek the
lead plaintiff....
Counsel have not offered any
reason for appointing an aggregation of unrelated
institutional and individual investors as lead
plaintiffs other than the argument that the language
of the statute does not expressly forbid such a
result.
F - 15

In re Donnkenny Inc.
(S.D.N. Y. 1997).

Sec.

Litig.,

171 F.R.D.

156,

157-58

Thus, the aggregation of plaintiffs has been disallowed
by several district courts. See, e.g., In re Network Assocs.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 99-01729, 1999 WL 1095313, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 1999) (based upon assumption that II [t]he whole
point of the [PSLRA] was to install a lead plaintiff with
substantive decisionmaking ability and authorityll; court held
that a~gregations of unrelated investors cannot satisfy lead
plaintJ.ff provisions of PSLRA); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC,
Inc., No. C 99-20743, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 19276, at *18-19
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1999) (liThe strictest approach forbids
aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs .... *** The court adopts
this narrow view .... "); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (II [T]he context and
structure of the PSLRA evince an intent that a 'group' consist
of more than a mere assemblage of unrelated persons who share
nothing in common other than the twin fortuities that (1) they
suffered losses and (2) they entered into retainer agreements
with the same attorney or attorneys") (emphasis in original);
Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 549 (same).
See generally R. Chris
Heck,
Comment,
Conflict and Aggregation:
Appointing
Insti tutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the
PSLRA, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199,1214-16 (1999). But, as Judge
Baird stated after summarizing the recent case law, the PSLRA
"clearly contemplates the appointment of multiple plaintiffs
to manage the litigation. II Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
In Oxford Health Plans, the Colorado Public Employees
Retirement Association (ColPERA) sought appointment as sole
lead plaintiff in a securities class action. In its motion,
ColPERA alleged losses in excess of $20 million due to
Oxford's allegedly fraudulent activi ties. A second movant for
appointment of lead plaintiff, a group consisting of 35
individuals (the "Vogel Groupll), alleged collective losses of
$10 million.
Another institution, PHBG Funds ("PHBG"),
alleging an estimated $2.76 million in losses, also moved for
appointment as lead plaintiff.
The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
ColPERA's motion, "urging the court to reject the request for
multiple lead plaintiffs because it would undercut Congress'
intent to curb lawyer-driven cases."
Karen Donovan, Oxford
Suits Raise Lead Counsel Issue, Nat'l L.J., June 15, 1998 at
B-1; see also Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two Years Later, Securities
News at 9.
Judge Brieant, however, overruled the SEC I S
argument,
stating that "in the circumstances of this
particular case, the interests of the proposed class will be
best served by a group of three co-lead plaintiffs. II Oxford
Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 45.
Accordingly, the court
appointed ColPERA, the Vogel Group and PHBG as co-lead
plaintiffs.
Id. at 49. The court then appointed the three
law firms proposed by each of the respective co-lead
plaintiffs as co-lead counsel.
Id. at 50. In October 1998,
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the Second Circuit held that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to consider ColPERA' s appeal of the district
court's denial of its motion for sole lead plaintiff status.
Metro Svcs., Inc. v. Wiggins, 158 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1988).
The position taken by Judge Brieant in Oxford Heal th
Plans regarding the aggregation of individual investors to

serve as co-lead plaintiffs clearly represents the majority and correct - view of the statute. See, e.g., Yousefi, 70 F.
Supp. 2d at 1067 (quoted above); Baan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5219, at *7 (liThe text of the PSLRA does not limit the
composition of a 'group of persons' to those only with a prelitigation relationship, nor does the legislative history
provide a sound enough foundation to support such a glossll;
appointing three individual members of 466-person shareholder
group as co-lead plaintiffs); Reiger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14705, at *13 (IIBy using the phrase 'group of persons,'
Congress made clear that a court can consider the aggregate
group's losses in determining which group has the largest
financial interest. II); In re Ride, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-97402WD, Order at 3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 1997) (liOn its face,
this
[statutory]
language calls for aggregation.
Any
suggestion to the contrary, based on legislative history,
cannot prevail against the statute's plain wording. II) ; In re
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-96-2644-SBA,
Order at 2-4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1997)
(proposed lead
plaintiffs can pool their shares together to form the largest
financial interest); Horizon/CMS, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (six
lead plaintiffs appointed); Malin v. IVAC Corp., No. 96-1843CIV-Moreno, Order at 4-8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1996) (holding
that the plaintiff group with the largest number of shares is
the most adequate plaintiff); Nager v. Websecure, Inc., No.
97-10662-GAO~ 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19601, at *3, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1190,111 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1997) (group of 10
plaintiffs appointed as lead plaintiffs); D'Hondt, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *4-19 (21 persons appointed as lead
plaintiffs); Zucke~n v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., No. 3:96-CV2258-T, Order at 5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 1997) (11 individual
plaintiffs with largest financial interest collectively
appointed as lead plaintiff); Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No.
Civ. 96-1514 PHX RCB, Order at 13 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 1996)
(plaintiffs from five separate actions collectively appointed
as lead plaintiffs); Powers v. Eichen, No. 96-1431-B(AJB),
Order at 1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1996)
(nine individual
plaintiffs collectively appointed as lead plaintiffs); cf .
Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 546, 549 (recognizing that "aggregating
the shares of several plaintiffs for purposes of this
calculation is proper under the statutory language," but
finding that the financial interest of a group of plaintiffs
was "significantly smaller ll than that of an institutional
investor, which was appointed as lead plaintiff; declining to
appoint co-lead plaintiffs lias it would inevitably delegate
more control and responsibility to the lawyers for the class
and make the class representatives more reliant on the
lawyers") (citing Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 157-58). Cf. In re
F - 17
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Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., Master File No. CV-S-96-00933PMP (RLM) Order (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 1997) (defendants stipulated
to 36 plaintiffs who were appointed lead plaintiffs); see also
Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 409 (IIWe do not suggest that either Rule
23, or the PSLRA, warrants an arbitrary limit on the number of
proposed Lead Plaintiffs, for we only hold that, in a case-bycase i:lquiry, a rule of reason prevails. II) .

Several courts have determined, however, that a large
group of lead plaintiffs would be unable to control the
litigation, effectively negotiate retention agreements, and
supervise the conduct of counsel. See, e.g., Yousefi, 70 F.
Supp. 2d at 1068 (refusing t:> appoint group consisting of
three named plaintiffs and "134 unrelated class members II ;
court appointed as lead plaintiffs two shareholders - one
institutional holder and one individual holder - who had
sustained largest losses); "Baan, 1999 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 5219,
at *8-14 (rejecting proposal that 466-member shareholder group
or 20-person committee be appointed as co-lead plaintiffs and
appointing three shareholders, each with unrealized losses in
excess of $300,000, as co-lead plaintiffs); Advanced Tissue
Sciences, 184 F.R.D. at 352-53 (liThe idea of appointing over
250 unrelated individual investors as lead plaintiffs runs
afoul of Congress's intent in enacting the PSLRA"; granting
alternate motion to appoint six designated group members as
co-lead plaintiffs); Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 408-09 (winnowing
300-person plaintiffs group to six co-lead plaintiffs) .

-

-

The SEC has taken the position that "ordinarily this
should be no more than three to five persons."
Baan, 1999
U.S. Dist.LEXIS 5219, at *9 (citing amicus curiae brief
submitted by SEC); see also Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1068
(IIIn fact, when courts appoint multiple class members as lead
plaintiffs, they typically appoint less than ten plaintiffs. II)
(citations omitted) ; Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 8, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins.
Group, Inc., No. CV-98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. 1998) ("[T]he
Court should limit the proposed lead plaintiff 'group' to a
small number capable of most effectively managing the
litigation and exercising control over counsel. II) .
G.

Discovery Regarding Most Adequate Plaintiff(s)

The PSLRA directs that discovery regarding whether a
member of the purported plaintiff class is the most adequate
plaintiff may be conducted by a plaintiff only if that
plaintiff first demonstrates a reasonable basis for a finding
that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of
adequately representing the class.
See 15 U.S.C. §78u4 (a) (3) (B) (iv); Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 547 (IIIf the
challenging member of the purported class can demonstrate a
reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the
class, then discovery on the issue may be conducted before the
Court appoints a Lead Plaintiff. II)
F - 18
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In In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. 96-CV-0633, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10546, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1996), Judge
Green addressed the issue of discovery in the context of a
leadership struggle:
Pursuant to Private Securities Litigation ReforrnAct
of 1995 ... limited discovery relating to whether a
member of the purported plaintiff class may be had
where there is a reasonable basis for finding that
the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff
is
incapable of adequately representing the class. As
Sands Point has asserted that it is a uniquely
si tuated institutional investor to which the Act
affords preference in appointing the lead plaintiff,
and as the Hooshmand plaintiffs have raised concerns
challenging this position, this court finds that
discovery on the issue of determining the most
adequate plaintiff is appropriate.

Id.; see also Party City, 189 F.R.D.' at 106.
H.

What Do Defendants Have To Say?

What is the position of defendants in the event of a
leadership fight? In the words of Magistrate Judge Erickson,
"it is doubtful" that defendants "have standing to object to
the adequacy of the Lead Plaintiffs that have been proposed. II
D'Hondt, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *11 n.6 (citing
Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60). See also Nice Sys., 188 F.R.D.
at 218 n.11 ("A defendant or defendants may not object to the
adequacy or typicality of the proposed lead plaintiff at this
preliminary stage of the litigation. II) (citations omitted) i
Baan, 1999 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 5219, at *4 n.1 ("Defendants
generally have been held to lack standing to challenge
appointment of lead plaintiffs.")
(citations omitted) i
Fischler, 1997 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 2875, at *6 (liThe plain
language of the [PSLRA] dictates only members of the plaintiff
class may offer evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of
the most adequate plaintiff."). But see King v. Livent, Inc.,
36 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (" [N]othing in the
text of the [PSLRA] precludes or limits the right of
defendants to be heard on this issue ll ) i Koppel v. 4987 Corp.,
No. 96 Civ. 7570 (RLC) , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12340, at *2425, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,640 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1999)
(stating that "[t]here is some disagreement as to whether the
PSLRA grants standing to defendants to challenge a motion to
appoint a lead plaintiff and class counsel")
(citations
omitted) .
One recent commentary states:

r
r

A recurring issue in lead plaintiff cases under
the [PSLRA] is whether defendants have standing to
challenge
the
presumption
that
a
particular
plaintiff is the most adequate plaintiff.
The
F - 19
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courts have generally held that defendants do not
have such standing, but each court also has noted
that defendants would have the opportunity to raise
any obj ections in subsequent class certification
proceedings.
Jacobson & Martin, Survey, 5 Securi ties Reform Act Li tig.
Rptr. at 173.
See also Seth Goodchild & Stephenie L. Brown,
Do Defendants Have Standing To Challenge Lead Plaintiff
Applicants Under the PSLRA?, 4 Securities Reform Act Litig.

Rptr. 145, 148
(Nov. 1997)
(asserting that II allowing
defendants standing to raise challenges to the lead
[plaintiff]
applicants is antithetical to the purpose
underlying the PSLRA") .
It should be noted that the opportunity for defendants to
subsequently contest class certification on various grounds
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 "is preserved. II
Nice Sys., 188
F.R.D. at 218 n.11 (citations omitted); accord Party City, 189
F.R.D. at 106 n.12 (liThe opportunity for Party City and/or the
Individual Defendants to contest class certification on these
grounds is preserved. II) (citations omitted).
I.

...

J

-

Criteria For Determining Most Adequate
Plaintiff

In Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 545-47, Judge Buchmeyer ruled
that an institutional investor was the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff, noting that (i) its motion for appointment
as lead plaintiff was timely; (ii) it had the largest
financial interest of any class member; and (iii) it met the
class requirements of Rule 23. In Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11866, Judge Coar further stated:
The PSLRA does not state how the court should
determine who has the largest financial interest,
but four factors are surely relevant: (1) the number
of shares purchased; (2) the number of net shares
purchased; (3) the total net funds expended by the
plaintiffs during the class period; and (4) the
approximate losses suffered by the plaintiffs.

...

I

-

Id. at *17.

Any member of the purported class may rebut the
presumption upon proof "that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff
will not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class ... [or] is subject to unique defenses
that
render
such
plaintiff
incapable
of
adequately
representing the class. II 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (II)
(aa) , (bb). See In re Nanophase Tech. Corp. Litig., No. 98 C
3450, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16171, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
1999) .
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In Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1997),
Judge Walker held that the proposed plaintiffs did not meet
the statutory requirement of "most adequate plaintiff" because
they did not purchase their stock until the class period was
one-half over and after the defendant company had issued
partial disclosures.
IV.

APPOINTMENT OF LEAD COUNSEL
A.

Statutory Text

The PSLRA requires the lead plaintiff, "subject to the
approval of the court, [to] select and retain counsel to
represent the class." 15 U. S. C. §78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (v); see also
Nanophase, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 16171, at *15 n.3; Yousefi,
70 F. Supp. 2d at 1071; Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 545; Donnkenny,
171 F.R.D. at 158. A court may disturb the lead plaintiffs'
choice of counsel only if it appears necessary to "protect the
interests of the class." Advanced Tissue, 184 F.R.D. at 353;
see also Milestone, 187 F.R.D. at 175-76 (detailing statutory
provisions governing appointment of lead counsel) .

B.

Multiple Lead Counsel

In Nager, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19601, at *4-5, Judge
O'Toole approved the selection of three law firms to serve as
an "executive committee" to manage the litigation, stating in
pertinent part:
There is no question that any of the firms is
qualified to represent the plaintiff class.
There
is some question whether it is necessary to approve
the selection of a "committee," when anyone firm
would be qualified to handle the matter.
However,
because this matter now involves five consolidated
cases,
each
initially
brought
by
particular
plaintiffs represented by different law firms, it
seems sensible to employ the "committee" approach to
minimize the potential for disputes about the
direction of the litigation.
There should be no
concern that duplicative legal efforts will result
in higher legal costs to the class because the
statute
limits
total
attorneys'
fees
to
"a
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages
and prejudgment interest actually paid to the
class." 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a) (6). That limit should
make it a matter of indifference to the class
whether a reasonable fee is paid to one or divided
among cooperating recipients.

Id.; see also Advanced Tissue, 184 F.R.D. at 353 (approving
appointment of three law firms to represent lead plaintiffs);
Reiger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *15-16 (same); In re
Sunbeam Sec. Litig., No. 98-8258-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21490, at *15-16 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 1998)
F - 21

(appointing four law firms as co-lead counsel and appointing
two law firms as co-liaison counsel); Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11866, at *26 (approving retention of two law firms to
serve as co-lead counsel,
"provided that there is no
duplication of attorneys' services, and the use of co-lead
counsel does not in any way increase attorneys' fees and
expenses"); In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. 96-CV-0633, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13492, at *2, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '99,313
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996) (appointing three law firms as colead counsel for plaintiffs); but see Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d
at 1072 (refusing to appoint three law firms as co-lead
counsel; lithe Court will only permit one law firm to serve as
lead counsel in this case on the basis that class interests
are better served by a central law firm"); Milestone, 187
F.R.D. at 180 (rejecting proposal that court appoint several
co-lead counsel, executive committee and liaison counsel);
accord In re Orbital Sciences Corp. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D.
237, 240 (E.D. Va. 1999) (II [T]he purpose of the [PSLRA] favors
the choice of one law firm to act in this capacity absent a
specific reason to use multiple firms") (citing Milestone) .

v.

-

RULE 9(b) PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENTS
A.

Level of Particularity Required

Rule 9(b) requires that allegations of fraud be specific
enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct
so that they can defend against the charge(s) and not just
deny that they have done anything wrong. Powers, 977 F. SUpp.
at 1036.
Rule 9 (b) requires that plaintiff plead with
sufficient
particularity
attribution
of. the
alleged
misrepresentations or omissions to each defendant; the
plaintiff is obligated to II 'distinguish among those they sue
and enlighten each defendant as to his or her part in the
alleged fraud. '" Id. at 1036-37 (citation omitted); see also
Silva Run Worldwide v. Gaming Lottery Corp., No. 96 Civ.
3231 (RPP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4699, at *27, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~90,196 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1998). However, lithe
complaint need only provide a reasonable delineation of the
underlying acts and transactions allegedly constitut[ing] the
fraud. II Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorp, No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996)
(citation omitted) .
A sufficient level of factual support for a Rule 10b-5
claim may be found where the circumstances of the fraud are
pled "in detail."
Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. SUpp.
1246, 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Thus, plaintiff's complaint must
set forth in detail such matters as the time, place and
contents of the false representations and the identity of the
person making each representation.
In other words, the
complaint must specify the II who , what, when, where, and how"
of the alleged fraud. In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
988 F.
SUpp.
1273,.1281
(D.
Minn.
1997);
see also
Cherednichenko v. Quarterdeck Corp., Case No. CV 97-4320 GHK,
F - 22
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1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *5, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'90,108 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1997); Varljen v. H.J. Meyers,
Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6742(DLC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at
*6-7, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,259 (S.D.N.Y. July 14,
1998}i Bryant v. Apple South, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (M.D.
Ga. 1998)
(plaintiffs adequately pled that defendants'
statements were false when made); Robertson v. Strassner, 32
F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same).
In the recent words of Judge Kimball, the PSLRA "imposes
even more rigorous pleading requirements on plaintiffs
alleging fraud in the securities context" because the
complain';: "must 'specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading' as well as 'the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading. ' " Karacand v. Edwards, 53 F. Supp.
2d 1236,1242 (D. Utah 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b) (1).
Thus, plaintiff's complaint must set forth with particularity
facts which create a strong inference that defendants knew
that their statements were false or misleading at the time
they were made.
See Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1281
(allegations of fraud concerning construction of casino were
adequately pled); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-12
(same).
However, Rule 9(b) 's particularity requirement is
relaxed where factual information is peculiarly within
defendant's knowledge or control.
See Bell v. Fore Sys.,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Tse v. Ventana
Med. Sys., No. 97-37-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16760, at *18
(D. Del. Sept. 23,1998); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (D. Colo. 1998);
In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 935 (D.N.J.
1998) .
B.

Under the PSLRA, a complaint must specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and if the allegation is based on
information and belief,
the complaint must state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
See
In re Ancor Communs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 22 F. Supp. 2d 999,
1003 (D. Minn. 1998); Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1354; In re
Olympic Fin. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 97-496 (MJD/AJB), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1998).

c.

r
r
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Allegations Based On Information And Belief

Allegations Based On Investigation Of Attorney

Plaintiffs are not required to meet the PSLRA's
heightened
standards
of
particularity
when
pleading
allegations based on the investigation of plaintiffs' counsel
and not upon information and belief. See Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp.
2d at 1354; In re Employee Solutions Sec. Litig., No. CIV 97545-PHX-RGS-OMP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16444, at *13, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,293 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 1998); Lister,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 389, at *7; Lister v. Oakley, Inc., No.
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SACV-97-809-GLT(EEx), 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 384, at *5, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,409 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1999).
VI.

PLEADING SECTION 10 (b) VIOLATIONS
A.

Primary Violators Only:
Liability

No Aiding Or Abetting

Only primary participants in a §10(b) violation may be
held liable.
Section 10 (b) did not create liability for
aiding and abetting the securities violations of others; such
secondary participation is beyond the scope of the statute.
Central Bank, N.A. v. First Inters·tate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994); see also Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031,1040
(S .0. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims against defendants who
were not specifically alleged to have made false or misleading
statements that did not fall within scope of group-published
information) .
B.

"Secondary" Actor's Misconduct May Lead To
Primary Liability

However, primary liability under §10(b) and/or SEC Rule
10b-5 may be imposed" not only on persons who made fraudulent
misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the
fraud and assisted in its perpetration. I " SEC v. First Jersey
Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Azrielli v.
Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994»; see also
In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192,
209 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The Second Circuit has held that more
than significant participation by the "secondary" actor is
needed to incur primary liability.
Shapiro v. Cantor, 123
F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). The misrepresentation must be
attributed to that specific actor at the time of publication
dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision.
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Ninth Circuit has held that "secondary" parties may be
primarily liable for statements made by others in which the
former significantly participated. In re Software Toolworks
Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally Jill
E. Fisch, Symposium:
The Scope of Private Securi ties
Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary
Defendants, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (1999).

-

I

C.

The Elements Plaintiff Must Allege To State A
Claim

To state a valid claim for violations of §10(b)/Rule lObS, plaintiff must allege that defendant
(1)
made a
misstatement or omission, (2) of material fact, (3) with
scienter, (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, (5) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (6) that
reliance proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bryant,
25 F. Supp. 2d at 1377; see also Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1037.

F - 24

....

-

r,

r

r
r

r
r

rr
r

r
r

r
r

,.
J

,

r

,.•

r

,.
I

1.

Falsity

Plaintiff's complaint must set forth what is false ~nd
misleading about the statement and why it is false.
See
Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1308 (complaint alleged in
sufficient detail precise dates, manner, content and nature of
statements alleged to be fraudulent); Warman v. Overland Data,
Inc., Case No. 97cv833 JM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009, at *910, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,167 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1998)
(same); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *6
(same). Plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement by alleging
facts demonstrating "'that the statements failed to reflect
the company's true condition at the time the statements were
made. '" Id. (citation omitted) .
A complaint must set forth precisely what statements or
omissions were made in what documents or oral presentations,
who made the statements, the time and place of the statements,
the contents of the statements or manner-in which they misled
the plaintiff, and what defendants gained as a consequence.
In re Valujet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1477
(N.D. Ga. 1977); see also Summit Med., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1071
(Rule 9{b) pleading requirements held satisfied).
2.

Materiality

A fact is material if it is substantially likely that the
fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly
altering the "total mix" of information available, and if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important to the investment decision.
Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, - 49 (1st Cir.
1999); Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1305; see also
B~ant, 25 F.
Supp. 2d at 1379; Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *12; Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1478;
Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *18.
Ordinarily,
whether a fact is material is a jury question requiring
assessment of inferences that a reasonable investor would draw
from a given set of facts. Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at
1306; Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *12-13
(refusing to dismiss complaint on materiality grounds; "[W]e
cannot conclude that none of the alleged misrepresentations
would have significantly altered the
'total mix'
of
information available to the market"); Valujet, 984 F. Supp.
at 1478 (same; airline's safety record was material).
3.

Duty to Disclose

If defendant chooses to reveal relevant, material information
even though it had no duty to do so, there is a duty to make
the disclosure complete and accurate.
In re Boeing Sec.
Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (W.D. Wash. 1998); see also
Schafferv. EvolvingSys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d1213, 1221 (D.
Colo. 1998)
(defendants released only positive financial
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information but should have revealed potentially negative
information as well) .
Plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction. Vento & Co. of New York,
LLC v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7751 (JGK) ,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3020, at *25, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'90,460 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999). A duty to disclose arises
when there is (1) insider trading; (2) a statute or regulation
requiring disclosure;
(3) an inaccurate, incomplete or
misleading prior disclosure; and/or (4) when one of two
parties to a securities transaction "'possess superior
knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that
the other is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge. '" Id.
at *26 (citation omitted). Insiders are defined as those who
are in a special relationship with the corporation and are
thereby privy to confidential information. Insiders assume an
affirmative duty of disclosure when trading in shares of their
own corporation. Tse v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., Civil Action
No. 97-37-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16760, at *28, *30 n.11
(D. Del. Sept. 23, 1998).
Statements may be rendered false and misleading by the
failure to fully dJ.sclose information. A'" "duty to speak the
full truth arises when a defendant undertakes the duty to say
anything. II , II
Zuckerman, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (defendants I
statements held actionable as unfounded predictions) (citation
omitted) .
Defendant has duty to disclose or abstain from
insider trading.
See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1381
(plaintiffs satisfied pleading requirements for Rule 10b-5
violation based upon insider trading); Voit, 977 F. Supp. at
368-69 (trading on non-public information creates duty to
disclose) .
D.

..

-

-

Pleading Scienter Under The PSLRA
1.

Introduction

To sufficiently allege scienter, the complaint must
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. "
15 U. S. C. §78u-4 (b) (2) .
The circuit and district
courts are divided as to the methods by which a plaintiff can
establish scienter. See, e.g., Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc.,
190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999) (IIWe have not yet determined
which pleading standard best effectuates Congress's intent.
Nor need we do so here because the stockholders have failed to
allege facts sufficient to meet even the most lenient standard
possible under the PSLRA, the two-pronged Second Circuit
test. II); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 804 (11th Cir.
1999) ("We do not address ... the question of what exactly a
'strong inference' of the appropriate scienter is, an issue
that has vexed the courts since the PSLRA' s enactment. II)
(citing circuit and district court opinions); In re Next Level
F - 26
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Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. 97 C 7362, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149, at *3-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2000) (surveying
decisions); In re Orbital Sciences Corp. Sec. Litig., 58 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 688 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1999) (after noting that the
"[t]he Fourth Circuit has yet to determine the point at which
a Complaint will suffice to meet this standard" and that "the
other circuits are deeply divided in this regard," stating
that "[t]he Court need not determine the appropriate
interpretation [of the PSLRA] to use, because whether applied
to a test of motive and opportunity or to a test of heightened
recklessness, unusual insider trading is sufficient to create
a strong inference of recklessness") (citation omitted). See
generally Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain
Meaning and Legislative History:
Which will Decide the
Standard for Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 577
(1999) .
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Second Circui t :

"Motive and Opportuni ty"

Prior to the PSLRA's enactment, in the Second Circuit a
strong inference of fraudulent intent could be established
either
(I)
"by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial
evidence
of
conscious
misbehavior
or
recklessness" or (2)
"by alleging facts to show that
defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud. II
The High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,
25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); see also In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Holding v. Nu-Tecb Bio-Med, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0764 (HB), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20399, at *11, Fed. Sec.L. Rep. (CCH)
'90,417 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1999) (liThe PSLRA raised the bar at
the pleading stage and requires the allegation of facts that
give rise to a strong inference of reckless or conscious
behavior on behalf of the defendant.") (citing In re Glenayre
Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y.
1997}}i accord Salomon Smith Barney v. Asset Securitization
Corp., No. 98 Civ. 4186 (BSJ), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at
*13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1999) i In re APC Telesvcs., Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 97 Civ. 9145 (BSJ), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17908,
at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1999).
Following enactment of the PSLRA,
there was some
confusion among the district courts as to the level of
pleading scienter required by the statute.
See High View
Fund, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 426 n.2 (collecting cases). In one of
the first appellate court opinions addressing the issue,
however, the Second Circuit held (albeit without much
analysis) that the PSLRA "heightened the requirement for
pleading scienter to the level used by the Second Circuit. II
Press v. Chemical Inv. Svcs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d
Cir. 1999). See also Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard
E. Jacobs Group, 186 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 1999); Stevelman
v. Atlas Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1999);
F - 27

Kalnit v. Eichler, No. 99 Civ. 3306 (SAS) , 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19545, at *24-36 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999) (offering
extensive analysis of plaintiffs' scienter allegations before
finding them insufficient); In re Scholastic Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 97 Civ. 2447 (JFK) , 2000 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 791, at
*34-40 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,2000) (same); In re Computer Assocs.
Class Action Sec. Litig., No. 98-CV-4839 (TCP) , 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17874, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1999)
(elucidating Second Circuit standard for pleading scienter);
Herzog v. GT Interactive Software Corp., No. 98 Civ. 0085
(DNE) , 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 18380, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
29, 1999) (same); In re Hudson Tech., Inc. Sec. Li tig., No. 98
Civ. 1616 (JGK) , 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 15032, at *16-17 & Il.4,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~90,661 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,1999)
(noting that Second Circuit "recently reiterated" in Press and
Stevelman that "fraud may be inferred from motive and
opportunity") (citation omitted); SEC v. Drescher, No. 99 Civ.
1418 (SAS) , 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 16033, at *9-10, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ~90,681 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1999) (same); Ruskin
v. TIG Holdings, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 1068 (LLS) , 1999 u.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14860, at *10-11, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~90, 657
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1999) (applying "motive and opportunity"
test); Global Intellicom, Inc. v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co., No.
99 Civ. 342 (DLC) , 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 11378, at *23, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~90,534 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1999); Fant v.
Perelman, No. 97 Civ. 8435 (LAP), 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 5694,
at *16-17, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~90,477 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9,
1999); Rubinstein v. Skyteller, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4620 (SAS) ,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2149, at *9, 1999 WL 105025, at *3, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~90,442 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).

I

-

Numerous district courts in other circuits
"have
concluded that Congress did not intend for the [PSLRA] to
abolish" the "motive and opportunity" formulation for pleading
scienter.
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d
396,408 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Next
Level, 2000 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, at *12 (asserting that
II [t]he majority of courts agree with the Second Circuit,
including those within this district [N.D. III.]") (citations
omitted); In re Transcrypt Int'l Sec. Litig., No. 4:98CV3099,
1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *23 (D. Neb. Nov. 4, 1999)
("The Second Circuit has led the way in interpreting the PSLRA
and specifically addressing the scienter requirement for
claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.") (citing Press); Coates
v. Heartland Wireless Communs., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 628, 642
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (IIThis court ... holds that scienter can be
pleaded based on motive and opportunity to commit fraud. II)
(footnote omitted); Robertson v. Strassner, 32 F. Supp. 2d
443, 447 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same).
See generally Lisa A.
Herrera, Comment, Will Motive, Opportunity or Recklessness No
Longer Consti tute Scienter for Fraud? A Survey of Recent
Federal District Court Decisions After the Enactment of the
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 26 Pepp. L.
Rev. 379 (1999).
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3.

The Third Circuit Follows The Second
Circuit

In a recent case, In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180
F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit stated that the
PSLRA's requirement for pleading scienter mirrors that
previously adopted in the Second Circuit, holding that it
"remains sufficient" for plaintiffs to plead scienter by
alle~ing facts "establishing a motive and an opportunity to
commJ.t fraud, or by setting forth facts that constitute
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious
behavior."
Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
"Motive and
opportunity,
like
all
other
allegations
of
scienter
(intentional, conscious, or reckless behavior) must now be
supported by facts stated 'with particularity' and must give
rise to a 'strong inference' of scienter."
Id. at 535
(quoting 15 U.S.C. §78u-4 (b) (2» .
See also In re Cendant
Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 98-1664 (WHW) , 1999 u.s. Dist.
LEXIS 18199, at *10-23 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 1999) (offering
lengthy analysis of, and upholding, plaintiffs' allegations
regarding defendants' scienter); In re Tel-Save Sec. Litig.,
Master File No. 98~CV-3145, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at
*16, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,693 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1999)
("After the [PSLRA], catch-all allegations that defendants
stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to
implement a fraudulent scheme are no longer sufficient,
because they do not state facts with particularity or give
rise to a strong inference of scienter ... a defendant I s
motive and opportunity to commit fraud must be clearly stated
by the plaintiff"); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627-28
(E.D.
Pa.
1999)
(elucidating Third Circuit standard); Buck v. Piercing Pagoda,
Inc., Civil Action No. 98-5535, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16092,
at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1999) (same); Silverman v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, Civil No. 99-856, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17703, at
*26-27 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 1999) (same); TFM Inv. Group v. Bauer,
Civil Action No. 99-840, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 15821, at *4-6
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1999) (applying Advanta standard and
finding plaintiffs' allegations of scienter insufficient); In
re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 354, 369 (D.N.J .
1999); Kenilworth Partners L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 59 F. Supp.
2d 417, 427 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Walnut Leasing Co., Inc. &

Equip. Leasing Corp. of America, Inc. Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro, No. 99-526, 1999 u.s. Dist.

LEXIS 14517, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1999).

Unlike the Second Circuit's opinion in Press, 166 F.3d at
538 , in Advan ta the Third Circui t conducted an in-depth
analysis of the PSLRA's legislative history to arrive at a
similar standard.
180 F. 3d at 530-33.
Advanta sought to
determine congressional intent by reviewing the legislative
debate surrounding the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998, which included a discussion regarding the
pleading requirements necessary to allege scienter under the
PSLRA. Id. at 533.
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District courts from other circuits have followed the
Third Circuit's approach. See, e.g., In re Green Tree Finan.
Corp. Stock Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 860, 870 (D. Minn. 1999)
("The Court believes the Advanta court's analysis of the issue
may be the most persuasive, and, to the extent 'motive and
opportunity' remains a valid inquiry, Advanta's admonishment
regarding the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements
correctly states the plaintiffs' burden."); In re Spyglass,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 C 512, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11382,
at *20, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,607 (N.D. Ill. July 21,
1999) (" [t] he scienter requirement can still be established by
a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud,
or by
establishing facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of
reckless or conscious behavior"; "The change made by the PSLRA
is that the complaint itself now must allege particular facts
supporting a strong inference of scienter as to each
defendant.") (citations omitted); Coates v. Heartland Wireless
Comrn., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(indicating that in the absence of post-PSLRA guidance from
the Fifth Circuit, it would follow the Third Circuit's
approach) ; Hartsell v. Source Media, Inc., No.3: 98-CV-1980-R,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13082, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 1999)
(reiterating that "allegations of 'motive and opportunity' are
sufficient to satisfy" scienter pleading requirement); accord
RGB Eye Assocs., P.A. v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., Civil
Action No. 3:98-CV-1715-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17665, at *25
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1999) (same).

4.

Other Formulations Of Scienter Pleading
Requirement

-

I

Some courts hold that "motive facts can be considered in
determining whether the complaint raises a strong inference of
scienter, even though satisfaction of the motive test alone
does not conclusively establish an inference of the required
state of mind" under the PSLRA.
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals
Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 411 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (collecting
cases) .
In a significant decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a
private securities plaintiff must plead in great detail "facts
that constitute circumstantial evidence of deliberate reckless
or conscious misconduct." In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Li tig. ,
183 F. 3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
See also
Heliotrope Gen'l, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 980
(9th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff' s complaint did not "state facts
that create a strong inference of the required degree of
intent")
(citing
Silicon
Graphics) ;
In
re
Sonus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C98-1164Z, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11517, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 1999)
(sustaining plaintiffs' amended complaint against motion to
dismiss where allegations that Sonus failed to report FDA
inspections revealing problems with pending approval of drug
showed strong inference that defendants acted with required
state of mind).
Thus far, none of the other circuit courts
F - 30

;

-

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r

have adopted the Ninth Circuit's formulation of the scienter
pleading requirement. See generally Susan J. Becker, Circuit

Courts Split on Scienter Pleading and Proof Requirements, 25

Litigation News, No.2, at 1, 4-5 (ABA Section of Litigation
Jan. 2000) ("Becker, Circuit Courts") .
In contrast to the approach taken in the Second and Third
Circuit, other appellate courts have held that alleging
defendants' "motive and opportunity" is no longer sufficient
to plead scienter, reasoning that the PSLRA was enacted to
heighten pleading standards for securities fraud claims.
A
recent Sixth Circuit decision, In re Comshare, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 542,549-51 (6th Cir. 1999), holds that under
the PSLRA, plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging facts
giving rise to strong inference of recklessness, but not by
alleging facts merely establishing that defendant had motive
and opportunity to commit securities fraud. Accord Hines v.
ESC Strategic Funds, Inc., Case No. 3:99-0530, 1999 u.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15790, at *31-32 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 17, 1999) (applying
Comshare standard); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d
1271, 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999)
(" [W]e are in basic
agreement with the Sixth Circuit .... * * * [W]e reject the
notion that allegations of motive and opportunity to commit
fraud, standing alone, are sufficient to establish scienter in
this Circuit. "); In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No.
97-2044 MJD/AJB, 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 15611, at *38-39 (D.
Minn. Mar. 29, 1999) (same). See also New England Health Care
Employees Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civil
Action No. 1:98-CV-99-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12999, at *2327 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 1999)
(holding that plaintiffs'
allegations regarding defendants' scienter satisfied Comshare
test) .
In a recent decision, Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194
F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999), the First Circuit generally followed
the Sixth Circuit's approach, offering an extensive analysis
of the PSLRA' s statutory language and legislative history, id.
at 191-97, before adopting the following standard for pleading
scienter:
Our view of the [PSLRA] is thus close to that
articulated by the Sixth Circuit [in Comshare] ....

r
I

r,.
t

r

Without adopting any pleading litany of motive
and opportunity, we reject defendants' argument that
facts showing motive and opportunity can never be
enough to permit the drawing of a strong inference
of scienter.
But. .. merely pleading motive and
opportunity, regardless of the strength of the
inferences to be drawn of scienter, is not enough.
[The Second, Third and Fifth]
[C]ircuits have
interpreted the PSLRA as permitting use of motive
and opportunity type pleading if it raises a strong
inference. Like the Third Circuit, we caution that
"catch-all allegations that defendants stood to
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benefit from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to
implement a fraudulent scheme are [not] sufficient. II
Similarly, the PSLRA neither prohibits nor
endorses the pleading of insider trading as evidence
of scienter, but requires that the evidence meet the
"strong inference II standard.
Unusual trading or
trading at suspicious times or in suspicious amounts
by corporate insiders has long been recognized as
probative of scienter.
The vitality of the
inference to be drawn depends on the facts, and can
range from marginal to strong. This continues to be
true in litigation after the effective date of the
PSLRA.
Indeed,
we still think today, that
allegations of unusual
insider trading by a
defendant with access
to material
non-public
information can support a strong inference of
scienter.
We similarly caution that mere pleading
of insider trading, without regard to either context
or the strength of the inferences to be drawn, is
not enough. At a minimum, the trading must be in a
context where defendants have incentives to withhold
material, non-public information, and it must be
unusual, well beyond the normal patterns of trading
by those defendants.
194 F.3d at 197-98 (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535). See also Geffon v. Micrion Corp.,
Civil Action No. 96-11596-REK, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19246, at
*45-48 (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1999) (construing First Circuit's
opinion in Greebel). See generally Matthew Roskoski, Note, A
Case-By-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 Mich. L. Rev.
2265 (1999); Ryan G. Meist, Would the Real Scienter Please
Stand Up:
The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 Minn. L.
Rev. 1103, 1126 (1998).
It is perceived by most commentators that in Comshare the
Sixth Circuit adopted a slightly more restrictive pleading
standard than that adopted by the Second Circuit -in Press (and
the Third Circuit in Advanta), but far less restrictive than
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics.
See
Herbert E. Milstein, Recent Developments in the Private
Securi ties Li tigation Reform Act, 5 Securities Litig. &
Regulation, No.9, at 12 (Jan. 12, 2000); Becker, Circuit
Courts, 25 Litigation News at 1 (contrasting the Sixth
Circuit's IIlow threshold for pleading scienter ll with the Ninth
Circuit's approach, and characterizing the Second and Third
Circuits as having "found middle ground ll ) •
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ACCOUNTING FRAUD: PLEADING SCIENTER UNDER
THE PSLRA

VII.
A.

SEC Focus On Accounting Fraud

In response to the erosion in the quality of financial
reporting, the SEC has commenced an intensive initiative to
challenge what it deems "accounting hocus pocus."
Such
practices, which include the immediate write-off of a huge
percentage of an acquired company's value as a charge to inprocess research and development (" IPR&D"), and avoiding
future earnings degradation from the amortization of goodwill,
manipulate earnings revenue and diminish the integrity and
reliability of financial reporting in the U. S. securities
markets.
See Remarks by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt made at
the Center for Law and Business at New York University (Sept.
28,
1998),
available
at
«www.sec.gov/news/
speeches/spch220.txt»
and comment letter submitted by SEC
Chief Accountant Lynn Turner to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (Oct. 9, 1998).
B.

Specific Allegations Of Accounting Fraud
Supporting Strong Inference Of Scienter Under
The PSLRA
1.

Earnings/Revenue Misrepresentations

A
number
of
district
courts
have
held
that
misrepresentations about the company's earnings or revenue, if
pled with requisite particularity, satisfy the standard for
pleading scienter.
See Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1472
(allegation that insiders engaged in elaborate accounting
fraud scheme designed to ensure that company met earnings and
revenue projections); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
970 F. Supp. 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(allegation that
corporate insider approved of plans for accounting fraud and
false revenue recognition evidence of scienter); In re
Wellcare Mgmt. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 632, 640
(N .D.N. Y. 1997) (allegation that corporate executive "had
knowledge of, condoned, and/or encouraged ... the deliberate
overstatement of earnings by a number of means"); Rehm, 954 F.
Supp. at 1255-56 (overstatement of earnings by persons
responsible
for
calculating
and
releasing
financial
information shows scienter); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23107, at *11-12 (court found strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1313-14 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (overstated revenues when method of recognition was
inconsistent with SFAS 48); In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1069 (D. Minn. 1998) (restating
earnings with 11% reduction of revenues); Varljen, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *2, *15 (defendants falsely inflated
earnings
by
including
income
from
fraudulent
medical
billings); In re Miller Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp.
2d 1323, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (defendants understated acquired
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companies' pre-merger revenues which overstated growth of
company's post-merger revenues, overstated company's revenue
growth in core manufacturing business by combining it with
revenue from non-manufacturing activities, reported income
misrepresented size of one-time gain from litigation
settlement, accounted for trade-ins at cost which was
substantially greater than market price, misrepresented other
one-time gains, engaged in "channel stuffing" by artificially
stimulating revenues by offering extraordinary discounts and
trade-ins and extended payment terms and other unusual
financing arrangements to mask deterioration in revenues};
Employee Solutions, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16444, at *3, *8
(setting aside low workers' compensation reserves enabled
defendants to present falsely as a highly profitable company) ;
In re Fine Host Co~. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70 (D.
Conn. 1998) (plaintiffs alleged that top officer admitted in
phone call that he knowingly capitalized certain expenses to
increase earnings); Inre Olympic Finan. Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
Civil File No. 97-496 (MJD/AJB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789,
at *11 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1998)
(defendants knowingly
overstated quality of loan portfolio); Hudson Venture
Partners, L.P. v. Patriot Aviation Group, Inc., No. 98 Civ.
4132 (DLC) , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 1999) (closely-held corporation underreported losses and
accounts payable and overreported accounts receivable and
overstated profits by 80% for first two months of fiscal
year) .

2.

Violations of GAAP Can Form Part Of The
Basis Supporting Strong Inference Of
Scienter

A violation of GAAP is generally insufficient to
establish fraud but, when combined with other circumstances
suggesting fraudulent intent, "such violation may be used to
show scienter." Cherednichenko, 1997 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 23107,
at *10 (citing Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1313)
(premature recognition of earnings from consignment sales,
combined with significant extent of alleged overstatement, as
well as other factors,
created strong inference that
defendants acted with either specific or reckless intent to
defraud), and Wellcare Mgmt., 964 F. Supp. at 640 (finding
that knowledge of deliberate overstatement of earnings and
other accounting improprieties, as well as other misconduct,
tended to show scienter)}; see also Gross, 977 F. Supp. at
1472
(allegations
that
corporate
insiders
"improperly
recognized income that [d]efendants knew should not have been
recognized under GAAP principles" is sufficient to establish
scienter); Ancor Communs., 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1005-06
(overstating revenues by reporting consignment sales in
violation of GAAP; defendants continually represented in SEC
filings that financial results were prepared in accordance
with GAAP); Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1313 (violating
GAAP by early recognition of consignment sales resulting in
overstated revenues); Health Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. at 203
F - 34
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(violations of GAAP without corresponding fraudulent intent
are insufficient to state claim); Miller Indus., 12 F. SUppa
2d at 1332 (overstatement of revenues and income in violation
of GAAP may constitute violation of Rule 10b-5).
3.

Improper Revenue Recognition Of A
Significant Portion Of Revenues

"While it is true that the mere fact that a company's
financial reporting was inaccurate does not establish
scienter, the magnitude of reporting errors may lend weight to
allegations of recklessness where defendants were in a
position to detect the errors.
The more serious the error,
the less believable are defendants protests that they were
completely unaware of [the Company's] true financial status
and the stronger is the inference that defendants must have
known about the discrepancy."
Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1256
(citations omitted); see also Marksman Partners, 927 F. SUppa
at 1314 (overstated revenues constituted significant portion
of company's total revenues); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23107, at *7 (substantial overstatement by reporting
consignment sales as revenues); Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10493, at *15 (defendants falsely inflated earnings by
including income from fraudulent Medicare billings) .
4.

Pleading That Accountant Had Motive And
Opportunity

As a matter of law, it is insufficient to allege that an
outside auditor's motive for committing fraud is a desire to
continue as that client's accountant and accrue the benefits
in the form of fees. See Retsky, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17459,
at *24-25 (rejecting "boilerplate" claims that accounting
firm's interest in gaining fees is sufficient to show motive
and commit fraud); see also Health Mgmt., 970 F. SUppa at 202
(fraudulent conduct is not within auditor's economic selfinterest) .

c.

Standard of "Recklessness" For Accountant's
Liability
1.

Plaintiff's Burden

Plaintiffs must show "'highly unreasonable [omissions or
acts], involving not merely simple negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor
must have been aware of it.'" Retsky, 1998 U. S. Dist. LEXIS
17459, at *26-27 (citation omitted); see also First Merchants,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *29 (same).
"[Plaintiffs] must prove that the accounting practices
were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all,
or "an egregious refusal to see the obvious or to investigate
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the doubtful," or that the accounting judgments which were
made were such that no reasonable accountant would have made
the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.'"
Retsky, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at *27 (citation
omitted); see also Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1255; First
Merchants, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *29; Health Mgmt.,
970 F. Supp. at 202; see also Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand,
L.L.P., No. 97 Civ. 3374 (RPP) , 1999 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 2102, at
*44, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '90,443 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. I, 1999)
("Failing to adhere to one or two Auditing Interpretations may
be only negligence, but Coopers is alleged to have disregarded
many different Auditing Interpretations. Based on the facts
as alleged, a trier of fact could find Cooper I s audit so
reckless that Coopers should have had knowledge of the
underlying fraud, and acted in blind disregard that there was
a strong likelihood that Happiness was engaged in the
underlying fraud.") (citation omitted).
2.

Ignoring "Red Flags" Of Accounting Fraud

-

-

Circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent can include
the presence of "red flags" or warning signs. See Transcrypt
Int'l, 1999 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *29 (denying motions to
dismiss because "plaintiffs have specifically alleged Ired
flag'
GAAP violations by Trans crypt and numerous GAAS
violations by Coopers"); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1256 ("[T]he
more serious the error, the less believable are defendants [I]
protests that they were completely unaware of [the company's]
true financial status and the stronger the inference that
defendants must have known about the discrepancy."); Health
Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. at 199 (outside auditor's ignorance of
"red flags" present evidence of its fraudulent intent)
(citation omitted); In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
835 F. Supp. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting independent
auditor's motion to dismiss where allegations of large
accounting errors gave rise to inference of scienter).
In Retsky, 1998 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at *29-32,
plaintiffs satisfied the applicable pleading requirements by
alleging that Price Waterhouse knew of "red flags" involved
with customer contract because (1) Price Waterhouse reviewed
and commented on a report prepared by the Company's internal
audit department noting concerns of premature revenue booking;
(2) Price Waterhouse noted that contract contingencies set
forth in contract precluded certain revenue recognition; and
(3) Price Waterhouse noted that the MD&A discussion in the
Form 10-K report concerning product risks failed to comply
with Reg S-K.
In First Merchants, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *1720, plaintiffs satisfied pleading requirements by alleging
that accountants should have known of "red flags" including
(1) bad debt reserves were out of line with bad debt writeoffs; (2) there were dramatic increases in the rate of 60- and
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90- day delinquencies; and (3) there was an increase in the
average length of loans reflecting higher risk borrowers.
VI:I:I.

A.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY
Primary Liability

In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that there can be
no liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for aiding and
abetting securities fraud. Unless the defendant committed a
manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of Section
10(b), the defendant has not violated the securities laws.
See also Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1998)
(denying Deloitte's motion to dismiss when complaint alleged
that accountants certified false revenues) .
B.

Secondary Actor's Conduct May Constitute
Primary Liability

However, primary liability under Rule 10b-5 may be
imposed
" 'not
only
on
persons
who
made
fraudulent
misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the
fraud and assisted in its perpetration. '" SEC v. First Jersey
Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir.
1994)) i see also Health Mgmt., 970 F. SUppa at 209. More than
significant participation by the secondary actor is needed to
incur primary liability.
Shapiro, 123 F. 3d at 720.
The
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at
the time of publication dissemination, that is, in advance of
the investment decision.
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152
F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
Secondary parties may be
primarily liable for statements made by others in which the
secondary party significantly participated.
Software
Toolworks, 50 F.3d 615.

C.

Fraudulent Scheme Liability

Although in Central Bank the Supreme Court eliminated
liability for aiders and abettors of securities fraud, under
§10 (b) /Rule 10b-5 primary liability may be imposed not only on
persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on
those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its
perpetration.
See Health Mgmt., 970 F. SUppa at 203; Page,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673, at *11-15; Marksman Partners, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12743, at *4 (defendants' involvement in
ship-hold-and-return scheme) .
D.

"Group Published" Doctrine

When alleging securities fraud based on false and
misleading
statements
in
prospectuses,
registration
statements, annual reports, press rleases, or other "group
published" information, there is a presumption that these
statements are the collective work of those individuals who
F - 37

have high level positions with the issuer; are involved in the
day-to-day operations; directly participate in management; and
were involved in drafting, reviewing, and/or disseminating the
false and misleading statements. Prospectuses, registration
statements, annual reports, press releases, or other group
published information are presumed to be collective actions.
Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D.
Colo. 1998).
While many defendants have argued that the so-called
"group pleading" doctrine was abolished by the PSLRA, the
weight of authority is to the contrary.
See In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)
("The PSLRA has not altered the group pleading
doctrine .... "); accord In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.,
MDL No. 1264, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 19306, at *23 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 15, 1999) ("[B]ecause the group pleading doctrine is a
rebuttable presumption applicable only to a limited group of
persons within the company,
the Court finds that the
presumption is not inconsistent with the PSLRA") (citations
omitted); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 5686
(RWS), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19329, at *68-69 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
13, 1999) (same); Miller Indus., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1329
(same); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (holding that the
PSLRA did abolish the "group pleading" doctrine).
IX.

-

-

-

THE SAFE HARBOR FOR "FORWARD-LOOKING" STATEMENTS
AND THE "BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE
A.

When Forward-Looking Statements Are Protected

The PSLRA's safe harbor provision prohibits liability
based on forward-looking statements if such statements (1) are
identified as such and are accompanied by cautionary language,
(2) were immaterial, (3) plaintiff fails to establish that the
person (or entity) making the statement had actual knowledge
of its falsity.
See Karacand, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1243;
Ceridian, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15611, at *18-19; Valujet, 984
F. Supp. at 1479; see also Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at
1106.
A forward-looking statement includes (a) statements
containing proj ections of revenues, income, earnings per
share, or other financial items; (b) statements of the plans
and objectives of management for future operations; and (c)
statements of future economic performance.
15 U.S.C. §78u5{i) (1); see Karacand, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1243; Ceridian, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15611, at *18; Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at
1382; Voit, 977 F. Supp. at 372; Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at
1356; see also Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (statements
regarding casino marketing plans were forward-looking);
Employee Solutions, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16444, at *9
(statements about accounting reserves were statements of
historical fact).

-

An oral forward-looking statement is protected if it (1)
is accompanied by a cautionary statement specifying first that
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the particular oral statement is a forward-looking statement
and second that the "'actual results might differ materially
from those projected in the forward-looking statement;' or (2)
is accompanied by an oral statement expressing that
'additional information concerning factors that could cause
actual results to materially differ from those in the forwardlooking statement is contained in a readily available written
document.'"
Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1355-56 (citing 15
U.S.C. §78u-5 (c) (2) (B) ) .
SEC Rule 3b-6 provides a safe harbor for forward-looking
statements made in quarterly or annual reports if it was made
with a "reasonable basis" and "in good faith." Valujet, 984
F. Supp. at 1479 (citing 17 C.F.R. §240.3b-6).
When
forecasts, opinions, or projections in a disclosure statement
are accompanied by meaningful warnings and cautionary
language, the forward looking statements may be deemed
immaterial as a matter of law. Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961
F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Grand Casinos, 988 F.
Supp. at 1279.

B.

When Forward-Looking Statements Are Not
Protected .

A prediction may be actionable as a false statement of
fact if (1) the speaker did not genuinely believe the
statement was true; (2) there was no reasonable basis for the
speaker to believe the statement; and (3) the speaker was
aware of an undisclosed fact tending to undermine the accuracy
of the statement. Berti v. VideoLan Tech., Civil Action No.
3:97-CV-296-H, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18066, at *13-14 (W.D.
Ky. June 10, 1998); see also Karacand, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1243
("The Safe Harbor does not apply to the extent a statement was
made by a person or entity having actual knowledge that it was
false or misleading.") (citing 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c) (1) (B}).
Thus, in Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1111-12,
plaintiffs
alleged
that
defendants
knew
that
their
predications that a hotel-casino construction project would be
on budget were false because they had received construction
estimates showing that the project would have cost overruns.
The court held that those allegations were sufficient to
wi thstand dismissal under the PSLRA' s II actual knowledge II
scienter standard for forward-looking statements. See also In
re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 119193
(D. Nev. 1999)
(material issues of fact regarding
defendants' knowledge of cost overruns on construction proj ect
and generation of change orders and extra work orders without
apparent regard for budgetary constraints precluded summary
judgment on defendants' claim that prospectus statements
regarding financial condition were not made with required
scienter); Weiss v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. CV-97-1376-ST,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17026, at *45-46 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 1999)
(" [T] his court interprets actual knowledge to mean that
defendants knew - not should have known - of facts which
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seriously undermined their prediction or knew - not should
have known
there was no reasonable basis for their
prediction ll ) •
A forward-looking statement is insulated from liability
unless the defendant fails to make accompanying cautionary
statements or the plaintiff proves the defendant actually knew
the statements were false when made.
See Schaffer, 29 F.
Supp. 2d at 1224 (defendants knew truth about future business
based on company's financial statements which revealed
downturn in new business); Kensington Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 385, at *10-11 (plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to
create strong inference of defendants' knowledge of falsity of
statements regarding introduction of new sunglass line).
The safe harbor explicitly excludes from protection
forward-looking statements included in financial statements
prepared in accordance with GAAP; statements contained in
registration statements; or statements made in connection wi th
a tender offer or initial public offering. See Queen Uno, 2
F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (particular and detailed representations
regarding expected production levels of specific facilities
may be actionable) .
The safe harbor provision does not insulate statements
IImisrepresent
historical/hard or
current
facts. II
Ceridian, 1999 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 15611, at *19 (citations
omitted); see also Geffon v. Micrion Corp., No. 98-11596-REK
(D. Mass. Sept. 24, 1998)
(statement of present fact,
"although they may affect the future performance of the
company, II are not protected under the PSLRA' s safe-harbor
provision); accord APAC Telesvcs., 1999 U. S. Dist. LEXIS
17908, at *23 (IILinking future success to present and past
performance
does
not
render
statements
immune
from
liability. II) . Courts must determine, at the pleading stage,
whether a forward-looking statement falls within the "safe
harbor. II
15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (e); Karacand, 53 F. Supp. 2d at
1243.
Because the PSLRA IIcloses the universe of supposedly
false statements under scrutiny to those 'specif[iedl I in the
complaint,"
the statute's legislative history "implies
piecemeal examination of the statements found in a company
communication. II
Harris, 182 F. 3d at 804 (quoting 15 U. S. C.
§78u-4 (b) (1) ) .

...

-

-

that

C.

The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine: When
Cautionary Language Protects Misleading
Statements

"Proving that Defendant has provided enough cautionary
language as a matter of law is a high standard." Lister, 1999
U.S. D~st. LEXIS 384, at *9; see also Kensington Capital, 1999
t;T.S. D~~t. LEXIS 385, at *8. "The 'bespeaks caution' doctrine
~s appl~ed narrowly because an overbroad interpretation would
encourage management to conceal deliberate misrepresentations
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beneath the mantle of broad cautionary language."
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *24.

Boeing,

Whether a statement is misleading may be determined as a
matter of law only when reasonable minds could not disagree as
to whether the mix of information is misleading. Powers, 977
F. Supp. at 1043; Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1279; Boeing,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *24-25 (reasonable minds could
differ as to whether cautionary language was sufficient) .
Under the judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine,
misstated '" forecasts, opinions, or proj ections' do not amount
to 'material misrepresentations' if 'meaningful cautionary
statements I
accompany
the
forward-looking
statements. "
Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1479 (alleged misrepresentation was
not based on forward-looking statements, but rather existing
facts) (citation omitted) .
A claim can only be dismissed under the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine if defendants' forward looking statements
are accompanied by enough cautionary language or risk
disclosure that "'reasonable minds' could not disagree that
the
challenged
statements
were
not
misleading. "
Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *17 (citation
omitted); Olympic Fin., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *12;
Boeing, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *17, *24; Kensington
Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *8.
The bespeaks caution doctrine provides a mechanism by
which a court can rule as a matter of law that defendants'
forward looking statements contained enough cautionary
language or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against
securities fraud.
Hoffman v. Avant! Corp., No. C9720698(RMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
16, 1997) (citation omitted). The doctrine reflects nothing
more than the unremarkable proposition that statements must be
analyzed in context.
See Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043.
Dismissing a securities action under the bespeaks caution
doctrine represents a conclusion that, as a matter of law, a
securities prospectus as a whole is not misleading due to the
risks disclosed and the nature and extent of the other
cautionary language employed. Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21823, at *5.
D.

Cases In Which Cautionary Disclosures Were
Insufficient To Bespeak Caution

See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (no defense when cautionary
statements regarding forward-looking information are separate
statements or documents from those listed in complaint);
Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *17-18
(warnings appeared in documents that did not accompany
allegedly misleading oral representations, thus diminishing
their cautionary effect); Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043-44
(information does not clearly preclude reasonable minds from
F - 41

differing); Fugman, 961 F. Supp. at 1199-98 (statements
concerning marketability of medical diagnostic test); Voit,
977 F. Supp. at 371 (cautionary warning itself was actionable
as mater~al misstatement); Hoffman, 1997 U. S. Dist. LEXIS
21823, at *5 (representations regarding merits of defendants'
legal position may be misleading and substantially minimize
impact, of company's risk disclosures); Olympic Fin., 1998 U. S.
Dist.
LEXIS 14789,
at *13
(documents containing some
cautionary language did not specifically address heart of
plaintiffs' claim); Boeing, 1998 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at
*19, *31 (no cautionary language in press release to warn of
steeper decline in productivity or extension of period of
inefficiency); Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (misleading
quarterly earnings are present factual conditions) ; Kensington
Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *8 (same; statements
concerning introduction of new sunglass line).
E.

Boilerplate Warnings Are Insufficient To
Bespeak Caution

To determine whether the doctrine immunizes defendants
from liability, the court analyzes whether the cautionary
statements are "precise" and directly addressed to the future
risk at issue. Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *5;
Olympic Fin., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789,. at *12.
liTo
immunize the type of conduct alleged here would be to give
companies a license to issue groundless appraisals to
investors so long as they include a modest footnote or
appendix with a kernel of truth that might enable an analyst
or accountant to spot the inconsistencies. II
Marksman
Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1307.
To be meaningful, cautionary statements must identify
important facts that could cause actual results to differ
materially from the forward looking statement. Boeing, 40 F.
Supp. 2d at 1169-71 (warnings did not speak to factors that
could adversely affect company's development of systems to
improve efficiency) .
If a party is aware of an actual danger or cause for
concern, the party may not rely on a generic disclaimer in
order to avoid liability under the bespeaks caution doctrine.
In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97
Civ. 4760, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, at *21, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep.
(CCH)
'90,306
(S.D.N.Y.
Oct.
20,
1998)
(blanket
disclaimer that defendant/ market maker "may from time to time
have long or short positions II not enough to protect
defendants); Feiner v. SS&C Tech., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (D.
Conn. 1998) (II [W]arning is not so precise and obvious that it
renders plaintiffs' allegations unactionable as a matter of
law. II) ; Warman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009, at *15 (rejecting
defendants'
bespeaks caution defense because cautionary
statements did not directly address defendants' projections
and II even if the statements were forward looking, the language
used by the defendants appears to be merely a boilerplate
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disclaimer"); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at
*17 (rejecting bespeaks caution defense because "many of the
disclosures appear to be merely boilerplate disclaimers")
(citation omitted); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1118
(plaintiffs alleged that because defendants knew of existing,
specific cost overruns and construction delays which would
necessarily affect operating revenues once hotel-casino
opened, they cannot insulate these statements with general
language
about
risks
inherent
in
every
construction
enterprise) .
F.

The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine Is Not
Applicable When Misrepresentations Or
omissions Concern Historical/Hard Or Current
Facts

Predictive statements contain the factual assertions that
the speaker genuinely believes the statement is accurate, that
there is a reasonable basis for that belief, and that the
speaker is unaware of any undisclosed facts that would tend to
seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. It follows
that statements of opinion are actionable if they are made in
bad faith or are not reasonably supported by evidence
available to the person that issues the statements.
See
Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, at *14; Grand
Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1279-1280 (forward-looking cautionary
language does not render immaterial presently known facts
regarding cost overruns and other construction difficulties) ;
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 47 (D.
Mass. 1997) (while defendants disclosed "risk" that existing
products may become obsolete by introduction of new products
by partners, defendants' failure to disclose that such new
product had already been created, was about to be introduced
to market, and would render company's "current product line
obsolete within the industry and, thus, materially lower [the
company's] revenues and earnings for the second quarter of
fiscal year 1996" held actionable); Page v. Derrickson, Case
No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673, at *33-34,
10 Fla. Law W. Fed. D 586 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997) ("bespeaks
caution"
doctrine
inapplicable
when plaintiffs
allege
misstatements of existing facts); Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043
(rejected defendants'
bespeaks caution defense because
cautionary language "does not directly address the delays that
Plaintiffs claim Proxima was then experiencing with its laserprojector development"); Valujet,
984 F. Supp. at 1479
(plaintiffs alleged that defendants misrepresented and failed
to disclose poor safety record and fact that FAA approval was
required before expansion could be consummated); Voi t v .
Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(allegations that defendants made omissions of present fact
regarding CEO departure and that stock plummeted following
announcement contradicted defendants' contention that omission
was soft information); Fugman, 961 F. Supp. at 1197 n. 9
(cautionary statements cannot render immaterial company IS
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factual representations regarding the adequacy
component in a medical diagnostic testing system) .

x.

of

one

Liability Of Securities Issuers And Their Officers
And Directors For Securities Analysts' Statements
A.

~

...

The Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine

In open market securities cases brought by defrauded
investors under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5, plaintiffs often employ the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988): "[M]ost publicly available
information is reflected in market price, [and therefore] an
investorls reliance on any public material misrepresentations
... may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action."
As the Basic Court recognized, the fraud-on-the-market
theory presupposes that the securities market "I transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market
price ....
The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the
investor, informing him that given all the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price. I " Id. at 244 (quotiniJ In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D.
134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
B.

The Important Role Played By Securities
Analysts

In explaining how the securities market translates
company-specific information into a stock price, the Basic
Court emphasized the importance of "market professionals":
We need not determine by adjudication what
economists and social scientists have debated
through the use of sophisticated statistical
analysis and the application of economic theory.
For purposes of accepting the presumption of
reliance in this case, we need only believe that
market
professionals
generally
consider most
publicly
announced
material
statements
about
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.
485 U.S. at 247 n.24 (emphasis added). Prominent among these
"market professionals" are securities analysts; indeed,
district courts have frequently stated that the number of such
analysts reporting on a particular security is one of the
factors to be examined in determining whether the fraud-onthe-market theory is to be applied in a particular case. See,
See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990).

2
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e.g., In re MOC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 804-05
(S.D. Cal. 1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286
(D.N.J. 1989).3

Courts
have
recognized
that
earnings
forecasts
disseminated by securities analysts are of particular
importance because such analysts are theoretically independent
of the companies they follow and, as a result, they can be
expected to provide more obj ective proj ections than the
companies themselves:
[T]he corporation's own officers are not likely to
be the most reliable source of projections of future
corporate performance.
Officers and internal
analysts may be biased by their personal goals in
evaluating the corporation I s prospects for shortand long-term success. [So] long as the corporation
provides
accurate
hard
data
to
the
market,
professional analysts and investors are in at least
as good and probably a better position to make the
predictions about a corporation's future which are
relevant to the valuation of corporate securities.

r

r
r
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r

This is true for a number of reasons.
First,
the professional analyst has more interest in making
the most accurate prediction possible, because the
analyst's reputation and livelihood depend solely on
the analyst's ability to be correct. The corporate
officer's success does not depend primarily or even
significantly on an ability to predict stock prices.
Second, the analyst has the benefit of objectivity
because the analyst is removed from the daily
operations of the corporation, whereas the corporate
officer is in the thick of these developments.
Finally, and most importantly, the analyst is
skilled in combining the specific data disclosed by
the corporation with general knowled$e about the
industry
and
the
national
and
l.nternational
economies
in which the
corporation competes.
Corporations call on their officers for other
skills.

r

r

r,.
t

r

r
r

r
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See also Brad M. Barber, et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory and the Indicators of Conunon Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J. Corp.
L. 285, 305 (1994) (number of analysts following stock and trading
volume are only factors having independent statistical significance
in determining market efficiency) ; Donald C. Langevoort, Investment
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1024
(1990)
(academic commentary supports the proposition that
" [i] nvestment analysts are crucial players in the mechanisms of
marketplace efficiency that lead to optimal allocations of capital
resources") .
3
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In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1481-82 (N.D.
Cal. 1992), aff 'd, 11 F. 3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993) (footnote
omitted) .•

c.

Liability Of Securities Issuers For Statements
And Projections Disseminated By Securities
Analysts
1.

Introduction

-

Several legal theories impose liability upon securities
issuers and their officers and directors for statements or
projections made by securities analysts, as Judge Legge has
cogently explained:
If defendants made misleading statements to
securities analysts regarding expected licensing
revenues, they may be liable for securities fraud,
even if the company did not adopt the analysts'
subsequent reports.
If a company chooses to speak
to the market on a subject, through an analyst or
otherwise, it must make a full and fair disclosure
to ensure that its statements are not materially
misleading. A company may be liable under Rule lObS for misrepresentations to analysts that reach the
market.
Although a company is not generally responsible
for the accuracy of statements made by securities
analysts,
a company may adopt or endorse an
analyst's
report,
causing
the
report
to
be
attributed to the company.
A defendant may become
sufficiently entangled by reviewing the analysts'
reports
and
making
representations
that
the
information is true or in accordance with the
company's views, or by exercising some measure of
control over the content of the reports.
For
liability
to
attach,
plaint~ffs
must
demonstrate: 1) that a corporate insider adopted the
analysts' forecasts; and 2) that the insider knew
the analysts' forecasts were unreasonable when made,
yet failed to disclose their unreasonableness to
investors.
Generally, a company is liable for
analysts' forecasts that it fostered and reviewed
but failed to correct if the company expressly or

See also In re Compaq Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 1307, 1315
(S.D. Tex. 1993) ("market makers often use analysts' opinions
rather than management's to form the basis for their decisions
about the appropriate market price for a company's stock ll )
(footnote omitted) ; William o. Fisher, The Analyst-Added Premium as
a Defense in Open Market Securities Fraud Cases, 53 Bus. Law. 35,
38-43 (Nov. 1997) (recognizing influence that securities analysts
have upon stock prices) .
4
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impliedly represented that the information in the
forecasts was accurate or coincided with the
company's views.

In re DSP Group Sec. Litig., No. C 95-4025-CAL, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11942, at *19-21, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~99,525
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1997) (citations omitted).
2.

PressTek

On December 22, 1997, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") issued an Enforcement Release defining the
circumstances under which a securities issuer may be held
liable for statements, including earnings forecasts, contained
in a securities analyst's report.
See In the Matter of
Presstek, Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9515,
1997 SEC LEXIS 2645 (Dec. 22, 1997). In an accompanying civil
action brought against Presstek's chairman, Robert Howard, and
president, Robert Verrando, the SEC alleged that Howard and
Verrando caused Presstek to disseminate, through its own
statements and its distribution of analysts' statement,
materially misleading information concerning its sales and
business prospects. 5
In 1994 and 1995, Howard directed
Presstek to distribute several thousand copies of several
editions of the Cabot Market Letter, a financial newsletter
that aggressively touted Presstek and which contained
excessive earnings proj ections for the company. Howard knew,
or was reckless in not knowing,
that those earnings
projections far exceeded Presstek's contemporaneous internal
projections. Presstek adopted those unrealistic projections
by distributing the Cabot Market Letters without disclaimer,
and during a time when Presstek elected not to make public its
own proj ections because management did not view them as
reliable.
In November 1995, Howard reviewed and edited the draft of
a research analyst's report on Presstek and had Presstek
distribute the report, which in final form substantially
overstated Presstek's sales and earnings expectations.
For
example, the report projected 1996 sales of a Presstek laser
imaging product of $26 million, when Presstek internally
projected only $10 million. It also projected 1996 sales of
consumable printing plates of $33.2 million, contrasted with
Presstek's internal projection of $8.7 million. It projected
1997 earnings of $2.42 per share, 80% more than Presstek's
internal proj ection of $1.34 per share.
Howard did not
correct those errors, and Presstek distributed the erroneous
report for more than six months to investors without
disclaimer.
Verrando was aware that proj ections in the
analyst's report were significantly greater than Presstek's

5
SEC v. Robert Howard, et al., No. 97 Civ. 9378 (SWK),
Litigation Release No. 15599, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2623 (Dec. 22, 1997).
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contemporaneous
distribution.

projections,

but

failed

to

halt

its

In its release, the SEC recognized "entanglement"
liability (see discussion below), stating that "[a] n issuer is
liable for inaccuracies in a research report published by
someona else" if it '" sufficiently entangled itself' with such
information to render them attributable to the issuer."
Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29 (citation omitted). The
SEC also recognized "adoption" liability (see discussion
below), stating that "[a] n issuer may also be liable for false
statements contained in a third-party report if it adopts,
expressly or impliedly, the statements after they are
published, even if management had no role in preparing the
reports." Id. at *31. Analyzing the facts of the case, the
SEC held that Presstek was liable under both theories. Id. at
*34-39.

D.

The "Entanglement" Theory

As a general rule, securities issuers are not liable for
statements or forecasts disseminated by securities analysts;
however, reference to reported cases demonstrates numerous
exceptions which nearly swallow this rule. Thus, issuers can
be held liable under §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 if they have
"sufficiently entangled [themselves] with the analysts'
forecasts [so as] to render those predictions 'attributable to
[the issuers].'" Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F. 2d
156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
In that case, the Second Circuit
explained the rationale for its holding:
We have no doubt that a company may so involve
itself in the preparation of reports and projections
by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material
errors in those projections.
This may occur when
officials of the company have, by their activity,
made an implied representation that the information
they have reviewed is true or at least in accordance
with the company's views.
Id.; accord Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29-30
(explicating "entanglement" theory and collecting cases). In
order for the securities issuer to be held liable for the
securities analysts' statements or projections under the socalled "entanglement" theory, the issuer must have placed its
11 imprimatur,
expressly or impliedly, on the analysts'
projections. " Elkind, 635 F. 2d at 163; see also Presstek,
1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *30.'
,
See also In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1410
(9th eire 1996); In re Nokia Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 3752
(DC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4100, at *31, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
190,195 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998); Verifone, 784 F. Supp. at 1486;
Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 603 {N.D. Cal.
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At least one district court has observed that there are
"sound reasons ... to construe the entanglement requirement
strictly." In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054,
1059 (N.D. Cal. 1993). As Judge Williams explained:
In today's complex and highly competitive financial
markets, countless analysts ... issue earnings and
revenue forecasts on virtually every publicly-traded
corporation.
Forecasts may vary a great deal.
If
corporate insiders are held liable under Rule 10b-5
every time one of these forecasts proves to be
incorrect, they would likely spend more time in
court than running their companies.
Also, if a loose and capricious entanglement
standard is allowed to develop, it will be very
difficult for corporate insiders to know how to
regulate their behavior in such a way as to adopt
only with those forecasts which they have carefully
examined and have determined to be reasonably
accurate. Corporate insiders should not be exposed
to Rule 10b-5 liability for an analyst's forecast
unless it is clear, based on the insider's conduct,
that he could have reasonably foreseen that he would
be held liable if the forecast turned out to be'
unreasonable when made and materially misleading to
the investing public.

Id.; see also In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934
(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Caere court's "strict construction"
language with approval). Relying upon Caere, 837 F. SUpp. at

1059, Judge Lasker recently posited the standard for liability
under the "entanglement" theory in the following terms:
Courts concluding that an issuer may be liable
under the statute for failure to correct an analyst
statement have generally required that the plaintiff
allege that: (1) the issuer "entangled" itself in
the making of a statement by the analyst; (2) the
issuer
knew
that
the
statement
(commonly
a
prediction) was false or lacked a reasonable factual
basis when made; and (3) the issuer failed to
disclose the falsity or the unreasonableness to
investors.
The element of entanglement may be
satisfied by the issuer having either "fostered,"
"induced," or otherwise caused the statement to be
made in the first place,
or having adopted,
ratified, or otherwise "endorsed" the statement
after it was made.
In either instance, the issuer
must have "sufficiently entangled itself with the
analysts' [statements] to render [them] attributable
to it."
1991) .
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In re Boston Tech. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D. Mass.
1998) (citations omitted); accord Peri tus Software, 52 F.
Supp. 2d at 230; In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D. Mass. 1999).'
Under this line of authority, courts typically hold that
a so-called "one-way flow of information, from [issuer]
representatives to analysts and from the analysts to their
customers" is not suff~cient "entanglement" to render the
issuer liable for the analysts' statements or projections.
Syntex, 95 F.3d at 934. Those courts which strictly construe
the requirements of the "entanglement" theory require
plaintiffs to allege with particularity the time, place,
content, and speaker of the ~ssuer's communications with the
securities analysts, and explain why the communications were
fraudulent. See Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 73-74 (1st
eire 1997) (declining to reach ultimate issue of whether
action against issuer could lie on basis of analyst
statements, but dismissing case on grounds of plaintiffs I
failure to plead issuer's "entanglement" sufficiently,
indicating that if squarely faced with issue, it might well
permit findings of liability for analyst statements); accord
Peritus Software, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 230; Number Nine Visual,
51 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31. 8
7
See also In re Crown Am. Realty Trust Sec. Litig., No. 95202J, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14609, at *54 (W.O. Pa. Sept. 15, 1997)
(to plead "imputation" theory with sufficient particularity to
avoid dismissal under Rule 9 (b), plaintiffs "'must (1) identify
specific analyst opinions and name the insider who adopted them;
(2) point to specific interactions between the insider and the
analyst which gave rise to the entanglement; and (3) state the
dates on which the acts which allegedly gave rise to the
entanglement occurred'") (citation omitted).

8
See also In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97
Civ. 1865 (HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8061, at *15 n.2, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) "90,235 (S.D.N.Y. May 27,1998) (liThe complaint
alleges that a report published by the firm of Robinson-Humphrey
Co. is attributable to defendants because it was written by a
former CFO of HMS and because the information is of sufficient
detail that it could only have come from defendants. I find that
these allegations do not sufficiently plead with particularity that
defendants so thoroughly I entangled I themselves with such report as
to render them liable for such reports. II) ; DSP Group, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11942, at *27 (IIPlaintiffs have not alleged [with
particularity] which securities analysts provided draft reports to
DSP corporate insiders, when they provided those reports, or which
corporate insiders reviewed and approved the draft reports. II) ;
Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D. Mass. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead "entanglement"
or misstatements of facts to analysts). But see Harvey M. Jasper
Retirement Trust v. Ivax Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1260, 1267 (S.D. Fla.
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Not surprisingly, with a liability standard phrased as
entanglement " or "imprimatur," the courts have experienced
difficulty in determining when an issuer may be held liable
for a securities analyst's statement or projection.
Some
cases addressing the question have held that an issuer who
simply provides background information to a securities analyst
will not be liable for statements in the analyst's subsequent
report.
As Judge Patel explained in Padnes v. Scios Nova
Inc., No. C95-1693 MHP, 1996 WL 539711 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18,
1996) :
II

Here, plaintiffs have pled only that the
analysts' reports were based on information provided
by the defendants.
This, without more, in [sic]
insufficient under the great weight of authority in
this district to attribute third-party statements to
a defendant company. Mere provision of information
cannot amount to entanglement sufficient to sustain
liability under Elkind.

Id. at *10 (citations omitted) .'
On the other hand, in Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, the
SEC held that the following facts constituted "entanglement":
Presstek's manag~ment directly participated in
preparing a report that it knew, or was reckless in
not knowing, included forecasts that were far more
optimistic than Presstek's contemporaneous internal
proj ections.
For example, the PMG Report quoted
management's projection of "a few 100 11 Pearlsetter
sales for 1996. However, Howard and Verrando knew,
or were reckless in not knowing, that Presstek IS
internal forecasts projected only half as many
Pearlsetter sales for 1996 as were forecast in the
PMG Report.
Moreover, in an effort to give added
weight to the inaccurate Pearlsetter forecast,
Howard falsely attributed it to "industry experts."
1995) (IIAt the pleading stage, all plaintiffs need allege is that
defendants provided the information to the securities analyst, upon
which the reports were based. II) .
9
See also In re Rasterops Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-9320349RPA(EAI), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18245, at *9, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1198,231 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994) (II [I]t is not enough
to simply allege that the reports were based on information
provided by the company and that the company received and reviewed
a draft of the report."); O'Sullivan v. Trident Microsystems, No.
C 93-20621 RMW (EAI) , 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17065, at *46, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1198,116 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,1994) ("While the
company may have provided the information on which the reports were
based, this does not mean the company is liable for the contents of
the reports. ") .
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Howard also failed to lower the PMG Reports 1996 or
1997 revenue forecasts to conform them to Presstek's
contemporaneous internal projections.
Although
Howard edited the PMG Report's 1996 EPS projection,
he did not correct its 1997 EPS projection ($2.42),
which far exceeded Presstek I s internal proj ection
($1.34). By revising certain forecasts concerning
Presstek's revenues and earnings, Howard impliedly
represented to PMG that those he did not revise were
accurate.
Id. at *34-35.
"Such involvement by management in the
preparation, review, and editing of the PMG Report establishes
Presstek's liability for the report's forecasts." Id. at *3536.
E.

The

n Condui t n

Theory

The "entanglement" analysis applies where the securities
analyst I s statement forecast is the product of his own work on
which the issuer has placed its imprimatur by entangling
conduct. When plaintiffs allege that the issuer consciously
planted false information with an analyst, so that the analyst
acted as a conduit for introducing the false information into
the market, the company may be liable whether or not it
entangled itself by review of draft reports. In the words of
one recent commentary:
If an issuer intentionally or recklessly
misleads securities analysts, then the analyst
reports are relevant to determine securities fraud
liability. Adoption or entanglement is not required
in such circumstances and an issuer cannot avoid
liability just because the fraud is perpetrated
through thirdparties.
Robert Norman Sobol, The Tangled Web of Issuer Liability for
Analyst Statements: In re Cirrus Logic Securities Litigation,
22 Del. J. Corp. L. 1051, 1057-58 (1997) ("Sobol, Tangled
Web") (footnotes omitted) .10
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the use of
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, " whether
practiced "directly or indirectly."
15 U.S.C. §78j (b) .
Section 20 (b) of the Exchange Act specifies that it is
unlawful for a person "to do any act or thing which it would
be unlawful for such person to do ... through or by means of
any other person." 15 U.S.C. §78t(b). As a result,
[m]anipulation of the prices of securities by the
dissemination of false and misleading information
10
It should be noted that in Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, the
SEC did not address the "conduit" theory of liability.
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through analysts is exactly the type of conduct
section
10(b)
prohibits.
When
an
issuer
communicates
such
misleading
information
to
investment analysts there is an expectation that the
false information will reach the marketplace and
influence prices.
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Sobol, Tangled Web,
omit ted) .11

Id. at 959 (citing Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080-81
(9th Cir. 1995)).
Accord DSP Group, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11942, at *25 (IIIf defendants provided inflated or otherwise
misleading licensing revenue proj ections to the analysts, that
could qualify as misleading the analysts. ") .

In another case, In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Litig., 946 F.
Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the district court observed:
Defendants also argue that they cannot be held
liable for allegedly misleading statements made to
analysts, unless plaintiffs can prove Cirrus's
entanglement with, or adoption of, the analysts'
reports. This is not the law .... The Court finds
that a company may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for
its own intentional or reckless misrepresentations

r

r
r
r

r

(footnote

[I]f defendants intentionally misled securities
analysts and the press in order to stave offaXoma
stock sell off, then these third-party reports would
be relevant to determine Xoma' s securities fraud
liability.
The Complaint asserts that Xoma
intentionally
used
these
third
parties
to
disseminate false information to the investing
public.
If this is true, Xoma cannot escape
liability simply because it carried out its alleged
fraud through the public statements of third
parties.
The Complaint should not have been
dismissed under 12 (b) (6), without a contextual,
"delicate
assessment"
of
the
facts
presented-including the statements of third-party
analysts.

r

r
r

Corp. L. at 1058

In Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996),
the Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of a securities fraud
complaint
which
alleged
that
the
securities
issuer
intentionally used securities analysts and the press to
disseminate false information to the investing public:

r
r
r

r

22 Del. J.

See also Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 307
(D. Mass. 1987) (stating that reliance on the market also includes
reliance on third party statements that just relayed the misstated
information from securities issuers).
11
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to analysts that reach the market, whether or not
the company adopts the resulting analysts' reports.

Id.

at

1466-67.

Similarly,

in Simon v. American Power
416 (D.R.I. 1996), the court
denied a motion to dismiss that part of the complaint alleging
liability for statements made by analysts because
Conversion Co~., 945 F. Supp.

[t]here are sufficient facts to support a finding
that any misstatements in the analysts' reports were
caused by APC's management.
The reports reference
numerous conversations with APC management on the
question of APC's build-up of inventories, during
which APC gave its explanation for the increase in
inventories. From that, it would be reasonable for
the fact-finder to infer that any misrepresentations
in the reports were based on or caused by false or
misleading information obtained directly from APC.
Such causation, if proven, is sufficient to support
APC's liability through the attribution of the
statements.

Id. at 429-30 (footnote omitted) .
In Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.H.
1996), the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss because
[s]ignificantly, the plaintiffs have identified
specific
analyst
statements
and
the
insider
information, sometimes directly quoted, upon which
they allege the statements were based .... Jeffrey
Swartz is alleged to have made direct statements,
excerpted verbatim,
statements of approval of
erroneous projections of outside analysts, and
statements concerning the size and nature of
Timberland's inventory and the demand for its
product.
The plaintiffs next allege, again in
detail,
that the following day Merrill Lynch
directly relied on and incorporated Swartz's remarks
into its report.

Id. at 1312.
It is not unusual for, plaintiffs to allege several
alternative theories of 1ssuer liability for analyst
statements.
See Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1474 (IlPlaintiffs
sufficiently allege that the [analysts'] reports were based on
misleading information provided by Defendants.
Finally,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, without any reasonable
basis, endorsed and adopted each of the analysts' reports by,
among other things, expressing comfort with the third and
fourth quarter earnings estimates contained in one of the
reports. II) (citations omitted); In re Wall Data Sec. Litig.,
No. C95-0528Z, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14052, at *14, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ~99,292 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 1996) (granting
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motion to dismiss as to entanglement theory, but not as to
conduit theory; "Plaintiffs' allegations that the Company made
false and misleading statements to analysts, however, are
relevant to plaintiffs' claim under §10{b) that the Company
made false and misleading statements about acceptance of Wall
Data products and the Company's potential for growth.").
Judge Smith has agreed that

r

[i] t is also possible for liability to attach if
a corporate officer or employee makes false and
misleading statements to an analyst, who then in
good faith incorporates them into his or her report.
Because a company official spoke ... this is a form
of direct liability and does not involve the
imputation of the analyst's statements back to the
company.
Under such a theory, the plaintiff must
"plead with the requisite specificity precisely what
misstatements were made by which defendants to which
analysts,
and
precisely
how
that
specific
misinformation reached the market through a specific
analyst report."
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Crown Am. Realty,

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14609, at *54 n.2
(citations omitted) {quoting Rubin v. Trimble, No. C-95-4353
MMC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14011, at *55-57 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
28, 1997».
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Supreme Court' s
decision in Central Bank, which abolished aiding and abetting
liability, does not foreclose such a theory, at least where
the securities analysts act wittingly.
In Cooper, 137 F.3d
616, where the court reversed dismissal of securities fraud
claims,
the securities issuer argued that "it is not
responsible for the recommendations of securities analysts,
even if it provided information on which the analysts'
assessments were based."
Id. at 623-24. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that it had held in Warshaw, 74
F.3d at 959, that "corporate defendants may be directly liable
under
[Rule]
lOb-S for providing false or misleading
information to third-party securities analysts." Cooper, 137
F.3d at 624.
Further rejecting the issuer's argument that
"Central Bank precludes holding it liable for the analysts'
statements," id., Judge Fletcher stated:
Merisel
is
alleged
to
statements to the analysts
analysts communicate those
This is not aiding and
liability; the complaint
[responsible] for its own
analysts.

have
made
misleading
with the intent that the
statements to the market.
abetting or secondary
alleges that Merisel is
false statements to the

Id.
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Judge Fletcher concluded her analysis of this issue by
stating that
[p]laintiffs' claims ... are not barred by Central
in that they are asserting that Merisel,
through false statements to analysts, and those
analysts, by issuing reports based on statements
they knew were false, together engaged in a scheme
to defraud the shareholders.

Bank

Cooper, 137 F.3d at 625.
F.

Securities Issuer's Review, Correction And/Or
Dissemination Of Securities Analysts' Reports

In Elkind, following a jury trial the Second Circuit
affirmed that the securities issuer, Liggett & Myers, was not
liable for securities analysts' projections. 635 F.2d at 163.
In so holding, it noted that Liggett had hired a public
relations firm in order to specifically encourage "closer
contact between analysts and company management II because
management
II concluded
that
the
company's
stock
was
underpriced, due in part to lack of appreciation in the
financial community for the breadth of its market activity."
Id. at 159.
While the Second Circuit noted that Liggett's
officers had received drafts of analysts'
reports and
corrected them, the court stressed that the company's review
and correction did not extend to forecasts:
[W]e find no reason to reverse as clearly erroneous
the district court's finding that Liggett did not
place its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the
analysts' projections. The company did examine and
comment on a number of reports, but its policy was
to refrain from comment on earnings forecasts.
Testimony at trial indicated that the analysts knew
the were not being made privy to the company's
internal proj ections.
While the evidence leaves
little doubt that Liggett made suggestions as to
factual and descriptive matters in a number of the
reports it reviewed, the record does not compel the
conclusion that this conduct carried a suggestion
that the analysts' projections were consistent with
Liggett's internal estimates....
Thus, Liggett
assumed no duty to disclose its own forecasts or to
warn the analysts (and the public) that their
optimistic view was not shared by the company.

Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted).
Subsequent decisions have reached varying results on the
precise question of whether review and correction of draft
securities analysts' reports by an officer or employer of the
securities issuer constitutes sufficient "entanglement II to
attribute the analysts' statements to the issuer.
In SEC v.
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Wellshire Sec., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 569, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
the court denied a permanent injunction as to two individual
defendants and dissolved an injunction against a corporate
defendant, finding that statements in a broker's market letter
were not attributable to those defendants. The district court
so held even though the brokers sent a draft of a market
letter to the defendants, the defendants corrected the draft
and sent it back to the broker, and the broker then
incorporated that corrected draft into its market letters.
Contrasting the facts of that case with Elkind, the court
wrote:
The facts of the case at bar indicate less
entanglement that in Elkind, where the court was not
inclined to find entanglement because the company's
general policy was not to involve itself with
forecasting.
No evidence has been presented as to
any meetings between the ... defendants and [the
broker] in preparing the drafts at bar or [the]
Market Letters.

Id. at 573.
On the other hand, there are a number of decisions
holding on their particular facts that review and correction
of analysts' draft reports by a securities issuer's officer or
employee is sufficient to constitute entanglement.
For
example, in In re ICN/Viratek Sec. Litig., No. 87 Civ. 4296,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4407, at *10, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'99,213 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1996), where the court denied
defendants' summary judgment motion, Judge Wood noted that
plaintiffs had "submitted evidence indicating not only that
defendants reviewed the PaineWebber report, but also that
defendants did fail to correct factual statements in the
report that they knew were erroneous - while at the same time
making other corrections and additions to the report."
(Emphasis in original.)
The district court contrasted the
facts before the Second Circuit in Elkind, where the
corporation reviewed and commented on an early draft of an
analyst's report but "did not review the actual text of the
final report just prior to issuance," and noted that in the
case at bar, defendants' "review and amendment of the final
draft of the report just 'befor~ its issuance" made a
difference. Id. at *16, *18 (emphasis in original). Accord
Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *35-36 (citing ICN/Viratek
wi th approval) .
In Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), tpe
court denied a motion to dismiss, noting that plaintiffs
alleged "that the analyst who wrote each of .these reports sent
copies to three Quickturn insiders (Lobo, D'Amour and Ostby),
and that all three of these insiders reviewed and approved of
the report during the week prior to the report' s public~tion."
Id. at 1372. See also In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F.
Supp. 1217, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 1994) {denying motion to dismiss
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because plaintiffs made "detailed allegations that Gupta
insiders provided information and guidance to analysts to
assist the analysts in creating forecasts for the company" and
alleged, although generally, "that defendants reviewed and
approved analysts' reports before publication") .
G.

RNa Comment R Policies

Cases that follow Elkind and find defendants not liable
for analysts' forecasts frequently emphasize that the issuer
had a policy of refraining from comment on such forecasts, or
point to statements by the issuer's management distancing the
company from the forecasts. See, e.g., Syntex, 95 F.3d at 934
(affirming dismissal of securities fraud claims;
"when
Defendant Freiman (Syntex's CEO) was asked about the analysts I
predictions related to future earnings per share, Mr. Freiman
stated, 'We don't forecast earnings,' and emphasized that such
estimates should not be attributed to Syntex"). 12
As the
district court noted in Caere:
The only specific statements alleged in the Amended
Complaint which suggest an entanglement are Caere1s
Chief Financial Officer's March 15, 1993, comments
regarding analysts' forecasts, indicating that Caere
did not have "sufficient information" upon which to
base a comment, that "the first quarter is typically
slower, reflecting seasonality in Caere' s business, "
and that "as a result, results for the [first]
quarter are always difficult to predict."
It
strains the intellect to imagine how this statement
could constitute an entanglement.
Caere' s Chief
Financial Officer was not embracing the analysts'
forecasts when she made this statement.
To the
contrary, she was suggesting that the analysts'
forecasts might be overly optimistic.
See also In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp.
1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(granting summary judgment for
defendants as to all statements in analysts' reports; "Rodgers and
Allen both testified that Cypress does not give its forecasts to
analysts and has a policy of not commenting on analysts' forecasts.
Plaintiffs have failed to present any credible evidence that
Cypress ever deviated from this policy during the class period.")
aff'd sub nom. Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9587 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec.
Litig., No. C-89-2493 (A)-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2052, at *1314, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '98,530 (N.D~ Cal. Feb. 8, 1995)
(granting summary judgment for defendants because. Seagate's
president "testified that throughout fiscal 1988, the company had
a
strict policy not to comment upon analysts'
financial
projections.
Analysts themselves confirm Seagate's adherence to
this policy. Plaintiffs fail to present evidepce that defendants
departed from their policy of not commenting on analysts'
forecasts."), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1996).
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837 F. Supp. at 1060; see also Cirrus Logic, 946 F. Supp. at
1466 (granting summary judgment for company defendants for
liability on opinions contained in 32 analyst reports; company
personnel who were authorized by internal policy to talk with
analysts stated that "they never commented on analysts'
financial proj ections, and never provided to analysts internal
earnings or revenue forecasts or other specific financial
guidance") .
As a result of plaintiffs' claims of issuer liability for
statements or projections contained in securities analysts'
reports, some issuers have reassessed their policies regarding
corporate communications with analysts. See Dal'3 E. Barnes,

Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great Expectations: Risk Management
Through Risk Disclosures, 1 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 155, 182

(1994) (citing to various articles indicating that companies
such as Exabyte Corp., Software Toolworks and Oracle Systems
Corp. now have stringent guidelines on the content and manner
of such communications as a result of securities litigation
involving those companies).

H.

"Adoption" Or "Ratification" Of Analysts'
Reports

While in Elkind the Second Circuit addressed prepublication "entanglement," several cases hold that an issuer
can be held liable for post-publication adoption or
ratification of a
securities
analyst's
statement
or
projection.
See Sobol, Tangled Web, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. at
1065 (distinguishing "[p]republication entanglement" from
post-publication "adoption" of analysts'
statements or
projections); Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29-33 (same) i
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that use of word "comfortable" by
corporate officer in regard to his views of certain analysts'
estimates clearly evidenced adoption) .
For example, a securities issuer might ratify, endorse,
or adopt an analyst's report (including presumably any
forecasts contained therein) by distributing copies of the
report to shareholders or potential investors:
The act of circulating the reports amounts to an
implied
representation
that
the
information
contained in the reports is accurate or reflects the
company's views....
By passing out the favorable
analyst reports, Rasterops was clearly imply~ng that
the company agreed with the forecasts contained in
the reports.

Rasterops, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18245, at *10, *11 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 31, 1994) (denying motion to dismiss and noting that
plaintiff alleged that "the company provided false information
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to the [securities] analysts and approved drafts
reports") .13 As the SEC recently concurred:

of

the

In
the
Commission's view,
under
certain
circumstances an issuer that disseminates false
third party reports may adopt the contents of those
reports and be fully liable for the misstatements
contained in them, even if it had no role whatsoever
in the preparation of the report.
If an issuer
knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the
information it distributes is false or misleading,
it cannot be insulated from liability because
management was not actively involved in the
preparation of that infonnation.
Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *33-34; see also Id. at *38
(citing Rasterops opinion with approval) .
In Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1115, Judge Pro granted
defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims based upon
the "entanglement" theory, finding that the complaint "fail [s]
to allege specific interactions between the insider and the
analyst giving rise to the entanglement, or allege when these
interactions occurred."
Id.
However, the court reached a
different conclusion as to other allegations:
Plaintiffs also point to two facsimile cover
sheets from an analyst to [Stratosphere chief
financial officer] Lettero for the proposition that
Lettero endorsed or approved the reports, and allege
that certain analysts testified in depositions that
Lettero was sent drafts of letters and sent drafts
of reports prior to issuance by the analysts.
Plaintiffs also contend that Stratosphere and the
Individual
Defendants
distributed
copies
of
analysts'
reports and/or provided a
list of
analysts' coverage of Stratosphere in the packages
that the company sent to potential investors. These
alle~ations are sufficient
to meet the pleading
requ~rements for liability, and this Court does not
dismiss liability based on these claims.

Id. at 1115-16.

See also Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017 RPA,
1995 u. S. Dist. LEXIS 19343, at *31 (N. D,. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995)
(stating that "[i]n addition to pre-publication entangl~ment ...
this Court has held that a company may also be liable if it
ratifies an analysts' report after the report has been published,"
but granting motion to dismiss because plaintiffs failed to alleged
which reports were circulated by defendants, which defendant
circulated reports and to whom reports were circulated).
13
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In Stack v. Lobo, No. 95-20049SW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19966, at *24 (N. D. Cal. Apr. 19, 1995), Judge Williams
observed that
II [b] Y
reproducing and
including
these
[securities analysts'] reports in their own stockholder
informational materials,
Quickturn may have
impliedly
represented that the information contained in those reports
was accurate or reflected the company' [s] own views II ; however,
the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss because
plaintiffs did II not identify the particular
'investor
relations package' or provide the date on which it was sent
out. II
In a later opinion in the same case, however, the
district court seemed to reconsider its earlier ruling and
found plaintiffs' allegations to· be sufficient, thereby
denying defendants' motion to dismiss as to securities
analysts' reports that had been included in investor relations
packets:
Plaintiffs here have pled sufficient facts with
regard to the investor relations package to satisfy
Rule 9 (b) .
Plaintiffs allege that specific
Quickturn insiders approved the
inclusion of
specific analysts' reports and brochures in the
package.
Requiring Plaintiffs to identify each
package that was sent out and the date on which it
was sent would be unduly burdensome and unrealistic.
Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1374.
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INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995 (the "Refonn Act") in
December 1995 to provide "protections to discourage frivolous [securities] litigation." H.R., Conf. Rep.
No. 104-369, 104m Cong., 1'1 Sess. at 32 (1995) (Nov. 28, 1995). The Refonn Act contains provisions
intended to combat certain abusive practices associated with private securities Iitigation. 2 Yet, as we
move into the fourth year since the Refonn Act was enacted, the resulting landscape appears very
different from the one that Congress envisioned. Studies conducted since the passage of the Refonn Act
show the following:
Increase in securities class actions in state court
Overall increase in litigation rates
Inconsistent interpretations of the 1995 Refonn Act's pleading standard
Long delays in case disposition
Higher defense and settlement costs3
Congress recently attempted to counteract some of these effects by changing the legislative
history of the Refonn Act by adding comments into the legislative history of the Securities Litigation
Unifonn Standards Act of 1998 (the "Unifonn Standards Act") (P.L. 105-353). The goal ofthe Unifonn
Standards Act is to prevent certain state private securities class actions alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the goals of the Refonn Act. The legislative history of the Unifonn Standards Act directs
federal courts to interpret the pleading standards of the Refonn Act as. unchanged from the pre-Reform
Act law. Through this mechanism, Congress sought to halt the wave of cases being channeled into state
courts and create clarity and consistency in pleading standards.

Mr. Allingham is a partner in the Wilmington, Delaware office of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & F10m LLP. He wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of Rosemary
Goodier, also of that office, in the preparation of this outline.
Among the abusive practices identified by Congress were: the routine of filing la",:suits
against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an
issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with
only faint hope that the discovery process would lead to a plausible cause of action;
targeting of deep pocket defendants (accountants, underwriters, and individuals who
might have insurance coverage) without regard to their actual culpability; and abuse of
the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it becomes more economical to
settle.
See generally Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse Website
http://securities.stanford.edu; see also Joseph A. Grundfest et aI., Securities Class Action
Litigation in Ql 1998: A Report to NASDO from the Stanford Law School Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse 1070 PLVCorp 71 (June 2, 1998).

r
r
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This outline addresses four aspects of the cases being litigated under the Reform Act: (I)
requirements for pleading facts sufficient to raise a "strong inference" of scienter; (2) pleading
misrepresentations with particularity; (3) the safe harbor for forward-looking statements; and (4) the
"limited" discovery rules and their effect on securities litigation. Additionally, the outline examines key
provisions of the Uniform Standards Act.
II.

THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
A.

Pleading Scienter Under The Reform Act
1.

,

The Reform Act Language: The Reform Act purported to clarify the
allegations necessary to satisfy the scienter element of a securities fraud claim. It
provides:
Required State of Mind: In any private action arising under this
chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only
on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.
15 U.S.C. S78u-4(b)(2)

2.

A Split of Authority Developed on the Pleading Standard
(a)

Pre-Reform Act split on the definition of recklessness: Prior to the
enactment of the Reform Act, lower courts held that "recklessness" was a
permissible basis for pleading scienter -- an issue the Supreme Court had
previously reserved when it decided that negligent conduct alone could
not create liability in § IO(b) and Rule 1O(b)(5) causes of action. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). After the Hochfelder
decision, lower courts held that recklessness was sufficient to cause
liability, but they were not in agreement with respect to the definition of
recklessness. As discussed below, this issue has been revisited in the
cases interpreting the heightened pleading requirements of the Reform
Act.

(b)

The Second Circuit standard before the Reform Act: Before the
Reform Act, the Second Circuit standard was widely regarded as
imposing the toughest pleading standard on plaintiffs, and it was this
standard that many believe was codified by the Reform Act. The preReform Act standard in the Second Circuit required that the facts alleged
in the complaint give rise to a "strong inference of fraudulent intent." In
re Time Warner. Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) citing
O'Brien v. Nat'l Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (F.2d Cir.
1991) (internal quotations omitted). Two tests were established by the

n

...
I

G- 2

r
r

Second Circuit under which a plaintiff might plead "scienter" without
direct knowledge of the defendants' state of mind:

r
r
r
r
r
r

(i)

The "motive and opportunity" test under which plaintiffs
could plead scienter by alleging facts demonstrating both
motive and opportunity to commit fraud. In re Time
Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig.. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).

(ii)

The "strong circumstantial evidence" test under which
plaintiffs could plead scienter by alleging facts
constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior. Id.

(c)

r
r
r
r

r

r
r
r

3.

Three interpretations of the Reform Act's pleading standard: Since
the enactment of the Reform Act, courts have struggled to interpret the
appropriate pleading standard. The courts are split over whether the
Reform Act should be read to codifY the Second Circuit standard or raise
the pleading standard further. Generally, the district and circuit courts
have adopted one of three approaches: (1) they have treated the Reform
Act as having codified the previous standards in effect in the Second
Circuit; (2) they have modified the Second Circuit standard holding that
the Reform Act adopted a pleading standard more stringent than that of
the Second Circuit, but that some form of recklessness remains a
substantive basis for pleading scienter; and (3) they have wholly
departed from the Second Circuit standard, holding that Congress
intended to include only complaints that contain strong circumstantial
evidence of "heightened recklessness."

Recent Case Law
(a)

Cases carrying over the existing Second Circuit Standard: The
Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have interpreted the Reform Act
pleading standards as carrying over the standard in effect in the Second
Circuit at the time the Reform Act was enacted. See Williams v. WMX
Tech. Inc., 12 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.,
180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166
F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). See also, Epstein v. Itron Inc., 993 F. Supp.
1314 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Robertson v. Strassner, 32 F. Supp. 2d 443,
447 (S.D. Tex. 1998); In re Wellcare Management Group, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 964 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.N.Y.l997).
(i)

In Press, the court found that the complaint's motiveand-opportunity allegations were sufficient. The court
articulated its reluctance to raise the bar for pleadings
further:

r

r
r
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[W]e are not inclined to create a nearly
impossible pleading standard when the 'intent' of
a corporation is at issue.... [A heightened
requirement of motive] would make virtually
impossible a plaintiffs ability to plead scienter
in a financial transaction involving a
corporation, institution, bank or the like that did
not involve specifically greedy comments from
an authorized corporate individual.

...

Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
(ii)

(b)

In Advanta, the Third Circuit concluded that the Reform
Act's pleading standard is approximately equal to the
Second Circuit's old standard, but the court pointed out
that the "with particularity" provision represented a
difference. Therefore, even though the scienter
requirement itself remains unchanged, the "particularity"
provision raises the bar for plaintiffs over the standard of
pre-Reform Act law. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
"Motive and opportunity, like all other allegations of
scienter (intentional, conscious, or reckless behavior),
must now be supported by facts stated 'with particularity'
and must give a 'strong inference' of scienter." Id. at 535
(citations omitted).

-

Cases modifying the Second Circuit standard to hold that allegations
of intent without more will not give rise to a presumption of intent:
The second line of cases (arising in the First, Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits) has modified the Second Circuit standard, rejecting the
sufficiency of allegations of mere motive and opportunity, but accepting
as well-pleaded, a complaint that alleges strong circumstantial evidence
of recklessness. See In re Comshare. Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550
(6th Cir. 1999); Greebel v. FTP Software. Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1 st Cir.
1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands. Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11 th Cir. 1999).
(i)

Acknowledging disagreement with Advanta, the Sixth
Circuit in Comshare wrote, "[W]e cannot agree that
under the [Reform Act], plaintiffs may establish a
'strong inference' of scienter merely by alleging facts
demonstrating motive and opportunity where those facts
do not simultaneously establish that the defendants acted
recklessly or knowingly, or with the requisite state of
mind." Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.

(ii)

Recently, the First Circuit expressly stated that its view
of the issue tracks that of the Sixth Circuit. Greebel, 194
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F.3d at 197. The court found the legislative history
inconclusive on whether the Refonn Act was meant to
embody or reject the Second Circuit's pleading standard.
Id. at 195. The court held:

r

r

Congress has effectively mandated a special
standard for measuring whether allegations of
scienter survive a motion to dismiss. While
under Rule 12(b)(6) all inferences must be
drawn in plaintiffs' favor, inferences of scienter
do not survive if they are merely reasonable, as
is true when pleadings for other causes of action
are tested by motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). Rather, inferences of scienter survive
a motion to dismiss only if they are both
reasonable and "strong" inferences.

r
r
r,

Id. at 195-96 (citation omitted). The Court further commented
that:

r
r

In the guise of tinkering with procedural
requirements, Congress has effectively, for
policy reasons, made it substantively harder for
plaintiffs to bring securities fraud cases, through
the "strong inference" of scienter requirement.

r

Id. at 196 n. 9.

r

(iii)

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
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(c)

The Eleventh Circuit recently also adopted this middleof-the-road approach. Bryant 187 F.3d at 1283. The
court held that "the Refonn Act does not prohibit the
practice of alleging scienter by pleading facts that denote
severe recklessness, the standard previously approved of
by this Circuit; but we also hold that the Refonn Act
does not codify the 'motive and opportunity' test
fonnulated by the Second Circuit." Id.

Cases Rejecting the Second Circuit Standard and Requiring a New
Higher Standard: A third line of cases, led by a divided Ninth Circuit
panel in In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999),
applies the most stringent pleading standard. The Ninth Circuit held that
to raise a "strong inference" of intent, not only are allegations of motive
and opportunity insufficient, but circumstantial evidence of "mere
recklessness" is also insufficient. Id. at 974. Although the Ninth Circuit's
requirement of "heightened recklessness" seems to constitute a
substantive change in the law of scienter, the court did not phrase it as

G-5

....
such. The court pointed to a distinction between a "reasonable inference"
and the Refonn Act's "strong inference," saying,
We hold that although facts showing mere recklessness
or a motive to commit fraud and opportunity to do so may
provide some reasonable inference of intent, they are not
sufficient to establish a strong inference of deliberate
recklessness. In order to show a strong inference of deliberate
recklessness, plaintiffs must state facts that come closer to
demonstrating intent as opposed to mere motive and opportunity.
Accordingly, we hold that particular facts giving rise to a strong
inference of deliberate recklessness, at a minimum, is required to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard under the [Refonn Act].
Id. See also Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Ca1.1997); Friedberg
v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Norway
Venture Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
4,

B.

-

Congress Attempts to Influence Judicial Construction of the Reform Act
Through The Legislative History of the Uniform Standards Act: In 1998,
Congress attempted to shed light retrospectively on the legislative intent
underlying the Refonn Act. In connection with the Unifonn Standards Act, the
bill's sponsors, the SEC, and the White House agreed to insert language into the
legislative history suggesting that the Refonn Act did not intend to rule out
recklessness as a basis for scienter. (See infra III.B.) As discussed below, the
courts are divided over the weight to be given to this post hoc addition to the
"legislative history" ofthe Refonn Act.

Pleading Misleading Statements With Particularity

1.

The Reform Act Language: Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
already requires particularity in pleading fraud claims, the Refonn Act addressed
claims made on "infonnation and belief' against individual officers and directors,
and on claims requiring heightened pleading of scienter (discussed above). The
Refonn Act states:
Misleading statements and omissions: In any private action
arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant-- (A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, ... and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
infonnation and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is fonned.
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15 U.S.c. § 78u-4(b)(1).

2.

Pre-Reform Act Interpretations: Similar to the Reform Act language, prior to
the Reform Act, the Ninth Circuit had required that plaintiffs not only identify
the allegedly false and misleading statements, but also that the complaint explain
why the statements were misleading. See. e.g., In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42
F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Queen Uno L.P. v. D'Alene Mines
Corp.,2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (D. Colo. 1998) (Reform Act is in large part a
codification of preexisting 10th Circuit law). However, some cases viewed the
standard as "relaxed" where the facts were particularly within defendants'
control, despite the fact that Rule 9(b) requires that facts based on information
and belief set forth the basis for the belief. See. e.g., In re Burlington Coat
Factoty Sec. Litig., 114F.3d 1410, 1417-18 (3dCir. 1997);Vento&Co.v.
Metromedia Fiber Network. Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,460, at
92,160 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,1999).

3.

Since the Reform Act was Enacted, Many Courts Continue to Accept the
"Relaxed" Standard even though many commentators believe that the Reform
Act called for a heightened standard. 4 See. e.g., Queen Uno Ltd., 2 F. Supp. 2d
at 1354 ("Although Plaintiffs could have stated they were seeking to plead on
information and belief, and consequently sought entitlement to an assumed
relaxation of the Reform Act's particularity requirements, they have not done
so"); Howard Gunty Profit Sharing Plan v. Quantum Corp., No. 9620711 SW,
1997 WL 514993, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997) ("Because Plaintiffs'
allegations [based on 'investigation of counse!'] are not based on information and
belief, the Court will not relax the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)").

r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

(a)

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

4

Pleading on "information and beUer' since the Reform Act: Some
courts have adopted a very narrow reading of the Reform Act, holding
that a complaint is not pleaded on "information and belief' unless the
plaintiff expressly says so. See. e.g., Howard Gunty Profit Sharing Plan
v. Ouantum Corp., No. 96 20711 SW, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6,
1998). Others courts have taken a broader approach, holding that if facts
are not pleaded as within the plaintiffs personal knowledge, they
necessarily are pleaded on "information and belief." See. e.g., In re
Boston Tech. Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43,53 (D. Mass. 1998)
(referring to pleading on information and belief "either explicitly or
implicitly"); Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. 96-Civ-1514 PHX RCV,
1998 WL 1018624 at *16 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998) (requiring specific
statement of sources underlying allegations pertaining to meeting where
"Plaintiffs have no apparent first-hand knowledge of the meeting").

See e.g., James B. Weidner, 1999 Update -- Pleading Motions under the Reform Act,
1136 PLI/Corp 61 (1999); Jonathan C. Dickey, et aI., Developments in Securities
Litigation and SEC Enforcement Actions, ALA-ABA Course of Study, July 22, 1999.
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(b)

(c)

4.

Pleading based on "investigation of counsel": Discrepancies also
exists as to whether statements alleged based on "investigation of
counsel" are based on "infonnation and belief." Some courts take the
position that any allegations not made on personal knowledge are, by
necessity, made on "infonnation and belief." In Havenick v. Network,
Express, Inc., the court held that "the law now requires a plaintiff to
draw a specific nexus between the allegedly fraudulent statements and
the facts upon which the allegation of fraud is dependent, or, at least, a
clear statement of why and how the plaintiff has reached the conclusion
that a particular statement is fraudulent." 981 F. Supp. 480, 526 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (complaint alleged on investigation of counsel). Other
courts have held that allegations based on investigation of counsel are
not pleaded on infonnation and belief. See, e.g., Queen Uno Ltd., 2 F.
Supp. 2d at 1353; Wannan v. Overland Data Inc., No. 97CV833 JM,
1998 WL 110018, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1998); Schlagel v. Learning
Tree Int'l, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,403, at
91,814 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23,1998); Howard Gunty, 1997 WL 514993,
at *3.

-

Importance of the interpretation: If plaintiffs are required to set forth
the basis for their fraud allegations, the lack of factual support for many
allegations would be readily apparent, exposing such allegations
(particularly scienter allegations) as little more than plaintiffs' own
guesswork -- and subject, therefore, to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. (This, in turn, itself, has important ramifications. See infra
n.B.5) Moreover, a very strict reading of the infonnation and belief
pleading standard would require plaintiffs to divulge confidential
sources, such as fonner employees or consultants, which plaintiffs may
be quite reluctant to do. One trial court held that plaintiffs must name
sources when pleading on infonnation and belief. See Lirette v. Shiva
Corp., 999 F. Supp. 164, 165 (D. Mass. 1998) (dismissing complaint and
requiring plaintiffs to "specify, as to each particular allegation (Le., every
sentence or clause separated by a comma or conjunction), whether that
allegation is made upon infonnation and belief or is supported by some
document or statement on personal knowledge by a potential witness"
and explaining that, "[a]s to statements made upon infonnation and
belief, the Court will assure that the factual avennents set out 'with
particularity all the facts upon which the belief is fonned' "). Another
court reached the opposite conclusion. In re Digi Int'l Sec. Litig., 6 F.
Supp.2d 1089, 1096-97 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that pleading on
infonnation and belief does not require disclosure of underlying
evidence).

The "Group Published" Pleading Doctrine: Prior to the Refonn Act, the
group-published doctrine essentially replaced the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b) with a presumption that infonnation contained in certain documents,
such as prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, and SEC filings,
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was part of a collective work. A plaintiff invoking the group-published doctrine
did not need to attribute an allegedly false or misleading statement directly to a
defendant, but instead only had to allege that the defendant "either participated in
the day-to-day corporate activities or had a special relationship with the
corporation, such as participation in preparing or communicating group
infonnation at particular times." See, e.g., Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F.
Supp. 1342, 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting In re GlenFed. Inc., 60 F.3d 591,
593 (9th Cir. 1995».

r

,..
t

r

(a)

Some Post-Reform Act courts hold the group-published doctrine
abolished: Since the enactment of the Refonn Act, some courts have
held that the group-published doctrine is no longer valid, noting that the
Refonn Act requires a plaintiff to make specific allegations as to each
defendant. See, e.g., Mara v. Tele-Save Holdings, Inc., 1999 WL 317103
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 1999) (concluding that the presumptions inherent in
group pleading are inconsistent with the Refonn Act's purposes); Allison
v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp. at 1350 ("To pennit ajudicial
presumption as to particularity simply cannot be reconciled with the
statutory mandate that plaintiffs must plead specific facts as to each act
or omission by the defendant").

(b)

Some Post-Reform Act courts continue to apply the doctrine: Other
courts continue to apply the group-published doctrine to sustain
complaints that do not specify the precise connection between a
defendant and the alleged misstatement or omission. In re Bankamerica
Corp. Sec. Litig.,1999 WL 1211839 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1999) (holding
that the doctrine has nothing to do with scienter; rather, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the contents of certain documents are attributable to
officers and directors, which is not inconsistent with the Refonn Act);
Schlagel, , 90,403, at 91,815-16 (leaving it up to defendants' to identif):
which executives made which statements); accord, ~, In re Digi Int'l
Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1101; Zuckennan v. Foxmeyer Health Corp.,
4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Robertson v. Strassner, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 443,446 (S.D. Tex. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig.,
1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (D. Nev. 1998).

(c)

Some Post-Reform Act courts apply a modified doctrine: Still other
courts have applied a modified group-published doctrine requiring
plaintiffs to plead with particularity defendants' participation in the dayto-day control of the corporation and their participation in the
preparation of the allegedly false statements. In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig.,
No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. July 1,
1997»; Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-20021 JW, 1998 WL
78120, at * 10-11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1998).

r

r
r
r

r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

5.

What Evidence The Court May Consider On Motions to Dismiss: Prior to
the Refonn Act, most courts held that it was proper to consider copies of

r

r
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documents specifically mentioned in the complaint, such as 10-Qs, press
releases, analyst reports, etc. Although the Refonn Act does not address this
subject, following the enactment of the Refonn Act, defendants have sought to
have other items considered at the pleadings stage, such as Fonn 4's reflecting
defendants' trading, stock price data, proxy statements showing total holdings by
defendants, transcripts of analyst conference calls, etc.
(a)

(b)

C,

Judicial notice of SEC filings: Recently, in Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 FJd 1271, 1275-76 (lIth Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the trial court grant of a motion to strike exhibits because
defendants included matters outside the pleadings. Included among the
documents that the court held were improperly stricken were Fonn 4s.
Id. at 1275 n. 5 The court held that it may judicially notice documents
that are required to be and actually are filed with the SEC, and that such
action is consistent with the aim of the Refonn Act -- to curb abusive
securities litigation. Id. at 1278 (noting that an important component of
achieving Congress' goal is to structure litigation to pennit dismissal at
the earliest feasible stage of litigation).
Trial courts have also allowed documents referenced in the complaint to
be considered. In PIeV\' v. Haggerty. 38 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820-21 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), the court considered a variety of SEC filings, press releases,
etc., on the grounds that they were generally averred to have been part of
the plaintiffs "basis of allegations." In Polk v. Fritz, No. C-96-2712
MHP, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1998), the court agreed to consider
auditors' workpapers. See Rhodes v. Omega Research, Inc., 38 F. Supp.
2d 1353, 1358 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1999) Uudicial notice of newspaper articles
not cited in complaint proper).

-

-

The Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements

1.

Background
(a)

SEC attempts to encourage publication of forward-looking
statements: Rule 175 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")
and Rule 3b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")
created a safe harbor protection for certain specific forward-looking
statements. These rules, which applied only to statements made,
reaffinned or later published in documents filed with the SEC, added
additional pleading and proof burdens, and shielded defendants from
securities claims where the forward-looking statements were made in
good faith and with a reasonable basis. Although the issuer was not
required to state the assumptions underlying the covered statements, the
assumptions, if stated, would also fall within the scope of the safe
harbor. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6084,44 F.R. 33810
(June 25, 1979). Nevertheless, issuers were reluctant to take advantage
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of the safe harbor, and the rules did not spur the quantity or quality of
forward-looking disclosures that the SEC had desired.
(b)

"The bespeaks caution" doctrine: The judicially-created "bespeaks
caution" doctrine provided issuers with additional protection against
securities claims based on allegedly false and misleading forwardlooking statements. The doctrine holds that certain types of predictions
may be rendered immaterial as a matter of law if accompanied by
appropriately specific cautionary language. As articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in 1994, "the doctrine, when properly construed, merely
represents the pragmatic application of two fundamental concepts in the
law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance." In re Worlds of
Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Boeing
Sec. Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169-72 (W.D. Wash. 1998). The
doctrine has been widely accepted in the courts. See, e.g., Parnes v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 548 (8th Cir. 1997); Grossman v.
Novell, 120F.3d 1112,1121 (lOthCir.1997);Olkeyv. Hyperion 1999
Tenn Trust. Inc., 98 FJd 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1996); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20
F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993); Romani v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson &
Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 1991); Rhodes v. Omega
Research. Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363-1364 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
(i)

Although courts have widely accepted the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine, they have differed in the extent to
which they take into account the defendant's good faith
or reasonable belief in the truth of the statement. Thus,
for example, in In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities
Litigation, 7 F.3d at 372, the court affinned the District
Court's dismissal of an action based on the "abundant
and meaningful cautionary language contained in the
prospectus." See also Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group. Inc.,
991 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding an
investor's recklessness may preclude recovery for false
and misleading statements and declining to impose
liability for allegedly false and misleading oral
statements where prospectus and partnership brochure
disclosed the risks of the venture). In contrast, in Mayer
v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639-41 (6th Cir. 1993), the
court held that an action should not have been dismissed
based solely on the presence of cautionary statements
because "[m]aterial statements which contain the
speaker's opinion are actionable under Section 1O(b) of
the ... Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the
opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded."
See also Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 168 (5th

r
r
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Cir. 1994) ("The appropriate inquiry is whether, under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact or the prediction
without a reasonable basis 'is one [that] a reasonable
investor would consider significant in [making] the
decision to invest, such that it alters the total mix of
infonnation available about the proposed investment"').
(ii)

2.

Variation also exists as to how closely the cautionary
language must correlate to the challenged forwardlooking statement in order to "bespeak caution." Some
courts required that the cautionary statements be
"substantive and tailored to the specific future
projections, estimates or opinions" challenged by
plaintiffs. E.g., Kline v. First Western Government
Securities, Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir.). Others took
a broader view, holding that cautionary statements in
one document may shield forward-looking statements in
other documents. E.g., Grossman v. Novell, 120 F.3d at
1121. The Ninth Circuit has drawn a distinction between
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine and the "truth-on-themarket" defense, noting that truth-on-the-market
requires the disclosed infonnation to have entered the
market in such a way as to "counterbalance" the alleged
misstatements, whereas the "bespeaks caution" doctrine
focuses on whether cautionary language in a particular
document is sufficient to render the "total mix of
infonnation" not misleading. See Provenz v. Miller, 102
F.3d 1478, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1996).

-

The Statutory Safe Harbor Under the Reform Act: Congress included as part
of the Refonn Act a statutory safe harbor for certain forward-looking statements.
By reducing the threat of liability, Congress sought to increase the quantity and
quality of forward-looking infonnation disseminated to investors. See H.R. Rep.
No. 105-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. at 43 (Joint Explanatory Statement Of The
Committee Of Conference) (Nov. 28, 1995).
(a)

(b)

The safe harbor codifies parts of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine
(Conference Report at 43), and immunizes forward-looking statements
that are "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially ...."
15 U.S.C. S 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
Under the safe harbor, oral statements may also qualify for
protection if they (1) identify the statement as forward-looking; (2) state
that actual results could differ materially; and (3) identify a "readily
available" written document containing additional factors that could
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cause results to differ materially from the forward-looking statement. 15
U.S.c. S 78u-5(b)(2).
(c)

No duty to update: The safe harbor expressly disclaims imposing any
duty to update any forward-looking statements. 15 U.S.C. S 78u- 5(d).
There may, however, be a duty to update if a statement's terms imply
continuing validity, but subsequent events render the initial statement
false or materially misleading. See. e.g., Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,
910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane).

(d)

Recent Cases

r
r
r

(i)

Courts applying the statutory safe harbor have indicated
that a company need not identify "all" factors that might
affect the validity of a projection, as long as it discloses
some of them. See. e.g., Rasheedi v. Cree Research.
Inc., No. 1:96CV000890, 1997 WL 785720, at *1-*2
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1997). Many courts have applied the
safe harbor to dismiss claims based on allegedly false or
misleading forward-looking statements. See. e.g., P.
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 546, 556-557 (D.N.J. 1999).

(ii)

However, as was true under the judicially created
"bespeaks caution" doctrine, general "boilerplate"
warnings will not suffice to immunize a forward-looking
statement. See. e.g., Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp.
1449, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998), affd, 182 FJd 799 (lIth
Cir. 1999). Thus, in several Reform Act cases, trial
courts have denied motions to dismiss, rmding that the
cautionary statements were not sufficiently particular.
See In re PLC Sys.. Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106,
121 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Stratosphere Sec. Litig., 1 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1117-18 (D. Nev. 1998); In re Employee
Solutions Sec. Litig., No. CIV 97 545 PHX RGS, 1998
WL 1031506, at *4-*5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 1998); In re
Boeing Securities Litigation, 1998 WL 1012783, at *6-

r

r
r
r

r
r

r
r

r
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r
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7.
(iii)

A few courts have held that claims based on forwardlooking statements should be dismissed for failure to
allege "actual knowledge." See. e.g., Hockey v.
Medhekar, No. C-96-0815, 1997 WL 203704, at *9-*10
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1997); In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 97-CV-4343, 1998 WL 387595, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. July 9, 1998), affd, 180 FJd 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
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3.

Impact of the Safe Harbor: The prevailing view thus far has been that the
statutory safe harbor has not had the desired effect of increasing the quantity or
quality of published forward-looking infonnation. See Committee on Securities
Regulation, Forward-Looking Statements and Cautionary Language After the
1995 Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act, The Record, Vol. 53, No.6 at 726
(NovlDec. 1998) (citation omitted).

(a)

(b)

D.

Quantity of information: Although issuers appear to be relying on the
safe harbor in making oral statements, it seems that companies are
continuing to rely on such oral statements in communicating to analysts
and institutional investors, thereby taking advantage of the ability to
cross-reference published risk disclosures to immunize th.eir oral
statements, but not making significant additional written disclosure. The
ease of shielding oral statements minimizes the incentives for companies
to make written forward-looking statements, as there is no institutional
pressure to do so. A recent study has concluded that there was "no
meaningful change in the nature or extent of written forward-looking
statements" as a result of the Refonn Act. Id. at 736.
Quality of information: The SEC has criticized the cautionary
language used in various disclosure documents as "boilerplate" and
overly general, and has indicated a desire to see companies provide more
forward-looking infonnation and improve the quality of the cautionary
statements. Id. at 728. Many companies continue to be reluctant to
disclose extensive forward-looking infonnation because of confusion in
the courts as to what constitutes "meaningful" cautionary statements
sufficient to immunize a forward-looking statement. Because the Refonn
Act codified a version of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, courts may
rely on pre-Refonn Act precedent, which, as described above, imposed
varying standards of what types of warnings are sufficient to immunize a
predictive statement. Also, the safe harbor does not apply to actions
brought by the SEC, leaving companies open to enforcement actions.
Moreover, the Refonn Act applies only to federal claims, so issuers
remained subject to liability under state law.

Discovery Limitations Imposed By The Reform Act
Reform Act language: The Refonn Act provides for a stay of discovery until
after pending motions to dismiss or other challenges to the sufficiency of the
complaint are decided. Specifically, the Refonn Act provides:
Stay of discovery; preservation of evidence
(1) In general In any private action arising under this subchapter,
all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds, upon
the motion of any party, that particularized discovery is
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necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
that party.
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(2) Preservation of evidence During the pendency of any stay of
discovery pursuant to this subsection, unless otherwise ordered
by the court, any party to the action with actual notice of the
allegations contained in the complaint shall treat all documents,
data compilations (including electronically recorded or stored
data), and tangible objects that are in the custody or control of
such person and that are relevant to the allegations, as if they
were the subject of a continuing request for production of
documents from an opposing party under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(3) Sanctions for willful violation A party aggrieved by the
willful failure of an opposing party to comply with paragraph (2)
may apply to the court for an order awarding appropriate
sanctions.
15 U.S.C. S 77z-1(b).

2.

Since the Refonn Act was enacted, plaintiffs have sought relief from the
discovery stay provisions; however, most of these efforts have been denied. See
~, Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (staying all discovery
during the pendency ofa motion for reconsideration); Novak v. Kasaks, C.A. No.
96 CIV 3073, 1996 WL 467534 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996); In re Trump Hotel
Shareholder Derivative Litig., No. 96 CIV 7820, 1997 WL 442135 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug 5, 1997) (fmding that stay apples to all Exchange claims including § 14(a)
claim alleged in complaint with a derivative claim).
(a)

In Hockey v. Medhekar, 932 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for some discovery. The court ruled that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the "automatic disclosures" required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court, holding that any discovery is unavailable until after the
resolution of motions to dismiss because Congress intended to prevent
plaintiffs from filing first and then searching for evidence to support
their claims. Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 FJd 325 (9 th
Cir. 1996).

(b)

Although the discovery-stay provision states that discovery may be
granted on a showing of "undue prejudice," the standard is diffIcult to
meet.

r
r
r

r
r

(i)

In sa Cowen Securities Corp. v. United States Dist.
Court, 189 FJd 909 (9 th Cir. 1999), the court reversed
the lower court's grant of limited discovery where the

r
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plaintiffs claimed failure to allow the discovery would
result in "undue prejudice." The court held that
"[d]istilled to its essence, the district court granted
plaintiffs leave to conduct discovery so that they might
uncover facts sufficient to satisfy the [Refonn] Act's
pleading requirements. This is not a pennissible reason
for lifting the discovery stay under the Act." Id. at 912.
The court further held that the Refonn Act "clearly
contemplates that 'discovery should be pennitted in
securities class actions only after the court has sustained
the legal sufficiency of the complaint.'" Id. at 912-13.
(ii)

(iii)

A similar result has been reached in many other courts.
See. e.g., Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding "particularized discovery"
requirement linked to both undue-prejudice and
preservation-of-evidence exceptions to stay); Powers v.
Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233, 234-36 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(construing statutory tenn "pendency" broadly to
prohibit discovery during district court's detennination
on motion to dismiss, any motions for reconsideration,
and any interlocutory appeal, noting that if plaintiffs
wanted to plead prejudice due to lack of discovery, they
had to point to "particular circumstances or evidence");
Medical Imaging Ctrs. of Am.. Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917
F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting "destruction"
language refers primarily to possible death of witness,
and undue prejudice standard requires a plaintiff to
establish "unique" need for discovery); Novak v.
Kasaks, 99 CIV 3073, 1996 WL 467534, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996) (staying discovery where
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances to justify exception; noting that plaintiffs
must demonstrate "great risk" of loss of highly relevant
evidence or "undue prejudice").
Yet some plaintiffs have met the standard. See Nager v.
Websecure. Inc. (In re Websecure. Inc. Sec. Litig.),
1997 WL 773717 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1997) (granting
expedited discovery where plaintiffs made a
"particularized" request on issues of use of initial public
offering proceeds and company's business plans and
prospects and, given preliminary injunction request and
bankruptcy context, plaintiffs met "undue prejudice"
test).
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III.

THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998
On November 3, 1998, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 (P.L. 105-353) ("Uniform Standards Act"). The Uniform Standards Act sought
to correct the shift of securities class action litigation from federal to state courts caused
by the heightened pleading standards and discovery restrictions in federal court instituted
by the Reform Act. See 105 P.L. 353, § 2 (Findings).
A.

Key Provisions Of The Uniform Standards Act

1.

Federal Preemption of Claims Arising Under State Law: The Uniform
Standards Act amends the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (" 1934 Act") to prohibit class actions brought under state
law in either federal or state court by any private party alleging (1) "an untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security;" or (2) "that the defendant used or employed any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase
or sale ofa covered security." See 105 P.L. 353 § I 01 (amending Section 16 of
the 1933 Act and Section 28 of the 1934 Act).
(a)

Exclusions from preemption:
(i)

The Uniform Standards Act preemption provisions
exclude class actions brought under the law of the state
of incorporation and involving either (1) the purchase or
sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer
exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the
issuer; or (2) any recommendation, position, or other
communication with respect to the sale of securities of
the issuer that is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an
affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity securities of
the issuer and that concerns decisions of those equity
holders with respect to voting their securities, acting in
response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising
dissenters' or appraisal rights. 105 P.L. 353 § 101.
Known as the "Delaware carve out," this exclusion is
designed to preserve remedies available under Delaware
law.

(ii)

The Uniform Standards Act preemption provisions also
do not apply to actions brought by states, political
subdivisions thereof, or state pension plans, either on
their own behalf or as members of a class comprised
solely of other states, political subdivisions or state
pension plans. 105 P.L. § 101.

r
r
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r
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2.

3.

4.

s.

(iii)

Also excluded are actions brought under contractual
agreements between issuers and indenture trustees. 105
P.L. 353 § 101.

(iv)

The Uniform Standards Act preserves the jurisdiction of
the securities commission (or agency Or office
performing similar functions) of any state under the laws
of such state to investigate and bring securities
enforcement actions.

Removal: The Uniform Standards Act provides defendants with an absolute
right to remove to federal court "any covered class action brought in any State
court involving a covered security." A "covered security" is defined to include
securities that satisfy the standards for a covered security under paragraph
18(b)(I) or 18(b)(2) of the 1933 Act; that is, securities listed on NYSE,
NASDAQ and other national exchanges with similar listing standards, as well as
securities senior to such securities.
Definition of "Covered Class Action": The Uniform Standards Act broadens
the defmition of a class action to include (I) any action, brought on behalf of 50
or more persons or prospective class members, in which questions of law and
fact exist that are common to those persons, and those questions predominate
over questions pertaining to only individuals; (2) any action in which one or
more parties seeks to recover damages on behalf of themselves and other
unnamed parties similarly situated in which questions of law and fact common to
those persons predominate over questions affecting only individuals; (3) any
group of lawsuits filed or pending in the same court and involving common
questions of law or fact, in which damages are sought on behalf of more than 50
persons and the lawsuits are joined, consolidated or otherwise proceed as a single
action for any purpose. 105 P.L. § 101 . "Covered class action" does not include
an exclusively derivative action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf
of a corporation.
Remand: Actions removed to federal court shall be remanded to state court if
the federal court determines that the action may be maintained in state court. 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii). See Derdiger v. Tallman, 75 F. Supp. 2d 322,324
(D. Del. 1999) (remanding to the Delaware Court of Chancery where plaintiff
contended that defendant committed equitable fraud that involved
communications to stockholders in connection with a vote on the merger
agreement).
Discovery: Recognizing that plaintiffs' class-action lawyers frequently pursue
"parallel litigation between state and federal courts in an apparent effort to avoid
the federal discovery stay or other provisions of [the Reform Act]" (see Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S. 1260, 104lh Cong., 2d
Sess., Congo Rec. HI0774 (daily ed. Oct 13, 1998», the Uniform Standards Act
provides that upon a proper showing, a federal court may stay discovery

-
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proceedings in any private securities action in a state court, "as necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to
a stay of discovery." Thus defendants sued in both state and federal courts may
now seek an order from the federal court staying discovery in the state court
proceedings. (See infra m.C.3)

6.

B.

Elimination of Concurrent Jurisdiction Over 1933 Act Claims: The Uniform
Standards Act eliminates state court jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to
the 1933 Act, creating exclusive federal jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims.

Pleading Standards Under The 1998 Act

1.

r

The Joint Explanatory Statement Submitted for Publication with the
Conference Report to the 1998 Act (S. 1260) attempts to clarify -retrospectively -- Congressional intent in passing the 1995 Act with respect to the
pleading standards for scienter. The statement reads, in part:
It is the clear understanding of the managers that Congress did not, in
adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter the standards of liability under
the Exchange Act.

r
r

The managers understand, however, that certain Federal district courts
have interpreted the Reform Act as having altered the scienter
requirement. In that regard, the managers again emphasize that the clear
intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither
the Reform Act nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in
Federal securities fraud suits.

r
r

Additionally, it was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated
during the legislative debate on the Reform Act, and particularly during
the debate on overriding the President's veto, that the Reform Act
establish a heightened uniform Federal standard on pleading
requirements based upon the pleading standard applied by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, the express language of the Reform
Act itself carefully provides that plaintiffs must "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
state of mind." The managers emphasize that neither the Reform Act nor
S. 1260 makes any attempt to defme that state of mind.

r
r
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H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

C.

Cases-Decided Since The Enactment Of The 1998 Uniform Standards Act
1.

Retroactive Legislative History
(a)

In In re Glenayre Technologies. Inc. Securities Litig.. No. 96 CIV 8252
(HB), 1998 WL 915907, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) the court
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rejected plaintiffs' arguments that statements made during the enactment
of the 1998 Act established that allegations of motive and opportunity
were sufficient to plead scienter, stating that "[t]his contention is without
merit since post-enactment legislative history plays no role in statutory
interpretation. "

2.

(b)

The court in Stunn v. Marriot Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) recognized the legislative history of the Unifonn Standards
Act as having at least persuasive authority when it held that the Refonn
Act incorporates the Second Circuit pleading standards. See also Carley
Capital Group v. Deloine & Touche. L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 13381339 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (same).

(c)

Without regard to whether it could properly consider the Unifonn
Standards Act, the First Circuit apparently took notice of the Unifonn
Standards Act but concluded that the legislative history, including the
Unifonn Standards Act, was unhelpful. Thus, the court in Greebel v.
FTP Software. Inc., found that "[t]he legislative history [including the
history of the Unifonn Standards Act] is inconclusive on whether the
[Refonn] Act was meant to either embody or to reject the Second
Circuit's pleading standards." 195 F.3d 185, 194 (lSI Cir. 1999). Citing
the Third Circuit opinion in In re Advanta, the court found that "[t]he
Refonn Act's legislative history on this point is ambiguous and even
contradictory." Id.

Limited to Prospective Application
(a)

The Unifonn Standards Act states that its prot1isions "shall not affect or
apply to any action commenced before and pending on the date of
enactment of this Act"; that is, November 3, 1998.

(b)

In Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc v Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, 968 P.2d 539 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2338 (1999), a class
action brought under California securities laws, the Supreme Court of
California held that the prohibition in the California code against market
manipulation provided a cause of action to out-of-state purchasers and
sellers of securities, even if the purchase or sale of securities took place
outside of the state of California. The court rejected arguments that pre1998 Unifonn Standards Act law provided for any implied preemption of
existing California securities law, noting "except to the extent it has been
subsequently modified by the Securities Litigation Unifonn Standards
Act of 1998, federal law in this arena supplements, but does not displace
state regulations and remedies." Id. at 552. With respect to the 1998
Unifonn Standards Act, the California court noted that "[i]nsofar as class
actions are concerned, recently enacted federal legislation, which is
inapplicable to pending actions, may accomplish what defendants urge"
by preempting most securities class actions. Id. at 545 n.12. While a

..
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dissenting justice argued for implied preemption under pre- Uniform
Standards Act law, the majority responded that by allowing pending
securities-fraud class actions in state court to continue and leaving
individual actions unrestricted, Congress "confirmed the independent
force of state securities law. Had Congress believed that its goals could
not be accomplished if suits based on state law were permitted or that
any conflict between state and federal law existed, all actions based on
state law, not simply class actions, would have been banned." Id.

r
r

r
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3.

Discovery: By its terms, the discovery provision might be applied to individual
actions as well as class actions. But after an exhaustive review of the Act's
legislative history, the first court to consider the issue has held that it should be
applied to class actions only. In re Transcrypt Int'l Sec. Litig., 57 F. Supp. 2d
836 (D. Neb. 1999).
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I.

Free Writing Issues

A.

Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
1.

Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful

r
r
r
r
t

r

r

r
r

r
r

Section 5(b)(I) of the Securities Act

"... to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security with
respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this title,
unless such prospectus meets the requirements of Section 10."
Section 10 of the Securities Act sets forth the information required to be included
in a preliminary or final prospectus. A Section 10 prospectus is commonly
referred to a "statutory prospectus." Prospectuses that do not satisfy the
requirements of Section 10 are sometimes referred to as "illegal prospectuses" or
"free writings."
A broker-dealer conducting business on the Internet must ensure that the
communications on its website are not viewed by the SEC staff as illegal
prospectuses in violation of Section 5(b)(1).

2.

Section 2(10) of the Securities Act

Section 2(10) ofthe Securities Act defines the term "prospectus" broadly as
"... any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."

H-l

Section 2(10) contains two exceptions from the definition of prospectus:

•

Communications delivered with or after delivery ofa final
prospectus

-

"... (a) a communication sent or given after the effective date of
the registration statement (other than a prospectus permitted under
subsection (b) of Section 10) shall not be deemed a prospectus if it
is proved that prior to or at the same time with such
communication a written prospectus meeting the requirements of
subsection (a) of Section 10 at the time of such communication
was sent or given to the person to whom the communication was
made.••."

•

Communications authorized by the Commission
"... (b) a notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication
in respect of a security shall not be deemed to be a prospectus if it
states from whom a written prospectus meeting the requirements of
Section 10 may be obtained and, in addition, does no more than
identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom orders
will be executed, and contain such other information as the
Commission, by rules or regulations deemed necessary or
appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed therein, may permit."

3.

-

Rule 134
a.

Exclusion from prospectus definition

Pursuant to the second exception under Section 2(10) quoted above, the
Commission in 1955 adopted Rule 134.
Rule 134 provides that the term prospectus

-

"... shall not include a notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
other communication published or transmitted to any person after a
registration statement has been filed ..."
if it contains only the statements required or permitted to be included
pursuant to Rule 134.

H-2
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b.

Rule 134(a) sets forth the information permitted in a Rule 134 notice,
including the following:

•

the name of the issuer;

•

the full title of the security;

•

the amount being offered;

•

a brief indication of the general type of business of the issuer;

•

the price of the security, or if the price is not known, the method of
its determination or the probable price range;

•

the name and address of the sender of the communication and the
fact that it is participating in the offering;

•

the names of the managing underwriters; and

•

the approximate date of the proposed sale to the public.

c.

Required disclosures in a Rule 134 notice

I

r

r
r
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Information permitted in a Rule 134 notice

Rule 134(b) sets forth three required disclosures:

•

A legend that offers to buy cannot be accepted until effectiveness
and that the communication is not an offer to sell or the solicitation
of an offer to buy in any state where the sale or solicitation would
be unlawful.

•

A statement whether the security is being offered in a distribution
by the issuer or a selling shareholder and whether the issue
represents new financing, refunding or both.

•

The name and address of a person or persons from whom a Section
10 prospectus may be obtained.

Rule 134(c) provides that the required Rule 134(b) disclosures are not
required in a communication:

"0) which does no more than state from whom a written
prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Act may
be obtained, identify the security, state the price thereof and sate
by whom orders will be executed; or

H-3

(ii) which is accompanied or preceded by a prospectus or a
summary prospectus which meets the requirements of Section 10
of the Act at the date of such preliminary communication."
Based upon the principles set forth in the Commission's 1995 release on
the "Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes" (ReI. No. 33-7233,
October 6, 1995), the Rule 134(b) disclosures should not be required in a
Rule 134 notice that contains a hyperlink to an electronic preliminary
prospectus. However, many issuers and broker-dealers include these
disclosures in the Rule 134 notice because they are not difficult to make.
d.

Can issuance ofRule 134 notice precede availability of
preliminary prospectus?

Although the wording of Rule 134 is unclear, the SEC staff interprets Rule
134(b)(3) as prohibiting the posting of a Rule 134 notice on a website until
a preliminary prospectus has been made available on the website.

e.

Solicitation ofindications ofinterest and conditional offers to
buy

-

-

Rule 134(d) provides that written solicitations of indications of interest
and conditional offers to buy are not illegal free writings if the following
disclosure is provided in the solicitation:
No offers to buy the securities can be accepted and no part of the
purchase price can be received until the registration statement has
become effective, and any such offer may be withdrawn or
revoked, without obligation or commitment of any kind, at any
time prior to notice of its acceptance given after the effective date.
An indication of interest in response to this advertisement will
involve no obligation or commitment of any kind."

-

Part III below discusses the legality of soliciting indications of interest and
conditional offers to buy under Section 5(a) of the Securities Act, which
prohibits sales prior to effectiveness.

4.

Section 2(9) of the Securities Act - electronic communications are
treated as written communications

Under Section 2(9) of the Securities Act, the term "written" includes "printed,
lithographed, or any means of graphic communication." "Graphic
communication" is understood to include "magnetic impulses or other forms of
computer data compilation." See, for example, Rule 405 under the Securities Act.

H-4
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B.

Free Writing Problem for Internet Offerings

The use of the Internet to offer and sell securities in public offerings presents free writing
concerns. All communications on an issuer's or a broker-dealer's website are potentially
illegal free writings.
Free writing is a greater concern for an Internet broker-dealer than for a broker-dealer
that solicits and communicates with its customers by telephone. The term prospectus
covers writings, which include electronic communications, but not oral statements,
except by radio or television broadcast. As a result, a registered representative at a
broker-dealer can telephone his or her customer and make an oral offer during the waiting
period without any free writing concerns. In contrast, if an Internet broker-dealer sends
its customers an e-mail regarding an offering or posts information on its website
regarding an offering, the broker-dealer must be careful that none of this information is
deemed to be a "free writing" in violation of Section 5(b)( I).

c.

What Written Communications are Free Writings?
1.

Does the communication offer or confirm the sale of a security?

Not all written communications are free writings. In analyzing a communication,
the key factor is whether the communication "offers any security for sale or
confIrms the sale of any security."

I
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2.

Commission releases on free writing

The Commission has provided guidance on free writing.
In a 1957 release ("Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date
of a Registration Statement," Securities Act Release No. 3844 (October 8, 1957)),
the Commission attempted to distinguish between disclosures that are intended to
relay important business and fInancial developments and disclosures that are
intended to condition the market for an upcoming offering. In the 1957 release
the Commission wrote:
"There has been an increasing tendency, particularly in the period since
World War II, to give publicity through many media concerning corporate
affairs which goes beyond the statutory requirements. This practice
reflects a commendable and growing recognition on the part of industry
and the investment community of the importance of informing security
holders and the public generally with respect to important business and
fInancial developments.
This trend should be encouraged."

H-5

The 1957 release proceeded to contrast these types of permitted communications
with other communications made with the intent to condition the public mind for, or
arouse public interest in, an offering. The Commission wrote:
"It follows from the express language and the legislative history of the
Securities Act that an issuer, underwriter or dealer may not legally begin a
public offering or initiate a public sales campaign prior to the filing of a
registration statement. It apparently is not generally understood, however,
that the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts,
generally, made in advance ofa proposed financing, although not couched in
terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public
mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer
in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in
fact part of the selling effort.
Nor is it generally understood that the release of publicity and the
publication of information between the filing date and the effective date of a
registration statement may similarly raise a question whether the publicity is
not in fact a selling effort by an illegal means; i.e., other than by means of
the statutory prospectus.

Instances have come to the attention of the Commission in which
information of a misleading character, gross exaggeration and outright
falsehood have been published by various means for the purpose of
conveying to the public a message designed to stimulate an appetite for
securities -- a message which could not properly have been included in a
statutory prospectus in conformity with the standards of integrity demanded
by the statute."

'"'"

...

..

..J

.,j

..

In a 1969 release ("Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and
Effective Date of a Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933,"
Securities Act Release No. 5009 (October 7, 1969», the Commission provided
further guidance on this issue. In the 1969 release, the Commission wrote that the
"... flow of normal corporate news, unrelated to a selling effort for an issue
of securities is natural, desirable and entirely consistent with the objectives
of disclosure to the public which underlies [sic] the federal securities laws."
The Commission further wrote that
"... disclosure of a material event would ordinarily not be subject to
restriction under Section 5 of the Securities Act if it is purely factual and
does not include predictions or opinions."
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D.

The Wit Capital No-Action Letter

r

1.

r

In the Wit Capital Corporation no-action letter (July 14, 1999), the SEC Staff
granted no-action relief for communications on "cuI de sacs" that Wit Capital
establishes for each offering. The no-action relief did not extend to
communications on Wit Capital's general website.

r
r

2.

a.

E-mail notices

Wit Capital commences the offering process by sending an e-mail notice
to its customers notifying them of an upcoming offering. The e-mail
notice contains only the information required or permitted under Rule 134.

r
r

b.

Cui de sacs for each offering

The e-mail notice contains a hyperlink to a separate area of its website that
Wit Capital establishes for each offering (a "cuI de sac"). Each cuI de sac
contains:

r

r
r
r
r

r

Wit Capital's communications

In its request for no-action relief, Wit Capital described the following
communications with its customers:

r
r

r

Relief granted and not granted

•

a copy of the preliminary prospectus for the offering in electronic
format;

•

a page for entering conditional offers to buy shares in the offering;

•

account opening forms; and

•

Wit Capital's rules and procedures for public offerings.

c.

Wit Capital's general website

Wit Capital also has a webpage on its general website that lists public
offerings. From this page, the viewer can hyperlink to the cuI de sac for
each offering. A viewer cannot hyperlink from the cuI de sac for an
offering to Wit Capital's general website.

3.

Analysis of Wit Capital's communications

In its request for no-action relief, Wit Capital analyzed these communications as
follows:

r

r
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•

The e-mail notices comply with Rule 134.

•

The webpage for entering conditional offers is permitted under
Rule 134(d).

•

The account opening and rules and procedures pages are merely
the broker-dealer's operating procedures and, accordingly, should
not be deemed free writings.

-

The establishment of the cuI de sac separates the information on the cuI de
sac from other information on Wit's general website and from information
that can be reached by hyperlink from Wit Capital's general website.

4.

SEC staff's response to request for no-action relief

In its response, the SEC staff wrote that it would not treat communications on the
cuI de sac as illegal free writings. However, the SEC staff wrote as follows with
respect to communications on Wit Capital's general website:
"You have not asked, and we do not address, Wit Capital's responsibilities
under the federal securities laws to cleanse (or otherwise modify) its
general website of any information that could be deemed illegally to
condition the market for a particular IPO security. These and other issues
arising from the use of electronic communications media in the context of
registered and exempt securities offerings (including, but not limited to,
those identified in the preceding paragraph) are under consideration, or
will be considered, by the Commission."

5.

,.,j

,

Guidance for other Internet brokers-dealers

Many Internet broker-dealers do not separate out public offering information in
cuI de sacs. This presents the concern that research and similar information
relating to an issuer or the issuer's industry that is readily accessible from the
public offering webpages could be deemed to be illegal free writings. As
indicated by the SEC staff's response in the Wit Capital no-action letter, the
Commission and the SEC staff are still considering this issue. For more
information, see the discussion below regarding hyperlinks and the electronic
envelope theory.

E.

-

Format of Rule 134 Notices

The traditional Rule 134 notice has taken the format of a tombstone advertisement.
Internet broker-dealers have adopted a more "plain english" format for Rule 134 notices.
In some cases, particularly for affinity offerings, the Rule 134 notice describes the
procedures for participating in a public offering through the broker-dealer. A sample of
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this type of notice was included as an exhibit to the Wit Capital no-action letter,
evidencing the staff's acceptance of this type of communication.

F.

Hyperlink Issues and the Electronic Envelope Theory
1.

Electronic envelope theory, research and hyperlinks to third-party
information providers

r

The Internet presents difficult free writing issues because of the viewer's ability to
navigate among webpages through browsers and hyperlinks. The Commission
has attempted to apply the principles that apply to paper communications to
electronic communications, but in some cases it is difficult to apply these
principles.

I

In example 16 from the 1995 release, the Commission set forth the electronic
envelope theory:

,.

r

r

r
r
r

r

"(16) Company XYZ places a preliminary prospectus on its Internet Web
site and provides direct access via a hyperlink to a research report on the
Company written by ABC Corporation, a registered brokerage firm. The
investor reviewing the preliminary prospectus can click on a box marked
"ABC's research report" and the investor will be linked to the brokerage
firm's Web site where the research report is available.
The hyperlink function provides the ability to access information located
on another Web site almost instantaneously. This direct and quick access
to ABC's research report would be similar to the Company including the
paper version of the research report in the same envelope that it is using to
mail the paper version of the preliminary prospectus to potential investors.
During the waiting period, the Company may make offers only through
the use of a preliminary prospectus, whether in paper or electronic format;
therefore, its use of the research report under these circumstances would
not be permissible."

~.

r

r

r
r

This example presents a clear case of free writing. However, where the link
between the prospectus and the research or similar information is less direct, the
analysis becomes more difficult. For example, what if the research or similar
information is contained on a third-party website that can be reached by hyperlink
from the broker-dealer's website? In its request for no-action relief, Wit Capital
argued that the key factor to consider is whether the purpose or reasonably
foreseeable effect of the hyperlinks provided by the broker-dealer is, our would
be, to lead the customer to illegal free writing information.
One approach that provides some protection is to notify the customer prominently
when the customer is exiting the broker-dealer website. A broker-dealer

r
r
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concerned about this issue also should avoid framing the website of the thirdparty information provider.

2.

Rule 134 notices

A Rule 134 notice may contain only the information permitted or required
pursuant to Rule 134. If an issuer places a Rule 134 notice on its website, does
the notice incorporate the other information on the issuer's website in violation of
Rule 134? Based upon the following example from the 1995 release, it should be
permissible for an issuer to place a Rule 134 notice on its web site:
"(18) Company XYZ places a tombstone advertisement complying with
Securities Act Rule 134 on its Internet website.
This would be permissible, provided that the advertisement otherwise
complies with Rule 134."
Although it is not explicitly stated, the Commission presumably would not allow
a Rule 134 notice if the Rule 134 notice contained a hyperlink to illegal free
writing, whether on the issuer's or a third-party website.

3.

Prospectus on the issuer's or the broker-dealer's website

The 1995 release contemplates that an issuer may include a prospectus on its
website. See, for example, examples 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12 and 16 (issuer placing a
preliminary prospectus on its website), and example 5 (issuer placing all offering
documents on its website). The principles that would permit an issuer to place a
prospectus on its web site should be equally applicable to permitting a brokerdealer to place a prospectus on its website.

4.

-

Hyperlink from the broker-dealer's website to the issuer's website

A hyperlink from the broker-dealer's website to the issuer's website could present
a free writing problem. Why would the broker-dealer provide this hyperlink
except to provide information regarding the issuer that is not included in the
prospectus?
The exception to this general rule is where the broker-dealer has an independent
business purpose in providing a hyperlink to the issuer's website. For example, in
an IPO for a company that provides news and research to customers of the brokerdealer (by hyperlink from the broker-dealer's website), the independent purpose
for providing the hyperlink would be to continue to make this service available to
the broker-dealer's customers.

H-lO
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5.
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)
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Hyperlink from the issuer's website to the broker-dealer's web site;
hyperlink from an e-mail sent by the issuer to the broker-dealer's
website

Hyperlinks from the issuer's communications to the broker-dealer's website
should not be a problem if the issuer's communications are not illegal free
writings. However, when providing this hyperlink, the issuer should review the
broker-dealer's website to ensure that there is no illegal free writing on the
broker-dealer's website.

r
r

6.

Banner ads

r

Banner ads should not contain information that would not be permitted in a Rule
134 notice. The SEC staff has expressed concern regarding banner ads in some
offerings, but the Commission's releases do not provide guidance regarding
banner ads.

r

7.

r

Confirmations of Sale

The term "prospectus" includes any written communication that "confirms the
sale of any security." This presents a free writing issue for the Internet brokerdealer. The traditional procedure has been for the registered representative to
telephone the customer after pricing to confirm the customer's allocation. This
procedure does not work for the Internet broker-dealer. Instead, customers of the
Internet broker-dealer expect that the broker-dealer will send them a notice after
pricing confirming the customer's allocation. However, this presents a free
writing concern.

r
r

In the Wit Capital no-action letter, the SEC staff granted no-action relief for an email that Wit Capital sends to a customer after pricing notifying the customer of
his or her allocation. The e-mail notice indicates that a Rule 1Ob-l 0 confirmation
will be sent to the customer concurrently with the final prospectus.

,.
t

r

r
r
r

r
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G.

Aircraft Carrier Release

In the so-called "aircraft carrier release" (Release No. 33-7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67174
(December 4, 1998)), the Commission wrote as follows on the issue of free writing:
"During the waiting period, oral offers may be made without content restrictions
other than due to liability concerns. Written offers, however, must have Section
10 contents or they cannot be used. This distinction appears to do little to
enhance investor protection or facilitate the capital formation process. One can
argue that it creates an incentive for issuers and underwriters to omit information
or to provide it in a manner that is not readily available to investors for later
reference....

H-ll

We believe that the waiting period should be a time of open dialogue between the
registrant and its potential investors, provided that the registrant is accountable for
the accuracy and completeness of its communications. The medium in which
disclosure is made should not be dictated by the regulatory structure but, rather,
by the needs of investors."
The Commission has proposed in the aircraft carrier release that issuers and underwriters be
entitled to disseminate free writing materials (i.e., materials that would otherwise be
deemed illegal prospectuses), subject to the following conditions:

H.

•

the free writing materials would have to include a prominent legend
advising investors to read the other disclosure documents filed with the
Commission;

•

to reduce selective disclosure, the free writing materials would have to be
filed with the Commission; and

•

the free writing materials would be subject to Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act (see discussion in Part II below).

-

Affinity Offerings

In many public offerings the issuer requests that a percentage of the shares being offered
be reserved for issuance to employees, customers or subscribers of the issuer, or other
persons with some business relationship to the issuer. These reservations of shares are
sometimes referred to as "friends and family," "directed share," or "affmity" offerings.

-

Shares in the affinity portion of an offering are sold through one or more underwriters or
dealers who are participating in the offering. An affinity offering presents a challenge to
a broker-dealer because the broker-dealer generally must communicate with customers
who are not customers of the broker-dealer when the offering is commenced.

..

When conducting an affinity offering, the broker-dealer must communicate with the
persons selected by the issuer and explain to them the process for participating in the
affinity offering. This process includes opening an account with the broker-dealer.
The SEC staff generally takes the view that communications to affinity persons that
indicate that a portion of shares in an offering are to be allocated to affinity persons and
that describe the procedure for participating in the affinity offering (including the
procedure for opening an account with the broker-dealer) should not be considered illegal
free writings. See, for example, the exhibits to the Wit Capital no-action letter.
However, in some cases, the SEC staff has been concerned that either the issuer or a
broker-dealer managing the affinity offering may have made communications to
customers that constitute illegal free writings. In these cases, the SEC has required the
issuer to include a risk factor in the prospectus on this issue. A risk factor in the
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prospectus for the Engage Technologies public offering reads as follows:

,..

"Prior to the effectiveness of the registration statement covering the shares of our
common stock being sold in this offering, Hambrecht & Quist, an underwriter of
this offering, provided written materials to approximately 80 employees of
Engage that we had designated as potential purchasers of up to 300,000 shares of
common stock in this offering through a directed share program. These materials
may constitute a prospectus that does not meet the requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933. No employee who received these written materials should rely upon
them in any manner in making a decision whether to purchase shares of common
stock in this offering.

i

r,

r
r

If the distribution of these materials by Hambrecht & Quist did constitute a
violation of the Securities Act of 1933, the recipients of these materials who
purchased common stock in this offering would have the right, for a period of one
year from the date of their purchase of common stock, to obtain recovery of the
consideration paid in connection with their purchase of common stock or, if they
had already sold the stock, sue us for damages resulting from their purchase of
common stock. These damages could total up to approximately $4.5 million plus
interest, based on the initial public offering price of$15.00 per share, if these
investors seek recovery or damages after an entire loss of their investment. If this
occurs, our business, results of operations and financial condition would be
harmed."

r

r
r

r
r

r

II.

Section 12(a)(2) Liability
A.

Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides liability for, and a right of rescission
against, any person who offers or sells a security,

r

"... by means of any prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission...
"

r

r

r
r
r
r

Section 12(a)(2)

B.

Internet Communications

Related to the concern regarding free writing is the concern that website communications,
if characterized as prospectuses, could subject the issuer or underwriters to liability under
Section 12(a)(2). However, the significance of Section 12(a)(2) for these
communications is unclear. If the communication is made prior to delivery of a final
prospectus, it is true that the communication, if deemed a prospectus and determined to
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be misleading, would give rise to liability under Section 12(a)(2). However, the
communication would necessarily be an illegal prospectus in violation of Section 5(b)(1),
giving rise to liability under Section 12(a)(1) (in other words, Section 12(a)(2) would not
impose any additional liability). If the communication is made with or after delivery of a
final prospectus, the language of Section 2(10) would appear to rule out Section 12(a)(2)
liability because, under Section 2(10), a prospectus excludes a communication sent with
or after delivery of a final prospectus.

C.

Aircraft Carrier Release

In the aircraft carrier release, the Commission proposes to lift the restrictions on free
writing in most cases, subject to certain conditions, including that the free writings are
filed with the Commission and are subject to liability under Section 12(a).

III.

Solicitation and Acceptance of Conditional Offers to Buy
A.

Section 5(a) of the Securities Act

Section 5(a) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to sell a security prior to the
effectiveness of the registration statement for the security.

B.

The Staff's View on Reconfirmations
1.

Affirmative reconfirmations after effectiveness

Prior to the Wit Capital no-action letter, members of the SEC staff took the
position that it is a violation of Section 5(a) to solicit conditional offers from
customers during the waiting period and accept those conditional offers after
effectiveness and pricing without an affirmative reconfirmation from the customer
after effectiveness.

...

-

-

This position presents an operational problem for the Internet broker-dealer
because it is difficult to get reconfirmations from customers in the short period
after effectiveness and before a security opens for trading. This is a particular
concern when an offering is declared effective prior to or during the trading day,
rather than after the close of trading.
In the Wit Capital no-action letter, the SEC staff agreed to modify its position on
affirmative reconfirmations somewhat subject to Wit Capital following the
procedures described in its request for no-action relief.

-

-
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2.

,..

The SEC staff also takes the view that an affirmative reconfIrmation from the
customer is required after a change in the estimated priced range of an offering
(sometimes referred to as a "repricing") or after an offering has priced outside the
expected price range. The theory behind this position presumably is that a
repricing or a pricing outside the range is material information and, accordingly,
the failure to get the customer's affirmative reconfIrmation after notifIcation of
this event is tantamount to a material omission. The SEC staffhas rejected a
proposal (intended to address the SEC's concern) whereby customers would
submit minimum and maximum price conditional offers outside the expected
price range for an offering and the broker-dealer could accept the customer's
conditional offer without affirmative reconfirmation if the offering were to price
within the minimum and maximum prices specified by the customer.

j

r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r

r
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The staffs position on this point presents a problem for a broker-dealer because it
may be difficult to get affirmative reconfirmations in the short period after a
repricing and before the market opens for trading. This problem is made more
difficult when an offering prices prior to or during the trading day. In this
situation, when an offering trades down from its public offering price, the brokerdealer is exposed to significant market risk if it is unable to obtain reconfIrmation
of all conditional offers prior to the start of trading.
C.

r

Wit Capital's Legal Argument -- Distinguishing Indications of Interest and
Conditional Offers to Buy

In its request for no-action relief, Wit Capital argued that Section 5(a) does not require
post-effective reconfirmation from customers who place conditional offers to buy.
Wit Capital argued as follows:
•

Conditional offers to buy must be distinguished from indications of interest.
Indications of interest involve no contractual obligation on the customer.
Accordingly, all indications of interest must be firmed up after effectiveness and
pricing. In contrast, conditional offers to buy are contractual offers made by the
customer, subject to the right of the broker-dealer to accept the conditional offer
by notice sent after effectiveness and pricing. Accordingly, the broker-dealer is
permitted to accept the customer's conditional offer to buy without reconfirmation
from the customer after effectiveness and pricing.

•

In 1954, Section 5 of the Securities Act was expressly amended to permit offers to
sell and the solicitation of conditional offers to buy during the waiting period.
This assertion is supported by the changes made to Section 5 and by the
legislative history.

r
r

r

Reconfirmations after repricings and pricing outside the range

r
r
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•

Although Rule 134(d), adopted in 1955, is a free writing provision, the wording of
Rule 134(d) evidences the Commission's acknowledgment and acceptance of the
common practice, at that time, of soliciting conditional offers during the waiting
period.

D.

Wit Capital's Procedures for Soliciting Conditional Offers

....
'i

While the staff did not fully agree with the legal arguments made by Wit Capital in its
request for no-action relief, the staff agreed that Wit Capital would not have to obtain
affirmative reconfirmations of conditional offers after effectiveness and pricing based
upon Wit Capital's agreement to comply with the following procedures:

1.

Notice of offering

When the preliminary prospectus for an offering becomes available, Wit Capital
posts the preliminary prospectus in electronic format on its website and sends an
e-mail to its customers notifying them of the offering.

2.

Solicitation of conditional offers

The e-mail contains a hyperlink to a cuI de sac established by Wit Capital for each
offering. The cuI de sac contains a copy of the preliminary prospectus as well as
a webpage through which the customer can enter a conditional offer to buy shares
in the offering.

3.

Reconfirmation of conditional offers approximately two business days
prior to effectiveness

Approximately two business days prior to the date upon which Wit Capital
expects the offering to be declared effective, Wit Capital will send a notice to its
customers requesting that they reconfirm their conditional offers before
effectiveness. If there is a delay in the offering, reconfirmations are valid for a
period of five business days.

4.

Period after effectiveness and pricing to cancel conditional offers

Wit Capital affords the customer a period after effectiveness and pricing during
which the customer can cancel his or her conditional offer. If the offering prices
after the close of trading, customers have until 11 p.m. to cancel their conditional
offers. If the offering prices during the day, customers have two hours to cancel
their conditional offers.

5.

~

Repricings and Recirculations

All conditional offers must be reconfirmed after repricings and recirculations.
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The Wit Capital no-action letter involves a liberalization of the staff's position on
reconfirmations after effectiveness. The staff, in essence, accepts the combination of the
customer's reconfirmation just prior to effectiveness and the customer's opportunity to
cancel after effectiveness and pricing as the substantial equivalent of a post-effective
reconfirmation from the customer.

E.

Principal Concerns Regarding the Wit Capital No-Action Letter

One of the principal concerns for broker-dealers with the conditions imposed in the Wit
Capital no-action letter is the requirement to offer customers an opportunity to cancel
their conditional offers after pricing. This is a particular concern when an offering prices
during the trading day because it affords customers the opportunity to rescind their
purchases after trading in a stock has commenced.
A second principal concern is the requirement that all conditional offers be reconfirmed
after a repricing or the pricing of a transaction outside the expected price range. The
Internet broker-dealer may be exposed to liability if it is unable to obtain affirmative
reconfirmations of all conditional offers between the time that a stock prices outside the
expected price range and the commencement of trading in the stock.

F.

Developments since Wit Capital No-Action Letter

The SEC staff has indicated that it would not object if other broker-dealers follow the
procedures set forth in the Wit Capital no-action letter. The SEC staff also has indicated
that the Wit Capital procedures are not the only procedures that would be acceptable to
the staff, and that the staff would consider other proposals that achieved the same
objectives. Since that time, the SEC staff has reviewed and approved procedures
submitted by other broker-dealers.
In offerings that include Internet distribution, the staff generally has requested detailed
information from broker-dealers in the offering who are involved in Internet distribution.
However, if an Internet broker-dealer submits its procedures for review by the SEC staff,
and the staff finds that these procedures are consistent with the principles of the Wit
Capital no-action letter, the staff will not continue to request in comment letters for
specific offerings that the broker-dealer describe its procedures in detail. Rather, the staff
will request that the broker-dealer confirm that it continues to follow the procedures
previously reviewed by the staff.
In some cases, the SEC staff has further liberalized the requirements of the Wit Capital
no-action letter. For example, it appears that the SEC will allow a cancellation period of
one hour, with the one-hour period commencing at the time of effectiveness. Of course,
if, subsequent to effectiveness there is a repricing or a pricing outside the expected price
range, the broker-dealer would have to affirmatively reconfirm all previously transmitted
conditional offers.

r
r
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G.

Application of Reconfirmation Requirements to Dutch Auctions

The SEC staff has indicated that the reconfinnation requirements also apply in the
context of offerings that involve a Dutch auction. In a Dutch auction, customers receive
priority for shares based upon the price that they bid for shares in the offering (i.e.,
customers who submit a higher bid have priority over customers who submit a lower
bid). The offering price is detennined based upon the "clearing price," which is the
highest price contained in valid conditional offers at which all of the shares in the
offering can be sold to potential investors. For example, if 1,000 shares are being offered
and customers bid for 500 shares at up to $7.00,500 shares at up to $6.00 and 500 shares
at up to $5.00, the clearing price will be $6.00.
The following is a summary of the procedures for the Dutch auction described in the
registration statement for the Andover.net initial public offering. These procedures
incorporate many of the principals set forth in the Wit Capital no-action letter.
1.

Before the registration statement becomes effective
a.

Solicitation ofconditional offers

Before the registration statement becomes effective, the underwriters and
participating dealers solicit conditional offers. Conditional offers are not
binding and may be withdrawn by the customer at any time prior to notice
of acceptance from the underwriter or dealer.

b.

Reconfirmation ofconditional offers

To remain valid, conditional offers must be reconfinned at least one
business day and not more than seven days before the expected effective
date for the offering. If the effective date extends beyond the seven-day
period, conditional offers must be reconfinned again.

-

All conditional offers must be reconfinned if the expected price range for
the offering is changed.

2.

After the registration statement becomes effective

a.

Closing ofauction

The auction may close no earlier than one hour after notice of
effectiveness is sent to investors.
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b.

Placing and reconfirmation ofconditional offers after
effectiveness

,.

r

New conditional offers may be placed at any time before the auction
closes, even after effectiveness. If the expected price range for the
offering does not change, and the offering prices within the expected price
range, any conditional offer to purchase shares that is within the price
range is deemed valid without any further reconfirmation from the
customer. If the expected price range changes, or the offering prices
outside the expected price range, reconfirmation is required.

r

c.

r

r

Once the clearing price has been determined, the issuer and underwriters
will determine the offering price, which may be lower, but not higher, than
the clearing price.

r

r
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Determination ofoffering price and acceptance ofconditional
offers

H.

Follow-On and Shelf Offerings

The application of the Wit Capital principles to follow-on and shelf offerings is unclear.
A primary distinction between initial public offerings and follow-on offerings is that
follow-on offerings generally are priced at the close of trading at a slight discount to the
market price. Accordingly, there are no "expected price ranges" as there are in the case
of initial public offerings. Does this mean that all conditional offers must be
affirmatively reconfirmed after pricing? Alternatively, can the broker-dealer be
exempted from this requirement if the price is within an acceptable price range
established by the customer or established by the broker-dealer and agreed to by the
customer?

IV.

Prospectus Delivery

A.

Rule 15c2-8 under the Exchange Act

Rule 15c2-8 under the Exchange Act requires a broker-dealer to
"... deliver a copy of the preliminary prospectus to any person who is expected to
receive a confirmation of sale [for the purchase of shares in the offering] at least
48 hours prior to the sending of such confirmation."

B.

Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act

Section 5(b)(2) makes it unlawful for any person to deliver a security through the mails
or in interstate commerce unless accompanied or preceded by a final prospectus. The
prospectus delivery requirement does not apply to private placements and other exempt
transactions.
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c.

1995 Release

The Commission's 1995 release sets forth various methods for satisfying the delivery
requirements under the securities laws, including prospectus delivery requirements. One
of these methods is to satisfy the consent, access and notice requirements described in the
1995 release. Another method is to obtain evidence that an investor actually received and
accessed the prospectus. A third method is to obtain evidence that the investor used
forms or other material available only upon accessing the prospectus. With regard to the
first method:
1.

Consent

The issuer or broker-dealer must obtain the customer's informed consent to
electronic delivery of the prospectus. The 1995 release provides that:
"If a consent if used, the consent should be an informed consent.
Recipients generally should be apprised: that information provided would
be available through a specific electronic medium or source (e.g., via a
limited proprietary system, or at a World Wide website); of the potential
that investors may incur costs (e.g., on-line time); and of the period
during, and the documents for, which the consent will be effective. For
instance, investors should be made aware of whether the consent extends
to more than one type of document. If an investor revokes a consent that
extends to more than one document, and consent is being relied upon by
the provider of the information to ensure effective delivery of
transmission, future documents should be delivered in paper unless the
provider of the information has an alternative mechanism for ensuring
effective electronic delivery."

2.

-

Access

The issuer or broker-dealer must provide the customer access to the prospectus.
Access to the prospectus must not be unduly burdensome. The 1995 release
provides that:
"... the use of a particular medium should not be so burdensome that
intended recipients cannot effectively access the information provided.
Moreover, as is the case with a paper document, a recipient should have
the opportunity to retain the information or have ongoing access
equivalent to personal retention."

-

-

-

-
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3.

The issuer or broker-dealer must put the customer on notice that the prospectus
has been delivered. The 1995 release provides that:

f

r

".... those providing electronic information should consider the extent to
which the electronic communication provides timely and adequate notice
to investors that information for them is available and, if necessary,
consider supplementing the electronic communication with another
communication that would provide notice similar to that provided by
delivery in paper. If an electronic document itself is provided --- for
example, on computer disk, CD-ROM, audio tape, videotape, or e-mail-that communication itself should generally be sufficient notice. If the
document is provided on an Internet website, however, separate notice
would be necessary to satisfy the delivery requirements unless the issuer
can otherwise evidence that delivery to the investor has been satisfied or
the document is not required to be delivered under the federal securities
laws."

r

,.
I

r
r
r

D.

r

r

r
r
r

Delivery of Prospectuses for After-Market Purchases

Pursuant to Section 4(3) of the Securities Act and Rule 174, transactions by a dealer in
the after-market are exempt from the prospectus delivery requirements of Section 5(b)(2),
except that after an IPO distribution has been completed, delivery of a final prospectus is
required for a period of25 days (in the case of NASDAQ securities or securities listed on
a national securities exchange) or 90 days (in the case of other securities) after the
offering. Rule 153 sets forth alternative delivery procedures in the case of transactions
effected on a national securities exchange.

r
r

r
r
r

Notice

The Internet broker-dealer can effect delivery of the final prospectus by sending an email to the purchaser with a hyperlink to the final prospectus.
The prospectus delivery requirement does not apply to unsolicited brokerage transactions.
However, when a broker-dealer participates in an offering, the cautious approach is to
comply with the prospectus delivery requirement for all transactions during the
applicable 25 or 90 day period.

v.

Private Placements
In a line of no-action letters, the Staff has permitted broker-dealers to solicit a significant
number of offerees for a private placement, subject to various conditions. See, for
example, E.F. Hutton & Co. (December 3, 1985); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
(December 3, 1985); and H.B. Shaine & Co., Inc. (May 1, 1987). One of these
conditions is that the broker-dealer must have established a pre-existing substantive
relationship with each offeree. A "substantive relationship" may be established with an
offeree (even if the offeree has not previously purchased securities from the broker-
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dealer) who has provided satisfactory responses to a questionnaire if the responses to the
questionnaire provide the broker-dealer with sufficient infonnation to evaluate the
offeree's level of sophistication and financial circumstances.
The questionnaires and the broker-dealer's mailings accompanying the questionnaires
may not make reference to any specific investments which are currently being offered or
contemplated for offering by the broker-dealer. In addition, sufficient time must elapse
between a respondent's completion of the questionnaire and the solicitation of the
respondent in any particular offering. A specific time period generally is not specified in
the no-action letters. However, Bateman Eichler agreed in its letter that,
"Under no circumstances would any offering materials [relating to a specific
offering] be sent for a minimum of 45 days after the mailing ... ,"

-

of the questionnaire.

A.

IPONet

The IPONet no-action letter (July 26, 1996), the SEC staff has applied the principles of
the line of no-action letters cited in the preceding subsection to the offer and sale of
securities in private placements over the Internet. As in the other no-action letters, all
investors must be pre-qualified prior to participating in any specific offering. All private
offerings are made through a password-protected area of the website.
Two issues left open in the IPONet letter are (i) the appropriate time period after
qualification (by questionnaire) after which it is pennissible to solicit qualified customers
for a particular offering, and (ii) the requirements regarding verification of the
infonnation provided by the customer.

-

The SEC staff issued similar no-action relief to Lamp Technologies (May 29, 1998)
relating to the solicitation of interests in a private investment fund whose participants are
limited to "qualified purchasers" (to comply with the Section 3(c)(7) exemption from
Investment Company Act registration) and "accredited investors" (to comply with the
Regulation D exemption from Securities Act registration).

VI.

Blue Sky Issues Relating to Public Offerings and Private Placements
A.

NSMIA; Section t8(a)

Section 18(a) of the Securities Act, adopted as part of the National Securities Markets
Improvements Act of 1986 (commonly known as NSMIA), provides that,
"... no law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any state
or any political subdivision thereof:
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(1) Requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities,
or registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or
indirectly apply to a security that:

r
r
,,.
r

r

(A) Is a covered security; or
(B) Will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction.

"
Covered securities include securities listed on the NYSE or AMEX, NASDAQ national
market securities and securities listed on certain regional exchanges, but exclude
NASDAQ SmallCap and non-NASDAQ over-the-counter securities.
Pursuant to Section 18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act, a
"... security is a covered security with respect to a transaction that is exempt
from registration pursuant to

r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r

r
r

(D) Commission rules or regulations under Section 4(2) ...,"
except that a state may still impose certain notice filing requirements.

B.

Public Offering Issues

Section 18(a) applies not only to securities listed on a national securities exchange and
NASDAQ national market securities, but also to securities that will become listed on a
national securities exchange or be approved for trading on NASDAQ NMS upon
completion of an offering. This means that offerings can be made through the Internet
prior to the approval of listing or trading, if the approval of listing or trading is obtained
prior to or upon completion of the transaction.
A potential problem occurs if offers are made through the Internet but exchange or
NASDAQ NMS approval is not subsequently obtained. This could occur if the offering
is canceled or if the offering does not qualify for exchange or NASDAQ NMS approval.

c.

Private Placement Issues

Based upon the definition of "covered security," an issuer and placement agent can
minimize blue sky concerns by structuring an offering to comply with Rule 506 under
Regulation D. Rule 506 is a commission rule under Section 4(2).
Rule 506 sets forth various requirements, including the following: (1) the filing of a
Form D with the Commission; (2) a prohibition on any form of general solicitation or
advertising; (3) the imposition of restrictions on transfer; and (4) restricting participation
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in the offering to accredited investors and up to 35 other investors (sometimes referred to
as "sophisticated investors"), each of whom,
"... has such knowledge and experience in financial and business maters that he
is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the
issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that such
purchaser comes within this description...."
Many states require that a copy of the Form D be filed with the state prior to the
commencement of a Regulation D offering in that state.

VII.

NASD Notice to Members 99-11
A.

Notice to Members 99-11

In NASD Notice to Members 99-11, NASD Regulation issued guidance to broker-dealers
regarding stock volatility. NTM 99-11 suggests disclosures that firms can make to retail
customers to educate them about the risks of price and volume volatility. NTM 99-11
also describes steps taken by some on-line brokers to respond to volatility.

B.

Discussion of IPOs in NTM 99-11

NTM 99-11 notes that there is particular volatility in the case of "hot IPOs" (i.e., IPOs
trading at a premium to the offering price in the after-market). NTM 99-11 recommends
that firms disclose the risk of placing market orders to buy hot IPO stocks and inform
customers that their risk can be reduced by placing limit orders. NTM 99-11 notes that
some firms do not accept market orders for hot IPO stocks and that other firms do not
accept any orders for IPO stocks until the IPO begins trading in the secondary market.

-

-

-

VIII. U.S. Regulation of Offshore Offerings
A.

Offerings not Targeted to U.S. Investors are Exempt

In its interpretation on the "Use ofInternet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit
Securities Transactions, or Advertise Investment Services Offshore" (March 23, 1998),
the Commission wrote that,
"Internet postings would not, by themselves, result in a registration obligation
under the U.S. securities laws."
Rather, the Commission wrote,
"... application of the registration provisions of the U.S. securities laws depends
on whether Internet offers, solicitations or other communications are targeted to
the United States."
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The Commission further wrote:

r
r

"We would not view issuers, broker-dealers, exchanges, and investment advisers
that implement measures that are reasonably designed to guard against sales or the
provision of services to U.S. persons to have targeted person in the United Sates
with their Internet offers."

•

r

According to the interpretation,
"What constitutes adequate measures will depend upon all the facts and
circumstances of any particular situation."

r,

r
r

r

r
r

B.

U.S. Offerors and Non-U.S. Offerors

In the interpretation, the Commission applies different principles for U.S. offerors and
non-U.S. offerors.

1.

Non-U.S. offerors

The Commission would not consider an Internet offer made by a non-U.S.
offeror as targeted at the United States if the following two conditions are
satisfied:

a.

The first condition for this safe harbor is that:
"The Web site includes a prominent disclaimer making it clear that
the offer is directed only to countries other than the United States.
For example, the Web site could state that the securities or services
are not being offered in the United States or to U.S. persons, or it
could specify those jurisdictions (other than the United States) in
which the offer is being made...."

r

r
r
r
r

Web site includes prominent disclaimer

b.

Offeror implements procedures reasonably designed to guard
against sales to U.S. persons

The second condition for the safe harbor is that:
"The Web site offeror implements procedures that are reasonably
designed to guard against sales to U.S. persons in the offshore
offering. For example, the offeror could ascertain the purchaser's
residence by obtaining such information as mailing addresses or
telephone numbers (or area code) prior to the sale..."

r
r
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2.

U.S.offerors

The Commission would not consider an Internet offer made by a U.S. offeror as
targeted at the United States if the following three conditions are satisfied:

a.

Web site includes prominent disclaimer

See discussion above.

b.

Offeror implements procedures reasonably designed to guard
against sales to U.S. persons

See discussion above.

c.

Offeror implements password-type procedures

The third condition for the safe harbor for a U.S. offeror is that,
"... the U.S. issuer implements password-type procedures that are
reasonably designed to ensure that only non-U.S. persons can
obtain access to the offer. Under this procedure, persons seeking
access to the Internet offer would have to demonstrate to the issuer
or intermediary that they are not U.S. persons before obtaining the
password for the site."
C.

Foreign Underwriters

If the issuer is a U.S. entity but the underwriter or distributor is a foreign entity, the
underwriter or distributor, as agent of the issuer, must ensure compliance with all three
conditions that apply for a U.S. issuer.
D.

Procedures are not exclusive

The procedures described in the interpretation are not the exclusive procedures for
demonstrating that offers are not targeted at U.S. customers. On the other hand,
offerings that comply with the technical requirements, but not the intent, of the
interpretation (i.e., to protect against unregistered public offers and sales to U.S. persons),
will be deemed targeted at U.S. customers.
IX.

Electronic Road Shows

A.

Restrictions on Road Shows Generally

As discussed in Part I above of this outline, Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act prohibits
prospectuses during the waiting period other than statutory prospectuses. The term
prospectus is broadly defined in Section 2(10) of the Securities Act to include all written
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communications and all communications by radio or television, subject to specified
exceptions.

B.

Traditional Road Shows

The traditional road show presentation generally has been permitted on the grounds that it
constitutes an oral, rather than a written, communication. While attendees may view
written materials at the road show, attendees are not permitted to take these materials
with them.
The audience for the traditional road show has generally been limited to institutional
investors.

c.

Electronic Road Shows
1.

Writing or broadcast

The problem with the electronic road show is that it can be characterized as either
a written communication or a communication by radio or television.

a.

Written communications

r

As discussed above, the Commission considers electronic communications
to be written communications.

r

b.

In no-action letters relating to traditional broadcast media, the SEC staff
has distinguished between communications made available to the public,
which would be deemed illegal prospectuses, and communications with a
limited audience, which would not be deemed illegal prospectuses. In
these letters the staff has interpreted the prohibition on radio and television
communications in Section 2(3) as a prohibition on public broadcasts. See
Exploration, Inc. (November 10, 1986), Merchants National Corporation
(January 12, 1976), Producers Funding Corporation (April 9, 1982) and
Transamerica Corporation (May 24, 1978) no-action letters.

r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

Broadcasts

2.

Two general approaches

There have been two general approaches to address the writing and broadcast
concerns:
•

The first approach has been to structure the road show so that it
does not constitute a writing or broadcast. This is the approach
adopted in the following no-action letters:
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Private Financial Network (March 12, 1997)
Net Roadshow, Inc. (September 8, 1997)
Bloomberg L.P. (December 1, 1997)
Thomson Financial Services, Inc. (September 4,
1998)
Activate.net Corporation (June 3, 1999)
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (November 12, 1999)
•

3.

The second approach involves treating the communication as a
prospectus.

Structuring the road show so it does not constitute a writing or
broadcast

The Commission has granted no-action relief to Private Financial Network
(March 12, 1997), Net Roadshow, Inc. (September 8, 1997), Bloomberg L.P.
(December 1, 1997), Thomson Financial Services, Inc. (September 4, 1998),
Activate.net Corporation (June 3, 1999) and Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. .
(November 12, 1999) relating to the transmission of road shows over the Internet
or another electronic communications systems in a manner that simulates the
traditional road show. In the no-action letters, the parties request that the
transmission of road shows for public offerings as described in the letters not be
characterized as the distribution of a prospectus under Section 2(10) of the
Securities Act.
The letters are based upon two basic principles:
•

the road show communications are not writings because, as in the
case of the traditional road show, investors are not permitted to
keep (i.e., print or download) any road show materials; and

•

the road show materials are not transmitted by "radio or television"
for purposes of Section 2(10) because the audience for the road
show transmissions is limited.

In a subsequent no-action letter (January 30, 1998), Net Roadshow obtained
similar relief for the transmission of road shows over the Internet in connection
with Rule 144A offerings.

...
H-28

r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r
r

Each of the letters contains similar conditions and restrictions. This outline refers
below primarily to the conditions set forth in the Net Roadshow and Bloomberg
letters, but these conditions are representative of the conditions set forth in the
other letters.
The conditions and restrictions in the electronic road show no-action letters can be
grouped into four categories.

a.

Conditions to ensure that the road show is not a broadcast.

Must limit access to road shows to qualified investors
To ensure that the road show is not a broadcast, access to the road
show is restricted to qualified investors. Qualified investors
generally are investors "typical of the investors who would
customarily be invited to attend a live road show, such as
registered broker/dealers and investment advisers" and qualified
institutional money managers. Net Roadshow letter. See also PFN
and Thomson no-action letters. See also Activate.net (access
restricted to "qualified investors who would customarily be invited
to attend a traditional road show, such as institutional investors,
securities firms, trading and sales personnel from participants in
the offering and research analysts").
In the Bloomberg letter, the audience for any road show is limited
to subscribers of THE BLOOMBERG service who have been
specifically enabled by an underwriter to receive transmission of
the particular road show. Each underwriter must agree with
Bloomberg that the underwriter will not enable a viewer to receive
a transmission unless the viewer is an institutional investor,
investment adviser or other person customarily invited to a road
show.

Charles Schwab no-action letter
The Charles Schwab no-action letter represents a significant
departure from the SEC staffs requirement in prior letters that
access to road shows be limited to institutional investors.
In the Charles Schwab letter, the SEC staff allows Schwab to
transmit electronic road shows to its Signature Services Gold level
customers. These are the only Schwab customers who have access
to Schwab's public offering website. To qualify as Gold level
customers, customers must either:

r

r

r
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•

Have at least $500,000 equity in household investment
positions; or

•

Execute at least 24 trades per year.

The SEC staff has indicated its reluctance to provide similar noaction relief to other parties, but has instead indicated its
preference to provide guidance on this issue in the SEC's
upcoming release on electronic communication issues.

-

In his grant of relief in the Schwab no-action letter, Brian Lane, the
former head of the Division of Corporation Finance and the author
of the letter, clearly states that the relief is being provided on
policy considerations alone, and the letter should not be interpreted
as an expression of any legal position by the Division or the staff.

b.

Conditions to ensure that the road show is not a writing
Period for viewing, the road show is limited
In the PFN letter, viewers may not view a road show more than 2
times. In the Net Roadshow letter, each qualified investor is
allowed to view a road show for one day only. In the Bloomberg
and Activate.net letters, viewers are able to view the road show
any number of times during a single 24-hour period but not
thereafter.

-

Editing of road show is limited
In the Net Roadshow letter, the live road show, including all
questions and answers, is filmed in its entirety and replayed over
the Internet at a similar speed as the live road show. Net
Roadshow may edit out "dead time" and give the issuer and/or
underwriter(s) the opportunity to edit out misstatements or
mistakes.
In the Bloomberg letter, road shows are not edited for content.
However, in the case of road shows transmitted on a delayed basis,
Bloomberg may edit out dead time and give the issuer and/or
underwriter(s) the opportunity to edit out misstatements or
mistakes.

..,

...
;I
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Must prohibit viewer from copying or downloading road show
material

,,..

In the Net Roadshow letter, the screen, throughout each road show,
carries a disclaimer at all times stating that the copying,
downloading or distribution of any road show material is not
permitted. In the Net Roadshow letter, the viewer is able to print
the entire preliminary prospectus but is not able to copy, download
or print any other portion of the road show transmission.

r

In the Bloomberg letter, if the road show is transmitted during the
waiting period, viewers are not permitted to copy, print or download information from the BLOOMBERG service.

r

r
r
r

c.

Conditions to ensure the primacy ofthe prospectus

Registration statement must be fIled prior to road show
Road shows are not transmitted for an offering until a registration
statement relating to the offering has been filed with the SEC.

\

r
r
r
r
r

r
r
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Must notify viewer of changes from live road show
In the Net Roadshow, Bloomberg and Thomson Financial letters, if
information changes from the time of the live road show, the
screen will include a periodic crawl providing a synopsis of the
changes and notify the viewer that the viewer may contact his or
her salesperson for further information.

Must prominently notify viewer of, and provide viewer access
to, the preliminary prospectus
In the Net Roadshow letter, a large and obvious button reading
"PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS" is displayed at all times
through the road show. A viewer may review the preliminary
prospectus in its entirety by clicking on the appropriate area of the
screen.
In the Bloomberg letter, if the road show is transmitted during the
waiting period, a preliminary prospectus is distributed to the
viewer. If the road show is transmitted after the registration
statement has been declared effective, a final prospectus is
distributed to the viewer.

I

r

r
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Must provide specifie~ disclosures to viewer
In the Net Roadshow letter, before viewing any road show, the
viewer is required to view (and acknowledge and agree to) a
disclosure that includes the following statements:
•

downloading of road show material is not permitted;

•

the internet road show does not constitute a prospectus;

•

it is strongly recommended that the viewer read the
prospectus;

•

the prospectus is available on the website;

•

a registration statement has been filed but not yet become
effective; and

•

the securities may not be sold prior to the registration
statement becoming effective.

In the Bloomberg letter, before and after each road show, viewers
receive the following notice:

•

a preliminary prospectus has been furnished to each
authorized viewer;

•

the viewer should refer to the prospectus (and the
registration statement of which it is a part) for more
complete information about the offering;

•

by electing to view the transmission, the viewer has agreed
not to videotape, record or re-transmit the contents of the
transmission; and

•

if a registration statement has been filed but not yet become
effective, the securities may not be sold prior to the
registration statement becoming effective.

Must notify viewer of the importance of the preliminary
prospectus
In the Net Roadshow letter, the viewer is informed by a periodic
crawl across the screen or by prominent text of the importance of
viewing the filed prospectus.
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In the Bloomberg letter, before and after each road show, viewers
are notified that a preliminary prospectus has been furnished to
each authorized viewer, and that the viewer should refer to the
prospectus (and the registration statement of which it is a part) for
more complete information about the offering.

r
r

r

Issuers and underwriters must ensure that Internet road show
is not inconsistent with preliminary prospectus

r

In the Bloomberg letter, the underwriters have exclusive control
over the content of each road show and will agree in writing with
Bloomberg to ensure that the information disclosed in the road
show is not inconsistent with the prospectus furnished to viewers.

r
r

d.

Sponsor's fees cannot be contingent upon success or size of
offering

r

In the Net Roadshow letter, the road show developer's fees are not
contingent upon the degree of success or size of an offering.

r

In the Bloomberg letter, Bloomberg's compensation consists of
customary rental fees paid by subscribers to THE BLOOMBERG
service (which is not increased as a result of the road show
transmissions) and reimbursement by the issuer or sponsoring
underwriter(s) of any special expenses, neither of which is
contingent on the size or successful conclusion of any offering.
Bloomberg also may decide to collect fees for access to a road
show on a subscription/pay-per-view basis for the viewers
authorized by the underwriters.

r
r

r
r
r

r

Condition to ensure that sponsor ofroad show is not required to
register as a broker-dealer

4.

Filing the electronic road show as a prospectus

A second approach has been to treat the electronic road show materials as a
prospectus. This involves filing the road show materials as a separate prospectus
or as an appendix to the statutory prospectus. The road show materials then
become subject to review by the SEC staff. In addition, as discussed above, the
information in the electronic road show becomes subject to Section 12 liability.

r

r
r
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D.

Aircraft Carrier Release

1.

Commission proposals

The Commission's proposals regarding free writing in the aircraft carrier release
would allow for road show presentations to be made available to all investors.
The proposals also would allow viewers of the presentations to keep materials
distributed at the road show. These permitted activities, as proposed, would be
subject to certain conditions, including the filing of the content of the road show
presentation with the Commission. In addition, the information in the road show
presentation would be subject to Section 12 liability.
The proposals described in the preceding paragraph are consistent with the
Commission's concerns regarding the current road show process, as expressed in
the aircraft carrier release:

j
-1

J

"It is common for issuers and underwriters to conduct road show

presentations during the waiting period for selected broker-dealers and
large institutional investors. While these road shows are valuable to some
investors because they provide a forum for investors' questions, their
value is curtailed because of the limited audience invited to attend and the
fact that issuers and underwriters do not allow participants to retain
materials used during the presentation (other than the preliminary
prospectus). These restrictions raise concerns regarding selective
disclosure of material information. They also raise concerns about
whether investors have been informed as well as they might have been
absent those restrictions."
The Commission's proposals in the aircraft carrier release thus far would not
affect the electronic road show no-action letters since the SEC staff has agreed
that these communications are not prospectuses. However, in footnote 313 to the
aircraft carrier release, the Commission requests comments,

-

..
-

"... on whether video road shows should be deemed free writing and
therefore would be required to be filed under these proposals."
Although not specified in the request for comments, it appears from the context of
the request that it relates to the limited audience video road shows described in
this section.

2.

..

Comment letters

Comment letters generally have opposed the characterization of video road shows
as free writings. Bloomberg L.P., in its comment letter, wrote as follows:

..
..
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"Bloomberg strongly recommends that the Commission not treat
electronic road shows as writings that would have to be filed with the
Commission in connection with offerings registered under the Securities
Act of 1933. Securities underwriters would be unlikely, we believe, to
continue to use electronic road shows if they were required, as a result of
such use, to file copies of the road shows with the Commission."

x.

Free Stock Offerings

In various no-action letters the SEC staff has expressed the view that
"... the issuance of securities in consideration of a person's registration on or visit to an
issuer's internet site would be an event of sale within the meaning of section 2(a)(3) of
the Securities Act of 1933. As a result, such an issuance would violate section 5 of the
Act unless it was the subject of a registration statement or a valid exemption from
registration."
See Vanderkam & Sanders (January 27, 1999). See also Simplystocks.com (February 4, 199)
and Andrew Jones and James Rutten (June 8, 1999). The SEC, in fact, has brought and settled
enforcement actions against several companies who offered and issued unregistered free stock
through their websites.

r
r
r

At least one issuer, YouNetwork Corporation, has registered an offering of free stock
(Registration No. 333-71949). The offering includes some shares offered to the first 250,000
members of the issuer's consumer network, additional shares offered to members based upon
referrals of other members to the issuer, and additional shares based upon rebates accumulated
through purchases and purchases of referred members. The maximum offering price indicated
on the cover page of the registration statement for the first two categories of shares is $0. This
would indicate that a Regulation A or Regulation D offering of free stock should not run afoul of
the maximum sale amount restrictions for Regulation A and Regulation D offerings.

r

Another issuer, USPages.net, Inc., has offered stock to website services customers and persons
who visit the issuer website. Pursuant to a press release by the issuer
(http://www.uspages.net/pressJelease.htm). the offering has been registered in 27 states but is
exempt from federal registration pursuant to Rule 504 under Regulation D. Pursuant to Rule
504(b)(l)(i), Regulation D's restrictions on general solicitation and limitations on resale do not
apply to offers and sales of securities that are made:

r

r
r

"Exclusively in one or more states that provide for the registration of the securities, and
require the public filing and delivery to investors of a substantive disclosure document
before sale, and are made in accordance with those state provisions."

r
r

r
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XI.

Suitability Obligations
A.

NASD Rule 2310; Suitability Obligations

NASD Rule 2310 provides that,
"In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs."
Under Rule 2310, a suitability obligation applies when a broker-dealer makes a
recommendation to a customer. A broker-dealer's suitability obligation also arises under
the common law "shingle" theory under which a broker-dealer, by holding itself out to
the public, undertakes that it will not make a recommendation to a customer unless it has
determined that the transaction is suitable for the customer.

B.

Suitability Obligations for Public Offerings

There is some disagreement as to whether suitability obligations should apply to Internet
broker-dealers that offer and sell shares in public offerings. Some Internet broker-dealers
have argued that in making public offerings available to their customers they are not
recommending the transaction to the customer and, in any event, are not recommending
the transaction as suitable for any specific customer.
However, the NASD has taken the position that Internet broker-dealers do have a
suitability obligation when they make public offerings available to their customers, at
least in the situation where they send e-mail notices of a specific offering to their
customers. The NASD's position is based, in part, upon its statement in NASD Notice to
Members 96-60 that,
"... a transaction will be considered to be recommended when the member ...
brings a specific security to the attention of the customer through any means,
including ... the transmission of electronic messages."
The NASD noted in a March 1997 letter that the foregoing statement,
"... was not intended to suggest that every statement that includes mention of a
security would be considered a recommendation."
However, the NASD did not provide further guidance. The NASD wrote in the March
1997 letter that,
"Whether a particular transaction is in fact recommended depends on an analysis
of all the relevant facts and circumstances."
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XII.

Minimum Deposit Requirements

The SEC staffhas expressed concern that it may constitute a violation of Section 5(a) of the
Securities Act to require customers to have funds on deposit in their accounts prior to the
effective time of a public offering, even though the funds are deposited into the customer's
account and are within the customer's control. The staffhas a particular concern when the
amounts deposited by customers prior to effectiveness of an offering equal the ultimate purchase
price for shares in the offering paid by the customers.
If a broker-dealer cannot require customers to have funds on deposit in their accounts, the
broker-dealer is exposed to credit risk if its customers do not deposit sufficient funds by closing.
This issue is of increased concern to the broker-dealer in affinity offerings where the brokerdealer is dealing with customers who have not previously opened accounts with the brokerdealer.

One approach that appears to be acceptable to the staff is to institute a minimum deposit
requirement in connection with the opening of new accounts. The amount of the minimum
deposit requirement should be uniform for all offerings. The following excerpt from the
Andover.net prospectus sets forth procedures that are acceptable to the staff:
"In order to open a brokerage account with WR Hambrecht & Co., potential investors
must deposit $2,000 in their account. In addition, once the registration statement
becomes effective and the auction closes, a prospective investor submitting a conditional
offer to purchase through a WR Hambrecht & Co. brokerage account must have an
account balance equal to or in excess of the amount of its conditional offer to purchase or
its conditional offer will not be accepted by WR Hambrecht & Co. No funds will be
transferred to the underwriters, however, until the acceptance of the conditional offer to
purchase and the subsequent closing of this offering."
These procedures also should be acceptable in traditional offerings that do not involve an
auction.
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AND
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r
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TERRY L. OVERBEY
THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY

r
r

I.

r

INTRODUCTION
Procter & Gamble derives two benefits from the electronic distribution of
proxy materials and annual reports and electronic proxy voting:

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r

II.

•

For each shareholder converted to full electronic distribution and
electronic voting, P&G saves approximately $4.00 in reduced
postage, printing and handling costs.

•

Many of P&G's shareholders want to receive proxy materials
electronically and to vote electronically, so we are providing a
service to these shareholders by offering electronic distribution and
voting.

STREET SHAREHOLDERS
For shares held beneficially in street name, all companies should take
advantage of electronic delivery and electronic voting to the fullest extent
possible because there are no legal issues and the proxy tabulators have
already done most of the work.
A.

Electronic Voting - Because the shares are held in street name, the
beneficial holder is merely providing voting instructions to the bank or
broker, not a proxy, so there are no issues under state law regarding
electronic proxies.

B.

Electronic Distribution - If a beneficial holder consents to receive
proxy materials electronically for a security, th~t consent is applicable
to all other securities held beneficially in the same account at the bank
or broker. Thus, even though P&G has never solicited consents from
its beneficial holders, we distributed over 8,000 sets of proxy materials
electronically in 1999 to our street shareholders who have otherwise
provided a consent to their bank or broker. To take advantage of this,
a company only needs to get in touch with Automatic Data Processing

1- 1

a few weeks before the record date, provide them with the website
address for its annual report and proxy statement and make sure the
website is active on the mailing date.
III.

REGISTERED SHAREHOLDERS
For a company, the situation with registered shareholders is more
complicated. Electronic votes must qualify as a legal proxy under the
company's state of incorporation and the company must obtain its own
consents to the electronic distribution of proxy materials.

A.

B.

Electronic Voting - A company must determine whether an electronic
proxy is valid under its state of incorporation and, if so, what process it
should use to ensure that the proxy has been properly authorized.

1.

In 1998 when P&G first considered electronic voting, the law in
Ohio was ambiguous. Ohio Revised Code 1701.48 required
proxies to be "appointed by a writing signed by such person"
and specified further that a writing included a "telegram or
cablegram appearing to have been transmitted by such person,
or a photographic, photostatic or equivalent reproduction of a
writing."

2.

While internet or telephonic proxies appeared to be within the
spirit of the law, they were not clearly authorized. We,
therefore, worked through our outside counsel, Dinsmore &
Shohl, and the Attorney General issued an informal opinion to
the Commissioner of Securities clarifying two issues:

a.

'Writing" includes computer transmitted documents such as email.

b.

An e-mail "appearing to be transmitted by such person" would
qualify as a "written" proxy.

3.

Even though the Attorney General's opinion focused solely on e-mail
transmissions, we received an opinion confirming that this reasoning
would apply equally to telephonic transmissions.

4.

Effective September 13, 1999, ORC 1701.48 was amended to
explicitly authorize electronic proxies if there is a "verifiable
communication."

Electronic Notice of Annual Meeting - Many states require
companies to send a "written" notice for the annual meeting of
shareholders. We relied upon the same Attorney General opinion to
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support the use of an electronic notice to satisfy the "written" notice
requirement. Companies should also confirm that their bylaws or
regulations do not require the notice to be "signed" or delivered by
"mail."

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

c.

Electronic Distribution - Two SEC releases (October, 1995 (#337233) and May, 1996 (#33-7288» provide guidance regarding the
electronic distribution of proxy materials. They set forth requirements
as to notice, access and evidence of delivery to insure compliance with
federal securities laws.
1.

Non-employee shareholders - There are three requirements
to deliver materials electronically to non-employee
shareholders, with the key requirement being to obtain an
informed consent from the shareholder:
a.

r
r
r

r
r
r
;

r
r,

r

r

2.

Provide evidence of delivery by obtaining consent from
shareholder.
•

Method of electronic delivery that will be used
(can't just post on a website)

•

Clarify any costs the shareholder may incur

•

Duration of the consent

•

Clarify the consent is revocable at any time

•

Confirm the documents covered by the consent

b.

Provide actual notice of availability of documents at
about the same time paper copies are mailed

c.

Provide effective access - relatively easy access plus
ability to retain a copy of the documents

Employee Shareholders - In Example 1 of the May, 1996
Release, the SEC provided an illustration that would allow an
implied "consent" for employee-shareholders if three factors
were present:
a.

The employees must have regular access to e-mail in the
ordinary course of their duties.

b.

The employees must be given the option to request
paper copies of the proxy materials.

1-3

i

c.

IV.

An e-mail must be delivered to the employees with
instructions for accessing the annual report and proxy
statement.

PROCTER & GAMBLE'S EXPERIENCE

A.

1998 Fiscal Year (June 30, 1998)

1.

All street shareholders were provided the opportunity to provide
voting instructions via telephone or internet and all consenting
street shareholders received their proxy materials electronically.

2.

P&G distributed its annual report and proxy statement
electronically to 25,000 employees in the U.S.

a.

3.

B.

2.

J
ij

.J

We did not distribute the annual report and proxy
statement electronically to any international employees
because we did not have time to determine which
employees had regular e-mail access.

Except for the consenting street shareholders, all other
shareholders (including employee-shareholders who received
electronic copies of the annual report and proxy statement)
received a paper copy of the proxy card in the mail, but all
shareholders had the option to vote electronically.

1999 Fiscal Year (June 30,1999)
1.

c

P&G expanded its electronic distribution in 1999.

a.

In addition to the 25,000 employees in the U.S., we
identified 9,000 international employees who were
eligible for electronic distribution.

b.

All 34,000 employees also received their proxy card
electronically, thereby eliminating postage costs entirely
and helping to increase the number of shareholders
voting over the internet.

Procter & Gamble has about 350,000 registered shareholders
and 500,000 street shareholders and in 1999, we had 350,000
shareholders who voted. The percentage of shareholders
voting by each method was as follows with the costs of
processing each vote indicated in parentheses:
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Mail ($.34)
Telephone ($.18)
Internet ($.03)
Total electronic
vote

r
r

3.

r
r

r

4.

v.

r
r

1998
24.5M
5.0M
29.5M

1999
34.4M
8.4M
42.8M

Index
140
170
145

P&G saved over $150,000 in 1999 by utilizing electronic
distribution and voting and we expect this figure to increase to over
$500,000 per year within a few years.

A.

Electronic distribution and voting has been well-received by P&G
shareholders. Favorable comments have far outnumbered negative
comments, and only 1% of employees have elected to receive paper
copies of their proxy materials.

B.

Employee Communications
1.

About one week prior to the mailing date of our proxy materials,
each employee-shareholder with regular e-mail access received
an e-mail from our CFO (see Exhibit I) announcing the
electronic distribution of proxy materials and providing "opt out"
instructions. This e-mail also included a PIN number for each
employee - the last four digits of each U.S. employee's social
security number or the P&G computer access number for each
international employee.

2.

On the mail date for our proxy materials, each employeeshareholder received a second e-mail (see Exhibit II) that
contained hyperlinks to the annual report, proxy statement,
proxy card and the proxyvote.com website.

3.

Copies of the 1999 proxyvote.com website for P&G are
included as Exhibit III.

r

r

Index
95
92
230
128

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

r

r
r

1999
82.2%
9.5%
8.3%
17.8%

The total number of P&G shareholders receiving proxy materials
electronically was as follows:

Employee-Shareholders
Street shareholders
Total shareholders

r

r
r

1998
86.1%
10.3%
3.6%
13.9%
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4.

A model letter to be used to solicit consents from registered and
street shareholders is included as Exhibit IV and a model for
registered shareholders only is included as Exhibit V. Procter &
Gamble plans to include a letter like this as part of another
mailing to our registered shareholders in 2000.

c.

All companies should start offering electronic voting and the electronic
distribution of proxy materials. These generate significant savings for
relatively little effort and provide a benefit to shareholders. A company
needs to appoint a project owner to coordinate the effort, which will
require an IT resource who can identify eligible employees and assist
with e-mail transmissions and the establishment of the hyperlinks.

I

.J

-

1-6

r

EXHIBIT I
EMPLOYEE-SHAREHOLDER E-MAIL ANNOUNCEMENT
REGARDING ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROXY MATERIALS

r
r

Dear Employee Shareholders,
PIN#

r
r
r

I'm pleased to announce that employee shareholders like you, who have Company provided
Internet access, will be able to once again view shareholder materials online.

r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r

Consistent with last year's approach, as an alternative to receiving paper copies of your 1999
annual report and proxy statement in the mail, copies of these documents will be available via
the Company's Investor Web site (www.pg.comlinvestor). Both documents can be accessed,
viewed and printed 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-per-week.
In addition, all P&G shareholders will have the option of voting their proxy this year over the
Internet or through a special telephone voting service. What's different this year is that your
proxy ballot will also be accessible online. I encourage you to take advantage of this new, costeffective service.
P&G is proud to be the first Ohio corporation to offer these services to its shareholders. We
believe these options will make it more convenient for shareholders to cast their votes on issues
that affect the Company. And just like votes cast using paper proxy cards, votes cast over the
Internet and telephone are tabulated by an outside vendor. P&G does not have access to
individual votes.
You will receive an e-mail message on or about August 27, describing how to access the
annual report, proxy statement and proxy ballot on the P&G Investor Web site. At that time,
employee shareholders will also be given the information required to vote your proxy ballot
online or telephonically. You will be need the PIN # listed above to access online voting.
This improvement is consistent with the Company's objective of increasing shareholder value
by decreasing unnecessary costs. We saved almost $100,000 last year and expect to save an
additional $200,000 through these programs this year, as many of our international employees
will receive their shareholder documents online for the first time. This amount should increase
significantly in future years as more of our non-employee shareholders begin to take advantage
of this capability.
Please consider using the electronic options to vote and receive shareholder materials.
Whatever your choice, please remember to vote your proxy.
Sincerely,
Clayton C. Daley, Jr.
Chief Financial Officer and Shareholder

If you wish to receive paper copies of the 1999 annual report. proxy statement and/or proxy ballot, or if
you don't have P&G provided Internet access. send an e-mail message to shareholders-im. Otherwise.
you will receive an e-mail on or about August 27, 1999 notifying you that these documents have been
posted on the Internet with instructions on how to access and print them.
Please send comments on this procedure to shareholders-im. Do not use the e-mail reply function to
send back comments or request paper copies.
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EXHIBIT II
EMPLOYEE-SHAREHOLDER E-MAIL ANNOUNCEMENT
REGARDING PROXY VOTING WITH HYPERLINKS TO OTHER SITES

Internet Mail Message
Received from host:

[208.207.118.123]

[208.207.118.123]

Click here for
help on Internet
Mail

From:

proxymaster@proxyvote.com on 09/01/99 03:14 PM

r
r

To:

Linda Rohrer-LDIPGI

r

Here are the instructions to access P&G's 1999 annual report, proxy statement and
proxy ballot. In addition, you'll find directions on how to cast your proxy vote, as
well as, an online link to your shareholder Swiffer sample.

r
r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r

r

cc:
Subject: Online Annual Report and Proxy Instructions %P01069· V1868855499%

Your Control Number: 1868855499

As Mr. Daley announced previously, employee shareholders, such as yourself, will be
given the ability to receive these documents online and vote your proxy
electronically. We encourage you to take advantage of the online options, however,
paper copies can be requested by sending an e-mail message to shareholders.im.
To Access the 1999 Online Annual Report, Proxy Statement and your shareholder Swiffer
sample:
1.
Click on this web site address:
Hyperlink

Http://www.pg.com/investor/ar_mstr_index.html

To Access your 1999 Proxy Ballot and Vote your Proxy Online via the Internet:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Print out this page. You will need your 12-digit "Control Number" listed above.
This control number is required to insure security of your vote.
Click on this Web site address:
http://www.proxyvote.com
Go to "To submit your voting instructions over our secure site, click HERE", and
cliCK where asked.
Page down to enter your 12-digit "Control Number" listed above.
Next, enter your PIN number where requested (below the Control Number).
Your PIN number is the last 4 digits of your social security number.
Click on "Click to Continue".
Follow the instructions to view your proxy ballot and cast your vote.

To Access your 1999 Proxy Ballot and Vote your Proxy via the Telephone:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Print out this page since you will need your 12-digit "Control Number" listed
above.
This control number is required for your security.
Click on this Web site address to print off a copy of the proxy ballot:
http://www.pg.com/investor/ar_mstr_index.html
Dial 1-800-690-6903
Key in your 12-digit "Control Number" when requested.
Note: Use the control number located on this page above.
Ignore the reference to a control number on your proxy form, as indicated by the
telephone instructions.
Follow the instructions to cast your vote.

1-9

J

J
i

..i

J

..
i

..i
1-10

r

EXHIBIT III

r
r

WEBSITE FOR PROXY VOTING

r

r
r
r

r
r

WELCOME TO PROXYVOTE.COM
Please select one of the links below•••
If you received your proxy material in the mail, please have your material and your control number ready.
If you received a notification via e-mail, please have your control number and Personal Identification
Number ready.

To submit your voting instructions over our secure site, click HERE.
If your browser cannot support secure transactions via SSL encryption, click HERE.

r

Need to update to a security enabled browser? Click HERE.

r

It's fast, convenient, and your voting instructions are immediately posted.

r
r
r
r
r

r
r

r

You can submit your proxy voting instructions right over the Internet
If you received notification by postal mail:
1. Read the Proxy Statement. The accompanying Voting Instruction Form or Proxy Card contains your Control
Number.
2. Enter the 12 digit Control Number to access an electronic ballot.
3. Complete the electronic ballot and submit your voting instructions.
4. Provide your E-Mail address if you want confirmation of your voting instructions.
If you received notification by E-Mail:
1. To access an electronic ballot, enter the 12 digit Control Number contained in your E-Mail message and the
PIN you used when you enrolled for electronic delivery.
2. The ballot displayed contains Internet Links to the Proxy Statement and the Annual Report; read them
carefully.
3. Complete the ballot and submit your voting instructions.

Enter your PIN NUMBER: L

I (last 4 digits of your 55#): (Required for the E-Mail option only)

Click to Continue

Need to update your browser or download the Adobe Acrobat® Reader? CLICK HERE
ProxyVote
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PROCTER AND GAMBLE Annual Meeting

J

To be held on 1011211999 for holders as of 0713011999
CUSIP 742718- 802

Your Control Number: 881030903006

J

Management Recommendations:
Choose this if you would like to vote your shares following management's recommendations. See below for the
detailed recommendations. Please read it carefully.
Vote my shares per management's recommendations

J
Proxy Ballot:
"

J

DIRECTORS:

'I

Directors Recommend: A vote for election of the following nominees

o For All Nominees o Withhold All Nominees
o For All EXCEPT Those Selected Below:

J

ODONALD R. BEALL
DGRODON F. BRUNNER

o RICHARD B. CHENEY
o DURK I. JAGER

o CHARLES R. LEE
PROPOSALS:

Please indicate your proposal selections by clicking on the fields below.
02 . RATIFY APPOINTMENT AUDITORS
Directors Recommend: FOR
ForO Against
Abstain

o

0

03 . RATIFY AND APPROVE CERTAIN GRANTS OF STOCK OPTIONS OR STOCK APPRECIATION RIGHTS
Directors Recommend: FOR
ForO Against
Abstain

o

0

04 . BOARD OF DIRECTORS TERMS
Directors Recommend: AGAINST
For Against
Abstain

o

1.______

0

0

Vote my shares per the above selections

J
Click to see: "Letter to our clients regarding voting authority·
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Proxy Final Submission
Please check all of the information below for accuracy.
See instructions below and click on Final Submission

r
r

Your Control Number: 8810 3090 3006
PROCTER AND GAMBLE Annual Meeting
To be held on 10/1211999 for holders as of 07/30/1999

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r

CUSIP 742718 - B02

You elected to vote with management's recommendation
DIRECTORS:
DONALD R. BEALL, GRODON F. BRUNNER, RICHARD B. CHENEY, DURK I. JAGER, CHARLES R. LEE
Directors recommend and will vote for all directors.
PROPOSALS:
02 . RATIFY APPOINTMENT AUDITORS
Directors Recommend and will vote for this Proposal
03. RATIFY AND APPROVE CERTAIN GRANTS OF STOCK OPTIONS OR STOCK APPRECIATION RIGHTS
Directors Recommend and will vote for this Proposal
04 . BOARD OF DIRECTORS TERMS
Directors Recommend and will vote against this Proposal

If any of the above information is incorrect, return to the proxy ballot form by using the Back feature of
your Browser Program

If you would like to receive an electronic confirmation when this vote is recorded enter your E-Mail
address here:
E-Mail: 1
...

-'

You now have the option to receive future shareholder communications (Annual Reports, Proxy Statements,
Quarterly Reports, etc.) electronically, instead of in print. This will save postage and mailing costs for the
company(s) in which you have invested. It also means that you can vote future proxies electronically, without a trip
to the Post Office.
Participation is completely your choice. To send future shareholder communications to you electronically, we
require your permission. We also require you to choose a four digit personal identification number. Most people
prefer to use the last four digits of their Social Security number. In the future, when, and if, material is available
electronically, we will send you an e-mail which will contain information that will point you to an Internet location
where the material is available.
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You only have to enroll this investment account once. It will automatically apply to any other company that offers
electronic distribution. We hope you will give this option your serious consideration.

ENROLLMENT
I wish to receive future shareholder communications electronically at the E-MAIL address supplied above. I have
chosen as my four digit personal identification number'
I

If all of the above information is correct then click on Final Submission below.
If any of the above information is incorrect, return to the proxy ballot form by using the Back feature of your
Browser Program
Final Submission

Thank You For Voting

,i
i

~

To enter your next Control Number Click Here

..i

J

1

1

...ii
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EXHIBIT IV
MODEL LETTER SOLICITING PROXY VOTING CONSENTS
FROM REGISTERED AND STREET SHAREHOLDERS

Procter&Gamble
The Procter & Gamble Company
Executive Offices
/ Procter & Gamble Plaza, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-33/5

May_,2000
Dear Procter & Gamble Shareholder:
We are pleased to offer you an opportunity to receive the Company's proxy statement and annual report
electronically over the Internet. You will also be able to vote your proxy over the Internet instead of using the
traditional paper proxy card. By choosing electronic access, you will also help Procter & Gamble reduce printing
and postage costs.
These new online services are available for any Procter & Gamble shares you have deposited with a bank or
brokerage finn that holds the shares on your behalf or for any shares you have in your own name. If you wish to
take advantage of these services, you must have an electronic mail (e-mail) account and access to an Internet
browser, and you will need to enroll by our record date of
, 2000.
To enroll in the new online program, access the www.lnvestorDelivery.com site and click "New Enrollment." You
will be asked to enter the Enrollment Number displayed above. If you hold Procter & Gamble shares in more than
one bank or brokerage account, you may receive additional copies of this letter with a separate Enrollment Number
for each account. You must complete the process for each account, using the Enrollment Number assigned to that
account. As part of the sign-up process, you will be asked to enter your e-mail address and create a four-digit
personal identification number (PIN). We recommend that you choose the same PIN for all accounts that use the
same e-mail address. When you have completed the enrollment, you will be sent an e-mail confirming your election
to use the online services.
When Procter & Gamble's proxy statement and annual report are available, you will be sent an e-mail notification
on how to access them electronically and how to vote your shares at the following Web site: www.ProxyVote.com.
Please read both the proxy statement and the annual report before you cast your vote.
Please note that although there is no charge for this service, there may be costs associated with electronic access to
the Procter & Gamble documents, such as usage charges from Internet access providers and telephone companies.
These costs are your responsibility. We are not involved in the operation of the www.InvestorDelivery.com and
www.ProxyVote.com Web sites and cannot take responsibility for any inaccurate information that may appear.
If you choose to use these new online services, your choice will apply not only to the Procter & Gamble shares held
in your bank or brokerage account, but also the securities of any other companies in your account. Accordingly, as
one or more of those companies make their shareholder communications available through electronic transmission
over the Internet, you will no longer receive printed copies of their proxy statements or annual reports.
If you elect to access your Procter & Gamble materials via the Internet, you can still request paper copies of Procter
& Gamble's proxy statement and annual report by contacting your bank, broker, or Procter & Gamble. You can
also access all of our financial SEC filings through the Procter & Gamble Web site at: www.pg.com.

Your enrollment in the new online program will remain in effect as long as your account remains active or until you
cancel your enrollment.
You are free to cancel your enrollment at any time by accessing
www.lnvestorDelivery.com on the Internet.
If you have Internet access, we hope you will take advantage of these new online services.
Sincerely,
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EXHIBIT V
MODEL LETTER SOLICITING PROXY VOTING CONSENTS
FROM REGISTERED SHAREHOLDERS ONLY

ProcJer&Gamble
The Procter & Gamble Company
Executive Offices
1 Procter & Gamble Plaza, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3315
May_, 2000
Dear Procter & Gamble Shareholder:
We are pleased to offer you an opportunity to receive the Company's proxy statement and annual report
electronically over the Internet. You will also be able to vote your proxy over the Internet instead of
using the traditional paper proxy card. By choosing electronic access, you will also help Procter &
Gamble reduce printing and postage costs.
These new online services are available for any Procter & Gamble shares you have in your own name. If
you wish to take advantage of these services, you must have an electronic mail (e-mail) account and
,2000.
access to an Internet browser, and you wi11 need to enroll by our record date of
To enroll in the new online program, access the www.InvestorDelivery.com site and click "New
Enrollment." You wi11 be asked to enter the Enrollment Number displayed above. If you hold Procter &
Gamble shares in more than one account, you may receive additional copies of this letter with a separate
Enrollment Number for each account. You must complete the process for each account, using the
Enrollment Number assigned to that account. As part of the sign-up process, you will be asked to enter
your e-mail address and create a four-digit personal identification number (PIN). We recommend that
you choose the same PIN for all accounts that use the same e-mail address. When you have completed
the enrolIment, you will be sent an e-mail confirming your election to use the online services.
When Procter & Gamble's proxy statement and annual report are available, you will be sent an e-mail
notification on how to access them electronically and how to vote your shares at the following Web site:
www.ProxyVote.com. Please read both the proxy statement and the annual report before you cast your
vote.
Please note that although there is no charge for this service, there may be costs associated with electronic
access to the Procter & Gamble documents, such as U!'iage charges from Internet access providers and
telephone companies. These costs are your responsibility. We are not involved in the operation of the
www.InvestorDelivery.com and www.ProxyVote.com Web sites and cannot take responsibility for any
inaccurate information that may appear.
If you elect to access your Procter & Gamble materials via the Internet, you can still request paper copies
of Procter & Gamble's proxy statement and annual report by contacting Procter & Gamble. You can
also access all of our financial SEC filings through the Procter & Gamble Web site at: www.pg.com.
Your enrollment in the new online program will remain in effect as long as your account remains active
or until you cancel your enrollment. You are free to cancel your enrollment at any time by accessing
www.InnstorDelivery.com on the Internet.
If you have Internet access, we hope you will take advantage of these new online services.
Sincerely,
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State Law Issues Affecting Electronic
Communications with Shareholders
C. Craig Bradley, Jr.
Stites & Harbison
Electronic technology offers corporations significant opportunities to enhance the means by
which they communicate with their shareholders. A growing number of public companies are taking
advantage of technological advances to offer shareholders the option of voting telephonically or through
the internet as alternatives to the traditional paper proxy card.' In addition, issuers have begun to
recognize the efficiencies and cost savings (and benefits to their shareholders) that can be achieved
through direct electronic distribution of annual reports, proxy statements and other shareholder
communications.2 In addition to satisfying the information and delivery requirements of the federal
securities laws/ issuers must focus on the substantive state laws governing communications between
corporations and their shareholders.
The principal state law issues raised by electronic voting and distribution are the validity of
electronic proxies and shareholder consents and the adequacy of electronic notice of shareholder
meetings. The following discussion summarizes the applicable laws in the states of Kentucky and
Delaware.

Electronic Proxies and Consents
The validity of a proxy is determined under the law of the state of the issuer's incorporation.
Traditional state statutes, while not mandating a specific form, typicaIly require that the grant of a proxy
4
be evidenced by some form of written appointment signed by the shareholder. To resolve legal
uncertainties about the validity of electronic voting, nearly 30 states have enacted legislation in recent
years to specificaIly authorize the use of electronic media to submit proxies. s These laws generally
lin 1998,275 issuers provided electronic voting to registered shareholders. In 1999, over 400 companies offered
electronic voting to their shareholders. American Society of Corporate Secretaries, "Technology and Other 1999
Proxy Trends," July 22,1999 teleconference (remarks of Charles Pursar of Proxy Services Corporation).
2 See Howard M. Friedman, "Proxy Solicitations and the Cyberspace Revolution," Insights, December 1997, p. 9;
John C. Wilcox, "Electronic Communication and Proxy Voting: The Governance Implications of Shareholders in
Cyberspace," Insights, March 1997, p. 8.
3 The Securities and Exchange Commission has encouraged public companies to explore the use of electronic media
for delivering disclosure documents under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. To
help facilitate the development and application of alternative electronic media systems, the Commission has also
provided guidance regarding the principals of individual access, consent, notice and evidence of delivery as they
relate to electronic disclosure practices and an issuer's responsibilities under the federal securities laws. See Use of
Eleetronic Media For Delivery Purposes, Release No. 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995) and Use OfElectronic Media by
Broker-Dealers. Transfer Agents. and Investment Advisers For Delivery OfInformation, Release No. 33-7288 (May
9,1996).
~ E.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 7.22(b) (1984).
5 Arizona (A.R.S. § 10-722); California (Cal Corp Code § 178); Colorado (C.R.S. § 7-107-203); Connecticut (Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 33-706); Delaware (D.G.L.C. § 212); Florida (Fla. Stat. § 607.0722); Georgia (O.C.G.A. § 14-2-722);
Hawaii (HRS § 415-33); Indiana (Bums Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-30-3); Louisiana (La. R.S. 12:75); Michigan (MSA
§ 21.200(42] Minnesota (Mrnn. Stat. § 302A.449); Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.22); Missouri
(R.S.Mo. § 351.245); Montana (Mont. Code Anno. § 35-1-525); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.355); New
Jersey (N.J. Stat. § 14A:5-19); New York (NY CLS Bus Corp § 609); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-22);
North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-76.2); Ohio (O.G.C.L. § 1701.48); Oklahoma (O.G.C.A. § 1057); Puerto
Rico (14 L.P.R.A § 2902); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-31); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-17-203);
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require that the electronic proxy be accompanied by some form of verification or authentication sufficient
to identify the shareholder submitting the proxy.6 In those states without express statutory authority,
corporations and their counsel must resolve interpretative questions regarding whether a telephonic or
internet vote meets the requirements under state law for a "written" proxy appointment "signed" by the
shareholder.
All states permit shareholders to act by consent in lieu of a meeting. Applicable statutes
generally specify that the consent action must be evidenced by one or more "written" consents "signed"
by the shareholders entitled to vote on the matter and "delivered" to the corporation.' Corporations
considering an electronic consent solicitation must determine whether consents transmitted electronically
meet the applicable statutory requirements for form, signature and delivery.8

Electronic Distribution of Shareholder Notices
Issuers considering electronic distribution of proxy materials must also address whether form and
delivery requirements for shareholder meeting notices are satisfied. For example, corporations choosing
to utilize electronic delivery for an annual shareholder meeting will post their meeting notice, proxy
statement and annual report on their web site and concurrently transmit an e-mail notice to all consenting
shareholders containing details about the location of the web site and how shareholders can access the
proxy materials on the internet. Many jurisdictions require that notices be in written form but authorize
notice to be communicated through a wide range of distribution media. 9 On the other hand, would this
practice qualify as acceptable notice under state statutes which may specify that notices of shareholder
meetings be in writing and delivered by mail?lO

Kentucky Law
The Kentucky Business Corporation Act does not specifically authorize the use of electronic
proxies. KRS 271B.7-220(2) provides, in pertinent part:
A shareholder may appoint a proxy to vote or otherwise act for him by signing an
appointment form .... For purposes of this section ... a telegram or cablegram
appearing to have been transmitted by the proper person, or a photographic, photostatic,
or equivalent reproduction of a writing appointing a proxy shall be deemed to be a
sufficient, signed appointment form.
Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-722); Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-663); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-722).
Section 7.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act was amended in 1996 to specifically authorize the transmission
of proxy appointments by electronic or other non-written means. 51 Bus. Law. 209 (Nov. 1995).
6 E.g., California Corporations Code § 178 (permits electronic transmissions generally, and specifically authorizes
telephonic transmissions). Section 1.40(7A) of the Model Business Corporation Act, added in 1996, defines an
electronic transmission as "any process of communication not directly involving the physical transfer of paper that is
suitable for the retention, retrieval, and reproduction of information by the recipient." The Official Comment to
Section 7.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act states: "An electronic transmission which appoints a proxy is
deemed the equivalent of a signed appointment form if it contains or is accompanied by information from which it
can be reasonably verified that the transmission was authorized by the shareholder or by the shareholder's agent or
attorney-in-fact." The Official Comment to Section 7.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act further notes that
the reference to electronic transmission is specifically intended to include telephonic voting procedures.
, See, e.g., Model Business Corporation Act § 7,04(a).
8 The Model Act definitions of"deliver" (§ 1.40(5» and "sign" (§ 1.40(22A» were amended or added in 1997 to
incorporate the concepts of electronic transmission and electronic signature.
9 See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 1.41(b) (1984) (notice may be communicated by telephone,
telegraph, teletype or other form of wire or wireless communication).
10 See, e.g., Ohio General Corporation Law § 1701041.
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However, the Kentucky electronic records and signature law, KRS 369.010-.030, authorizes
consenting parties to agree to accept electronic records and electronic signatures as substitutes for
traditional signed written documents. I I A qualifying electronic signature must possess the following
characteristics: (a) it is unique to the f:erson using it; (b) it is capable of verification; and (c) it is under
the sole control of the person using it. 2 As a result, electronic proxies (including both telephonic and
internet votes) which satisfy the requirements for an electronic signature under KRS 369.020 should be
enforceable under the Business Corporation Act. 13 Similarly, an electronic shareholder consent which
includes a legally enforceable electronic signature under Chapter 369 should be valid for purposes of
Kentucky corporate law.
KRS 271B.1-41O requires notices to be in written form but doesn't limit delivery to mail.
Transmission of shareholder notices electronically (such as e-mail and posting to a web site) should be an
acceptable form of delivery under Kentucky law.
In addition to relevant statutory restrictions, corporations should review their articles of
incorporation and bylaws for any provisions which would preclude or be inconsistent with electronic
voting and distribution arrangements.

Delaware Law
The Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") specifically provides for proxy solicitation by
means of any authorized electronic transmission. Section 212 of the DGCL provides, in pertinent part:
(b)
Each stockholder ... may authorize another person or persons to act for such
stockholder by proxy....

r
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(c)
Without limiting the manner in which a stockholder may authorize another
person or persons to act for such stockholder as proxy pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section, the following shall constitute a valid means by which a stockholder may grant
such authority....
(2)
A stockholder may authorize another person or persons to act for such
stockholder as proxy by transmitting or authorizing the transmission of a telegram,
cablegram, or other means of electronic transmission to the person who will be the holder
KRS 369.030(3) provides in pertinent part:
If all parties to a private sector transaction agree to the use of an electronic record or an electronic
signature ...
(a)
Information, records, and electronic signatures shall not be denied legal effect, validity,
or enforceability solely on the grounds that they are in electronic, duplicate, or imaged
form.
(b)
Where a statute or administrative regulation requires a manual signature, or provides for
certain consequences if a document is not manually signed, an electronic signature shall
have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature.
(c)
Where a statute or administrative regulation requires information to be "written," or "in
writing," or provides for certain consequences if it is not, that statute or administrative
regulation shall be satisfied by an electronic record.
12 KRS 369.020(3). The current practice for corporations offering electronic voting options to its shareholders is to
assign each shareholder a personal identification number which is used to authenticate the shareholder's voting
instructions.
13 For example, Ashland Inc.'s proxy statement for its January 2000 annual shareholder meeting states that the
telephone and internet voting procedures offered for that meeting were designed to comply with Kentucky law
regarding the use of electronic signatures.
II
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of the proxy ... provided that any such telegram, cablegram or other means of electronic
transmission must either set forth or be submitted with information from which it can be
determined that the telegram, cablegram or other electronic transmission was authorized
by the stockholder. If it is determined that such telegrams, cablegrams or other electronic
transmissions are valid, the inspectors, or if there are no inspectors, such other persons
making that determination shall specify the information upon which they relied.
(d)
Any copy, facsimile telecommunication or other reliable reproduction of the
writing or transmission created pursuant to subsection (c) of this section may be
substituted or used in lieu of the original writing or transmission for any and all purposes
for which the original writing or transmission could be used, provided that such copy,
facsimile telecommunication or other reproduction shall be a complete reproduction of
the entire original writing or transmission.
Section 222(a) of the DGCL requires corporations to give written notice of shareholder meetings.
Neither the exact form of the notice or an exclusive means of delivery are specified in the statute.
Conclusion
Much of the legal uncertainty over the validity of electronic proxies and shareholder notices has
been clarified or eliminated as state corporate laws have been updated to accommodate modern
technology practices. Issuers should nevertheless review the expanded state laws carefully to be certain
that their electronic systems and procedures satisfy the applicable requirements for retrieval and retention
of electronic corporate records and for authentication of electronic signatures and transmissions.
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State Law Issues Regarding
Electronic Communications with Shareholders
ofIndiana and Tennessee Corporations
Cynthia W. Young
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
From a corporate law standpoint, required communications between a corporation and its
shareholders are generally limited to notices (such as notices of meetings and certain actions
taken without a meeting) and voting by proxies or written consents. Written when pen, paper
and the United States mail were the means of commercial communication, many corporate
statutes worded these requirements in terms of written notices or communications which were
signed and delivered when mailed.
Increasingly, corporations and shareholders are preferring electronic communications to
pen, paper and the mail. Electronic communications can be quicker, cheaper and, in some
contexts, easier. Electronic communications are becoming an accepted practice from a securities
law perspective. But for communications that must satisfy both corporate and securities law
requirements, the question is: Are they permissible under the laws of the state in which the
corporation is organized? The Securities and Exchange Commission has had a practice of
requiring public companies to answer this question in their proxy materials, when they offer
electronic voting.\
Various approaches have been taken by states to permit electronic communications under
their corporate codes. The Model Business Corporation Act has updated its definitions, which
are generally applicable to sections throughout the Act, to include concepts consistent with
electronic communications, and then addressed permissible electronic communications in
specific, operative sections. Indiana and Tennessee have, in general, followed a hybrid approach
to authorize certain types of electronic communications with shareholders.
An Indiana or Tennessee corporation may send notice of shareholders' meetings by wire

or wireless communication, though it is advisable for corporations using this method of
communication to confirm receipt of the notice. In addition, shareholders may "vote"
electronically, through the appointment of proxies.
There is currently no mechanism under either the Indiana or the Tennessee Business
Corporation Act for "electronic" written consents by shareholders or directors.

\ Item 17 in the Division of Corporation Finance Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations
(July 1997) (http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/phin797r.txt) states
When a company offers shareholders the option ofsubmitting a proxy by Internet, the proxy
statement should include a description ofInternet voting procedures and the validity under
applicable state law of proxies granted pursuant to this mechanism of electronic
transmission. Rule 14a-9 requires similar disclosure on the proxy card.
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Indiana
Electronic notice

While generally requiring that notice be "in writing'? IC 23-1-20-29 permits any notice
under the Indiana Business Corporation Act to be communicated
by telephone, telegraph, teletype, or other form of wire or wireless
communication.
However, the corporation bears the risk ifthe notice to shareholders it communicates
electronically is not received. Written notice mailed by an Indiana corporation to its shareholders
is effective when mailed, if mailed and correctly addressed, as shown in the corporation's current
record of shareholders. IC 23-1-20-29(c). In contrast, written notice communicated
electronically is not effective until received. IC 23-1-20-29(e)(I).
Voting by proxy

IC 23-1-30-3 establishes three ways in which a shareholder may authorize a person to act
for the shareholder as proxy
~

r

The shareholder or the shareholder's designated officer, director, employee or
agent may execute a writing by signing it or causing his signature to be affixed to
the writing by any reasonable means, including by facsimile signature
The shareholder may transmit or authorize the transmission of an electronic
submission. The electronic transmission

r
r

•

may be transmitted by any electronic means, including data and voice
telephonic communications and computer network

•

may be transmitted to the person who is the holder of the proxy, a proxy
solicitation firm or a proxy support service organization or similar agency
authorized by the person who will be the holder of the proxy to receive the
electronic submission

•

must either contain or be accompanied by information from which it can
be determined that the electronic submission was transmitted by or
authorized by the shareholder.

r
r
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2

Oral notice is permitted only if authorized by the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws.
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A copy, facsimile telecommunication or other reliable reproduction of the writing or electronic
submission created may be used instead of the original writing or electronic submission for all
purposes for which the original writing or electronic transmission may be used if it is a complete
copy of the entire original writing or electronic submission.
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Under IC 23-1-30-5, a corporation is entitled to reject a vote, consent, waiver, or proxy
appointment if the secretary or other officer or agent authorized to tabulate votes, acting in good
faith, has reasonable basis for doubt about: (1) the validity of the signature on a writing or about
the signatory's authority to sign for the shareholder; or (2) the validity of an electronic
submission or the submitter's authority to make the electronic transmission.
Actions without a meeting

The statutes permitting actions by shareholders or directors by written consent in lieu of a
meeting require that the action be evidenced by a written consent signed by the shareholders or
directors. IC 23-1-29-4; IC 23-1-34-2. Signed written consents by shareholders must be
delivered to the corporation, and signed written consents by directors must be included in the
corporation's records. Neither of these statutes contain any mechanism for a shareholder or
director to "execute" a written consent in any manner other than signing it.

Tennessee
Electronic notice

While generally requiring that notice be "in writing'? T.C.A. Section 48-11-202 permits
any notice under the Tennessee Business Corporation Act to be communicated electronically, as
follows:
(c)

r
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In addition, the shareholder may authorize a person to act as the shareholder's
proxy by any other method authorized by law.

Notice may be communicated in person; by telephone, telegraph, teletype,
facsimile transmission or other form of wire or wireless communication;
or by mail or private carrier. . ..

However, the corporation bears the risk if the notice to shareholders it communicates
electronically is not received. Written notice mailed by a Tennessee corporation to its
shareholders is effective when mailed if mailed postage prepaid and correctly addressed, as

Oral notice is effective if it is reasonable under the circumstances and not prohibited by the charter or
bylaws.

3
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shown in the corporation's current record of shareholders. T.C.A. Section 48-11-202(c). In
contrast, written notice communicated electronically is not effective until received. T.C.A.
Section 48-11-202(e)(1).
Electronic voting

r
r
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Under T.C.A. 48-17-203(b)(2),
a shareholder may authorize another person to act for the shareholder as proxy by
transmitting or authorizing the transmission of a telegram, cablegram, facsimile or
other means of electronic transmission to the person who will be the holder of the
proxy or to a proxy solicitation firm, proxy support service organization or like
agent duly authorized by the person who will be the holder of the proxy to receive
such transmission, provided that any such telegram, cablegram, facsimile or other
electronic transmission was authorized by the shareholder. If it is determined that
such telegrams, cablegrams, facsimiles or other electronic communications are
valid, the inspectors or, if there are no inspectors, such other persons making such
determination shall specify the information upon which they relied.
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A copy, facsimile transmission or other reliable reproduction of the electronic submission created
. may be used instead of the original writing or electronic submission for all purposes for which
the original writing or electronic transmission may be used if it is a complete copy of the entire
original electronic transmission.
Actions without a meeting
The statutes permitting actions by shareholders or directors by written consent in lieu of a
meeting require that the action be evidenced by a written consent signed by each shareholder.
T.C.A. Section 48-17-104 and Section 48-18-202. Signed written consents by shareholders must
be delivered to the corporation, and signed written consents by directors must be included in the
corporation's records. Unlike the proxy statute [T.C.A. Section 48-17-203(b)], neither of these
statutes contain any mechanism for a shareholder or director to "execute" a written consent in
any manner other than signing it.

Note
The language in the Indiana and Tennessee statutes permitting delivery of notices by wire
or wireless communications tracked the language in the corresponding section (§ 1.41) of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act as in effect prior to the amendments of the Model Act
pertaining to electronic filings, which were adopted effective September 20, 1997. See
Committee on Corporate Laws, A.B.A., Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendments Pertaining to Electronic Filings/Standards ofConduct and Standards of
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Liabilityfor Directors, 53 Bus. Law 157 (1997); Committee on Corporate Laws, A.B.A.,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Electronic Filings,
52 Bus. Law 991 (1997). The changes made to the Model Act pertaining to electronic filing
included changing the notice section to expressly provide that
•
•
•

Notice by electronic transmission is written notice.
Notice may be communicated by telephone, voice mail or other electronic means4 •
Notice is effective when electronically transmitted to the shareholder in the
manner authorized by the shareholder.

These changes were accompanied by a change in the official comment to address specifically
notice by electronic transmission.
The 1997 changes to the Model Act establish a workable framework under which a
corporation may use electronic means to communicate notice to its shareholders. Still, language
permitting the communication of notice by wire or wireless communication should be broad
enough to permit delivery of notices bye-mail.

February 2000
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4 This method of communication was substituted for telephone, telegraph, teletype, or other form of wire
or wireless communication.
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Overview

One of the stated purposes of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 was
to amend the Federal securities laws in order to promote efficiency and capital formation in the
financial markets. As explained in the statement by the Conference Committee which
accompanied the final draft of the legislation:
The development and growth of the nation's capital markets has prompted the
Congress to examine the need for legislation modernizing and rationalizing our scheme of
securities regulation to promote investment, decrease the cost of capital, and encourage
competition. The Managers have sought to achieve these goals while also advancing the
historic commitment of the securities laws to promoting the protection of investors. In
particular, the system of dual Federal and state securities regulation has resulted in a
degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation. Securities offerings and the brokers and
dealers engaged in securities transactions are all currently subject to a dual system of
regulation that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.
During the course of consideration of this legislation, the Congress received
testimony indicating that this duplicative regulation tends to raise the cost of capital to
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate protection to investors or
to our markets. Testimony also indicated that technological change has transformed the
capital raising process, necessitating changes in the regulatory scheme to facilitate the
flow of information to potential investors and reduce the marginal cost of capital to firms.
The Managers have sought to eliminate duplicative and unnecessary regulatory burdens
while preserving important investor protections by reallocating responsibility over the
regulation of the nation's securities markets in a more logical fashion between the Federal
government and the states.
With respect to securities offerings, the Managers have allocated regulatory
responsibility between the Federal and state governments based on the nature of the
securities offering. Some securities offerings, such as those made by investment
companies, and certain private placements are inherently national in nature, and are
therefore subject to only Federal regulation. Smaller, regional, and intrastate securities
offerings remain subject to state regulation. The Managers have preserved the authority of
the states to protect investors through application of state antifraud laws. This
preservation of authority is intended to permit state securities regulators to continue to
exercise their police power to prevent fraud and broker-dealer sales practice abuses, such
as churning accounts or misleading customers. It does not preserve the authority of state
securities regulators to regulate the securities registration and offering process through
commenting on and/or imposing requirements on the contents of prospectuses or other
offering documents, whether prior to their use in a state or after such use. The Conference
Report requires the SEC to conduct a study on the lack of uniformity in state regulation
of non-covered securities. Such study shall focus on the effect of such uniformity or lack
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thereof on the cost of capital, innovation and technological development in securities
markets, and duplicative regulation with respect to securities issuers, including small
business.
Overviews of the impact ofNSMIA on securities offerings and the Kentucky legislative and
regulatory initiatives spearheaded by the Kentucky Division of Securities in response to
NSMIA's mandates were presented at the 9th Biennial Midwest/Midsouth Securities Conference.
See The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: An Overview of Current
Impact, by Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., and Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions
Division of Securities - An Overview of 1997 Initiatives, by Marion H. Lewis.
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This paper provides a follow-up report, focusing on private placements, and their use by
issuers after NSMIA.

•

National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
o NSMIA changed the securities offering process for "covered securities" by preempting
state law registration and qualification requirements. The extent of the preemption - and
whether state notice filings and fees may still be required - depends on the type of
covered securities being offered. NSMIA brought about this change by amending
Section 18 to the Securities Act of 1933.
o Four types of "covered securities" are defined in Section 18. They include
Listed securities - This category includes securities that are (or will be upon
completion of the offering) listed (or authorized for listing) on

*

the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange or the National
Market System of Nasdaq, or

*

Tier 1 of the Pacific Exchange, Incorporation, Tier 1 of the Philadelphia
Exchange, Incorporated, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Incorporation [see Rule 146 under the Securities Act of 1933],

or are securities of the same issuer that are equal in seniority or senior to such
listed securities.
•

States may not impose any filing requirement or fee in connection with offerings
of these securities.
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Investment company securities -- This category includes securities issued by an
investment company registered, or that has filed a registration statement under, the
Investment Company Act of 1940

t

r
r

Exempt securities - A third category includes securities when offered and sold
pursuant to certain exemptions under Sections 3 and Section 4 of the Securities Act of
1933, or pursuant to rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. These covered securities include
•

secondary trading in securities by non-affiliates of the issuer exempt under
Sections 4(1) or 4(3), provided the issuer files reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act

•

broker's transactions exempt under Section 4(4)

•

transactions in securities exempt under Section 3(a)(2) - except that municipal
securities will not be a covered security in the state in which the issuer is located

•

commercial paper exempt under Section 3(a)(3)

•

securities issued by savings and loan associations or other entities exempt under
Section 3(a)(5) or 3(a)(6)

r

•

securities issued in connection with certain Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings
exempt under Section 3(a)(7)

r
r
r
r
r

•

insurance and endowment policies and annuity contracts exempt under Section
3(a)(8)

•

the exchange of securities by an issuer with its existing security holders exempt
under Section 3(a)(9)

•

the issuance of equity securities in certain bank and savings and loan holding
company formations exempt under Section 3(a)(l2)

•

securities issued by certain church plans, companies or accounts exempt under
Section 3(a)(13)

•

the issuance of securities pursuant to rules or regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under Section 4(2), although a state may impose notice
filing requirements that are substantially similar to those required under rule or
regulation as in effect on September 1, 1996.

r

r
r

r
r

r

r
r
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Currently, the only rule or regulation issued by the SEC under Section 4(2) is
Rule 506 of Regulation D.

*

Examples of exempt offerings that are not covered securities

+ limited offerings under Rule 504 or Rule 505 of Regulation D
+ offerings pursuant to compensatory plans under Rule 701
Qualified investors - A final category covers securities when offered and sold to
qualified investors, as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission by rule.
To date, the SEC has not defined the term "qualified investors".
o

Advantages of offering a covered security
Issuers are not required to comply with state securities law requirements to register or
qualify the securities or the securities transaction
State law requirements prohibiting, limiting or imposing conditions on the use of an
offering document prepared by or on behalf of an issuer with respect to the covered
security are preempted
Avoid any state merit review of the offering or the issuer

o

Some state law compliance is still required
Except in connection with offerings oflisted securities (see above), states may
continue to require notice filings and assess fees in connection with offerings of
covered securities.
•

A state securities commission may require the filing of documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933,
together with annual or periodic reports ofthe value of securities offered or sold
in the state (to the extent not included in the SEC filings), for notice purposes and
the assessment of any fee, together with payment of any required fees and a
consent to service of process.

•

Until a state, by law, rule, regulation, or order or administrative action, provides
otherwise, filing and registration fees with respect to securities and securities
transactions will continue to be collected in amounts determined pursuant to state
law as in effect on the day before NSMIA was enacted. These fees must be paid,
and supporting data reported, on the same schedule as would have been applicable
absent preemption.

r
r

•

r

r

Nothing in NSMIA prohibits a state securities commission from suspending the offer
or sale of securities within that state for failure to submit any filing or fee required
under law and permitted by NSMIA. In addition, during the first three years after the
enactment ofNSMIA (until October 1999), a state securities commission could
require registration of securities if the issuer refused to pay the fee required.

r
I

r

State securities commissions retain jurisdiction to investigate and bring enforcement
actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful actions by brokers or dealers in
connection with securities or securities transactions

r

While an offering of covered securities is, in effect, exempted from state registration
and qualification requirements, this exemption does not extend to state broker-dealer
and agent requirements.

r
r

•

r
,

r
r

r
r

r
r
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Listings of states that have adopted laws and/or regulations in response to NSMIA
and containing filing requirements for covered securities offerings can be found at
I CCH BLUE SKY L. RPTR. ~ 6491.

•

State laws must still be examined to determine whether participants in the offering
- or representatives of the issuer - will fall within the definition of a broker,
dealer, agent or the like and will have to comply with state licensing requirements
because of their role in the offering.

Private placements and limited offerings- coordinating Federal and state exemptions
o Under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering do not have to comply with the registration requirements imposed
under Section 5 of that act.
The statute does not indicate what requirements must be met in order for a transaction
by an issuer not to involve any public offering. One must look to the case law to
determine the criteria considered important by courts when judging the availability of
this exemption
Securities offered and sold in reliance on Section 4(2), and not pursuant to a rule
adopted under Section 4(2) by the Securities and Exchange Commission, are not
covered securities. The securities offering will have to be structured to meet an
exemption from registration under applicable state securities laws, or be registered or
qualified under those securities laws.

r
r
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o The Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 506 to provide a safe harbor as
to what constitutes a transaction not involving a public offering, for purposes of Section
4(2).
A security issued in a non-public offering exempt from registration under Rule 506
will be a "covered security" with respect that offering, and will be exempt from state
registration and qualification requirements, although a state may impose notice filing
requirements that are "substantially similar" to those required under Regulation D, as
in effect on September 1, 1996.
•

Under Regulation D, that notice, a Form D, is required to be filed with the SEC
within 15 days after the first sale. The requirement to file notice of sales is
contained in Rule 503. Failure to file the notice with respect to an offering will
not affect the exempt status of the offering. However, if an issuer, or any of its
predecessors or affiliates have been temporarily, preliminarily or permanently
enjoined for failure to comply with this notice filing requirement, the issuer
cannot use the exemptions under Rule 506 (or 504 or 505), unless the Securities
and Exchange Commission, determines, upon a showing a good cause, that it is
not necessary under the circumstances that the exemption be denied.

As noted in the SEC's Report on Unifonnity of State Regulatory Requirements for
Offerings of Securities That Are Not "Covered Securities", October 11, 1997
(http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm). some states require advance notice
of these offerings of covered securities, before sales are made, or require the filing of
offering materials which are not required to be filed with the SEC.
Conditions that must be met for Rule 506 offerings:
•
•
•

•

•

no general advertising or general solicitation
no more than 35 purchasers, not counting accredited investors
each purchaser who is not an accredited investors must, alone or with his
purchaser representative, have such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
investment
all purchasers who are not accredited investors must receive information meeting
minimum disclosure requirements a reasonable time before they make their
investment decision
restrictions on transferability apply to securities acquired, and the issuer must
exercise reasonable care to assure that investors are purchasing for investment and
are not underwriters (i.e., acquiring securities with a view to engaging in a
distribution)

L-6

J

M

..
;'.1

r
r
r

o

r
r

Other exemptions for limited offerings of securities that do not constitute covered
securities have been established by regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Offerings of securities pursuant to these limited offering exemptions must
be registered or qualified under applicable state securities laws absent a state exemption
from registration. The limited offering exemptions created by the SEC include
•

r

r
r

the exemption for limited offerings and sales of securities not exceeding
$1,000,000, pursuant to Rule 504 of Regulation D

*

This exemption cannot be used by an issuer that is subject to the reporting
requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, that is an investment company, or that is a development stage company
that either has no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated its
business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
person.

*

The maximum aggregate offering price cannot exceed $1,000,000 less the
aggregate offering price of all securities sold during the 12 months before the
start of and during the Rule 504 offering in reliance on any exemption under
Section 3(b) or in violation of Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.

*

Effective April 7, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission modified
Rule 504 to curb fraudulent transactions in securities of microcap companies.
General advertising and general solicitation are now prohibited under Rule
504 and securities issued in reliance on the exemption will be restricted
securities unless offers and sales of the securities are either

r
r

r
r
r

+ registered pursuant to state law requirements that require the public filing
and delivery to investors of substantive disclosure documents before sale I,
or

+ made exclusively according to state law exemptions from registration that
permit general solicitation and general advertising so long as sales are
made only to accredited investors

r
r

r
r

•

A Model Accredited Investor Exemption for sales by an issuer to
accredited investors was adopted by the North American Securities

So long as this requirement is met, offers and sales may also be made in other states that do not require
registration or public filing or delivery of disclosure documents provided the disclosure document is
delivered to all purchasers before sale.
I

r
r
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Administrators Association (NASAA) in 1997. See CCH NASAA
RPr.p.361
•

the exemption for limited offerings and sales of securities not exceeding
$5,000,000, pursuant to Rule 505 of Regulation D

*
*
*
*

*

*

no general advertising or general solicitation
no more than 35 purchasers, not counting accredited investors
all purchasers who are not accredited investors must receive information
meeting minimum disclosure requirements a reasonable time before they
make their investment decision
restrictions on transferability apply to securities acquired, and the issuer must
exercise reasonable care to assure that investors are purchasing for investment
and are not underwriters (i.e., acquiring securities with a view to engaging in a
distribution)
the maximum aggregate offering price cannot exceed $5,000,000 less the
aggregate offering price of all securities sold during the 12 months before the
start of and during the Rule 505 offering in reliance on any exemption under
Section 3(b) or in violation of Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
the "bad boy" provisions of Regulation A apply

•

the exemption for mini-public offerings not exceeding $5,000,000, pursuant to
Regulation A

•

the exemption for offers and sales pursuant to certain compensatory benefit plans
and contracts, pursuant to Rule 701

*

This exemption is available to private companies - that is, an issuer that is not
subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that is not an investment company
registered, or required to be registered, under the Investment Company Act of
1940.

*

The exemption covers offers and sales of securities under a written
compensatory benefitplan (or written compensation contract) to employees,
directors, general partners, officers or consultants and advisors.

*

Effective February 25, 1999, Rule 701 was amended to, among other things
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+ remove the $5 million per year aggregate offering price ceiling. The

r

aggregate amount of securities that can now be sold2 pursuant to the
exemption during a 12-month cannot exceed the greater of

r

•
•

r
r

•

+ require specific disclosure from issuers if the aggregate sales price of the
amount of securities sold during a 12 month period exceeds $5 million

+ impose special requirements on the types of consultants and advisors to

r

whom securities may be offered and sold in reliance on the rule
•
•
•

r
r

they must be natural persons
they must provide bona fide services
the services provided cannot be in connection with the offer or sale of
securities in a capital raising transaction, and cannot directly or
indirectly promote or maintain a market for the issuer's securities

+ extend the exemption to family members of employees, directors, general

r

partners, officers and consultants and advisors who acquire such securities
through gifts or domestic relations orders

f

r

These limited offering exemptions were created by the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. This statute
authorizes the SEC to create additional exemptions from the Federal registration
requirements for issues of securities that do not exceed $5,000,000, in the aggregate.

r
r

•

r
r
r

r

15% of the total assets of the issuer\ or
15% of the outstanding amount of the class of securities being
offered3, or
$1,000,000

Section 3(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 also authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission to create registration exemptions for securities issued by
small business investment companies under the Small Business Investment Act of
1958. The SEC has adopted Regulation E which provides an exemption for
securities of small business investment companies, subject to certain conditions.

2

Sales of securities underlying an option are counted as sales on the date the option is granted.

3

Measured at the issuer's most recent balance sheet date (no later than its last fiscal year end).

r

r
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Standard state exemptions for private placements and limited offerings in Kentucky

..

Covered securities filing requirements, including filings for transactions exempt
under Rule 506 of Regulation D, are contained in KRS 292.327
•

With respect to an offering exempt under Rule 506, the notice on Form D,
together with a $250 filing fee and a consent to service of process, must be filed
no later than 15 days after the first sale in Kentucky.

KRS 292.410(1 )(i) provides an exemption from state registration requirements for
certain types of limited offerings.
•

The types of limited offerings covered by this exemption are

*

Organizer/manager: each purchaser has access to all the material facts with
respect to the securities by reason of the purchaser's active involvement in the
organization or management of the issuer or the purchaser's family
relationship with a person actively involved in the organization or
management of the issuer

*

Limited qualified purchasers: there are no more than 15 purchasers in
Kentucky and each Kentucky purchaser is an accredited investor or meets the
active involvement test described above

*

Limited amount: the aggregate offering price of the securities (in and outside
Kentucky) does not exceed $500,000, the total number of purchasers (in and
outside Kentucky) does not exceed 35, and each purchaser either is an
accredited investor or meets the active involvement test described above, or
receives all of the material facts with respect to the investment decision

+ Upon request, the Commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions may, by order, increase the maximum offering amount above
$500,000 or the maximum number of purchasers above 35 if the
Commissioner determines that the increase is necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. The request must be
made in advance of sales, and must be accompanied by
•

a statement of the reasons for requesting the increase

•

a copy of the offering circular or other disclosure materials being
distributed to prospective purchasers
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•

a copy of the written representation and legend serving as the issuer's
basis for reasonably believing each purchaser's investment intent and
awareness of the transferability and resale restrictions on the securities
being offered

•

a $250 filing fee

The following conditions must be met:

*

no general advertising or general solicitation

*

the issuer must reasonably believe each purchaser is acquiring the securities
for investment and is aware of the restrictions imposed on transferability and
resale

Kentucky's counterpart to Rules 504 and 505 is contained in Rule 808 KAR 10:210
•

Offerings exempt under Rule 504 (as in effect June 14, 1996) or Rule 505 (as in
effect August 13, 1992) will be exempt if the following conditions are met

*

no general advertisement or general solicitation

*

the issuer must reasonably believe each purchaser is acquiring the securities
for investment and is aware of the restrictions imposed on transferability and
resale

*

notice is filed, together with a $250 filing fee

+ The required notice consists of notice on Form D, manually signed on
behalf of the issuer, and information furnished by the issuer to an offeree
(issuers must also provide notice of material changes to the offering
materials during the course of the offering within 15 days, and file a copy
of any subsequent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission)

r
r

+ The notice must be filed no later than 15 days after the first sale from or

r

into Kentucky, for Rule 505 transactions, or at least 10 business days prior
to the first sale from or into Kentucky, for Rule 504 transactions

r

•

r

r
r

*

The Department of Financial Institutions can determine that the
exemption is not available during this time period.

Disqualifying provisions, similar (but not identical) to the "bad boy"
provisions contained in Regulation A, apply
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•

The exemption does not exempt any person who receives a commission, finder
fee or other remuneration in connection with a sale of a security from state brokerdealer or agent registration requirements

Kentucky's Rule 701
•

Offers and sales of securities that are exempt under Rule 701 are also exempt
from registration in Kentucky, pursuant to Rule 808 KAR 10:300. However, this
exemption cannot be used as part of a plan or scheme to circumvent the purpose
of the exemption, including to raise capital.

Limited offerings to accredited investors - Rule 808 KAR 10-340
•

Offers and sales by an issuer are exempt if sales are made exclusively to
accredited investors

*

A general announcement of the offering may be made by any means, but its
content generally must be limited to that set out in the rule

*

Information may be distributed to accredited investors (either through an
electronic database restricted to prequalified accredited investors or to a
prospective purchaser whom the issuer reasonably believes to be an accredited
investor)

*

A notice filing is required within 15 days after the first sale in Kentucky,
which must be accompanied by a copy of the general announcement, a
consent to service of process and a $250 fee.

•

An issuer cannot rely on this exemption if the issuer issues interests in an oil, gas
or mineral enterprise, or is in the development stage and has no specific business
plan or purpose or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or
acquisition with an unidentified person.

•

An issuer may be disqualified from using this exemption as a result of certain stop
orders, criminal convictions, administrative enforcement orders or judgments or
restraining orders or injunctions.

Other Kentucky exemptions that might be useful
•

securities issued in a statutory merger or reorganization (KRS 292.410(1)(n))

-
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•

safe harbor for limited liability company membership interests - Rule 808 KAR
10:360

Federal covered securities are excepted from the state registration requirements [IC
23-2-1-3(3)], although the Securities Commissioner may, by rule or otherwise,
require notice filings and a fee pursuant to IC 23-2-1-6.1.

r

For offerings made in compliance with Rule 506 of Regulation D, the Form D must
be filed no later than 15 days after the date of first sale in Indiana. See Administrative
Order of the Securities Commissioner, Indiana Division of Securities, dated
November 22, 1996 [2 CCH BLUE SKY L. RPTR. ~ 24,692]; Section 710 lAC 1-136(d)(2).

r
r

The Indiana uniform limited offering exemption is contained in Section 710 lAC 113-6. It exempts from state registration offers and sales exempt pursuant to Rule 504,
505 or 506 (as made effective by identified SEC releases). The exemption for
offerings made in compliance with Rule 504 or 505 is subject to the following
conditions:

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

offerings to existing security holders of the issuer ifno commission or other
remuneration is paid or given for soliciting any security holder in this state (KRS
292.410(1 )(k»

o Limited offering exemptions in Indiana

r

r
r

•

4

*

No commission, fee or other remuneration is paid for soliciting prospective
purchasers in Indiana to any broker-dealer who is not registered in Indiana

*

Notice on Form D is filed no later than 10 full business days prior to the
receipt of consideration or the delivery of a subscription agreement by an
Indiana investor, together with a copy of offering materials and a consent to
service of process

*

With respect to sales to nonaccredited investors in Indiana, either the issuer
must reasonably believe (after inquiry) that the investment is a suitable
investment4 or the purchaser must either alone or with his purchaser
representative have such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that the purchaser is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
investment

An investment that does not exceed 10% of the investor's net worth is presumed to be suitable.
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The Indiana Securities Commissioner may, by order, increase the number of
purchasers or waive any of the conditions of this exemption
A statutory limited offering exemption is also contained in IC 23-2-1-2(b)(l0).

*

Similar to Kentucky's statutory exemption, this section provides an exemption
for limited offerings of restricted securities where there are a limited number
of nonaccredited purchasers (either no more than 20 in Indiana or 35
anywhere), there is no general advertisement or general solicitation, and the
issuer reasonably believes each purchaser is purchasing for investment and is
aware of the transferability and resale restrictions on the securities being
offered. 5 This exemption is self-executing if

+ each purchaser has access to all material facts by reason of his active
involvement (or his family relationship with a person actively involved) in
the organization or management of the issuer, or

J

+ there are no more than 15 purchasers in Indiana and each Indiana
purchaser is an accredited investor or meets the active involvement test
described above, or

+ the aggregate offering price of the securities (in and outside Indiana) does
not exceed $500,000, the total number of purchasers (in and outside
Indiana) does not exceed 25, and each purchaser either is an accredited
investor or meets the active involvement test described above, or receives
all of the material facts with respect to the security

*

Advance filings are required in connection with other types of transactions,
and a $100 filing fee is required. Notices of sales are also required under
Section 710 lAC 1-13-4. Based on the "tips" provided in the interpretive
opinion of James Andrew Klimek, Chief Counsel to the Securities
Commissioner, Indiana Securities Division, dated September 30, 1996, [2
CCH BLUE SKY L. RPTR. ~ 24,693], issuers will want to rely on the Indiana
limited offering exemption provided by regulation for a transaction that does
not fit within the statute's self-executing exemption.

Section 710 lAC 1-13-3 contains the "bad boy" provisions that can disqualify an
issuer from using the limited offering exemptions established by the regulation and
the statute.

5

See 710 lAC 1-13-2 for rules for calculating the number of purchasers and disclosure obligations.
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The Indiana model accredited investor exemption was adopted by Administrative
Order of the Securities Commissioner, dated February 27, 1998. 2 CCH BLUE SKY
L. RPTR. ~ 24,698.

r

Securities issued in connection with an employee stock purchase, savings, pension,
profit-sharing or similar plan are exempt from state registration requirements pursuant
to IC 23-2-1-2(a)(7). In addition, offers and sales to directors and executive officers
are exempt under IC 23-2-1-2(b)(9).

r
r

r

r
r
r

r

r

o

Limited offering exemptions in Tennessee
The notice filing requirements for covered securities are contained in Section 48-2125 of the Tennessee Code, and Rule 0780-4-2-.12. Certain exemptions from the
statutory notice filing and fee requirements have been added. See 3 CCH BLUE SKY
L. RPTR. ~54,180.
•

For Rule 506 transactions, the notice on Form D must be filed within 15 days
after the first sale in Tennessee, together with a consent to service of process and a
$500 fee.

•

Rule 0780-4-2-.12 also requires that each notice filing include "a copy of the
issuer's prospectus and statement of additional information."

Tennessee's uniform limited offering exemption, Rule 0780-4-2-.08, is limited to
transactions exempt under Rule 505.
•

r

r
r

r

*

The notice filing must include the manually signed Form D, a consent to
service of process, the date of the first sale in Tennessee (if any) and copies of
offering materials (legends on offering documents are required). Additional
information may be requested by the Division.

•

Suitability requirements apply to nonaccredited investors

•

No commissions, fees or other remuneration may be paid for soliciting
prospective purchasers in Tennessee except to persons appropriately registered in
Tennessee.

•

"Bad boy" provisions can disqualify a person from relying on this exemption

r

r

Notice filing and a $300 fee are required no later than 15 days after the earlier of
the first payment of consideration or the delivery of a signed subscription
agreement by a Tennessee investor

r

r
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Limited offerings are also exempt under Section 48-2-103(b)(4) of the Tennessee
Code if
•

The aggregate number of Tennessee purchasers of securities from the issuer and
its affiliates pursuant to the exemption does not exceed 15 during a 12 month
period

•

The securities are not offered by means of publicly disseminated advertisements
or sales literature

•

All purchasers in Tennessee purchase for investment and not with an intent to
participate in a distribution (investment intent is presumed if securities are held
for 2 years after full payment)

-

Section 48-2-103(b)(9) of the Tennessee Code Annotated contains an exemption of
securities issued in connection with a stock bonus plan requiring payment of no
consideration other than services or in connection with certain qualified stock bonus
or retirement plans
The March 7, 1995 Statement of Policy, Kenneth T. McClellan, Assistant
Commissioner for Securities, addresses the status of limited liability company
interests as securities. 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. RPTR. ~54,521.
•

Common questions
o

What disclosures are required
Rule 502(b)(2) of Regulation D describes the type of information that must be
furnished to nonaccredited investors in a Rule 505 or 506 offering a reasonable time
prior to the purchase. For U.S. issuers that are not subject to the reporting
requirements under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, these
requirements include, to the extent material to an understanding of the issuer, its
business and the securities being offered
•

The same type of information that would be required in an offering circular
pursuant to Regulation A (or, if the issuer is not eligible to use Regulation A, the
same kind of information that would be required in a prospectus pursuant to a
registration statement form the issuer would be entitled to use)

•

The type of financial statements required depends on the amount of the offering

*

Only the issuer's balance sheet (dated within 120 days of the start of the
offering) is required to be audited for offerings up to $2,000,000 or for
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offerings over $2,000,000 if the issuer (other than a limited partnership)
cannot obtain audited financial statements without unreasonable expense

r
r

•

The issuer must also provide purchasers the opportunity to ask questions and to
receive answers and to obtain additional information to verify the information
furnished.

•

In addition, the issuer must provide a brief description of any additional material
written information concerning the offering that has been provided to an
accredited investor.

•

For business combinations or exchange offers, in addition to the information
required by a registration statement on Form S-4, the issuer is required to provide
purchasers written information about any terms or arrangements of the proposed
transactions that are materially different from those for all other security holders.

•

The issuer must advise the purchaser of the limitations on resale.

SEC Rule 701 requires the delivery to investors of a copy of the compensatory benefit
plan or contract. In addition, if aggregate sales during a 12 month period exceed $5
million, investors must be given, a reasonable time before the date of sale (or, in the
case of options, date of exercise)

r

•

a summary plan description for plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or, if the plan is not subject to ERISA, a summary
of the material terms of the plan

r

•

information about the risks associated with an investment in the securities being
sold

r

•

financial statements that would be required to be delivered in a Regulation A
offering, which are as of a date no more than 180 days before the date of sale

r
r
r

r
r

In any case, disclosure is required to the extent necessary to comply with Federal and
state anti-fraud rules.
o

Integration - when will offers and sales be treated as part of the same offering
Regulation D
•

Rule 502(a) of Regulation D creates a safe harbor for when offers aI).d sales will
not be "integrated" and treated as part of the same offering. Offers and sales that
occur more than 6 months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are made

r

r
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more than 6 months after completion of a Regulation D offering will not be
considered a part of the Regulation D offering so long as during those 6 month
periods there are no other offers or sales of securities by the issuer of the same
class as those offered in the Regulation D offering (other than offers and sales
under an employee benefit plan).
•

When that safe harbor is unavailable, the following factors should be considered
in determining whether offers should be integrated

*
*
*
*

*

whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing
whether the sales involve the issuance of the same class of securities
whether the sales have been made at or about the same time
whether the same type of consideration is being received
whether the sales are made for the same general purpose

Offers and sales exempt under Rule 70 I will not be integrated with any other offers or
sales.
Some state exemptions also contain "no integration" provisions.
o

What happens if something goes wrong, and the intended exemption is not available
Insignificant deviations from the requirements of Rule 504, 505 or 506 of Regulation
D or Kentucky's, Indiana's or Tennessee's counterpart will not result in the loss of
the exemption. However, an enforcement action may still be brought.
•

To qualify as an insignificant deviation under Rule 508 of Regulation D, the
person relying on the exemption must show

*

the term, condition or requirement not complied with was not directly
intended to protect the particular individual or entity to whom the offer or sale
was made

*

the failure to comply was insignificant with respect to the offer as a whole

+ the dollar limits in Rules 504 and 505 are significant
+ limitations on the manner of sale are significant
+ limitations on the number of purchasers are significant

*

a good faith reasonable attempt was made to comply with all applicable terms,
conditions and requirements
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•

Kentucky, Indiana and Tennessee provide similar treatment of insignificant
deviations in 808 KAR 10:210, Section 710 lAC 1-13-6, and Rule 0780-4-2-.08.

o Broker-dealer compliance
State securities laws frequently define an "agent" to include individuals representing
an issuer in effecting purchasers or sales of securities, and impose licensing or
registration requirements on them. Such definitions raise the potential problem that
an officer or employee of an issuer could be characterized as an "agent" when the
issuer offers securities directly, without the use of a broker-dealer. One approach
states have taken that addresses this potential problem is to exclude from the
definition of an "agent" individuals who represent issuers in connection with certain
types of transactions exempt under state law. However, with the adoption ofNSMIA,
states may not have extended this approach to transactions in covered securities. As a
result, an issuer may still be forced to find a state exemption in order to make an
offering directly, by its officers or employees.
Kentucky's definition of "agent" avoids this potential problem. In Kentucky, an
individual is excluded from the definition of an "agent" if the individual primarily
performs, or is intended primarily to perform upon completion of the offering of the
issuer's securities, substantial duties for or on behalf of the issuer otherwise than in
connection with transactions in the issuer's own securities and the individual's
compensation is not based upon the amount of purchases or sales of the issuer's own
securities effected for the issuer. KRS 292.310(1 )(a)e.
Indiana, in contrast, does not contain such an exclusion. IC 23-2-1-1(b). Whether an
individual representing an issuer in connection with an offering will be required to
register as an "agent" will depend on whether the transaction falls within certain
exemptions, such as
•

transactions exempt under IC 23-2-1-2(b), or

•

transactions with existing employees, partners or directors of the issuer, if no
commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting a person in Indiana

In Tennessee, an "agent" refers to individuals representing broker-dealers in effecting
or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities from, in or into Tennessee.
T.C.A. Section 48-2-102(2). Issuers are generally excluded from the definition of
"broker-dealer", subject to an exception with respect to fractional undivided interests
in oil, gas or other mineral rights. T.C.A. Section 48-2-102(3).

r
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Bass, Berry & Sims PLC
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Rule 144A. Adopted in April 1990, Rule 144A provides a safe
harbor for resales of privately placed or other unregistered securities
such as foreign debt and equity to "qualified institutional buyers"
(popularly lmown as "QIBs"). Four conditions must be met:
1.

a.
Sales only to QIBs - the securities can only be sold to
QIBs or persons reasonably believed to be QIBs for their own account
or for the account of another QIB. QIBs are:
(i)
Any corporation, partnership or other entity (not an
individual) that owns and invests on a consolidated basis $100
million or more in the aggregate in non-affiliate securities;
(ii) Any investment company that is part of a family of
investment companies that has the same investment adviser and
together own $100 million of non-affiliate securities;
(iii) Registered dealers that own or invest on a
discretionary basis at least $10 million of non-affiliate
securities, or are acting in a "riskless principal transaction" on
behalf of a QIB;
(iv) US or foreign banks or thrifts that not only own or
invest more than $100 million in non-affiliate securities, but
also have an audited net worth of at least $25 million;
(v) For purposes of above tests, non-affiliate securities
cannot include bank deposits, loan participations, repurchase
agreements and securities subject thereto, or interest rate,
currency or commodity swaps;
(vi) For purposes of determining QIB status, sellers
may rely on publicly available financial statements, securities
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manual information or certification from the chief financial
officer or other executive officer of the purchasing QIB.
b;
Notice from Seller - the seller must take reasonable steps
to make sure purchaser is aware that the seller may rely on 144A.
However, there is no requirement of a legend or other resale
restriction.
c.
Securities that can be sold under 144A - Debt or equity
that, when issued, are not of the same class as securities listed as a
national securities exchange or quoted through an automated
interdealer quotation system ("Quoted Securities"). Convertible
securities that are not immediately convertible or have a conversion
premium of 10 percent or more are not considered to be of the same
class as Quoted Securities. Warrants are treated as of the same class
as the underlying security unless at the time of issuance they had a
term of at least three years and an effective exercise premium of at
least 10%. Open-end investment companies, unit investment trusts
and face-amount certificate companies cannot utilize Rule 144A.
d.
Disclosure Requirements - For issuers which are neither
reporting companies under the Exchange Act or a foreign company
exempt from reporting pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b), the holder and an
prospective purchaser must have the right to obtain from the issuer
(and the purchaser must have obtained if requested) a "very brief
statement" of the nature of the business of the issuer and the products
and services it offers and the issuer's most recent balance sheet and
profit and loss and retained earnings statement for the most recent
period and the two preceding years (audited "to the extent reasonably
available").
e.
General Solicitation - Rule 144A does not contain any
prohibition relating to "general solicitation." However, most 144A
transactions are structured to avoid general solicitation, so that the
resale might arguably qualify as a "4(1 ~)" exemption.
f.
PORTAL ("Private Offering, Resale and Trading through
Automated Linkages"). When Rule 144A was adopted, the SEC also
approved rules establishing a NASD marketplace known as PORTAL,
which is limited to Rule 144A securities, Rule 144(a)(3) restricted
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securities, or securities contractually required to be resold only
pursuant to Regulation S, Rule 144A or Rule 144 or in "secondary
private placements." Access to PORTAL is limited to QIBs,
"PORTAL" dealers and "PORTAL brokers."
2.
Rule 144A Private Placement Procedures - The procedures for
Rule 144A offerings are similar to those for standard public offering.
Typically there is a purchase agreement between the issuer and its
investment bankers containing representations, warranties, covenants
and conditions, including indemnification and contribution provisions.
An offering memorandum containing prospectus-like information
concerning the issuer and the securities offered is prepared and
utilized by the purchasers for the resale of the securities pursuant to
Rule 144A to QIBs.
3.

Exxon Capital Exchange Offers.

a.
Rule 144A offerings are often followed by SEC
registered exchange offers (usually referred to as "AB exchange
offers" or "Exxon Capital exchange offers") where the issuer offers to
the holders of 144A securities to exchange them for similar securities
that have been registered, and therefore are freely tradable. Usually
the exchange offer is made pursuant to the terms of a registration
rights agreement between the issuer and the 144A investment banks
whereby the issuer agrees to register substantially identical securities
on Form S-4, allowing exchanging QIB purchasers to acquire
securities that can be resold without delivery of a prospectus. See
Exxon Capital Holdings Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1988)
and Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, SEC No-Action Letter (June
5, 1991), among others. From the issuer's standpoint, the procedure
permits the institutional purchasers to acquire registered securities
without having to maintain a shelf registration.
b.

These no-action letters generally are conditioned on:
(i)

the holder not being an affiliate of the issuer;

(ii) the holder having acquired the new securities in
the ordinary course of business;
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:;

(iii) the holder having no arrangement or understanding
with any person to participate in a distribution of the new
securities; and
(iv) the holder not having purchased the "old"
securities directly from the issuer to resell pursuant to Rule
144A or any other available 33 Act exemption.
c.
This procedure is available for non-convertible debt
securities, non-convertible preferred stock, trust preferred securities
and depository share representing common stock of non-reporting
non-US companies.
d.
Attached are selected portions of the documentation of a
typical Exxon Capital exchange offer.
e.
The SEC's Aircraft Carrier Release proposed to repeal
the Exxon Capital line of interpretative letters, primarily because the
flexibility and speed for public offerings by Form B and mediumsized Form A issuers purportedly provided under the proposal
eliminates the need to facilitate these Exxon Capital offerings. The
staff expressed concern in the Aircraft Carrier Release over Rule
144A/Exxon Capital offerings acting as conduits that allow securities
to flow to public markets. However, a study by former SEC
Commissioner Charles C. Cox found that retail trading after Exxon
Capital exchange offers averaged less than 0.5% of the principal
amount issued and slightly more than 1% of the aggregate trading
volume.
f.
The predominance of 144A offerings clearly was
influential in the staffs undertaking the wholesale review which
resulted in the Aircraft Carrier Release. The staff noted that in 1997
Rule 144A offerings comprised 17% of all offerings, including 21 %
of all equity and 16% of all debt. In that year 16% of the high-yield
debt, 72% of the convertible investment grade debt, and 10% of the
investment grade debt were issued in the Rule 144A market. It is with
noting that Form S-3 is available for the last category, but not for
high-yield or convertible debt offerings.
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g.
Recently, a group of 60 secuntIes lawyers, including
seven fonner SEC Commissioners and six of the last seven directors
of the Division of Corporation Finance, have submitted an outline to
the staff for how public and private offerings of securities should be
regulated in the future. Among their proposals is to liberalize the
definition of QIB so that it is consolidated with those of "accredited
investor" under Reg D and "qualified purchaser" under the 40 Act.
The group also recommends eliminating restrictions on offers for, all
private placements, including I 44A, and confining Securities Act
protection to purchasers as opposed to offerees.
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ATTACHMENT
SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE DOCUMENTATION OF A TYPICAL
"EXXON CAPITAL EXCHANGE OFFER"

,

r

- Marsh Supermarkets Example -

MARSH SUPERMARKETS, INC.
(an Indiana corporation)

r
r

$150,000,000
PURCHASE AGREEMENT

r
r

July 29, 1997

r
r

.MERRILL LYNCH & CO.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated
McDonald & Company Securities, Inc.
c/o Merrill Lynch & Co.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated
North Tower
World Financial Center
New York, New York 10281-1209

r

Ladies and Gentlemen:

r

r
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I

,t

r

r

r
r

r
r

Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., an Indiana corporation (the "Company"), and each of
the Guarantors listed on Schedule B hereto (the "Guarantors") confirm their respective
agreements with Merrill Lynch & Co., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated ("Merrill Lynch") and each of the other Initial Purchasers named in
Schedule A hereto (collectively, the "Initial Purchasers", which temt shall also include
any initial purchaser substituted as hereinafter provided in Section 10 hereof), for whom
Merrill Lynch is acting as representative (in such capacity, the "Representative"), with
respect to (i) the issue and sale by the Company and the purchase by the Initial
Purchasers, acting severally and not jointly, of the respective principal amounts set forth
in said Schedule A of $150,000,000 aggregate principal amount of the Company's Senior
Subordinated Notes due 2007 (the "Securities") and (ii) the issue and sale by the
Guarantors and the purchase by the Initial Purchasers, acting severally and not jointly, of
the senior subordinated guarantees (the "Guarantees") of the Company's obligations
under the Securities. The Securities and the Guarantees are to be issued pursuant to an
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indenture dated as of August 5, 1997 (the "Indenture") among the Company, the
Guarantors and State Street Bank and Trust Company, as trustee (the "Trustee").
Securities and Guarantees issued in book-entry form will be issued to Cede & Co. as
nominee of The Depository Trust Company ("DTC") pursuant to a letter agreement, to be
dated as of the Closing Time (as defined in Section 2(b» (the "DTC Agreement"), among
the Company, the Guarantors, the Trustee and DTC.

...

The Company and the Guarantors understand that the Initial Purchasers propose to
make an offering of the Securities and the Guarantees on the terms and in the manner set
forth herein and agree that the Initial Purchasers may resell, subject to the conditions set
forth herein, all or a portion of the Securities and the Guarantees to purchasers
("Subsequent Purchasers") at any time after the date of this Agreement. The Securities
and the Guarantees are to be offered and sold through the Initial Purchasers without being
registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "1933 Act"), in reliance
upon exemptions therefrom. Pu.rsuant to the terms of the Securities, the Guarantees and
the Indenture, investors that acquire Securities and Guarantees may only resell or
otherwise transfer such Securities and Guarantees if such Securities and Guarantees are
hereafter registered under the 1933 Act or if an exemption from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act is available (including the exemption afforded by Rule
144A ("Rule 144A") or Regulation S ("Regulation SIt) of the rules and regulations
promulgated under the 1933 Act by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission"».
The Company and the Guarantors have prepared and delivered to each Initial
Purchaser copies of a preliminary offering memorandum dated July 16, 1997 (the
"Preliminary Offering Memorandum") and have prepared and will deliver to each Initial
Purchaser, on the date hereof or the next succeeding day, copies of a final offering
memorandum dated July 29, 1997 (the "Final Offering Memorandum"), each to be used
by such Initial Purchaser in connection with its solicitation of, purchases of, or offering
of, the Securities and the Guarantees. "Offering Memorandum" means, with respect to
any date or time referred to in this Agreement, the most recent offering memorandum
(whether the Preliminary Offering Memorandum or the Final Offering Memorandum, or
any amendment or supplement to either such document), including exhibits thereto and
any documents incorporated therein by reference, which has been prepared and delivered
by the Company and the Guarantors to the Initial Purchasers in connection with their
solicitation of purchases of, or offering of, the Securities and the Guarantees.
All references in this Agreement to financial statements and schedules and other
information which is "contained," "included" or "stated" in the Offering Memorandum
(or other references of like import) shall be deemed to mean and include all such financial
statements and schedules and other information which is incorporated by reference in the
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Offering Memorandum; and all references in this Agreement to amendments or
supplements to the Offering Memorandum shall be deemed to mean and include the filing
of any document under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") which is
incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum.
The holders of the Securities and the Guarantees will be entitled to the benefits of
the registration rights agreement to be dated as of the Closing Time (the "Registration
Rights Agreement"), among the Company, the Guarantors and the Initial Purchasers,
pursuant to which the Company will agree to file, as soon as practicable after the Closing
Time but in any event within 30 days of the Closing Time, a registration statement with
the Commission registering the Exchange Securities (as defined in the Registration Rights
Agreement) under the 1933 Act.
SECTION 1.

Representations and Warranties.

(a)
Representations and Warranties by the Company and the Guarantors. The
Company and each of the Guarantors, jointly and severally, represent and warrant to each
Initial Purchaser as of the date hereof and as of the Closing Time referred Jo in Section
2(b) hereof, and agree with each Initial Purchaser as follows:
(i)
Similar Offerings. The Company and the Guarantors have not,
directly or indirectly, solicited any offer to buy or offered to sell, and will not,
directly or indirectly, solicit any offer to buy or offer to sell, in the United States or
to any United States citizen or resident, any security which is or would be
integrated with the sale of the Securities and the Guarantees in a manner that
would require the Securities or the Guarantees to be registered under the 1933 Act.
(ii)
Offering Memorandum. The Offering Memorandum does not, and
at the Closing Time will not, include an untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; provided,
that this representation, warranty and agreement shall not apply to statements in or
omissions from the Offering Memorandum made in reliance upon and in
conformity with information furnished to the Company and the Guarantors in
writing by any Initial Purchaser through Merrill Lynch expressly for use in the
Offering Memorandum.

r
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(xxx) Rule 144A Eligibility. The Securities and the Guarantees are
eligible for resale pursuant to Rule 144A and will not be, at the Closing Time, of
the same class as securities listed on a national securities exchange registered
under Section 6 of the 1934 Act, or quoted in a U.S. automated interdealer
quotation system.

-

(xxxi) No General Solicitation. None of the Company, the Guarantors,
any of their respective affiliates, as such term is defined in Rule SOl(b) under the
1933 Act ("Affiliates"), or any person acting on any of their behalf (other than the
Initial Purchasers, as to whom the Company and the Guarantors make no
representation) has engaged or will engage, in connection with the offering of the
Securities and the Guarantees, in any form of general solicitation or general
advertising within the meaning of Rule S02(c) under the 1933 Act.
(xxxii) No Registration Required. Subject to compliance by the Initial
Purchasers with the representations and warranties set forth in Section 2, it is not
necessary in connection with the offer, sale and delivery of the Securities and the
Guarantees to the Initial Purchasers and to each Subsequent Purchaser in the
manner contemplated by this Agreement and the Offering Memorandum to register
the Securities and the Guarantees under the 1933 Act or to qualify the Indenture
under the Tmst Indenture Act of 1939, as amended (the "1939 Act").

-

(xxxiii) No Directed Selling Efforts. With respect to those Securities and
Guarantees sold in reliance on Regulation S, (A) none of the Company, the
Guarantors, any of their respective Affiliates or any person acting o~ their behalf
(other than the Initial Purchasers, as to whom the Company and the Guarantors
make no representation) has engaged or will engage in any directed selling efforts
within the meaning of Regulation S and (B) each of the Company, the Guarantors,
any of their respective Affiliates and any person acting on their behalf (other than
the Initial Purchasers, as to whom the Company and the Guarantors make no
representation) has complied and will comply with the offering restrictions
requirement of Regulation S.
(xxxiv) PORTAL. There are no securities of the Company or any of the
Guarantors which are of the same class as the Securities or the Guarantees that are
listed on a national securities exchange registered under Section 6 of the 1934 Act,
or quoted in a United States automated inter dealer quotation system. The
Company and the Guarantors have been advised by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. PORTAL Market that the Securities and the Guarantees
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will be designated PORTAL eligible securities in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(xxxv) Authorization of the Credit Agreement. The $30 million credit
agreement among the Company, Marsh Supermarkets, LLC ("LLC"), the other
guarantors named therein and Harris Bank, dated as of July 25, 1997 (the "Harris
Credit Agreement"), has been duly authorized, executed and delivered by the
Company and LLC and constitutes a valid and binding obligation of the Company
and LLC, enforceable against the Company and LLC in accordance with its terms.
(b)
Officer's Certificates. Any certificate signed by any officer of the Company
or any of the Subsidiaries delivered to the Initial Purchasers or to counsel for the Initial
Purchasers pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be deemed a representation and
warranty by the Company or any of the Subsidiaries to each Initial Purchaser as to the
matters covered thereby.
SECTION 2.

Sale and Deliverv to Initial Purchasers: Closing.

(a)
Securities and -Guarantees. On the basis of the representations and
warranties herein contained and subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth, the
Company and the Guarantors agree to sell to each Initial Purchaser, severally and not
jointly, and each Initial Purchaser, severally and not jointly, agrees to purchase from the
Company and the Guarantors, at the price set forth in Schedule C, the aggregate principal
amount of Securities (including the Guarantees) set forth in Schedule A opposite the
name of such Initial Purchaser, plus any additional principal amount of Securities
(including the Guarantees) which such Initial Purchaser may become obligated to
purchase pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 hereof.
(b)
Payment. Payment of the purchase price for, and delivery of certificates
for, the Securities and the Guarantees shall be made at the office of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, or at such other place as shall be agreed upon by the Representative,
the Company and the Guarantors at 9:00 A.M. (New York Time) on the fifth business day
after the date hereof (unless postponed in accordance with the provisions of Section 10),
or such other time not later than ten business days after such date as shall be agreed upon
by the Representative, the Company and the Guarantors (such time and date of payment
and delivery being herein called the "Closing Time").
Payment shall be made to the Company and the Guarantors by wire transfer of
immediately available funds to a bank account designated by the Company and the
Guarantors, against delivery to the respective accounts of the Initial Purchasers of
certificates for the Securities and the Guarantees to be purchased by them. It is

t

r

M-ll

understood that each Initial Purchaser has authorized the Representative, for its account,
to accept delivery of, rec~ipt for, and make payment of the purchase price for, the
Securities and the Guarantees which it has agreed to purchase. Merrill Lynch,
individually and not as representative of the Initial Purchasers, may (but shall not be
obligated to) make payment of the purchase price for the Securities and the Guarantees to
be purchased by any Initial Purchaser whose funds have not been received by the Closing
Time, but such payment shall not relieve such Initial Purchaser from its obligations
hereunder. The certificates representing the Securities and the Guarantees shall be
registered in the name of Cede & Co. pursuant to the DTC Agreement, or physical
certificates representing the Securities and the Guarantees shall be registered in the names
and denominations requested by the Initial Purchasers, and in either case shall be made
available for examination and packaging by the Initial Purchasers in The City of New
York not later than 9:00 A.M. on the last business day prior to the Closing Time.

Qualified Institutional Buyer. Each Initial Purchaser severally and not
(c)
jointly represents and warrants to, and agrees with, the Company and each of the
Guarantors that it is a "qualified institutional buyer" within the meaning of Rule 144A
under the 1933 Act (a "Qualified Institutional Buyer") and an "accredited investor" within
the meaning ofRule 501(a) under the 1933 Act (an "Accredited Investor").
(d)
Denominations; Registration. Certificates for the Securities- (including the
Guarantees) shall be in such denominations ($1,000 or integral multiples thereof) and
registered in such names as the Representative may request in writing at least one full
business day before the Closing Time.
SECTION 3.
Covenants of the CompanY and the Guarantors. The Company
and the Guarantors, jointly and severally, covenant with each Initial Purchaser as follows:
(a)
Offering Memorandum. The Company and the Guarantors, as promptly as
possible, will furnish to each Initial Purchaser, without charge, such number of copies of
the Preliminary Offering Memorandum, the Final Offering Memorandum and any
amendments and supplements thereto and documents incorporated by reference therein as
such Initial Purchaser may reasonably request.

Notice and Effect of Alaterial Events. The Company and the Guarantors
(b)
will immediately notify each Initial Purchaser, and confirm such notice in writing, of (x)
any filing made by the Company or any Guarantor of information relating to the offering
of the Securities and the Guarantees with any securities exchange or any other regulatory
body in the United States or any other jurisdiction, and (y) prior to the completion of the
placement of the Securities and the Guarantees by the Initial Purchasers as evidenced by a
notice in writing from the Initial Purchasers to the Company, any material changes in or
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affecting the earnings, business affairs or business prospects of the Company and the
Subsidiaries which (i) make any statement in the Offering Memorandum or any document
incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum false or misleading or (ii) are not
disclosed in the Offering Memorandum. In such event or if during such time any event
shall occur or condition shall exist as a result of which it is necessary, in the opinion of
the Company and the Guarantors, their counsel, the Initial Purchasers or counsel for the
Initial Purchasers, to amend or supplement the Final Offering Memorandum in order that
the Final Offering Memorandum not include any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not
misleading in the light of the circumstances then existing, the Company and the
Guarantors will forthwith amend or supplement the Final Offering Memorandum by
preparing and furnishing to each Initial Purchaser an amendment or amendments of, or a
supplement or supplements to, the Final Offering Memorandum (in form and substance
satisfactory in the reasonable opinion of counsel for the Initial Purchasers) so that, as so
amended or supplemented, the Final Offering Memorandum will not include an untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time it is delivered to a
Subsequent Purchaser, not misleading.
(c)
Amendment to Offering Memorandum and Supplements. The Company and
the Guarantors will advise each Initial Purchaser promptly of any proposal to amend or·
supplement the Offering Memorandum and will not effect such amendment or
supplement without the consent of the Initial Purchasers, which shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Neither the consent of the Initial Purchasers to, nor the Initial Purchaser's
delivery of, any such amendment or supplement, shall constitute a waiver of any of the
conditions set forth in Section 5 hereof.
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(d)
Qualification of Securities and Guarantees for Offer and Sale. The
Company and the Guarantors will use their best efforts to register or qualify the Securities
and the Guarantees for offering and sale under the applicable securities laws of such
jurisdictions as the Representative may designate and will maintain such qualifications in
effect as long as required for the sale of the Securities and the Guarantees; provided,
however, that the Company and the Guarantors shall not be obligated to file any general
consent to service of process or to qualify as a foreign corporation or as a dealer in
securiti~s in any jurisdiction in which it is not so qualified or to subject itself to taxation
in respect of doing business in any jurisdiction in which it is not otherwise so subject.

(e)
Integration. The Company and the Guarantors agree that they will not and
will cause their affiliates not to make any offer or sale of securities of the Company or
any Guarantor of any class if, as a result of the doctrine of "integration" referred to in
Rule 502 under the 1933 Act, such offer or sale could be deemed to render invalid (for the
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purpose of (i) the sale of the Securities and the Guarantees by the Company and the
Guarantors to the Initial Purchasers, (ii) the resale of the Securities and the Guarantees by
the Initial Purchasers to Subsequent Purchasers or (iii) the resale of the Securities and the
Guarantees by such Subsequent Purchasers to others) the exemption from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act provided by Section 4(2) thereof or by Rule 144A or by
Regulation S thereunder or otherwise.

-

Rating of Securities. The Company and the Guarantors shall take all
(f)
reasonable action necessary to enable Standard & Poor's Corporation ("S&P"), and
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. ("Moody's"), to provide their respective credit ratings of
the Securities and the Guarantees.
Rule 144A Information. The Company and the Guarantors agree that, in
(g)
order to render the Securities and the Guarantees eligible for resale pursuant to Rule 144A
under the 1933 Act, while any of the Securities and the Guarantees remain outstanding, it
will make available, upon request, to any holder of Securities and Guarantees or
prospective purchasers of Securities and Guarantees the information specified in Rule
144A(d)(4), unless the Company and the Guarantors furnish information to the
Commission pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act (such information, whether
made available to holders or prospective purchasers or furnished to the Commission, is
hereinafter referred to as "Additional Information").
Restriction on Resales. Until the expiration of two years after the original
(h)
issuance of the Securities and the Guarantees, the Company and the Guarantors will not,
and will cause their "affiliates" (as such term is defined in Rule 144(a)(l) under the 1933
Act) not to, resell any Securities and Guarantees which are "restricted securities" (as such
term is defined under Rule 144(a)(3) under the 1933 Act) that have been reacquired by
any of them and shall immediately upon any purchase of any such S~curities and
Guarantees submit such Securities and Guarantees to the Trustee for cancellation.
Use of Proceeds. The Company and the Guarantors will use the net
proceeds received by them from the sale of the Securities and the" Guarantees in the
manner specified in the Offering Memorandum under "Use of Proceeds." The Company
will send a notice of redemption to Holders of the Senior Notes (as defined in the
Offering Memorandum) no later than the Closing Time.

-

-

(i)

U)

Restriction on Sale ofSecurities. During a period of 90 days from the date
of the Offering Memorandum, the Company and the Guarantors will not, without the
prior written consent of Merrill Lynch, directly or indirectly, issue, sell, offer to sell, grant
any option for the sale of, or otherwise dispose of, any debt securities or guarantees of
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debt securities of the Company (other than borrowings under the Company's bank credit
agreements, the Securities, the Guarantees and the Exchange Securities).
(k)
DTC Clearance. The Company and the Guarantors will use all reasonable
efforts in cooperation with the Initial Purchasers to permit the Securities and the
Guarantees to be eligible for clearance and settlement through DTC.
(1)
Legends. .Each certificate for a Security (including the Guarantee) will bear
the legend contained in "Notice to Investors" in the Offering Memorandum for the. time
period and upon the other terms stated in the Offering Memorandum.

(m) Interim Financial Statements. Prior to the Closing Time, the Company
shall furnish to the Initial Purchasers copies of any budgets or revised budgets for fiscal
1997 and any unaudited interim financial statements of the Company, promptly after they
have been completed, for any periods subsequent to the periods covered by the financial
statements appearing in the Offering Memorandum.
(n)
Periodic Reports. For a period of three years after the Closing Time, the
Company and the Guarantors will furnish to the Initial Purchasers copies of all annual
reports, quarterly reports ai'ld current reports filed with the Commission on Forms 10-K,
10-Q and 8-K, or such other similar forms as may be designated by the Commission, and
such other documents, reports and information as shall be furnished by the Company and
the Guarantors generally to the holders of the Securities and the Guarantees or to security
holders of its publicly issued securities generally.
SECTION 4.

Pavment of Expenses.

(a)
Expenses. The Company and the Guarantors, jointly and severally, will pay
all expenses incident to the performance of their respective obligations under this
Agreement, including (i) the preparation, printing and any filing of the Offering
Memorandum and the Registration Statement (including financial statements and any
schedules or exhibits) and of each amendment or supplement thereto, including the
preliminary prospectuses and the prospectus to be contained in the Registration
Statement, (ii) the preparation, printing and delivery to the Initial Purchasers of this
Agreement, the Registration Rights Agreement, the Indenture and such other documents
as may be required in connection with the offering, purchase, sale and delivery of the
Securities and the Guarantees, (iii) the preparation, issuance and delivery of the
certificates for the Securities and the Guarantees to the Initial Purchasers, including any
charges of DTC in connection therewith, (iv) the fees and disbursements of the
Company's and the Guarantors' counsel, accountants and other advisors,
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REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT

This Registration Rights Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and entered
into this 5th day.of August, 1997, among Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., an Indiana
corporation (the "Company"), Marsh Drugs, Inc., an Indiana corporation, Marsh Village
Pantries, Inc., an Indiana corporation, Mundy Realty, Inc., an Indiana corporation,
Marlease, Inc., an Indiana corporation, Marsh International, Inc., an Indiana
corporation, Maraines Greenery, Inc., an Indiana corporation, Limited Holdings, Inc.,
an Indiana corporation, Convenience Store Distributing Company, an Ohio partnership,
Marsh P. Q., Inc., an Indiana corporation, S. C. T., Inc., an Indiana corporation, North
Marion Development Corporation., an Indiana corporation, Contract Transport, Inc.,
an Indiana corporation, Crystal Food Services, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company, Lobill Foods, LLC, an Indiana limited liability company, Contract
Transport, LLC, an Indiana limited liability company, Marsh Supermarkets, LLC, an
Indiana limited liability company, Village Pantry, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company, Marsh Drugs, LLC, an Indiana limited liability company, Trademark
Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Marsh Clearing House, LLC, an Indiana
limited liability company (collectively, the "Guarantors") and Merrill Lynch, pierce,
Fenner & Smith Incorporated and McDonald & Company Securities, Inc. (collectively,
the "Initial Purchasers").
This Agreement is made pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, dated July
29, 1997, among the Company, the Guarantors and the Initial Purchasers (the "Purchase
Agreement"), which provides for (i) the sale by the Company to the Initial Purchasers of
an aggregate of$150 million principal amount of the Company's 8 7/8% Senior
Subordinated Notes due 2007, Series A (the "Securities") and (ii) the issue and sale by
the Guarantors and the purchase by the Initial Purchasers of the guarantees (the
"Guarantees") of the Company's obligations under the Securities. In order to induce the
Initial Purchasers to enter into the Purchase Agreement, the Company and the
Guarantors have agreed to provide to the Initial Purchasers and their direct and indirect
transferees the registration rights set forth in this Agreement. The execution of this
Agreement is a condition to the closing under the Purchase Agreement.
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Definitions.

As used in this Agreement, the following capitalized defined terms shall
have the following meanings:
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"Registration Statement" shall mean any registration statement of the
Company and the Guarantors which covers any of the Exchange Securities or
Registrable Securities pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and all
amendments and supplements to any such Registration Statement, including posteffective amendments, in each case including the Prospectus contained therein, all
exhibits thereto and all material incorporated by reference therein.
"SEC" shall mean the Securities and Exchange Commission or any
successor agency or government body performing the functions currently
performed by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
"Shelf Registration" shall mean a registration effected pursuant to
Section 2.2 hereof
"Shelf Registration Statement" shall mean a "shelf' registration statement
of the Company and the Guarantors pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.2 of
this Agreement which covers all of the Registrable Securities on an appropriate
form under Rule 415 under the 1933 Act, or any similar rule that may be adopted
by the SEC, and all amendments and supplements to such registration statement,
including post-effective amendments, in each case including the Prospectus
contained therein, all exhibits thereto and all material incorporated by reference
therein.
.
"Trustee" shall mean the trustee with respect to the Securities and the
Guarantees under the Indenture.
2.

Registration Under the 1933 Act.

2.1
Exchange Offer. The Company and the Guarantors shall (A) prepare
and, as soon as practicable but not later than 30 days following the Closing Date, file
with the SEC an Exchange Offer Registration Statement on an appropriate form under
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the 1933 Act with respect to a proposed Exchange Offer and the issuance and delivery
to the Holders, in exchange for the Registrable Securities, a like principal amount of
Exchange Securities, (B) use their reasonable best efforts to cause the Exchange Offer
Registration Statement to be declared effective under the 1933 Act within 90 days of the
Closing Date, (C) use their reasonable best efforts to keep the Exchange Offer
Registration Statement effective until the closing of the Exchange Offer and (D) use
their reasonable best efforts to cause the Exchange Offer to be consummated not later
than 120 days following the Closing Date. The Exchange Securities will be issued
under the Indenture. Upon the effectiveness of the Exchange Offer Registration
Statement, the Company and the Guarantors shall promptly commence the Exchange
Offer, it being the objective of such Exchange Offer to enable each Holder eligible and
electing to exchange Registrable Securities for Exchange Securities (assuming that such
Holder (a) is not an affiliate of the Company or any of the Guarantors within the
meaning of Rule 405 under the 1933 Act, (b) is not a broker-dealer tendering
Registrable Securities acquired directly from the Company or any of the Guarantors for
its own account, (c) acquired the Exchange Securities in the ordinary course of such
Holder's business and (d) has no arrangements or understandings with any person to
participate in the Exchange Offer for the purpose of distributing the Exchange
Securities) to transfer such Exchange Securities from and after their receipt without any
limitations or restrictions under the 1933 Act and without material restrictions under the
securities laws of a substantial proportion of the several states of the United States.

...

...
...

In connection with the Exchange Offer, the Company and the Guarantors
shall:
(a)
mail as promptly as practicable to each Holder a copy of the
Prospectus forming part ofthe Exchange Offer Registration Statement, together with an
appropriate letter of transmittal and related documents;

...!

...

(b)
keep the Exchange Offer open for acceptance for a period of
not less than 30 calendar days after the date notice thereof is mailed t<? the Holders (or
longer if required by applicable law) (such period referred to herein as the "Exchange
Period");
(c)

utilize the services of the Depositary for the Exchange Offer;

(d)
permit Holders to withdraw tendered Registrable Securities at
any time prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time), on the last business day of the
Exchange Period, by sending to the institution specified in the notice, a telegram, telex,
facsimile transmission or letter setting forth the name of such Holder, the principal
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amount of Registrable Securities delivered for exchange, and a statement that such
Holder is withdrawing his election to have such Securities and Guarantees exchanged;
(e)
notify each Holder that any Registrable Security not tendered
will remain outstandIng and continue to accrue interest, but will not retain any rights
under this Agreement (except in the case of the Initial Purchasers and Participating
Broker-Dealers as provided herein); and
(f)
otherwise comply in all respects with all applicable laws
relating to the Exchange Offer.

As soon as practicable after the close of the Exchange Offer, the Company
and the Guarantors shall:
(i) accept for exchange all Registrable Securities duly tendered and
not validly withdrawn pursuant to the Exchange Offer in accordance with
the terms of the Exchange Offer Registration Statement and the letter of
transmittal which shall be an exhibit thereto;
(ii) deliver to the Trustee for cancellation all Registrable Securities
so accepted for exchange; -and
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(iii) cause the Trustee promptly to authenticate and deliver
Exchange Securities to each Holder ofRegistrable Securities so accepted
for exchange in a principal amount equal to the principal amount of the
Registrable Securities of such Holder so accepted for exchange.
Interest on each Exchange Security will accrue from the last date on which
interest was paid on the Registrable Securities surrendered in exchange therefor or, if no
interest has been paid on the Registrable Securities, from the date of original issuance.
The Exchange Offer shall not be subject to any conditions, other than (i) that the
Exchange Offer, or the making of any exchange by a Holder, does not violate applicable
law or any applicable interpretation of the staff of the SEC, (ii) the due tendering of
Registrable Securities in accordance with the Exchange Offer, (iii) that each Holder of
Registrable Securities exchanged in the Exchange Offer shall have represented that all
Exchange Securities to be received by it shall be acquired in the ordinary course of its
business and that at the time of the consummation of the Exchange Offer it shall have no
arrangement or understanding with any person to participate in the distribution (within
the meaning of the 1933 Act) of the Exchange Securities and shall have made such other
representations as may be reasonably necessary under applicable SEC rules, regulations
or interpretations to render the use of Form S-4 or other appropriate form under the 1933
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Act available and (iv) that no action or proceeding shall have been instituted or
threatened in any court or by or before any governmental agency with respect to the
Exchange Offer which, in the Company's and the Guarantors' judgment, would
reasonably be expected to impair the ability of the Company and the Guarantors to
proceed with the Exchange Offer. The Company and the Guarantors shall inform the
Initial Purchasers ofthe names and addresses of the Holders to whom the Exchange
Offer is made, and the Initial Purchasers shall have the right to contact such Holders and
otherwise facilitate the tender ofRegistrable Securities in the Exchange Offer.
2.2
ShelfRe~stration. (i) If, because of any changes in law, SEC rules
or regulations or applicable interpretations thereof by the staff of the SEC, the Company
or the Guarantors are not permitted to effect the Exchange Offer as contemplated by
Section 2.1 hereof, (ii) if for any other reason the Exchange Offer Registration
Statement is not declared effective within 90 days following the original issue of the
Registrable Securities or the Exchange Offer is not consummated within 120 days after
the original issue of the Registrable Securities, (iii) upon the request of either of the
Initial Purchasers or (iv) if a Holder is not permitted to participate in the Exchange Offer
or does not receive fully tradable Exchange Securities pursuant to the Exchange Offer,
then in case of each of clauses (i) through (iv) the Company and the Guarantors shall, at
their cost:
(a)
As promptly as practicable, file with the SEC, and thereafter
shall use its reasonable best efforts to cause to be declared effective as
promptly as practicable but no later than 120 days after the original issue of
the Registrable Securities, a ShelfRegistration Statement relating to the
offer and sale of the Registrable Securities by the Holders from time to time
in accordance with the methods of distribution elected by the Majority
Holders participating in the ShelfRegistration and set forth in such Shelf
Registration Statement.
(b)
Use their reasonable best efforts to keep the Shelf
Registration Statement continuously effective in order to permit the
Prospectus forming part thereof to be usable by Holders for a period of two
years from the date the Shelf Registration Statement is declared effective by
the SEC, or for such shorter period that will terminate when all Registrable
Securities covered by the Shelf Registration Statement have been sold
pursuant to the Shelf Registration Statement or cease to be outstanding or
otherwise to be Registrable Securities.

-

-

...

,

-

-

(c)
Notwithstanding any other provisions hereof, use their
reasonable best efforts to ensure that (i) any Shelf Registration Statement
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and any amendment thereto and any Prospectus forming part thereof and
any supplement thereto complies in all material respects with the 1933 Act
and the rules and regulations thereunder, (ii) any Shelf Registration
Statement and any amendment thereto does not, when it becomes effective,
contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading and (iii) any Prospectus forming part of any Shelf Registration
Statement, and any supplement to such Prospectus (as amended or
supplemented from time to time), does not include an untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light ofthe circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.
The Company and the Guarantors further agree, if necessary, to supplement
or amend the ShelfRegistration Statement, as required by Section 3(b) below, and to
furnish to the Holders of Registrable Securities copies of any such supplement or
amendment promptly after its being used or filed with the SEC.
2.3
Expenses. The Company and the Guarantors shall pay all
Registration Expenses in connection with the registration pursuant to Section 2.1 or 2.2.
Each Holder shall pay all underwriting discounts and commissions and transfer taxes, if
any, relating to the sale or disposition of such Holder's Registrable Securities pursuant to
the Shelf Registration Statement.
2.4. Effectiveness. (a) The Company and the Guarantors will be deemed
not to have used their best efforts to cause the Exchange Offer Registration Statement or
the Shelf Registration Statement, as the case may be, to become, or to remain, effective
during the requisite period if the Company or any Guarantor voluntarily takes any action
that would, or omits to take any action which omission would, result in any such
Registration Statement not being declared effective or in the holders of Registrable
Securities covered thereby not being able to exchange or offer and sell such Registrable
Securities during that period as and to the extent contemplated hereby, unless such
action is required by applicable law.
(b)
An Exchange Offer Registration Statement pursuant to Section 2.1
hereof or a Shelf Registration Statement pursuant to Section 2.2 hereof will not be
deemed to have become effective unless it has been declared effective by the SEC;
provided, however, that if, after it has been declared effective, the offering of Registrable
Securities pursuant to a Shelf Registration Statement is interfered with by any stop order,
injunction or other order or requirement of the SEC or any other governmental agency or
court, such Registration Statement will be deemed not to have become effective during
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the period of such interference, until the offering ofRegistrable Securities pursuant to
such Registration Statement may legally resume. .
2.5
Interest. The Indenture executed in connection with the Securities
and the Guarantees will provide that in the event that either (a) the Exchange Offer
Registration Statement is not filed with the Commission on or prior to the 30th calendar
day following the date of original issue of the Securities and the Guarantees, (b) the
Exchange Offer Registration Statement has not been declared effective on or prior to the
90th calendar day following the date of original issue of the. Securities and th~ Guarantees
or (c) the Exchange Offer is not consummated or a ShelfRegistration Statement is not
declared effective, in either case, on or prior to the 120th calendar day following the date
of original issue ofthe Securities and the Guarantees (each such event referred to in
clauses (a) through (c) above, a "Registration Default"), the interest rate borne by the
Securities shall be increased by one-quarter of one percent per annum upon the
occurrence of each Registration Default, which rate will increase by one quarter of one
percent each 90-day period that such additional interest continues to accrue under any
such circumstance, with an aggregate maximum increase in the interest rate equal to one
percent (1 %) per annum. Following the cure of all Registration Defaults the accrual of
additional interest will cease and the interest rate will revert to the original rate.

3.

.J

J

Registration Procedures.

In connection with the obligations ofthe Company and the Guarantors with
respect to Registration Statements pursuant to Sections 2.1 and 2.2 hereof, the Company
and the Guarantors shall:
(a)
prepare and use their reasonable best efforts to file with the SEC a
Registration Statement, within the relevant time period specified in Section 2, on the
appropriate form under the 1933 Act, which form (i) shall be selected by the Company
and the Guarantors, (ii) shall, in the case of a Shelf Registration, be available for the sale
of the Registrable Securities by the selling Holders thereof, (iii) shall comply as to form
in all material respects with the requirements of the applicable form and include or
incorporate by reference all financial statements required by the SEC to be filed
therewith or incorporated by reference therein, and (iv) shall comply in all respects with
the requirements ofRegulation S-T under the Securities Act, and use their best efforts to
cause such Registration Statement to become effective and remain effective in
accordance with Section 2 hereof;
(b)
prepare and use their reasonable best efforts to file with the SEC
such amendments and post-effective amendments to each Registration Statement as may
be necessary under applicable law to keep such Registration Statement effective for the
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applicable period; and use their reasonable best efforts to cause each Prospectus to be
supplemented by any required prospectus supplement, and as so supplemented to be
filed pursuant to Rule 424 under the 1933 Act and comply with the provisions of the
1933 Act applicable to them with respect to the disposition of all securities covered by
each Registration Statement during the applicable period in accordance with the
intended method or methods of distribution by the selling Holders thereof;
(c)
in the case ofa ShelfRegistration, (i) notify each Holder of
Registrable Securities, at least five business days prior to filing, that a Shelf Registration
Statement with respect to the Registrable Securities is being filed and advising such
Holders that the distribution of Registrable Securities will be made in accordance with
the method selected by the Majority Holders participating in the ShelfRegistration; (ii)
furnish to each Holder of Registrable Securities and to each underwriter of an
underwritten offering ofRegistrable Securities, if any, without charge, as many copies
of each Prospectus, including each preliminary Prospectus, and any amendment or .
supplement thereto and such other documents as such Holder or underwriter may
reasonably request, including financial statements and schedules and, if the Holder so
requests, all exhibits in order to facilitate the public sale or other disposition of the
Registrable Securities; and (iii) hereby consent to the use of the Prospectus or any
amendment or supplement thereto by each ofthe selling Holders ofRegistrable
Securities in connection with the offering and sale of the Registrable Securities covered
by the Prospectus or any amendment or supplement thereto;
(d)
use their reasonable best efforts to register or qualify the Registrable
Securities under all applicable state securities or "blue sky" laws of such jurisdictions as
any Holder of Registrable Securities covered by a Registration Statement and each
underwriter of an underwritten offering ofRegistrable Securities shall reasonably
request by the time the applicable Registration Statement is declared effective by the
SEC, and do any and all other acts and things which may be reasonably necessary or
advisable to enable each such Holder and underwriter to consummate the disposition in
each such jurisdiction of such Registrable Securities owned by such Holder; prOVided,
however, that the Company and the Guarantors shall not be required to (i) qualify as a
foreign corporation or as a dealer in securities in any jurisdiction where it would not
otherwise be required to qualify but for this Section 3(d), or (ii) take any action which
would subject it to general service of process or taxation in any such jurisdiction where
it is not then so subject;
(e)
notify promptly each Holder of Registrable Securities under a Shelf
Registration or any Participating Broker-Dealer who has notified the Company and the
Guarantors that it is utilizing the Exchange Offer Registration Statement as provided in
paragraph (f) below and, if requested by such Holder or Participating Broker-Dealer,
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confirm such advice in writing promptly (i) when a Registration Statement has become
effective and when any post-effective amendments and supplements thereto become
effective, (ii) of any request by the SEC or any state securities authority for posteffective ameijdments and supplements to a Registration Statement and Prospectus or
for additional information after the Registration Statement has become effective, (iii) of
the issuance by the SEC or any state securities authority of any stop order suspending
the effectiveness of a Registration Statement or the initiation of any proceedings for that
purpose, (iv) in the case of a ShelfRegistration, if, between the effective date of a
Registration Statement and the closing of any sale ofRegistrable Securities covered
thereby, the representations and warranties of the Company or any Guarantor contained
in any underwriting agreement, securities sales agreement or other similar agreement, if
any, relating to the offering cease to be true and correct in all material respects, (v) of
the happening of any event or the discovery of any facts during the period a Shelf
Registration Statement is effective which makes any statement made in such
Registration Statement or the related Prospectus untrue in any material respect or which
requires the making of any changes in such Registration Statement or Prospectus in
order to make the statements therein not misleading and (vi) ofthe receipt by the
Company or any Guarantor of any notification with respect to the suspensiop of the
qualification of the Registrable Securities or the Exchange Securities, as the case may
be, for sale in any jurisdiction or the initiation or threatening of any proceeding for such
purpose;
.
(f)
(A) in the case of the Exchange Offer Registration Statement
(i) include in the Exchange Offer Registration Statement a section entitled "Plan of
Distribution" which section shall be reasonably acceptable to the Initial Purchasers, and
which shall contain a summary statement of the positions taken or policies made by the
staff of the SEC with respect to the potential "underwriter" status of any broker-dealer
that holds Registrable Securities acquired for its own account as a result of marketmaking activities or other trading activities and that will be the beneficial owner (as
defined in Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange Act) ofExchange Securities to be received
by such broker-dealer in the Exchange Offer, whether such positions ~r policies have
been publicly disseminated by the staff of the SEC or such positions or policies
represent the prevailing views ofthe staff of the SEC, including a statement that any
such broker-dealer who receives Exchange Securities for Registrable Securities pursuant
to the Exchange Offer may be deemed a statutory underwriter and must deliver a
prospectus meeting the requirements ofthe 1933 Act in connection with any resale of
such Exchange Securities, (ii) furnish to each Participating Broker-Dealer who has
delivered to the Company and the Guarantors the notice referred to in Section 3(e),
without charge, as many copies of each Prospectus included in the Exchange Offer
Registration Statement, including any preliminary prospectus, and any amendment or
supplement thereto, as such Participating Broker-Dealer may reasonably request,
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(iii) hereby consent to the use of the Prospectus fonning part of the Exchange Offer
Registration Statement or any amendment or supplement thereto, by any person subject
to the prospectus delivery requirements ofthe SEC, including all Participating BrokerDealers, in connection with the sale or transfer of the Exchange Securities covered by
the Prospectus or any amendment or supplement thereto, and (iv) include in the
transmittal letter or similar documentation to be executed by an exchange offeree in
order to participate in the Exchange Offer (x) the following provision:
"If the exchange offeree is a broker-dealer holding Registrable Securities
acquired for its own account as a result of market-making activities or other
trading activities, it will deliver a prospectus meeting the requirements of
the 1933 Act in connection with any resale of Exchange Securities received
in respect of such Registrable Securities pursuant to the Exchange Offer;"
and
(y) a statement to the effect that by a broker-dealer making the acknowledgment
described in clause (x) and by delivering a Prospectus in connection with the exchange
. of Registrable Securities, the broker-dealer will not be deemed to admit that it is an
underwriter within the meaning of the 1933 Act; and
(B)
in the case of any Exchange Offer Registration
Statement, the Company and the Guarantors agree to deliver to the Initial Purchasers on
behalf of the Participating Broker-Dealers upon the effectiveness ofthe Exchange Offer
Registration Statement (i) an opinion of counselor opinions of counsel substantially in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (ii) an officers' certificate substantially in the
fonn customarily delivered in a public offering of debt securities and (iii) a comfort
letter or comfort letters in customary fonn if pennitted by Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 72 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (or ifsuch a
comfort letter is not pennitted, an agreed upon procedures letter in customary fonn) at
least as broad in scope and coverage as the comfort letter or comfort letters delivered to
the Initial Purchasers in connection with the initial sale of the Securities and the
Guarantees to the Initial Purchasers;
(g)
(i) in the case of an Exchange Offer, furnish counsel for the Initial
Purchasers and (ii) in the case of a Shelf Registration, furnish counsel for the Holders of
Registrable Securities copies of any comment letters received from the SEC or any other
request by the SEC or any state securities authority for amendments or supplements to a
Registration Statement and Prospectus or for additional infonnation;
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Notwithstanding the provisions ofthis Section 4, no Initial Purchaser shall be
required to contribute any amount in excess of the amount by which the total price at
which the Securities and Guarantees sold by it were offered exceeds the amount of any
damages which such Initial Purchaser has otherwise been required to pay by reason of
such untrue or alleged untrue statement or omission or alleged omission.

J
.J

No person guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation (within the meaning of
Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act) shall be entitled to contribution from any person who was
not guilty of such fraudulent misrepresentation.
For purposes ofthis Section 4, each person, if any, who controls an Initial
Purc_haser or Holder within the meaning of Sect~on 15 of the 1933 Act or SeCtion 20 of
the 1934 Act shall have the same rights to contribution as such Initial Purchaser or
Holder, and each director of the Company or any Guarantor, and each person, if any,
who controls the Company or any Guarantor within the meaning of Section 15 ofthe
1933 Act or Section 20 of the 1934 Act shall have the same rights to contribution as the
Company or any Guarantor. The Initial Purchasers' respective obligations to contribute
pursuant to this Section 7 are several in proportion to the principal amount of Securities
set forth opposite their respective names in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement and
not joint.
5.

Miscellaneous.

5.1
Rule 144 and Rule 144A. For so long as the Company or any
Guarantor is subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15 of the 1934 Act,
the Company and each Guarantor covenants that they will file the reports required to be
filed by them under the 1933 Act and Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 1934 Act and the
rules and regulations adopted by the SEC thereunder. If the Company and the
Guarantors cease to be so required to file such reports, the Company and the Guarantors
covenant that they will upon the request of any Holder of Registrable Securities (a)
make available to such Holder such information as is necessary to permit sales pursuant
to Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, (b) deliver such information to a prospective purchaser
as is necessary to permit sales pursuant to Rule 144A under the 1933 Act and it will take
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such further action as any Holder of Registrable Securities may reasonably request, and
(c) take such further action that is reasonable in the circumstances, in each case, to the
extent required from time to time to enable such Holder to sell its Registrable Securities
without registration under the 1933 Act within the limitation of the exemptions provided
by (i) Rule 144 under the 1933 Act, as such Rule may be amended from time to time,
(ii) Rule 144A under the 1933 Act, as such Rule may be amended from time to time, or
(iii) any similar rules or regulations hereafter adopted by the SEC. Upon the request of
any Holder ofRegistrable Securities, the Company and the Guarantors will deliver to
such Holder a written statement as to whether they have complied with such
requirements.
5.2 No Inconsistent Agreements. The Company and each Guarantor
have not entered into and the Company and each Guarantor will not after the date of this
Agreement enter into any agreement which is inconsistent with the rights granted to the
Holders of Registrable Securities in this Agreement or otherwise conflicts with the
provisions hereof The rights granted to the Holders hereunder do not in any way
conflict with the rights granted to the holders of the Company's and each Guarantor's
other issued and outstanding securities under any such agreements.
5.3
Amendments and Waivers. The provisions of this Agreement,
including the provisions of this sentence, may not be amended, modified or
supplemented, and waivers or consents to departures from the provisions hereof may not
be given unless the Company and the Guarantors have obtained the written consent of
Holders of at least a majority in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
Registrable Securities affected by such amendment, modification, supplement, waiver or
departure.
5.4 Notices. All notices and other communications provided for or
permitted hereunder shall be made in writing by hand delivery, registered first-class
mail, telex, telecopier, or any courier guaranteeing overnight delivery (a) if to a Holder,
at the most current address given by such Holder to the Company and the Guarantors by
means of a notice given in accordance with the provisions of this Section 5.4, which
address initially is the address set forth in the Purchase Agreement with respect to the
Initial Purchasers; and (b) if to the Company or any Guarantor, initially at the
Company's or such Guarantor's address set forth in the Purchase Agreement, and
thereafter at such other address of which notice is given in accordance with the
provisions of this Section 5.4.
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All such notices and communications shall be deemed to have been duly
given: at the time delivered by hand, if personally delivered; two business days after
being deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, ifmailed; when answered back, if telexed;
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when receipt is acknowledged, if telecopied; and on the next business day if timely
delivered to an air courier guaranteeing overnight delivery.
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Copies of all such notices, demands, or other communications shall be
concurrently delivered by the person giving the same to the Trustee under the Indenture,
at the address specified in such Indenture.
5.5
Successor and Assigns. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of
and be binding upon the successors, assigns and transferees of each of the parties,
including, without limitation and without the need for an express assignment,
subsequent Holders; provided that nothing herein shall be deemed to permit any
assignment, transfer or other disposition of Registrable Securities in violation ofthe
terms of the Purchase Agreement. If any transferee of any Holder shall acquire
Registrable Securities, in any manner, whether by operation of law or otherwise, such
Registrable Securities shall be held subject to all of the terms of this Agreement, and by
taking and holding such Registrable Securities such person shall be conclusively
deemed to have agreed to be bound by and to perform all of the terms and provisions of
this Agreement, including the restrictions on resale set forth in this Agreement and, if
applicable, the Purchase Agreement, and such person shall be entitled to receive the
benefits hereof.
5.6 Third Partv Beneficiaries. The Initial Purchasers (even ifthe Initial
Purchasers are not Holders of Registrable Securities) shall be third party beneficiaries to
the agreements made hereunder between the Company and the Guarantors, on the one
hand, and the Holders, on the other hand, and shall have the right to enforce such
agreements directly to the extent they deem such enforcement necessary or advisable to
protect their rights or the rights of Holders hereunder. Each Holder ofRegistrable
Securities shall be a third party beneficiary to the agreements made hereunder between
the Company and the Guarantors, on the one hand, and the Initial Purchasers, on the
other hand, and shall have the right to enforce such agreements directly to the extent it
deems such enforcement necessary or advisable to protect its rights hereunder.
5.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts and by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so
executed shall be deemed to be an original and all of which taken together shall
constitute one and the same agreement.
5.8 Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for convenience of
reference only and shall not limit or otherwise affect the meaning hereof.
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OFFERING MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

$150,000,000

mARSH
Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.
8 7/8% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007
Interest on the 8'/,% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007 (the "Notes") of Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. (the "Company") offered
hereby (the "Offering") will be payable semi-annually in arrears on February 1 and August 1 of each year, commencing February I,
1998. The Notes will mature on August 1,2007. The Notes are redeemable at any time on or after August 1,2002 at the option of the
Company, in whole or in part, at the redemption prices set forth herein, together with accrued and unpaid interest, if any, to the date of
redemption. Upon the occurrence of a Change of Control (as defined herein), each holder of Notes may require the Company to
purchase all or a portion of such holder's Notes at a purchase price equal to 101% of the principal amount thereof, together with
accrued and unpaid interest, if any, to the date of purchase. See "Description of the Notes."
The Notes will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Company and, as such, will be subordinated in right of payment
to all existing and future senior indebtedness of the Company. The Notes will rank pari passu in right of payment with all other existing
and future senior subordinated indebtedness, if any, of the Company, and senior in right of payment to all existing and future
subordinated indebtedness, if any, of the Company. The Notes will be guaranteed, jointly and severally, on a senior subordinated basis
(the "Guarantees"), by all of the Company's subsidiaries (other than three immaterial subsidiaries) (the "Guarantors" and, together
with the Company, the "Issuers"). The Guarantees will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Guarantors and will be
subordinated to all existing and future Guarantor Senior Indebtedness (as defined herein). See "Description of the Notes - Ranking."
As of March 29, 1997, on a pro forma basis after giving effect to the Offering and the application of the estimated net proceeds
therefrom, the Company and the Guarantors would have had approximately $219.1 million in aggregate principal amount of
indebtedness outstanding, of which $49.2 million would have ranked senior in right of payment to the Notes and the Guarantees (all of
which would have been secured) and approximately S19.9 million would have been subordinated in right of payment to the Notes and
the Guarantees.
The Company's Class A and Class B Common Stock are traded on the Nasdaq National Market under the symbols "MARSA"
and "MARSB," respectively.

See "Risk Factors" beginning on page 13 for a discussion of certain factors that should be
considered by prospective investors in evaluating an investment in the Notes.

,

r
r
t

r
r

r
r
r

r
r

THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES Aer OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE
"SECURITIES ACI""), OR ANY STATE SECURITIES LAWS AND, UNLESS SO REGISTERED, MAY NOT BE
OFFERED OR SOLD EXCEPT PURSUANT TO AN EXEMPTION FROM, OR IN A TRANSACTION NOT SUBJEer
TO, THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES Aer AND APPUCABLE STATE
SECURITIES LAWS. ACCORDINGLY, THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY ARE BEING OFFERED AND
SOLD ONLY (A) TO "QUAUFIED INSTITUTIONAL BUYERS" (AS DEFINED IN RULE 144A UNDER
THE SECURITIES Aer ("RULE 144A"» IN COMPUANCE WITH RULE 144A, AND (B) PURSUANT
TO OFFERS AND SALES THAT OCCUR OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING
OF REGULATION S UNDER THE SECURITIES Aer. SEE "NOTICES TO INVESTORS."
Price to
I.yestors(l)

Per Note .............................•.....
Total

..........................................................

99.185%
$148,777,500

Initial Purchasers'
Discount(2)

2.625%
$3,937,500

Proceeds 10
Company(3)

96.56%
$144,840,000

(I) Plus accrued interest, if any, from August 5, 1997.
(2) The Issuers have agreed to indemnify the Initial Purchasers (as defined herein) against certain liabilities, including liabilities
under the Securities Act. See "Plan of Distribution."
(3) Before deducting expenses payable by the Company, estimated at S7oo,ooo.
The Notes are offered by the Initial Purchasers, subject to prior sale, when, as and if issued to and accepted by them. subject to
approval of certain legal matters by counsel for the Initial Purchasers and certain other conditions. The Initial Purchasers reserve the
right to withdraw, cancel or modify such offer and to reject orders in whole or in part. It is expected that delivery of the Notes will be
made Ihrough the book-entry facilities of The Depository Trust Company in New York, New York on or about August 5, 1997 against
payment in immediately available funds.

Merrill Lynch & Co.

McDonald & Company
Securities, Inc.

The date of this Offering Memorandum is July 29, 1997.
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SUBJECT TO COMPLETION DATED JULY 16, 1997
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFERING MEMORANDUM

$150,000,000

mARSH
Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.
% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007
Interest on the % Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007 (the "Notes") of Marsh Supennarkets, Inc. (the "Company") offered
and
of each year, commencing
,
hereby (the "Offering") will be payable semi-annually in arrears on
1998. The Notes will mature on
,2007. The Notes are redeemable at any time on or after
,2002 at the
option of the Company, in whole or in part, at the redemption prices set forth herein, together with accrued and unpaid interest, if any,
to the date of redemption. Upon the occurrence of a Change of Control (as defined herein), each holder of Notes may require the
Company to purchase all or a portion of such holder's Notes at a purchase price equal to 101% of the principal amount thereof, together
with accrued and unpaid interest, if any, to the date of purchase. See "Description of the Notes."

J

The Notes will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Company and, as such, will be subordinated in right of payment
to all existing and future senior indebtedness of the Company. The Notes will rank pari passu in right of payment with all other existing
and future senior subordinated indebtedness, if any, of the Company, and senior in right of payment to all existing and future
subordinated indebtedness, if any, of the Company. The Notes will be guaranteed, jointly and severally, on a senior subordinated basis
(the "Guarantees"), by all of the Company's subsidiaries (the "Guarantors" and, together with the Company, the "Issuers"). The
Guarantees will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Guarantors and will be subordinated to all existing and future
Guarantor Senior Indebtedness (as defined herein). See "Description of the Notes - Ranking." As of March 29,1997, on a pro forma
basis after giving effect to the Offering and the application of the estimated net proceeds therefrom, the Company and the Guarantors
would have had approximately $219.1 million in aggregate principal amount of indebtedness outstanding, of which $49.2 million would
have ranked senior in right of payment to the Notes and the Guarantees (all of which would have been secured) and approximately
$19.9 million would have been subordinated in right of payment to the Notes and the Guarantees.
The Company's Class A and Class B Common Stock are traded on the Nasdaq Kational Market under the symbols "MARSA"
and "MARSB," respectively.

See "Risk Factors" beginning on page 13 for a discussion of certain factors that should be
considered by prospective im'estors in evaluating an investment in the Notes.
THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE
"SECURITIES ACT"), OR ANY STATE SECURITIES LAWS AND, U~LESS SO REGISTERED, MAY ~OT BE
OFFERED OR SOLD EXCEPT PURSUANT TO AN EXEMPTION FROM, OR IN A TRANSACTION NOT SUBJECT
TO, THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND APPUCABLE STATE
SECURITIES LAWS, ACCORDINGLY, THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY ARE BEING OFFERED AND
SOLD ONLY (A) TO "QUAUFIED INSTITUTIONAL BUYERS" (AS DEFINED IN RULE 144A UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT ("RULE 144A"» IN COMPUANCE WITH Rt:LE 144A, AND (B) PURSUANT
TO OFFERS AND SALES THAT OCCUR OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING
OF REGULATION S UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT, SEE ":"OTICES TO I:"'VESTORS,"
Price to
In.estors(l )

Per Note .............. , ....................
Total

................................................................

Initial Pun:ha~rs'
Discount (2)

%

%

$

Proceeds to
Company(3)

%

5

I

j

$

(I) Plus accrued interest, if any, from
,1997.
(2) The Issuers have agreed to indemnify the Initial Purchasers (as defined herein) against certain liabilities, including liabilities
under the Securities Act. See "Plan of Distribution."
(3) Before deducting expenses payable by the Company, estimated at $
The Notes are offered by the Initial Purchasers, subject to prior sale, when, as and if issued to and accepted by them. subject to
approval of certain legal matters by counsel for the Initial Purchasers and certain other conditions. The Initial Purchasers reserve the
right to withdraw, cancel or modify such offer and to reject orders in whole or in part. It is expected that delivery of the Notes will be
made through the book-entry facilities of The Depository Trust Company in New York. New York on or about
• 1997
against payment in immediately available funds.

Merrill Lynch & Co.

McDonald & Company
Securities, Inc.

The date of this Offering Memorandum is
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THE OFFERING IS BEING MADE IN RELIANCE UPON AN EXEMPTION FROM THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT FOR AN OFFER AND SALE OF
SECURITIES THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE A PUBLIC OFFERING. EACH PURCHASER OF
NOTES OFFERED HEREBY IN MAKING ITS PURCHASE WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE MADE
CERTAIN ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS AND AGREEMENTS AS SET FORTH
HEREIN UNDER "NOTICES TO INVESTORS." THE NOTES HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OR ANY STATE SECURITIES LAWS AND, UNLESS SO
REGISTERED, MAY NOT BE-OFFERED OR SOLD EXCEPT PURSUANT TO AN EXEMPTION
FROM, OR IN A TRANSACTION NOT SUBJECT TO, THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND APPLICABLE STATE SECURITIES LAWS. PURCHASERS OF
THE NOTES SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO BEAR THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF THEIR INVESTMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.
THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM IS BEING SUBMITTED ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS
TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FOR INFORMATIONAL USE
SOLELY IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE PURCHASE OF THE
NOTES. USE OF THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE IS NOT
AUTHORIZED. THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM MAY NOT BE COPIED OR REPRODUCED
IN WHOLE OR IN PART NOR MAY IT BE DISTRIBUTED, NOR MAY ANY OF ITS CONTENTS
BE DISCLOSED, TO ANYONE OTHER THAN THE PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS TO WHOM IT
IS SUBMITTED. EACH OFFEREE OF THE NOTES, BY ACCEPTING DELIVERY OF THIS
OFFERING MEMORANDUM, AGREES TO THE FOREGOING. SEE "NOTICES TO
INVESTORS."
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM WAS OBTAINED FROM THE ISSUERS AND OTHER SOURCES BUT NO ASSURANCE CAN BE GIVEN
AS TO THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF SUCH INFORMATION. THIS OFFERING
MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZES CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION. SUCH SUM·
MARIES ARE QUALIFIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH DOCUMENTS
AND INFORMATION. IN MAKING AN INVESTMENT DECISION, INVESTORS MUST RELY
ON THEIR OWN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUERS AND THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING,
INCLUDING THE MERITS AND RISKS INVOLVED. NO REPRESENTATION IS MADE TO
ANY OFFEREE OR PURCHASER OF THE NOTES REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF AN
INVESTMENT THEREIN BY SUCH OFFEREE OR PURCHASER UNDER ANY APPLICABLE
LEGAL STANDARD. THE CONTENTS OF THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM ARE NOT TO BE
CONSTRUED AS LEGAL, BUSINESS OR TAX ADVICE. EACH PROSPECTIVE INVESTOR
SHOULD CONSULT ITS OWN ATTORNEY, BUSINESS ADVISOR AND TAX ADVISOR AS TO
LEGAL, BUSINESS OR TAX ADVICE.
NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IS MADE AS TO THE
ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THE INFORMATION SET FORTH HEREIN, AND NOTHING CONTAINED IN THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM IS, OR SHALL BE RELIED UPON AS,
A PROMISE OR REPRESENTATION, WHETHER AS TO THE PAST OR THE FUTURE. THE
INITIAL PURCHASERS HAVE NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED ANY SUCH INFORMATION AND ASSUME NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS
THEREOF.
ALL INQUIRIES RELATING TO THIS OFFERING MEMORANDUM AND THE OFFERING
CONTEMPLATED HEREIN SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE INITIAL PURCHASERS. PRO·
SPECTIVE INVESTORS MAY OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE INITIAL
PURCHASERS OR THE ISSUERS THAT THEY MAY REASONABLY REQUIRE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECISION TO PURCHASE ANY OF THE NOTES.
THE NOTES HAVE NOT BEEN RECOMMENDED, APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (THE "COMMISSION") OR ANY STATE SE-

M - 31

...
I

Use of Proceeds

Exchange Offer; Registration
Rights

.

.

The Company intends to use net proceeds from the Offering to repay
-senior unsecured indebtedness and related prepayment penalties. The
remaining net proceeds will be used to repay amounts outstanding under
revolving credit facilities between the Company and Harris Trust and
Savings Bank (the "Harris Revolving Credit Agreement") and, unless
terminated and repaid prior to the closing of the Offering, each of
KeyBank National Association (the "KeyBank Revolving Credit Agreement") and National City Bank, Indiana, a national banking association
(the "National City Bank Revolving Credit Agreement") (collectively,
the "Revolving Credit Agreements"), and notes payable to Bank One,
Dayton NA (the "Bank One Note Payable") and First Merchants Bank
of Muncie (the "First Merchants Note Payable") and for general
corporate purposes, including capital expenditures. See "Use of Proceeds," "Capitalization" and "Description of Certain Indebtedness."
Pursuant to a registration rights agreement relating to the Notes and the
Guarantees (the "Registration Rights Agreement") by and among the
Company, the Guarantors and the Initial Purchasers, the Company and
the Guarantors have agreed to use their best efforts to (i) file within 30
days, and cause to ·become effective within 90 days, of the date of original
issuance of the Notes, a registration statement (the "Exchange Offer
Registration Statement") with respect to an offer to exchange the Notes
(the "Exchange Offer") for notes of the Company with terms identical
in all material respects to the Notes (the "Exchange Notes") (except
that the Exchange Notes will not contain terms with respect to transfer
restrictions or interest rate increases as described below) and (ii) cause
the Exchange Offer to be consummated within 120 days of the original
issuance of the Notes.
In the event that any changes in law or the applicable interpretations of
the staff of the Commission do not permit the Issuers to effect the
Exchange Offer, or if the Exchange Offer Registration Statement is not
declared effective within 90 days or consummated within 120 days
following the original issue of the Notes, or upon the request of any of
the Initial Purchasers, or if any holder of the Notes is not permitted by
applicable law to participate in the Exchange Offer or elects to participate in the Exchange Offer but does not receive fully tradable Exchange
Notes pursuant to the Exchange Offer, the Issuers will use their best
efforts to cause a shelf registration statement with respect to the resale of
the Notes (the "Shelf Registration Statement") to become effective
within 120 days following the original issue of the Notes (or within 30
days of the request of any Initial Purchaser) and to keep the Shelf
Registration Statement effective for up to two years from the date the
Shelf Registration Statement is declared effective by the Commission.
The interest rate on the Notes is subject to increase under certain
circumstances if the Issuers are not in compliance with their obligations
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under the Registration Rights Agreement. See "Exchange Offer; Registration Rights."
Absence of Public Market for
the Notes. . . ... . . . . . . . . .. ..
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Transfer Restrictions. . . . . . . . . . .

There is no public trading market for the Notes and the Company does
not intend to apply for listing of the Notes on any national securities
exchange or for quotation of the Notes on any automated dealer
quotation system. The Company has been advised by the Initial Purchasers that they presently intend to make a market in the Notes after the
consummation of the Offering contemplated hereby, although they are
under no obligation to do so and may discontinue any market-making
activities at any time without notice. Although it is expected that the
Notes will be eligible for trading in the Private Offering, Resales and
Trading through Automated Linkages ("PORTAL") market, no assurance can be given as to the liquidity of the trading market for the Notes
or that an active public market for the Notes will develop. If an active
trading market for the Notes does not develop, the market price and
liquidity of the Notes may be adversely affected. If the Notes are traded,
they may trade at a discount from their initial offering price, depending
on prevailing interest rates, the market for similar securities, the performance of the Company and certain other factors. See "Risk Factors - Absence of Public Market for the Notes."
The Notes have not been registered under the Securities Act and may
not be offered or sold within the United States or to, or for the'benefit of,
U.S. persons except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction
not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act. See
"Notices to Investors."
Risk Factors

See "Risk Factors," beginning on page 13, for a discussion of certain factors that should be considered by
prospective investors in evaluating an investment in the Notes.
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PLAN OF DISTRIBUTION
Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in a purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement")
among the Company, each of the Guarantors and each of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated ("Merrill Lynch") and McDonald & Company Securities, Inc., the Company has agreed to sell
to each of the Initial Purchasers, and each of the Initial Purchasers severally and not jointly has agreed to
purchase from the Company, the aggregate principal amount of the Notes set forth opposite its name below.
The Initial Purchasers have agreed, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Purchase Agreement,
to purchase all of the Notes if any.of the Notes are purchased.
Principal
Amount

Initial Purchaser

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated
McDonald & Company Securities, Inc. .
Total

.
.
.

...I
j

$120,000,000
30,000,000
$150,000,000

The Initial Purchasers propose to offer the Notes for resale in transactions not requiring registration under
the Securities Act or applicable state securities laws, including sales pursuant to Rule 144A under the
Securities Act. The Initial Purchasers will not offer or sell the Notes except (i) to persons they reasonably
believe to be QIBs (as defined herein) and (ii) pursuant to offers and sales to non-U.S. Personsthat occur
outside the United States within the meaning of Regulation S (as defined herein). Notes sold pursuant to
Regulation S may not be offered or resold in the United States or to U.S. Persons (as defined in Regulation
S), except pursuant to an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act or pursuant to a
registration statement declared effective under the Securities Act. Each purchaser of the Notes offered hereby
in making its purchase will be deemed to have made certain acknowledgments, representations and
agreements as set forth under "Notices to Investors." The Initial Purchasers have advised the Company that
they propose initially to offer the Notes at the price set forth on the cover page hereof. After the initial offering
of the Notes, the offering price and other selling terms of the Notes may from time to time vary based on
market conditions.
There is no public trading market for the Notes and the Company does not intend to apply for listing of
the Notes on any national securities exchange or for quotation of the Notes on any automated dealer quotation
system. The Company has been advised by the Initial Purchasers that they presently intend to make a market
in the Notes after the consummation of the Offering contemplated hereby, although they are under no
obligation to do so and may discontinue any market-making activities at any time without any notice.
Although the Notes are expected to be eligible for trading in the PORTAL market, the National Association
of Securities Dealers' screenbased, automated market for trading of securities eligible for resale under Rule
l44A, no assurance can be given as to the liquidity of the trading market for the Notes or that an active public
market for the Notes wiII develop. If an active trading market for the Notes does not develop, the market price
and liquidity of the Notes may be adversely affected. If the Notes are traded, they may trade at a discount
from their initial offering price, depending on prevailing interest rates, the market for similar securities, the
performance of the Company and certain other factors.
The Issuers have agreed, subject to certain exceptions (including borrowings under revolving credit
agreements), not to directly or indirectly offer, pledge, sell, contract to sell, sell any option or contract to
purchase, purchase any option or contract to sell, grant any option, right or warrant for the sale of or otherwise
dispose of or transfer any debt securities, or file a registration statement under the Securities Act with respect
to the foregoing, without the prior written consent of Merrill Lynch on behalf of the Initial Purchasers, for a
period of 90 days after the date of this Offering Memorandum.
The Issuers have agreed to indemnify the Initial Purchasers against certain liabilities, including certain
liabilities under the Securities Act, or to contribute to payments the Initial Purchasers may be required to
make in respect thereof.
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Until the distribution of the Notes is completed, rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission may
limit the ability of the Initial Purchasers and certain selling group members to bid for and purchase the Notes.
As an exception to these rules, the Initial Purchasers are permitted to engage in certain transactions that
stabilize the price of the Notes. Such transactions consist of bids or purchases for the purpose of pegging,
fixing or maintainit:lg the price of the Notes.
If the Initial Purchasers create a short position in connection with the offering, i.e., if they sell more
Notes than are set forth on the cover page of this Offering Memorandum, the Initial Purchasers may reduce
that short position by purchasing Notes in the open market. In general, purchases of a security for the purpose
of stabilization or to reduce a short position could cause the price of the security to be higher than it might be
in the absence of such purchases.

Neither the Issuers nor any of the Initial Purchasers makes any representation or prediction as to the
direction or magnitude of any effect that the transactions described above may have on the price of the Notes.
In addition, neither the Issuers nor any of the Initial Purchasers makes any representation that the Initial
Purchasers will engage in such transactions or that such transactions, once commenced, will not be
discontinued without notice.
The Initial Purchasers have from time to time provided and may in the future provide investment banking
and financial advisory services to the Company and its affiliates.
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. and Nesbitt Bums Securities Inc. have acted as financial advisors to the
Company in connection with the Offering and will receive fees of $100,000 and $20,000, respectively, as
compensation for such services.
LEGAL MATTERS
Certain legal matters with respect to the legality of the issuance of the Notes offered hereby will be
passed upon for the Company by Bass, Berry & Sims PLC, First American Center, Nashville, Tennessee
37238. Certain legal matters will be passed upon for the Initial Purchasers by Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson (a partnership which includes professional corporations), One New York Plaza, New York, New
York 10004. Bass, Berry & Sims PLC and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson will rely as to all matters
of Indiana law upon the opinion of P. Lawrence Butt, Counsel of the Company. Bass, Berry & Sims PLC will
rely as to all matters of New York law upon the opinion of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
The consolidated financial statements of Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. and subsidiaries at March 29, 1997
and March 30, 1996, and for each of the three years in the period ended March 29, 1997, appearing in this
Offering Memorandum have been audited by Ernst & Young LLP, independent auditors, as set forth in their
report thereon appearing elsewhere herein.
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As filed with the Securities and Exchan&e Commission on October 29, 1997
Registration No. 333-34855

J

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

Amendment No. 2
to

FORM 8-4

J

REGISTRATION STATEMENT
UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

MARSH SUPERMARKETS, INC.
(Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter)

Indiana

5411

(Slille or othr jIIriMIkdtm 01
br&orponUit»I or orpniztItioII)

(Primluy SIiINIIml INlIUtriGI
CIMsljictJlioII CAU NlII1Iw)

35-0918179

(I.RS. Emp.,

...

IdMtijictJlioII No.)

9800 Crosspoint BouleYard
Indianapolis, Indiana 46256-3350
(317) 594-2100
(AddIas. itldudJ", zip COtk. oNl r.kplunw

11l1l1I"''' ilr&llIdi", _

ctNle. 01 RqisIrtmt'l prllldptll U«lIti.". olficu)

SEE TABLE OF ADDmONAL REGISTRANTS

P. Lawrence Butt
Senior Vice President, Counsel and Secretary
Marsh Supermarkets, InCo
9800 Crosspoint Boule,ard
Indianapolis, Indiana 46256-3350
.
(317) 594-2100
(NfUIII" AddIas. itldudi", zip COtk. oNl r.kp/J_ 1I111fll¥" itldudJ", IInO COtk. o/oplU 101' _me.)
Copies of all communications to:
James H. Cheek

m

Bass, Berry " Sims PLC

2700 Fint American Center
NasbYiIie, Tennessee 37238
(61S) 742-6200

...

Approximate date of commencement of proposed sale to the public As soon as practicable after this
Registration Statement becomes effective.
.

If the securities being registered on this form are being offered in connection with the formation of a
holding company and there is compliance with General Instruction G. check the following box. 0
If this Form is filed to register additional securities for an offering pursuant to Rule 462(b) under the
Securities Act, please check the following box and list the Securities Act registration statement number of the
earlier effective registration statement for the same offering. 0
If this Form is a post-cffective amendment filed pursuant to Rule 462(c) under the Securities Act, check
the following box and list the Securities Act registration statement number of the earlier effective registration
statement for the same offering. 0
The Registnnt hereby amends this Registntion Statement on such date or dates as may be necessary to
delay its effecti,e date until tbe Registrant shall file a further amendment which specifically states that this
Registntion Statement sball thereafter become efl'ecti,e in accordance with Section 8(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, or until the Registration Statement shall become efl'ecti,e on such date as the
Commission, acting punuantto such Section 8(a), may determine.
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Offer to Exchange
up to 5150,000,000 of
8li'll Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007, Series B
for any and all of the outstanding
..8'n" Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007
of
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Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.

~:rJ

The Exchange Offer will expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time,
on
, 1997; unless extended.

;~!E
-=:; . . . .
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Marsh Supermartccts. 1Dc., an Indiana corporation (the "Compally"), hereby offers, upon the terms and subject to the conditions
CD 2 ~ set forth in this Prospect1ll and the ICCOIIlpall)'Ulllener of transmittal (the "Letter of Transmittal" IUId, together with this Prospectus,
=:; - ca the "Exchaqc Offef'), to excbaqc an qgrc:pte of up to 5150,000,000 principal amount of 8~'Jo Senior SubordiDated Notes due 2007,
~
Series B (the "Elu:haDp Notes"), which have been registered UDder the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), for
"C '" if an identical face amount of the issued and outstaDdiDa 8li'Jo Senior SubordiDated Notes due 2007 (the "144A Notes" and, together with
~ ~ ~ the Elu:haDp Notes, the "Notes") of the Company from the Holders (as de&ned herein) thereof in integral multiples of $1,000. As of
c l!tthe date of this Prospectus, there is 5150,000,000 in agregate principal amount of the 144A Notes outstanding. The terms of the
CD ' " Is
Exchange Notes are identical in all material respects to the 144A Notes, except that the Exchange Notes have been registered under the
~ Securities Act, and therefore will Dot bear legends restric:tiDg their transfer and will not contain certain provisions providing for an
cu ... ::::1 increase: in the interest rate ~yablc: on the I44A Notes under certain circumstances relating to the Registration Rights Agreement (as
~~
de&ned hereiD), which provuions will terminate as to all of the Notes upon the consummation of the Exchange Offer. The Exchange
'E CD' § Notes will be obligations of the Compallyeridenc:iDg the same indebtedness as the 144A Notes, and will be entitled to the benefits of the
::::I
same Indenture (as de&ned hereiD). See "Exchange Offer."
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Interest on the Exchange Notes will be payable semi-annually in arrears on February 1 and August 1 in each year. commencing
February I, 1998. The Exchange Notes will mature on August 1,2007. The Exchange Notes are redeemable at any time on or after
~ ... ~ August I, 2002 at the option of the Compally, in whole or in part, at the redemption prices set forth herein, together with accrued and
C; ~ S unpaid interest. if any, to the date of redemption. Upon the occurrence of a Change of Control (as de&ned hereiD). each holder of the
c;, 8:1 "Exchange Notes may require the Company to purchase all or a portion of such holder's Exchange Notes at a purchase price equal to
'§.8 ~ 101CJ. of the principal amount thereof, together with accrued and unpaid interest. if any, to the date of purchase. There can be no
~ - c assurance that the Company will have sufficient funds necessary to repurchase the Exchange Notes. The provisions of the Indenture
i,g allow the Compally to inc:ur additional indebtedness, including Senior Indebtedness, subject to certain limitations. The provisions of the
-Ei -cu~ ~ Indenture do not require the Company to repurchase the Exchange Notes in the event of highly leveraged or certain other transactions if
S -;;; i such transaction is not a transaction dclined as a Change of Control See "Description of the Exchange Notes - Certain Covenants."
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The Exchange Notes will be UDlCCUred senior subordiDated obliptions of the Compally and, as such, will be subordinated in right
of payment to all existing and future: ICDior indebtedness of the CompallY. The Exchange Notes will rank pariJHWV in right of payment
with all other existing and future: 1CDi0r subordiDated indebtcciness, if any, of the Compally, and senior in right of payment to all existing
and future: lubordiDated indebtedness, if any, of the CompallY. The Compan)' bas not issued, and does not haft any current
arranaemeatl to issue, aa)' lipl&cant addltioaal iaclebted_ to "hlc:ll the Notes _uld lie senior, IUbordlaate or raat 1Mri fMSSII In
ript of p&)'IIIent. The Notes will lie etrectiftl)' IUbonilnate to esseatlall)' all of the currentl)' outltandln,ladebtedaeu of the Company
and its lubsidlaries. The Exchan&c Notes will be fully and unconditionally JlWlDtced, jointly and ICYCrally, on a senior subordiDated
basis (the "Guarantees") by all of the Company's Illbsidiaries (other than three inconsequential subsidiaries) (the "Guanmton" and.
together with the Compally, the "Issuen"). The Guarantees will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Guaranton and will
be subordiDated to all existing and future Guarantor Senior IDdebtedness (as defined herein). See "Description of the Exchange
Notes - RaDkiDg." The Company has 570.0 million in aYailable credit. under its existing revolving credit agreements and notes payable
to banb, which is senior in right ofpaymcnt to the Notes. As ofSeptember 13,1997, aftergiring effeet to the offering of the I44A Notes
and the application of the net proceeds therefrom, the Company and the Guarantors had outstanding 5216.1 million of aggregate
principal amount of indebtedness, of which 546.2 million ranJccd senior in right of payment to the Exchange Notes and the Guarantces
(all of which was ICCImd) and approximately 519.9 million was subordiDated in right of payment to the Exchange Notes and the
Guarantees. As of the date of this Prospect1II, virtually all of the consolidated assets of the CompallY were held by the Guaranton and
~rtually all of the Company's cash flow and net income was generated by the Guaranton. Therefore, the Company's ability to maIcc
Interest and principal payments when due to holden of the Exchange Notes is dependent, in pan, upon the receipt of sufficient funds
from its subsidiaries.
(cove, pap colllinued 011 tte%l poge)

See "Risk Factors," beginning on page 13, for a discussion of certain factors that sbould be considered by
participants in tbe EXchange
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THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION NOR HAS THE
~c~
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION
§~
PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY
S<3i!~
REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
~~~
UNTIL
, 1997 (90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS PROSPECTUS). ALL DEALERS EFFECTING
~.! ~ TRATIONNSMACTIyONS IN THE REGISTERED SECURITIES, WHETHER OR NOT PARTICIPATING IN THIS DISTRlBU~ ~G>
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BE REQUIRED TO DELIVER A PROSPECTUS.

The Date of this Prospectus is
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, 1997.

The Company will accept for exchange any and all validly tendered 144A Notes on or prior to the
Expiration Date (as defined herein). Tenders of time, on the Expiration Date; otherwise such tenders arc
irrevocable. The Exchange Offer is not conditioned upon any minimum principal amount of 144A Notes being
tendered for exchange. For certain conditions to the Exchange Offer, see "The Exchange OfferConditions."
The 144A Notes were offered and sold on August 5, 1997 at a price of $991.85 per $1,000 principal
amount of Notes. For federal income tax purposes, the amount of original issue discount on the 144A Notes is
considered to be de minimis and is treated as zero. See "Description of Certain Federal Income Tax
Consequences of an Investment in the Notes."
The 144A Notes were offered and sold in a transaction not registered under the Securities Act in reliance
upon an exemption from the registration requirements thereof. In general the 144A Notes may not be offered
or sold unless registered under the Securities Act, except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction
not subject to, the Securities Act. .
The Exchange Notes arc being offered hereby in order to satisfy certain obligations of the Company
contained in the Registration Rights Agreement. The Company has agreed to pay the expenses of the
Exchange Offer. Based on interpretations by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") set forth in no-action letters issued to third parties, the Company believes that the Exchange
Notes issued pursuant to the Exchange Offer in exchange for 144A Notes may be offered for resale, resold or
otherwise transferred by any Holder thereof (other than any such Holder that is an "affiliate" of the Company
within the meaning of Rule 405 promulgated under the Securities Act) without compliance with the
registration and prospectus delivery provisions of the Securities Act, provided that such Exchange Notes arc
acquired in the ordinary course of such Holder's business and such Holder is not engaged in and docs not
intend to engage in a distribution of such Exchange Notes. In some cases, certain broker-dealers may be
required to deliver a prospectus in connection with the resale of such Exchange Notes.

:1
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This Prospectus, as it may be amended or supplemented from time to time, may be used by a brokerdealer in connection with any resale of Exchange Notes received in exchange for such 144A Notes where such
144A Notes were acquired by such broker-dcaler for its own account as a result of market-making activities or
other trading activities (other than 144A Notes acquired directly from the Company). The Company has
agreed that it will make this Prospectus available to any broker-dealer for usc in connection with any such
resale.

.J

Prior to this Exchange Offer, there has been no public market for the 144A Notes or Exchange Notes. If
a market for the Exchange Notes should develop, the Exchange Notes could trade at a discount from their
principal amount. The Company docs not intend to list the Exchange Notes on any securities exchange nor
docs the Company intend to apply for quotation of the Exchange Notes on the NASDAQ National Market or
other quotation system. The Initial Purchasers (as defined herein) have indicated to the Company that they
intend to make a market in the Notes, but arc not obligated to do so and such market-making activities may
be discontinued at any time. As a result, no assurance can be given that an active trading market for the
Exchange Notes will develop.

J

The Exchange Notes issued pursuant to this Exchange Offer will be issued in the form of Global
Exchange Notes (as defined herein), which will be deposited with, or on behalf of, The Depository Trust
Company (the "Depository" or "DTC") and registered in its name or in the name of Cede'" Co., its
nominee. Beneficial interests in the Global Exchange Notes representing the Exchange Notes will be shown
on, and transfers thereof will be effected through, records maintained by the DTC and its participants.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, 144A Notes held in certificated form will be exchanged solely for Certificated
Exchange Notes (as defined herein). After the initial issuance of the Global Exchange Notes, Certificated
Exchange Notes will be issued in exchange for the Global Exchange Notes only on the terms set forth in the
Indenture. See "Description of the Exchange Notes - Book-Entry, Delivery and Form."
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PROSPECTUS

mARSH
Offer to Exchange
up to $150,000,000 of
SYa% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007, Series B
. for any and all of the outstanding
SYa% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007
of

Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.
The Exchange Offer will expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time,
on December 3, 1997, unless extended.
Marsh Supermarkets. Inc., an Indiana corporation (the "Companv"), hereby offers, upon the terms and subject to the conditions
set forth in this Prospectus and the accompanying letter of u".lnsmittal ·(the "Letter of Transmittal" and, together with this Prospectus,
the "Exchange Offer"). to exchange an aggregate of up to 5150,000.000 principal amount of 8'11% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007,
Series B (the "Exchange Notes"). which have been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), for
an identical face amount of the issued and outstanding 8'11% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007 (the "144A Notes" and, together with
the Exchange Notes, the "Notes") of the Company from the Holders (as defined herein) thereof in integral multiples of $1,000. As of
the date of this Prospectus. there is $150,000.000 in aggregate principal amount of the 144A Notes outstanding. The terms of the
Exchange Notes are identical in all material respects to the I44A Notes, except that the Exchange Notes have been registered under the
Securities Act, and therefore will not bear legends restricting their transfer and will not contain certain provisions providing for an
increase in the interest rate payable on the I44A Notes under certain circumstances relating to the Registration Rights Agreement (as
defined herein), which provisions will terminate as to all of the Notes upon the consummation of the Exchange Offer. The Exchange
Notes will be obligations of the Company evidencing the same indebtedness as the I44A Notes. and will be entitled to the benefits of the
same Indenture (as defined herein). See "Exchange Offer."
Interest on the Exchange Notes will be payable semi-annually in arrears on February I and August I in each year, commencing
February I, 1998. The Exchange Notes will mature on August 1,2007. The Exchange Notes are redeemable at any time on or after
August 1.2002 at the option of the Company, in whole or in part, at the redemption prices set forth herein, together with accrued and
unpaid interest, if any, to the date of redemption. Upon the occurrence of a Change of Control (as defined herein), each holder of the
Exchange Notes may require the Company to purchase all or a portion of such holder's Exchange Notes at a purchase price equal to
10 I% of the principal amount thereof, together with accrued and unpaid interest, if any, to the date of purchase. There can be no
assurance that the Company will have sufficient funds necessary to repurchase the Exchange Notes. The provisions of the Indenture
allow the Company to incur additional indebtedness. including Senior Indebtedness, subject to certain limitations. The provisions of the
Indenture do not require the Company to repurchase the Exchange Notes in the event of highly leveraged or certain other transactions if
such transaction is not a transaction defined as a Change of Control. See "Description of the Exchange Notes - Certain Co\·enants.'·
The Exchange Notes will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Company and, as such, will be subordinated in right
(If payment to all existing and future senior indebtedness of the Company. The Exchange Notes will rank pari passu in right of payment
wilh all other existing and future senior subordinated indebledness. if any, of the Company, and senior in right of payment to all existing
and future subordinated indebtedness, if any, of the Company. The Company has not issued, and does not have any current
arrangements to issue. any significant additional indebtedness to which the Notes would be senior, subordinate or rank ptlri ptlSSU in
riJ:ht of payment. The Notes will be effectively subordinate to essentially all of the currently outstanding indebtedness of the Campan,·
and its subsidiaries. The Exchange Notes will be fully and unconditionally guaranteed. jointly and severally, on a senior subordinated
hasis (the "Guarantees") by all of the Company's subsidiaries (other than three inconsequential subsidiaries) (the "Guarantors" and.
logether with the Company, the "Issuers"). The Guarantees will be unsecured senior subordinated obligations of the Guarantors and will
he subordinated to all existing and future Guarantor Senior Indebtedness (as defined herein). See "Description of the Exchange
Notes - RanJcing." The Company has $70.0 million in available credit, under its existing revolving credit agreements and notes payabk
to banks, which is senior in right of payment to the Notes. As of September 13. 1997, after giving effect to the offering of the 144A NOles
an.d t.he application of the net proceeds therefrom: ~he Company !indo th~ Guarantors had outstanding S216.1 million of aggregate
prinCipal a!J1ount of indebtedness, of which $46.2 million. ~nked seDlor In ~ght o~ pa~ment to the Exchange Notes and the Guaranlees
(all of which was secured) and approximately $19.9 mIllion was su~rdlDated In nght of payment to the Exchange Notes and the
~uarantees. As of the date of this Prospectus, virtually all of the consolidated assets of the Company were held by the Guarantors and
yrnually all of the Company's cash flow and net income was generated by the Guarantors. Therefore, the Company's ability to make
IDlere~t and principal payments when due to holders of the Exchange Notes is dependent, in part. upon the receipt of sufficient funds
from liS subsidiaries.

r

.S.ee "Risk Factors," beginning on page 13, for a discussion of certain factors that should be considered by
partiCIpants in the Exchange
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THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION NOR HAS THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ANY STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION
PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY
REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
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(cover page continued on neo'et page)

U.l'TIL JANUARY 29, 1998, (90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS PROSPECTUS). Al'.: DEALERS EFFECTING
TTRI A~SACTlONS IN THE REGISTERED SECURITIES. WHETHER OR NOT PARTICIPATll'G IN THIS DISTRIBU0:-';. MAY BE REQUIRED TO DELIVER A PROSPECTUS.

The DateQf this Prospectus is October 31, 1997.
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARSH SUPERMARKETS, INC.
Offer to Exchange

d

8'MI% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007, Series B
for any and all of the outstanding
8'MI% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007
THE EXCHANGE OFFER AND WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS WILL EXPIRE AT 5:0Q P.M.,
NEW YORK CITY TIME, ON DECEMBER 3, 1997, UNLESS THE OFFER IS EXTENDED

J

State Street Bank and Trust Company
(the "Exchange Agent")
By Mail
(registered or certified mail
recommended) :

State Street Bank and
Trust Company
Corporate Trust Department
P.O. Box 778
Boston, MA 02102-0078
Attention: Ms. Sandra
Szczsponik

By Facsimile Transmission:

By Hand or Overnight Courier:

(617) 664-5395

Confirm by Telephone
or for Information Call:

(617) 664-5587

State Street Bank and
Trust Company
Corporate Trust Department,
4th floor
Two International Place
Boston, MA 02110
Attention: Ms. Sandra
Szczsponik

Delivery of this instrument to an address other than as set forth above or transmission of instructions via a
facsimile number other than the ones listed above will not constitute a valid delivery. The instructions
accompanying this Letter of Transmittal should be read carefully before this Letter of Transmittal is
completed.
The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of the Prospectus dated October 31, 1997 (the "Prospectus") of Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. (the "Company") and this Letter of Transmittal, which together
constitute the Company's offer (the "Exchange Offer") to exchange $1,000 principal amount of its 8Ys%
Senior Subordinated Notes due 2007, Series B (the "Exchange Notes"), which have been registered under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), pursuant to a Registration Statement of which
the Prospectus is a part, for each $1,000 principal amount of its outstanding 8%% Senior Subordinated Notes
due 2007 (the "144A Notes"). The term "Expiration Date" shall mean 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on
December 3, 1997, unless the Exchange Offer is extended, in which case the term "Expiration Date" means
the latest date and time to which the Exchange Offer is extended. Capitalized terms used but not defined
herein have the meaning given to them in the Prospectus.
YOUR BANK OR BROKER CAN ASSIST YOU IN COMPLETING THIS FORM. THE
INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED WITH THIS LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL MUST BE FOLLOWED.
QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE OR FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THE
PROSPECTUS AND THIS LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE EXCHANGE AGENT.
List on the next page the 144A Notes to which this Letter of Transmittal relates. If the space indicated is
inadequate, the Certificate or Registration Numbers and the Principal Amounts should be listed on a
separately signed schedule affixed hereto.
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I.

LIQUIDITY OBJECTIVE

Investors in private companies typically seek liquidity as one of their principal objectives.
Liquidity is generally achieved either through a sale of the private company or through an eventual
public offering by the company. Although a public offering may create a market for the company's
securities, a pre-IPO investor is not always free to sell into that market. The following describes the
barriers to liquidity following a public offering and the means available to overcome those barriers.
II.

BARRIERS TO LIQUIDITY

A.

Securities Law Restrictions

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") provides for the registration of securities
prior to sale unless an exemption is available. Section 4( 1) exempts all transactions from the Section 5
requirements except those by "an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." The term "underwriter" is defined in
Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 Act as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to ... the
distribution of any security." Section 2(a)(11) further defines the term "issuer" for this purpose to
include "... any person ... controlling ... the issuer. .." As a result of these statutory provisions, any
proposed resale of securities that either occurs relatively soon after they were purchased from the issuer
or is made by an affiliate of an issuer may be deemed sold in connection with a distribution and
therefore not exempt under the 1933 Act.

B.

Lock-up Provisions.

Underwriters of securities in initial public offerings ("IPO") will generally require all directors,
officers and significant shareholders to enter into lock-up agreements restricting the sale of their shares
following the IPO. In some cases, underwriters will also impose lock-up restrictions on shares issued in
the IPO that are directed to specific persons by the issuer's management (so-called "friends and family
shares"). These agreements are designed to prevent such persons from selling shares in the market
during the volatile period immediately following an IPO. During this period, the underwriters are often
engaging in stabilizing transactions in the form of open market purchases to maintain the price of the
issuer's stock. Insider sales during this period could undermine such efforts.
Typical lock-up provisions are very broad and not only apply to direct sales of stock but also to
offers, pledges, contracts to sell, sales of options or contracts to purchase, purchases of options or
contracts to sell, swaps or other arrangements that transfer to any of the economic consequences of
ownership. In some cases exception to the lock-up restrictions are permitted for certain transactions that
would not be expected to impact the market for the issuer's securities. These include gifts, transfers to a
trust for the benefit of the restricted shareholder, and transfers to entities wholly owned by the restricted
shareholder, provided in each such instance that such transfers do not require payment for the shares and
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that the transferee agrees to be bound by the restrictions of the lock-up agreement. A sample lock-up
agreement is attached as Appendix A.
Transfer restrictions that contain lock-up agreements are generally enforceable under state law if
they satisfy certain conditions. In particular, such restrictions must be either set forth in a written
agreement entered into among shareholders or by the shareholder and the company or alternatively they
must be included in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation. See KRS 271B.6-270 and
§ 202 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. However, if such restrictions are added to the articles
of incorporation or bylaws pursuant to an amendment, they will only be effective with respect to
shareholders who voted for the amendment or acquired their shares after the amendment went into
effect.
Underwriters will often release shareholders from lock-up restrictions prior to expiration of the
lock-up period if the stock is trading at a sufficiently high level and they do not believe that such sales
will adversely affect the market for the shares. Sometimes the lifting of these lock-up restrictions is
accomplished on a controlled basis whereby the restricted party will only be allowed to sell a portion of
his shares through the underwriter and the underwriter will limit the aggregate number of shares sold
pursuant to the lifted lock-up to a fixed amount per day.

III.

PATHS TO LIQUIDITY

A.

Rule 144

Rule 144 exempts from the registration prerequirements certain ordinary trading transactions of
limited amounts of securities owned by (a) affiliates of the issuer or (b) persons who acquired securities
from the issuer or an affiliate of an issuer in a private transaction. For a transaction to be exempt under
Rule 144, a number of requirements must be met. These include the following:
•

Rule 144(c) which requires that there be available current public information with respect
to the issuer of the securities. This requirement can be met if the company is current with
its filing obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

•

Rule 144(d) which requires that a person acquiring the securities from the issuer in a nonpublic transaction must hold them for at least one year before reselling them. Shares
acquired by an affiliate in a non-private transaction are not subject to any holding period
requirement.

•

Rule 144(e) which provides that sales by any person of an issuer's securities under Rule
144 during any three month period may not exceed the greater of (a) one percent of the
total number of shares of the security outstanding and (b) the average weekly trading
volume for the preceding four weeks.

•

Rule 144(f) which requires that the securities be sold in ordinary brokers' transactions.

If the securities have been held for at least two years after having been acquired from the issuer or an
affiliate of the issuer, the volume limitations and manner of sale restrictions are no longer applicable for
non-affiliates.

r
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The following is a summary of some of the most significant issues under Rule 144 that relate to
securities purchased in private equity transactions.

r

Commencement ofHolding Period (or Warrants. Rule 144(d) states that "[i]fthe acquirer takes
the securities by purchase, the one year period shall not begin until the full purchase price or other
consideration is paid or given by the person acquiring the securities from the issuer or from an affiliate
of the issuer." The SEC takes the position that any consideration paid for the security, no matter how
small, requires the commencement of a new holding period. Thus, the holding period for a person who
acquires a warrant on January 1, 2000 and pays $0.01 per share to exercise the warrant on January 1,
2002 will not be deemed to commence until the exercise date. However, the SEC has permitted the
holding period to commence as of the date of the issuance of the warrants if they are exercised pursuant
to a "cashless" exercise procedure in the warrant. See Technology Funding Secured Investors II, SEC
No-Action Letter (July 23, 1991). This is accomplished through an exercise whereby the holder
surrenders the warrant and receives only the net share amount (i.e., the total number of shares subject to
the warrant less that number of shares equal in value to the exercise price of the warrant). For these
reasons, it is important to include a cashless exercise provision in all warrants even ones with a nominal
exerCIse pnce.
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Distributions by a Venture Capital Fund to its Partners. Often a partner of a venture capital firm
will serve as a director of a portfolio company in which the firm's investment limited partnership has
invested. As a result, both the partner and by attribution, the limited partnership, will be deemed to be
affiliates of the portfolio company. Thus it would be anticipated that any securities distributed by the
partnership to its limited partners would commence a new Rule 144 holding period. In such
circumstances, however the SEC has taken the position that the limited partners can "tack" the period in
which the partnership held the securities to the period that the limited partners hold the securities in
determining whether the one and two year holding periods have been satisfied under Rule 144. Although
such taking is permitted, the SEC otherwise applies the restrictions applicable to shares formerly held by
affiliates. Accordingly, the unlimited resale provision in 144(k) will not be available to the limited
partners until three months have elapsed from the date of distribution. During the period that the
unlimited resale provision is unavailable, and for a maximum of two years after the distribution, the
individual limited partners will also have to aggregate their sales under the volume limitation provisions
of Rule 144. See Release No. 33-6099 at Q&A 34 and 45.
Capital Stock issued upon Conversion ofa Limited Liability Company into a Corporation. Many
business entities are initially organized as limited liability companies for tax and other reasons. When
such companies decide to go public, they will convert to the corporate form. An issue arises under
144(d) whether shareholders of the new corporation may tack onto their holding period the time period
in which they owned the LLC interests that were converted into such shares. Rule 144(d)(3)(i) states
that "[s]ecurities acquired from the issuer ... pursuant to a ... recapitalization shall be deemed to have
been acquired at the same time as .. , the securities surrendered in connection with the recapitalization."
In a number of no action letters, the SEC staff has expressly permitted tacking for a reorganization of a
limited partnership into a corporation. See Hygeia Sciences, SEC No-Action Letter (March 13, 1986).
Recently, the same result was reached with respect to limited liability companies. See Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, SEC No-Action Letter (February 11, 2000). In order for tacking to apply, the following
criteria must be present: (1) the partnership agreement or operating agreement or other organizational
document must expressly contemplate reorganization as a corporation and the holder seeking to tack
must not have veto or other voting rights with respect to the transaction; (2) there is no change in the
business or operations of the company as a result of the reorganization; and (3) the equity interests of the
stockholders of the successor corporation are based on their proportionate interests in the prior entity.
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Thus, it is advisable to include a provision in the operating agreement of an LLC that clearly states the
LLC may convert to a corporation at the discretion of the manager or an LLC board of directors, with no
discretion given to a member to block the transaction. In addition, the operating agreement should
specifically delineate the corporate securities that the members will receive in the reorganization in
exchange for their LLC interests.

B.

Registration Rights

Primarily because of the holding period and volume limitations set forth in Rule 144, it is often
not possible for an investor to sell the full amount of shares that he would like to sell following an IPO
even after any applicable lock-up period has expired. Even if it is permissible to sell such shares under
the 1933 Act, the investor may not be able to sell such shares without negatively impacting the price of
the stock and therefore resulting in a lower sales proceeds to the investor. Accordingly, it is common for
an investor to negotiate "registration rights" for his shares. Such rights are commonly provided in
venture capital transactions and are often included in other transactions where capital stock or warrants
are issued including bank financings and strategic alliances.
There are two principal types of registration rights. Demand registration rights allow the holder
to compel registration of the holder's shares either at his election or at the election of the holders of a
fixed percentage of shares. Piggyback registration rights allow the holder to register his shares only if
the company is otherwise registering shares of its stock either in an offering by the company or by
another shareholder.
The following are certain issues that arise in connection with the negotiation of registration
rights.

When may demand registration rights be exercised? Generally, demand registration rights may
not be exercised until after a company becomes public. Otherwise, the holder of registration rights
would have the ability to make the decision as to when the company is to go public rather than having
that decision made by the company's board of directors and management. However, some investors
require that demand rights be exercisable at any time after a specified number of years after the
investment has been made regardless of whether the company is public at that time.
How long after the company has become public must the investor wait until it can first exercise
,its demand rights? Generally, a minimum of six months from the effective date of the company's initial
public offering. This relates to the typical six month lock-up period during which the company does not
wish to have additional shares enter the market. At times issuers will require a minimum 12 month
period before demand registration rights may be exercised. This is to allow the issuer to utilize Form S3 to register the shares. Form S-3 is only available if the issuer has been a public company for at least
12 months and is a greatly simplified filing compared to the Form S-1 that must be used in connection
with initial public offerings and any offerings made within the first 12 months after an initial public
offering.
Who may elect to exercise demand registration rights? Generally, the issuer will require that a
specified percentage of the holders of a class of equity securities make the demand for registration
(generally 25% to 50%). This ensures that the costs of registration are not incurred unless a significant
number of holders desire to avail themselves of registration rights. For similar reasons, registration
rights agreements will typically provide that a demand notice cannot be made unless the total amount of
securities to be sold exceeds a certain minimum threshold (e.g., $5,000,000).
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When mayan issuer defer a registration pursuant to demand or piggyback registration rights?
Often the registration rights agreement will provide that if the company's board of directors determines
in good faith that a registration would be harmful to the company and/or its shareholders (e.g., the
company would have to reveal a confidential transaction or unfavorable market conditions exist) the
company may delay the registration. Since this provision undermines the rights of holders of
registration rights, there are typically limits on these deferral rights by the company. First, the deferral
may not be for more than a specified number of days (e.g., 180 days) and second, the company is not
permitted to utilize this right more than a specified number of times during a particular period (e.g.,
more than once during any 12 month period).
How many demand registration rights are generally made available? Although this provision is
negotiable, two to three demand rights are common. In addition, holders are often granted unlimited
Form S-3 registrations. The only limitations on such registrations are that they must be for a minimum
amount (generally $1,000,000 or more), the company's registration is not at the time seriously
detrimental to the company under the same standards described above, or a prior S-3 registration was
made within the last six months.
How many piggyback registration rights does a holder typically receive? Given the relatively
low cost of allowing someone to exercise piggyback rights, these are generally unlimited.
In an underwritten offering, under what circumstances maya holder attempting to exercise
registration rights be denied the right to have such shares included in the underwritten offering? Most
registration rights agreements provide that if the managing underwriter determines in good faith that
marketing factors require a limitation on the number of shares to be included in the offering, then the
underwriter may exclude the shares. Cutbacks are generally made on a prorated basis based on the
number of shares each person is entitled to register. In the context of a piggyback registration, the
company will generally not be cut back in the number of shares that it can sell and only shareholders
will be subject to cutbacks. Often the cutback provisions will provide that no shares of the investors will
be cut back unless all management shares are excluded.
What expenses will the company generally bear in connection with a registered offering made
l!ursuant to the exercise of registration rights? Generally, all costs of the offering other than
commissions and underwriter's discounts will be paid by the issuer. Often, though not always, the issuer
will pay the cost of at least one counsel for the selling shareholders. This amount is often limited to a
specified dollar amount.
When do registration rights typically terminate? Generally, there is a time limit placed on the
ability to use registration rights, typically three to seven years. In addition, registration rights as to a
particular holder are often terminated when all of the holder's remaining registerable securities may be
sold without registration under Rule 144(k) during a three month period.
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SAMPLE LOCK-UP AGREEMENT

_ _ _ _,2000
[Names and addresses
of Underwriters]
RE:

LOCK-UP AGREEMENT ("Agreement")

Ladies and Gentlemen:
The undersigned is an owner of record or beneficially of certain shares of Common Stock, par
(the "
") of
, a Delaware corporation (the
value $
"Company"), or securities convertible into or exchangeable for or issuable upon the exercise of stock
options and warrants to purchase shares of Common Stock. The undersigned understands that you, as
representatives (the "Representatives"), propose to enter into an underwriting agreement (the
"Underwriting Agreement") on behalf of the several Underwriters named therein (collectively, the
"Underwriters"), with the Company providing for a public offering of shares of the Common Stock of
the Company pursuant to a Registration Statement on Form S-1 to be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Public Offering"). The undersigned recognizes that the Public Offering
will benefit the undersigned and the Company by, among other things, raising additional capital for the
operations of the Company. The undersigned acknowledges that you and the other Underwriters are
relying on the representations and agreements of the undersigned contained in this Agreement in
carrying out the Public Offering and in entering into underwriting arrangements with the Company with
respect to the Public Offering.
To induce the Underwriters that may participate in the Public Offering to continue their efforts in
connection with the Public Offering, the undersigned hereby agrees that, without the prior written
(which consent may be withheld in its sole discretion), it
consent of
will not, and will not publicly announce its intention to, during the period commencing on the date
hereof and ending 180 days after the date of the final prospectus relating to the Public Offering (the
"Prospectus"), (1) offer, pledge, sell, contract to sell, sell any option or contract to purchase, purchase
any option or contract to sell, grant any option, right or warrant to purchase, lend or otherwise transfer or
dispose of, directly or indirectly, any shares of Common Stock or any securities convertible into or
exercisable or exchangeable for Common Stock or (2) enter into any swap or other arrangement that
transfers to another, in whole or in part, any of the economic consequences of ownership of the
Common Stock, whether any such transaction described in clause (1) or (2) above is to be settled by
delivery of Common Stock or such other securities, in cash or otherwise. In addition, the undersigned
(which consent may be
agrees that, without the prior written consent of
withheld in its sole discretion), it will not, during the period commencing on the date hereof and ending
180 days after the date of the Prospectus, make any demand for or exercise any right with respect to, the
registration, offering or sale of any shares of Common Stock or any security convertible into or
exchangeable for or issuable upon the exercise of stock options and warrants to purchase shares of
Common Stock. With respect to the Public Offering, the undersigned waives any registration rights
relating to registration under the Securities Act of 1933, a amended, of any offering or sale of any
Common Stock owned either of record or beneficially by the undersigned, including any rights to
receive notice of the Public Offering.

N-6

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

The foregoing restrictions are expressly agreed to preclude the undersigned from engaging in any
hedging or other transaction which is designed to or reasonably expected to lead to or result in a sale or
disposition of the Common Stock even if such Common Stock would be disposed of by someone other
than the undersigned. Such prohibited hedging or other transactions would include without limitation
any short sale or any purchase, sale or grant of any right (including without limitation any put option or
put equivalent position or call option or call equivalent position) with respect to any of the Common
Stock or with respect to any security that includes, relates to, or derives any significant part of its value
from such Common Stock.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned may transfer shares of Common Stock or
securities convertible into or exchangeable or exercisable for Common Stock (i) as a bona fide gift or
gifts, provided that the donee or donees thereof agree to be bound by the restrictions set forth herein, (ii)
to any trust for the direct or indirect benefit of the undersigned or the immediate family of the
undersigned, provided that the trustee of the trust agrees to be bound by the restrictions set forth herein,
and provided further that any such transfer shall not involve a disposition for value, (iii) to any
corporation, partnership, limited liability company or other business entity that is wholly owned by the
undersigned and/or its donees or assignees, provided that any such transfer shall not involve a
disposition for value and any such transferee agrees to be bound by the restrictions set forth herein, or
(iv) to the Underwriters pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement. For purposes of this Agreement,
"immediate family" shall mean any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption, not more remote than
first cousin.

r

The undersigned understands that whether the Public Offering actually occurs will depend on a
number of factors, including stock market conditions. The Public Offering will only be made pursuant
to an Underwriting Agreement, the terms of which are subject to negotiation among the Company and
the Underwriters. The undersigned agrees and consents to the entry of stop transfer instructions with the
Company's transfer agent and registrar against the transfer of shares of Common Stock or securities
convertible into or exchangeable or exercisable for Common Stock held by the undersigned except in
compliance with the foregoing restrictions.

r

This Agreement is irrevocable and shall be binding on the undersigned and the respective
successors, heirs, personal representatives and assigns of the undersigned.
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This Agreement shall terminate if the Underwriting Agreement (other than provisions that
survive termination) shall terminate or be terminated prior to the payment for the delivery of the shares
of the Common Stock thereunder or if such agreement is not executed by each party thereto on or prior
to
,2000.
Very truly yours,

Address:
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INTRODUCTION

o

-

On February 8, 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, chaired by Ira Millstein and
John Whitehead (Millstein/Whitehead Committee) issued its report and
recommendations (Millstein/Whitehead Repor~.l This effort is one of many
chapters in a story that began more than twenty years ago with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). 2 The FCPA
requires that accurate financial books and records be kept, and that internal controls be reasonably designed to prevent and detect fraud and assure
preservation of assets and adherence to corporate policies. 3 The adoption
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 added impetus to the requirement of strong internal controls.· Also in 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission) completed a comprehensive study of financial fraud and prescribed remedies,
including specific recommendations as to the role of corporate audit committees.5 In 1991 federal banking legislation mandated that audit committees for financial institutions with assets in excess of S150 million be

-Mr. Olson is a senior panner at Gibson, Dunn &: Crutcher in Washington, D.C. and counsels
a number of corporate audit committees as pan of his practice. Corinne A. Lammen, an
associate at Thorp Reed &: Armstrong, LLP, assisted in pn:paration of this anicle.
I. REPORT A.,\;D RECOMMENDATIO:'S OF THE BLUE RIBBO;II COMMITTEE 0;11 bIPROV·
IXG THE EFFECT/\!E.'1ESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999) [hen:inaner MILL·
STEI:,/WHITEHEAD REPORT], rtprinttd(witlttnlt appnuJias) ;"54 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1999) [hen:·
inaner Millstein/U7titmttH/ Repori]. EJiltri /tOte: Any reference to the Millstnn/U7titrllMd RtJ1ort's
appendices will be to the n:pon as originally published by the committee and to the page
numben then:in.
2. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. H94 (1977) (codified as amended in scatten:d sections of
15 U.S.C.).
3. S« 15 U.S.C. § 78m(bX2) (19901).
4. S« Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991·998 (establishing the
duties of the U.S. Sentencing Commission); U.S. St:."TESCING GVIDEUNF.5 ~f.-\',\;UAL (1997).
5. REPORT OF THE NATIO:-iAL COM:\/ISSION 0:-: FRAUDULENT FINA.,\;CIAJ. Rt;PORTING,
app. I, at 179-81 (1987).
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composed entirely of independent directors. 6 ln 1992 The American Law
Institute's Principles qf Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations proposed guidelines for audit committee responsibility. 7 Following up on the
work of the Treadway Commission, in 1992 the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission published a four-part manual
on effective internal controls which described a key role for audit committees. R In 1995 the Public Oversight Board, an autonomous group affiliated with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, published guidance with respect to the shared responsibilities of managers,
directors (particularly audit committees), and auditors for accurate financial reporting. 9
In short, the Millstein/Whitehead Committee was not writing on a
blank slate. In fact, its report offers little that has not been said before, but
it does serve as a useful summary and synthesis of the lore about the role
and responsibilities of audit committees that has developed over the past
two decades. The Millstein/ Whitehead Report is not the last chapter. Already
undenvay, under sponsorship of the Center for Board Leadership and the
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACO), is a comprehensive
study by a different Blue Ribbon Commission chaired by former U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. 10 This study will emphasize audit committee "best practices" and
provide further practical guidance for conscientious boards of directors.
The MillsteinlJVhitehead Report has been reprinted (without appendices)
as part of this Symposium. I I The major securities markets that sponsored
the report, and the SEC, whose staff, led by Chairman Levitt, inspired
and actively participated in the deliberations of the Millstein/Whitehead
Committee, will presumably move forward over the next year or so with
at least some of the recommendations for enhanced market-listing standards on audit committee qualifications and independence and on further
disclosures to shareholders about the work of audit committees.
Without waiting for such regulatory action, well-informed public company managers and advisers will measure the practices of their own audit
committees against the best practices recommendations in the Afillstein/
J17zitehead Report and, where appropriate, adjust their practices. Assuming,
6. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvt:ment Act of 1991 § 112, 12 U.S.C. §
183Im(g)(I)(A), (;)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
7. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
3.05 (Proposed Final Drart 1992).
8. CO:\IMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTERNAL CO;llTROL-I:\TEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992).
9. PuBUC OVERSIGHT BD., DIRECTORS, ~1A.'1AGEMENT, AND AUDITORS-AwES IN
PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS (1995).
10. The author is a member of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees which
is conducting the Center for Board Leadenhip/NACD study. A repon by this commission
is expected to be issued by mid'summer 1999.
I I. Set Sflpra note I.
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however, that this happens, the hard question remains as to whether implementation of the Millstein/ Whitehead Report's recommendations will in
fact make a difference in improving the quality of financial reporting and
preventing fraud.

committees and that those committees' members meet certain independence and experience requirements, the markets have little practical ability
to monitor or enforce such standards once a company is listed. Court
decisions have generally agreed that the listing agreement is a private contract between the listed company and the securities market, and have not
recognized that shareholders or others have the right to enforce the agreement's provisions,1S
The securities markets themselves have neither the personnel in place
nor the enforcement tools to ensure compliance. None of the major markets currently monitor compliance with their corporate governance standards on a systematic basis; monitoring is focused on compliance with
financial condition requirements, which can relatively easily be measured
by review of 1934 Act reports filed with the SEC. Even if each market
were to set up operations to review compliance with governance standards,
the market's only remedy is to threaten delisting of the offending company's securities from the market. This "atomic bomb" sanction is unattractive to the markets that exist to promote, not discourage, the liquidity
of public company securities and that survive on the fees derived from
listing and trading. It has the perverse impact of punishing a company's
public shareholders by depriving them of market liquidity, instead of focusing on the managers who might be responsible for governance lapses.
Understandably, delisting occurs only in extraordinary cases and after significant advance notice and multiple opportunities for review and approval
within the self-regulatory structure of the markets. Given the severity of
the delisting sanction and its impact on innocent public shareholders, this
process is entirely appropriate. It does, however, mean that using listing
standards alone to prescribe governance norms is a blunt, imperfect, and
uncertain weapon.
The author knows of at least half a dozen instances in recent years
where companies listed on the major markets did not meet even today's
more limited governance requirements and where, despite continued violations, the market in question took no action. Such instances included

UMITATIONS OF THE MIILSTEIN I WHITEHEAD
APPROACH

o
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To approach an answer to this critical question, it is helpful to first note
some limitations inherent in the Millstein/Whitehead approach.
The first problem arises from the wide range of public companies covered and the supposed impracticability of recruiting and operating a fulldress audit committee for many smaller companies that, under historic
market-listing requirements, may have as few as two "independent" directors, who mayor may not have financial or accounting experience}2
The Millstein/Whitehead Committee has addressed this problem by recommending a two-tier structure with less stringent audit committee listing
requirements for companies with less than $200 million in market capitalization}3 The problem, of course, is that these often aggressive-growth,
entrepreneurally managed businesses may be precisely the group most
likely to push the edge of the envelope on financial reporting practices.
Such companies often have minimal internal audit staff. For these companies and their shareholders, the Millstein/Whitehead Committee offers
scant guidance as to what additional internal controls or external audit
steps might be substituted for, or adequately supplement the work of, a
less developed internal audit function and a potentially smaller, less experienced audit committee.

HOW W1U THE MARKETS ENFORCE THE NEW

RUUS?

Second, an inherent limitation in the Millstein/Whitehead approach is
its reliance on market-listing standards as a primary enforcement mechanism for enhanced audit committee standards}· While the securities markets can certainly mandate that newly listed companies maintain audit
12. See, e.g., Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 'I 10,021 (requiring that listed companies have
at least two independent directon and that an audit committee be established, a majority or
the memben or which must be independent); Nat'l Ass'n or Sec. Dealen Manual (CCH)
Rule 446O(c)-(d) (requiring that listed companies maintain a minimum of two independent
directon on the board or directon and that an audit committee be maintained, a majority
of the memben or which must be independent directon); N.Y.S.E. Listed Company ]\fanual
§ 303.00 (requiring that listed companies have at least a two-member audit committee composed solely or independent directors).
13. MillsltinlWhilLhtad Report, supra note I, at 1081, 1082 (Recommendations 2 and 3).
14. See gmerally id. at 1070-76 (containing recommendations ror increasing the indt'pendence and effectiveness or the audit committee).
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15. See, e.g., State Teachen Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851-53 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that the plaintiff did not have an implied right or action for violation or stock
exchange listing agreement and company manual based on corporation's railure to notiry
exchange or construction contract); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore &: Ohio R.R.,
509 F. Supp. 1002, 1015-17 (WO. Pa. 1981) (holding that a listing agreement between a
corporation and a stock exchange did not create third-party-beneficiary rights in investon),
tiff'd i" part, rev'd in part on otMr grounds, 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982). q: Sparta Surgical Corp.
Yo National Ass'n or Sec. Oealen, 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It is undisputed ..•
that a party has no private right or action against an exchange for violating its own rules
••..n) (citation omitted); Spicer v. Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 25961 (7th Cir. 1992) (reenrorcing the notion that § 6(b) or the Securities Exchange Act or 1934
(1934 Act) permits registration or a national securities exchange only ir the exchange meets
certain conditions and does not grant investon a private right or action against the exchange
or exchange memben ror violating its own rules).
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instances of listed companies that had only a single independent director
for years even though an major markets require at least two; issuers whose
chief executive officer was listed as a member of, and regularly attended
and participated in, audit committee meetings; and companies that had
never formally designated an audit committee or where the designated
committee did not meet at any time during the year. Is it realistic to believe,
as the Millstein/Whitehead Committee implicitly posits, that the New
York Stock Exchange (with nearly 3000 listed companies) and the recently
partnered NASDAQ Stock Market/American Stock Exchange (with even
more listed companies) will be able to meaningfully monitor and enforce
new, more elaborate audit committee standards that include much more
specific independence and "financial literacy" qualifications for committee
members and that require adoption and annual review of a detailed committee charter?

A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

o
w

It may be that the only practical solution-one that the Millstein/ JYlzitehead Report commendably supports-will be for the SEC to adopt new
disclosure requirements mandating that public issuers specifically represent
in the annual proxy statement whether and how they comply with the
enhanced exchange and NASDAQ listing standards. 16 If the SEC takes
such action, concerned shareholders will at least be able to readily obtain
the relevant information and, throl,lgh the proxy process and informal
pressure, move companies toward compliance.
Thus, when it comes to remedies, the Millstein/Whitehead Committee
has implicitly recognized that listing standards alone cannot do the job
without adding companion SEC disclosure requirements. Once disclosure
occurs, shareholders can turn to the proxy process or, in egregious cases,
to the courts for relief from boards that fail to adhere to the new governance norms. In its recent decisions administering Rule 14a-8, which governs shareholder access to management's proxy statement,17 the SEC has
taken a permissive view of mandatory bylaw amendments proposed by
shareholders who wish to force governance changes.18 Further, with the
eloquent opinion of former Chancellor Allen in Camnark as precedent, 19
the Delaware Court of Chancery has recognized that the board of directors' duty of oversight includes the responsibility to see that the corporation has a reasonable system of internal controls in place. 20 The standards
16. q: Millstmr/U'lri1L1wJJ &purl, sufJranote I, at 1083, 1087-88 (Recommendations 5 and 9).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
18. Sn, t.g., General DataComm Indus., Inc., SEC l':o-Action utter, 1998 WL 883796
(Dec. 9, 1998).
19. I" rt Caremark Int'llnc. Derivati~ Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
20. Sn itJ. at 970 ("rA] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists ....").
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proposed by the Millstein/Whitehead Committee, particularly if they are
endorsed by being made part of the listing standards of the major markets,
may well become key elements in litigation that challenges directors on
the point of whether the corporate audit committee has functioned adequately as part of the company's system of internal controls.

AUDIT COMMITTEE OVERLOAD
Another potential problem with the Millstein/Whitehead recommendations, as well as with other recent literature emphasizing the importance
of a strong audit committee, is the risk of overloading committee memben
with too many responsibilities. This can have three adverse impacts:
(i) committee effort and energy may be dissipated in so many directions
that the committee becomes ever more busy but ever less effective; (ii)
good directors may decline to take on the burden of audit committee
service; and (iii) based on some unfortunate case law developments,21 those
who do serve may face increased risk of personal liability or at least a
greater chance than other directors of being nanted as defendants in shareholder lawsuits.
Several recent examples of audit committee charters identify more than
twenty separate "duties" frequently assigned to audit committees. 22 These
duties include private meetings with both the external and internal auditors and a review of: (i) financial statements and accompanying notes;
(ii) the to-K Annual Report filed with the SEC; (iii) quarterly and other
private reports filed with the SEC; (iv) financial press releases; (v) the external audit plan; (vi) the internal audit plan; (vii) staffing and quality of
internal audit; (viii) audit fees; (ix) non-audit (consulting and other) work
and fees of the external auditors; (x) codes of conduct; (xi) the system of
internal controls; (xii) compliance with codes of conduct and internal con- .
troIs; (xiii) litigation exposure; (xiv) risk identification and risk management; (xv) performance of the chief financial officer, chief accounting
officer, and head of internal audit; (xvi) the annual "management letter"
(with the outside auditors); (xvii) expense reports of senior management;
(xviii) management "conflict of interest" transactions with the corporation; and (xix) alleged fraudulent actions or violations of law reported by
internal compliance programs or, under the terms of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),23 by the outside auditor. 24 Of
course, the audit committee is generally charged with selecting, or at least
21. Sn infta note 35 (citing cases).
22. Sn MJUSTEIN/WHITEHEAD REPORT, SIIJmI note I, app. C (presenting five sample
audit committee chaners).
23. Pub. 1.. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. Sn 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 1997) (setting fonh the PSLMs audit requirements).
Su gmtrallyJonathan C. Dickey, TN New Ar.u/ifQr RLsponsiJJilitin Under lite Privale Stturities litigtJtimt
Riform Act, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May-:June 1996, at 4; Harvey 1.. Pitt et aI., Mort
tha" "C14ssical GMS": Ar.u/its anti Corporale [l!tgality UntI" lite litigtJlion RPm Act, in 28TH ANN.
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recommending, the external auditors, periodically reviewing their performance, approving their fees and, where the committee deems appropriate,
recommending a change in auditors. To this list, the Millstein/Whitehead
Committee would add still more work for the audit committee, including
(i) adoption and annual review of a committee charter;25 (ii) review of
reports to government agencies other than the SEC;26 (iii) review of the
"quality" of accounting principles and judgments;27 (IV) review of securities trading policies;28 and (v) conducting various investigations. 29
Such charters and charges of responsibility are daunting, particularly
when a company is trying to recruit the type of strong, experienced outside
director who can best meet these challenging duties. Women and men
with relevant experience and ability, even if retired from active management of a business or professional organization, are likely to be busy people
much in demand. Unless we want to create a mandarin class of "professional directors" beholden to corporate managers for their board sinecures, audit committee membership must not be made so burdensome
that only the otherwise idle or ill-advised will accept.

UABIUTY CONCERNS

o
.j:>.

As did the SEC when it mandated compliance committee reports on
executive compensation in 1992,30 the Millstein/Whitehead Committee
proposes that a partial safe harbor be adopted by the SEC as part of the
proposal that each audit committee provide a formal report letter to shareholders in each corporate annual report. 3 • In his introductory essay on
the report, co-ehair Millstein asserts that the committee "contemplates" a
far broader safe harbor than the report specifically recommends,32 but,
based on the example of the compensation report safe harbor and the
INST. ON SEC. REG., at 269 (PLI Corp. Law &: Practice Course Handbook Series No. B47141, 1996); Harvey L. Pitt &: David B. Hardison, New &porting Oblifationsjor OutsidtAudihlrs,
NAT'L LJ., Mar. 25, 1996, at B4.
25. Millstein/ Whilthtdt/ RIport, SfIJ1rtI note I, at 1083 (Recommendation 5).
26. MILLSTElNIWHITEHEAD REPORT, JfI/ml note I, app. Cat 68. Although the committee did not "formally endorse" the sample audit committee charters set forth in Appendix
C to the report, the sample charters were "advance[d] ... as illustrations of charters that
ha\'e been de\'eloped as models or employed in actual practice." Ii., app. C. at 55.
27. Millstein/WhiIthtdt/ RIport, SfIJ1rtI note I, at 1086 (Recommendation 8).
28. MILLSTEIN/WHITEHEAD REPORT, JfI/ml note I, app. Cat 69; s« sapra note 26 (discussing impact of sample charters).
29. MILLSTEJNIWHITEHEAD REPORT, SfI/1rtI note I, app. C at 61, 66; Stt sapra note 26
(discussing impact of sample charters).
30. Executi\'e Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg: 48,126, 48,138-39 (1992) (codified
in part in 17 C.F.R. pu. 228, 229), tDMtdtd Executi\'e Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed.
Reg: 53,985 (1992).
31. Millslti,,/Whilthtdt/ RIport, SfIJ1rtI note I, at 1087·88 (Recommendation 9).
32. Ira M. Millstein, 1"lrrNluLiion hi tilt Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the EfTecti\'eness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 Bus. Lo\w.
1057,1065 (1999).
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author's conversations with SEC staff members, it seems more likely that
the safe harbor, if adopted, will protect only against federal securities law
claims based on the report itself, not on claimed breaches of state law
duties of care of audit committee members or federal class action claims
generally. While even a limited safe harbor is helpful, it is only a small step
in alleviating the liability concerns of audit committee members faced with
increased monitoring and reporting duties. Corporate indemnification
provisions and statutory protections against monetary liability for breaches
of directors' duties of care give additional comfort. 33
None of these defenses, however, offers effective protection against the
embarrassment, potential damage to reputation, and just plain distraction
and harassment that come when directors are sued and forced to defend
themselves. The more duties well-meaning authoritative groups, such as
the Millstein/Whitehead Committee, propose for audit committees, the
more likely plaintiffs' lawyers are to name committee members as defendants, and the more likely courts are to refuse dismissal of such allegations.
Courts have held inside directors--such as executive officers and lawyers
for the corporation-to higher standards than other directors in meeting
their duty of care. 34 Unfortunately, a number of courts have carried this
perfectly valid principle over to outside directors who serve on the audit
committee, arguing that such directors have access to "inside" knowledge
of financial information and have agreed to assume the specialized role
of financial "experts," or "supervisors" of the audit and reporting function
on behalf of the rest of the directors and shareholders. 35
33. Set, t.,., DEL. CODE A:\;:-J. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 145 (Supp. 1998).
34. Set, t.,., Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 263-67 (D. Or. 1972) (requiring a standard
of care of defendants in accordance with their degree of invoMment as the company's
officers, directors, underwriters, and financial and technical advisors); Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 578 (E.D.N.V. 1971) (holding inside directors,
accountants, and underwriters to a higher duty of reasonable in\'estigation than that of
outside directors); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643,696-97 (S.D.N.V. 1968)
(rejecting the defendant-underwriters' argument that the standard of diligence for the reasonably prudent underwriter should be solely that of a reasonably prudent director).
35. Set, ,,,., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer (I" trJWP Inc. Sec. Litig.), 928 F. Supp. 1239,
1259-61 (S.D.N.V. 1996) (denying summary judgment to a defendant audit committee accused of being "wi11ruUy blind" in its supenision of a fraudulent independent auditor); I" tr
I\fTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig:, 898 F. Supp. 974, 980 (E.D.N.V. 1995) (denying the
dismissal motion of defendant audit committee members who "were charged with O\'erseeing
the conduct of I\ITC's accountants'), lJ(JJ;aW in part, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.V. 1997);
TISChler v. Baltimore Bancorp., 80 I F. Supp. 1493, 150I-02 (D. Md. 1992) (finding possible
validity in a negligence claim against outside directors by virtue of their "special knowledge"
of the banking industry and real estate market); Greenfield v. Professional Care, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 110, 114-15 (E.D.N.V. 1987) (denying dismissal motions of defendants assigned to
monitor auditing and other company functions); Dubowski v. Ash (I" tr AM Int'l Inc. Sec.
Litig:), 606 F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.V. 1985) (finding asufficient complaint against defendant
audit committee members who were responsible for reviewing an independent auditor but
who were not officers). Set also Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse Inc., 273
N.V.S.2d 16,27 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (reasoning that the scope of directors' duties to the corporation is dependent upon their management roles).
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While claiming to not endorse a higher duty of care for audit committee
members,56 the Millstein/Whitehead Committee makes no practical suggestion to address audit committee members' understandable fear of increased litigation risk. Rather, by lengthening the list of duties and processes that audit committees are urged to assume, the report may provide
added fodder for differential liability standards for audit committee directors. In fact, if adopted, the Millstein/ Whitehead Report's recommendation
that the SEC impose an annual certification-type report requirement on
audit committees37 will increase liability exposure for committee members.
This is because the certification requirement will provide a reasonable basis
for specific allegations of audit committee responsibility for financial reporting failures.58

INSURANCE IMPUCATIONS

o
I

VI

Another disturbing recent trend has been the tendency of some insurance carriers to deny or take reservations to coverage when directors are
sued for corporate financial fraud. Such denials and reservations are based
on the theory that if the "fraud" in financial statements preceded an application for initial or renewal coverage, the application was itself infected
by fraud, so the coverage is voided. Some carriers have taken the position
that any restatement of financial results for periods reported on prior to
the initial or renewal coverage period is prima facie proof of fraud in the
inducement for the insurance contract. While such a position may make
some sense when applied to corporate managers who are actual participants in fraudulent financial reporting decisions, its extension to audit
committee members and other outside directors will present a real deterrent to board service.
In short, while the Millstein/Whitehead Report serves as a useful recapitulation of other literature and offers some helpful "best practices" suggestions by focusing heavily on listing standards, qualifications, and enumeration of additional duties and reporting requirements, it will increase
the burdens of audit committee membership and raise liability concerns,
thus possibly discouraging good directors from accepting audit committee
service. Unfortunately, while the report devotes some thirty-six pages to
introductory material and to its regulatory recommendations, only a short
eight-page section discusses the best practices that truly effective audit

36. Millslli"IW1Iilt'-J RIporl, SIIJmI note I, at 1082-83.
37. Id. at 1087-88 (Recommendation 9).
38. Securities fraud claims must specify each statement alleged to have been misleading,
the reasons why the statement was misleading, and, if the allegation is made on information
and belief, must state with panicularity all facts upon which that belief is based and which
give rise to an inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. &t 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. III 1997).

-, -, --, --, -, -, -, --, -,
committees follow. This is a missed opportunity that hopefully will be
addressed by the Center for Board Leadership/NACO project.39

TEN RULES FOR REAUY EFFECTIVE AUDIT
COMMI7TEES
If the Millstein/Whitehead Report focuses too much on formal requirements, what are the conclusions and recommendations for "best practices"
it might have made that do truly make a difference in committee effectiveness? The following suggests ten rules of the road for effective audit
committee work. Note that none of these practical rules focuses on committee member credentials, adds to the catalog of formal committees tasks,
or requires the preparation of formal certifications or reports.

1. RECOGNIZE PRACTICAL liMITATIONS
Directors are not and should not try to be full-time corporate managers.
Except in times of crisis, they should provide oversight and counsel to the
managers of the corporation but they are not responsible for the day-today work of management or for setting the company's strategic course.
Audit committee members, in ordinary times, meet three or four times a
year for a few hours. Even if they meet more frequently, as a practical
matter they can have only a general overview of financial statements and
accounting issues. Effective audit committees recognize that they cannot
micro-manage the enterprise and focus on what they can do well as overseers of financial integrity and risk management.

2. AUDIT COMMITTEES ARE NOT AUDITORS OR UWTERS
While it may well be desirable that at least some audit committee members have financial management or accounting backgrounds, not all
boards have or can recruit outside directors with such qualifications. As a
practical matter, while one can expect all audit committee members to
have, or take the time to learn, a basic knowledge of the essential principles
of financial reporting-to be able to "read" financial statements, including
the footnotes, with understanding-the audit committee will have neither
the time nor the technical expertise to second-guess book entry decisions
and selection of applicable or "appropriate" accounting principles, or to
determine the "quality" of financial reporting decisions.
Effective audit committees understand that they are not and cannot be
auditors. They focus on being comfortable with the integrity and skill of
the auditors, internal and external, who report to them. While they should
exercise constructive skepticism as they meet privately to question outside
auditors about the quality of management's financial reporting and to
39. Set.4 note 10 and accompanying text.
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question both external and internal auditors about the quality of controls,
they must rely for the most part on the financial reporting judgments of
the full-time managers and professionals. If the audit committee attempts
to master the obscurities of generally accepted accounting principles, or
the detailed line item requirements of periodic reports filed with the SEC,
there is a real danger that it will not take enough time to focus on the big
picture issues it is uniquely qualified to address.
As an example, several years ago, when derivative exposures became a
concern, new SEC disclosure requirements were imposed. 40 Some audit
committees spent hours in briefings on the new disclosure requirements
and in reviewing the descriptions of derivative exposures in SEC filings.
As one long experienced financial manager, who is also an effective audit
committee member, observed to the author, "Our time would be better
spent talking with management about what derivative positions they take,
why they take them, and how they monitor them than by sitting through
briefings by lawyers and accountants on all these disclosure requirements."
In the case cited, that is exacdy what that audit committee did, with the
result that the company's managers made several changes in the way they
monitor derivative exposures.
The greatest danger of recommendations, such as those in the Afillstein/
Whitehead &port, and in the SEC's recent "aircraft carrier" proposals41 for
more certifications and "read, review and sign" requirements,42 is that
audit committees will be pushed t~ward an unhelpful focus on disclosure
and accounting details, spending more time being briefed and reassured
by lawyers and auditors, and too litde time in meaningful financial oversight discussions with corporate management.

3. EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEES FOCUS ON THE
BIG ISSUES
The corollary of not getting miscast as technical disclosure or accounting experts is that good audit committees should do something that technical experts may not do. The audit committee should focus on identifying
and reviewing with senior corporate management the key areas of business
and financial risk to which the enterprise is exposed. The process of helping management identify, manage, and control such risks is the most im40. Set 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (1998).
41. Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,320-22 (1998) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Dec. 4, 1998).
42. One commentator has even suggested that the cenification proposed in Recommendation 9 of the MillsteinlWhiuheDt/ &port may require audit committees to undenake an
acti\ity that would be in violation of slate laws that require the licensing of any person who
certifies as to the reliability of financial information. Letter from B.W Vick, Vick & Co.
L.L.P., toJohn F. Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (Feb. 15, 1999) (on file wilh TIl,
Businm ltzwytr, University of Maryland School of Law); J« GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-3-21,
-23, -35 (Supp. 1998).
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portant job for any audit committee. To that end, effective audit committees will often devote a substantial portion of each meeting to a briefing
and dialogue with the corporate managers of a particular function (such
as the treasury function) or a particular operating group, in order to understand the risks presented by, and the risk management techniques employed in, that function or business.
For this critical task, the best qualified audit committee members will
often be those who have practical management experience, and industry
knowledge, as opposed to those with a financial or accounting background.

4. EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEES AVOID AUDIT
OVERLOAD
The best audit committees do not take on too many responsibilities. In
order to be effective overseers of the financial function and focus on "big
picture" risk issues, good audit committees do not become buried in reams
of reports and detailed review of disclosure documents. They focus instead
on the quality of systems and people who are responsible for financial
management and reporting.

5. AUDIT COA1A1ITTEES SHOULD LOOKFORWARD,
NOT BACK
As is human nature, audit committees too often focus on problems of
the past-horses already out of the proverbial barn-rather than the risks
of the future. There is, of course, some value in understanding the pathology of past problems. It is also true that SEC disclosure requirements
tend to trail the emergence of new problems by at least several years
because of the time required for standard setting, and audit committees
do need to have a general understanding of such new rules as they are
adopted. Too much focus, however, on fact-finding-or fault-finding-for
past problems or on the latest SEC disclosure rules can result in audit
committee members focusing on critical issues too late in the oversight
cycle. A recent example is the Year 2000 computer problem where, like
the SEC, many corporate audit committees did not effectively focus on
the issue until mid-1998, even though computer experts had identified the
issue much earlier. This occurred in part because the issue did not receive
much general press attention or comment until 1998 and because the SEC,
and audit committees, were still spending a great deal of time focusing on
"old" issues such as derivative exposures, which had given rise to surprise
losses at several corporations a few years earlier. Today's effective audit
committee should be looking beyond the identified issues of the past and
the obvious, well-publicized issues of the present and asking itself, as well
as the corporation's management and auditors: What are the loss exposures three, four, and five years from now?
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6. EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMI7TEES FOCUS ON
MAN4GEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
The best audit committees continually evaluate the quality and trustworthiness of senior corporate managers, particularly those responsible
for financial accounting, internal controls, and financial reports. Good
audit committees regularly meet with the chief executive, chief financial,
and chief accounting officers, and the head of internal audit, not just to
discuss issues but also to assess the quality and effectiveness of these officers. Where they do not have confidence in a person, they bring to the
chief executive or to the full board their view that a change is needed.
Note that for this critical function, once again technical accounting or
financial knowledge is far less important than experience in judging people
and performance.

7. GOOD AUDIT COMMI7TEES STRENGTHEN INFERNAL
CONFROLS AND SUPPORT THE INFERNAL AUDIT
FUNCTION

o
.....:l

The best audit committees spend more time on the quality of the company's internal controls, including "tone at the top" attitudes of senior
management, and less time reading and revising reports and disclosure
documents. Effective audit committees act as the "godfathers" for the head
of internal audit, assuring themselves through regular private meetings
that the internal audit staff is large enough and appropriately trained and
that it has respect in the organization. Audit committees should have at
least a ratification role in selecting the head of internal audit and in assuring adequate compensation and promotion and advancement opportunities for internal auditors. For example, in at least one very successful
major corporation, the audit committee has established the principle that
all candidates for the chief financial officer position will, at some time
during their careers, have performed effectively as part of the internal
audit staff. Thus, the committee has both emphasized the importance of
the internal audit function and assured itself that future senior financial
officers will have an internal control orientation.
Of course, any conscientious audit committee will also review the internal audit plan each year, to be sure that the scope of audit work and
the cycle of review frequency for each operating unit and corporate function is reasonable, but this review is less important than being comfortable
with the quality of the people responsible for internal audit. The internal
audit and internal controls functions are a particular challenge at smaller
public companies without enough dedicated internal audit staff. In such
cases, the committee should focus with the chief financial officer and outside auditors on how best to provide effective internal audit functions. For
example, it may be that the function can be wholly or partly outsourced
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to the external auditors or to another audit firm which has appropriate
depth of staff and expertise.
In making their decisions it is critical that audit committees bear in
mind the important differences between the jobs of external and internal
auditors. External auditors review financial statements prepared by management and, based on their review of the overall adequacy of controls
and on limited sampling and review techniques, express an opinion on
whether the financial statements accord with generally accepted accounting principles. Internal auditors, on the other hand, examine operating
and staff units of the corporation to determine whether internal controls
are being adhered to, assets properly safeguarded, and management directions followed. Their review is thus more detailed, more focused, and
directed to a different end-assuring effective management control.

8. EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEES PLANREAliSTIC
MEETING SCHEDULES AM) AGENDAS
Audit committees function best when they have careful advance planning of their schedules and agendas. A danger of requiring more director
involvement in, and responsibility for, quarterly reports and earnings releases is that audit committees will become bogged down in meetings related to historical financial information and spend too little time on the
identification and management of risks and the quality of financial controls and personnel. Meeting schedules and meeting agendas should be
planned out in advance by the audit committee chair and corporate financial officers to be certain that these important "big picture" issues are
not scanted as the number of formal and procedural duties increases.

9. EFFECTIVE AUDIT COAfAl.ITTEE MEMBERS "LEARN
THE COMPANr"
As with other effective directors, the best audit committee members
spend hours learning about the company and its business. They visit facilities, talk with employees, read (publications and analyst reports), and
learn about the enterprise's major competitors. In the electronic age, they
may even visit "chat rooms" devoted to the company or its industry to see
what the "buzz" is about the company. With this base of knowledge, they
are able to make better oversight judgments about risk management and
financial reporting issues.
One of the best audit committee chairs the author has worked with is
a retired retail marketing executive. ''''hile she had no formal training in
accounting or finance, she has an inquiring mind, excellent judgment
honed by years of experience in management and, of great importance,
she did her homework and has learned a great deal about the business of
the companies on whose boards she sits. She is thus equipped to assess

risk and ask insightful questions and to prod management in the right
direction.

10. THE BEST AUDIT COMMITTEES ARE CONSTRUCTIVE
SKEPTICS
Good audit committee members approach both corporate managers
and outside auditors with an attitude of healthy skepticism. They ask managers thought-provoking questions: What keeps you awake at night? What
are our competitors doing? What happens if we enter a period of recession? What are your contingency plans if things do not go as you plan?
Who is the back up if he/she becomes unavailable? They ask auditors:
How comfortable are you with management? Is management pushing you
on recording revenues or deferring expenses? How good is our internal
audit function? Have you made any recommendations management has
not followed?
It is neither necessary nor appropriate in most cases to be hostile or
disruptive. Audit committee members can be tactful and generally supportive of management. Committee members must probe and challenge
to identify potential areas of concern before they become significant problems. One wonders whether some of the highly visible financial reporting
failures of recent months-for example, Cendant, Sunbeam, and Livent4 3-might have been prevented, or at least detected earlier, had audit
committee members and other outside directors operated with a more
skeptical view and been more willing to challenge managerial reports and
assurances.
What is reasonably clear is that the way to get more effective work from
audit committees is not to require more reports, impose more formal experience qualifications, or create a greater risk of committee members
being named as defendants. The Millstein/Whitehead Committee itself
recognizes that "a director's ability to ask and intelligendy evaluate the
answers to [probing] questions may not require 'expertise' but rather
hinges on intelligence, diligence, a probing mind, and a certain basic 'financial literacy.' "44 To the extent that the AlillsteinlWhitehead Report encourages public company boards to focus on selecting audit committee
members with those personal characteristics, and encourages audit committees to use their time efficiendy, with significant time devoted to risk
identification and management and a constructive, forward-looking dialogue with management and the internal and external auditors, it will have
served a valuable purpose. To the extent that it simply adds more lines to
the litany of committee duties, and more reporting and liability burdens
to the chores of committee membership, it will not have materially advanced the quality of corporate financial oversight.
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43. Su .fl"I"all, Miehad Connor, Rtgulalors Targtl &okhtping Trirks,
1998, at 810.
44. MillstnnIW1ri~"'ad Rtport, supra note I, at 1081.
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When the chairman, general counsel, and chief accountant of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assert that something is awry
in corporate financial reporting, I a skeptic could chalk it up to regulatory
enthusiasm, or, simply, as a response to media attention and a flurry of
recent and publicly reported accounting irregularities. Mindful of potential skepticism, the SEC encouraged the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to form a
private sector body to investigate the problems the SEC perceived. Accordingly, the Committee2 took an' objective look at U.S. corporate finaneMr. Milbtein is a Senior Panner at the New York-based law firm of Weil, GOlshal & Manges
LLP. Mr. Millstein is the Special Advisor to lhe World Bank on Corporate Gm-ernance, and
Chairman of the Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Gm-ernance of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. He is the Eugene F. Williams, Jr.,
VISiting Professor in Competitive Enterprise and Strategy at the Yale School of Management,
and a member of the American Academy of Ans &: Sciences. Mr. Millslein served as CaChair of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effecth-eness of Corporate Audit
Comminees (Committee), and here speaks as to what he believes the Comminee's consensus
view to be.
I. S« Chairman Anhur Levin, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at the New York Univenity Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.sec.p·/news/speeches/
spch220.txt>; Chairman Anhur Levin, A Pannenhip for the Public Trust, Remarks Before
the American Institute of Cenified Public Accounlants (AICPA) (Dec. 8, 1998) <http://
www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch230.txt>; Chief Accountant Lynn E. Turner, Making financial Statements Real: Recent Problems in the Accounting for Purchased In-Process Research and Development, Remarks at the the Software and SelVice Industry Analysl Group
(Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch25I.htm>; Chief Accountanl
Lynn E. Turner, Current Projects of the Office of lhe Chief Accounlant, Remarks at the
Colorado Stale Society of Cenified Public Accountants 1998 SEC Conference (Dec. 3,1998)
<hnp:llwww.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch243.htm>.
2. Ira M. Millstein andJohn C. Whitehead, former Deputy Secretary of Slale and relired
Co-Chairman and Senior Panner of Goldman, Sachs & Co., co-chaired lhe Comminl"(,.
The Committee was formed in October 1998 by lhe NYSE and lhe NASD, and ilS members
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cial reporting, specifically assessing the current mechanisms for oversight
and accountability among corporate audit committees, independent auditors, and financial and senior management.
In the course of its analysis the Committee canvassed its members, all
of whom are active participants in the private sector. It also reached out
to gain perspective from other knowledgeable and interested parties involved in the corporate financial reporting process. 3 Importantly, the Committee turned to seminal prior works and reports on the same topic. 4 Based
on this diligence, the Committee independently concluded that the concern is real-improvements in financial reporting are needed. 5 Moreover,
progressive change is overdue; calls for reform in this area have been echoed time and again over the last several decades, without sufficient response.6
In formulating the Report, the Committee took special note of the numerous prior suggestions for improvement in corporate financial reporting,
many of which had languished in debate. 7 There was no need to retread
ground well covered. Indeed, the Report relies on key provisions of prior
studies and updates them with the Committee's own thoughts. The priority
were:.John H. Biggs, Chairman, President, and CEO of TIAA-CREF; Frank]. Borelli,
Senior Vice President and CFO of Manh &: Mclennan Companies, Inc.; Charles A.
Bowsher, former Comptroller General of the United States; Dennis D. Dammerman, Vice
Chairman and Executive Officer of the General Electric Company; Richard A. Grasso,
Chairman and CEO of the NYSE; Phillip Laskawy, Chairman and CEO of Ernst &: Young
LLP;JamesJ. Schiro, CEO of PricewalerhouseCoopen LLP; Wdliam C. Steere,Jr., Chairman and CEO of Pfizer Inc.; and Frank G. Zarb, Chairman and CEO of the NASD. Paula
Lowitt, an associate with Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, was a member of the Committee
SlafT.
3. Press Release, Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees (Nov. 4, 1998), in REPORT AND RECOMM£.I'lDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIllBOS COMMITIEE ON IMPROVING THE EFFEcTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES app. A al 50 (1999). The press release describes the area of inquiry, requests public
comment, and announces a public hearing on Dec. 9, 1998. Id.
FAi",,'s note: The appendices to the 1hport ami RewtnmmtJatitltts of t1tI Btw RiIJIJon Committn 011
Improving t1tI E;jfictivmess of CorporaJt Autlil Committns (&port, were not reprinled in this issue of
Thl llruine.r.r Lawyer. References to the appendices will therefore require a review of the
original Report. All references to the body of' the 1hport will be provided as references to the
full text as reprinted herein. S« 1hport tmtl RNommmtlatitltts of t1tI Bhu RiIJIJo" Committn 011
Improving t1tI Fj[«ti_ of Corpora~ Alltiit Committm, 54 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1999) [hereinafter

Mitl.rteinl WhiJe"-J RtporlJ.
4. S« Mill.rtei"IW1Iitelw41hport, .fII/JrtI note 3, at 1067-68; .rtf al.ro NATIONAL Ass'N OF
CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PRoFESSIONAUSM (1996); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUOULENT F'lNANCIAL REPORTING (1987) [hereinalter TREADWAY REPORT]; PuBUC OVERSIGHT BoARD
ADVISORY PANEL ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, STRENGTHENING THE PROFESSIONALISM
or THE IlI.'DEPENDENT AUDITOR (1994) [hereinalter POB REPORT].
5. Mitl.rteinl Whitmtatl1hport, supra nOle 3, at 1068.
6. Cj ill.
7. Cjill.

I"" ~"

I""",

L,~,,,., •.

L,~",,,.

L . ~"",

L~.,

L~~N

L,."3~.

t., '

--, -,

was to publish the Committee's conclusions promptly in an effort to precipitate action in short order.
While the Committee welcomes and expects vigorous discussion of the
Report, the Committee structured the Report to advance very specific practical recommendations so that discussion, this time, would not be generalized or philosophic, but would be directed to the particulars. The Committee urges that the affected communities, private sector, and regulators
will not allow the necessity for change to be buried by debate.

THE CURRENT PROBLEM
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The integrity of our securities markets rides on the integrity of financial
reporting by the corporations who have access to those markets. The U.S.
securities markets are the most trusted, and hence the deepest and most
fluid in the world. The goal of all the participants in and regulators of
those markets is to keep them trusted and to improve their integrity and
reliability.
The current concern with financial reporting is primarily fueled by a
perceived need for corporations to constantly "make the numbers"-to
match or exceed analysts' expectations and projections. That push, plus
the fact that financial reporting is not an exact science (e.g., Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GMP) leave wide areas of discretion),
allows managers to make choices ~n preparing a company's financial reports. While such reports may not violate GAAp, under certain circumstances they may obscure the true condition of the company. Earnings
management crosses the line when it is abused to obscure the reality of
the company's situation.
The question of when the line is crossed, i.e., when the financial report
ceases to be fairly presented and becomes instead fogged, is not definable
with an exact precision in all instances for all companies. Not surprisingly,
many expert groups before the Committee, as noted above, have wrestled
with this issue: in particular, the Treadway Commission in 1987,8 and the
Public Oversight Board of the AICPA in 1994.9
These and other groups developed the notion that the inquiry into the
issue of accuracy should focus on "the quality, not just the acceptability"
of a company's financial reporting. While the Committee does not define
"quality," the term suggests an attempt to make appropriate and candid
judgments on the accounting choices that fall within the large grey area
of discretion allowed for by GAAP.
The Report is designed to advance awareness and implementation of
measures to promote this concept of "quality" financial reporting among
the audit committee, the outside auditor, and management. The Com8. SN TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 4.
9. SN POB REPORT, supra note 4.
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mittee knew this could not be done by prescribing a list of precise accounting rules and strictures-the leeway GAAP affords is necessary and
there will always be areas of discretion in financial reporting to which tight
proscriptions will not apply. Consequently, the Committee chose to concentrate on process; specifically, the Committee wanted to improve the
process by which that discretion is overseen and exercised. The goal was
to try to ensure that independence, awareness, diligence, and care were
the primary principles governing the unavoidable exercise of discretion.
Focusing on process leads directly to the board of directors. The board
has ultimate responsibility for overseeing and monitoring all aspects of the
corporation's performance, including its financial reporting.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
It is fitting that the Report frames the issue of improving corporate financial reporting in the corporate governance context, since the evolution
of modern corporate governance that began in the 1970s was rooted in
financial reporting issues.
Prior to the 1970s, boards of directors were management-dominated,
passive, and generally inert. lo Such passivity was largely overlooked;
boards of directors were not expected to do much more than rubber-stamp
management's decisions. I I With the SEC's investigation of managerial
misconduct and misreported earnings at the Penn Central Company (Penn
Central), however, the dangers of little to no board oversight became readily apparent to regulators, the corporate community, and the public. 12 The
SEC's 1972 official report on Penn Central, the nation's largest railroad
company and (then) sixth largest industrial corporation, criticized, as never

10. Charles M. Elson, Dine"" Compmsalimt tUUl tire Mantzgtmnll-CaphtmJ Board-Tile Hislor'}
REV. 127, 130-31 (1996) (citing ADoLF A. BERLE,JR.
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933».
II. Based on a study of boards of directors in the late 196Os, Myles L Mace aptly
described the disconnection between board responsibility and actual board activity:
"[B]oards of directors of most large and medium-sized companies do IlOl establish objectives,
strategies, and policies, however defined," do Mt "ask[] discerning questions," and do IlOl
"select the [CEO]." MYLES L MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH & REAUTY 185-90 (1971); see
alsoJA\'
LoRSCH & EuZABETH MAcIVER, PAWNS OR PoTENTATES: THE REAUTY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 7-8 (1989) (describing the passive culture of the traditional
board, and the practices that have supponed that culture). Thus boards were found not
to perform the classical and generally accepted roles that are attributed to them. Note that
only a decade ago, Peter Drucker was quoted as declaring that "[t]he board of directors is
an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction." SN CHARLES A. ANDERSON & ROBERT N.
A.."HONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIRECTORS: INSIGHTS FOR BoARD MEMBERS AND
EXECUTIVES I (1986).
12. SN SEC, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPA.lln': STAFF
REPORT OF THE SECURrl1ES AND EXCIfANGE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS (1972).
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before, the failure of the board of a publicly traded company to provide
effective oversight. Specifically, the SEC found that
(i) the outside directors did not have the acumen to deal with financial crisis; 13
(ii) the outside directors were passive about the information they
received from management;14 and
(iii) board meetings were formalistic, with little discussion and practically no opportunity for outside directors to discuss affairs
among themselves. IS
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In issuing its 1972 official report, the SEC emphasized the need for
board independence, and placed outside directors in a special position of
authority. 16
Against the backdrop of Penn Central and with growing recognition
that "the somnolent Penn Central board of directors was typical of most
giant corporations' boards in the postwar period,"'7 the SEC probed further into inappropriate and fraudulent financial reporting, including widespread undisclosed use of slush funds for improper foreign and domestic
payments. As a condition to settling enforcement actions against a number
of large corporations for undisclosed improper payments, the SEC began
to require that boards form special committees composed of a majority
of independent directors to monitor compliance in the future.'8 Outside
directors were instructed to monitor and oversee management and corporate conduct.'9
'
13. Stt gmtrally itJ. at 152-72.
14. /d. at 152-53.

15. /d. at 153.
16. Stt id. at 150-52.

I 7. Jod Seligman, A ShNp in HOff's Clothing: Tilt American Law Institu" PrinciplL5 oj Corpora"
GoVtTnanct Pro}tcl, 55 GEO. WASH. 1.. REV. 325, 330 (1987).
18. /d. at 334.
19. Stt t.g., SEC v. Mattei, Inc., [1974-1975 Transf~r Bind~r] F~d. S~c. 1.. R~p. (CCH)
~ 94,807, at 96,693-95 (D.D.C. Oct. I, 1974) (ord~ring corporat~ gov~rnanc~ reforms in
addition to ~rman~nt injunctions in ~spons~ to th~ filing of defecti\'~ financial statements,
including: (i) th~ appointm~nt of a board of di~ctors comprisW of a majority of di~ctors
unaffiJiat~d with Mattei, Inc. (Mattei); (ii) th~ appointm~nt of an ~xecuti\'~ committe~ comprisW of a majority of th~ n~w, unaffiliat~d di~ctors; and (iii) the appointment by the
unaffiliated di~ctors of a special counsel to conduct further iO\'estigation into the financial
practices of Mattei and to prepa~ a ~port to be filed with th~ court); SEC v. "'estgateCalifornia Corp., Litig. Rele~ No. 6142,1973 SEC LEXIS 2364, at·I··2 (S.D. Cal. :'\0\'.
9, 1973) (requiring th~ c~ation of a s~n m~mber board, five of whom we~ appointed by
th~ court in consultation with th~ SEC; and th~ ~stablishment of an executh'e commillee
consisting of a majority of outside di~ctors); SEC \'. Coastal States Gas Corp., Litig. Release
No. 6054, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2544, at ·2··3 (S.D. Tex. S~pt. 12, 1973) (ordering thf' increase
in th~ number of di~ctors from 10 to 13, with six to be inde~ndent directors df'signatf'd
by the court, and the establishment of an ex{'cutive commill{'~ of three di~ctors, two of
whom w{'re to be appoint~d from among the six new inde~ndent directors).
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By the mid-1970s, the SEC had solidified its view that some independent internal board mechanism was needed to ensure accountability of
management. 20 In 1977, the SEC approved an NYSE rule requiring all
listed domestic companies "to establish . . . and maintain thereafter, an
audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that . . . would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member."21 Scandal
had brought independent director responsibility to the fore, particularly
in respect of the audit committee.
The role and importance of the independent director has been further
developed since the 19708 by the courts, particularly those of Delaware. 22
Additionally, in the 199Os, an evolution in thinking about board responsibilities led many high-profile U.S. boards to take voluntary action to
20. A5 a prologu~ to the era of questionable payments, the SEC continued to pursue
actions against companies that it was hqinning to investigate at the time the 1972 official
~port was first published. One of the most notorious cases involved Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
(Lockheed). The SEC charged that from 1968 until at least 1975, Lockheed and certain of
its officers made secret payments to fo~ign governmental officials of approximately 525
million to assist in procuring and maintaining contracts with fo~ign governments. The payments we~ disguised by false accounting, cash payments, and lau~ring funds through
consultants or corporate entities. Stt SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transf~r
Bind~r] Fed. Sec. 1.. Rep. (CCH) '95,509, at 95,569 (D.D.C. Apr. 13,1976). In addition,
Lockheed officials we~ accused of paying Out over 5200 million in corporate funds, without
adequate financial ~cords, to various consultants, commission agents, and others. In the
consent d~cr~e, th~ SEC r~qui~d that Lockhe~d form a sp«:ial committee, satisfactory to
the SEC and compos~d solely of non·management di~ctors or ~rsons unaffiliat~d with
Lockheed, to conduct ~xt~nsive investigations into the allegations and all possible violative
conduct and to pr~pare a ~port to be filed with th~ SEC. Id. at 95,570.
21. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act ReI~~ No. 13,346, 1977 SEC LEXIS
2252, at·1 (Mar. 9, 1977) (footnot~ omitted); 5tt N~s E. u~ch & Robert H. Mundh~im,
Tilt Outsidt Dirtclor oj tkt Publit:ly HtUl Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1800-01 (1976) (stating
that an early SEC att~mpt to draft a position pa~r on outside di~ctors was motivat~d in
part by th~ SEC's inquiry into the Penn C~ntral bankruptcy).
22. Stt Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (finding that the board was
grossly n~gligent wh~n it approved th~ sale of the company after just a f~w hours of delib~ration, without se~king ex~rt advice, and without informing itself of the chairman's role
in selling the company for a low price); IN abo Unocal Corp. v. M~sa Petrol~um Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). A board can def~nd against a hostile tak~O\'er if, after a goodfaith ~asonabl~ investigation, th~ board has a r~asonable beli~f that th~ tak~over bid pos~d
a dang~r to th~ corporation and the d~f~nsive tactics ~ ~asonabl~ in ~Iationship to the
thr~at posed. [d. at 958. The court ~mphasiz~d that involvem~nt by a majority of outside
disint~~st~d di~ctors is a significant factor in showing good faith. /d. at 955; 5tt auo Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990) (c~diting a
d~cision mad~ by a w~n·informed, inde~nd~nt board); In rt Ca~mark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (~xplaining that as part of its duty of ca~, the
board of directors has an obligation to "exerc~ a good faithjudgm~nt that th~ corporation's
information and r~portingsyst~m is in conc~pt and design ad~quate to assu~ th~ board that
appropriat~ information will com~ to its alt~ntion in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary
o~rations").
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improve their ability to monitor management actively.23 This movement
toward board "self-improvement" has primarily concerned structural
modifications to promote director independence and improve the board's
ability to objectively assess management and corporate performance. U
The movement to progressive corporate governance, which included
regulatory, court-driven, and voluntary measures to improve overall board
independence and oversight, was initiated by the SEC's early focus on
financial reporting and then the audit committee's structure and role. It is
totally consistent, therefore, that now good corporate governance practice
points to the audit committee as the focal point for improvements in financial reporting.
The steps the &port oudines are what some of our best corporations,
but not enough of them, are already doing in whole or in part. The
Committee's suggestions describe more comprehensive practices which the
audit committee by design is expected to perform. For example, today a
majority of the board must sign the company's Form IO-K Annual Report
(I O-K), which includes the corporation's financial statements. 25 The report
simply spells out how to make that signature mean what it was always
supposed to mean-i.e., not just a rubber stamp, but an assurance of a
responsible oversight process by the full board through the audit committee.
The Reports ten recommendations are grouped in three general categories to enhance the process through which the audit committee carries
out its duties:
'
(i) strengthening the independence of the audit committee;
(ii) making the operation of the audit committee more effective; and
(iii) improving the mechanisms for discussion and accountability
among the audit committee, the outside auditors, and the management.
The Committee believes the recommendations are straightforward and
clear.

AREAS OF FOCUS
As stated at the outset, the Committee recognized that the Rrport's recommendations would generate discussion, and hopes that such discussion
23. Thne included the boards of American Expre~ Co., General Motors Corp. (G~I),
International Busin~ Machines Corp., Eastman Kodak Co., \\'estinghouse Electric Corp.,
and later, Kman Corp., \\~R. Grace & Co., and Morrison Knudsen Corp., among others.
24. &t, t.g., GM BoarrJ tif DimloTs Corporate Golltrllallct Guidtlillts (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://www.gm.com/about/investor/stockholder/guiddines.html>; Stt also California
Public Employees' Retirement Sys., US. Corporate Gol."lIallct Prillciplts (Apr. 13, 1998) < http:/
/www.calpersgovernance.org/prineiples/domestic/us/pageOI.asp>.
25. Set Millstnll/Whilthead Report, supra note 3, at 1087.
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will be used constructively to devise the most appropriate measures for
improvement. In this spirit, it may be helpful to briefly review the two
most likely subjects for dialogue arising from the Report (i) how to define
"quality"; and (ii) the concern that the &port and its recommendations
will lead to increased liability for audit committee members.

HOW TO DEFINE "QUAUTr"
The Rrporl puts the "quality" issue into the spodight in two ways. First,
it recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) be
modified to "require that a company's outside auditor discuss with the
audit committee the auditor's judgments about the quality, not just the
acceptability, of the company's accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting."26 This discussion would include the auditor's view of
the aggressiveness or conservatism of the accounting principles applied,
the underlying estimates, and other significant judgments made by management. Next, as a natural extension of this GAAS requirement, the
Rrporl suggests that the audit committee disclose whether or not it conducted such discussions on quality with the outside auditor, fin.ancial management, and amongst the committee members themselves.27
If these two recommendations are to be implemented, the question of
how to define "quality" will be unavoidable. The accounting profession
will need to wresde with that term and give it (and related ones, such as
"aggressive" and "conservative") parameters if auditors, audit committees, and management are to give their discussions real meaning. The
Committee recognized that this is a tall order, but if the goal is to heighten
auditors' and audit committees' scrutiny and inquiry into this issue of
quality, there must be a baseline definition, or at least some parameters
that screen out what is and is not included in the ambit of "quality." Some
members of the accounting community and other interested parties are
skeptical about the feasibility of defining this term, while others are optimistic. At the very least, a narrowing of the broad area of discretion will
suffice as a "definition"-as a start.

IMPACT ONUABIUTr
The argument has been raised that because the audit committee will
be making disclosures as to its consideration of the auditing standards
applied in the company's reporting as well as compliance with GAAP, audit
committee members will be exposed to increased risk of class action and
derivative lawsuits, if not increased liability. The Committee views this
perception as unfounded. The opposite should be true. If audit committees
adhere to the diligence and practices suggested in the &porl, such behavior
26. Set ill. at 1086 (Recommendation 8).

27. &t ill. at 1087·88 (Recommendation 9).

will protect audit committees against allegations of liability under state
la\v. The Report also emphasizes the need for the SEC to create an appro-

o
I

.....
~

priate "safe harbor" to avoid any question under federal law in this regard. 28
As to common law claims, such as those based on an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty and mismanagement, the law does not require directors and
audit committees always to have made the "correct" decisions. The law
only requires that directors engage in a reasonable, honest, and independently minded decisionmaking process to fulfill their responsibilities. 29
Consequently, an audit committee that follows the Report's recommendations to conduct discussions with the auditors and management and to
disclose the audit committee's belief-in reliance on its discussions with
management and the auditors-that the company's financials conform
with GAAP can only strengthen such committee's record of diligence.
This, in turn, can only heighten the committee's protection under the
business judgment rule, which after all is fundamentally premised on good
faith process. Moreover, one would expect the courts to be particularly
cognizant of the need to avoid imposing undue risk or enhanced standards
on those who undertake audit committee service and adhere to good process as suggested in the Report.
.
This should suffice as protection for directors under state law, and the
Committee has recommended a "safe harbor" under federal law.. The
Committee contemplates that such fi federal safe harbor would apply not
only to the audit committee's formal disclosure in the company's IO-K
that the Report specifically recommends, but also to any actions taken by
the directors'serving on the audit committee. Specifically, the safe harbor
should be designed to protect audit committee members from liability
arising out of claims alleging that audit committee members should be
held to a higher standard than other directors. This protection must be
broad enough to cover any statements made in the IO-K, the "judgments"
upon which the company's financial reports are based, and the reliance
of the audit committee members on management and the outside auditors
which the recommendations expressly contemplate. 30
Finally, compare this protection for directors with the current mandate
which requires, without further definition, a majority of directors to sign
the IO-K.31 Is the current situation, without explicit guidelines as to responsibility and liability, and without explicit justification for reliance on
both management and the outside auditors, preferable to the concrete
guidance on appropriate practices and the supplemental safe harbor pro-

tection proposed by the Committee's recommendations? The Committee
thought not.

CONCLUSION
There is one last point to bear in mind as the discussion ensues over
the precise form that the recommendations should take. While the Committee recommends changes to the listing requirements of the NYSE and
the NASD, and disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws,
the Committee contemplates these changes as only a part of the path to
improvement. Enhancing audit committee performance is, and should be,
a do-it-yourself kit. Although the Committee has reason to expect expedition, implementation by the regulators will probably take time. Meanwhile, audit committees, if they so desire, can implement every one of
these suggestions without further regulation. Self-help has been a large
component of the history of improved governance, and the Committee
hopes that the Report will spur similar action.

28. Ste itJ. at 1083, 1088 (Recommendations 5 and 9).
29. Ste Unceal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985); Smith v.
Van Corkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).

30. Ste Millslei"IWhitelretui Rtport, ntpra note 3, at 1087-88 (Recommendation 9).
31. Ste itJ. at 1087.
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Letter From the Chairmen

Since the end of September 1998, when you caDed upon us to chair this

senior and financial management. the Internal auditor, and the outside audi -

Blue Ribbon Committee, we have been honored to work with our fellow

tors regarding Onanclal reporting and the oversight process. Underpinning

Committee members on what we believe to be a truly collaborative effort.

our work Is the recognition that quaDty financial account,", and reporting

We are pleased to submit to you this Report and Recommendations. but

can only result from effective Interrelationships among these relevant corpo •

wish to acknowledBe that much of our work Is based on the outstanding research

rate partldpants.

and best practices documents previously drafted and cIIsseminated by others. In
particular. the Committee ~ to commend and thank those responsible for

that promote quality Rnanclal reporting. fecCll"lztnB the benefits that Inure from

the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent FInanclaI Reporting

this praetlce: market confldence. a more eftlclent anocatlon of capital, and the

(Treadway Commission (1987» and Strensthentns the Professlonallzatlon of

resulting lower cost of capJtaI. The stren&th of America's capital markets always

the Independent Auditor.

o

Throughout our deDberatlons we have strived to produce recommendattons

Report to the Public ~t Board of the SEC

has been their adherence to transparency and fun disclosure.

Praetlce Section, American Institute of Certlfled Public Accountants (AICPA)

I

......

0\

Because so many groups within the CGrJIOrate community are vested In

from the AdvllOI'Y Panel on Auditor Indepenclence (1994) rI994 POB

some aspect of board oversllIht and the financial reportln& process. you have

Report-) .- both resources the Committee used 1lberaiiy.

assembled In this Commlttee representatlves from the whole specuum or the

This Report, however. Is not Intended to cover the breadth of financial

Interested partles. In this spirit, the Committee pthered Input from a wide

reporting Issues addressed by these and other prior reports. Nor does this

range of constltuendes through a public hearing and open request for formal

Report focus on fraud per se, although many of our recommendations may

Written comments on the topic.

reduce the possibility of fraud.

The Committee's focus Is on the large grey

area where discretion and subjective Judgments beer on the quality of financial
reporting.

It Is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules where discretion Is

required. AccordlnJly, we emphasize the need for financial management to
make sound financial Judgments and the process by which the outside auditors
and the audit committee evaluate those Judgments.
Our Report Is geared toward ell'ectlng pragmatic. progressive changes In
the functions and expectations placed on corporate boards, audit committees,
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verview and
Recommendations

cannot. however. suggest a single appropriate template for oversight by

We, therefore. at the outset, urge boards of directors to understand and

broad parameters. each audit committee should evolve and develop Its

adopt the attitude of the modem board which recognizes that the board

own guidelines suited to Itself and Its corporation.
A starting point for the development of audit committee guidelines

requires. a fidUciary for those who Invest In the corporation. Board
W
membership Is no longer just a reward for Wmaklng It In corporate

Is a recognition of the audit committee's position In the larger gover-

America: being a director today requires the appropriate attitude and

Certainly. It Is not the role of the audit committee to prepare financial

capabilities. and It demands time and attention.

statements or engage In the myriad of decisions relating to the prepara-

The measure of the board. then. Is not simply whether It fulfills Its

......

dysfunctional, the audit committee likely will not be much better. We

founded In the practices and attitudes of the entire board of directors.

must perform active and Independent oversight to be. as the law

I

on and relate to these very same board-wide principles. If the board Is

all audit committees. Just as wone size doesn't fit au Wwhen It comes to
w
board governance. wone size can't fit all audit committees. Within

Recommendations for the performance of audit committees must be

o

--, -, .--' --, -, --, --, -, -,

nance process as It relates to the oversight of financial reporting.

tion of those statements. The commlttee'sjob Is clearly one of oversight

wlegalw requirements but, more Importantly. the board's attitude and how

and monitoring, and In carrying out this job It aets In reUance on senior

It puts Into practice Its awareness and understanding of Its responsibili-

financial management and the outside auditors. A proper and well-

ties. Is the board simply going through the motions. or has It demon-

functioning system exists. therefore, when the three main groups respon-

strated awareness of Its Important role by having some form of Inde-

sible for financial reporting -- the full board InclUding the audit commit-

pendent leadership that can act without relying only on management's
Initiative? Has the board established guidelines or operational proce-

tee, financial management Including the intema! auditors, and the outW
side auditors -- form a Wthree-Iegged stool that supports responsible

dures for Its own functioning? Do the Independent directors meet. alone

financial disclosure and active and participatory oversight. However. in

periodically to evaluate management and company performance and

the view of the Committee. the audit committee must be W
first among

strategy? Does the board engage In Individual director and full board

equals· In this process, since the audit committee Is an extension of the

evaluation? From self-generated measures such as these, one can Infer

full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.

-...J

that the board Is aware, Independent, professional and well-governing,

Turning from awareness and execution of responsibilities to

or at least Is endeavoring to be distinct from management. In essence,

another modem element of governance. we note that disclosure and

these signs show that a board Is moving from being passive to active.

transparency have become the first hallmark of good governance looked

If a board Is functioning properly. the audit committee can build

to by Investors. The lack of disclosure and transparency no doubt con-

..

trlbuted to the recent flight of capital from Asia. If a corporation Is to

hopes that these proposed amendments to listing standards be consid-

be a viable attraction for capital, Its board must ensure disclosure and

ered by any market that is a primary venue for U.S. equities.

transparency concerning the company's true financial performance as

It Is with these perspectives the Committee advances the recom-

well as Its governance practices. Accounting games may be short-term

mendations outlined In summary form below. The section of this

fixes. but they are not long-term bases for financial credibility.

Report. entitled "The Audit Committee as Catalyst for Effective

Our recommendations. therefore, build on these two essentials:

Financial Reporting,· more fully describes the rationale and Intentions

first. an audit committee with actual practices and overall performance

underlying each of these recommendations.

that refiect the professionalism embodied by the full board of which It is
a part. and second. a legal, regulatory. and self-regulatory framework that
emphasizes disclosure and transparency and accountability.
The Committee wishes to stress that while the recommendations
In this Report appear separately. they together form a mosaic to enhance
financial reporting and oversight of that process: In this light. the

o

Committee views the recomme~datlonsas an Integrated set of objectives

I

.....

that must be adopted In Its entirety In order to accomplish the Intended

00

results. The need for such an Integrated approach Is of even greater
Importance given the fact that Implementation will require action by a
number of entitles Including the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). the securities markets through the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs), the accounting profession, and. of course, boards and audit
committees.
Notably, while several of the recommendations that apply to public
companies contemplate an exemption for smaller entities due to the burdens Involved, the Committee urges all companies regardless of size to
make a good faith attempt to follow these recommendations. Similarly.
while a number of the recommendations propose amendments to the
listing standards applied by the NYSE and the NASD, the Committee
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Summary
The first two recommendations are aimed at strengthening the Inde-

to Which the corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments that are or have been slgnlflcant*

pendence of the audit committee:

to the corporation or business organization In any of the
past five yean;

Recommendation

1

• a director belns employed as an executive of another com-

The Committee recommends that both the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
SecurIties Dee1en (NASD) adopt the following definition or
Independence for purpoleS of service on the audit committee for
listed companies with a market capitalization above $200 mlUlon
(or a more appropriate measure for ldentlfylnt smaller-silled companies as determined Jointly by the NYSE and the NASD):
Members of the audit committee shall be considered Independent If they have no relationship to the corporation that

o

may Interfere with the exercise of their Independence from

I

.....

1.0

pany where any of the corporation's executives serves on that
company's compensation committee.
A director who has one or more of these relationships may
be appointed to the audit committee, if the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that membership
on the committee by the IndiVidual Is required by the best
Interests of the corporation and Its shareholders, and the board
discloses. In the next annual proxy statement subsequent to
such determination, the nature of the relationship and the reasons for that determination.

management and the cor-po,:atlon. Examples of such relationships Include:
• a director belns employed by the corporation or any of Its
amUates for the current year or any of the past flve yean;

Recommendation

2

The Committee recommends that In addition to adoptlns
and complyins with the definition of Independence set forth

• a director acceptins any compensation from the corporation
or any of Its amUates other than compensation for board
service or benefits under a

tax-quaUfle~

retirement plan;

• a director belns a member of the Immediate family of an
Individual who Is, or has been In any of the past five yean.
employed by the corporation or any of Its amUates as an
executive officer;

above for purposes of service on the audit committee, the NYSE
and the NASD require that listed companies with a market
capitalization above

$200 million (or a more appropriate meas-

ure for Identlfyins smaller-!Ized companies as determined Jointly
by the NYSE and the NASD) have an audit committee comprised solely of Independent directors.
The Committee recommends that the NYSE and the
NASD maintain their respective current audit committee Inde-

• a director belns a partner In, or a controlDns shareholder or
an executive omcer of, any for-profit business organization

pendence requirements as well as their respective definitions of

1_._ttoe_

• Thee-.....
Amertcen Law
10 thetlOCtlon.
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Recommendation
Independence for listed companies with a market capltaUzation

I

•

4

The Committee recommends that the NYSE and the

of $200 million or below (or a more appropriate measure for

NASD require the audit committee 'of each ilsted company to

Identifying smaller-sized companies as determined jointly by the

(l) adopt a formal written charter that Is approved by the full

NYSE and the NASD).

board of directors and that specifies the scope of the commit-

tee's responsibilities, and how It carries out those responsibili-

Our second set of recommendations Is aimed at making the audit com-

ties, Including structure, processes, and membership require-

mittee more effective:

ments, and (II) review and reassess the adequacy of the audit
committee charter on an annual basis.

Recommendation

3

Recommendation

The Committee recommends that the NYSE and the

The Committee recommends that the Securities and

NASD require Usted companies with a market capltaUration
above

Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgate rules that require the

$200 mlllion (or a more appropriate measure for Identify-

audit committee for each reporting company to disclose in the

Ing smaller-sized companies as determined Jointly by the NYSE

o

company's proxy statement for Its annual meeting of sharehold-

and the NASD) to have an audit committee comprised of a

N

o

5

ers whether the audit committee has adopted a formal written

minimum of three directors, each of whom Is financially literate

charter, and, if so, whether the audit committee satisfied its

(as described in the section of this report entitled ·Financlal

responsibilities dUring the prior year in compliance with its

Literacy·) or becomes financially Uterate within a reasonable

charter, which charter shall be disclosed at least triennially In

period of time after his or her appointment to the audit com-

the annual report to shareholders or pro."C)' statement and In the

mittee, and further that at least one member of the audit com-

next annual report to shareholders or proxy statement after any

mittee have accounting or related financial management

significant amendment to that charter.

expertise.

The Committee further recommends that the SEC adopt a

The Committee recommends that the NYSE and the

·safe harbor· applicable to. all disclosure referenced in this,

NASD maintain their respective current audit committee size

Recommendation 5.

and membership requirements for companies with a market
capitaliratlon of $200 million or below (or a more appropriate
measure for identifying smaller-sized companies as determined
jointly by the NYSE and the NASD).
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The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted

Our flnal group of recommendations addresses mechanisms for

Auditing Standards (GAAS) require that a company's outside

accountability among the audit committee, the outside auditors, and

auditor discuss with the audit committee the audltor'sjudgmanagement:

ments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company's accounting principles as applied in Its financial reportIng: the discussion should Include such Issues as the clarity of

Recommendation

•

the company's nnanclal disclosures and degree of agresslveness

The Committee recommends that the listing rules for

or conservatism of the company's accounting principles and

both the NYSE and the NASD require that the audit commit-

underlying estimates and other significant decisions made by

tee charter for every listed company specJfy that the outside

management In preparing the financial disclosure and reviewed

auditor is ultimately accountable to the board of dlrecton and

by the outside auditors. This requirement should be written In

the audit committee, as representatives of shareholders, and

a way to encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid bolle....

that these shareholder representatives have the ultimate

plate.

authority and responsibility to select, evaluate, and, where
appropriate, replace the outside auditor (or to nominate the

o

outside auditor to be proposed for shareholder approval in any

IV

proxy statement),

.....

Recommendation
•

9

The Committee recommends that the SEC require aU
reporting companies to include a ietter from the audit commit-

Recommendation
-

7

The Committee recommends that the listing rules for
both the NYSE and the NASD require that the audit committee charter for every listed company specify that the audit committee is responsible for ensuring its receipt from the outside
auditors of a formal written statement delineating all relationships between the auditor and the company, consistent with
Independence Standards Board Standard 1, and that the audit
committee is also responsible for actively engaging In a dialogue
with the auditor with respect to any disclosed relationships or
services that may Impact the objectivity and Independence of
the auditor and for taking, or recommending that the full board
take, appropriate action to ensure the Independence of the outside auditor.

tee In the company's annual report to shareholders and Form

lOoK Annual Report disclosing whether or not, with respect to
the prior fiscal year: (i) management has reviewed the audited
financial statements with the audit committee, Including a discussion of the quality of the accounting principles as applied
and significant judgments.aft'ecting the company's financial
statements; (II) the outside auditors have discussed with the
audit committee the outside auditors' judgments of the quality
of those principles as applied and judgments referenced In (I)
above under the circumstances; (m) the members of the audit
committee have discussed among themselves, without management or the outside audlton present, the Information disclosed
to the audit committee described In (i) and (II) above: and (Iv)

-, -,

II

he Case for Timely and
Practica I Action

the audit committee. In reliance on the review and discussions

The corporate governance debate has changed dramatically over the last

conducted with management and the outside audlton punuant

three decades. moving from fundamental arguments over Its relevance.

to (I) and (II) above. believes that the company's financial

to a practical discussion (which assumes relevance) of how to transform

statements are fairly presented In conformity with Generally

the concept from a good Idea on paper to a reality In practice. One of

Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) In all material
the Issues that has taken on Increasing Importance In the search for good

respects,

governance Is how best to harness the ovenlght process to achieve more

The Committee further recommends that the SEC adopt a
"safe harbor" applicable to any disclosure referenced In this

fully the goal of quality corporate financial reporting. This Important

Recommendation 9.

search leads Immediately to the audit committee of the board of dlrecton -- the entity at the core of the corporate financial reporting process.

Recommendation

o

-

In recent yean, there has been an Increasing sense of urgency sur-

10

rounding the need for responsible financial reporting given the market's

The Committee recommends that the SEC require that a

~uditor conduct a SAS 11 Interim
Financial Review prior to the company's filing of Its Form 10-Q.

Increasing focus on corporate earnings and a long and powerful bull mar-

reporting company's outside

N
N

The Committee further recommends that SAS

11

ket. At the same time, the demands on the flexibility of our financial

be

reporting have become Increasingly Intense -- with the growing sophlstl-

amended to require that a reporting company's outside auditor

cation of complex financial Instruments to manage risks, the use of cor-

discuss with the audit committee. or at least Its chairman. and
porate restructurings to stay abreast of the latest business trends, and the

a representative of financial management, In penon, or by
telephone conference call, the matten described In AU

emergence of new Industries based on technology and Information. The

380, Communications With the Audit Committee.
prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to

recent turmoil In foreign markets has further compounded pressures on

Section

financial reporting.

any public announcement of financial results). Including sig-

Navigating these uncharted waten requires great skill, and some-

nificant adjustments, management judgments and accounting
times the temptation not to disappoint proves too great. The Chairman

estimates, significant new accounting policies. and disagree-

of the SEC, Arthur levitt. at a recent address at New York Unlvenlty

ments with management.

on the present state of financial reporting. expressed his "fear (that) we
are witnessing a gradual. but noticeable erosion In the quality of flnanclal reporting," and the emergence of a "grey area ... where accounting
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practices are perverted; where managers cut comers; where earnings
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The Committee believes practices such as those described above

reports reOect the desires of management rather than underlying finan-

can distort a company's true financial condition and resuits of opera-

cial performance of the company.·

tions, thus providing a compelling Impetus for the Committee's task of

There Is little question. In the Committee's view, that some compa-

improving oversight of the financial reporting system through the audit

nies do respond to analysts and short-term market pressures by ·manag-

committee. Such practices. if left unchecked. have the potential to

Ing· their earnings. While earnings management Is not neeessarl1y Inap-

undermine Investor confidence In the integrity of our securities markets.

propriate. It can become abusive when It obscures the true financial per-

Accordingly. the Committee calls for strengthening the roie of the

formance of the company.
In that same address. SEC Chairman Levitt also referred to a nurn-

audit committee With pragmatic. progressive recommendations that can
be qUickly implemented. If these recommendations are implemented.

ber of highly publlcbed reports of companies practicing inappropriate

the Committee believes audit committees Will be more effective in help-

earnings management in order to meet analysts' forecasts and to deliber-

ing to ensure the transparency and integrity of financial reponing and.

ately smooth earnings. Some of the specific practices referred to Include:

thereby, maintain the investor confidence that makes our securities mar-

deliberately overstating one-tlme "big bath· restructuring
charges In order to provide a cushion to satisfy future Wall

o

Street earnings estimates; ,

N

w

..

•

the misuse of acquisition accounting. particularly Improper
write-offs of acquired In-process research development, to inappropriately overstate future earnings;

kets the deepest and most liquid in the world.
We leave it to other quallfled bodies to debate and study thoroughly
the proper technical accounting measures and the myriad other relevant
issues that arise In this domain. In addition, the audit committee, If
properly functioning and advised, can deal With the technical Issues as
they arise in a manner tailored to the Individual company.

•

such Items as saies returns. ioans iosses or warranty costs In
good times and use those reserves to smooth future earnings In
bad times:

•

Here. we

·cookieJar reserves· where companies over-accrue charges for

premature revenue recognition. before a sale Is complete. before
a product Is delivered to a customer, or at a time when the customer stili has options to terminate. void or delay the sale;

focus on the broad oversight process, because even the finest set of ruies
Will be no better than the oversight process designed to oversee them.
Improving oversight of the financial reporting process necessarily
Involves the Imposition of certain burdens and costs on public companies. Despite these costs, the Committee believes that a more transparent and reliable financial reporting process ultimately results In a more

•

improper deferral of expenses to Improve reponed results; and
misuse of the concept of materiality to mask Inappropriate
accounting treatment.

efficient allocation of and lower cost of capital. To the extent that
Instances of outright fraud, as well as other practices that result In lower
quality nnanclal reponing, are reduced With IrnproIIed O\'emght, the benefits clearly justify these expencIitures d resources.

II

he AUdit Committee as Catalyst
tion. structure, and responslbllities, as referenced In the Bibliography to

for Effective Financial Reporting

this Report. The Committee believes that the same progressive gover-

Good governance promotes relationships of accountability among the

nance standards applicable to the full board should be used to decide

primary corporate participants to enhance corporate performance. It

how the audit committee should carry out ItsJob, and who should serve

holds management accountable to the board and the board accountable

on the audit committee.

to shareholders. In this paradigm, the board Is In place to ensure that

AUdit Committee MemberShip

management Is working In the best Interests of the corporation and Its
shareholders -- by working to enhance corporate economic value. The

o
N

~

Good govemance dictates that the board be comprised of individuals

audit committee's role flows directly from the board oversight function.

with certain personal characteristics, such as a recognition of the Impor-

A key element of board oversight Is working with management to

tance of the board's tasks, Integrity, a sense of accountablUty, a history of

achieve corporate legal and ethical compliance. Such oversight Includes

achievement, and the abUlty to ask tough questiON. Directors also should

ensuring that quality accounting policies. Internal controls, and Inde-

possess certain core competencies -- such as flnanclalliteracy, experience

pendent and objective outside auditors are In place to deter fraud, antlc-

with organizatiON. leadership, and strategic thinking. DIrectors must

Ipate financial risks and promote,accurate, high quality and timely dis-

have a significant degree of commitment to the company and Its board --

closure of financial and other material Information to the board, to the

such that they have adequate time for meetlng preparation, near perfect

public markets, and to shareholders.

meeting attendance, and ongoing education as to the company's business

This oversight function is typically delegated by the full board to

and environment and topical Issues.

the audit committee, pursuant to the board's general ablllty under state

Individual directors who contribute special expertise relevant to the com-

law to delegate certain of Its duties to committees. While the listing

pany, such as manufacturing, marketl.... financial. accounting. and Inter-

standards ofthe primary U.S. securities exchanges mandate that compa-

national or other appropriate experience.

nles have an audit committee, these Ilstlng standards do not stipulate

overaII should CONIst of a mll10r1ty of Independent directors.

moreover, how It should function. Similarly, neither state corporate law

audit committee should possess most ofthe characteristics and core com-

nor federal securities law lend much guidance on audit committee struc-

petencies enumerated above. The Committee vIeWs certain of these

ture or role.

attributes as particularly Important for audit committee membership -

A slgnlflcant body of literature concerning corporate governance

namely, recognition of the significance of the audit committee's responsl-

has evolved over the past two decades guiding boards In their composl-

L._...

Most Importantly. the board

It fonows that as a member of the full board each member of the

with much specificity how an audit committee should be comprised and,

I~ <."~

As a whole, the board should have

L,.,

l ....~

I, .."",

L ..~,~
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L,,,,,,,,.
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bllltles, time commitment, financial literacy, and, above all, independence.
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Independence
The rationale supportlnl the call for a majority of Independent
dlrecton on a board of dlrecton -- that Independence Is critical to ensurInl that the board fulfills Its objective ovenlabt role and holds management accountable to shareholden -- Is especially applicable to the audit
committee. In fact. It Is widely recognized that each member of the
audit committee should be an independent director. Several recent
studies have produced a correlation between audit committee Independence and two desirable outcomes: a higher degree of active ovenight
and a lower incidence of financial statement fraud. In addition. com-

o
I

N

VI

pany officen. however, cannot comprise the majority of the committee.
Rule 4460 of the Marketplace Rules of the NASD requires that an
Issuer maintain an audit committee comprised of a majority of Independent dlrecton. Rule 42oo(a) (13) defines an "independent" director as a
penon other than an officer or employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any other individual havinl a relationship that. in the opinion of the board or directon. would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carryinl out the responsibUlties of a director.
The Committee believes that the current NYSE and NASD stan-

mon sense dictates that a director without any financial. family. or other

dards on Independence allow for too much discretion and should be for-

material personal ties to management Is more likely to be able to evalu-

tified. Certain relationships can impair a director's Independentjudg-

ate objectively the propriety of management's accounting. internal con-

ment and therefore should automatically disqualify a director from being

trol and reporting practices.

considered "independent,"

The NYSE reqUires listed companies to have at least a two-member audit committee composed of all Independent directon. The
NYSE Listed Company Manual characterizes independent directon as
those who are ·free from any relationship that, In the opinion

or the

Board of Dlrecton. would Interfere with the exercise of Independent
judgment as a committee member,· Section 303.00 specifies that
directOR who are •arrolates·

or the company. or otncen or employees

of the company or of Its subsidiaries. are not considered independent.
Former officen of the company and Its subsidiaries. however, may qualify for audit committee membenhip despite continued pension or
deferred compensation from the company if "in the opinion of the
Board of DirectOR. such penon will exercise independent judgment
and will materially assist the function of the committee,· Former com-

The Committee also recognizes. however. that smaller companies
may have greater difficulties meetlnl any enhanced standard regarding
Independence: compani_ with smaller market capitalizations -- so-called
·small-cap· companies -- may have relationships with larae investOR
that may require greater flexibility as to board and audit committee
membenhlp and composition.
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Executive Overcompensation
and Board Independence
By Charles M. Elson
Stetson University College of Law

I

n far too many U.S. corporations, executives are paid much more than their
performance seems to justify. The problem of overcompensation will not be solved,
however, by the varied solutions currently being circulated, such as strict payment
caps, fixed worker I manager salary multiples, taxation changes and even judicial
intervention.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a large salary. The problem is
overcompensation, not high compensation. Many executives who earn substantial
salaries are worth every penny, considering their contribution to corporate profitability.
Corporations will, and should, pay high-performing executives good salaries, not only to
reward their performance but also to retain their services in a highly competitive labor
marketplace. High compensation also can be a valuable incentive for future performance.
To somehow limit arbitrarily the compensation that a corporation may offer limits the
effectiveness of this important incentive.
Currently debated approaches to curb corporate overcompensation fail to adequately
address its root causes. Overcompensation is usually the result of a failure in the
bargaining process between a corporate board and management over salary. In many of
America's leading corporations, management is supervised by a board still largely
dominated by management.
Excessive compensation results when passive boards aligned with management agree
to executive salary packages on demand - in the absence of engaged oversight or
negotiation. It is not, however, the fact of management appointment that makes a board
member passive in this regard - it is a lack of real independence from and, some may
argue, dependence on company management. Many board members have the kinds of
indirect and sometimes direct financial relationships with management that make active
oversight difficult to exercise. Examples:
• Providing professional services to the corporation, either legal or financial.
• Existence of a significant consulting or employment relationship with the company.
• A substantial commercial relationship between the director's organization and the
board's company.
• Reciprocal directorships between management and the board member.
Each of these relationships creates financial linkage with management that may
interfere with objective oversight. And to compound the problem, when directors receive
substantial fees for board service without meaningful, personal equity investment in the
enterprise, their incentive to exercise effective compensation oversight is further reduced.
So, what is the solution?
The answer to the overcompensation conundrum is simple - board equity and
independence. Each director who sits on a company's compensation committee, which
traditionally is charged with negotiating executive compensation arrangements, needs to
be independent of company management in all respects and needs to be a meaningful

P- 1

equity holder in the enterprise. His or her financial relationship to the enterprise should
be that of a stockholder. No other financial ties that may compromise objectivity should
be permitted.
Independence frees a director from susceptibility to pressure, both direct and subtle,
from management for pay packages unrelated to performance. Equity ownership, both
through primarily equity-based director compensation schemes and affirmative stockholding requirements for each board member, creates a more proprietary attitude on the
part of the director to take the company's interests, not management's, to heart when
negotiating compensatio:. arrangements.
Will equity and independence work to reign in executive overcompensation? An
empirical study I conducted a few years ago suggested that bargaining between board
and management would be more effective when outside directors have substantial
stockholdings in the corporation. Business Week, in conjunction with Standard & Poor's
Compustat Services, Inc., conducts an annual survey of executive compensation in 500 of
the nation's largest publicly traded corporations. Compensation is then compared with
executive performance as measured by corporate profitability and total return to the
stockholders in stock appreciation and dividends. My own study reviewed the 158
businesses in the Business Week survey that received either the poorest possible rating for
compensation in relation to performance or the best.
An intriguing fact emerged from my examination. Companies with what the Business
Week survey called excessive levels of executive compensation tended to have corporate
boards controlled by outside directors with insignificant equity holdings in the business.
However, businesses with levels of executive pay the survey suggested were in line with
services delivered, tended to be controlled by boards whose outside directors held
substantial equity positions in fhe companies. There appeared to be a link between
substantial stock ownership and more effective compensation oversight by outside
directors. An alignment of directors' interests with those of the shareholders, rather than
management, through the possession of large shareholding positions, would explain this
phenomenon. And, in 1996, the National Association of Corporate Directors' Commission
on Director Professionalism urged that corporate boards be composed of a substantial
majority of independent directors. Independence essentially was defined as directors
having no substantial financial relationship with the enterprise other than meaningful
equity ownership.
Compensation committees composed only of independent, equity-holding directors,
and full boards substantially dominated by such individuals are shareholders' best
weapons against overcompensated management. As this phenomenon receives greater
public attention, both courts and shareholders will come to expect nothing less from
those who serve as stewards of the public corporation. c
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A Board-Based Solution to Overpaid CEOs
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.In many u.s. corporations,:executives
are paid much more than their performance seems, to. justlCy. The problem of
overcompensation will not besolved,:how·
ever, by the ClintOn administration's approach to the question.
Arguing on Feb.:ll that "the tax code
should no,longer. subsidize excessive pay
of chief executives;" President Clinton requested In his budget, and Congress then
mandated;.; that executive compensation
over $1 million a year "unrelated to the
pr'!lductlvlty o( the. enterprise:,;no longer
be deductible by the offendlnlrcorporatlon
as. a legitimate business expense.· The
president apparently concluded that all ex·
ecutlve salaries 0; above $1 million were
somehow f Inherently suspect~ He '. has
miSSed the point completely•.
There ~ Is· .nothing Inherently" wrong
with a large salary. The problem Is'overcompensation; f nof high compensation.
Many executives who earn well·over a
million dollars are worth every penny,
considering their contributions to corporate profitability. Corporations will gladly
pay . high-performing executlves' handsomely, not only to reward their perfor·
mance but to retain their services In the
competitive 'labor marketplace.~.. High
compensatloi( can I also be a: ~aluable Incentive for future performance. To limit
arbitrarily the compensation that all cor··
porations may orrer limits the errective.ness or this Important Incentive.

Furthermore, the Clinton approach to
corporate overcompensation falls to address fts root cause. Overcompensation Is
usually the result of a failure In the bargaining process between a corporate board
and management over salary.
In many of America's leading corpora'
tlons, .management Is supervised by a
board largely appointed by management.
Excessive compensation results when pas·

Manager's Journal
By Charles M. Elson

-_._--------slve boards beholden to management

agree to salary packages on demand, In
the absence of spirited negotiation.
An empirical study Irecently conducted
suggested that bargaining between board
and management will be more erfectlve
when outside directors have substantial
stockholdings In the corporation. Dusiness
Week, In conjunction with Standard &
Poor's Compustat Services Inc., conducts
an annual survey of executive compensa·
tlon In 500 or the nation's largest publicly
traded corporations. Compensation Is then
compared with executive performance as
measured by corporate prorilablllty and
total return to the stockholders In stock ape
preclation and dividends. My own study
reviewed ·the 158 businesses In the Busl·

ness Week survey that received either the
poorest possible rating for compensation
In relation to performance or the best.
An Intriguing fact emerged from myex·
amlnatlon. Those companies with apparently excessive levels of executive compen'
!mtlon tended to have corporate boards con· .
trolled by outside directors with Inslgnlrt·
cant equity holdings In the business. On the
other hand. those businesses with levels of
executive pay considered in line with services delivered tended to be controlled by
boards whose outside directors held substanllal equity poslllons in the companies,
There appeared to be a link between substanllal stock ownership and more errec·
live compensallon oversight by the outside
directors. An alignment of dlreclors'interesls with those of the shareholders, rather
than management, through the possession
of large shareholdlng posillons, would ex·
plain Ihis phenomenon.
Dased on the findings of my study, I believe that some reform in board structure Is
warranted to create more errectlve board·
level review of executive compensallon and
to promote more reasonable compensation
schemes. The ontslde directors must be
made to consider management compensation proposals not rrom the perspecllve of
one engaged by and beholden to management, but from the viewpoint of the stock·
holders to whom they are legally responsl·
ble. The best way to create this perspective
Is to appeal directly to these directors' pee

cunlary Interests;-To ensure that they will
examine a management ·lnlt1atlve-In..t~e
best Interests of the stockholders, we must
make them shareholders as well.
Corporations should pay their directors
their.annual fees In company stock that Js
restricted as to resale during the dlrector:s
term In oHice. In a few years, each outsl~e
director will have accumulated a reason·
ably substantial portfolioand wll\ therefore
possess a powerfUl financial Incentive to
act more Independently of management;
Although some might argue..that ~a
stock-opUon grant to directors may,ser,ve
the same purpose, such an approach would
prove less errectlve than direct equity own'
ershlp, simply because of the highly tenta'
tlve nature of an option prior to exercise.
Stock ownership provides tbe director with
a present tangible stake In an enterprise,
not merely some speculative expectancy of
a discounted future position.
Additionally, directors' term· lenglhs
must be slgntrlcantlyexpanded. This would
ensure that their equity pbSlUons will reach
the level necessary to influence their del!l·
slon making: by stretching out the time between elections, It would· also make ill
harder for management to bully dlrectots
with a threat not to renominate them.
Directorstock ownership may not proye·
the comprehensive cure to the overcome
pensatlon controversy-but Il will have'a
stront:' ~allltary errect and Is a much mote
positive approach than the Clinton admlh·
1stration's taxation-based plan,
4(r. Elson is an assoclale professor ,0/
lalO, Stelson UnilItrslly, St. Pelersbll'l1,
lola., anti a !ellOl" at the Heritage Fbllnda'
lioll i,/ IVtlshill!11oll, [J.e.

~~
o ='"

=~

:~

~ ~

/7}=

.gOO
....~

fD

a

..,

~

C"~
fD ~

'"l

NO
..,

...':l=

.:-'c

-

~~

P-4

j
I

J

!
J

J
J
]
j

J
J
J
J
J
11

.J

-,

'.

-, -, -, -, -., --,

-,

XXXIV

SEPTE.\,IBER

1993

NU}IBER

5

EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION-A
BOARD-BASED SOLUTIONt
CHARLES ~1. ELSO:-r*
b:TRODUCTION

"t:1
V1

Envy, for better or worse, is a fundamental part of the human
condition. Whether we admit it or not, most of us take a keen interest
in the financial status of our neighbors. Few aspects of existence in
contemporary society create more; anger, resenbnent and dissension
than how much we are compensated for our daily toils in comparison
to what our fellow workers eam. It is this simple fact, along with
distributive justice concerns, that explain the cause of the extraordinary popular attention and fury directed at the seemingly innocuous
issue of executive compensation. Within the last several months, both
the popular and financial media have devoted much attention to the
charge that the executives of America's largest and most respected
public corporations are being grossly overpaid for their services, at the
expense of their shareholders, employees and the general public.'
Comparisons are made with historic U.s. compensation levels and the
t

eop,right 0 1993 CHAaus M. EUOlC
• Assodau: ProCestOr. SlCUOn Cn1--.ity CoDegc oCLaw; AB.. Hartard Cnlw:nity.I981;JD..
Cn1!1enity oCV"linla. 1985. The author acknowledgel the IIIOlt helplW eommenll OCProCCIIOri
Stephen BaInbridge. William Carney. Alftcd Conard. Michacl DooIC)\ Allan Farnsworth. Saul
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I..it& Pili.. arul.1AI to Grin, WALL ST.j.. Apr. 22.1992. atltl; Amanda Bennetl, Voica G/ Proiat.
WALLST.J. Apr. 22.1992. at R6; Tommy DenlOn. WMrw is tIwJwtia i.. Bioalftl unutiw Bcmusa'.
LA. DAJLY j. )fay 14. 1991. at 6.

Is..

-,
938

BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

'-,

-, -,

'.

-,

BOSTON COLLEGE LAlV REVIEW

""

.., ..., -,
(Vol. 3-1:937

amounts executives of foreign competitors receive, particularly in relation to the spread between the salaries of the highest and lowest paid
employees. t It is argued that U.S. executives are being compensated at
an alarmingly high and dramatically escalating rate, despite the fact
that domestic corporations may be performing less efficiently and less
profitably than similarly situated foreign enterprises.' What are the
legal ramifications of this executive compensation issue and is there a
need for some sort of legal response?
The controversy is not a new one. In the mid-1930s, a similar
public debate emerged O\'er what was then considered to be the extraordinarily high compensation levels of certain corporate executives.
While acknowledging that a corporate board may be responsible for
salaries paid to executives that exceeded compensation for senices
rendered and thus became actionable "waste" or improper gifts of
corporate assets, the courts generally declined to intervene.· It was
believed that a court was no better at valuing an executive's worth than
a properly functioning board, and therefore judicial review would be
fruitless.' With the judiciary a reluctant venue for compensation reform, Congress attempted to resolve the issue by dramatically raising
tIn 1991. the avenge chieC exccuti-e oC a brge corporlllion - . pUd approximalely 104
timel the a.eragc: faclOry emploYCC'1 wage. In 1980. the ll¥CnCe chid cxeculiw: earned only f!
timel the average CaclOry worker'l wage. john A. Byrne, W1tot, M, ~ , CEO, F.pt BlId,
Bus. Wit. May 4.1992. at 142. 14S. S. 0110 aoaDlT A.C. )10:'. .. &: NIU )I~ow. Pown "-''It
ACCOIl:''TAllIUrT 170 (1991) (obscning thaI cxecuti~ overcompensation has a ncpam: clI'ect
on employcc morale); Linda j. Banil. 1M Ou_pmutilm Prt1#Ilmt: A CJllectiw AJ¥totuIt to
ConITo1li"K £:ucutiw P.,. 68l.... D. Lj. 59. 69-71 (1992):Jonathan Rowe. CEO PtJ] AI"" e-",..,
Moro1I, 0ausnA,... SCI. )lo:.-rro.. :Mar. 12. 1992. at IS.
S Roberto Coizueta, Chairman oCCoca Cola, recently rccciocd 0"Cr 580.000.000 In resaiCU':d
ItOCk Cor hilocniccslO the company. Anthony O·ReilIy. the retiring chieCCllCCUliw: officer oCHJ.
Heinz. - . pUd $75,Cl85.ooo in compensation Cor 1991. And Cor the _ e JClU'. Leon Hinch.
chairman oC t:.5. Surgical Corp.. recciwed S23~81.ooo. Sa B~e. lUI- nou: 2. at If!. Can any
one CXCCUliw:'1 ocnic:cs be worth that much 10 the corporadon? The tenor oC the ftried an1dcs
dilCwsing the phenomenon Nggcla noL S« . . . note 1.
4.w. &K.• Rogen Y. HiD. 289 C.5. 582. 591-92 (1933) (rullnr that bonus paymcna 10
exccutives which haYe no relation to the Yal11e oClCniccs rendered arc gifts oCcorporale property.
and rcmanclinc to the trial COIirt 10 determine whether paymenll conslituU':d a _te oC corporau:
_a); ScilZ Y. t:nion Bran Ie: )letal )lCg. Co•• 189 'X.W. 586, 587-88 ()(lnn. I~) (cxplaininl
that courll should proceed with caution when determining whether saIarics arc cxCllhc and
unreasonable; coura are not called upon 10 maltc a JClU'ly a\lClit and adjult salarics); CalIin ...
'Xational Oty Bank. 281 N.n 795. 802~ (Sup. Ct. 1935) (rullnl tha~ the magnitude oC the
lOW eompensation rcechcd by o8icen docs nol, by iloclC. entitle plaintim to l'CCO\'Cr. but merely
requires an in~ltiplionby court u to whether a Cluse oC action ailll and lcaoa the burden oC
prooC on the p1ainlilli); Barris. lUI- nou: 2. at 81-83; Dcdcw 'agll. CMllm,.. to Eututiw Owr
e-pnutllitm.. For tIw Mar*fts or tIw
8 j. eo... L 231. 252-55 (1983).
'HeUer Y. Boylan. 29 'X.Y.5.2d 653.679-80 (Sup. CL 1941) ("COUrli arc iU-<quipped 10 IOI\'C
or even 10 grapple with theoc entangled economic problems.' • •/Ttl ........ 32 'X.Y.5.2d 131 (App.
Diy. 1941).

Cou"".

Seplember 199'}

LYECUTI'-'l: O"'ERCOMPENSATION

the income ta.ution rates imposed on those receiving the greatest
compensation.' }\o legal changes, however, in internal corporate governance procedures were enacted. Following this ta.'Cation-based response, the issue basically lay dormant until the perceived salary excesses of the late 19805 re\ived public interest and debate.
Although some may argue that through efficient market function,
either few executives are O\'ercompensated or that market-based forces
will act to limit salary excesses,7 there is a compensation problem today
that, for \o-arious reasons to be discussed below, is not responsi\'e to a
market-based solution. The best way to encourage reasonable compensation without discouraging effective executive performance centers
on better internal corporate ovenight. Such ovenight may come only
from an unfettered, unbiased, independent board of directon. This
article proposes two reforms in corporate board structure to encourage
such independence ofjudgment that will result in the proper review
of executive compensation procedures. Fint, the outside directors
should be compensated solely in company stock. Second, directors'
term lengths should be significantly expanded. These internal structural changes will result in a more effective board-level review of executive compensation and should lead to more reasonable compensation schemes.
Unfortunately, as this article will discuss, most commentaton examining the compensation issue have not focused on reform of the
internal corporate governance procedures that created the problem.
Rather, they have proposed externally-based solutions that will either
prove ineffective or hinder effective corporate management. Indeed,
the regulatory and legislative communities have been quickest to respond, offering varying responses to the overcompensation problem.
The Securities and E.'"change Commission, probably seeking to stimu-

'"t:I
I

0'\

I

• Shareholcler Communications llules. Exchange Act ltelease No. 34-19562. 5& Fed. 1lq.
41.6'5 (SEC 1991).The SEC re';sed the proposal in 1992. 1lquIatlon of Communications Among
Securityh!llclen. Exchange Act Release No. 54-30849.57 FecL1lq. 29,564 (SEC 1m).
lOne of me elemenll of the SEC proposal. and later adopred in rule form. required
companies to compare. In graphic form. the company's performance with the :amount of COIllo
pensation III execulioes receloed. Execuli"C Compensation DiJcIosure. Eschange Act ltelease Nos.
''-6940 '" 54-30851. 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582 (SEC 1992): Executioe Compensalion Disdoswe.
Exchange AcI1le1euc No. 6962.57 Fed.lleJ. 48.126 (SEC 1992).
.IOmnibus tte..:nue 1leconclliation BID of 1993. HJt 254, 10Sd Cong~ ht Seu. (1993).
This bill prohiblll publldy hdd corpoI'ations rr- deducting executi"C compensation in excess
of one miUlon doUars per annum. 14. Howcoer. corporations that tie compensalion to performance may be able 10 conlinue to deduct me enlire amounl of compensation. In order 10 qualify
for this performance-based compensalion exception. corporations must meet 1m: basic requiremenll: 1) executi"C compensation mull be made according 10 a preoloualyellabllshed pa:Connance baaed goal: 2) the performance goal may not be altered following III establishment; S) such
a plan mUSI be approoed by a board commlaee that b comprised of at lcut_ ouulde directors;
4) the mafCrial rerms of the plan mUll be disclosed to and nlified by ItOCkhoideri prior to the
payment of compensation; and 5) me commillee must certify atia&clion of the performance
goals prior to me paymenl of compensation. 14. Thul, corporalions may IM>id the deduction
Ilmitalion by either foDowing these guldeUnes. shifting • portion of compenation InIO IIOd.
oplions. "which are generaIIyconsidered 'perr_ance based" or makinC paymenu 10. craIl&ed
relirement plan. ltadlryn Jones. T.... lAw EtcfI«lItl to Bri", l.iuI6 SAift ira EucuIiw Pot,. N.Y. TOlD,
Auc. 24. 1995. al Cl.
ColllCCluendY. some cOllllftt:ntaton and COI'JIO"re execulioes haoe
suggesled that these new deduC1ion Ilmllalions wiD in actuality baYe only a Ilmlretl lmpxt upon
mOil corporate executi"C compensalion schemes. 14.
II H.1t 2264. The biD. which both the Houac: and Senare paaed by the narrowest of margins.
lmpolCl a ren percenl Ainu upon Indmduals with _ble income In excCSl of the applicable
thresholcl of _ hundred &tty thousand dollars. 14. Set abo Jackie Calmes. IVIIA Sip.......
PraiMn' IV-Ill Erou &apra" lJro9. WALL ST.J.• Aug. 9. 1993. al A4. During the presidential
campaign. President Clinton proposed implementing a "millionaires- sunax upon lndMduais
with incomes in exceu of one mililon doUan. Set PraiJnaI-E1«I Cli""", F _ ~ itt nlor M~ T.... BrNA. 10 DAILY TAX REp. (B~A) J).4 (Jan. 15. 199'). Ho_r. Presidenl
Clinton NblC'lUently lowered this ceiling and proposed imposing. ren pettenl ......... upon
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late a shareholder response to the issue, has taken a two-flanked approach. The fint, adopted in early 1992 during the height of the proxy
season, loosened the restrictions on placing shareholder-initiated proposals on compensation issues on corporate ballots.' The second, initially released as proposed amendments to the proxy rules and later
adopted with some revisions, expanded the amount of disclosure com"
panies must pro\ide to their shareholden on the amounts their top
executi\'es are paid.' The Congress, on the recommendation of President Clinton, chose an historic ta.'C-based response to the problem. In
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress mandated that cor"
porations may no longer deduct, as a business e.'Cpense, any compensation to an executive in excess of $1 million per annum that is not
related to performance.1o Additionally, a new -millionaires· surta."t has
been imposed on incomes in excess of two hundred fifty thousand
dollan per year. II

EX£a.-nvz 9 Ie n.'!. 10-11 (1951).
, Set, 11.1·. Robert Thomas. h Cmftorr* &_tiw ~&uuiw'.i" THE ATTACK Ol'
CoUOIlATE AxnICA 276. 278 p.r. BruceJohnson ed~ 1978) (-COmpetition among eorpontions
••• leU me leoel of executiyc compenalion.,; Daniel It Fischel. 1M ~
u
M_ml, 55 V"""D. L REv. 1259. 1265. 128' (1982) ("(M}arkel COnstninll ••• may be more
effectioe In aeaing aaJarieJ than a committee of uninformed independenl direclOn.1; ~chol..
Wolfson. A Criliqul 01 CDrporat6 LAw. 54 C. MIA)IJ L REv. 959. 975-78 (1980) ("exceuh'C"
compensalion Is eliminated by market forces. including competition for executioe positions);
AllsaJ. Baker. StorA O/ItioIu-d Pmc tA4l Buill Silicon VII11IJ. WALL ST.J••June 2'. 1m. at A.."O;
Andrew It Brownllein Ie )lorrls J. l'anner. W1l4I S1uIuItI Sd CEO PfIJ' T1w hair c...,rrur
SA.m1loldlnr. HAav. Bel. REv•• ~June 1992. al28 (arguing that executi\'Cs are paid In line
with performance and their pay should nol be cuI); Jte"in J. )rurphy. Top &culi_ on Worth
EW? Nu:Ml TM, (Af. HAllY. Bes. R£v~ )w..,\pr. 1986. '1125 (arguing thaI currenl compensation
policies encourage managen to actin the bestlnreresll or company shareholden).
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A debate is also occurring within the academic community. Despite the traditional reluctance of courts to involve themseh-es in compensation disputes, a few commentators have called for increasing
judicial activism in reviewing questionable compensation schemes. l !
Given the present interest in both the legal and financial communities
in the emerging power of institutional investors, some academics ha\'e
suggested an institutional investor-based solution to the problem.
Should the institutions eschew their traditional passhity and take a
greater interest in the management of the companies in which they
invest, they may act as a po\\-erful force in preventing executive overcompensation."
Although each of these approaches is not without some merit, this
article will argue that they are ·solutions· that will either cause more
harm than good, or effect little change in the present state of affairs
which, given the level of public discontent, cannot be ignored. The
problem of executive overcompensation is best dealt with not at the
regulatory or even shareholder level, but by focusing on that body
traditionally charged with responsibility for corporate oversight-the
board of directors. It is the board which must approve all executive
compensation. Thus, it is the board which must act to rein in overzealous and overcompensated ma~agement. Some commentators have
suggested that only by strengthening the power and independence of
the board's compensation committee will the issue be successfully
resolved. It Such tampering, however, is not the solution. In large publicly-traded companies, where the compensation crisis is most manifest,
no major shareholder or group of shareholders controls the acthities

indioiduals with incomes in exccu of _ hundred fiIty thousand doUan per annum. Cndcr the
new _ code. the efTecuYe _ nrc for Indi,iduals with Incomes In CllCess or _ hundred fifty
thousand doD. . per year has risen 10 '9.6 percent. H.1l 2264.
•
IIVagts. mpra nole 4. at 27S-76: Carl T. Bops. &RUiw buvliw Gmt/W'U"'itIra and 1M
FUN of~Dmt«ra9.41 B~FF. L by. 1.79-8' (199'); Richard L. Sbonen.Jr•• Xot<:.
An 0wrrMw of 1M 1WoIJ Apilul buvliw ~ 45 llt.,-GUlS LJ. 121. 15~1 (1992)•
•s s., &1•• Bernard S. Black, 1M "'ue of buliluIionalln_1tIr M ....ilorinr- 1M £...piriClJl
£Wkrt«.!9 CC1A L REv. 895. 91S-17 (1992) (berelnafacr Bbclr.. £ ...piriCIJl £uideftaJ; Kc-oin Co
SaNen Ie: Joann S. Lublin. AdiWI HoIt1nJ: GiImI I.._t«s n... TMir ~IUlcks M_ at u.s.
~ W.u.r. ST.J. Apr. 27,1992. at AI.
It S. Lance Berser. N... IniIWi_/ar I/w Gmtpmsaciora Gmt...iIr«, Duw:roas .. ao"llDs.
W"tnter 1985. al SS:James W. Fisher.Jr•• CrdJIinr PoIUJ/ar Perf..-..a anti &warth. DPW:TollS
Ie: BOAaDS. WInter 1986, al26. S. alroAl'-a L. Cowan. s-d &011I BacA-Saa'd1i"f'. X.Y. TDns.
June 2. 1992. at Cl (nollng that the leaden of -'ous companics ofacn sit on each others'
compensalion co_luees and, as sucb. set pay for one _aber). SolDe Iar&e inslituuonal
In_rs are proposing that sbardtolden be aUowal 10 ... t<: on the sdeclion of compensation
consultants used by boards to set execuliYe compenoalion. Cilben Fuchlberg. In_km Md, s.d
Vote Oft Luauiw PtItJ Corasullantr. W.u.r. ST.J.• Aug. 27. 1992. at Bl.
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of the enterprise because of the sheer size of the operation and atomistic shareholding patterns. Rather, corporate management controls the
bwiness. The board is not representative of anyone shareholder or
shareholder group. but is picked by and responsi\-e to the leading
officers of the corporation. This phenomenon may be described as the
·captured board· S}ndrome.u In a captured board, the directors, responsible for Q\'ersight, are generally either the officers themseh-es
(inside directors); participants in enterprises retained by management,
such as law firms, and investment banks (inside ·outside- directors);
or social or business acquaintances of the top executives, most likely
the top officers of other corporations, on whose boards the chief
executive officers may sit (·outside· directors).!' Although such board
composition may lead to affable board gatherings, the oversight function may be severely compromised. Even if the compensation committee (which determines compensation levels) itself is composed exclusively of ·outside· directors, both economic and psychological ties to
management exist that preclude exercise of truly independent judgment. Theoretically, the threat of legal liability should ensJlre unencumbered judgment, but, as a matter of practice, the protection afforded by the business judgment rule and concomitant reliance on
·captured- outside consultants counters any potential prophylactic
effect. A compensation committee is only as effective as its members.
If the outside directors comprising it are beholden in any respect to
management, whether by economic or psychic ties, the committee win
not function as the panacea.
The solution lies in loosening the outside directors' ties to management and recreating a vital and independent board, which win
engage in active oversight, not passive agreement. A way must be found
to reinvigorate the outside director who traditionally acted in the
shareholders' interests by directing management. Some commentators
have argued that this may be accomplished by placing representatives
of the corporation's m~or institutional shareholders on the board. 17
Its. Ma.VIN A. Else-'Ulle, THE Sn.t:cn:u or TItlE CoUOllATIOl(
rr-aJ1J MYLES L MACE, DDlI:CTOIlS: MYTH "ltD It.EAun (1986).

1S9--18 (1976). S.

II oW Avery S. Coben. 1M 0UlsiU Di~Um, 1fGporuibililie, and Cmabihliora 11I111I
Pu6lic ~ S4 WASH. Ie: Ln L REv. 1S7. 1S7 (1977) (dassifying directors u ·ansUie
e1ireclOn. non-independent outside direclOn, and Independent outside e1ireclOn,: CtJ7twt*
Dim:Iar's CttitWd, SS Bt:s. lAw. 1595. 1619-20 (1978) (descn'bing eIlreclOn as lDanagelDenl
and non-managClllent directon): hI_ PaxsCtPUS or CoaPOllA'n CovDlc"l<CE 11.29 (AU.)
(TentauYe DraA Xo.ll. 1991) (abandoning abe use oClabels, but defining wben a direclOr has
a -significant relationship' ";th a compan"'s senior execu!iYes).
I' SftJayne W. Barnard. SIa_1ulIIkr Auas IIII/w PrO>lJ IWisiW. 40 CAT1I. C. L REv.'7 (1990)
(arguing thaI the proxy rules should be moelified so thaI it is easier for sharebolders 10 elect
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They reason that because these individuals attained their board positions as a result of their relationship to the shareholding institutions
and not to management, they ",ill act in the shareholders' best interests, independent of management. 11 This approach is problematic in
one major respect. It assumes that the institutions will bond together
to elect their representatives and that the institutions possess sufficient
voting power to place enough directors in office to gain control over
the board.
There is, however, a much simpler and more effecti\'e way to
reposition the board to act as a counter-force to management, and
resolve the perceived compensation crisis. The outside directors must
be made to consider management proposals from the perspective of
the equity-holders to whom they are legally responsible, and not from
the viewpoint of one engaged b}' and beholden to management. Afu~r
all, they were elected to their positions as the representati\'es of the
shareholders, not the officers. The best way to create this perspecti\'e
may be to appeal directly to these directors' pecuniary interests. To
ensure that they will examine a management initiative in the best
interests of the· stockholders, we must make them shareholders as well.
Frequendy, hO\\'e\'er, outside directors do own stock in the corporations on whose boards they sit.' Yet, they are still subject to management capture. \\by? It is because their equity positions in the companies are insubstantial compared with the monetary and reputational
compensation they receive for serving on the board. Financially, it is
far better to side with management and not risk failing to be renominated and recehoing the compensation and prestige a board seat
brings, than to act independendy and face removal If, howe\'er, one's
personal financial interest in the corporation's stock exceeded the
annual compensation and prestige value of board membership, one
would be less ,.,i1ling to side automatically with management. Self-interest is obviously tied to board behavior, and if a director's self-interest
is aligned with the equity-holders, as opposed to management, then
the compensation problem, and maybe even the whole issue of management capture, might be solved. But how do we place significant
equity positions in the hands of the outside directors?
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This article proposes that corporations should pay their directors
their annual fees in restricted company stock. In a few years, each
outside director will have accumulated a reasonably substantial portfolio and, therefore, will possess a powerful financial incentive to act
more independently of management. Additionally, directors' term
lengths must be significandy expanded both to ensure that their equity
positions (or potential positions) will reach the levels necessary to
influence their decision-making and to mitigate the chilling effect of
a management threat not to renominate that frequent elections create.
Of course, the linchpin to the effectiveness of this approach is the
assumption that stock ownership has a salutary impact on ind,ividual
behavior-that significant stock ownership does make for a director
less susceptible to management capture. An empirical examination of
the voting beha\ior of boards comprised of outside directors with
substantial stockholdings, compared with boards with outside members who do not, should confirm the validity of the approach. This
article undertakes such an examination. In the realm of executive
compensation, it appears that companies with boards composed of
outside directors with significant shareholdings are less susceptible to
the charge of executive overcompensation than companies without
such boards. In fact, an apparent relationship exists between the way
companies are regarded by the financial community in terms of the
fairness of executive compensation, and the levels of outside director
stock ownership. Those companies that are viewed as having high
levels of executive compensation tend to have fewer outside directors
with significant holdings in the business. On the other hand, those
businesses with levels of executive pay considered to be in line with
services rendered tend to have a greater number of outside directors
with significant equity holdings. An alignment of the directors' interests with those of the shareholders, rather than with management,
through the de\'elopment of substantial equity holdings which results
in more effective oversight, would explain this phenomenon. Director
stock ownership may not prove the comprehensive cure to the overcompensation controversy and related captured board syndrome":"but
it may have a strong salutary effect and certainly would be a good
beginning.
Part I of this article examines the question of overcompensation.
Are U.S. executives overpaid, and, if so, can the market itself act to
correct any imbalances? For reasons to be discussed, I think the market
cannot. Part II considers the various solutions proffered, including
heightened disclosure, tax-based remedies, judicial involvement, institutional shareholder activism, and strengthened board compensation

ouuiclc directon): Bernard S. Black. ",,"II lllllcAin,r Acmll: 1M Protreiu of lrulilUlioul In_ltIr
lW.... 59 l:Q.A 1.. RI:\'. III (199!) (hercinalier Black, ",,"II] (arping that rqulatlon. should
be relaxed 10 that pardcular in,Dtudoft. may be permitted 10 own So-10" ot certain companie.).
Sn olio Ronald J. Cillon I< lldnier Nukman, &inwrtli.., 1M Oullitk Dimlor. An ~ fur
1,..litlllitm4/ In_11m, 45 STA-'\:. 1.. ~'. 86S (1991) (calline tor inldlUDoml 1n''e'lOn 10 orpnize
a eore or proteuioml c1ireclOn).
•
I' Black, AfmII. IUprO ROle 17. atl-C!-H.
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committees. These approaches are critiqued as either ineffective or
cawing more harm than good to ultimate shareholder and national
interests. Part III focwcs on stock ownership and lengthened board
terms as the preferred response to the problem of overcompensation.
Finally, this article examines the link between substantial equity holdings and better oversight and proposes that companies create such
holdings in their outside directors. This proposal should cventuall~'
result in more effective board oversight, reasonable market-bascd compensation schemes, and healthier, more competitive corporations.

.I.

THE O\·ERCO~IPE."1SATJO"PROBlL'\l

A

."
\0

Is Thert Owrcompen.sation7

Before embarking on a quest to determine an appropriate solution to a perceived inequit}·, it must first be determined that a problem
exists which requires an active response. In other words, are C.S.
executives overcompensated and, if so, is extraordinary action necessary to remedy the situation? The problem with examining compensation is that the entire inquiry begs the question-for what is the true
value of the deployment of human capital? Unlike determining the
cost of providing a physical good based upon known variables, there
is really no mechanistic process for quantifying the l'alue of human
labor. If it were merely the cost of the basic human needs of food,
clothing and shelter, we would all be compensated similarly.19 HowC\'er,
we are not. Although human effort is in one sense easily quantifiable
by being limited to the ph}'Sicai capacities of the human being and the
time limitations of the twenty-fom-hour day, human capital is highly
differentiated. The tasks required to maintain an adl'aDced economy
are extraordinarily varied and require vastly different skills. Some skills
are seemingly more valuable to society than others and, as a result, are
compensated at higher IC\·els. What those levels may be are determined
through the routine function of the market.
How much individuals are compensated for their labors is the
"As Kart Man: and Fredrich Enseb stalled:
The aYenge price or . . .e labor is the minimum . . . . I.e. thai q<WIlWIl or the
means or subsisllence which is abIoluldy requisite ID keep the laborer in bare
exislience as a laborer •••• We by no means inllend ID abolisb this penonal appropriation or the prodUCll
labor.. • • • All thai we wanl ID do ""'! wilb is Ibe

or

miscr.lble characller or Ibis approprialion ••••
MtnlifUIII oflM c....."nist P.I]. in ~lAa., Ie L"fcD.S. BASIC WluTD:cS os Pouncs &: PtnwsOo
PHY 22 (Lewis S. Feuer cd. 1959).
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result of an implicit or explicit bargaining process. One party has labor
to offer and another has a need for the skill. The resulting compensation is the product of the matching of expectations-what one expects
to receive and what the other is willing to give. These expectations,
created through routine market function, determine compensation
levels. What others are giving or receiving for similar tasks produces
the expectations that determine particular compensation levels for
particular skills. The -''alue- of a particular skill is not implicit in the
skill itself but, rather, is simply the result of this bargaining process. In
this regard, there is really no such thing as an implicitly -fair- salaryonly one that is acceptable to both parties.
This is the real problem with discussions concerning -overcompensation,- for if a salary is the result of an active bargaining process
can such compensation ever be considered excessive? Because there is
no trUly objective standard for loaJuing human capital other than
through the operation of the market driven by active bargaining, the
reasonableness of a particular compensation arrangement is objectively indeterminable. Reasonableness is the product of the bargain.
For example, who can say that an employee is overcompensated if two
willing parties agree that the efforts of one of them are worth one
million dollars? If one is voluntarily willing to part with capital to obtain
a particular service, that is the value of the service. The compensation
is thw reasonable. Compensation becomes unreasonable when it is not
the product of balanced bargaining. Where one party to a bargain, due
to external pressures, is unable or unwilling to bargain effectively to
maximize self-interest, then the resulting agreement may be unreasonable.
In the corporate setting, the executive bargains with the corporation for compensation. The executive possesses managerial skills that
the corporation desires. The corporation possesses capital that the
executive desires in exchange for services rendered. How much capital
will be parted with for these services is the result of bargaining. The
resulting salary may be problematic where effective bargaining does
not take place because one party docs not attempt to maximize its own
self-interest. This is the crux of the overcompensation dispute. Executive salary arrangements are the products of negotiation between the
executive and the company's board of directors who represent the
interests of the company and its owners, the shareholders. If the board
is reluctant to bargain effectively'with management because, despite
its fiduciary obligations, it believes itself to be more closely allied with
management than the shareholders, then the product of such a ~ar
gain- may be no bargain at all to the corporation and its owners.

..,
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Alliances between bargaining parties may result in acquiescence rather
than bargained-for agreemenL Salary arrangements that result from
such a one-sided bargaining proceS1l may be susceptible to charges of
exceS1l.
Although the popular media focUses simply on the large executive
salaries themselves as proof of the existence of an o\'ercompensation
problem. the problem actually involves the proceS1l by which these
salanes were determined and not the dollar amounL A lucrative salary.
either standing on its own or in comparison with other salaries paid
within the organization. is not in and of itself proof that the recipient
has been overcompensated. As long as the compensation was the
product of an active. good-faith bargaining proceS1l between the board
and the executive. the salary cannot be characterized as unreasonable.
Negotiation. mothoated by self·interest on both sides. assures proper
compensation. There is really nothing improper about an executive's
compensation if a board determines that the services rendered are
highly valuable to the corporation and offering a high salary is the only
way to retain that executive.
Compensation amounts do become problematic. however. when
a board. beholden to a particular executive. agrees to a salary package
upon demand, in the absence ofself-interested bargaining. The failure
to actively negotiate an executive's compensation request is most likely
to occur in corporations where the directors are not obligated to any
particular shareholder or shareholder block. but gain and maintain
their board seats because of executive largesse. This situation generally
exists in companies that, due to their large size and consequent atomistic shareholding patterns. are controlled by incumbent management
and not by one shareholder or group of shareholders.!O In such busineS1les. the boards of directors generally consist of management and
those appointed by managemenL In these situations. it is un~ise for
the outside directors to actively challenge the executi\"es who have
placed them in office.II Such directors have little incentive. other than
fiduciary duty (which for reasons to be discussed has pro\"en ineffective
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in creating incentive), to bargain actively with management over compensation.
Many of the largest U.S. public corporations have shareholding
ownership patterns that dispose them to such potential management
capture and attendant compensation problems.1! It is these companies
which have traditionally paid their executives the largest salaries and
are currently the target of popular scrutiny.u A large salary is not in
and ofitselfmalignanL However. a significant executive compensation
package paid b}' a large public corporation subject to management
capture. may be indicati\'e, because of its size. of a failure by the
directors to ha\'e bargained effectively. Such compensation may thus
be overcompensation. Because of the rapid escalation in executi"e
compensation scales in the U.S. and in the large number ofcompanies
whose boards do not report to a controlling shareholder group. it is
clear that a strong potential for overcompensation ma>' msL It
The difficulty with attempting to measure the adequacy of compensation is the highly subjective nature of the entire matter. This is
why the courts have traditionally been reluctant to open theIr dockets
to salary ~isputes, There are too many ways of measuring compensation and related performance.1S 'What by one standard is exceS1live. may
Id.; _ also HD)CA.-:. IUfWtI note 20, at 30-48; MONKS " )('~'OW, IUfWtI note !, at 75-;9; Victor
Brudn~ TM I~I DindM-H_IJ CiIJ or l'olaaIift
95 HArtv. L REv. 597.

Vi"',

607-39 (1982); Cilson" Kraalurtan••ufWtl note 17, at 875-76 ("All 100 of\len '" outside dircclOn
••• cum out 10 be more independent or shareholdcn than ther arc or msnagemcnt.,. ThIs
be changing. In October 1992, the outside directon orCcneral
fired their
tituation
CEO in response 10 the company's lacJduster pcrrormanee,
Paul Ingrassia. lJotnd IVf&pl4us1lw LBO, WALL ST.J., OcL SO, 1992, at A14. S. ab!IjAY W. LoItlCH, PAw:o.'S oa PC)l'C(·
TAns: THE JW.uTY OF /o.)cDUCA·S CoUOUTI: B_sI7-'1 (1989) (noling that whUe the CEO
IliJI control. the dircc_ nominalion procell, board. arc bqrlnnlng to haw: greater panidpalion
in the proccu): Thoma A. Stcwvt, TM Ja"l u DftIIl, Form.-,.-z.Jan. 11, 1995, at 54 (dltcuulng
recent firings and roreed rcsignaliona or companr etOs); Stuart )lieber. Firwu ~Irid C£OI itt
PitAi.., s-.t "'__ WALL ST.J., )1... 15,199', at 81 (reporting IU"'CT wbleb Indicates that
man,. compania now prohibit corporate Insidcn from nomloaline new directon).
It S. HD)CA.-:, IUfWtI note 20, at 70-85.
II
)(o"-u" )IL-:ow,..",. note 2, at 166 (explalnlng that in 1989, rhe _rage CEO
at top 200 compania received 52.8 mUlion in salarr and bonulCl); Arcb Patton. 77tou MiIIMm~y_ ~ in [xECt:TJVI: Co~TlON : A SntATI:G.c Ct.'DI: 'Oa TIll: 1990s 4',
.... (Fred It. Foulkes ed., 1991) (notine that excculiw: par In the 100 largeR pub6drcwncd
corporallons incrcucd by an a-.gc or 15.7$ in 1985); £UCU1iw e-peru..itm s-.6Nn( Bes.
WE., Mar 4, 1992, at 148-62 (raling CXCCUIM par ....ong 500 largest 1:.5. compania).
to S. IUfWtI note 2. S. ab!I )I~-u " )IIlIOW, IUfWtI note I, at 166-6; (noting that 1:.5.
ellcculiw: par siplficandy outpaced Inflation, wage, and profill rates &om 19;; to 198; and that
American CEO, In biUlolHloUar compania recene _ to three lima the par or complll2ble
ellcculi_ in Europe andJapan).
II Statistic. dacrlbing compcnsalion IC\'CIs do not gk'C a complete piccure or an csccuo.'C's
compensation pacbge.1n addition to salary and incenliw: awardt. CIlCCUtioe eompensalion orten

mar

"Io_s

s.

s.. I.,.,

• AI or December 'I. 1974, manasement eonuoOed 165 or the 200 IUSCn. pub6d,.owned.
nonfinandal corporaliona in the 1:niled SlatCSo [DWAaD S. HD)CA.-:, CoUOUTI: eo:-'TJlO~
CoUOUTI: POWER 58 (1981) (Table 5.2). -(\\1ldc difFusion [or .tDck) doca not increase the
power or holden or _all bloc... or 1tOCIr.; It cnhancct the power or wlloc¥cr conuob the pro..,.
machinery.- Ill. at 53. S. ab!I )1Aa. ..",. note 15, at 8U4. S. e-oIlJ ADou A. BUlLE, Ja~
" CAIlDDo"l:ll C. )(u"'S, THE )JODD.-: CoUOUTIOlI Ao-:D PUVATI: Paopm1'T 47-118 (1955).
tIElSD.. . EItG, IUfWtI note 15, at 147.
(lIn lire a in 1_ the power to hire Implia the fIO"Cr to fire. A director who hu
been broupt on the board by a chid csccuti_ outside dirccton ltPlcallr
are-Is thercCore like.,. to rcprd bImscIC a scning at the Iatter's sufferance.
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be by another perfectly reasonable. This is what accounts for the
tremendous division within the financial community over who is being
overpaid and who is not." The only way to judge a compensation
package o~ectively is through the same process by which businesses
themselves are assigned value-through the operation of routine market forces, characterized b}' active bargaining. Given the potential for
subdued bargaining and coincident overcompensation in the largest
corporations, coupled with rapidly accelerating salary scales in the face
of a national economic recession, it is not surprising that the popular
media have sounded an alarm. Although it is \'ery difficult to look at
a specific salary and immediately reach an informed conclusion as to
its excessiveness, the great potential for abuse mandates the formulation of a prophylactic response.

B. Tht Inadequacy

"1::j

......

......

of a Markd-Based Response

Some argue that even if an overcompensation problem does exist,
no external response need be forthcoming. The ordinary operation of
the markets themselves wiD provide the solution. If the compensation
scheme in a particular company is unreasonable, then market forces
wiD punish that enterprise in the form of a lower stock price. The
lessened equity value win, in turtl, force the board to bargain more
effectively for reduced salary levels to avoid revolt and replacement by
enraged shareholders. Under this model, a market-induced decline in
share values will encourage shareholder rebellion sufficient to compel
a traditionally management-allied board to reconsider its compensation bargaining strategy. As a result, no externally-based approach to
the compensation problem is necessary. The situation wiD take care of
itsel£
This approach may be seriously flawed despite its strong logical
appeal. It is based entirely on the problematic assumption that unreaincludes e"ecutl..: Hock pIaN wilh companrvraneed linanc:ing. we or companr aircraft and
.utomobiles. financiU. tax. and esrate counsd1ing. retiremmt benefia.lif'e insurance. and intangibles. such u the power to designate firml >oi!h which !he company does business. that increase
!he e"ecuti..:·s prestige and power. V. HD...y RoTHSCltlUl. 2l1o"D Ie AaTHt.... D. Srolt.~. EnCt:Tn"E
Co_~SAnOlo: 1-2 (19801).
~folt e"ecutl..: compmsation pIaN .ucmpt to align an CXecuti":·1 nlC or COlDpensadon
>oi!h !he company'l performance in ..nOUl areas. mOlt prcdominandy stock pricel and profill.
S. Seymour Burehman. C1Ioosi", A~II Perf-- M-. i .. ExEa.,.m: Co~SA
nolo:: A STUnclC Cl."lDE I'OR nil: 1990s 189 (Fred It. Foulkes eeL, 1991): Stephm F. O·B~Tne.
LiMi", MCIftO£CI"ft'I Perf-_I..anli- 10 SltlmItotMr \VflIIdI,J. Co... ACCT. Ie FIlo:., Autumn
199I,.t 91; S. Prakash Selhi &: Nobualti N_ilti, F.cIoti", 1.. _1ion I",. T,,!, M.....,...,t'ftIs
Qnn~titm, DDU:CTOIlS &: BoARDS. \\'"utter 1986••t 21.
"S« JU/WG notes 1 and 7.
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sonable executive salary levels will result in lower equity prices. Although high salaries may indicate a lax bargaining environment
between the board and the company's top executives regarding compensation practices, the harm to the company itself may appear insignificant in a macro view. To a multibillion dollar corporation, a few
million more dollars paid to its top management than may actually be
necessary to retain their services has litde bearing on that business's
overall profitability. In this sense, the alleged overcompensation may
be statistically insignificanL To a business earning $250,000,000, a
million doDar overpayment to an executive, while a spectacular windfall to that individual, is insignificant in evaluating the company's
earnings. :t7
Many techniques are used to value a business. Analysts consider
such factors as price/earnings ratios, debt to equity computations,
projected earnings streams, resale value, and break-up potential,
among others, to determine the going equity \'alue of an enterprise. t8
While an executive's compensation is ofmajor concern to that individual, in a large organization it has Iitde impact on any of the common
valuation methods because of its small relative scale. The actual effect
of an excessive salary on the company's earnings or even its total asset
base is likely to be minimal, if not minuscule.29 Therefore, even if an
executive has been grossly overpaid, the impact on the company's stock
price wiD be negligible because the market places its heaviest emphasis
in valuation on -the bottom line,· whether that may involve earnings,
assets or liabilities."For a -market-based- solution to the compensation
It Bul . . D.-suFo note 1.at 135 ~6clw:l S. Kesner,N.tional Director on Compensation
and Benefits .t the accounting firm or Ar!hur Andersen, IlalCl that -(A) $5 miDion CEO pay
pacbgc on !he bottom line of. 52 billion sales company is dearly not the issue.'. As fOrmer
minais Senator E _ t M. Dirbm remarked. -A billion here, • billion there. and pretty soon
,au're talking about real moncy.- RasPECYrt."U.Y Qt.-oYED 155 (Suzy Platt ed~ 1989).
fa Analysts use rour main methods to ....ue companies. Discounted cub 0_ anal,," ("DO--)
essmtlaJly IlateS th.t !he....ue or a company is rcOCClCd in !he profill the companywill am Q\'Cr
• projected period of time. Wi!h !he companble company method, anal,.... compare !he business
to be ....ued >oith companies posseuing similar financial and opentlonal profilcL Wi!h the
companble acquisitionl method, !he ....ue ora business is based on the COlt ofacquiring similar
businellCl. Liquidation anal~1 determines !he company's ....ue bued on the pricel the comcould be sold ror in an orderly manner. Anal)'IU apply combinations and .-iatlons
pany's _
of !helC me!hods whm ....u.ing a company. Ro.arr L 1CL"Hlo:, l~ESTXJ:o," BAnll(G 97-12S
(1990). S. Mso Brian H. SalJ'er, ToueAl"f All &us in SIUiftg Merp- PriOll, MntcI:llS Ie AcQl."tSI·
nolo:s. Fal11984, at 42 (analyzing !he Itrmgths and wealtneua of !he rour me!hods).
II Molt ....u.tion anal!'Cs do not separatdy addrcu the cxecutl'C's compensalion. S.suFo
note 28.
M S« Brownstein Ie Panner. suFo nolC 7••t !9 ('"I'be question il not 'Arc cxceuti-a paid
too much?' The real question is 'Are shareholders gemng !heir moncy·. wor!h &om !heir
e"eculivcs?"').
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problem to be effective, overcompensation must ha\'e a reasonably
significant impact on the equity ,"alue of a company to force a board
response.
The market functioning alone will provide no certain remedy,
because the problem seems to merit little market attention.'· Still, a
response is warranted. Even if an executive is overpaid onl}' a single
dollar, that dollar rightfully belongs to the shareholders, not the executive. In our system ofcriminaljustice, the amount that an individual
takes wrongfully is unimportant in adjudging potential criminal responsibility. The mere fact that an unlawful gain occurred is the basis
for action. So must a response in the corporate arena be similarly
forthcoming? While an unreasonable compensation scheme may, in
and of itself, have little impact on overall corporate performance, it
may also indicate a much broader problem that should demand an
immediate response. An overcompensated executive is indicath-e of an
inattentive board whose neglect may result in far more dire consequences for corporate profitability than a simple excessive salary
scheme.'2Inattention to this problem will ultimately result in a runaway
management which may lead to corporate disaster. By the time company profits have decreased to such a level as to warrant a market-based
response, the damage to the business and shareholder wealth will have
already been done. If the loss to the corporation of its market share
and reputation are severe enough, the damage may be irreversibly
crippling and perhaps even fatal to the enterprise. An active, non-market-based response is therefore required.
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Disclosure

Rccendy. a number oC formerly pusi\'C boards baft become inc:reuingly acliw: and ha,'C
remo"Cd &om oflic:e managers who were J>rc"iously untouchable. For example. Paul E. lego. the
Chairman and cro or Wcstinghouse. resigned his post in response 10 mounlinl char(es or
inadequale corporaae financial pa'Cormance and growing concern about management drecli''Co
ness lUDOnpt the company's directon. SWart ).(jeher. WaIita,rAoa&N:r Pout £. UpRaiplOI CJtiIj.
"'AU. ST.J.Jan. 28. 199', at..u, A6. m),rs cro and ChainnanJohn F. Akers _
forced inID
retirement as the company _ iu slOCk price lose halCoCiu ...tue within a six-month time Crame:
the corporalion _ Corced 10 make a 55$ cutin lu quaraerly clMclcnd. and recorded a SUi
biDion loss in 1992. ).fichul W. :IoIWer I< laurence Hoopa'. Sipm, Of/: dAm Quill 1111&\' UIItItr
H--, Ptanon; DirNlm41$ sr.uw, WALl. ST.J..Jan. 27.1995. atAl. A6.
In the put 18 months, 1S Fortune 500 corporale CEO. haw: dllter resigned. been fired, or
been asked by their c1ireclOn to prepare Cor dcparture. Prominent among lego's and Akcr's
colleagues: ~cho1uJ. X'lChoIu,Jr.• Time Warner; Tom H. Barrelt, Cooclynr;Jamcs D. Robinson
m, American Express: Kenneth H. Olsen. Digital Equipment;joseph 1l. Canion. Compaq Compuler; and Jamcs L Ketelsen. Tenneco. Stewan, $Ill- note 21. at 54. 5>36. 40.
Sl17 c.F.Jl. 5 24O.14a-8Cc)(7) (1992). lluIe 14a-8(c)(7) states:
(c) The registrant may omit a proposal and My Ita_entin support lItereoCCrom
iu pro..,. statement and Corm oC proxy under any oC the CoUowinl circumstances:

,. Compemalion comlllCntator CracC CryuJ conceclcs that a CEO's pay pacbgc docs not
significandy influence IlOdt ftIues, but
lItat inoeston should consider bollt lite amount
oCan executiw:'s pay u well ullte mechanisms by which be is paid in order 10 make an inlel1.icent
inoestment decision. CMU S. CaTJTA.. l.. SUIl.CH or ExcESS 2.55-64 (1991).
"The consequences or an inatlenliw: board and lite rcsuhinl bcnefiu oC an aaMst board
are best iUUllrated by lite recent turmoil at Ceneral ),Ioton. Throurhout ils history, lite C),I board
.... ~'PialJy beholden 10 C:IoI management. willt board meednr being Iitde more than social
ptherinls in which the CEO's arenda .... approw:cL Aller a Ionl. steady decline during which
C:IoI's share or the American car market dropped from .52~ to '3$, the C),I board IinaUr took
alIinnaliw: stcps to improoe the company's perCormance. Slept which included firinl c),rs cro,
Robert Stempel. S«John CrccnwaJd. WM' \lin, Wnmr', TDCE, ~O¥. 9, 1992, at 42,"'.

l,,_.~.~_

Height~d

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the ·SEC") has developed a tw~tiered approach to the issue. This approach involves a
reexamination of the way the pro~'}' rules deal with executive compensation questions and it will have about as much effect on the problem
as aspirin provides for the common cold. It may make us feel a bit
better, but the offending virus remains. FlJ'St, the SEC has liberalized
its stance on permitting shareholders' resolutions regarding executive
compensation onto the annual meedng ballot Traditionally, such pr~
posals were excluded as a matter of policy. Under Rule 14a-8(C) (7) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, resolutions that dealt "with
a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations
of the registrant" were .excludable," Resolutions relating to compensation were said to fall within this catc;gory. In early 1992, however, the
SEC amended its policy and announced that it would no longer permit
the wholesale exclusion of such proposals, as long as they targeted top
executive compensation and not ordinary managerial compensation
policy," At least ten shareholder proposals calling for compensation

As the controversy over compensation has grown, proposals to
solve the problem have proliferated as well. The gO\'ernmental and
legal communities have offered several dramatically differing solutions.
These well-intentioned approaches miss the mark. They appear to

L

[Vol 54:9'7

attack the manifestation of the problem without targeting its root
cause-passive bargaining resulting from inactive boards. These pr~
posals will either prove ineffecti\'e or may even act to compound the
damage to corporate health that O\'ercompensation creates.

II. A CRITIQUE OF CURRE:-'"TI.Y PROPOSED SOU:TIONS

1
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(7) 1C the proposal deals with a matler relalinl 10 the conduct oC lite ordinary
business operations oC the registrant.
.. tte.in C. Salwen, SM,.Mltltr PnJpolllb On P", Mw' «diMl, SEC iii Ttll 10 F,""" WAU.
ST. J.. Feb. U, 1992. at Al.
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limitations were allowed onto proxy ballots. None, however, was ultimately successful.ss
The second tier of the SEC's response to the compensation issue
involves increased public disclosure of executive salary arrangements.
In june, 1992, the SEC proposed sweeping changes in the I}pe and
amount of disclosure that must be made to the public by reporting
corporations in the executive pay area. The reasoning behind the
proposals was ostensibly "to improve shareholders' understanding of
all forms of compensation paid to senior executives and directors, the
criteria used by the board of directors in reaching compensation decisions, and the degree of relationship between compensation and corporate performance."" Three new disclosure requirements were proposed. First, all compensation paid to certain senior executives was to
be reported to the public in the form of a ·Summary Compensation
Table" which would "show both annual and long-term compensation
in a single, comprehensive oven.iew...,7 Second, the board's Compensation Committee would be directed to prepare a report ·on the
corporate performance factors that it relied on in making specific
compensation awards for reporting executi\'es, as well as describe the
general policies of the committee in determining senior executive
compensation...,. Third, the reporting corporation would be required
to prepare an annual "Performance Graph"" to aid in shareholder
evaluation of the effectiveness of corporate performance in relationship to compensation practices. This graph would set forth the cumulative total return to shareholders of the registrant over a period of at
least the previous fi\'e years, together with the comparable return to
IS The len proposals and the percentage or shares "Oled in faoor or each modon are: m~f:
improw:d disclosure or officer pay, 16.7" shares; Baltimore Cu Ie Electric: cap executh'C pay at
20x a\'CI'IICe worker's salary, 12.!" shares; wanm Kodak: disclose executive ~ce pacbges.
15.9')1, shares; Equitnarlt: tie ueeudve severance pay to company perrormance, 16.5')1, shares; Bell
Adantic: cnd management short-term bonUJ plan. 1009" shares; Black Hills Corp.: diminate
director's retirement plan, 36.9" shares: Chrysfer: disallow moduinc or stock options, 5.6%
shares; Aetna: cut clirector's pay for wlure to aaend board mee1incs. 7.5" shares; Baale )10110tain Cold: cut executh'C pay
and end StoCIt options until profil recooen, nol on baJJot;
1leebolt: establish compensation commiltee or independent clirectors. 19.2% shares. Execulh-e
Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Acl Release ~o. 6940.57 Fed. Rq. 29,su. 29,58S auly 2,
1992); lluaolt b-r·1. LTD. )IAa. SO, 1992. PaOlCT STATDCDT (1992): &.uk
CoI4 SPouibll Loss, Rn.-rus, Apr. 21. 1992. availllNl in LEXIS, ~ex.is Library, lleuten rile: SoIwen•
.rvpra nOlI' 34. alAI!. S« a""Juclith H. Do~nski, A Grou..4 s-u Buil4J Jttr 'N_ 0/'" A6ow~
8t:s. WI:. )by lI. 1992. at Sf (obsef\'Utg thai many shaftholders are withholclinc pro,,! "Otel in
UI elTon to remCM: directors &om companl' boards).
J6 £Xecutioe Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Releue ~o. 6962. 57 Fed. Rq. 48.126.
48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
17 14. al 48,12~27.
til 14. al 48,127.
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shareholders for the stocks included in (i) the Standard and Poor's
500 Composite Stock Price Index rS Be P 500"); and (li) any recognized industry index (e.g., the Dow jones Transportation A\'erage) or
a group of peer companies selected by the registrant. 48 Following
substantial public comment and debate,41 the SEC adopted the proposals with some changes made in the amount of information to be
disclosed. A number of the proposed tables were either te\ised or
dropped "to eliminate redundant information and to imprO\'e the
clarity of information presented. "42 Despite these changes, the increase
in the amount and I}-pe of information to be reported under the new
rules as compared \\ith the material disclosed under the old regime
was substantial.
It is clear from these changes that the SEC has settled on a
disclosure-based approach to the compensation controversy. In the
SEC's view, the solution to o\-ercompensation lies with an informed
and empowered shareholdership, informed as to exactly how much
the executives are earning and how that figure relates to performance,
and empowered to vote both on compensation resolutions and, if
thoroughly dissatisfied, on ultimate board replacement. SEC Chairman
Richard C. Breeden has summarized the Commission's theory behind
its actions by stating that:
The proposals would give the shareholders more information
and then make it reasonably possible for them to do something about that information . • ... The philosophy that underlies the proposals is that the people in the best position,
if a company is deteriorating or stagnating, to do something
about it are the people who own it. For too long, the Wall
Street rule has been that if you don't like what's going on,
sell out. That has made it difficult and expensive for shareholders. These proposals make sure the information is out in
the open and remove the restraints so shareholders can do
something.a
This approach, although not without some visceral appeal (for
who can argue with a better-informed public), is basically ineffectual.
Indeed, in its very premise can be found the source of its primary

"u.
41

57 Fed. Rq. aI48127. The SEC recen'Cd more than 900 letten or comment concerning
the proposal. 14.

4f14.
., Slephen Labalon. SEC IV-Ill &pitY Futkr Dist:ltnutY 01umdiw P,.,. :-:.Y. TDfES, Oct. 15.
1992, al AI, C22.
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weakness. The whole concept relies on the idea that an outraged and
invigorated shareholding public will pro\ide the solution to the perceived corporate malaise. Shareholder activism will result in more
accountable and productive management. The best way to create this
necessary activism is through the prodding effect of heightened disclosure. Additionally. the more excessive a salary structure appears. the
more likely that full disclosure will embarrass management into correcting the situation.
Although it is certainly true that as the owners of the enterprise.
shareholders have the power to engage effective and accountable managers. it is equally clear that this ability does not always translate into
results. Indeed. it was the same shareholders who permitted the creation of that management capture that has led to the entire controvel'S}·...
Shareholder passivity created the problem. and it is unlikely that disclosure will provide the solution. This irksome passivity is not the result
of a lack of information. but. rather. a growth in the size of the typical
public corporate entity. The larger the corporation became. the more
likely its ownership took on an atomistic quality. with no one shareholder or shareholding group exercising control.+I MoreO\·er. as the
size of proportionate shareholding fell. individual shareholders. who
no longer held controlling or particularly significant amounts ofstock.
lacked the incentive to take an active role in the corporation's affairs.
Management then filled the vacuum.4S Increased disclosure will have
no effect on this situation. As Professor Bainbridge has observed:

Ie)(u.VI:\t

What about the institutional in\"estors whose growing ownership
presence in the largest public corporation presents. according to many
scholars. so much potential for effecting positive change in corporate
governance? Will increased disclosure motivate this group to pursue
more reasonable compensation practices? Probably not. First, for reasons to be developed later in this section.4? it is unlikely that institutional investors. even if awakened from their current economic slumber. will.ever achieve the substantial control position in a corporation
necessary to direct the affairs of the business. Second. it is unclear that
the compensation disclosure now mandated by the SEC will inform
institutional investors (or individual investors. for that matter) of anything that they do not already know. As a result of the heightened
media attention to the issue. much information on compensation
programs in a dizzying variety of corporations (based on past disclosure requirements) has flooded the market-place. Various popular
financial publications feature annual performance profiles of numerous public companies detailing compensation practices and how they
relate to overall performance. 4I There is no shortage of information
available to the individual investor on corporate compensation. Moreover. the performance comparisons the SEC has now required reporting companies to make are well within the analytical capabilities of
even the most inexperienced financial analyst and may be available to
all investors through periodic brokerage house reports. Indeed. the
SEC's new disclosure regime will only serve to create more fodder for
potential Rule lOb-5 mis-disclosure actions. 49 The end result may be an
·Stephen M. Bainbridge, b«uliw P.,: ll7lo Us1nu7. 1.&cAL 1'Das, AuC. 10, 199!. u 23.
"Iiehael P. Dooley, T_ ModftI of ~ GowmafttI. 47 ks. ....w. 461.525 (1992)
(obscrYinC thai lhareholders are nol efTec1ive mOllilon oC. compan"l board oC directorl and
thai prominenl Ceanares or corporate law aclUally malcc II dilllcull Cor chareholden 10 hold the
board and m. . . .n lepIIy responsible).
n So. infra nota 90-100 and accompanyinc lext.

S. •

tis., '-r-. TIw &a's P.,. WAUoST.J.,Apr. 22.I992.uR9;Eucutiwe-,.,...oIlioN~
Bl:S. WL. May 4. 1992. al 149;
BOO CAmptmia POI Tlwir 1JouG, FOUEI, )Ia)' 25, 1992. at
182•
.. So. Bainbridge. IV,,", note 46. al 22 (commenlinc thai dilcJosure rula only benefil
p1aintifli· Iawye:n who wiD brine lawsuits and defense 1:aw)'cn who wiD dd'end them). To &\'Oid
dais potenrialliabilil)'. compania haoe ltarted co hire a mel)' oC cWrerenl ..mson. Indudinc law
IIrml. compensarlon consultants, publie relarlonlllrmi. accountants,lnoelanent banks. computer
IOCtware mUcrI. and publilhen oC eleclronic data. Thul. company Ihareholderl mull pay Cor
Increased diJclosure In the Corm oC Cea the company pays CO these adviJon. Joann S. LubUn ..

m....

A. EIn:-..EIlC. C.UES AlIo"D ).(ATEIl1AU 0:1: CoItPOR.,nollo"S

142-1' (concise 6th cd. 1988).
4S /tl. at 141.
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with corporate disclosure: ignore it and simply vote for management's director slate and management compensation proposals."

Basic financial economics tells us that most shareholders prefer to be passive investors. A rational shareholder will expend
the effort to make an informed decision only if the expected
benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and
complexity of SEC disclosure documents. the opportunity
costs are quite high and very apparent. In contrast. the benefits aren't at all clear because most shareholders' holdings are
too small to have any significant effect on the vote's outcome.
For most shareholders, therefore. the investment of time and
effort necessary to make informed voting decisions remains
a game not worth playing.•.• What then will shareholders
do with the enhanced disclosure required by the commission's present proposals? They will do what they always do
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increase in official information a\'ailable, but with little corresponding
benefit.5O Increased required disclosure wiD do little to arrest the traditional cause of shareholder passivity and wiD have an insignificant
impact on overcompensation.

B. InCTtQ.Std Taxation

"t1
I

......
v.

The second major response to the compensation contrO\"ersy has
come from the legislature. In early August, 1993, the Congress, upon
the recommendation of the President, enacted legislation that placed
a one million dollar limit on the deductibility of executive compensation. Under a provision contained within the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, corporations are no longer able to deduct, as a business
expense, compensation payments to executives that exceed one million dollars per annum that are not performance-based.51 Additionally,
a special surtax has been imposed on incomes in excess of two hundred
fifty thousand dollars per year.52 The theory seems to be that ~. remm'ing the deductibility of high salaries, and increasing the taxes due by
the recipients of sizeable compensation, corporations and the individ·
ual r~cipients will find i't too costly to negotiate excessive compensation
packages. The benefits of high compensation to the recipient will be
taxed out of existence and the corporation itself will find it twice as
expensive to pay such large salaries. Moreover, by setting the ta.ution
tripwire at one million dollars, Congress seems to ha\"e concluded that
salaries over this level are per se excessive.
Although this approach will certainly ·solve· the compensation
problem and simultaneously produce heightened re\"enues for a taxJulie A. Lopez, £Ma,tiw-I'II] Dis...... Rula I'll] oJI-F1tr AduilorJ, WALL ST. J~Jan. 15. 1993. at
Bl.
"Indeed. !he new did_e requlremenll may Cftn ~ !he deleterious elrcet orddusine
!he In~or In "dala_rIUU."Joann lublin. £McuIi_ Grv",~ A60uI SEC Pflm III &pi... "'_
h] DoItI, WALL ST.J.. Sept. 21.1992. at Bl.,The new ditd_e requiremenll. h
• appear
to haft Increued InllilUuonai imPestor Icnlliny or !he compensation practices or at lcaot one
company. The \\oitconlin public penoion rund io leel:ine to remove !he outside dirceton or
Paramount Communicationl who approftd !he company', executive c_pensation plan. Thc
fUnd is bulne ill acoon on charta, required br the SEC. which ahow that, a1thoueh Panmount·.
IlOCk haa undcrpcrCormed bo!h !he Slandard .. Poon 500 arock Index u well u peer group
'lOCb. Paramount exceuo,"," continued to receive bonuae•• Suaan Pulliam. 1'........""'" I. T"rrW
., PnuimtFun4 Du, IlIWtdA Sloc* Pria, Lt«uIiwP..,. WALL ST.J•• )Olar.". 1993. at A".
.. OmnibUi Revenue Reconcillation BiU or 1995. H.R. 2264. 103d Cone.• ht Seu. (1993).
Sec ...,... note 10 and aceompan~me text ror a diacualion or the new Iimilaoona placed upon
corporate deducoon. ror exccutioe compcnaation.
"0mnibua Revenue R.cconcillaoon BiU or 1995. H.R. 2264. 103d Cone.• ht Seu. (1995).
Sec mpra note 11 and IICcompan)mg text ror an cumination orthe NrtU placed on Individual
income" in exceu or two hundred fif'ty !houoand dollars.

-.

-,
958

-, -, --, --, -, --,
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REV/£W

...,

.

(Vol. U:937

starved treasury, it will have no favorable impact on corporate health
in general. This response is akin to removing a splinter by amputating
the limb. The splinter is gone, but at enOrmous cost. Similarly, this
tax-based ·cure" may result in more harm to the patient than the initial
problem.
First, there is nothing inherently wrong with a salary O\"er one
million dollars. An executive who produces substantial increases in
corporate profitability that results in large profits for the shareholders,
may be worth paying more to retain in the competiti\"e labor market
place." The salary is only problematic when it has not been fairly
bargained for. Second, a salary not only provides compensation for an
individual's efforts, but also acts as an incentive for future acti\ity.
Companies compensate both to re\vard past activities and to encourage
greater productivity in the future. The idea emanates from the classic
carrot-stick parable. It is not the stick that compels productive labor,
but the carrot as incentive. The larger the carrot, the greater incentive
to increase productivity.54 While a large salary may certainly be \iewed
as a wasteful expenditure of corporate assets if one assumes that wages
were simply created to compensate solely for work produced, from a
different perspective, heavy compensation may be beneficial to the
corporate enterprise as a powerful incentive for heightened management creativity and effort. The larger the proffered salary, the greater
effort potentially to be expended. To limit arbitrarily the amount of
compensation will effectively eliminate any incentive for the kind of
executive productivity necessary to keep our large corporations competitive.
The term compensation itself is a bit of a misnomer, for compensation is not merely a reward for past services, but also acts as an
incentive for future efforts. As pointed out earlier, a large salary is not
in and of itself pernicious; it is only when it has not been bargained
for and is a simple toll paid to the ineffective that it becomes troublesome." To solve the perceived problem of overcompensation by summarily taxing out ofexistence salaries over one million dollars per year

lis. CaYSTAL, JUt- nOte 31. at 159-73 (arpine that hich-paid CEO. or Rccbok, Walt
Dimey, and HJ. Heinz arc properly compcnaatcd due to !he riak !hey lake and the returna they
ccnerate ror !heir lharcholdcn).
54 s.LLoYD C. RE=OLD' ET AL, LABOR EcOl<OXICS A.''D LuOR1b:r.ATlOl<S 183-84 (1986).
Burchman. JUt- note 25. at 189-211 (diacuuinewayo to create proper incenti,"" throueh
exccuoft compcruation). Thi. "ClUTOt"!heory or compenaalion i. evidenlly in operation u m~l
ae....che. Cor a new CEO. Dcapite mM·. weU-publici%ed problem•• it hu had liale difficulty finding
accompliohed candidates ror!he lucratioe pooition. ~lichad W. lolillcr. IBM's Sm,m far NtlII UadIr
APJ-n AMatl cf $duduw. WALL ST.J.. Feb. 24.1993. at Bl.
us. infra notel 113-16 and accompanyinc texL

s...,""

.-'

September 1995J

959

EXECUlnE O'llERCOMPENSATION

960

would stifle the crucial incentives created by the prospect of high, and
perhaps seemingly excessive, salary levels.

While some have sought to curtail compensation through heightened disclosure or ta.,,·based legislative limits, one group of commen·
tators has focused on ajudiciall}'-based approach.56 The}' maintain that
active judicial re\iew of executive compensation structures ma}' serve
to limit executive salaries. Professor Vagts has argued that while judicial
evaluations of -the excessiveness of compensation are not easy to make,
they are not impossible..•• [C)ourts can and should carefully scrutinize compensation that is substantially oUt of line and prune off the
abnormal amount when notjustified by special risks run by the executive recipients or special contributions made by them. "57 This approach
to the compensation issue is not without some appeal but it may pro\'e
to be as ineffective today as it was when the problem first emerged in
the mid-19SOs.
Board compensation decisions are generally protected by the business judgment rule.56 Provided that there has been an informed deci-

acted on an in/ormed basis, In good faith and in the honest belief that the &clion
wen was In the best inllerest ••• of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion.
thatjudgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the p~' challenging the decision to establish facts rebuuing the presumpdon.
14. at 812 (citations omitted). The American u.,.·lnstilUte-in its PriftriJ114 ofCttrptwtlU Cowm.
bas defined the rule in the following manner:
(c) A director or officer who makes a busineujudgment in good faith fulfill. his
du~' under this Section if:
(1) he is not Interested ••• in the subject of his business judgment:
(2) he is in/ormed with respect to the subject of his busineu judgment to the
elttent he reasonably belie.es to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(S) he rationally bcliC\'CI that his business judgment is in the best Interest of the
corporation.
PaL'<CII'US OF CoItPOIlATE Cov1:It.'tAl'CCEo '''''' note 16. § 4.01. S. Smith •. Van Corlom, 488
A.!d 858. 872 (Del. 1985). S.IIlsoTeren •. Howard. S22F.2d 949 (9th ar.I963);WaD &: Beaver
Street Corp••• )lunlOn Line. Inc.• 58 F. Supp.l09 (D. )ld. 1944); Riclwdson •. Blue CraM :Mining
Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (LD.K,.. 19S9), oJftl, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Or. 1942); Haber •. Bdl, 465 A.2d
SSS (Del. Ch. 1985).
The Delaware Supreme Courl, in &tml u
explained the rationale behind the application of the business judgment rule to compensation decisions:
We ba.e before us a [stock opdonJ plan which. in the judgment of a dlsintcrcslled
Board, Is adequately designed to further the corporate purpose of securing the
rcllendon of key employees' scnic:es. It is thcorctic:ally poaible. we suppose. that
some businessmen couIcl be found who -wd hold the opinion that opdons
exercisable at once were improwidendy granlled. bul, on the other hand. there are
businessmen who -.ld hold a fa-orable wew. as this board of independent businessmen in fact did. At most, therefore. we find ourselw:s in the twillght lone where
reasonable businessmen. fuUy informed. might difTcr. We think. therefore. we are
precluded &om substilUdng our unin/ormed opinion for that ofexperienced business managers of a cocporadon who ba>-e no penonallntercst In the outcome. and,
whose sole interest is the furtherance of the corporalle enterprise.
160.ud 1S1. 738 (Del. 1960). otrtllllb - . Dsla' Yo American AIrlines, 167 A.!d 231 (1961).
Seclion 5.0S of the AU Prinripla of ~ Cowm_ pnmdcs In part that a court may
not in...idate a compcnsadon arrangement if It Is "authorized in adoance or ratified by disintereSlled dlrecton • • • in a manner that sadslies the standards of the business judgment rule.·
Pat:<ClPLIS OF CoItPOUTE Cov1:It.'l:AXCE" su/WtJ note 16. § 5.oS(a) (2). Where clirccton ba"C a
personal interest in the IWng of exccuti"C compensalion. the busincu judgment rule does not
apply and the directors must pro"C that the nnsacdons were fair to the cocporalion. Cohen ••
Ayers. 596 F.l!d 7SS. 7S9-tO (7th Or. 1979) (citing Itcrbs •. California Eastern Airways. 90 A.!d
652 (Del. 1952). re\~ tlInW, 90 A.2d 6!i2 (1952); Coalicb •• Hq1fen Chemical Corp~ 90 A.2d
660 (Del. 1952».
H [.en disinterested cIirecton and shareholden caNlot ~. waste. Ragen ~ HiU, 289 C S.
582. 591-92 (1933) (''If' a bonus payment bas no relalion to the '~ue of scnic:es for which It is
gioen, it Is in reaUl)' a gift In part, and the majorll)' .todtholders ba"C no pG"'er to gi.e a"-:or
cocporate propel't)' against the prolest of the minoril)'.,. Courts usually define ......te· In terms
of the adequacy of consideradon the corporation reccWes &om the employee in return for the
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51 S« Barris. mpra note 2, at 86-88; Vacts, mpra note 4, at 252-61. Both authon point out
the willingness of sC\Wal courtS to grapple with the ooercompensadon iuue by applying comparad.e data in judging the appropriateneu of compensation In close corporation. tax and partner·
abip cases. Although the authors note that there arc salient difl'crcnca between public corporations and dose corporations, and between tax cases and derivallw: actions. they each condude
that courts should be willing to apply the same type ofanalysis in the context ofpublic corporadon
o.ercompensadon cases. Barris, su". note 2. at 86-88; Vagu, supra note 4. at 252-61. S« .lso
Bogus, su". note 12. at 79-8S.
Barris, ".,..note 2. at 87.lJu' _ecoffrey S. Rebnerl,
·'Vagts. w.pra note 4, at 276. oW
Comment, 77N b«uliw e-pmstllU1rt Conlnld: CmJIiftf Intlrffli_ 10 lWuu Ap9 CosII, S7
STA.'I:. L REv. 1147.1154 n.sa (1985) (obsel"ling that courts ba.enotapplied re:uoningemplo,-ed
in dose corporadon and lax casa to public corporadon cases).
51 Compensation decisions arc in essence °tdf dcaling· lranSacdons because they may be
wtcd on by those inside clirccton who ba"C an oboiou. stake In the decision and thcoredcally
should be n:ftcwcd under the rules governing self-inllereslled transacdons. ..-hicb require that
auch transaclions must (I) be fully clisdosed to the corporate dccisioJHDalr.en and (2) be fair to
the corporation in order to pass mUSIer. Because ·compen.lion cliffcrs &om other self-inllerested
transactions,· these rules are applied somewhat dift'crcnlly. Secdon 5.0S of the [ALl'sJ PrinriJ114
of ~ CowmanClr, foUowing the casc law, therefcwc breaks ofF compensation transactions
for separate treatment by adopdng the rule that if run disdosurc bas been made. and the
compenation bas been approwcd by disinterested directon. It will be fC\;cwcd onJy under a
busincu judgment standard. )ldwin A. Eisenberg. &/f/nllralMl Tnlftllldions in CArpt1nIk fA""
IS J. Co.,.. L 997.1006 (1988). Therefore. prowided that an eXCC1lu.e who is also a director docs
not -ote on his compensadon arrangement, the disintcreslled directors' decision to apprO''e that
arrangement will be prollected by the business judgment rule. oW Barris. IUpra note 2. at 81-8S.
In Aronson Yo Lewis. 4iS A.l!d 805 (Del. 1985). the Delaware Supreme Court desaibed the
business juclcment rule as:
[AJ prcsumplion that in making a busineu decision the directon ora corporation
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sion-making process and no self-dealing, a board's compensation
award win be judicially unassailable, with one exception, \\bere compensation to an executive simply bears no relation to the services that
individual has rendered, it win be considered a waste of corporate
assets and thus actionable. 59 This standard was initially promulgated by

C. Judicial Activism
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the Supreme Court in 1933 in Rogers V. Hill,&o which remains the
seminal compensation case.6 \ Following disclosures made in the 1930s
of substantial compensation paid to executives immediately prior to
and during the Great Depression. a number of shareholder actions
were brought challenging these compensation practices.6! The Rogers
decision determined the approach for judicial review of these claims.
While the ·waste- standard articulated by the Rogers Court was
seemingly simple to comprehend. problems arose in its actual application. The difficulty was. of course. in determining when exacdy compensation was unrelated to sen-ices rendered. The oft<ited language
of a New York State Supreme Court Judge in the legendary Heller v.
Boylarf" decision highlights the difficulty of determining what constituted actionable waste:

"tl

Assuming arguendo. that the compensation should be revised, what }"ardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to
supply the measuring-rod? The conscience of equity? Equity
is but another name of human being temporarily judicially
robed: He is not omnipotent or omniscient Can equity be so
arrogant as to hold that it knows more about managing this

I

.....

-..J

compensalion paid by !he cOtp0t'2lion. oS«, ~'l" Pogostin Y. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984)
(holding lIlat slOCk option plans must contain conditionl or surrounding circumlW\CeI mUlt be
luch lIlat !he corporation may reasonably expect to receiw: !he contemplated benefit from Ihe
grant of options); Sue Y. Brady, 18-1 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (ruling !hat !he court's
examination iI limited to discovering wbe!her what !he corporation bas received from Ihe
emplo}"CC il so inadequate in value lIlat no person of ordinary, sound businell judgment _uld
deem it _rib what !he corporalion paid). Courts haw: held lIlat boards have not wasted
corporate allCts when Ihe boards canceled exilting SlOCk oplion plans and reissued new oplionl
to cxecutivel at a lower exercise price when !he companY'1 stock price dedined. Sa Co1Im, 596
F.2d at 741-43.
The Cnited States Court ofAppeall for !he Eigb!h Circuit, in In'm"JliMuJllftl. Co. .. JoAou,
ruled !hat in determining whelher a corporation receives -adequatc· eonsider:ation for pa~'1Denll
to an ex«utiw:, a court must inquire into wbe1her !he compensation an ex«utiw: rece;''Cs bearl
a "reasonable relationship- to !he sen'ices rendered. 874 F.!d 1447 (1989) (citations omia.cd).
The court furlher ltated lIlat lO find a reasonable relationlhip. a coun mUit an"""r three
queltions. F'lrlt, did Ihe corporation benefit from !he IttYicel rendered? If !he corporation
received no benefill in excbange for !he paymenll, !he compensation plan Is waste. Second, was
!he compensation 10 disproporlionate to !he benefits receiw:d lIlat a reasonable person _uld
lhink lIlat!he corporalion received no quid pro quo; If no quid pro quo resulted, !he ~1ftenll
would constilUte corporate gifts. F'anally, did Ihe senices rendered trigger !he payments? If lOme
o!her occurrence triggered the pa~'IIlents, !he plan Is invalid because It cannot allUre performance.ltL atl461~2 (citaDOftl omitted).
-289 C.s. 582 (195').
I. Barris. nlJmI. note 2. at 84.
ft Vag"" nlJmI. nOle 4, at 252-5'.
"HeUer Y. Boylan, 29 :-:.Y.S.2d 65' (Sup. CL 1941), aJTtl_., 52 :-:.\:S.2d lSI (App.Di\'.
1941), rtII~ tlmktl,'2 :-:.Y.s.2d 1011 (1942).
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corporation than its stockholders?
Yes. the Court possesses the pawn- to prune these payments.
but openness forces the confession that the pruning would
be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic or scientific.
Whether or not it would be fair and just. is highly dubious.
Yet, merely because the problem is perplexing is no reason
for eschewing iL It is not timidity. however. which perturbs
me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for re\ising these
figures were I inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished.
The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables. manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be- more than inexact-it would be the precise
antithesis ofjustice; it would be a farce.
If comparisons are to be made. with whose compensation
are they to be made-executives? Those connected with the
motion picture industry? Radio artists? Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President of the
United States? Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to
grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed.
their solution is not within the juridical province."
For these reasons. courts have been highly reluctant to ifi\"Olve
themselves in compensation disputes. A compensation decision is not
really capable of mechanistic review. It is essentially a business judgment and the same rationale that mandated the creation of the business judgment rule lies behind judicial reluctance to characterize certain payments as -waste.- A court is hardly in a better position than an
informed. impartial board to determine an executive's worth.- Furthermore. the liability that would result from such judicial secondguessing would seriously compromise a board's effectiveness and its
ability to recruit prospective members. Thus. since the Heller ruling,
there have been few reported cases dealing with the compensation
levels of executives of large publicly-traded corporations. In those
cases. the courts have reached similar results. ·either applbing] the
business judgment rule and endors[ing] the compensation practice.
or simply throw[ing) in the towel and refus[ing] to deal with the
problem....
Despite judicial reluctance to decide compensation questions in14 29

:-:.Y.s.2d at 679-80.
note 2, at 82. Sa abo \'agu, su"'" note 4, at 254-55.
- Barril, suJml. note 2. at 82. Sa infr" notes 67-69 and accompanying teaL Sa also Barris,
suJml. nole 2, at 86-88; Vag"',
note 4. at 253-57.
15 Banis,
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volving large, public corporations, the same reticence is not e\ident in
numerous cases regarding compensation disputes in smaller close corporations. Courts regularly pass on salary fairness, or lack thereof, in
this area.·7 In addition, in the ta.'C arena, both tax court and U.S. Disaict
Court judges frequently re\iew executive compensation packages to
determine the appropriateness of specific corporate deductions for
-reasonable· compensation expenditures under § 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code.II Commentators argue that if the courts have no problem determining the reasonableness of compensation in the close
corporation and tax settings, they should extend the same -judicial
aggressiveness· to the large corporation compensation cases."
This call for judicial acti\ism, in the face of escalating compensation packages, \\ill remain as unheeded by the courts in the future as
it was when initially issued b}' Professor Vagts more than ten years ago.
Although courts have indeed manifested a willingness to review compensation in certain limited contexts, Professor Vagts' call to action
underestimates the critical differences between compensation disputes
in the close corporation or tax cases and those involving large corporations. The close corporation compensation cases are not disputes
about compensation at all. Rath~r, they are grounded in the attempted
oppression of minority shareholden by a controlling shareholder or
group of shareholders." In actuality, these cases invoh'e attempts by

'"t:I
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can determine reuonable compensation inooMd some kind or self'-dealing or bad faith eonducL

rd.

tr-

VaglI,,..,,... note 4, at 256 nnJ 14-15 (cidnglluelZ'" Topping,es S.W.2d 624,6S1 (Mo. CL App.
1970) (def'endanl. president or company, raised his own salary; lUit brought by derendant'l
ex...ue who owned half' !he company'IItoCIr.); Fenddman ... Feneo Hanclbas Co~ 482 S.W.2d
461 ()lo. 1912) (majority lhareholder directors fOrced minority lhareholder cIirector who
rounded company out or oBice and pxid no dmdenda to non-direetor shareholders; fOunder
returned to rormer job or cutting linings ror pursel); Goldman ... Jameaon, 215 So. 2d 108 (Ala.
1915) (directoR owning SO'lo or company I_k remOftd minority shareholder &-om board and
did not pay dmdenda); Binz Y. SL Louil Hide &: Tallow Co~ 318 S.W.2d 228 ~Io. CL App. 19&1)
(alier minority lhareholder/clirector sold _ k to son, other direetoR brought In .&Iilional
directon In ~oladon stock asreement and raised their aalaries».
In one ltudy, courts round compensation to be neeslift In 23 out 61 dose corporation
OYeI'Compensation cases. or these IS _
all but one Imohed aeIf'-help ... self'-dealing on the
part or the def'endant execua..c. 2 WASIm."GTOl( • Ro1'HscHI1D, IUpra note 6, at 865-61.
)lOlt courts, befOre they wiD SUbadNte their judgment ror that oC the directorl, seem to
require thai unreasonable compensalion be eoupled wi!h a dear showing cIiabonesl. oppreali.-e
or improwidenl corporate management that !hey can label "I'raud,- "bad wth: "brexh or
fiduciary duty.O "-ate,- or °apo&alion.o
1 F. HODcE O'NEAL .ttoamr B. THOllCPS()l(, O'NEAL'S OPPaESSlOlf or ~ SKAUHOlJ)o
us S 5.08, &159-60 (2d ec:I. 1991).
71
Sugarman .. Sugarman, 791 F.!d S (ht Cir.1986); Bessette Y. Bessette, 4~ N.L2d
206 ()Iau. 1982); Shelstad Y. Cook. 2!S N.W.2d 511 (WIS. 1977).
Donahue Y. RDdd Electrotype Co~ S~S N.L2d 50!. 51S-15 (MUI.1975) (describing
...noua rreeZe-oUI techniques). S.
O'NEAL. THOXPSO';, IUpra note 70, S S.07.
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the controlling shareholders to steer large portions of the corporate
profits selfward rather than sharing the fruits of corporate success
proportionately with their fellow equity-holden. Instead of dividing the
profits evenly through dividends, the controlling indi\iduals enrich
only themselves through large compensation packages, leaving fellow
shareholden out in the cold, deprived of the benefits of equity ownership.71
Whether effected through simple greed or as part of some nefarious -freeze-out" scheme,7t this manifestly unfair sharing is the type of
self-dealing that courts, from an equity standpoint, are eager to remedy. It is not the size of the compensation that pro\'Okes a judicial
response, but the attempt to di\'ert profits from the minority holders.
These shareholders really have no other remedy besidesjudicial inter\'ention. Because of their minority status, they cannot \\in a board or
shareholder vote on the practice, nor is there any market for their
shares. The only potential purchaser is the oppressing majority. In such
circumstances, it is a relatively appealing task for a court to intervene
and find the compensation unjustified, either forcing a proper sharing
of corporate profits with the minority, or a majority buy-out of their
shares at an acceptable price. This explains judicial \\iDingness to
engage in compensation review in this area. Such judicial involvement
is not really about compensation; rather, it involves clear and remedi-

11 Set, &r~ Roged, Inc. Y. Paglee, S72 A.l!d 1059 Dofc:l. 1911); Caller Y. Caller. S16 ~.L2d 114
(til. 1914), ..
3S6 ~.E.!d 886 (1915); BakerY. Cohn, 42 ~.Y.5.2d l!9 (Sup. CL 1942), rMtlifiN.
afI4 ..
40 N.Y.5.2d 62S (I94S), OIfftl.., rutlijW. 54 N.L2d 689 (1944). S«..". Barril, IUpra
note 2. at 81; Vacll, IUprw note 4, at 2M.
• The Inrcrnal 1teYenue Code lates generally that a lrade or busineu deduclion Ihall be
allowed fOr all ordinary Uld neceaaary npenses, a prO¥ilion which includel a °rnaonable0
allowance ror aalaries and compensalion ror lenicelactually renderec:l.lJtc. S162(a)(l) (1988).
FactoR used by the courts include: the employee'l qu-'ific:aliona; the nature. ntent and scope
or the employce'l -k: the size and complexity or the business; a compariJon or ...ariel pxid
with the 1"0. income and the net income; the preWIing general economic condiriona; compari.
son or lalaricl wi!h clialributiona to ItaCkholderl; !he preWling rates or compensation fOr com·
parable poIilion In comparable coneema; the salary poIiey or the -pa,u u to all employ.:es;
and, in !he cue or _all corporaliona with a limited number or ollicen, the amount or compensadon paid to the panicularempJoree In recentycan.)Iayaon ~lfg. Y. Comm'r.l18 F.2d 115,119
(6th 0,. 1949). S. ~ WlJUA)I L PA':''TDt, Coaroun A:!(D TAX AsPEC1'S or CLoSZLT
HEuI CoUOUTlOl<S 215-20 (2d ec:I. 1981); DaWI L Hoffman, HMJmr Sipifi-.t FtIdtm I.
1M 0tltI.s /ar ~ CoIItpm.tllUM. 50 J. TAX'lf 155 (1919).
.. Barris, ,.."... note 2, at 81;
IUprw note 4. at 276. S« ..". Charlel ~I. Yablon,
o--pm.tIli1tJ: TIw ~ l.-"r anti &evaw P.,. 92 CoLt;)I. L Jl£,.'. 1867, 1896-1906
(1992) (r'CWewing GUlF S. caTSTA~ b: SEAaCH or ExcESS (1991» (sucgesdng that easing the
Ieplsandard &-om "-ateO to °rnaonable In relalion to the corporate benmu expected- ..in
ereate !he pollibility or litigation wI!h attendant uncertainty which wiD re....t in incenti.-e Cor
restraint by CEO. aeekinglUbatandally abo¥e-a\~rage compcnsadon).
to All or!he close corporation cuel Proreaaor Yap ~leI to support his proposition that couru

rd.

BOSTON COLLECE LAlV REVIElV

964

s.. &,.,

"s.

L,<,,~

L".

prwrou,

L"~",,

I,....,

c,

I,,,,,, '

1",,,

l.~".,,~

l=,~",

I ... ','

l _

r

--, --, -, --, -, --,
Seplember 1995)

"'0

,

......
\0

.,

EXECLTIlE OVERCO.\IP£.\"S:lTION

-, -, -, --,
96S

able self-dealing. Without the protection of the courts, few im"estors
would be willing to accept minority status in a small corporation, and
such enterprises would be deprived of necessary investment capilal.
This is not the case in the large public corporation setting ",here
excessive executive compensation deprives shareholders of a relati\"el}'
small portion of profits and is effected ~. a group without the kind of
absolute control possible in the close corporation arena. In small
businesses, it is not uncommon for a control group to possess o\'er 50%
of the corporation's stock and effectively block any kind of minority
response to unwelcome actions. 7S In the large public corporation,
management controls a relatively small amount ofstock and can alwa}'s
be outvoted by an outraged shareholdership. This is obviously not an
easy task but it is not a numerical impossibility, as is often the case in
the close corporation setting. Thus, judicial involvement seems less
necessary, as the problem appears less drastic and other remedies are
available. Concerns aboutjudicial competence to re\iew compensation
reemerge and stifle inten-ention.'74
Judicial activism in the taxation cases is also easily distinguished
from the ordinary compensation dispute. The general object of any
kind of tax litigation is not the punishment of some ove.;reaching
executive, but the production of additional revenue for a tax-star\"ed
federal treasury.'75 The objective is revenue generation and any judicial
"SIlrl>cmMu," S28 N.E.2d at'll (dcftning a dose corporation _ a corpontion l}'Pified br
-(I) a small number or s_kholden; (2) no ready market ror the corporal.e slock: and (S)
substantial majority s~oldcr participation in managemenl'. Holden or a majority or a
eompany'sllock ha"t: the ability 10 elcct and conlrol a majority or the company's dircclOn and
thus ha"t: the power 10 emplo)' a ....-iCl)" or lechniques 10 clcprioe minorilJ' shareholders or the
....ue or their inll:resu in the company. Some elWllples or these techniques indude a refusal 10
declare dMdcnds, payment oC exorbitant salaries 10 majority shareholder oIIicers. refusal 10
employ minority shareholden, and sale oCcorporale _1110 majority sharcholden at inadequal.e
prices. O'Nt.u. .. TH014PSOS-. IVJm' nOle 70, 5 S.02.
Due 10 the disparity in size orearnings belWCCn a small dose corporation and a large public
corporation, it is usually easier Cor a court 10 delermine whether an CJlCcuti\'C·s saJary is exce....'C
in the dose corporation. For ClWIlple. a 51 mlDion salary ror an exccuti\'C in a ForlUne SOO
company is insignificant in reJation 10 the company's botlOm line. wherea in a small dose
corporation. the same salary could constilUte a significanl percentage or the company's earnings
Cor a gioen year and thuslUbslanlially reduce cJmclcnd pa~'DIenu 10 the company's shareholden.
SIlr Yap. 1UJ1rt' note 4. at 2S3-56.
"The ellCcuUoe compensation cacs in this area gencraJly deal with dose corporations in
which company cxccutioes are also conlrOUing shareholders. Section 162 oCthe InlcrnaJ Revenue
Code is designed 10 p~t these _r-managers &om distributing sums in the guise or salaries
(which are deductible by the corporation) that are aclUally non-deductible dividends and thus
subjecllO corporale-levd taxation. 14. a12'7. Thus, in this area. couru do nol rocus solely on the
reasonablenea or an executivc's compensation. They are equally, I( nOI more, concerned ,,;th a
company's dividend policy.
Lt., McCandlca lile Sery. y. t:ni..,d Stales, 422 F.2d 1"6 (CL
Q. 1970) (finding compensauon reasonable, yel disal'-ing deduction because the corporauon
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concern about second-guessing a board is secondary to the p:-ocess.
With this in mind, courts review compensation in this arena nt;,: ~ith
the objective of limiting unreasonable salaries, but to determ:~e the
legitimacy of income deductions that reduce tax revenues.16 The business judgment concerns that accompany judicial review of orCinary'
compensation actions are simpl)' not present in this area and thus do
not create the same judicial reluctance to become iD\'OI\'ed.
The problem of judicial iD\'OI\"ement in large corporation compensation disputes, like that raised in HeUer,77 is as valid today as it was
fifty years ago. Courts neither feel comfortable nor particular~' wellqualified to substitute their business judgment for that of an informed
board of directors. Nothing has changed in the past five decades to
enable courts to determine with any better precision what part of a
salary has been earned and what part constitutes "waste." The Judiciary's discomfort and consequent reticence remain and will continue.
There simply is no mechanistic procedure available to compute with
precision an executive's worth and anyjudicial resolution of the matter
involves a judgment call of the t}pe courts have typically 8\'Oided.
Unless 8 plaintiff can in'troduce some kind of evidence of fraudulent
or collusive behavior on the part of a board in its compensation
decision-making process, misconduct which would provide for easy
judicial resolution, it is highly unlikely that the courts will abandon
their traditional passivity in compensation cases. Judicial acti\ism is
simply not a realistic solution to the overcompensation dilemma.

D. Institutional SharJwlder Activism
Another proffered solution to the compensation problem invol\-es
institutional shareholder activism. It is argued that institutional in\'e5did not pay dMdends the prnious me yean). SIlr •
Ccoll'rey 5. R.:hncn. 77w &«utiw
Omcpms/llitm Qmtrad: CrrGIi.., IrtUJltiwI III &tlu. "cm9 Cos,., S7 5TA."'C. L RE\'. 1147. II»

n.sa (198').

7SThe legal standard in the .... cacs Is diCCercnt from the _cbnl In sh3rcholdcr lUlu.
While shareholden mUll show that compensation amounlS to
the ..,st in the WI c:ucs Is
merely one or ·reasonablene...• SftIUJ1rG no..,s '9 and 68.
ProCasor Yap obscroes thaI ~ C_ .... cases imoI"t: public Corpor2Uons. '1It:II. IUFa note
4, at 258. This Cact Is nol surprising gi\'Cn thaI, in most public corpor2Uons. compensation Is
apprcwcd by a majority or disinleresled c!ireclOn and has no relation 10 the comp....y·S di\-idcnd
policy. 1£ a public company docs nol pay m.-idcnds. It usually rein\'CslS the sums into the comp:my
ror n_ capital or deblscnice. Bu' _ R.J. ~nolds Tobacco Co. y. t:nil.ed 513..... H9 F. Supp.
889.896-97 (CL a. 19S7) (finding thaI disaibuuons or prolill 10 emplo~us or a public CGrJration in proportion 10 the emplo)'CCs' s_kholdings constitul.ed a dividend distriltuuoll 2nd nol
compensation).
" HeUer .. 1IofIan. 29 :O:.Y.s.2d 65S (Sup. CL 1941).
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tors, who increasingly constitute the largest shareholders in many of
the largest public corporations," possess tremendous potential to effect positive change in the operation of these businesses by becoming
more active -monitors- of corporate management. The size and financial sophistication of institutional investors make them uniquely positioned to take the lead in promoting corporate productivit}·. Increased
institutional investor acti\ism will result in more effective shareholder
oversight of both boards and managers and may prove a solution to
corporate inefficiency by stimulating more productive and responsh·e
management. Indeed, much scholarly attention has been dC\'oted to
the -promise of institutional investor voice.-79
The positive potential of active monitoring may also carry o\·er to
the compensation area. Professor Black has suggested that despite
-systemic shortfalls in corporate performance ..• institutional oversight, either directly or through stronger boards of directors, could
correct these shortfalls.•.. Institutional investors could add value by
... establishing a more arm's-length process for setting CEO pay.'" As
a corporation's largest shareholders, institutions may have the clout to
force a board to bargain impartially and effectively with senior management to produce reasoned compensation arrangements. Failure to
so act could result in a board's ultimate replacement by a coalition of
shareholders spearheaded by the agitated institutional investors. The
prospect, or even the actual or perceived threat, of such action would

""t:l
N

o

I' 5«, I.r.• Bernard s. Black, SMrJtD146 PGUiviIJ R-_iftftl, 89 )(rCH.1- bY.5:!O (1990)
(dcscribinS the complex web oC lepl rules and cultunl Caeton that pre~1 InatilUDonal sharebolden &om becoming more acti~ moniton); Cofrce. m". note 79 (sugeslinS that an incen~ Cor instiNdonal monitoring be crealed by restrictins portCoIio dMnificalion. requirins fUnd
managers to price inwcstmcnt and monitorinS senices kparatelY. and authorizinS incenJi,'C
compensation for fund manasers); Conard, m". note 79, at 176-78 (callinS for. among other
things. S'"eater accea to company proxy ltatements and the remcml oC the threat oC "controllinS
penon" liability); Dent, $fI/WtI note 79. at 907 (propaling that a eommittee oC a firm's 10 or 20
larsen sbarebolden be siven authority to use corporate funds to solicit proxies). q. Rosenbaum.
m". note 79 (contenclins that cbanses in the proll)' rules are unneeeuary). S. Gbo)(arkJ. Roe.
A Politiclll n-, /If AIIUricGra ~ F_raew" 91 CoLL". 1- bY, 10 (1991) (obseninS that
U.s. IinanciallnaJiIUDons cannot reacb their CuD potenJial as monitors due to a wriety oC Iepl
prohibitions desiped to prewnt them &om pining too mucb power).
aSee Black, Apw. m". note 17, at 850-49. Cor a diseuaion oC the tViety or_thods
instilUdonal inOleston could employ to afrcct corporate perCormance.
a S. Bernard S. Black, DUcIosurr, Nol ~ip: TM e- Jt1r Pr., 1lIf- 17J. CoIIP.149 (1991) [bereinal\cr Black, DUclanmr); Conard. mpr. note 79. at 161-62. li7-78; Dent, m".
DOte 79. at 907-25.
"ColI"ee. m"._ 79. at 1551-66.
• Partieipation in a "sbarebolden' adWor7 colIIIDitllee" is the most commonly proposed role
for the instiNlional in\'CllOl'.1n senenJ. these committees would be composed oCreprcsentali~
of a companr's larJeSI sharebolders and would be appointed by the board or direcJMI for
OIIC>1Car tennl. The commiaee would lUhise the board on matters or concern to the company's
shareholders and submit proposals &om lime to lime. S. Barnard, . . _te 79; Jock, m".
note 79, at 49. ProCessor Barnard UJUCs that shareholders' acMsory committees wiD be lnefrecd\'C
monitors oC corporalle perf'ol1lWlee and sugesa that instilUJions should place representatives
on the board itself; rather than on some "sbadowcommillee."Bamard,m".note 79,&1 1168-i5.
II S. Lot:ts 1.owEl>"STI:Il(. WHAT'S Wao:cG WtYH WALL Snu:r: SHotrr.TDuc GAcc ""~ nil:
AasCo"tU SHAIWIOLDDt. 209-10 (1988); Barnard. m". note 79, at 1168-75; Dent,
note
79. at 907.
11 CillOn .. Kraabnan. $fI/WtI note 17. at 88S-9!.
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be strong enough to convince otherwise passive directors to act more
effectively.
To encourage this seemingly positive form of monitoring, a number of commentators have proposed various reforms in the legal rules
regulating institutional conduct in order to give institutional in\'estors
more freedom and incentive to engage in acti,,'e oversight ofcorporate
activities. I' In addition, they have formulated numerous techniques for
institutional investors to use in their attempts to exercise corporate
contro1." These proposals include: amending various SEC regulations
to permit more communication and coordination between institutions;" altering regulations governing institutional investment strategy
to restrict portfolio diversification to discourage investor -exit- and
encourage investor "voice;"If creating activist shareholders' ad\isory'
committees to make management more aware of institutional concerns;85 placing representatives of the institutional investors on the
corporate boards themselves;8' or even creating a cadre of professional
directors who would serve on corporate boards to demand effective
management.1?

"B7 the end oC 199O.lnadNlions oomed 55" or the equity in U.s. companiel.1n addidon.
insdNtions ba~ bqun to concentrate their _
in specific companies. Jayne W. Barnard.
IlUtilulitmtll Ira_11m .rt4 t/w N_ CDrt-.tI GclwrraGraew" 69 :.I.e. 1- bY. 1155. 1140 (1991)
(obscning that the top twenty pension funds plus the ten larJest U.s. money manasen bold
more than 16" oC the sbares in the 10 largen U.s. corporations) (citing W"dJiam Taylor. em Bit
Ot.mns MtJIt" • Bit DilJrrmar,
B\:s. bY.• Sept.-OcL 1990, at 70); Black, Apw. $uprts note
17. at 827. S. Gbo Carol)'h It Brancato. TM PiwW RW /If IlUtilutilmllllnvaltn ira CG!JitG1
MtnAm, ira L"snn."TtOl(AL L'CVD'nSc: CHA~"CD ""_ RDPOl(SlalUT1ES OF nil: 21ST CD"T1.'1lY
~5 (Arnold W. SamelZ Ie James 1- Bicksler cds., 1991); Banis, $fI/WtI nOle 2. at 89.
"Black, ..,...,., m". note 17. 5« Gbo ~lol>"KS Ie )(D."OW, m". note 2; Barnard. $fI/WtI_te
78; Black, btJtirit:-1 £ui4mew" $fI/WtI nOle 15; Richard ~l. Bwtbaum. lrutitulitmtll ""-rs IIft4
Ct1rporGtI M~ A e-~ hnpm;w. 57 BaOOL 1- bY. 1 (1991);Jobn e. Coffee. Jr.
UfuidiIJ Vemg Coratrol: TM IlUtilulitmtlll.._1tIr a Ct1rporGtI M...iIor. 91 Cou:)(. 1- In·. 1277
(1991); AlCred F. Conard, &,_ M....pWlintI:
CGftilIIlinar. 22 C. )flcH.JL au. 117
(1988); George W. Dent,Jr.• T-.d Uraiffi", Ot.mns1li,.ra4 CoratroI ira t/w PvMic ~
1989 WIS. 1- bY. 881 (1989); Cilson &: J\raahuan, m". note 17; Louis Lowenstein. W7a,
M ....,-ml$ Should (Art4 SItou14 :t.'oI) H_Rapm/orTMirSlutn1wl4m, I; J. CoIIP.1- 1 (1991);
Thomas e. PaeCgcn. llUtitutitlrulll_tIM Ante Ponas: A e-,..,mw A-!rm tJ/ ... £1fVrf"'l
F_ ira Ctwf-'* Amtritll IIft4 a.m..." 26 Lvr'L lAw. 527 (1992); Ichovd B. Rock. TM lAfic
Gra4 (Ura_Jllin) Sipiji_ /If IlUlilvtilmlll SAtm1IoIikr Adiuism, 79 Gm.1-J. 443 (1991); Roben
D. Rosenbaum, FMAI,dalUlru of s.rad: Till lVftlA1'MfIi.sa Ura4nl.7i", t/w Curmol Pwlllor 1"n»tJ Rull
a""fa, 17J. CoIIP.1- 165 (1991).
"Black, £mJtirit:-1 £ui4mew" $u", note 15, at 899, 91~17.
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It is unquestionable that institutional investors have begun to
exercise more power over corporate affairs than they did e\'en a few
years ago. In a number of large corporations, they have been active
agitators for change in corporate policy and personnel. Most recently,
a number of the large institutions have played a major role in forcing
changes in management and policy at such prominent corporations as
IBM, Sears Roebuck, American Express, and even General Motors."
Despite this activity, it is unclear whether these groups will either be
able, or even desire to be a primary force in effecting change in
executive compensation practices." There are a number of reasons
why sole reliance on institutions to resolve the compensation controversy would be a mistake.
The first set of problems \,ith institutional action is general in
nature. There are several fundamental reasons why institutional investors, as currently constituted, may never be able to monitor corporate
activities in the manner envisioned by their supporters. The first concern has to do with investment strategy. Professor Coffee has argued
that there is an inherent preference among many institutions to structure their investment portfolios in such a manner as to provide maximum liquidity. Investments are arranged by type and size to pro\ide
for quick and easy disposition in the event that conditions warrant.
Thus, investments that are not readily saleable are avoided. Such liquidity, the ability to easily exit an investment, effectively eliminates

II As ilS financial oudook hu deteriorated. IBM hu faced increased sharehOlder agitation
hm groups Nch u the Cniled Shareholders Association (t:M). L"SA plans to preu at 1B.\{'s
annual meeling (or the pusage o( (our proxy ptopolals which deal with management per(ormance, _night, and compensalion. Catherine knll Ie Joseph Weber. IBM Aftw AAm. Bel. Wll~
Feb. 8, 1995. at 22. Sean Roebuclr.·s Edward Brennan re&nquished _raJ leadenbip roles and
the company agreed to moest iuell' o( eertain business lines In the face o( powing shareholder
threatS. See-rt, IV'" note !I, at SS. Despite the fact that American Exprell ChairmanJames C.
Robinson m Inidal1y pcnuaded his bawd to keep him In poooer In the face o( disappointing
resullS. Institudonallbareholder asilation ewentual1y led to his raignadon.J. P. Morpn.joined
by Alliance Capiral and Putnam Manacement, _ high'" lnI1uendaJ In (ordng Robinson's
remowl, LesIic Wayne. SAomWMrs bIrd# It.. P-r lIIIilA NoIiorI'6 BifP' e-,...ia. lI:.Y.
Ton:s. Feb. 1. 1995. at AI. It _ Institulional shareholder pressure that ,"-as inslrWDenral In
comlncing the board o( General )loton to demand the resignadon 01 lIS chielexeeulioe. Robert
C. Slempel.11Il. See See-rt, IV'" noll: !I,lora Iiltofcompaniel \bat ~ responded toin,_
preuure by chanCinl leaclenhip• . - • B1Kk,
IVFrs ROle 17. at 828-19.
In addition, Inweston such u the CouncU oflnstitulional In''Uton, CM, and "''Ct'aJ stale
anJllo!ft pension fUndi ba¥C: all pined the aaendon o( corporale management by creating
publicized "bit IbIS- o( poorlr1-lormina corporations. k'Iln G. SaJ_ lrutilulioN An Paiud
C10ul in s - d _ WALL ST.J. Sept. 21. 199!, at BI. A prime eumple b ITT Corp.
which hdd several meetings..,jlb shareholders and agreed to demands that certain m:uuogement
policies be ehanged. in order to be rem_d from CM's "bitlisL- Salwen Ie Lublin. IUFrs nore
13.
inftlI ROle 100.
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any incentive to exercise a meaningful voice in corporate affairs. The
institutions
have considerable reason to remain 'rationally apathetic'
about corporate governance and litde reason to become active participants. Why? [A] tradeoff exists and must be recognized between liquidity and control. Investors that want liquidity may hesitate to accept control • . • . [A] preference
for liquidity chills the willingness of institutional investors to
participate in the control of major corporations .••.Coffee suggests several structural reforms to lessen the bias towards
"exit" and encourage the exercise of "voice"-such as "a restricted
diversification strategy which would discourage institutional investors from diversifying beyond the limits of their monitoring capacity. "91 Unless such reforms are implemented, however, the continued predilection towards liquidity lessens the incentive to monitor,
which suggests a continuing passivity among the institutions.
The second concern involves size and communication. Although
institutional holdings are substantial, particularly in dollar terms, each
institution's ownership interest in the various corporations in which it
invests is likely to be proportionately quite small.ft This reflects a
preference for liquidity and portfolio diversification as well as legal
restraints." As a result, even if a company's stock is held primarily by
institutions, these holders, individually, control very little of that company's overall equity. To exercise ·control,· therefore, a number of
institutions would have to agree to form a coalition. This may be
problematic. F'ltst, each institution may have varying goals regarding
its investment in a particular company and its own general investment
strategy. No two institutions are precisely alike insofar as participant
composition and investment goals are concerned.It Consequently, each
"ColI'ee.IVFrs notc '19. at lUI.
lilt/. at ISS8.
"For example. e¥en the nation'slargestSlllte empto,ce pension lund, CaJpcn (CaJll'omia
Publie Employees' Retirement S7stcm). onl)' owns .6'1. of \\CstIngbouse·. OUlStanding shares.
)fieher, IV'" note 32. at AS. AS. Indeed. despite ilS Rock pord'oIlo totalling S25 biDion. Calpen
bas limited lIS holdlngsta jUIl under a 1'1. ownership Intcrestln more than 1.000 large C.s.
corporations. George Anden. Rat1aJ NIIliva: WNkH«Itl ofCa1pm L«tura OJlwrF"." Hu 0 Bt-rl Fms, WALL ST. J ••Jan. 19. 1995. at AI, A9.
n.- Colfee
note 79. S. IVFrs notes 90-9! and accompanJing texL
.. . - Brancato
nole 78. at 7-lS ("Institutionallmators are not a 'monolltbie· group
and bawe wiele.,. diwergent In_ent and risk objecdwes. u _11 u ftlJing atlitudes on their
appropriale role In corporate P"C"W'Ce.'. One commentllOr upel that public pension l'undI.
which ha¥C: the grealiest power to lnI1uence manasanent, are not we1l<quipped to do 10 etrec.
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would likely respond to '\-arying control issues with differing le\'els of
concern. Where interests diverge, coalitions and consequent power
may disappear. Second, as some commentators have obsen-ed, to act
as a group, the '\wying shareholding institutions must be able to
communicate with one another freely. Under present SEC regulations,
including the proxy rules, hOwe'\-er, such communication may be restricted.1S Although changes have been suggested and some, in fact,
promulgated,ll6 it remains to be seen how easily institutional im'estors
may be able to solicit each other's votes or consent so as to act as a
group without running afoul of '\'arious SEC requirements.
While these problems generally act to restrict institutional acti\ity,
another set ofdifficulties exists that may also limit institutional investor
effectiveness in the compensation area. The first concern involves the
benefits to be achieved by active compensation re\iew. As discussed
earlier, the actual impact on corporate earnings that an excessive salary
represents is not likely to be particularly significant.'1 Given the costs
in terms of reputational capital expended in a compensation challenge91 and time required for organization of opposition among the

I,u, .

Fmancial institutions are also run by corporate executives
who may be receiving, or be interested in receiving, compensation at levels or in forms not very different from those that
are under attack from the various shareholder groups. Such
executives are unlikely to mount or join challenges to executive compensation plans because they may feel , •• that the
compensation offered to their fellow executives is perfectly
appropriate."
Thus, the management structure of some of the institutional investors, may itself serve to limit active compensation oversighL
There is no doubt that institutions are becoming more restless
shareholders and have begun to demand a more active role in corporate governance. For the various reasons discussed, however, they may
never prove as effective in providing either compensation oversight or
even a more general monitoring role, This does not mean that efforts
to encourage institutional voice should cease, but this ·voicew may not
bring as much positive change as earlier envisioned, particularly in the
compensation arena. IGO

lively becausc oC their poliliallJMninded leadership. In connst. pr"..te instilllDOns. such as
muwal funds, are run by indMduals with Ircater financial expcrDsc. but who havc &a1e inclina·
lion to inIIucnce management. T~"or. 1Utwa note 78, at 72. Sa infra nolCl 98-99 and accomp.
nying text. Sa a&o Anders, IUJtra note 92, at Al (rcp«DnI that the head oC Calpen is Cacine
pressure &om his board, which Is composed mostly oC state 00iciab. to limit his efforts In
inIIucndnc poorly pcrConninc companies and to concenlnte instead on the management or the
pcnslon fund itself).
It SEC rccubtions define -proxy- and "'so&dtation- '¥CrJ ~ly so that WtuaJly any Statement oC opinion to sccuriry holden Is subjcct to cosdy and lIme<onsuminl fi1Inr; requlremenll.
Iluies 14.1(1), 14&-1(1), i4M, 17 C.Flt. 55 240.14.1(1), 240.14.1(1), !!40.14&-5(a), 240.14a-6
(1992). In lldclltion, aIlsolicitadons are subjcct to andhud rules which mar chiD communications
in a hotly<ontested proxy filht. Rule 14.9&, 17 C.Flt.1 240.14&-9(a) (1992). Black, Dilclarurw.
'''''''' note 85, at 5S-57. See infra note 96 Cor a discussion or recent chanles to these rules. Sa
"0 Black. A,...w. IUtwa note 17, at 820 n.9; Coffee, IUtwa note 79. at 15-12-15; Conard, IUtwa
note 79, at 161-62.
"The SEC recently cased the rules pw:rnine communicadons amone sharcholclcn. The
chances Include: An excmpdon &om the proxy rules Cor communications with sharcholdcn
where the person soIiciq Is not seekins proxy authoriry and docs not " - a subJtandaJ interest
in thcsubjcct mailer orlhc "Gte. 17 C.F.R..1240.14.2(b) (1992) (amendment to Iluie 14a-2(b».
The definidon or -solicitation- has been chanced so that sbareholdcn can pub&cly announce
how they Intend to "Gte and prcMde reasons Cor that decision without b;ng to comply with Ihe
proxy rules. 17 C.Flt. 1240.14&-1(1) (1992) (amendment to Iluie 14&-1). Solicitations COIWC)'Cd
throUlh the public meella are not subject to the proxy rulcs 10 lone u a ddlnid\'C proxy statement
is filed with the SEC. 17 C.Flt. 5 240.14.'(1) (1992) (amendment to Iluie 14&-'). In certain
ll'an_tions, companies mUlt furnish aharcholden with lisll oC aU company sbareholdcn. 17
c.F.R. 5 240.14.7 (1992) (amendment to Rule 14.7). Rqulalion oC Communications Amonl
Sbareholden, Exchanle Act Release :':0. 1I1526, 57 Fed. Res. 48,275, 48,2;6 (OcL 22, 1992).
" Sa ,''''''' notes 27-50 and accon>panrine text.
II Sa Yablon, IUJtra note 69, at 189'.
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\'aJ"ious stockholders. it may be that the potential benefit of slightly
increased earnings due to lower compensation costs, particularly when
diluted among many holders, may not appear worth the effort. Indeed,
it would seem more expedient to expend one's energies challenging
management on the issues that have a more substantial and fundamental impact on the company's business prospects, such as expansion,
asset disposition or even general labor policy, than championing an
issue with limited impact on the company's ·bottom line.·
The second concern involves the interests of those managing the
large institutions. As Professor Yablon has pointed out:
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E. Strmgthened Compensation Committees

A final approach that has been offered to resolve the compensation controversy involves a change in the internal functioning of the
corporation's board ofdirectors. It has been suggested that there be a
reformation of the way in which the board's compensation committee,
"Id.
I . Rccendy, the head oC CaJpen, Dale Hanscn, has rccciYcd pressure Ctom his board to limit
his shareholder aclMsm and direct more oChis encrr. to the pension fund's da~ar operadons. Hansen Is 1Iicwcd as Ihe leader oC the shareholder rir;hll movement and his rea-eat could
ereale uncertainry as to the future actl1lism oC other larr;e Institutional inVCIlOn. ARden, IUtwa
note 92, at AI.
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appointed to "review, analyze, and approve or revise compensation
proposa1s:IOI operates to assure independent and effective oversight.
If this committee could be strengthened and made more independent
of management, then excessive compensation programs could be defeated before they even reach the full board for consideration. This
approach is laudable but ultimately unworkable. The problem lies not
in the functioning of this committee, but in the composition of the
board itself.
Compensation decisions by a board are generally protected by the
businessjudgment rule. lot & noted earlier, such decisions are immune
from attack if made by disinterested directors following an "informed"
decision-making process.lOS & one way of satisfying this requirement,
most publicly-held corporations have formed compensation committees, traditionally comprised ofseveral outside directors (those who are
not employees of the bwiness) to examine and consider proposals for
executive compensation. lOt These committees theoretically evaluate the
performance of senior management and make recommendations on
compensation formulas to the full board. Frequentl)·, a company's
management engages compensation consultants to study the subject
company's executive salary scheme and to advise its committee on its
appropriateness. These outside advisors examine compensation scales
at companies of similar size, similar profitability and in similar indwtries to determine the reasonableness of each proposed plan. I05 The
10. Banis, ItA,,", note 2. at 75. S. •
CRYSTAL, ItA"" note 51. at 242-45 (af1'IinI that
compcnsalion committees hire their «non Independent compcnsalion consulianu and establish
more formal procedures Cor determining compcnsalion); James W. Fisher, Jr•• 1M &l6 O/'M
e-pmsoliora eo.....i". ita Exzct.'TIVE Co)lPL'lSATJON: A $11tATECJC Ct.'D~ roll THE 1990s 566.
569-71 (Fred It. Foulkes ed.. 1991) (Ngaling that compcnsalion committees should. among
other thinI'. Cltablish a charter which dearly designates the committee's responsibDilies and its
relaliomhip 10 management); Lance BcrJer, NftI lniliGlirla for IN ~ eo...",i".
Daw:Tou I< BoAaDs. Winter 1985. at 55 (derailing how compcnsaJion committees can become
more proaciM and link payment strater. and performance or the company). q. Frederick W.
<Aok. E.unaiw Pa1 .nil tIw .8oanf, DIucToas I< BoARDS, Spring 1992. at .., (arping that
compcnsalion committees should not hire their «non _lIants).
lit S. tu"" notes 58-62 and accompllft)'ing teat.

11t14.
1M Recent studies indicate that between 84 and 99 percentoflargc

publidy-held corporaDons

hMc compcnsalion committees. S. rasher....,... note 101. at 566 (dling j.£. Richard. eo...pm.
IIIlUm eo...",ill« 1 - . 1989, DIUCTOIl'S )(Ollo"THLY.Junc 1989. at 5); 1'aD."CIPLES OF ColtPOllAn
Con:It.-:..." a. ...,... note 16, at 5SA05. Compensalion committees should be composed enlirdy
of outside dincron. 14!lIThe American Law lnslitute recommends that large publidy-hdd corporalions establish
compcnsalion committees 10 pro"jdc o¥Cl'sight on compensation issue.. The committees should
&clively rai_ existing compensalion prognms and recommend methods that ensure that pa".
menll are reasonably related to executive performance. PaL-:cJPUS OF CouollAn Covo..-:ASCE,
$U/JrO note 16, 5 M.05. TradilionalJy. however, compensalion commill«s have been relalh'ely
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presence of only outside directors on such committees and the abstention ofinterested officers from compensation voting removes any selfdealing taint from such decisions and eliminates any challenge on
self-dealing grounds. Moreover, the retention of independent consultants to advise the compensation committee and the committee's recommendations to the full board following extensive discwsion with the
consultants assure that the informed decision-making process required
by the bwiness judgment rule has been met and that the board's
compensation decisions will thw be protected.
If compensation committees functioned in the truly independent
fashion envisioned in their origination, then there would be little
controversy over excessive compensation. The outside directors comprising the committees, bolstered by the efforts of independent compensation consultants, would bargain effectively with management to
produce compensation packages that were the result of serious neg~
tiation and not simple acquiescence on demand. Unfortunately, for
reasons inherent in present board composition and structure, this is
unlikely to occur. & noted earlier, many larger public corporations,
due to atomistic shareholding patterns and ineffective communication
among shareholders, are subject to management capture.1011 No one
passive. Critics argue that IDOst compensalion committees simply rubbcr-stamp compcnsalion

plarlI Nbmitted to them by consultanu hired by management, CaYSTAL, ...tra note 51.at 42-50;
Bcrgcr.tu,...note 101,at3S-S";JoannS. Lublin. ~onP-uGdM_Auw~Hiri..,
Consullonu"'" Si*'infCltu1la, WAU.ST.J..July 15. 1992.atBI. This passhit)" may be dlanging.
Twent)" percent of major corporalions' compcnsalion committees hMc hired their own compensation consultanu 10 get a second opinion on cxccutioc pay plans. 14.
According 10 Professor CrJllal. a former compensation conNltant, ellcculi_ usc NCb
consultanu ro justify their salariCSlD the compcnsalion committee. The compensation consultant
hu a Met)" of techniques at his cIisposallO accomplish this wk. FInt, the consultant wiD compare
the ellCcum.e·s compensation plan with the plans at similar companies 10 determine whcsher the
ellcculivc is being paid compctiliYCly. The ellcculivc and the consultant can manipulate this
process by induding in the Nne}' companies which arc not oboiously similar 10 she subject
company. but which have executha which arc paid CIlCCIIiYCly. In addition, the cxccud\'e may
uk the compensation consulant lD limit his company eomparisons 10 certain eatqories or pay.
For CIlaIDple, if the CIlCCUD\'e hu a NbstandaJ sabry. but docs not recci\'e oplions, he can uk
the consultant 10 Nncy the option granu or similar companies and not their sabry po&del.
explaining that he wiU hire the _Iant to do a salary comparison nCllt ,ear. lnc.;labt". the
comparisons will ~ that the exccum.e mUit be chm more slOCk options. CYCIl if the execuDOC'S base salary dw.Cs the salaries or CIlecuD\'es in eompanble companies. :-ot only mUit the
ellcculivc's pay be compeliti\'C. but it mull prooide she properincenliYCI. Thus.aCter determining
a competiiM ICYd of pay based on eomparisons with other companies. the consultant wiD
Itnacture an incen.nc payment package based on a ...net)" of market and qualitali\'e measures
10 that the elleculi\'e wiD be paid addilional amounts for any improwements in the compan,,'s
performance. CaYSTAL, ...,... note 31. at 42-60. S«iJboBurchman....JmI note 23, at 189; Yablon.
...tr- note 69, at 1877-81.
I . S. "'pra note 20 and accompanying text.
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shareholder or shareholding group possesses enough shares to exercise control of the corporation through the election of a majority of
the board. Instead, incumbent management, through control of the
proxy process, fills the power \'acuum and nominates' its own candidates for board membership.lol The board of directors, theoretically
composed of representatives of\'arious shareholding groups, is instead
peopled by individuals selected by managemenL
Serving on such boards are the officers themselves, individuals
performing \"arious professional services for the corporation, such as
lawyers and iD\'estment bankers, and, finally, those with no real professional attachment to the enterprise other than board membership. lOS
The first two groups, because of their employment or financial relationship to management, may find it difficult to exercise independent
oversighL The third group (from which the membership of the compensation committee is recruited) will rarely challenge management
prerogative either, although there have been recent exceptions)" Such
board members are usually selected either by the chairman or other
senior management and they possess extensive professional and personal ties to the officers that compromise their effectiveness as monitors. 110 These directors are often officers ofother public corporationslll
and frequently ask their counterParts, whom they oversee, to serve as
members of their own boards. Cross-directorships are not uncommon. lI!
There are three problems with such arrangements that lead to
ineffective oversighL First, personal and psychic ties to the individuals
who are responsible for one's appointment to a board make it difficult
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to engage in necessary confrontation. It is always tough to challenge a
friend-particularly where the challenging party may one day, as an
officer of another enterprise, end up in the same position. Second,
conflict with a manager who is also a member ofone's own board may
lead to future retribution on one's o\Vn turf, thus reducing the incentive to acL Third. where one owes one's board position to the largesse
of management. any action taken that is inimical to management may
result in a failure to be renominated to the board, which, given the
large fees paid to directors\13 and great reputational advantage to board
membership, may function as an effective club to stifle dissension.
Such realities hinder effective oversight by a corporation's outside
directors. Because the compensation committees are peopled by such
outside directors, it is highly questionable whether, on compensation
matters, these individuals possess the kind of independence from management necessary to function as effective bargainers for the corporate
interesL 114
Indeed, because of these relational realities, compensation mat:
ters are particularly susceptible to management influence. The single
most sensitive iss'ole to an employee relating to his employment is
compensation. Few issues cause as much excitement or resentment as
how much one is to be paid. A confrontation with a manager over
compensation has the potential to breed more iU-will towards a complaining director than any other kind of policy dispute. Given the
outside director's personal ties to management and the lucrative nature of a board seat, there is very little incentive to engage in a dispute
with an executive over salary. Such a confrontation will breed tremendous resentment and may result in that director's failure to be renominated at the next board election. liS Furthermore, considering that

I"Sfticl.
IN See: SUf/nl nole. 15-16 andlCCOmpanyins lellt tor a disc:uuiOll of !he: cli.linclion betwc:e:n
·ansicle:" and "outside:" clirc:aon.
"'Sftsuf/nl nOle. 21 and 32.
IIISftSUf/nl nole 21 and accompan~inCleXLSft.,. CaTSTAL, IUf/nI nolt: 31. at 22....30;
Cilson &: KnaJunan. 6VJ1N nOle 17. at 88-1. Bu... Marlin Upton Ie S _ A.1tosc:nbluns. A N_
S,,_ ofCttrt-a16 Gowmona: TIN Qui"fuftl1lialElulUm ofDind«s, 58 C.CHI. L Rn.187. 247
(UJWnCthat dirt:CUlr. nc:c:d not baYc: an Id_ _ relationship with manacc:mc:nt llD be c:a'c:c:.
lift).
IIlllwris. IUf/nI nole 2. at 76lit 14. at 76, 7S n.ll!. A. rc:c:e:nt lNeIy or 788 of the: nadon'. larcc:1t public: e:_panie:.
e:onduclc:d by Dirc:cllDnhip. a consulainC firm Joealed in We:.aport, Connc:clicul, round that in 1I9
of !he: companie:. lW'vc:,e:d, the: leade:n or those: bulinc:ue. sc:rftd on one: _aber'. boards in a
"croIl-dirC:Clor.hip" phenome:non. The: .tudy Maber dc:uiled that In 6ft of Ihose: companic:s. the:
c:roll-dirc:cllDnhips in"Ohc:clabe: board.' compensalion commillC:C:'. Cowan. IUf/nI nole 14. at Cl.
The: h compe:nsation e:_millee: cro....lrecaonhip. were B.F. Coodric:h Co. and ErOler Co.:
Conacra. 1nc:. and Vlllmonllndwtric:., Inc.; K£Uog Co. and Cpjohn Co.: Sonoco ProdUCIl Co.
and XalionsBank Corp.; and A.Uerpn.lnc. and Beckman In.lrumc:nll, Inc. 14.
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II'For example. non-anploycc: clirCClOn rt:Cc:ift annual compensation In abe amount or
533.000 at £aon. S!l!l,OOO at 18)1, 548,000 at Ame:rican [xpRu, and 533.000 at Cc:nc:rIII Electric:.
)Io_r. thc:sc: noJloC1llplore:e: dirt:CUlr. wually rccc:ift a re:e of bctwc:e:n 51.000 and 52,000 for
each mc:c:lincatlendc:d.ln Iddition, c_millee: e:halrmc:n usually rc:ceift a supplemc:ntal rcalncr
orbetwec:n 53.000 and $3,000 per annum. ~CA.'o: Ex_I Co.. )far. 14, 1991 hOXT STA~
SID"T. at 7 (1991): Exx_ Co... )far. 6, 1992 hOltT STATPCL'n', at 5 (1992): L'o:TU.'o:ATIO.'o:AL
Bl:llNUI :MACHL'o:IS CoU'•• Mar. 16. 1992 holeY 5TA'r'DCDT, at 10 (1992): CL'o:DlAL Eucnuc
Co. Mar. 3. 1992 hOXT STATPCL'n', al13 (1992). Sow.,. Barris, IUf/nInole I. at 78 n.114. 79.
IH In Iddilion. mosl compcnlalion commillc:c: memben do not haft the: expcr1isc: 10 aalualC
compensation pacUcc. proposc:d by consultanu propcrly.
They arc, ror abe: mOlt pari, not ftry Idept at .laliltic:s and corporate: finance:. and
th"" may not be able 10 rollow abe consultant'. eophislicalc:d re:uoninC' Funher.
th"" baYc: no counsd or thc:lr own to tc:U the:m thaI whal the: consultant is IaJ'incu
or is not true:. So abey may either ran asleep or look repc:aliedly at abelr watches in
such a way thaI abe COnsultanl wiD not flilllD nolice:. CaYlTAL, IUf/nI nole 31. at 30.
115 /4. al226-27: Barri•• IUf/nI nole I. al 79.
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executive compensation has little bearing on a large company's overall
profits, why would an indhidual risk a lucrative board seat on an issue
sure to inflame passions but also certain to have minimal impact on
corporate performance? Fmally, because many outside directors are
also officers of other large corporations, it is not in their own self-interest to object too strenuously to generous compensation, for the
higher their peers' compensation tends to be, the richer their 0\\'11
packages may become.1I1
This reality makes it extraordinarily difficult for an outside director in a management-dominated enterprise to engage in the sort of
active bargaining with executives over compensation that will result in
reasonable salary arrangements. Despite the existence of a compensation committee theoretically comprised of -independent- outsiders to
monitor compensation, the very composition of most boards in the
large public corporation setting limits the effectiveness of that supposedly independent body. A compensation committee is only as independent as its members, and in the typical management-captured
corporation, given the predilections of most outside directors, that
independence is likely to be minimal.
Despite these problems tha~ may lead to the ineffectiveness of a
compensation committee and the full board for that matter, in issues
relating to executive compensation, each director is still subject to legal
requirements as to conduct that should theoretically compel effective
action. Unfortunately, the threat of legal liability has little impact on
director behavior or effectiveness. Ideally, a director should carry out
his or her responsibilities "with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances.-1\7 This would seem to compel circumspect and diligent conduct in executive salary negotiations. Under the
businessjudgment rule. however, a director may be found to have met
this duty of care, if in making a specific business decision, he or she
has acted without self-interest, in an informed manner and with a
rational belief that the decision is in the best interests of the corporaI"Barrii. "".. nOIe t •• 78. S. also CRYSTAt.. " " . . nOle 51. lit tt7-ts (obsenins lhal a
CEO can ensure NCh compcnsadon by pladnc other company CEOI wilh pay pacJtaca rivaIinc
his own on lhe compensation commitlee).
Il7PaDlCIJUS or eoaroRATE Ccn'D.~"CZ,. .~ note 16. S4.01 (a). Approximalely 57 Kalel
ha"C adopled ltatutory dul)' or eare proYisionl; the rest haoe a common law dul)' or care. Ill. at
200. MOlt ItaleS h&\'C adopted a reasonable care ltandard./t/. • n.15. S. also t )CODEL BeSDlESS
Cov.Ac:TA.-or.5dS 8.50. al 954 (1990); CAL. Coar. CoDI: S 309(a) (\\est 1990);~.Y.Bt:s.CoIlP.
lAw 5717 (McKinney 1986); Craham" AI1iI Chalmers Mrs. Co•• 188 A.2d 125. 150 (Del. 1963);
6ut -. "f.• lty. RI:V. STAT. A.'~. 5 2718.8-300(1) (8aIdwin 1989) ("A direcaor lhail discharee NI
duties ••• (i]n a manner he boneldy beliew:1 10 be in lhe best interests or the corporation. j.
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tion. 11I A director who so acts in reaching a business decision is then
protected from any legal liability to his or her shareholders.
This standard of care is not very difficult to satisfy, particularly in
the compensation area. Provided that the directors are to receh-e none
of the compensation they are ~"Oting on and the decision is not ·so
removed from the realm of reason as to appear absolutely irrational
(few decisions could ever be so characterized), two of the business
judgment rule's three elements have been meLI 19 Most challenges to
a particular board decision involve the third requirement, that an
informed decision was made. How exactly does one demonstrate that a
decision was informed? The Delaware Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkoml20 created a number ofimportant guideposts
to informed decisionmaking. In addition to requiring that a board
spend a proper amount of time making a particular decision,l!I the
court also suggested that the retention of some independent thirdparty advisor might assist a board in meeting the ·informed w requiremenll~ Consequently, a compensation committee's decisions may be
labeled -informed w and. thus, protected, upon a showing that the
committee has no actual interest in the salary recommendations it is
considering, has spent a significant amount of time discussing compensation proposals, and has relied on the advice of a third-party
advisor as to the appropriateness of a partiCUlar salary package. And,
in due course, the full board itself is entitled to rely upon the recommendation of its compensation committee when approving a salary
proposal in order to meet its own obligations under the business
judgment rule and, thus. reduce any threat of shareholder liability.l"
The retention of an independent compensation consultant insuW

III PaDlCD'US or CoUOUTE Covu.'CA),'C1:, . ." . nole 16. S 4.01 (c). Where a director bas
not made a busineu decision. such u in cue, or oJDiuion, lhe busineuJudcment rule does nOI
apply and lhe direclOr should be judced under lhe reuonable an: standard. S. Aronson ••
Lewil. 475 A.2d 805. 81 S (Del. 1984).
IItPaDlCD'US or CoUOUTE Covu."A.'tCZ, . .~ _
16,1 4.01 (e) cmL r.
'·488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
ItlltL .874 (boldine dlallhe board or directors _ crouIy nqlleent wben It approved lhe
Ale or lhe company with only two boun or deliberadon).
lit It/. at 876-88. S. ~ Charla M. Elson. F--. o,tnilrrv: An TIaI, Filir • S/IIN14
W.. e-r. 55 OHIO ST. L In. 951 (1992).
IDs.. ...f .• lnternationallns. Co. ~Joluu. 874 F.!d 1447. 1460 (11th Cir. 1989) (-(\V]hen a
board', enUlIIIent or a course oraction merely dl'eetualellhe plans or a disinleresled direclOn'
COIlllll;llCc, lhe board'l aclion Is /Jriwt- ftKW subject to lhe prolections or lhe busineuJudcment
rule. j. s.1IAfinJ nOles 58-59 and aceompanyinc leXL When a compensadon plan is nolapprO\"Cd
by a majoril)' ordilinlerelted directon. the burden or proof shih hm the shareholder challeng.
ing lhe plan to the directors. who mUll prooc dial the plan _ fair to the eorporation. Cohen
•. Ayers. 596 F.2d 7". 759-40 (7lh Cir. 1979).
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I"For eumple. Towers Perrin. the larzc.t eompeaualion consulainl firm -'so c1csips elD·
p1o,cc pension Uld health pIanlI ror companies. CaTSTAI.o IUJWo note 51. at !19-2O.
lIS Id. at 21S-19.
IR/d. al 42-50. S. w.!N note 103.
117 Set, e.f•• Lucian A. Bcbchuk &: "bred Kahan. Fllirvg Opiftioru: H_ Ftlir A~ n., II,",
WMt c.." &DoIvA6out It'. 1989 Dt:u LJ. 27 (1989); WiDiamJ. Carner. Fllirvu 0pi"it1ru: HtnII
A~ n., "'"' m., W. SIwvU Do NoI1aillf A60ut It, 70 W"SH. C. LQ. 5!5 (1992); Elson. su!N
note 122. S. su!N note. 1tG-25 Uld accomp..."u.ltellt.
s.. II1so Sueln L H.....I. Tia n..t Bin4, Fired TIIIII6nmtl.r CEO Will t·"...u~ 0Du 10 "
CAruvIlif'«FirM, W"lLST.J~Aus 25.1995. at AI. Immediately f'oUO'ofinl the ouslcrofTambnnd.
Qairman and Chier Ixcculioc :Marlin C. Emmello the corporadon lI:nninated all eonuacu with
Personnel Corporalion or America (PeA). PeA. a corporalion with which Emmell had dose

F. Sum71ltJ17
The variow proposals for attacking the problem of executi\'e
O\'ercompensation, whether invoMng heightened disclosure, ta.,,·based

F.,.

incestuous relationship'- when a chier hires a compensalion consultant to advise the boud
conceminl exccuuoc eompensalion.ltl.
I. S. CllYSTAI.o w.!Nnote 51. at21~0; ht _Cook, JV/Wllnote 101. at 45, 45 (obscr\;ns
thai the best compensation consultanll are not adoocalCl ror the CIO. bul merely provide
independent, objecli"C advice).
18 S. m!N nOles ~ and accompanying text.
UII CaTSTAI.o m!N nole 51. al 224-28; Barris, m!N note 2. at 77-78. Sa supra noles 112-16
Uld accompanyinl text.

personal ties. is a human resources firm thai had been retained to advise the board or directors
eoneerninl. amonl other malters. excculi\'C compensalion. As a result orpCA". efToru. Emmell
receiocd alucratioc benefit package and options to purchase close 10 600.000 Tambrands shares.
Judith F"ucher. publisher or Ixccuti\'C Compensation llcporu. says thai "it is, or can be. an
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sary to assure a compensation package reasonably related to an executive's professional contributions. This compensation consultant -for
hire- phenomenon, particularly when combined with compensation
committees comprised of outside directo~ who may be unwilling to
challenge management results in compensation arrangements that are
acquiesced to and not bargained for, and, thus, are potentially unreasonable"· Unfortunately, these arrangements enjoy legal protection
through the operation of the bwinessjudgment rule, administered b}'
ajudiciary reluctant to invoh'e itself in compensation disputes. 's
Although a board's we of a compensation committee comprised
exclusively of outside directors has the theoretical potemial to create
reasoned compensation schemes, this solution is entirely predicated
on finding outside directors who are unwilling to compromise their
objectivity in the face of management capture. This potential may
never be realized given the current state of the outside directorship in
the typical large public corporation and the ready a\-ailability of possibly corruptible outside compensation consultants. How, then, can a
compensation committee be made more effective? The solution does
not lie in making the cor:uultants more independent ofmanagementtheir desire for future retention and the subjec:tivity inherent in the
analytic process have rendered this a most difficult goal. Rather, an
approach must be found to promote independent and responsible
behavior on the part of the outside directors. Simply mandating that
compensation decisions be made exclusively by outside directors \Ioill
accomplish little; only if these directors are truly independent in motivation, will the dispassionate bargaining requisite to reasonable compensation ever occur. uo Strengthening the compensation committees
will have negligible impact, unless those who comprise these bodies
are given sufficient motivation to act effectively. This seems unlikely to
occur under the current scheme of director appointment and retention.

lates both the compensation committee and the full board from liability. Theoretically, the use of a third-party advisor would help to ensure
director probity in compensation decisionmalcing. This, of course,
assumes that the consultant acts in an objective and independent
manner when advising the directors. Unfortunately, this is rarely the
case. There are two fundamental problems in the structure of the
consultant/corporation relationship that undercut objectivil}" First,
these advisors are generally hired by management and frequently perform multiple tasks for the corporation.J~f Thus. there is a powerful
disincentive for recommending a salary structure that management
would consider inadequate. It is difficult to cross the party who has
engaged you, particularly if the promise of future dealings with that
party or friends of that party lie in the offing.Js
Second, compensation structuring is not a precise art or science.
It is based on comparisons with what other business are paying. There
is tremendous subjectivity in\"Olved in deciding with what businesses
the client's compensation structure will be compared. The consultant
may look at companies in the same industry, differing types of bwinesses of similar size, or even companies with a similar profitability
picture-the universe is practically infinite,limited only by the number
of businesses in existence. Moreover, the relative weight given to each
element is also completely up to the advisor.I!lI The high level of
subjectivity inherent in compensation analysis and the reengagement
concerns discussed above, have left consultants prone to management
capture in the same way that investment bankers who render corporate
fairness opinions lack independence from the corporation that has
retained them. ltT & a result, the advice given by a compensation
consultant potentially lacks the objectivity and independence neces-
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remedies, judicial involvement, institutional shareholder acthism or
strengthened board compensation committees will ultimatel)' prove
ineffective and, worse still, may even jeopardize corporate well-being.
Although they may attack the problem from various angles, these
proposals fail to strike at the heart of the issue. The real solution to
overcompensation lies with stimulating effective board oversight. This
must take place from within the boardroom itseU: Solutions that attempt to change board beha\ior through external pressure may effect
some positive results, but they do not tackle the problem that created
the overcompensation issue in the first place. The board must act as
its own motivational force. External pressure will have an impact only
so long as it continues to be applied. Once the pressure is reduced due
to public apathy, the problem will resurface. The only long-term solution is to create a corporate regime based on board self-motivation.
Only then will the board function as the effecti\'e monitoring force
both as to compensation and general corporate affairs for which it was
originally created.

m.
"'0
I

N
-...J

THE EQUITY-BASED APPROACH

The overcompensation controversy is the result of unchecked
self-interest on the part of management and passive indifference by
the corporation's board of directors. Because personal greed created
the problem, a similar appeal to individual interest may resolve it.
Externally-based pressure on a board to bargain effectively with management overcompensation, as noted earlier, is an ineffective approach. There is a much simpler and efficacious method to reposition
the board as a counter-force to management in the compensation area.
A. Sloc/r. OwnershiP
The outside directors must be made to consider executi\'e compensation proposals from the viewpoint of the company's stockholders
to whom they are legally obligated instead of from the perspective of
ones beholden to management. It is the stockholders who stand to lose
the most from unreasonable compensation arrangements. Thus, it is
crucial that the company's outside directors re-align their interests and
thinking with those of the shareholders. The most effective way of
creating such perspective is to appeal directly to these directors' personal pecuniary interests. The outside directors must not remain mere
observers of the corporate enterprise, but must become active equity
participants. IT a director's personal capital is potentially affected by
an excessive compensation package, that director is much less likely to
acquiesce to such a proposal. It is easy to spend other people's money

.

BOSTON COLUGE LAW RE\7EW

982

.,

-....

-.., -,

[\'oL 54:9S7

freel}"; it is alwa}"S much more difficult to be inattentively lavish with
what one considers to be one's own funds.
By becoming equity-holders, the outside directors would assume
a personal stake in the success or failure of the enterprise.1SI Decisions
that had a negative impact upon the business would be collaterally
harmful to their own personal financial interests. Thus, director demand for effecti\'e management would no longer be the result of
compliance with distant legal requirements, or ''aguel}' understood
pressures from outside institutions, but would emanate from within.
Directors would have a substantial personal interest in creating an
efficient and competitive management structure. To demand less
would be disad\'antageous to their own financial weD-being.
Equity ownership would act to counter the pressures placed on
the outside directors as a result of management capture. It is very hard
to resist the demands of indi\iduals to whom you owe your position
when your involvement in the venture is limited to the fee you receive
for your services and the continuance of that fee is subject to the wiD
of management. Possessing an actual stake in the venture itself alters
the nature of this relationship considerably. In addition to the consideration that the active monitoring ofmanagement may lead to eventual
replacement, an outside director must also consider that the failure to
exercise effective O\"ersight may also result in the diminution of that
individual's personal wealth. Under such an arrangement, it would not
be quite so easy to simply acquiesce to the demands of management.
Nowhere would the positive effect of a personally-motivated outside directorship be more evident than in the area of executive compensation. Overcompensation is the result of ineffecti\"e bargaining.

u.e

I.,.,

benelill or ouaide dlreclOr Hoek ownership
been weD-doeumented• .s.,
nOle 15. at 61-65 (outside direclOn who own Nbstandal &mOunlS or stoek in their
company are more likely 10 ask discerning queltions than no_1IOdtho1dinC outside dlreclOn):
Louil Fernandez, Ta Dtfmal, CJtiliJl Gtriftl, DIUCTOU Ie BOAaDS. Spring 1985, al51 (dilCUllins tax advantaea or I_It paymenll):james j. Fituimmolll. A 1kf16 AIJI1rMdt III Diftd4r P.,.
DIUCTOU Ie BOAaDs. Sprinr 1m. at 48. 49-50 (director. paid In IIOCk are more dosely aligned
with lbareholderl Uld are in a beller position to enNre that top InUlaeement Is paid based on
ill performance): Edmund W. Utdelidd. A SCGb IIIiIA &rridId SIo6, DDl.ECTOU &: BoAaDs,
Spring 1985, at 51. 52 ("Paying dlreclOn in meaningfUl amoWlIl orreKricted nod pes them a
common ltake with die lhareholders.,. S. also Pearl Meyer. 1M m.. of I1v OIlbiJl DimItw M
...LtuiIJ 0lmIr. DlUcrou lelloAus. Spring 1986, at 41 (obseninC thaI, hiltorica1ly. dlreeton
owned Jarce amounll or IJoek Uld that companies mar be relUminc to this compensation
IhleST)·
Brown Brodlen Harrilnan'1 Lawrence Tucker, who ~ as a direetor on one panicular
corporate board lhat had Ul _rage director invelanent ornearly one mWion doUan. described
that croup as a "board that pays allention•••• I've never seen poc:ket caIcuIalOn COllie out 10
quidlr in my life.' Fi.......... L,"VESTO& 's Bt:s~"lSS DAILY. july i. 1995 at 4.
III The
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People without great incentive to press for position rarely do. Equity
ownership would align the position of the outside director with that of
the group most disadvantaged by unreasonable compensation, the
shareholders. It would pro'i de an incentive to bargain not out of a
sense of duty to some indistinguishable mass of stockholders, but duty
to one's own interest. Given the fundamental fact of human nature
that all are susceptible to the vice of envy, no one delights in providing
a financial windfall to another, most especially when it comes out of
one's own pocket. It is galling enough to see someone overpaid for
their efforts; it is all the more galling to be the \'ehicle for such
overpayment, particularly when the ill-gotten gain results in the perceived diminution of one's own wealth. This dynamic would set an
appropriate tone for compensation negotiations between management
and equity-holding outside directors, and, in turn, create the sort of
active bargaining that would lead to more reasoned compensation.

N
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Very often, though, outside directors do in fact hold stock in the
companies they serve. If equity ownership has any moti'-ational impact
or potential, why then are these directors still so susceptible to management capture? It is not that the possession of an equity position in
a venture has no impact on director motivation, but the fact that these
directors' stockholdings in their companies are insubstantial compared
with the monetary and reputational compensation they receive for
board service. In the typical large public corporation, many of the
outside directors own relatively small amounts of company stock.lS!

STATZloCD'T. at 12 (1991); RAlSTOl' Pt:Im'A Co~ December 10. 1991 Paoxy STATDCL''T. at S-9
(1991); SLUtS RoDeo." Co.• Mar. 21.1991 hOXT STATDCL"T.at6 (1991);WALT DU:\Tr CoItP.,
Dec. 27. 1991 hOXT STATDID'T. at 2 (1991).
ISS Ilemunerallon ror nonoemplO)'ft directors oAen ellceeds 540.000 including their annual
relainer. the ree recei""d ror allending mccangs. and any additional compensation they may
receiw: lOr chairinC committees. S. sa,... note liS. Orten remuneration goes beJond annual
compensation and pa~'lDenll ror meetings attended. For cample. each nonoemplOJCe clirector
at EuuDan EocIak is covered by group term lire insurancc in the amount of $100.000. N_....
plOJCe directon at American Express, who ha"C senecI at leut Ii"" ~ars. are cJigt"ble to recei9C
per annum upon their retirement tom the board. These paymenll continue lOr a
number orJCarl equal to the time sel'\'t:d on the board or until death. Similarly. General ElCC1ric',
DOn-employee direclOn. who ha"C -..eel atleut liYe ,ears. are over 6!i yean of ace. and retire
direcdy tom the board. are e6g1b1e to receloc either an annual paymmt lOr 6re equal to the
amount of the Jut retainer receIw:d or a $4.50.000 lICe Insurance polley. AxDuCAX EXPItISs. )far.
14.1991 hOXT STATDCD"T. at7 (1991); UST)CA.'C KoDAK Co~:Mar. 18.1991l'ROXT nA1'DCDo'T.
at 8 (1991); Cc."DtA1. b.Ecnuc Co~ )far. S. 1992 hOXT STATDCL"T. at IS (1992). S. Bruce
Ovoerton. RlautUrotimt of Oulsitlt DirrdIm, if! ExEc1."TIVE Co1oCPE.'CSAnox: A STltATECtC Ct:m£
lOa TIlt 19901 S8S (Fred Eo Foulkes e~ 1991).
u's.:MAct, suJlrG note 15. at 87-91; o.'CrtOn. sa,... note ISS. at SIIS.
tss S. BaTAX Bt:ameGH .. JOHN HnTAJl. BAUARlAXS AT TIll: CAn: 9;-98 (Harper Peren·
n1a11991). At the time or the LBO. JlJJlXabisco'soullide directors were ....one the h1ehestpaid
direclOn in American Industry. o."non. sa,... note ISS. at S88.

t3lFor cxample. the holdinp of a rew noted oullide dirccton at _raJ larJer public
corporaliona are u rouows:

DlUc::roa
Bank of Boston Donald Monan
ThoDlU B. Wheeler
A1&ed :M. Zeien
m)1
Harold Brown
Xannat Iteohane
Richard :Munro
Mobil
Donald Fites
DIsne,.
Roben Stem
SW1IeY Cold
Sunu~1 Williams
Cary WlIIon

Druc::roa

SILUIES
0
2!6
500
S21
S21
421
200
0

Philip Morris

SIWlU

Rupert :Murdoch

400

Richard Parsona
Sears Roebuck :Mandell de W"Uldt
NonnaPacc
Nancy C. ltcynolds
1taIston Purina D..'idBanb

Francis FCfIUIOn

500
450
400

SSO.ooo

454
200
556

250
480

0

Bank or Boston Corp~ February 26. 1992 PaoxT STATDCL''T. at 6 (11192); L''TEL''AnOl'AL
BesCIo"US:MACHI:<t CoItP~ )Iar. 16. 1992 hOXT STATDCD'T, at 11 (1992); )foalL COItP.• )Iar. 18.
1991 hOXT STATDCD'T. at 7.10 (1991); PHIuP :Mcwus CoXPA."lES L"c~ Mar. 7. 1991 hmeT
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Their major stake in the venture is the fee they receive each year for
board service. Such fees, particularly in the larger corporations, may
well exceed 540,000 per annum-no small reward for a position involving the attendance of only a few meetings a year. In addition, the
social and reputational ad\'3Dtages for board service are obvious. The
more prestigious the company on whose board an indi,idual sits, the
more influential one is considered in the business community,leading
to other opportunities for financial benefit. ISt Outside directors may
sometimes supplement their fees with lucrative consulting contracts
provided by solicitous management. The most glaring example of this
phenomenon occurred during the leadership of F. Ross Johnson, the
legendary CEO of RJR/Nabisco, who had placed several outside directors on the compan~' payroll prior to the leveraged bU)'-out that eventually costJohnson his job.1:I5
Generally, the cumulath-e annual fees paid to each outside director, particularly when considered over the multi-year terms of typical
board membership, involve considerably more money than the usual
value of that director's stockholdings in the business. Most business
decisions involve a consideration of both the costs and benefits of the
contemplated strategy. When an outside director makes a decision that
challenges management prerogative, that director, in a managementcontrolled enterprise, risks retribution from the dominant executives
that might involve the failure to be renominated to the board at the
next election. Obviously, before making such a decision, the director

B. Lengthened Director Terms
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will, consciously or not, weigh the various benefits such a decision
entails, with any attendant costs. Where a director's stockholdings in a
given corporation are substantially less than the income that a director
receives in fees, the potential loss of such fees may weigh more hea\ily
in that director's mind than any beneficial increase in stock \'a1ue that
might result from the corporate efficiencies created. This \I,-ould explain management -capture- e\'en in situations where the outside directors have equity positions in their companies. The key, then, is not
merely stock ownership but substantial ownership.
At what threshold do holdings become -substantial"? To ha\"e a
salutary impact on director beha\ior, equity ownership by outside directors must be significant enough to affect a director's decision-making process. An outside director's shareholding position must be large
enough that, in deciding a particular course of action, concern about
how that decision \I,ill positively affect equity value will subsume traditional desires to placate fee-paying management. A director's personal
shareholdings must weigh more heavily in that individual's decisionmaking process than fee maintenance concerns. The value of that
individual's equity interest in the business must exceed the amount to
be obtaineH through continued fee income. If a director's personal
interest in the company's stock were to exceed the annual compensation and prestige value of board membership, perhaps that individual
would be less willing to side continually and complacently with management when such behavior could have a negative impact on the
company's market \'a1ue and, thus, on his or her personal holdings.
We must make it in the director's own self.interest to challenge and
monitor management. A large equity position in the business would
go far toward accomplishing this goal. But how can we create a stake
large enough to induce favored behavior?
To create the appropriate equity incentive, the corporation should
simply pay the directors their annual fee in company common stock.
As compensation for the exercise of oversight as a board member. it
seems only natural that each director should be rewarded with an
interest in the business itself. In addition, the company should make
a limited cash payment to each equity-eompensated director to cover
any income taxes that may be imposed as the result of such stock
grants. To prevent the quick liquidation of these stock payments and
consequent loss of equity-based incentive. the stock awarded must be
restricted as to resale during the individual's directorship.u6
"'To aJle~le any polenliailiquidilJ' concerns thaI a direclor may ha\'C: as thc rnuh oC Nch
rnlriclion. the corporalion mal' aJI_ the indi..dual 10 pledge the resaicled slOCk as collaleral
Cor either a companrsponsorcd or third-pany loan.
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Although such a compensation system will create substantial stockholdings in the hands of the pre\iously complacent outside directors,
a few problems remain. As noted earlier, to have any sort of fa\-orable
impact on director behavior, the amount of stock that each director
holds must be reasonably substantial. The key is to prO\ide each individual with a block large enough to induce active monitoring. Although a director's yearly fee may purchase a large amount of stock,
it may not be enough to create the kind of stake that \I,ill counterbalance the fear of replacement that management challenge may bring.
Therefore. a director's term of office must be expanded significantly.
Instead of being elected to a term of one to three years, directors
should instead sene for five-year terms. In addition to minimizing the
immediacy of any management replacement threat, such a term will
create in each director both an immediate equity stake aneJ, \I,ithout
yearly re-election concerns. the promise of a fixed number of future
stock grants. Five years' worth of fees paid in company stock should
result in the accumulation of a reasonably substantial equity position
for each director.· sr Moreover, because of the fixed five-year term, the
beneficial impact of equity ownership will manifest itself throughout
the period of board service. A director will either possess the stock
itself or the expectancy of a certain five-year accumulation that will
provide similar incentive.
The quinquennial election of directors is not a new proposal.
Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, two prominent corporate practitioners, have recently advocated such a change in board structure.
along with a host of other major governance reforms. lSI They suggest
that the creation of a fi\-e-year fixed term of office will create a co~
rate -long-term \iew- highly beneficial to corporate ~tality"I" The
main goal of their proposal, hOwe\'er. involves the creation of a corporate governance model -that will lead managers and stockholders to
work cooperatively towards the corporation's long-term business suc-

." For example. if a direclOr is paid 555.000 per annum. at the conclusion or his teral. he
should own SI75.000 in company 'lOCIr.. It he recenes $50.000 per JCM'. he _Id c_p1ete his
term wilh 5250,000 _nil or IlOCL
·3ILiplOn Ie Rosenblum....,.. note 110. a1187. The quinquenniaJ eJeclion oC e1ireclOn is
one parI oCLiplOn and Rosenblum', propouJ Cor comprehensJ.-e reCorm or the prnenl corporale
co-nance I)'Ilem. Their proposal would .Iso bar nonconsensuu changes in coall'Ol be\'ween
elcclions: pro.;de major shareholdcrs o.ith access 10 corporale proxy materials relaling 10 eleclions oC direclorS; require a der:aiJed ,;.~ repon on the company'. perCormance and a
prospeclhe Ii-,ear plan; and lie managemenl compensation awards and penallin 10 the corporation's perCormance againlllhe plan. Ill. atl90.
.,. Ill. al 216.
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cess. -140 Their arguments advocating term expansion focus primarily
on creating a management/shareholder -long term- cooperation relationship, rather than corporate producti\ity through active director
oversight HI Despite this goal, their call for a longer range perspective
on company affairs, an omious by-product of five-year director terms,
is a laudable and desirable result Who can really argue with management and boards of directors making decisions with the long-term
health of the enterprise in mind? Some of lipton's and Rosenblum's
other proposals, especially those promoting the hindrance of changes
of corporate control, are more problematic. They should not detract,
however, from the potential benefits of quinquennial director terms.
If five-year terms can be combined with equity grants, an effecti\'e
incentive for active director monitoring will be created, resulting in
greater producti\ity and responsibility to the equil}'-holders in the
executive compensation area.
There are t",o potential drawbacks, however, to lengthened director terms. First, such terms may make corporate changes of con trol
much more difficult to accomplish, and second, they could lead to the
possible entrenchment of ineffective or even disloyal directors. These
problems are not as dramatic as they would appear at initial glance.
First, shareholders always have' the right to remove a director for
cause,14! a power which should resolve the problem of the disloyal or
inattentive director. Second, provision could be made to allow shareholder removal of directors without cause, which should ease any
potential chilling effect of the proposal on changes of corporate control. However, given the more active director behavior this proposal
should entail, changes of control would not appear so necessary to
compel effective management. Moreover, the -long view- perspective
such a lengthened term may provide to the outside directors, no longer
subject to the pressures of annual election, also weighs heavily in its
favor. Directors, now possessing a five-year time horizon, will find it
easier to make decisions that offer the promise of strong returns over
the long term, even though they may have a negative impact on
profitability in the shon-run. The five-year term has, thus, great potential.
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Of course, as no approach to resolving a particular corporate
problem comes without its costs, we must consider the negative impact
an equity-based approach may entail. One difficulty that increased
equity-ownership may create involves the possible chilling of positi"e
risk-taking beha\ior by the outside directors. A business will onl)' prosper by the amount of risk management is \~illing to take. The greater
the risk taken, the greater the potential return to the shareholders. It
may be argued that outside directors who own large amounts of company stock, particularly those with limited outside assets, will hal'e such
a significant portion of their personal wealth tied to company stock
that they will have an incenti\'e to demand that management adopt a
more conservative risk-taking posture. While such an approach may
preserve the value of these indi\idual's personal holdings through the
steady maintenance of corporate assets, it will concurrently deter the
sort ofaggressive behavior that brings the potential ofsignificant profit
and asset growth. Unfortunately, these individuals would have no opportunity to increase their personal tolerance to risk through the
portfolio diversification techniques other investors utilize, because they
would be forced to hold unsalable restricted stock.
This problem, although not insignificant, is not as troubling as it
would initially appear. It assumes that the commitment of a large
portion of one's assets to a single enterprise inevitably leads to conservative behavior. This is not always the case. Many successful entrepreneurs have most of their personal wealth invested in their businesses.
This does not discourage, but rather acts to encourage risk, for the
ultimate goal of wealth accumulation that motivates these individuals
cannot be met without risk. They achieved success through risk and
their stockholdings encouraged still greater risk because of the potential to share in the larger returns such risk brings. What about those
in business who are not entrepreneurial in spirit, but who possess a
more restrained, managerial bent? For such individuals, unless they
possess significant holdings in other ventures, the commitment of a
large portion of their personal wealth to the company on whose board
they sit may discourage risk-taking. On the other hand, can it be said
that a fee-based compensation program will act conversely to stimulate
risk-taking behavior? Not necessarily. In fact, this is why there has been
a shift in recent years to creating compensation programs for corporate
management that result in executive equity accumulation rather than
simple cash payments. One goal is to encourage risk-taking, rather

... Ill. al 189.

to remOft directon ";!houl caUIe. s.. .., .• CAL CoaP. CoDE § !OS(a) (Wesl 1990); REv. :>OloDI1
BcsI:>o"£Ss CoaP.Arr § 8.OS (1984); ~Y. Bcs. CoaP.1.Aw § 706 (!okKinna- 1986). S. .1111 CAa..
" I:u£:o.-.ac, 1UF" nole 44. al 15s-54.
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than position preservation.14' Creating equity positions in outside directors may have the same impact.
Although some individuals are risk-averse by nature (and, indeed,
the presence on a board of such persons may even be a welcome
counterbalance to those with excessive dare), it is not at all clear that
the payment of directors' fees in cash encourages risk-positive behavior. As noted earlier, in the typical management-captured corporation,
the expectation of continued fee income leads to passive conduct
ultimately harmful to corporate productivity. Risk averse individuals
are particularly susceptible to such pressure. Creation of an equitybased incentive as an antidote to director passivity may produce the
positive impact on behavior that will far outweigh any potential danger
of elevated risk aversion among a few individuals. In fact, the impact
may be risk neutral (for some may be inherently risk-averse) or even
risk-positive.
A second disad\'antage of equity-based director compensation may
be the exclusion from the pool of potential directors of those who
would rather be compensated for their activities with cash. It could be
argued that by refusing to compensate in cash, a corporation could.
deprive itself of the services of a large grO\1p of talented individuals.
No such loss would occur by paying cash fees, for a company could
attract the involvement of both those who desire cash and those who
would prefer equity (these individuals could easily convert their cash
payments into company stock). This argument misses the point. It was
the payment of fees in cash that, in the management-captured enterprise, created the passivity that led to oversight-driven producthity
problems in the first place. A director who would demand only cash
and refuse to take an equity position in the enterprise might be just
the sort of individual who should not serve as a monitor of management behavior. l44 Of course, a director is not giving up the right to
.0 s., c.f•• M"tehacl C. J e - .. E.c¥in J. )(urpJt1. CEO lnund..-lt" Not H_ Mum You
B~:s. REv•• ~June 1990. a~ 138. 141 ("By conU'OUing a meaningful
percentage or IOtaI corpora~e equity. seniOC' managen experience a direct and powulul'Cccdbadt
dect' from changes in market \'aIue."); Slepben F. O'Byme.l.iMirtf M_-e-m' IfIafIli_ 14
SItIIrMoIMr WIIIlIA"J. Co.,.. AcCT." FL'(~AulUmn 1991. at 91. 97; AllsaJ. Baker. St«A 0jIfi0nI-d
Pm T1t4t Buill Sili_ VGII.9. W.w. ST.J••June 23, 1992, at A2O; Cilbcn Fucbsbcrg. F~ Crilic
tfBitSt«APltmJForCEOs N-SutJ1tlrfJ T
W.w.ST.J~ Dec. I&, 1992.atBl; /Iu' _Amanda
Bennett, ToAm, Sled: Bit F~ Ra, M_
O/»iotv /lui FIIilI4 EII4 P., CriIicisIll, WALL ST.J~
Mar. 11, 1992. at AI.
'''One commencaror scaleS that be triD not sene on public company boards unlcu be can
make a Nbscanlial cub In_cnt in the company. This large Inoatment allows him 10 get
IntlOlvo;d In ncarly c¥cry facet of lbc busincu, wbleb in IUm creates a cbance 10 earn a N bstanlial
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compensation by being paid in stock. The form of compensation is
simply being \'aried. Indeed, to decline to serve simply because of a
non-eash form of payment suggests the sort of purely mercenary mentality that has led to the entire problem of management capture. A
board made up ofindividuals willing to demonstrate a real commitment to the shareholders they were elected to serve by taking an equity
position in the enterprise is a corporation's best hope. An equity-based
director compensation system \\ill lead to the type of board composition that will maximize management productivity. And reasoned executive compensation will be a beneficial by-product of this approach.
D. The Empirical Evidence

Central, of course, to the effectiveness of an equity-based solution
to the compensation dilemma is the assumption that stock ownership
has a positive impact on director behavior. For this approach to succeed, there must be a link between equity ownership and more motivated director behavior. An empirical examination of the executive
fompensation \'Oting behavior of boards composed ofoutside directors
with substantial stockholdings, compared with boards whose outside
members do not possess large equity stakes, may act to demonstrate
the potentially positive impact of an equity-based approach.
Business lVeeh magazine, in conjunction with Standard 8c Poor's
Compustat Services, Inc., conducts an annual survey of 500 of the
nation's largest publicly-traded corporations in an attempt -to measure
how closely- executive compensation by those companies -matches
performance. -'45 The study uses two lleparate approaches to rate performance. The first compares an executive's compensation package
with the business's total reNrn to shareholden in stock appreciation
and dividends over a three-year period. The second measures compensation against corporate profitability for the same time period. The
survey is conducted by assigning each company examined to one of
nine industry groups. A comparison is made among those companies
in each group based on how their individual compensation programs
compared with shareholder return and company profit. A -performance rating- is then assigned to each company surveyed for each of
the two categories examined. Each business is thus rated on a scale of
1 (indicating the best performance) to 5 (indicating the poorest). "The
relUm as well as decreases the chance of lawsuiu liom olber shareholders. \\i111am A. Sahlman.
W7I] Sane P«1p1l SIaould,,', &rw ... Pu6lic BoartlJ. HAllY. Bt:s.REv•• ~June 1990. at !S.
teByrne, SuJ1'4 note 2. a~ 148.
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top 15% of the sample receives a 1. 25% a 2. 30% a 3. 20% a 4. and
10% a 5."146
.
Assuming that this sun·ey. conducted by two independent organizations. possesses even minimal validity in its assessment of the relationship between pay and performance. it provides an excellent starting point for an empirical examination of the link. if any. between
-reasoned" compensation and outside director stock ~nership. Of the
500 companies examined in the Business Week study, approximately
158147 were selected that possessed. in either one of the two categories
examined. either the poorest possible rating ("5") for compensation
in relation to performance. or the best ("I"). The proX)' statements of
41
14'47 Allied
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sipal. Inc.: AIltel Corp.; Amerada Hesa Corp.; American Isprell Co.; American
Home Produeu Corp.: American Inll:rnalional Croup. Inc.; AmlCn. Inc.; A.'IP. Inc.; Apple
Computer. Inc.;Arco Chemical Co.• Allanlic Richfidd Co•• Automauc Data Processin«. Inc.: A\'On
Produeu. Inc.: Baker Hughes, Inc.; Ballhnore Cas &: EJectric Co: Banc One Corp.: Bear Stearns
Companies. Inc.; Bc:ckton Didtinson &: Co.; Berkshire Hatha_r. Inc.; Bell Laboratories, Inc.;
Biomet, Inc.; BristoJ.:'>I,'Cn Squibb Co.; Burlin«ton l":orthc:rn. Inc.; Burlin«tOn Raources. Inc.;
Capital CilieslABC, Inc.; Carolina Power &: Ught Co.; Caterpillar. Inc.; CBS. Inc.: Centc:rior
Ener«)' Corp.; Cenn! &: South Wcst Corp.; Chase: Manhattan Corp.; ChClllicaJ Banking Corp.;
Chrysler Corp.; Cilic:orp; Coc:a-Cola Enterpriscs, Inc.; CoIIImonwealth Editon Co.; Compaq Com·
puter Corp.; Consolidated Rail Corp.; Cooper lire &: Rubber Co.; CosliCO WhoJc:saJe Corponlion;
CPC Internalional. Inc.; CSX Corp.; Deluxc Corponlion: Detroit Editon Co.; Digital Equipment
Corp.; Dominion Resources, Inc.; Dow Chemical Co.; Dukc Power Co.; Eastman Kodalt Co.; Ethyl
Corp.; Exxon Corp.; Federal Expreu Corp.: Futh Third Bancorp. FU'It Chicago Corp.; First
InlCntalC Bancorp. Flc:c:tIl':onW' FananciaJ Croup,Jnc.; Ford )lotor Co.; FPL Croup. Inc.; Frank.
lin Resourccs. Inc.; Frec:pon.)lc)(oran. Inc.; Cc:nc:raJ EJccaic: Co.; Cc:neraJ :'>loton Corp.; Cc:nu·
inc: Paru Co.; Colden West FInancial Corp.; Creal Lal<c:s Chcmical Corp.; Hcwleu-Pac:l<ard Co.;
Hillenbrand Industries. Inc.; HJ. Hcin& Co.; Home Depot, Inc.; Honc:yweU. Inc.; H &: R Block,
Inc.; Inll:l Corp.: 1n_lional Bwincu )(achines Corp.; Intc:madonal FlIl¥On &: Fragnnccs.lnc.;
rrr Corp.; Keycorp; Kimberl)' Cark Corp.; Uz Claiborne. Inc.; Lon« Island IJ«hting Co.; L,-onddl Pelt'OChemical Co.; )layrag Corp.; )(BfA, Inc.; )(CCormick Ie Co.. Inc.;)lO Communicalions
Corp.; )lead Corp.; )lcdeo Containmcnt Seniccs, Inc.; McDon BanIt Corp.; )(erriD Lynch &: Co..
Inc.; )Gaoson Corp.; :Iolobil Corp.; )Iolc:s. Inc.; )lorm Stanlcr Croup, Inc.; Xalco ChClllical Co.;
l":alional Medical Enterprises. Inc.; l":c:wmont Cold Co.; l":c:w Yorlt Tunes Co.; :-:ike. Inc.; l":O\'CU.
Inc.; l":ucor Corp.; l":yncx Corp.; Ocdde:ntaJ Petrolcum Corp.; Oracle: Systems Corp.; Pacilicorp;
PaD Corp.; Panmount Communic:aclona, Inc.; Pennsyhania Power Ie JJchl Co.; Pc:nnzoiJ Co.;
Phdps Dodge Corp.; Philip Morris CoIIIpanies.lnc.; Pioneer Hi-Brc:d In_clonal. Inc.; Premier
Industrial Corp.; Primc:rica Corp.; Ralston Purina Co.; Rec:bol< Intc:rnalional, Lsd.; Jtoadwa.y
Sc:niccs. Inc.; Rubbc:nnaid. Inc.; Saf'eco Corp.; Salomon. Inc.; San Dic:p Cas Ie EJc:c:tric Co.;
SchJumberter. Ltd.;Seolt Papcr Co.; Sc:an Roebuck Ie Co.; Southern Co.; Southern l":c:w England
Telc:communicalions; Stanlcr Works; SLJude: )lcdical. Inc.; Stone: Containc:rCorp.; Stryl<cr Corp.;
SunlrUsl Banb, Inc.; s,nIl:X Corp.; Tambnnds, Inc.; TECO EnU«T' Inc.; Telc:cOlllmunicalioM,
Inc.; Tribune: Co.; Tenneco. Inc.; Tc:xaco. Inc.; Texas Instruments, Inc.; Texas t:tilitic:s Co.;
TordunU'k Corp.;
Inc.;
:Io1c:dicaJ Incorporall:d; Tyco Labontories, Inc.; t:nion Camp
Corp.; t:nion Carbide: Corp.; t:nion Pacific Corp.; t:AL Corporalion; Unill:d Technologies Corp.;
t:nocaJ Corp.; t:pjobn Co.; t:.5. Bancorp; Walt Disnc:y: Wasil: Management, Inc.; WeDs Fargo Ie
Co.; WeslinchoulC Electric Corp.; W'allamcac: Induslries, Inc.; W'um-Dixie Stores, Inc.; WilConsin
Energy Corp.; Wm. WriglcrJr. Co.
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each of these selected corporations were then reviewed to ascertain
how much company stock was held by each of the companies' outside
directors. This study then compared the stockholdings of outside directors serving on the boards with the worst ratings (indicating O\'erpaid executives) with the holdings of outside directors on the boards
of companies with the best ratings (indicating reasonably paid executives). This comparison was an attempt to test the h}opothesis that
outside directors on the boards of companies that pay their executives
in a "reasoned" manner are more likely to have substantial equity
holdings in those companies than outside directors on the boards of
companies with "overpiud" executives. It was then determined how
many companies in the two groups were run by boards in ""hich
outside directors with individual holdings valued in excess of$10,ooou'
constituted a majority of the full board and thus theoretically controlled that institution. This procedure was repeated for holdings \'a1ued
in excess of $25,000. $50.000. $100.000. SI25.ooo. $150,000 and
$200,000.
The results, presented in Table I. tend to confirm the initial
hypothesis on the relationship between equity holdings and effective
compensation oversight. The greater the value of outside director
holdings. the more likely it was that the corporation surveyed would
be managed by "reasonably" compensated executives. In the group of
companies with overcompensated executives. as the value of the stockholdings of the outside directors increased, the number of companies
with directors holding such equity positions decreased dramatically. At
the $10.000 level, 83.1% of the companies surveyed had outside director stockholdings meeting the relevant criteria. At the $50.000 level,
the percentage dropped substantially to 42.2%. and at the $100.000
level. the percentage fell to 18.2%. Finally. in the $200,000 category.
the highest level surveyed, only 6.5% of the companies in the overcompensation grouping had outside director equity holdings at that \'a1ue
level
The results for those companies in the "reasonable" compensation
category differed significantly. To be sure, there W3S, as the dollar
criteria grew. a decline in the numbers of companies meeting the
standards at each level. The decline. however. was not nearly as steep
or dramatic as in the overcompensation model and bottomed out at a
significantly higher base percentage. At the $10,000 level. 75.5% of the
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'-The s_k priccs used to a1eulate: the dollar ftIuc of the outside clircclDrl' llOdthoIdings
rc:Oected the dosin« marl<cl ftIucs of the wrious IlOCb as ofJuJr 9. 1992. WALL ST. J~July 9.
1992,.1~5.

L,

I"""

r

l",.

I

L"

L,~,.

1.

t,-P.

I.

L._".

-, -, --, -,

-, -, -, --, -, --, --, -, -, -, ......, --,

'I

994

,~~
"ti

'til:

I

C

.¥
U
c
~

~

c

c:

C.

5

c

...c
u

l!~;;iE~~~

C:IIIi-:'"':=:~~

---:-.=,

~tte

i~~
-i.e

-I
- :" *'

':~t:

te.:
~

ti
S"'ft

COE

5

~~~tE~~~
r:.t.:--~

..~",,~

~::i~~~~~

I:!!c.

:: sg
5 ...

!l

ClC

~

>

I:: .§
.. ~X
rs
.:: u

'"C

':"'0
- ...
U
U

I

VJ
VJ

~ ~

c
_u u

c..
ClC ~ e
an£lo
-cu
oJ

>..~~
~E.o
Ic:

=

8c
fr.1-S-

c:
C u

~ ~

.=
'"

I-

5
C

-C
S

Vi

c

i

r!Q
U
~

--t I

S,:

~
co·j!!!

ri2
ljEK,

~~~t!t~~~
-C'C\Of..,

.....

."

:i~~~i=.:

~55

I

-=

c'c 'c
CJr:r:

~~ii

til

:s ~
E
C

teSeS
"
e's'o
....~Zuu
= '"' s...
.0.0
="?ee

;:~~~I:=~

=..
~ -; 's=
Q

.!!

... c.. c.
c E E

== I
58-

11 c
c.:o
...

.s

~

~.~.~

ii

.!

-=

U '=
.-

>."=

S

c:

eC
u

ic:
Q

...=

..

"B

ic

co

rl

i!l:R::i:!::e>Oft

J

Q

Col

.0

e

i

~~~§-~§.~.

c ....
;;=
..
AAAAAAA
:R8..,c~

-~:::

IJOSTO.'· COLUCE LA1V REV1ElV

(\ol "':9'7

companies surveyed had outside director stockholdings meeting the
relevant criteria. At the 550,000 level, the percentage dropped to
48.1%, and at the $100,000 level, the percentage stood at 32.1%.
Finally, in the 5200,000 category, 18.5% of the companies in the -reasonable- compensation grouping had outside director equity holdings
at that value level.
While at the lower le"els of stockholdings, S10,ooO-$50,ooo, the
results in both groups were rather similar, it was when the base holdings reached the $100,000 level that the two groups diverged sig- .
nificantlyand the effect of equity ownenhip on compensation patterns
appeared to ha"e the greatest impact. At the $100,000 le\'el, only 18.2%
of the companies in the overcompensation grouping met the equityholding criteria; at S150,ooO, only 11.7%, and at S200,OOO, just 6.5%.
This differed significantly from those companies in the -reasonablecompensation grouping where, at the S100,Ooo level, 32.1% met the
criteria, at the 5150,000, 23.5%, and at the $200,000 le\'el, 18.5%. &
the stockholding le\'els gre\v, the spread between the two groups increased significantly. At the 5100,000 level, there were almost ~ice as
many companies with -reasoned-.compensation schemes than those
overcompensating their executh·es. And at the highest le\'el, the spread
between the two grew to almost three times in number.
What, then, do these numben demonstrate and how do they
relate to an equity-based solution to the O\'ercompensation problem?
The results of this survey suggest that at lower levels ofoutside director
equity ownenhip-that is, less than S50,OOO-the impact of equity
ownenhip on director behavior seems inconsequential. But as the
value of director holdings increases, the two groups experience su~
stantial divergence in result. Substantially fewer of the corporations
that are overpa}ing their executives, at least by the standards of the
Business Week study, are run by boards numerically dominated by
outside directon with substantial equity holdings in those businessesthat is, greater than $100,000 per director. Many more of the companies that are reasonably compensating their directon have boards
numerically controlled by outside directon with large stockholding
positions. At the S2oo,ooO level, there are almost three times as many
companies that -reasonably- compensate their executi,-es as those in
the overcompensation category. Although this is obviously not a SUT\"e)'
of great scientific precision, it does suggest that there may be some
connection between heightened equity-ownenhip and more effective
compensation oversight. The more substantial the holdings become,
the greater the appearance of a link between stock ownership and the
kind ofeffective monitoring that leads to reasoned compensation. This
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-,

September 199')

EXECU11\'E OVERCOMPENSATION

fact gives support to the theory that the creation of substantial equity
positions in the outside directors may lead to more effective compensation oversighL
Missing, of course, from an interpretation of the results of the
study, is any indication of the effect of a five-year board term on
director behavior. None of the 158 companies surveyed had such a
term structure. What does appear from the results, howe\"er, is an
indication of the positive impact not simply of stock ownership, but of
substantial stock ownership. The key to more effective compensation
monitoring, then, is to create in each outside director a substantial
equity position in the business itselt The payment of director fees in
stock, in combination with five-year terms of office, lI.ill create such
holdings. As noted earlier, \019 implementation of this plan will result in
outside director stakes in the larger corporations of at least $175,000,
or even higher, which, as indicated in the survey, is well above the level
at which positive benefit appears to begin.
The empirical evidence yielded by this study, does suggest that in
the realm of executive compensation, companies with boards composed of outside directors with significant shareholdings, are less susceptible to the charge of executive, overcompensation than those companies that do noL Fewer of those companies that are believed to
overcompensate their executives, have outside directors with significant holdings in the business than those enterprises with levels of
executive pay that are viewed as proportionate to services delivered.
An alignment of the directors' interests with those of the shareholders,
rather than with management, through the development of large
shareholding positions resulting in more effective oversight, would
explain this phenomenon. Thw, an equity-based approach to the
compensation controversy seems potentially helpful and warranted.
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of a management unresponsive to shareholder welfare because it is
unchecked by appropriate monitoring and oversight 1»" an active and
involved board. Such seU:interested management, moti\'ated primarily
by personal gain, may create the kind of ineffective corporate enterprise that will result both in diminished shareholder profit and leg.
ened overall societal wealth. Eventually, when corporate productivity
declines sufficiently to provoke a market-based response to the situation-the wholesale replacement of management-the problem of
overcompensation lI.ill be remedied. But by the time this occurs, the
damage to the enterprise that ineffective management brings ~ill already have taken place and, in the highly competiti\·e world market,
may prove fatal to the enterprise. Thus, in practice, a market-based
solution may come along too late to save the enterprise, and is an
ineffective remedy to the problem.
This destructive result need not occur. The key is to prevent the
problem from ever developing, not to ·solve" it once it has manifested
itself and lessened shareholder value. A number of solutions. to executive overcompensation have been proffered including heightened disclosure, tax-based remedies, judicial involvement, institutional shareholder activism, and strengthened board compensation committees.
Several of these approaches attempt to eliminate the problem without
attacking the root causes, thus creating the potential for its eventual
reemergence. All, unfortunately, will ultimately prove ineffective, and
some even potentially harmful to corporate well-being.
The most effective solution lies in stimulating effective board
oversight. We mwt reinvigorate the board from within; each director
must function as his or her own motivational force. The only real
long-term solution to the compensation controversy is to create effective management monitoring based on board self-moti\'ation. Such
internal motivation will result from substantial equity-ownership on the
part of the outside directors. To create the sizeable shareholdings that
may achieve such positive monitoring, directors should be paid their
annual fee in company stoe:k. To ensure that the holdings grow large
enough to induce the desired behavior, this equity-eompensation proposal must be combined with a quinquennial term of office for each
board member. Director stoe:k ownership may not prO\"e the comprehensive cure to the overcompensation problem, but the costs of this
approach are minimal and it is a good beginning. This proposal may
well result in more reasoned executive compensation schemes, more
effective board oversight, and, most importandy, a healthier, more
competitive corporation•

Executive overcompensation is a serious problem that weakens the
corporate enterprise and undermines public confidence in the management of our largest institutions. It is primarily the result of ineffective monitoring and bargaining on the part of corporate boards of
directors. Unlike a number of governance issues, it is not susceptible
to effective solution through the normal operation of market forces.
Overcompensation is not merely a problem in and of itsel£ Rather, it
is symptomatic ofa more serious problem within the corporation-that
•tt Sa
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Introductory Note.
This ·outline" consists of: (a) In Section II, brief description of examples of
settings in which lawyers involved acquisitions must deal with present value
concepts; (b) In Section III, an in-depth analysis of ·fair price" (a concept from
the jurisprudence of corporate fiduciary duties) and ·fair value" (a concept from
appraisal statutes) by the author in his law review article, Rutheford B Campbell,
Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N. Car. L. Rev. 101
(1999); and (c) In Section IV, a couple of important Kentucky cases, which will
demonstrate, hopefully, the kinds of problems lawyers will face as they attempt
to deal with complicated valuation problems in the face of older decisions that
may not reflect properly modern finance theory and modern developments from
other jurisdictions.
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ft

II. Examples of settings in which lawyers must deal with "fair value and/or "fair price
guestions.

ft

A. Transactional lawyer representing a special negotiation committee in
an affiliated acquisition.
E.g., Majority shareholders (70% owners) of Corporation cause a
freezeout of the minority shareholders through merger of
Corporation into NewCo,. Majority shareholder of Corporation own
100% of NewCo. The purpose of the freezeout is to eliminate
sufficient numbers of shareholders to qualify for S Corporation
status. Prior to the transaction, Corporation was earning, after
taxes, $1 million. Because of the elimination of the income tax at
the corporate level following the freezeout, NewCo will earn
apprOXimately $1.3 million. Prior to the freezeout, Corporation has
200 shareholders and thus is very thinly traded.

J
...

J

B. Transactional lawyers representing the board of a target company in a
friendly all cash acquisition.
E.g., In a friendly, negotiated deal, Aggressor offers to acquire
Target in a transaction structured as a statutory merger for $10 per
share. In determining whether to approve this offer and recommend
the merger to its shareholders, Target's board must measure
Aggressor's $10 offer against some measure of the "faif value for
Target. Thus, if the "faif value for Target is more than $10 per
share, the board's fiduciary duty requires that it reject the offer.
Legal rules determine how "faif value is to be measured.

iI

IIIIIi

C. Litigator representing shareholders of a target company in a suit
alleging breach of fiduciary dUty or exercising appraisal rights (or both).
In order, for example, to determine whether the litigator should accept a
settlement offer, obviously the litigator must understand the legal rules
applicable to the calculation of fair value and fair price.
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CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
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RlITHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR..

In statutory corporate acquisitions, dissenters' rights entitle
shareholders of acquired corporations to obtain a "fair value" for
their consideration, while common-law fiduciary duties ensure that
such shareholders receive a <Yair price" in the transaction. Courts,
however, have had difficulty defining and measuring fair value
and fair price, leaving this area ofthe law in disarray. This Article
reviews the current framework of appraisal rights and fiduciary
duties and proposes refined definitions offair value and fair price
that are based on attractive moral and economic values widely
shared by society. The proposal respects the expectations of
shareholders and provides guidance for the proper measure of
valuations in acquisitions.
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INTRODUCTION

In a statutory corporate acquisition,! the stockholders of the
acquired corporation are entitled to receive adequate consideration
for their stock. 2 This right is protected by state appraisal statutes,
pursuant to which stockholders who are unhappy with the terms of
the acquisition can exercise their dissenters' rights 3 and thereby
receive cash equal to the "fair value" of their shares.4
Stockholders of the acquired corporation also are protected by
common-law fiduciary duties, which ensure that they receive a "fair
price" for their shares. The term "fair price" grew out of the common
law of corporate fiduciary duties as applied in affiliated acquisitions,
in which a court is required to consider fair price as a part of its
evaluation of the acquisition under the intrinsic fairness test. s Even
1. Mos! corporate statutes provide expressly for acquisition through merger. share
exchange, and sale of assets. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 11.01-12.01 (1998).
Today, approximately 24 states have adopted some form of the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA or "Model Act"), and seven states have corporate acts based on
an earlier version of the MBCA. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. at xxvii (Supp. 1997).
2. Stockholders on the acquiring side of the transaction also may be entitled to
receive fair value through appraisal in certain instances. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 13.02(a)(I).
3. See, e.g., itt. § 13.02(a)(I)-(3).
4. See, e.g., id. § 13.01(3) (defining "fair value"); id. § 13.02(a) ("[S]hareholder[s] ...
[are] entitled to ... fair value.").
5. See, e.g., Weinberger v. DOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-15 (Del. 1983): see also infra
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non-affiliated, arm's length acquisitions, however, generate a fair
price requirement,6 as the directors of Trans Union Corporation
learned in Smith v. Van Gorkom.7 Fundamentally, the Trans Union
directors in Van Gorkom failed their common-law fiduciary duty
because they did not take reasonable steps to ensure that the
stockholders of Trans Union received a fair price for their stock in an
arm's length transaction.s
Resolving matters of fair value and fair price is difficult for
courts.9 For example, cases involving the resolution of what
constitutes fair value and fair price require courts to make financial
calculations involving complex judgmentapO and theoreticapt issues
note 32 and accompanying text (describing the intrinsic fairness test).
6. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining a manager's obligation to
en<;ure a fair price for the shareholders).
7. 488 A,2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
8. In Van Gorkom, the board of Trans Union approved, subject to a shareholder
vote, the acquisition of Trans Union by the Pritzker interests at $55 per share. The court
noted that the "high and low range [for the trading price of Trans Union's stock] for 1980
through September 19 (the last trading day before announcement of the merger) was $38
1/4 to $29 112." [d. at 866 n.5. The Delaware Supreme Court held that, even though the
sales price was well above the trading price the day before the merger, the board's
approval of that acquisition violated the business judgment standard because the board
had not used reasonable care to investigate the proposed acquisition. See id. at 874; see
also infra note 30 (providing a concise statement of the business judgment standard).
Subsequently, the Trans Union director-defendants became parties to a $23.5 million
settlement of the Trans Union stockholders' claims. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERtALS ON CORPORATIONS 627 (7th ed. 1995).
9. Commentators also try to define and explain fair price and fair value. Predictably,
those who are devotees of the law and economics movement ("Contractarians") are
driven by their fundamental assessment of the dominating importance of economic
efficiency and the need to get assets into the hands of the most efficient users. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
351, 370 (1996) (arguing against protection for minority shareholders in buyout
transactions because such protection prevents optimal asset investment). Contractarians,
accordingly, are less concerned about a "fair" sharing of value than about providing
sufficient economic incentives for, and removing all impediments to, the flow of assets into
the hands of the most efficient users. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions. 91 YALE W. 698, 700-15 (1982) (arguing in favor of. and
defending as fair, an unequal sharing of gains from corporate control transactions).
Other commentators opposed to, or at least strongly suspicious of, the
Contractarians' views and factual assumptions ("Regulators") consider major corporate
restructuring as a transaction rich in opportunities to treat certain stockholders unfairly.
Regulators, therefore, as compared with Contractarians, typically have an expansive view
of fair price and fair value and define those terms in ways designed to ensure some "fair"
sharing of the benefits of transactions with all stockholders. See, e.g., Victor Brudney &
Marvin A, Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 297, 345 (1974) (arguing fairness requires that gains from mergers be shared among
all interested parties).
10. Present value calculations require many factual predictions or guesses about
future events. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) opinion in the Atlas
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that can be puzzling for courts unaccustomed to the world of
corporate finance. Nevertheless, courts in recent years have done
much better in dealing with such issues, especially in states such as
Delaware, where much of this litigation takes place. 12 With some
facility, courts now often deal with financial concepts as complicated
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model,13 a circumstance that is a far cry
from the primitive analyses utilized by courts in earlier periods. 14
Notwithstanding such progress by courts in the area of financial
calculations, fair value and fair price cases continue to be perplexing,
and some of the most difficult issues for courts involve the allocation
Pipeline case, although not involving an acquisition. provides a classic example of such
guesswork. See In re Atlas Pipeline Corp.• 9 S.E.C. 416, 421-40 (1941). In Atlas Pipeline,
the SEC significantly underestimated the value of Atlas apparently because the SEC
judged inaccurately the probability that the United States would enter int" World War II.
See VICfOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATION, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 31-32 (4th ed. 1993) (providing information
regarding the unpredicted commercial success of Atlas during the wartime economy).
11. "Theoretical" matters are not always distinct from "judgmental" matters. The
intent here, however, is to establish a "theoretical" rubric that includes, for example: (1)
whether present value should be determined by utilizing earnings calculated under
generally accepted accounting principles or, alternatively, whether cash flows should be
used to establish present value, see Walter J. Blum & Wilber G. Katz, Depreciation and
Enterprise Valuation. 32 U. CHI. L REV. 236. 238-42 (1965); and (2) whether an
appropriate capitalization rate for a company should include unsystematic or unique risk,
this latter issue arising when valuation of a company is measured by some form of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 183--88 (5th ed. 1996).
12 Professors Macey and Miller reported some years ago that 40% of all New York
Stock Exchange Companies were incorporated in Delaware and that 82% of all
reincorporations went to Delaware. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L REV. 469, 483 (1987).
Various theories are offered for the preeminence of Delaware in corporate charters. For a
description of these theories. see id. passim, and Roberta Romano, The State of
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L REV. 709. 720--25 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at
*23-24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (mem.), rev'd on other grounds, Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). For an explanation of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 183--88,990.
14. Earlier cases in which courts provided inadequate analyses for their valuations of
corporations or ownership interests in corporations include Hottenstein v. York Ice
Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 952-53 (3d Cir. 1943), Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 418,422-25 (D. Del. 1944), Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198,205
(D. Del. 1943), affd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944), Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 763, 771 (D. Del. 1943), Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Del. Ch.
1943), State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853, 864 (Iowa 1948), Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39
N.W.2d 341, 347-50 (Mich. 1949), Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215, 21~17
(NJ. Ch. 1944), affd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944), Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d
200,202 (N.J. Ch. 1943), Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1943), Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89, 99-100 (R.I.
1969), Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025, 1033-36 (Wash. 1952) (en bane).
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of the significant financial gains often generated by acquisitions. 15 In
such instances, courts must resolve the matter of how much, if any, of
the value created by an acquisition is included in fair value and fair
price and accordingly shared with the shareholders of the acquired
corporation.
To a significant extent, courts' difficulties in dealing with such
matters are the result of their inability or unwillingness to articulate
fundamental underlying principles for fair value and fair price
determinations. Without such principles, outcomes lack consistency
and predictability and also may lack sound moral or economic
footing.
The impact of unprincipled decision-making falls in the first
instance on the parties involved in corporate acquisitions. Consider,
for example, a simple affiliated transaction in which a subsidiary
corporation is to be merged into its parent, and, under the terms of
the definitive merger agreement, the minority public shareholders of
the subsidiary are to receive $10 per share in cash for their stock. The
board of directors of the subsidiary typically is required to evaluate
the offer and, if the deal is to go forward, must recommend the
merger to the subsidiary's shareholders.'6 If the offer of $10 per share
is less than a fair price for the stock of the subsidiary, the board is in
danger of violating its fiduciary duty to the subsidiary's shareholders
if it recommends the transaction. The board, therefore, must
measure its conduct against the criterion of fair price. As a corollary,
shareholders of the subsidiary, in voting on the acquisition, also will
evaluate whether the offer of $10 per share amounts to fair value and
fair price. If the offer falls short of fair value or fair price, then the
shareholders are not limited to the proffered exchange and may have
valuable claims against the corporation and its managers.
The definitions of fair value and fair price, however, have
significance beyond the particular parties to the transaction. Because
the meanings assigned to fair value and fair price impact both the
allocative efficiency l7 of society's assets and the fairness of the

,

...
J

15. See infra notes 72-96, 107-28 and accompanying text.
16. For example, under the Model Act, the board of the acquired corporation is
required to "adopt" the plan of merger and "recommend" the plan to the corporation's
shareholders. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 11.01, .03.
17. In this piece, economic efficiency is used to mean an allocation of assets or rights
to those who are willing and able to pay most for them. This definition is widely used.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12-16 (5th ed.I998). I do
not mean to imply that Judge Posner believes that the pursuit of economic efficiency is
necessarily morally attractive. Other definitions of economic efficiency are discussed in
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
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distribution of those assets among its citizens, society also has a strong
interest in the proper definition of those terms.
Using the simple example above, the parent is encouraged to
undertake the merger if it is able to freeze out the public minority
shareholders at a low price, because the lower the price is the more
the parent nets from the transaction. If one assumes that the parent is
the most efficient user of the subsidiary's assets (an assumption, of
course, that is not legitimate in all cases), the low price encourages
the movement of assets into the hands of the most efficient user. IS
The low price under those factual assumptions, therefore, promotes
an efficient allocation of assets.
At the same time, however, the distributive impact on the parties
involved in a freeze-out of the minority shareholders at a very low
price may be morally unacceptable to some. Assume an extreme case
in which the market value of the subsidiary stock prior to the
affiliated merger is $10 per share and the parent undertakes the
freeze-out at $1 per share. The distributive impact of that transaction,
even if it leads to an economically efficient allocation, may be morally
unacceptable to many.19 Setting fair value and fair price at an amount
well above $1 per share in such a transaction is one way society can
eliminate such distributive inequality.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate fair value and fair
price in a manner that is intelligible, as well as morally and
economically attractive. The principles underlying this analysis are
512 (1980).
18. This type of analysis also is proffered as support for an argument against
management's deployment of antitakeover tactics in the face of a hostile bid for a
company. Because such takeovers are viewed as a situation in which assets (the target)
flow into the hands of more efficient users, and because defensive tactics can increase the
price that the bidder will have to pay for the target, some commentators argue that
defensive tactics will reduce the economic incentive for more efficient users to attempt to
acquire underutilized assets. Much of the thinking and debate on these matters can be
found in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding 10 a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981), Daniel R.
Fischel, Efficient Capilal Markel Theory, the Markel for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L REV. 1 (1978), and Ronald J. Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV.
51 (1982).
19. In Economic Analysis of Law, Judge Posner specifically disavows an opinion on
the morality or desirability of pursuing economic efficiency (i.e., pursuing an allocation of
assets in which assets are in the hands of those willing to pay most for the assets). He
views his book as a positive work and admits, or at least suggests, that a state of economic
efficiency mayor may not be morally attractive. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 15,30. In
another work, however, he defends the moral attractiveness of economic efficiency as a
goal of society. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the EffiCiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L REV. 487, 488-502 (1980).
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based on a reasonably strong version of consent. If one is able to find
that the corporate constituencies, shareholders in this case, consent to
a particular measure of fair value and fair price, then holding the
shareholders to their bargain is morally attractive and economically
sound. Morally, permitting shareholders voluntarily to allocate rights
to share in wealth in the event of an acquisition of their company is
consistent with principles of both utilitarianism20 and Kantianism.21
Similarly, permitting shareholders to trade with regard to such rights
is the very essence of the creation of economic wealth. 22
20. To use a simple example. assume initially that Shareholder A has the right to
receive all the corporate synergy generated by an acquisition. If Shareholder A prefers
cash to the synergy right and Shareholder B prefers the synergy right to cash, a purchase
of Shareholder A's synergy right by Shareholder B must make each happier, otherwise
they would not trade. Total utility, therefore, is increased by the trade, assuming that the
trade generates no disutility for third parties. Utilitarianism in a modcm setting i$
discussed in JJ.e. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANSM, FOR AND AGAINST
(1973), and H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 828, 829-31
(1979). It is worth noting, however, that utilitarianism has been subjected to intense
criticism from various quarters. See, e.g.• POSNER, supra note 17, at 13 ("The fact that one
person has a greater capacity for pleasure than another is not a very good reason for a
forced transfer of wealth from the second to the first."); Coleman. supra note 17, at 511
(summarizing popular criticism of utilitarianism); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191,216 (1980) ("[U]tilitarianism, as a general theory of either value or
justice, is false and its present unpopularity is well-deserved.").
21. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUcnONTOJURISPRUDENCE 70-82 (rev. ed. 1990), in which the authors present a
compact and thoughtful discussion of Kantianism as a basis for legal rules. Broadly.
Kantianism refers to analyses based on the work of Immanuel Kant. although Murphy and
Coleman warn that what they present as "Kantianism" "is in no sense attempted to be a
literal presentation of the views of Immanuel Kant." Instead, they present "a kind of
moral view that is highly Kantian in spirit." [d. at 99 n.6.
The following quotations from Murphy and Coleman are helpful to illuminate the
meaning of Kantianism, as it is used in this Article: "Kantianism ... is the view that the
rational choice in ethics is always the choice that respects the rights of autonomous
persons freely to determine their own destinies, even if respect is bought at the cost of a
loss of happiness or well being." Id. at 71. Kantianism is respect for individual autonomy,
based on "our status as free and autonomous creatures with the capacity to make choices
that are rational in a special sense." Id. at 77. If, therefore, individuals consent to a
particular allocation of rights in the event of acquisitions, and society respects their
bargain or trading on the matter, then society is acting in a manner that is respectful of
individuals and their autonomy and, thus, in a manner that broadly is consistent with
Kantianism.
Judge Posner has used a somewhat similar,argument" to link consent with
Kantianism and ultimately with his view of the moral attractiveness of the pursuit of
wealth maximization. See Posner, supra note 19, at 488-502.
On Kant more generally, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT (1970) (presenting a critical discussion of Kant's philosop'hy).
22. Judge Posner, for example, describes trading as a'·'basic economic principle"
necessary to achieve economic efficiency and to create wealth. See POSNER, supra note
17, at 12-17. This is easily explained. If one defines economic efficiency as an allocative
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Part I of this article is a brief overview of appraisal rights and
corporate fiduciary duties applicable in acquisitions.
Part II
highlights the confusion and uncertainty of present definitions of fair
value and fair price and provides a foundation for later discussions by
parsing the corporate value that is available for division among
stockholders in acquisitions. Part III then describes the present state
of the law regarding stockholders' rights to fair value in appraisal
proceedings and fair price in fiduciary duty cases. The Part, to a large
extent, explains today's rules by reference to the corporate value
parsed in Part II. Part IV offers refined definitions of fair value and
fair price. These refined definitions also are described by reference to
the parsed value of Part II and, hopefully, are founded on attractive
moral and economic values that are widely shared by society.
I. ApPRAISAL RIGHTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN ACQUISITIONS

Both appraisal statutes and fiduciary duty rules protect the right
of an acquired corporation's shareholders to receive some fair
measure of corporate value in a statutory acquisition. Accordingly, a
brief overview of appraisal rights and fiduciary duties as they apply to
corporate acquisitions is a helpful way to begin.
A.

Appraisal Rights

Corporate statutes provide appraisal rights for stockholders
whose companies are acquired in statutory acquisitionsP Appraisal
rights are predicated solely on the nature of the particular transaction
and are available without regard to any wrongdoing or conflict of
interest on the part of persons or entities involved in the particular
covered transaction. 24 Accordingly, a dissatisfied stockholder of a
state in which resources or rights are in the hands of those willing to pay the most for
them, then economic value or wealth is created by moving resources or rights from the
hands of those who are not willing to pay most into the hands of those who are willing to
do so. Rules that facilitate such trades, therefore, lead to economic efficiency and the
creation of economic wealth or value.
23. See 2 AMERICAN LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 291-99 (1994) [hereinafter ALI CORP. Gov.]
(describing the history of appraisal proceedings, the breadth of the remedies available in
various states, and the actual use of appraisal proceedings in acquisitions).
24. The Model Act, for example, permits stockholders to exercise appraisal rights in
several transactions, including mergers, share exchanges, sales of substantially all assets
other than in the regular course of business, and certain amendments to the company's
articles of incorporation that significantly affect the rights of stockholders. See MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02.
All states provide for statutory appraisal rights. See ALI CORP. Gov., supra note
23, at 292. Not unexpectedly, variations appear among states. See Hideki Kanda & Saul
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corporation acquired, for example, in a statutory merger is entitled to
have the acquiring company pay her or him cash for the securities
that are exchanged in the acquisition,2S provided, of course, that the
.. dissatisfied stockholder follows the complex'procedures that typically
are part of the state's appraisal regime. 26
Shareholders of an acquired corporation who perfect their
appraisal rights are entitled:.to receive cash equal to the "fair value"
of their sharesY

B.

Fiduciary Duties

Shareholders of acquired corporations are also protected by
fiduciary duty principles. Fiduciary duty claims by disgruntled
shareholders of corporations that are acquired in arm's length
acquisitions typically are evaluated under the business judgment
standard.28 The standard requires corporate managers to perform
their tasks, including the facilitation of acquisitions, in good faith and
without any significant conflict and reasonably to investigate the
proposed action. 29 If these criteria are met, the ultimate decision of
an acquired corporation's managers to pursue a particular acquisition
of their company under particular terms violates their fiduciary duty

Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Low, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429,
445-61 (1985) (examining the variety in various appraisal statutes by contrasting
appraisals in Delaware, New Jersey, and New York). The Reporter's Notes to the
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance observe generally that "[a]1I
jurisdictions grant dissenters' rights in at least some mergers" and specifically that "[f]ortyfour jurisdictions expressly grant an appraisal remedy in connection with certain sales
amounting to all or substantially all the firm's assets." while "[t]wenty-five jurisdictions
expressly grant an appraisal remedy for certain amendments to the certificate of
incorporation." ALI CORP. GOV., supra note 23, at 29fr97. For an outstanding
description of the evolution of the appraisal remedy, see Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Low, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-23
(1995).
25. The Commentary to the Principles of Corporate Governance states that the
"better justification" for the right to appraisal is "that it can curtail unfair conduct by those
controlling the corporation through an ex ante provision that does not involve high
monitoring costs." ALI CORP. Gov., supra note 23, at 293.
26. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. C~P. Aer. §§ 13.2D-.31.
27. See id. § 13.02(a). Recently, proposed amendments to the appraisal provisions of
the Model Act were promulgated. These amendments, if adopted by the states, would
change both the scope of the appraisal proceedings availability and the definition of "fair
value." See MODEL BUS. CORP. Aer. §§ 13.01'-.31 (Proposed Changes 1998), available in
Proposed Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Appraisal Rights, 54 BuS.
LAw. 209,251-67 (1998).
28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), is probably the most famous case
applying the business judgment test to acquisitions. See supra note 8.
29. See infra note 30.
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only if that judgment is so bad as to amount to something similar to
gross negligence.30
On the other hand, an acquisition undertaken in a conflict of
interest setting, such as a corporate parent's acquisition through a
statutory merger of a public minority's interest in its subsidiary, is
evaluated under the intrinsic fairness test. 31 Under the intrinsic
fairness test, the decisions of the acquired (subsidiary) corporation's
managers and its controlling stockholder (parent) to facilitate or
undertake the acquisition are evaluated against a more general
concept of fairness. In considering whether the acquisition is fair,
courts look at two elements, fair price and fair dealing. In the final
analysis, however, fairness is considered as a whole and not as a
function of its individual elements.32
In all cases, whether or not a conflict is present, managers'
conduct in acquisitions is measured against some fair price criterion.
In cases without a conflict, corporate managers' facilitation of an
acquisition of their company at an unfair price will violate their
fiduciary duty under the business judgment standard, unless the
managers are able to defend the loss flowing from their malfeasance
by establishing some level of due diligence. This defense, of course,
does not detract from the primary obligation of managers to garner a
30. The Principles of Corporate Governance state that a director or officer meets his
duties under a business judgment test if the director or officer "makes a business judgment
in good faith" and:
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent
the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
ALI CORP. Gov., supra nOle 23, § 4.01(c).
The standard under the Principles of Corporate Governance by which the actual
judgment of the director or officer is evaluated is described in section (3), above, as
"rationally believes." The Delaware Supreme Court defines that standard as one of "gross
negligence." This Article uses the Delaware Supreme Court's definition. See, e.g., Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. The difference between "rationally believes" and "gross
negligence" is uncertain.
31. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
32. See ill. Later language, however, clouds the applicability of this approach. In
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor Ir), 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), the court
stated that, under an intrinsic fairness analysis, the defendants "must establish ... that the
transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price." Ill. at 361 (emphasis
added). The language was repeated in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor
III"), 663 A.2d 1156,1162 (Del. 1995). Later in the TechnicolorJII opinion, however, the
court referred to the "unified approach to entire fairness mandated by established
Delaware law" and, still later, to the "non-bifurcated components of entire fairness." Id.
at 1172.
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fair price for the acquired corporation, but instead merely protects
directors if their fault level is low. Cases involving a conflict apply the
.-intrinsic fairness-doctrine, and the- fair price obligation is even more
direct. In these cases, unless managers of the acquired corporation
obtain a fair price for the stock of the acquired corporation, the
managers risk a determination that the transaction was not
intrinsically fair. 33
C.

The Relationship Between Appraisal Rights (Fair Value) and
Fiduciary Duties (Fair Price)

Courts generally have determined that the measure of fair price
is different from the measure of fair value.34 With the possibility of
two different measures of recovery, depending upon the path a
disgruntled shareholder takes, cases inevitably arise addressing
whether a disgruntled stockholder subjected to an acquisition may
obtain one remedy or the other. 3s
Stated succinctly, courts usually hold that appraisal with its fair
value remedy is the exclusive remedy for disgruntled stockholders in
an acquisition, unless the transaction involves some measure of unfair
dealing. 36 Accordingly, when the controversy is only about price and
33. Although the fiduciary standard by which managers' conduct is evaluated
appropriately changes. depending on whether such managers are acting in a conflict or a
non-conflict setting. the constancy of the fair price requirement across all such decisions
makes sense. Fundamentally. the fair price requirement is based on the managers' broad
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. and that obligation of managers is ubiquitous.
Thus. managers' approval of any acquisition of their company, irrespective of the
existence of conflict, always must maximize shareholder wealth in order to meet the
managers' fiduciary obligation. In other words. managers must always ensure that
shareholders receive a fair price for their shares.
The discussion in the balance of this Article relies primarily on affiliated
acquisitions. which typically involve managers in conflict decisions and thus subject them
to the intrinsic fairness test. No attempt is made to distinguish or discuss separately
conflict and non-conflict cases. Notwithstanding this emphasis in the discussion. the
-analyses and this Article's ultimate proposal respecting the appropriate measure of fair
price are intended to be applicable to both conflict and non-conflict situations.
34. See infra notes 45-132 and accompanying text.
35. In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor 1"), 542 A.2d 1182. 1188-89
(1988). the court held that a disgruntled shareholder may pursue both appraisal and a
breach of fiduciary claim in one lawsuit. although double recovery is not permitted.
36. See Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp.• 498 A,2d 1099. 1104-05 (Del. 1985);
Weinberger. 457 A,2d at 714; Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co.• No. Civ. A, 10307. 1996
WL 159626. at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1. 1996) (mem.); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. Civ.
A. 7244, 1933 WL 208763, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 8. 1993) (mem.). Statutes also typically
deal with the exclusivity of appraisal proceedings. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 13.02(b) (stating that the appraisal is exclusive. unless "the action is unlawful or
fraudulent"). Professor Thompson argues that "[a]ppraisal should not be exclusive until
there is a comprehensive legislative treatment of the remedy." Thompson. supra note 24,
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not about process, unhappy stockholders are entitled only to pursue
their appraisal remedies and receive fair value.37 Apparently this
outcome holds even if the price offered in the acquisition is extremely
unfair.
II. PARSING SYNERGY
This Part of the Article parses the additional economic value, or
synergy,38 created by corporate acquisitions that move assets into
more efficient hands. 39 This parsing is undertaken through the use of
the following factual pattern, which, although hypothetical, is meant
to be representative of recurring reality.40 This analysis is later used
in Part III as a framework to consider the present definitions of fair
value and fair price, and Part IV uses the analysis to propose an
appropriate definition of fair value and fair price.
Assume that an acquidng corporation ("Acquiring
Corporation") merges an acquired corporation ("Acquired
Corporation") into itself through a statutory merger for a cash price
equal to $10 for each of Acquired Corporation's outstanding shares of
common stock. Prior to the merger, Acquired Corporation has one
million shares of common stock outstanding. Acquiring Corporation
owns 51% of the Acquired Corporation's outstanding shares of
common stock, and the remaining 49% of Acquired Corporation's
An Acquired Corporation
common stock is publicly owned.
stockholder, Ms. C, is unhappy with the terms of the acquisition and
believes her one share of Acquired Corporation is worth considerably
more than $10.
As to the value of Acquired Corporation, assume the following
facts exist immediately before the acquisition:
(1) Acquired Corporation's common stock is selling in an
at 54.
37. On the other hand, when the case involves unfair dealings, courts are willing to
allow disgruntled shareholders to pursue fiduciary remedies. See Thompson, supra note
24, at 24 n.l02 (acknowledging and listing "[a]t least eleven Delaware cases in the last
decade [that] apply the fair dealing/fiduciary duty standard from Weinberger without
relegating the plaintiff to appraisal").
38. "Synergy," as used in this article, means total additional value created by moving
assets into new hands.
39. See supra note 22.
40. The parsing in this section is similar in structure to the approach Professors Gilson
and Black take in their fine teaching materials. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 253--638 (2d ed. 1995).
Their book provides an excellent discussion of the economic and legal aspects of most of
the Additives discussed in this Article. Their materials are rich in legal and economic
analyses and citations.
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efficient market41 for $10 per share.
(2) Acquired Corporation has not disclosed the material fact
that it just signed a lucrative government contract to supply the parts
for a new jet fighter. If disclosed, this fact would increase the market
price of Acquired Corporation's common stock by $1 per share. The
increase in value of Acquired Corporation's stock that would be
generated by the disclosure of the information is referred to herein as
the "Information Additive."
(3) During the last year, the managers of Acquired Corporation
made an unwise, discrete decision that violated the managers'
fiduciary duties to Acquired Corporation. Assume, for example, that
the company's board of directors caused Acquired Corporation to
invest in a project that was a total loss and that the decision to invest
was so unwise as to violate the business judgment standard applicable
to the decision. No move has been made to pursue legal recourse
against the legally culpable managers. As a result of this breach of
duty, the company suffered damages that, if reasonably pursued
through legal means, would increase the market price of Acquired
Corporation's common stock by $1 per share. The increase in value
in Acquired Corporation's stock that would be generated by pursuing
a legal remedy is referred to herein as the "Discrete Mismanagement
Additive."
(4) Acquired Corporation owns an expensive machine used in its
operations and currently uses only fifty percent of the machine's
capacity. Managers of Acquired Corporation could reduce this
overcapacity inefficiency through a number of means, including
selling the machine and outsourcing the particular function, renting
the excess capacity to other manufacturing companies that need the
function, entering into strategic alliances with other companies, or
merging with a company, such as Acquiring Corporation, that can use
the excess capacity. These steps, if reasonably pursued by Acquired
Corporation's managers, would create an operational savings that
would increase the market price of Acquired Corporation's stock by
$1 per share. This increase in value in Acquired Corporation's stock
is referred to herein as the "Operational Savings Additive."

-

I

J

-

41. "Efficient market," as used in this Article and unless otherwise indicated, means
only that the market for the particular stock is sufficiently active to absorb information
effectively into the price of stock and to reflect the preferences of traders. The term does
not mean that necessarily all information about the stock and the company is available to
the market. For instance, some information may be unknown and thus not impounded in
price. Scholars have developed various measures and descriptions of market efficiency.
See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 321-27.
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(5) In addition to the foregoing, Acquired Corporation is
significantly and broadly mismanaged or undermanaged. Assume, for
example, that the board fails to monitor senior management, thereby
enabling senior managers to divert too much corporate value to
themselves, fails to make efficient investments in technology, fails to
capitalize on expansion opportunities, permits bickering among top
employees that significantly and adversely affects production levels,
and fails to uncover significant theft and diversion of assets by top
employees. As a result, the efficient market reduces the price it is
willing to pay for the stock of Acquired Corporation. If the company
were managed at a reasonable level of skill and integrity-that is, at a
level that approximates the minimum level required by fiduciary
standards-the market price of Acquired Corporation's common
stock would increase by $1 per share. The increase in value in
Acquired Corporation's stock that would be generated by such better
management is referred to herein as the "Reasonable Management
Additive."
(6) If Acquired Corporation were broadly managed at a superreasonable level- that is, at a level that approximates the finest
available management-the market would increase the value of
Acquired Corporation's common stock by an additional $1 per share.
The increase in value in Acquired Corporation's stock that would be
generated by the finest available management is referred to herein as
the "Super-Reasonable Management Additive."
(7) By moving Acquired Corporation's assets into the hands of
different managers, 500 of Acquired Corporation's present employees
could be eliminated. One way, but not the only way, to accomplish
this cost saving is through Acquired Corporation's merger into
Acquiring Corporation. Terminating the 500 employees without
cause is legal, although some may feel morally troubled by such a
firing of workers without cause.42 The total savings from the
elimination of such jobs would result in an increase in value equal to
$1 per share for each share of Acquired Corporation common stock
outstanding and is referred to herein as the "Labor Reduction
Additive."
(8) To effect the acquisition, Acquiring Corporation, or other
acquirers of Acquired Corporation's assets, will borrow heavily. As a
result of the additional leverage, the existing creditors of Acquired
42. For example, an interesting body of scholarship argues that such conduct on the
part of the corporation may violate an implied contract with workers. See infra note 167
and accompanying text.
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Corporation will lose significant value, wliich will be captured by the
equity holders of Acquired Corporation and Acquiring Corporation.43
The total value that will be transferred from creditors to equity
owners as a result of this additional leverage amounts to $1 for each
outstanding share of Acquired Corporation's stock and is referred to
herein as the "Creditor Value Reduction Additive."
While all of this hypothetical background is admittedly tedious
and somewhat complex, parsing the total value, or synergy, created
by moving the assets of Acquired Corporation into new hands
advances the analysis offered in this Article in a number of ways.
First, it demonstrates that acquisition synergy does not spring from
any single source, but is instead generated by various economic
considerations. The parsing also illuminates the principal bases for
the synergy generated by corporate acquisitions. 44
More broadly, the parsing facilitates an examination of the
allocative and distributive implications of rules governing the sharing
of synergy and further assists the evaluation of the moral and
economic force of the arguments various claimants may make for that
synergy. One is able to anticipate, for example, that Ms. C will lay
claim to her proportionate share of the synergy, arguing, perhaps as a
matter of distributive equality or "fairness," that she has a legitimate
43. The highly leveraged transactions of the 1980s attracted much attention in the
legal and financial literature. Authors report both the loss to creditors that resulted from
such transactions, see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L REV. 931,
933 n.2 (reporting that between 1984 and 1988. the bonds of 183 companies "lost value as a
result of mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts"), and the gains to shareholders
resulting from such transactions, see, e.g., Bernard Black & Joseph A. Grundfest,
Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162
Billion Is a Lot of Money, J. ApPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1988, at 5 (estimating that the
wealth of stockholders increased $162 million during the period between 1981 and 1986 as
a result oftakeovers).
44. The parsing in this section does not necessarily exhaust the sources of gain or
synergy generated by acquisitions. For example, Professors Gilson and Black state that
tax benefits are a "common explanation" for the incentive to acquire. GILSON & BLACK,
supra note 40, at 454. Gilson and Black go on to say, however, that "the accuracy of the
claim that a significant number of acquisitions are tax-motivated ... has remained hard to
assess." Id.; see also ALAN J. AUERBACK & DAVID REISHUS, The Impact of Taxation on
Mergers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUlSmONS 69, 70 (Alan J. Auerback ed.
1988) (claiming that although tax incentives may playa role in acquisitions, convincing
evidence is limited). In another article, Professor Black opines that "[t]ax effects are most
important in [leveraged buyouts], where they may explain perhaps a third of the observed
premiums, although estimates vary." Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 611 (1989).
In any event, the elements of value separated by the parsing in this section are
sufficient for the purposes of this Article, because any additional sources of value, such as
tax savings, can be allocated by reference to the analysis this Article provides.
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claim to a payment amounting to $17 for her one share of Acquired
Corporation stock. Parsing facilitates the evaluation of the legitimacy
of her claim.
III. THE MEASURE OF FAIR VALUE AND FAIR PRICE UNDER
TODAY'S LAWS

This section describes and analyzes today's laws regarding the
calculation of fair value and fair price, with attention paid to the
obligation to share synergy. What emerges from this discussion is a
series of discrete rules that cannot be explained by reference to any
unifying principle.
A. Appraisal Rights and the Right to "Fair Value"

1. The Model Business COrporation Act
Under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),
shareholders of an acquired corporation who dissent normally are
entitled to receive, in lieu of the consideration offered in the
acquisition, cash equal to the "fair value" of their stock. Fair value is
stated to be "the value of the shares immediately before the
effectuation of the [acquisition] ... , excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the [acquisition] ... unless exclusion
would be inequitable."45
The ambiguities in the critical terms of this definition of fair
value are apparent. 46 "Value" is undefined,47 leaving unanswered, for
45. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01(3). Recently a proposal was made to amend this
definition of fair value as follows:
"Fair Value" means the value of the corporation's shares determined:
(i) immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the
shareholder objects;
(ii) using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques generally
employed for similar businesses in the context of the transaction requiring
appraisal; and
(iii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status except,
if appropriate, for amendments to the articles pursuant to section
13.02(a)(5).
MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 13.01(4) (Proposed Changes 1998), supra note 27, at 251.
46. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy and How Courts
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE U. 613, 627 (1998) (discussing the limited guidance
available in the language of appraisal statutes with respect to the determination of fair
value).
47. California defines appraisal value as "fair market value." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1300(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). The act goes on to define further the timing and
method of calculation: "The fair market value shall be determined as of the day before
the first announcement of the terms of the proposed reorganization or short-form merger,
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example, the fundamental question of whether "value" should be
computed as liquidation value or going concern value.
"Appreciation," which normally is excluded from fair value under the
terms of the definition,48 is also an undefined term. Thus, returning to
the parsing of synergy described in Part II of this Article, an issue
exists as to whether the statute intends that all of the Additives be
considered "appreciation" and accordingly beyond the reach of
dissenting stockholders. Finally, the term "inequitable" is undefined,
once more leaving uncertain the matter of whether it is "inequitable"
to exclude dissenting shareholders from sharing in some or all of the
Additives described in Part II.
The Official Comment to the MBCA provides some guidance for
dealing with these ambiguities, stating that the statute "leaves to the
... courts ... the details by which 'fair value' is to be determined."49
Regarding the impact of pre-existing common law on the calculation
of fair value, the Comment states that the MBCA leaves "untouched
the accumulated case law."so
The drafters of the MBCA, therefore, purposefully left critical
terms in the appraisal statute ambiguous. The intent apparently was
to delegate to courts the task of determining the essential components
of, and methodologies for, calculating fair value and to reaffirm, or at
least leave unchanged, the existing jurisprudence on these matters.
2. Cases Interpreting Fair Value
Courts faced with interpreting ambiguous appraisal statutes have
articulated a number of rules regarding the calculation of fair valueY

-i

excluding any appreciation or depreciation in consequence of the proposed action ...."
[d.

48. New York law, however. allows sharing of such appreciation with dissenters. See
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §623(h)(4) (McKinney 1986); see a/so Cawley v. SCM Corp.. 530
N.E.2d 1264. 1267 (N.Y. 1988) (interpreting New York law as including in appraisal value
elements of future value derived from the merger); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp.. 473
N.E.2d 19,27 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
49. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01, official cmt. 3.
50. [d. Recent proposed changes in the Model Act also change the Official Comment
on fair value. See MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 13.01(4), official cmt. 2 (Proposed Changes
1998), supra note 27, at 255. The Comments to the Proposed Changes state, for example,
that the new definition of fair value "permits consideration of changes in the market price
of the corporation's shares in anticipation of the transaction, to the extent such changes
are relevant." [d. The Comment goes on to approve valuation techniques for fair value
that include "assigning a higher valuation to corporate assets that would be more
productive if acquired in a comparable transaction, but excluding any element of value
attributable to the unique synergies of the actual purchaser of the corporation." [d. at 256.
51. For an outstanding discussion of how courts have dealt with fair value cases. see
Wertheimer, supra note 46, at 626-702.
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These rules, however, generally are limited in scope and appear to
have no unifying principles.
Predictably, such rules lead to
problematic and inconsistent outcomes.S2
a. Going Concern Value
One rule that seems well settled in case law is that fair value is
based on going concern value and not on the liquidation value of the
corporation. s3 Intuitively, this rule seems correct. Stockholders
52. One problem for courts is the nearly dizzying array of valuation techniques that
may be offered by the parties in a single case. For example, in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing
Co., No. Civ. A. 7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.),: the dissenters'
experts offered three separate methods of valuation to the court. See id. at ·3-7. In
another example, In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992), the expert
for the dissenting stockholders offered three separate valuations of Shell, each based on a
different valuation methodology, and the company's expert also offered three additional
valuation metboos for calculating the fair valul" (\f Shell. See id. at 1216-17.
When faced with an offering of multiple methodologies for the determination of
fair value, a court must either select from the methodological offerings of the litigants or,
perhaps, reject all such offerings and utilize the court's own methodology. Thus, for
example, from the six analyses offered by the parties in Shell Oil, the Vice Chancellor
selected one methodology, referred to in the case as the "present value of equity analysis,"
and determined that analysis to be "entitled to the greatest weight." Id. at 1218. The Vice
Chancellor, however, finally arrived at fair value by discounting the "present value of
equity analysis" by 20%. See id. In Cooper, also mentioned above, the court found none
of the proffered valuation methods persuasive and thus used its own, different fair value
methodology, which was "based upon an estimate of the actual market value of the stock
as determined from ... [the] successful tender offer price" for the company. Cooper, 1993
WL 208763, at ·8. Although the courts in both Shell Oil and Cooper attempted to explain
the selection of their particular fair value methodology, neither was successful. Neither
court provided any meaningful principle for the selection of one methodology over the
other.
To some extent, the opinion in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983),
explains the parties' proffering of multiple valuation methodologies. Weinberger
eliminated the Delaware block method as the "exclusive" method for determining present
value in Delaware and practically solicited future parties to offer any method of valuation
that was reasonable. See id. at 703-04. For a description of the Delaware block method
and the valuation computation under that method, see the authorities cited in infra notes
55-56. More fundamentally, however, the proffer of multiple methodologies by litigants
and the difficulty courts have in articulating criteria for selection from among the various
offerings may best be explained by the absence of principles. Unconstrained by clear and
sensible principles, litigants naturally offer differing valuation methodologies that suit
their particular preferences. Without a theoretical anchor, courts, especially when faced
with such multiple methodologies, are likely to make inconsistent selections over time and,
thus, provide no guidance for future litigants. The cycle, therefore, repeats itself, as future
litigants are able to select their preferred methodologies from prior unprincipled decisions.
Surveying all this, Professor Wertheimer nevertheless concludes that "the most
prominent method of valuation in Delaware has been the discounted cash flow ...
method." Wertheimer, supra note 46, at 627.
53. In Delaware, this rule goes back many years, see, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950), and continues to be applied uniformly today. See, e.g.,
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (stating
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invest in anticipation of participating in the value that a corporation
generates as a going concern. Thus, to the extent that appraisal is
designed to compensate stockholders for what is taken from them,
going concern value, and not liquidation value, seems the appropriate
measure of fair value.54
Even this most fundamental idea, however, is applied unevenly.
For example, some courts allow liquidation value to seep into going
concern value calculations by considering liquidation value as a
component of going concern value. Such is the case with the
Delaware block approach,ss under which liquidation value or, as it is
called, "asset value," is typically accorded significant weight in the
present value calculation.s6
that liquidation value is not appropriate as the sole measure); Shell Oil, (lJ7 A.2d at 121819 (same); Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 7%, 803 (Del. 1992) (same).
54. Liquidation value, however, should be considered a part of going concern value if
there is some probability that liquidation may in fact occur. In such a case, the anticipated
proceeds from liquidation comprise a part of the company's cash flows that are discounted
to a present value. To use a simple example, assume it is anticipated that Acquired
Corporation wiII generate cash flows of $100 in each of years one and two, wiII generate
no cash flows in year three, and wiII be liquidated for net value of $100 at the end of year
three. The going concern value of Acquired Corporation should be the discounted value
of $100 per year in each of the next three years. The liquidation value of $100, therefore,
merely becomes a part of the anticipated cash flows of Acquired Corporation. The
approach that the SEC used to value Atlas in In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 43738 (1941), provides an example of the use of this methodology.
Similarly, liquidation value is relevant to going concern value because a high
liquidation value may reduce the risk of the investment. Financial economists generally
view risk as the range of the dispersion of probable outcomes. See WILBUR G.
LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 8-18 (1%9) (providing a utilitarian explanation for
risk aversion and an explanation why investors, therefore, accept risk only if paid to do
so); see also BREALEY & MYERS. supra note 11, at 143-66 (explaining risk in terms of
variance or standard deviations). A high liquidation value may compress the lower range
of outcomes from an investment, thus reducing the variance in possible outcomes and
accordingly reducing risk and increasing the present value of a company or its stock.
55. Prior to Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701, the Delaware block method (or, as it also
was called, the weighted average method) of valuation was the exclusive method for
valuation in Delaware. See, e.g., Francis I. DuPont 7 Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
312 A.2d 344, 349-50 (Del. Ch. 1973), affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); In re Delaware
Racing Ass'n, 206 A.2d 664, 670 (Del. Ch.), affd, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1%5). Writing in
1984, Dean Joel Seligman observed that "in the post-World War II period, virtually all
states followed the Delaware block-valuation approach." Joel Seligman, Reappraising the
Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 841 (1984). Delaware courts have
correctly noted that Weinberger did not prohibit the use of the Delaware block approach,
but instead only eliminated the methodology's exclusivity. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985). Other jurisdictions apparently continue to rely on the
Delaware block approach. See, e.g., Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d
1308,1311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
56. For an outstanding discussion of the Delaware block approach and the way courts
handled this valuation methodology around the time Weinberger was decided, see
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In other instances, courts have reached an improper measure of
going concern value by applying too literally the rule that fair value is
determined by going concern value. In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. ,57
for example, minority stockholders were frozen out of Kirby
Corporation in a short-form merger at a price of $125 per share. 58
Applying the Delaware block approach, the Chancellor found that
the earnings value of Kirby was $120 per share but that the asset
value of Kirby was $456 per share.59 The Chancellor weighted
earnings at 60% and assets at 40% and thus arrived at a weighted
average value of $254.40 per share, which the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed.60
Kirby's assets should have received 100% of the weight, and thus
the going concern value of Kirby for appraisal purposes should have
been at least $456. This result follows from the principle that
corporate managers owe a duty to stockholders to maximize
stockholder wealth. Kirby's managers should have sold the assets of
Kirby and divided the proceeds among stockholders.61 It is nearly too
simple to observe that corporate managers who can manage the
company only to a value of $120 per share should sell the company's
assets to other managers who can manage at $456 (or more) per
share.62 Corporate stockholders benefit from the sale, and society
profits from the moving of assets into the hands of more efficient
users. In this instance, going concern value should have been based
on an assumption of appropriate management of the assets by Kirby's
managers, an assumption which leads to a going concern value of
$456 per share.
Even the simplest of the discrete rules of fair value, therefore, is
Seligman, supra note 55, at 841-56: see also J. Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting
Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 629,641-42 (1977) (presenting a chart
to illustrate the percentage weight applied by various courts during valuation
proceedings); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1453, 1468-71 (1966) (discussing the weight allocation applied by Delaware courts in
valuation cases).
57. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
58. See id. at 139.
59. See id. at 147 n.3.
60. See id. at 145-46.
61. For a different opinion on such cases, see Seligman, supra note 55, at 850 (arguing
that asset values have no necessary significance in calculations of the value of a minority
shareholder's interest, because minority shareholders have no power to compel
liquidation).
62. In Rapid·American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802-m (Del. 1992), the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Bell. See also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.
(UTechnicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (relying on Bell in its valuation
analysis).
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often misunderstood and misapplied by courts.
b. Proportionate Share of the Entity
Another broad issue facing courts in appraisal proceedings is the
question of whether fair value should be measured by the value of a
dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest in the entire company
or by the value of the dissenting shareholder's individual shares. One
way this issue may arise is in relation to minority interests in a
publicly traded company that has an identifiable majority
stockholder.63 An efficient market may discount such minority
shares,64 in part because the market fears that the majority
shareholder will forcibly acquire the minority interest at an unfairly
low price.65 The question that courts face in such a case is whether
fair value should impound the so-called minority discount or,
alternatively, whether dissenting stockholders are entitled to some
part of the control premium.
.
A similar issue comes up in the context of appraisals involving
closely held corporations. In these cases, the company may argue
that the fair value of the stock should be discounted because there is
no active market for the sale of the securities.66
Courts differ as to whether fair value should be reduced to
reflect a minority discount or a nonmarketability discount, although
most appear to conclude that such discounts should not be considered
in fair value calculations. 67 Thus, in broadly mechanical terms, courts
63. An example of this is In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.• 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
in which Royal Dutch Petroleum Company owned 94.6% of Shell at the time of the
freeze-out merger. See id. at 1216.
64. See Charles W. Murdock. The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact on Valuation of Minority Shares. 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425. 478 (1990); see also J.A.c. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley. Illiquidity and
Exploitation: A Proposed Statlltory Soilltion to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem.
63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) (arguing that an outside buyer will discount the value of the
shares to account for the risk that the majority will reduce the rate of return).
65. See Victor Brudney. Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions
and Reorganizations. 71 CAL. L. REV. 1073. 1099 (1983); Theodore N. Mirvis. Two-Tier
Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485, 489
(1983); Carole B. Silver, Fair Dealing Comes of Age in the Regulation of Going Private
Transactions, 9 J. CORP. L. 385. 396 (1984).
66. See, e.g.• Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett. 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989)
(rejecting the company's argument that nonmarketability discounts should be applied); In
re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1003 (Me. 1989) (same).
67. The following are examples of cases that measure fair value by the dissenter's
proportionate share of the entity as a whole: Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1218; Rapid-American.
603 A.2d at 802; Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144; McLoon Oil. 565 A.2d at 1004. In Ford v.
Courier-Journal Job Printing Co.• 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1982). however, the Kentucky
court used a "marketability discount" of 25% in arriving at fair value for a closely held
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calculate the going concern value for the corporation as a whole and
then award a dissenting shareholder value equal to his or her
proportionate ownership interest in the company.68
In determining whether or not to include a minority or
nonmarketability discount in fair value, courts typically fail to
articulate meaningful principles, offering instead only the most
general explanations as to why they exclude or include such discounts
in their fair value calculation. Courts, for example, often support the
exclusion of such discounts as a way to promote "faimess,"69 avoid a
result that "unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap
a windfall from the appraisal process,"70 or avoid a "transfer of wealth
from the minority shareholders to shareholders in control."71
Once again, one may have a sense that courts are essentially on
sound ground in not allowing minority or nonmarketability discounts,
even though the extremely general reasoning supporting such
outcomes may be less than satisfying. One may, for example,
conclude that disallowing a minority discount is consistent with
corporate fiduciary obligations. As described above, the minority
discount, at least to a large degree, is thought to be the result of the
pricing by the efficient market of the expropriation risk, which
includes, for example, the risk that the minority shareholders will be
frozen out at an unfairly low price. Such a freeze-out is inconsistent
with the fiduciary duties the majority shareholder and the acquired
corporation's managers owe to minority shareholders. Accordingly,
disallowing the minority discount removes the incentive to exploit
this potentially unfair advantage and promotes conduct consistent
with corporate fiduciary obligations.
c. Sharing Synergy
Today's law regarding the obligation to share synergy in
appraisal proceedings can best be explained by reference to the
parsing analysis offered in Part II of this Article. As described
earlier, the MBCA excludes from fair value "any appreciation ... [in
corporation. See id. at 556-57. Recently promulgated proposed amendments to the
MBCA reject minority and nonmarketability discounts in appraisal proceedings. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4)(iii) (Proposed Changes 1998), supra note 27, at 251.
68. One court explained that it has an obligation to establish "the best price a single
buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for the firm as an entirety[.] The court then
prorates that value for the whole firm equally among all shares of its common stock. The
result is that all of those shares have the same fair value." McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1004.
69. Jd.

70. Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145.
71. McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1004.
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the value of the dissenter's stock] in anticipation of the [acquisition]
... unless exclusion would be inequitable."n Delaware statutes
exclude from fair value73 "any element of value arising from the
accomplishment ... of the merger."74 Under such statutory language,
however, the obligation to share synergy with dissenters is poorly
defined. It is unclear which of the Additives described in Part II's
parsing discussion qualify as, in the words of the statutes, appreciation
in value that is "in anticipation of' or "arising from" the
amalgamation of the companies.
Cases provide some help, indicating that the Information
Additive (the value added by correcting misinformation about the
Acquired Corporation) and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive
(the additional value created by pursuing a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against Acquired Corporation's managers) should be included
in fair value. Stated alternatively and in the language of the appraisal
statutes, the cases hold that the value represented by those two
Additives should not be excluded from fair value as being in
"anticipation of' or "arising from" the acquisition.
Regarding the Information Additive, the court in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor 1"),75 for example, stated directly that
fair value must reflect "all relevant information regarding the

72. MODEL Bus. CORP. Aer. § 13.01(3). Proposed amendments to the MBCA would
change this language. Specifically. the language of the proposed amendments requires
that fair value be "determined ... immediately before the effectuation of the corporate
action to which the shareholder objects." MODEL Bus. CORP. Aer § 13.01(4)(i)
(Proposed Changes 1998). slIpra note 27, at 251. Obviously. this language provides no
explicit exclusion of appreciation. The Official Comments state that "section 13.01(4)
permits consideration of changes in the market price of the corporation's shares in
anticipation of the transaction. to the extent such changes are relevant:' Id. § 13.01(4),
official cmt. 2.
73. Recently. the Delaware court was required to determine the point at which fair
value is calculated in a second step. clean up merger. The case, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. ("Technicolor IV"). 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). involved a two-step, friendly acquisition
in which MacAndrews & Forbes Group Inc. (MAF) acquired 82% of Technicolor in the
first step and then froze out the minority stockholders in a second-step merger. See id. at
293. Between the completion of the tender offer and the second-step merger, MAF took
control of Technicolor and began· to implement a plan of operation that -iniproved the
value of Technicolor. See id. The question for the court was whether the exclusion of
"value arising from the ... merger" from fair value excluded the new value generated by
MAFs business plan. Jd. at 294 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h». The court
took a literal reading of the statute and held that fair value was determined on the day of
the merger, which, as a result, impounded in fair value the value of the improvements
made between the tender and the second step merger. See id. at 298--99.
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
75. 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988).
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company and its shares."76 The court explained that if the value
added by the Information Additive were not included in the fair value
calculation, dissenting shareholders might "be deprived of part of the
true investment value of their shares."77
Similarly, cases provide support for including the Discrete
Mismanagement Additive in fair value. 78 In Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett,79 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
value of a usurped corporate opportunity must be considered in
arriving at fair value. Fair value, the court concluded, must include
the present value of the earnings lost as a result of the usurpation of
the opportunity.so A related rule comes from Porter v. Texas
Commerce Bankshares, Inc.,81 in which the Chancellor stated that "[i]f
the company has substantial and valuable derivative claims, they, like
any asset of the company, may be valued in an appraisal."82

76. Id. at 1187 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP.lnc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983». The
court expanded the scope of the information that would be impounded in fair value
beyond the materiality standard. The court stated that fair value includes "bits and pieces
of nonmaterial information that have value as a totality." Id. at 1187 n.8.
77. Id. Both Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett. 564 A.2d 1137, 1143-44 (Del. 1989), and
Porter v. Texas Commerce Bankshares, Inc., No. Civ. A. 9114, 1989 WL 120358, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 12. 1989) (mem.), which are discussed in infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text, provide support for including the Information Additive in fair value.
Disclosure of material information generally is considered a part of the fiduciary
duty of corporate managers. See, e.g., Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp.• No. Civ. A.
7313, 1985 WL 4449, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (finding a breach of duty by
corporate fiduciaries because of a disclosure failure in connection with a self-tender). As a
result, allowing minority shareholders of Acquired Corporation to participate in the value
generated by correcting managers' nondisclosures seems similar to allowing minority
shareholders to participate in the value generated by correcting prior discrete acts of
mismanagement.
78. An interesting question faced by courts is whether excessive salaries paid to top
executives can be considered in determining fair value. The argument is that the
difference between the actual, excessive salary and the fair market value of executive
services should be considered as part of the earnings of the corporation and thus a part of
fair value. Often, this matter has arisen in valuation of smaller corporations, in which
control persons attempt to take large salaries in order to acquire a tax benefit for the
corporation. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. Civ. A. 8474, 1996
WL 483093 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1996) (mem.) (asserting that capitalizing excessive
compensation is no different than capitalizing future cash flows), rev'd on other groum;ls,
701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997); Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc. 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (N.Y:App.
Div. 1987) (stating that, to reflect true earning power, excess capitalization should be
eliminated from corporate expenses).
79. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
SO. Id. at 1144. The court accepted the lower court's determination that, but for the
usurpation, the corporation's earnings "would have increased resulting in a higher per
share valuation at the time of the merger." Id.
81. No. Civ. A. 9114, 1989 WL 120358 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1989) (mem.).
82. Id. at *5.
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Referencing the parsing analysis of Part II, one is able to
conclude that fair value in the hypothetical transaction would
probably be at least $12 per share, because fair value would include
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive.
What is much more difficult to establish under current law, however,
is whether additional Additives would be included in fair value or
would be excluded under the terms of the appraisal statute as
appreciation arising from the acquisition. In quantified terms, the
issue is whether a court faced with facts similar to those in the parsing
hypothetical would be willing to establish fair value at an amount in
excess of $12 per share and perhaps as much as $17 per share. 8J
The case law bearing on this question is both conflicting and
imprecise.84 In one case, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,85 the evidence
was that, if liquidated, Kirby had a net asset value of around $456 per
share.86 The court nonetheless determined fair value to be only $254
per share.87 Obviously excluded from the court's measure of fair
value was most of the synergy that could have been generated by
moving Kirby's assets into more efficient hands. Thus, although not
discussed in terms of the various components of synergy described
through the parsing in Part II, most of the Additives that may have
been in play in that acquisition were excluded from fair value.88
In contrast to Bell, the outcome in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co. 89
appears to include in fair value most of the synergy generated by that
83. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
84. In addition to Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.• 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). and Cooper
v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. Civ. A. 7244,1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8,1993) (mem.),
which are discussed in the text. a third case deserves mention, although the court's
disposition of the case does not materially advance this discussion. In David J. Greene ,(:
Co. v. DUlllzillftltemational, fllC., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968), the court in an appraisal
proceeding refused to increase earnings for valuation purposes based on the prospective
elimination of losses from an unprofitable operation. See id. at 432-33. The court seemed
to base its decision on the uncertainty that the loss elimination would actually materialize.
See id.
85. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). This case is discussed elsewhere in this Article. See
supra text accompanying notes 57-62; infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
86. See Bell, 413 A.2d. at 139-40, 147-48.
87. See id. at 145-48.
88. Based on a literal interpretation of the Delaware appraisal statute, the outcome in
Bell may appear correct. AsSescribed previously, the Delaware statute excludes from fair
value "any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998). Because apparently the
only way a value for Kirby of $456 per share could be achieved was by moving Kirby's
assets out of the hands of present managers and into the hands of new managers, the
higher value of $456 per share arguably was possible only "from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger." See Bell, 413 A.2d at 139-40.
89. No. Civ. A. 7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8,1993) (mem.).
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acquisition.90 Pabst was selling at around $14 per share when it
became the subject of a bidding contest for control. Ultimately,
Heileman won the bidding contest, paying a blended value of $29.50
per share.91 In an appraisal proceeding, the Chancellor rejected the
$14 pre-bidding market price as an appropriate measure of fair value
because that price had prevailed more than a year before the merger
and for other "various reasons" that the court never explained.92 The
court also rejected Heileman's winning bid of $29.50 per share as the
measure of fair value because that price most likely contained "a
control premium unrelated to the value of [Pabst] '" as a going
concern."93 The court, essentially without further explanation,
concluded that fair value of the Pabst stock was $27 per share. 94
As a result, the dissenting Pabst shareholders were permitted to
share in most of the value created when the Pabst assets were moved
into more efficient hands. Specifically, of the $15.50 per share
difference between the pre-bidding price for Pabst ($14 per share)
and the fully bid price for Pabst ($29.50 per share), dissenters
participated in synergy amounting to $13 per share and were denied
participation in synergy equaling only $2.50 per share.9s
Cooper, therefore, cannot be reconciled with Bell. The Bell
court excluded from fair value nearly all the gains that could be
recognized by moving assets into more efficient hands, while the
Cooper court included nearly all of these gains in fair value.
Attempting to fit the Cooper outcome into the language of the
applicable Delaware appraisal statute also is an interesting exercise,
because the statute excludes from fair value "any element of value
arising from the accomplishment ... of the merger."96 Interpreting
this language literally, one might conclude that the entire $15.50 per
share in synergy generated by the transaction in Cooper falls within
that exclusionary language and that, accordingly, fair value of the
Pabst stock should have been set at $14 per share (the pre-bidding
price). On the other hand, such a literal approach to the meaning of
90. See id. at *10.
91. The bids were all front-end loaded. Heileman's successful bid was $32 in cash on
the front end and $24 in debentures on the back end, which amounted to a blended value
of $29.50 per share. See id. at *8.
92. See id. at *9.
93. Jd. at *8-9. The Delaware court in other cases uses the term "control premium"
interchangeably with synergy. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor
IV"), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 19%).
94. See Cooper, 1993 WL 208763, at *8.
95. See id. at *9.
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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the language of appraisal statutes may also lead to the exclusion of
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive
from fair value, and we saw previously that courts are unwilling to
accede to such exclusions.97
The right of dissenting shareholders to share in the synergy
generated by acquisitions, therefore, is uncertain. Although the cases
do indicate that fair value includes both the Information Additive and
the Discrete Mismanagement Additive, and thus fair value within the
parsing hypothetical in Part II would be at least $12 per share,98 the
inclusion of other Additives in fair value is uncertain and subject to
apparently conflicting rules. Within the parsing hypothetical, one is
unable to determine whether fair value for Acquired Corporation's
shares under current law should be $12 per share, $17 per share, or
some value between these two figures.
3. Summary
Appraisal statutes are designed to be vague and to rely on courts
to establish their critical terms, including the definition of fair value.
Courts, however, have been unable to articulate meaningful
principles to guide them in fair value cases. As a result, the few
discrete common-law rules defining fair value are confusing and, in
some instances, irreconcilable.
B.

-

Fiduciary Duties and the Right to "Fair Price"

While the fair value obligation in appraisal proceedings is rooted
in statute, the obligation of fair price has developed through the
common law. Notwithstanding these differing origins, the discrete
common-law rules respecting the determination of fair price are in
many respects similar to the discrete rules respecting fair value. In at
least one way, however, rules of fair price and fair value appear to
differ significantly. Specifically, the rhetoric in fair price cases, unlike
the rhetoric in fair value cases, seems to require the inclusion of some
measure of synergy generated by the challenged transaction. 99

-

7

I

97. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
98. The $12 per share is comprised of the $10 initial price. plus $1 for the Information
Additive. and $1 for the Discrete Mismanagement Additive.
99. Already. though, we have seen that some (but not all) fair value cases may award
a significant portion of the synergy to dissenting shareholders. See supra notes 79-98 and
accompanying text.
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1. Specific Rules of Fair Price

a. Going Concern Value
As in the fair value cases, courts determine fair price as going
concern value and not as liquidation value,l00 and some courts
indicate a willingness to apply this rule even in situations in which
liquidation value exceeds the going concern value for the entity.101
This latter outcome, refusing to consider liquidation value as fair
price when liquidation value exceeds the market or going concern
value, is subject to the same criticism described in the fair value
section of this Article,102 in that such a result is inconsistent with
managers' duty to maximize shareholder wealth and provides a
disincentive to move assets into the hands of most efficient users. 103
b. Proportionate Share of the Entity
In calculating the fair price of a stockholder's shares in an
acquired company, courts generally start with the plaintiff's "pro rata
value of the entire firm as a going enterprise."I04 This calculation
means that fair price, like fair value, normally does not impound any
minority or nonmarketability discount in the event the shares are
closely held or thinly traded. lOS While the refusal to reduce fair price
by any minority or nonmarketability discount may seem attractive
and, indeed, may be the better rule, courts typically arrive at this
outcome in fair price cases, as they do in fair value cases, without the

100. See, e.g.• Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.• 493 A.2d 929, 942 (Del. 1985). Courts also
have held that book value is not a proper measure of fair price. See Seagraves v. Urstadt
Property Co., No. Civ. A. 10307. 1996 WL 159626. at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. I, 1996) (mem.);
Sealy Mattress Co. of New Jersey. Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324. 1334-35 (Del. Ch.
1987).
101. In Rosenblatt, the complaining shareholder attempted to have fair price measured
by liquidation value, under the theory that the real worth of an oil company is in its assets,
principally in its reserves. See id. at 941. Obviously, the plaintiff was convinced that
liquidation value was higher than going concern value. See id. at 941-92. The court
rejected the shareholder's argument, stating that for fair price purposes, "a company is
valued as a going concern, not on what can be obtained by its liquidation." ld. at 942.
102. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
103. See ill.
104. Kahn v, Tremont Corp., No. Civ. A. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar.
21,1996) (mem.), rev'd on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (1997).
105. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 693 n.14 (Del. Ch. 1996). The
Ryan court also determined that market value was an inappropriate measure of fair value
of the complaining shareholders' stock, given that the market price was depressed because
of the "illiquidity [of the stock] due to the relatively small number of outstanding minority
shares being traded." ld. at 693.

Q- 31

1999]

CORPORA TE ACQUISITIONS

129

-

benefit of articulated principles. I06
c. Sharing Synergy
Although the product of a convoluted pedigree, the generally
accepted rule is that fair price includes some portion of synergy.I07 To
explain this apparently broad rule, reference again is made to the
parsing of value described in Part II of this Article. los The discussion,
therefore, is framed in terms of identifying those Additives or
components of synergy that are a part of the fair price and that,
accordingly, must be shared with the shareholders of Acquired
Corporation.
Not surprisingly, cases provide support for including the gains
represented by the Information Additive (the value added by
correcting misinformation about Acquired Corporation) and the
Discrete Mismanagement Additive (the additional value created by
pursuing a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Acquired
Corporation's managers) in the calculation of fair price. Accordingly,
the court in Kahn v. Tremont Corp.l09 addressed the inclusion of the
Information Additive by stating that "fair price is a price that is
106. Kahn. 1996 WL 145452. at *10. does. however. provide an interesting and
economically sound explanation for the reason that the market. even if active. will
discount minority shares when there is an identifiable majority block of stock. Kahn
involved the parent's sale to a subsidiary of stock in a second subsidiary corporation. A
stockholder of the purchasing subsidiary claimed that the price of the sister's stock was too
high. Because the transaction involved a connict on the part of the parent. the court
analyzed the claim under the intrinsic fairness test and thus inquired whether the price of
the sister's stock to the subsidiary was a "fair price." See id at *9-15. The Kahn court
stated that
the market may deeply discount or ignore possible future cash flows not reflected
in established dividend patterns because the controlling shareholder may have
other ways of getting increased corporate cash flows out of the enterprise. While
fiduciary duties are designed to protect against that eventuality. that protection is
expensive to invoke. slow and quite imperfect. Thus it is not at all irrational for
markets to discount deeply potential non-dividend cash flows in some situations
where a controlling shareholder exists.
Id. at *9 n.14.
107. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.• 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). the court articulated the
meaning of fair price. but it did so in an indirect manner by indicating that in certain
instances the measure of damages for an intrinsic fairness violation includes rescissory
damages. See id. at 714. For its definition of rescissory damages. the Weinberger court
relied on Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.• 429 A.2d 497, 505 (Del. 1981), which essentially
defined the term rescissory damages to include the synergy from the transaction. Putting
these together. and because damages are co-extensive with the wrong, the measure of the
obligation to offer a fair price to minority stockholders in affiliated acquisitions necessarily
includes a portion of the synergy generated by the transaction.
lOB. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
109. No. Civ. A. 12339, 1996 WL 145452 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21. 1996) (mem.).
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within a range that reasonable men and women with access to relevant
information might accept."\\O
Regarding the
obligation
to
include
the
Discrete
Mismanagement Additive in fair price, a number of cases reject the
idea that fair price can be discounted by the negative value of serious,
past mismanagement. 111 In David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
International, Inc.,112 the court held that fair price must include the
recapture of the value lost through the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity. In Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club,
Inc.,113 the court held that fair price included the value of wrongfully
wasted corporate assets. 114
In evaluating whether the other Additives are included in fair
price under current law, one is required to look to more general rules
from cases such as Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. lls Technicolor
became the subject of a friendly acquisition by MacAndrews &
Forbes Group, Inc. (MAF). Immediately before MAF manifested its
interest, Technicolor stock was selling at around $11 per share. 1I6
Ultimately, the Technicolor board of directors agreed that their
company would be acquired by MAF at $23 per share. 1I7 In a prior
110. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
111. In addition to the cases described in infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text, in
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp.• 342 A.2d 566 (N. J. 1975), the court indicated that fair
price should not be reduced as a result of the excessive salaries the majority stockholders
paid to themselves. See id. at 571. Also, in Ryan v. Tad's Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 682
(Del. Ch. 1996), fair price included the recapture of the value of consulting and noncompetition agreements, which the court viewed as a mechanism that controlling
stockholders used to divert corporate value to themselves. See id. at 694-95. The Ryan
court held that the defendants. who had the burden on the matter, had not proven that the
contracts were worth what the majority stockholders individually were paid for them.
Thus, the presumption became that the contract price represented a diversion of corporate
value to the majority stockholders. See id. at 690.
112. 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
113. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986). In Coggins, the court determined that a freeze-out
violated fiduciary duties, because it served no legitimate corporate purpose. The court
ordered rescissory damages as a remedy, and thus dealt with fair price in that context. See
id. at 1120.
114. See id. at 1120. The court noted that "[t]he present value of the Patriots ... should
include the amount wrongfully removed or diverted from the corporate coffers by the
individual defendants." Id. More technically, Coggins held that rescissory damages must
include a recapture of value lost through corporate waste. See id. As described above, the
measure of rescissory damages and fair price should be considered co-extensive. See supra
note 107.
115. 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
("Technicolor m"). 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
116. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor II"), 634 A.2d 345, 352 (Del.
1993).
117. See id. at 357.
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decision, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor //"),118 the
Delaware Supreme'Court concluded, however, that Technicolor's
board had not informed itself fully about the acquisition.
Accordingly, the court held that the board's decision to approve the
acquisition at $23 per share did not get business judgment protection,
but instead was to be evaluated under the intrinsic fairness test. lI9 On
remand from Technicolor II, therefore, the Chancery Court in
Cinerama considered whether the action of the board of Technicolor
in approving the acquisition at $23 per share met the intrinsic fairness
test, which, in tum, required· the Cinerama court to consider whether
$23 per share amounted to a fair price. l20
Consistent with other Delaware cases,12I the court in Cinerama
defined fair price as "the highest value reasonably achievable" for the
Technicolor stock. l22 The court recognized that, in a competitive
market for corporate control of Technicolor, a succ~ssful bidder
would "be driven to pay a substantial part of the expected synergy
value" over to the target's shareholders. l23 The court's reckoning on
that matter is based on the simple economic fact that, in such
circumstances, surrendering a substantial part of the synergistic gain
to the seller is necessary in order for the successful buyer to out-bid
its rivals.
The court then applied this criterion by assuming that a bidder
other than MAF would have been willing to pay $25 per share for
Technicolor. Even under that assumption, however, the court
concluded that the acquisition price of $23 per share "was certainly
fair," given that the Technicolor stockholders, as the result of the sale
to MAF at $23 per share, garnered 86% of the total synergy that
might be generated by selling Technicolor to the very highest possible

...i

I

118. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
119. See id. at 368-69.
120. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1138-39.
121. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor Ill"), 663 A.2d 1156. 1162,
1177 (Del. 1995); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,48
(Del. 1994); Technicolor 1I, 634 A.2d at 361.
122. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143. At other points, the Cinerama court articulated its
standard of fair price differently, stating, for example, that "fair price does not mean the
highest price financeable or the highest price that fiduciary [sic] could afford." ld. Later,
the court stated that fair price was one a "reasonable seller ... would regard as within a
range of fair" and, still later, described fair price as "one that such a seller could
reasonably accept." ld. All of these definitions seem to be either alternate ways of
stating. or at least not inconsistent with, what apparently is the basic criterion of fair price,
which is that it be the highest value reasonably available under the circumstances.
123. /d.
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bidder. 124
Initially, it is hard to understand how the fair price criterion
articulated in Cinerama, which requires managers to get "the highest
value reasonably achievable," is satisfied by an acquisition price that
is $2 (or 8%) less than the price the court assumes to be available
from the highest bidder.12S One possibility could be that the
Cinerama court concluded without articulation that the search costs
for additional bidders, including the costs associated with the risk that
MAF would abandon its interest in Technicolor, exceeded $2 per
share.
Alternatively, one may reconcile the outcome in Cinerama to the
broad rule from the case if the court determined, again, without
articulation, that $23 per share, although less than the maximum
value available for the Technicolor stock, did not amount to a
performance by managers that was so bad as to rise to the level of
culpability necessary to support a finding that the managers had
breached their fiduciary duty. Thus, for example, assuming that
negligence were the standard by which we judge managers in this
case, the failure to maximize shareholder wealth did not amount to a
deviation from ordinary care.
A final explanation for the outcome may be the court's
unarticulated assumption that competition in the market for
corporate control of Technicolor was insufficient to drive the price to
$25 per share, even though the most efficient user actually could pay
that price. For example, assume that a number of Technicolor
competitors, including MAF, could develop sufficient efficiencies to
make money by paying $23 per share for Technicolor, but could not
make money at any higher price. One super efficient competitor,
however, could make money by paying up to, but not beyond, $25 per
share. The price under these assumptions respecting the market for
corporate control would settle somewhere between $23 per share and

;

r

r
r

124. See id. In Cinerama, as described in supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text,
the pre-bidding market price of Technicolor was around $11 per share, the merger price
was $23 per share, and the highest price the court supposed to be possible for Technicolor
was $25 per share. See id. "Synergy:' therefore, was apparently considered to be the $14
difference between the pre-bidding market price and the highest possible price. The old
Technicolor shareholders received $23 per share for their stock, which amounted to $12 in
synergy ($23 merger price minus the $11 pre-bidding market price), or 86% (12114ths) of
the synergy. See id.
Cinerama was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Technicolor JlI, 663
A.2d at 1156. The supreme court specifically affirmed both the lower court's standard of
fair price and its application to the facts of the case. See id. at 1176-77, 1180.
125. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143.

r
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$25 per share. Thus, $23 per share would be within the range,
although on the low end, of the "highest value reasonably
achievable. "126
Notwithstanding these possible explanations, the Cinerama
opinion remains ambiguous concerning the meaning of fair price,
even though the essence of the broad Cinerama formula may be
attractive. 127 This confusion is due at least in part to the fact that it is
impossible to determine which, if any, of the foregoing explanations is
the basis for the decision. As a result, the value of Cinerama is
limited, for example, when one attempts to apply Cinerama to a case
such as the hypothetical situation in Part 11. 128 Within the facts of that
hypothetical, one is able to suppose only that fair price is somewhere
between $12 and $17 per share and is perhaps closer to the latter
amount. 129

-

2. Summary
The uncertainty regarding the proper measure of fair price is
made significantly worse by the common-law rules limiting the broad
availability of the fair price protection. Recall from the discussion in
Part II.C of this Article that Weinberger and its progeny hold that the
fair price obligation of the intrinsic fairness standard is inapplicable if
the corporate fiduciaries have acted with procedural fairness. l30 In
instances of fair dealing, Weinberger holds that complaining
shareholders' exclusive remedy is appraisal, a remedy that seemingly
denies shareholders full participation in synergy.13I
126. [d. In order for the outcome under this analysis to be consistent with the broad
rule of the case, one must assume that MAF is the second highest bidder and that the
normal results of competition would mean that the super-competitor could acquire
Technicolor without sharing any of the unique synergy (the $2 between $23 and $25 per
share) it would generate by the acquisition. The case contains no factual bases for such
assumptions, however.
127. In fact, the Cinerama formula for fair price ("the highest value reasonable
achievable") is quite close to the formula for fair value and fair price proposed in this
Article. See infra text accompanying note 177.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
129. The raw numbers of Cinerama would indicate that fair price in the hypothetical
should be around $16 per share. In the hypothetical, the synergy generated by the
acquisition amounts to $7 (this assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that all the Additives would
be considered synergy within Cinerama); if Cinerama holds that the fair price obligation
requires that at least 86% of such synergy be shared proportionately by the shareholders
of the Acquired Corporation, shareholders of the Acquired Corporation would be entitled
to approximately $16 per share ($10 market value plus 86% of $7 in synergy).
130. See supra text accompanying note 36.
131. Recall, however, that this rule is uncertain. Some appraisal cases seem to permit
shareholders to share in synergy. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
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Consider the implications of the Weinberger rule for the
hypothetical situation in Part II and the principal parties involved in
that transaction. Acquiring Corporation, which controls Acquired
Corporation, must first determine what price it is required by its
fiduciary duties to pay for this acquisition. Similarly, Acquired
Corporation's independent negotiating committee, which, in light of
the Weinberger opinion, the Acquired Corporation's board will
undoubtedly appoint in order to evaluate Acquiring Corporation's
offer,132 must also determine the price it is able to approve consistent
with its fiduciary duties.
The most difficult problem for both Acquiring Corporation and
Acquired Corporation's independent negotiating committee is the
matter of whether fair price, which apparently includes some measure
of synergy, or, alternatively. fair value, which may not include
synergy, is the standard by which the fiduciary obligations of
Acquiring Corporation and the independent negotiating committee
are to be judged. If fair price is the measure of the principal parties'
fiduciary obligation, perhaps something close to $17 per share may be
required; if fair value IS the measure of the principal parties' fiduciary
obligation, perhaps something around $12 per share may be
sufficient. The uncertainty in all this is obviously troubling, not only
to the parties, who may not be able to figure out what to do, but also
to society, as such ambiguities may provide an incentive for resource
allocations that are economically inefficient or otherwise morally
unattractive.
IV. THE ApPROPRIATE MEASURE OF FAIR VALUE AND FAIR PRICE

As described in the preceding parts, today's rules respecting fair
value and fair price generally are confusing and appear to lack moral
or economic foundations. The purpose of this part, therefore, is to
propose rules of fair value and fair price that are founded on
attractive moral and economic values widely shared by society, rules
that also are sufficiently intelligible to enable parties to engage in ex
ante planning with predictable outcomes.
A.

True Consent
In developing principles to guide courts in fair value and fair
price cases, one attractive analysis is founded on consent and thus
focuses on the expectations of the parties. 133 Accordingly, when
132. See Weinberger v. UOP. Inc.. 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
133. Judge Posner proposes that consent provides moral support for the pursuit of
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presented with the matter of whether a minority stockholder is
.permitted to share in an}'-'or all of the Additives described in Part II, a
court utilizing this analysis attempts to reach an outcome that respects
the ex ante expectations of the parties. If parties in the particular
situation strike an ex ante bargain with regard to the sharing of the
Additives and the bargain generates no third party effects, the
consent to the transaction by those who are affected may go a long
way in satisfying both moral and economic concerns that result from a
particular outcome.
Assume, for example, that within the facts of the hypothetical in
Part II, Ms. C purchases a share of common stock in Acquired
Company believing that, in the event of an affiliated merger, she has
the right to the market value of her stock ($10 per share), plus the
value of the Information Additive (which adds $1 per share), the
Discrete Mismanagement Additive (which adds another $1 per
share), and the Operational Savings Additive (which adds another $1
per share). One may be content in that instance to hold Ms. C to the
bargain she made and thus to award Ms. C $13 as fair price or fair
value in the case of an acquisition, because Ms. C consented to and
priced the outcome through her willingness to purchase Acquired
Corporation stock at, assume, $10 per share. Morally, one may be
satisfied with such an outcome, given that Ms. C ex ante voluntarily
entered into a transaction that maximized her happiness and that was
in furtherance of her personal autonomy.l34 Expressed in economic
terms, such voluntary trades are the very essence of economic
efficiency. Such trades, assuming no third party effects, by definition
create economic wealth. 135
While clearly demonstrable consent to transactions is a powerful
factor providing moral and economic legitimacy for particular
outcomes, the difficulty with this criterion is that such true consent is
rarely clearly demonstrable in these types of transactions. To state
economic efficiency. See Posner, supra note 19, at 488-502. He finds consent congenial to
both a utilitarian regime and a Kantian regime. See id. at 489-90. Simplified, a voluntary
(consensual), wealth-creating trade between two parties generates an increase in total
utility (assuming no third party effects), see id. at 488; similarly, permitting such voluntary
(consensual) trades also respects the autonomy of the trading parties as rational beings.
See id. at 490. Thus, by permitting such pursuit of economic efficiency, Posner says that
society "will produce an ethically attractive combination of happiness, of rights (to liberty
and property), and of sharing with the less fortunate." Id. at 487. Posner does not explain
this last point in his article.
134. See supra notes 20-21 for a brief discussion of utilitarianism and Kantianism.
135. For the meaning of economic efficiency and the creation of economic wealth as
used in this Article, see supra notes 17, 22.
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the apparent, it is impossible to demonstrate that all the shareholders
involved in a freeze-out merger of a publicly held company consented
ex ante to a particular payout formula that includes none, part, or all
of the elements of value described in Part II. More likely, most, and
probably all, shareholders at the time they purchased their shares in
Acquired Corporation were ignorant about that particular term in
their investment contract. Without any such true consent respecting
the matter of fair value and fair price, enforcing a particular outcome
becomes more troubling, both morally and economically.
B.

Contractarians' Version of Consent

Some scholars who follow the traditions of neoclassical
economics ("Contractarians") are not slowed by the inability to
demonstrate the true consent of the parties to a particular term.
Instead, Contractarians generally are morally and economically
satisfied with enforcing terms (i.e., allocating rights) that coincide
with the terms to which the parties would agree, assuming transaction
costs were zero. 136 Pursuing this line of reasoning, Contractarians
propose that the parties, if able to bargain freely and without costs,
would agree to terms that lead to allocative efficiency. In other
words, absent transaction costs, the Contractarians propose that the
parties through bargaining will agree to terms allocating a particular
right to the party that is willing to pay most for the right. 137
Easterbrook and Fischel turn this line of thinking into an
argument in favor of allowing Acquiring Corporation to grab all the
synergy generated by the transaction. 138 They argue that all
shareholders, including minority shareholders of Acquired
Corporation, like Ms. C, would agree ex ante for Acquiring
Corporation to get all the synergy generated by the acquisition. 139
Their reasoning is that such an outcome generates broadly
136. See, e.g.. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 700 ("[T]he legal system should
supply rules that mimic the ex ante agreements shareholders would reach if they could
bargain for and enforce their agreements costlessly." (emphasis added»; Posner, supra
note 19, at 491-97.
137. This form of analysis is used repeatedly and in various factual settings by law and
economics scholars. For example, Judge Posner, in addition to using this analysis to
interpret contracts, as I am doing here, see POSNER, supra note 17, at 105, also uses this
analysis to discuss the economics involved in the incompatible uses of property rights. See
id. at 55.
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 708-10. Professor Cox critiques
Easterbrook and Fischel's theories in connection with his article on derivative suits. See
James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative
Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 749-52 (1984).
139. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 711.
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throughout society the maximum incentive to create economic value
by moving assets _into more efficient hands, as the more profit
Acquiring Corporation is able to garner from the transaction, the
more likely the transaction is to occur.t40
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that by holding a diversified
portfolio, investors such as Ms. C are able to share broadly in the
value created by such moves and to insulate themselves from any
unfair treatment stemming from unequal sharing of gain in anyone
instance. 141 With a diversified portfolio, investors like Ms. C
sometimes will benefit from unequal sharing (by being shareholders
in the acquiring corporation) and sometimes lose from the unequal
sharing (by being shareholders in the acquired corporation), but over
a diversified portfolio, these gains and losses should balance OUt. 142
Consequently, the total additional gain from a rule of unequal sharing
will enrich such diversified investors, because through diversification
they will participate in the additional economic value created by the
incentive to undertake the transactions. 143 From all this, Easterbrook
and Fischel are willing to infer that shareholders such as Ms. C would
consent to an unequal sharing of gains. l44
Easterbrook and Fischel's line of argument is problematic on a
number of grounds. Perhaps the most apparent basis for criticism is
the fact that not all investors hold portfolios that are sufficiently
diversified to ensure that they will be losers and winners equally over
time. 145
An even more difficult problem for this line of reasoning results
from the failure to distinguish the various sources of synergy,l46 a
140. See id.
141. See id. at 712-13.
142. See id.
143. Seeid.
144. See id. at 713-14.
145. Easterbrook and Fischel, in response to this criticism, state that their argument is
supported by "[t]he existence of diversification-not its employment." [d. at 713.
Diversification is, in their view, cheap ("available at a remarkably low cost"), and, thus,
anyone choosing not to diversify has no moral basis for complaint ("have little claim that
they were treated inequitably"). [d. In all events, Easterbrook and Fischel place a high
value on encouraging value-maximizing transactions. See id. Not all would agree with
such factual assumptions and moral reckonings, however. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 23, 29-30 (1982).
146. My disagreement with Easterbrook and Fischel's conclusion that Acquiring
Corporation should be able to seize all the synergy may be less dramatic than first appears.
In their piece, they set "market value" as a "rule-of-thumb" for the minimum amount that
shareholders, such as Ms. C, should receive. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 71415. The balance of the value generated by an acquisition may, under their regime, be
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matter that is best understood by reference to the parsing in Part II.
Assume now that Ms. C is fully diversified and is frozen out in a
-merger ofAcquired. Corporation into Acquiring Corporation at $10
per share. 147 To infer Ms. C's consent to this outcome, one must
conclude that she (and all shareholders), in order to provide fuel for
value maximizing transactions, consented ex ante to a freeze-out
value that impounds disinformation, mismanagement, and non-value
maximizing conduct on the part of their corporate managers.
Relating this to the parsing in Part II, one must infer that Ms. C
consented to forego the value of the Additives that could be attained
by good management and full disclosure.
Obviously, an inference of consent on the part of investors to
such conduct by managers is difficult to draw. In the first place, such
an inference is inconsistent with society's mandatory corporate
fiduciary duties, which require managers to pursue shareholder
wealth maximization with some reasonable degree of care and
vigor. l48 To restate slightly differently, such an inference of consent
would also create a perverse incentive for Acquiring Corporation (the
majority shareholder) to act through its agents (the managers of
Acquired Corporation) to undermanage, mismanage, and fail to
disclose facts about Acquired Corporation in order to maximize
Acquiring Corporation's gain on the transaction. Indeed, the worse
the management of Acquired Corporation, the greater the gain of
Acquiring Corporation. This incentive may lead to conduct that is
not only economically inefficient but also inconsistent with broadly
shared societal values as manifested through our corporate fiduciary
principles.
To relate this to the Additives described in Part II, it is most
difficult to conclude that Ms. C consented ex ante to, or that society
benefits from, Acquired Corporation's managers' failure, for
example, to make complete disclosure (the Information Additive) or
to pursue the reasonably attainable operational efficiencies (the
Operational Savings Additive).
One, therefore, may be inclined to search for a regime based on a
shared unequally. If they were willing to accept my proposed definition of fair value and
fair price as their definition of "market value" (Le., they were willing to define "market
value" as the value that an efficient market would put on the stock. assuming that the
market had all material information and that the company were managed as required by
fiduciary laws, see infra text accompanying note 155). then. obviously. I would have no
quarrel with their analysis.
147. This amount. as described in Part II, equals the market price for Acquired
Corporation's common stock.
148. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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version of consent that is more satisfying than that offered by the
Contractarians.

C.

Consent Through Corporate Fiduciary Principles

1. The Bases for the Theory
By considering the fiduciary obligations imposed on corporate
managers, one generally is able to identify and respect the
expectations of investors with regard to the allocation of value in the
event of an acquisition. This approach facilitates an articulation of
fair value and fair price based on a version of consent that is closer to
true consent than the version offered by the Contractarians.
Pursuant to corporate fiduciary duties, corporate managers are
obliged to make all moves that increase total stockholder wealth and
to refrain from making moves that diminish stockholder wealth. 149
Under the duty of due care, managers avoid liability for any act or
omission that does not so maximize stockholder wealth only if they
act consistent with some level of due diligence, such as acting in a
manner that is not negligent or not reckless. ISO
Similarly, under the duty of loyalty, managers are forbidden to
transfer wealth away from any stockholder or group of stockholders
to another corporate constituency or to other stockholders. lSI This
principle explains why an unfair contract between a corporate officer
and the corporation violates the officer's fiduciary dutylS2 and why an
149. See generally Rutheford B Campbell. Jr.• A Positive Analysis o/the Common Law
o/Corporate Fiduciary Duties. 84 Ky. LJ. 455 (1995-96) [hereinafter Campbell. A Positive
Analysis] (arguing that the fiduciary duties of corporate managers are best understood as
obligations to make all moves that enhance lotal shareholder wealth and to refrain from
making any move that diminishes the wealth of any shareholder. rules that the author
characterizes and describes as the obligation to pursue Pareto efficiency on behalf of
corporate shareholders).
150. Today corporate managers may be subject to a negligence standard respecting
their monitoring duties. See, e.g.• MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.3O(a)(2); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank. 432 A.2d 814. 817 (N.J. 1981) (holding corporate directors personally liable
in negligence for the failure to prevent misappropriation of trust funds by other directors).
For discrete decisions under the business judgment test. corporate managers may be
required to act without negligence in investigating the action and without gross negligence
at the decisionmaking stage. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d 858. 872 (Del.
1985).
151. See Campbell. A Positive Analysis, supra note 149, at 474-78 (describing by
reference to Pareto criteria the impact of the duty of loyalty on single company
recapitalizations and affiliated mergers).
152. An example of this is the classic case, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric
Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918). The Model Act now has significant provisions dealing with
such conflict transactions. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 8.60-.63.
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unfair corporate freeze-out of minority stockholders by a majority
stockholder also violates fiduciary duties owed to the minority
stockholders. ls3 Each represents a detrimental wealth transfer away
from a stockholder or a group of stockholders to either the corporate
officer in the first case or majority stockholder in the second case and,
thus, violates the obligation to avoid moves that harm stockholders.
One can infer that investors, at least in a general sense,
understand these fiduciary duties and, thus, price their stock
purchases in light of their expectations about managers' fiduciary
duties. After all, such general duties are longstanding and often are
applied in highly visible situations in the business world-hostile
takeovers, for example. If asked, nearly all stockholders likely would
affirm their understanding that corporate managers are legally bound
to look out for the stockholders' interests, that corporate mangers
must try to increase the value of the corporation, and that corporate
managers are not permitted to give away any part of the stockholders'
pro rata interests in the corporation to themselves, other
stockholders, or other corporate constituencies.
One way to animate this is to assume that a hypothetical
company, Alpha Co., is able to and does eliminate all of its fiduciary
duties, that this change is widely published, and that no other
company is able or willing to follow Alpha's lead in that matter. One
would certainly anticipate that such a change would decrease the
market value of Alpha's stock, as investors migrate to companies
whose managers are subject to the basic fiduciary obligations to
maximize wealth and avoid detrimental wealth transfers. Investors
would likely be willing to remain invested in Alpha Co. only if paid a
significant premium for the risk generated by rules permitting
managers with complete legal impunity to undermanage the
corporation and expropriate shareholder wealth for themselves and
other favored constituencies. l54
153. Examples of affiliated merger cases include Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983), Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), Schreiber v. Bryan, No.
4250, 1979 WL 2706 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 1979), Tanzer v. International General Industries,
Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979), Walter J. Schloss Associates. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway, 536 A.2d 147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), and Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
154. Not surprisingly, others have made similar observations in other settings. For
example, in a piece on insider trading, Professor James D. Cox concludes that any harm to
a corporation as a result of society's changing legal rules to permit insider trading would
cause the market to "discount the value of ... [the] firm." James D. Cox, Insider Trading
and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE LJ. 628, 63739. In another piece dealing with international securities regulation, Professor Cox
observes that investors trading in markets with high instances of "fraud, manipulation,
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Thus, although conclusive proof is difficult to find, logic and
analysis point strongly to the conclusion that investors, at least as a
general matter, expect and price the basic fiduciary protections that
managers are required by law to accord them. To measure fair value
and fair price in a manner that is consistent with the fiduciary duties
of corporate managers, therefore, can be legitimized by an attractive
version of consent.

-

2. The Articulation and Application of the Theory
At this point, a more definite articulation of fair value and fair
price is possible.
Shareholders subjected to an acquisition of their company should
be entitled to fair value and fair price in an amount equal to the value
that an efficient market would place on their proportionate interest in
the company, assuming that the company is operated in a manner
consistent with corporate managers' fiduciary duties and that the
market has available all material information about the company.
This broad principle for determining fair value and fair price amounts
to an acceptable approximation of the parties' bargain and
accordingly leads to outcomes that can be legitimized by a reasonably
strong and, thus, attractive version of consent. The principle is also
consistent with society's moral and economic values as reflected
through our laws, specifically in the rules respecting the conduct of
corporate fiduciaries.
To understand both the attractiveness of the formula and the
likely outcomes from its application,155 consider its application to the
hypothetical situation described in Part II. Start, for example, with a
consideration of the Information Additive (the value created by

.J

J

unfairness ... will discount the price of each security in that market by a greater amount
than a comparable security in a market where they believe there is a lower incidence of
such abuses." James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COlUM.
L. REV. 1200, 1201 (1999).
155. Two previously discussed matters deserve mention at this point. In Part III of this
Article, we saw that, under today's laws, fair value and fair price usually do not include
any nonmarketability discount or minority discount. See supra notes 63-71, 104-06 and
accompanying text. These rules would continue under the author's proposed formula.
Investors should anticipate that corporate managers, in furtherance of their obligations to
maximize shareholder wealth, will move ownership configurations away from
disadvantageous circumstances. A contrary rule of allowing minority discounts and
nonmarketability discounts in fair value and fair price would create perverse incentives for
a controlling shareholder to establish or maintain a non-maximizing ownership
configuration in order to acquire the subsidiary at a bargain price. Creating such
incentives is inconsistent with corporate fiduciaries' duties to maximize shareholder
wealth.
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correcting
material
misinformation)
and
the
Discrete
Mismanagement Additive (the value created by pursuing a recovery
-against corporate-managers for a breach of their fiduciary duties).
Because legal rules prevent managers from exploiting
undisclosed informationIS6 and require that managers adhere to
standards of due care,I51 shareholders purchasing stock in a
corporation can be considered reasonably to anticipate and, thus,
price their investment based upon the assumptions of disclosure and
reasonable management.ISS Fiduciary duties, supplemented by state
and federal securities antifraud rules, therefore, provide acceptable
bases for inferring an attractive version of consent to the right of
shareholders to share in those two Additives. Quantified within the
assumptions of the hypothetical situation described in Part II, consent
comfortably underpins a value of at least $12 per share for the
corporation's stock, which amounts to the pre-bidding market value
of the stock of Acquired Corporation ($10 per share), plus $1 each for
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive. Is9
Additionally, including these two Additives in fair value and fair
price is consistent with society's manifested moral and economic
values. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this is to consider the
perverse incentives generated by a rule that excludes these Additives
from fair value and fair price. In an affiliated acquisition, for
example, such an exclusion would give majority stockholders and
their surrogates-corporate managers-the incentive to withhold
material positive information from the other shareholders and the
market and the incentive to mismanage the corporation in order to
156. The most obvious source of this principle is Rule 1Ob-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998). A disclosure obligation is also
part of managers' fiduciary duty. See, for example, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709. in which
disclosure failures by fiduciaries was a part of the basis for finding a breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with an affiliated acquisition. See id. at 709. Another example is Kahn
v. United States Sugar Corp., No. Civ. A. 7313, 1985 WL 4449 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985), in
which the Chancellor found that, in connection with a self-tender, managers breached
their fiduciary duty to selling shareholders by failing to disclose certain material facts to
them. See id. at .1.
157. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
158. This sentence initially appears to refer to minority shareholders who are, for
example, at risk of being frozen out of a corporation at an unfair price. This idea,
however, applies both to minority and majority stockholders. Thus, majority shareholders
should have no legitimate expectation that managers will undermanage or fail to disclose
material information as a way to facilitate the majority shareholders' acquisition of the
minority's portion of the Additives.
159. As described earlier, courts today seem inclined to include these Additives in fair
value and fair price. See supra notes 75-82, 109-14 and accompanying text.
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drive down the fair value or fair price of the stock. As noted earlier,
the legal requirements of corporate fiduciary and antifraud principles
manifest society's distaste
for such nondisclosure and
mismanagement. l60
Consider now whether fair value and fair price should include
the Operational Savings Additive (the value created in our example
by eliminating, perhaps through a merger with Acquiring
Corporation, the overcapacity inefficiency of a major machine owned
by Acquired Corporation) and the Reasonable Management
Additive (the value created by increased efficiency in generalized
management and monitoring of the corporation). The assumption in
Part II for each of those Additives is that the value is created by
moving the management of Acquired Corporation's assets out of the
hands of poor managers and into the hands of managers who perform
at the minimum level required by corporate fiduciary laws.
Formulated in this manner, the answer to the question of
whether to include those two Additives in fair value and fair price
once again can be based on the logic of the consent analysis used to
include the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive in value. 161 Shareholders. when purchasing stock in a
corporation, can be considered reasonably to anticipate and, thus, to
price their investment based upon the assumption that managers will
comply with their fiduciary obligations to eliminate operational
inefficiencies and generally to manage and monitor the corporation
reasonably. Once again, therefore, fiduciary duties provide an
acceptable basis for inferring an attractive version of consent for the
right of shareholders to share in the Operational Savings Additive
and the Reasonable Management Additive.
For the same reason, society's manifested moral and economic
values support including these two Additives in fair value and fair
price. 162 Indeed, perverse incentives to undermanage or mismanage

...

I

j
160. Excluding the two Additives from fair value and fair price may be distasteful both
to those concerned with distributive equality and those concerned with allocative
efficiency. Persons who have a taste for distributive equality may feel that excluding
minority shareholders from participating in the two Additives results in majority
shareholders' receiving an unfairly large portion of the corporate value. Perhaps, although
this is less certain, persons concerned ....ith allocative efficiency may also object to
excluding the Additives. because the assets of the company are, for a period of time,
undermanaged and may be misallocated as a result of misinformation. A contrary
argument, however. can be based on the discussion in supra text accompanying notes 13845.
161. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 160 and accompan~ing text.
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the corporation are created by excluding these Additives from fair
value and .fair price. Exclusion of these Additives, therefore, would
be inconsistent with societal values reflected in corporate fiduciary
laws.
What becomes clear from this discussion is that fair value and
fair price should include all of the so-called "synergies" that
managerial conduct consistent with fiduciary obligations can garner.
Quantified within the hypothetical situation of Part II, fair value and
fair price should be at least $14 per share, which includes the original
market price of the Acquired Corporation's stock, plus the
Information Additive, the Discrete Mismanagement Additive, the
Operational Savings Additive, and the Reasonable Management
Additive.
The Super-Reasonable Management Additive was defined in
Part II as the vaiue added by moving the assets of Acquired
Corporation into the hands of the finest available management. The
question of whether this particular type of synergy should be included
in fair value and fair price, however, may appear not susceptible to a
consent analysis and accordingly more problematic in its resolution.
The argument against including the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive in fair value and fair price relies on the fact that such a
superior level of management exceeds the level required by law,
which, in turn, appears to negate any assumption that shareholders of
Acquired Corporation anticipate or price such fine management. As
investors arguably do not invest with any expectation of such superior
management, consent appears to be lacking.
Such an analysis, however, may be incomplete. While investors
may not expect their corporate managers themselves to manage at the
highest level, investors do expect managers to take reasonable steps
to maximize the value of the corporation. Thus, if third party supermanagers are better able than present management to manage the
corporation's assets, the obligation of the present managers to engage
in reasonable conduct may dictate that they sell the assets to the
super-managers, who presumably will pay a price for the assets that
exceeds the value of the assets in the hands of existing corporate
managers.
Although incorrectly decided, the facts of Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp.l63 can be used to illustrate this point. In Bell, the common stock
of Kirby appears to have had a market price in the area of $125 per

163. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
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share. t64 The court found, however, that the asset value of Kirby was
$456 per share. 165 It seems difficult to argue that, in such a situation,
-the· Kirby shareholders consented to.the managers' failure to sell the
assets, even if one assumes that the old managers were managing the
company at a level consistent with legally imposed fiduciary
standards. The more likely assumption regarding shareholders'
expectations, and certainly the assumption that creates incentives to
move assets into more productive hands, is that the Kirby
shareholders expected their fiduciaries, consistent with their
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, to sell the assets of Kirby
to the more efficient user, who was willing to pay an amount equal to
$456 per share for the assets.
Perhaps if one attempts to refine the foregoing, the analysis does
not lead to the inclusion of all of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive in fair value and fair price, given that the allocation of that
Additive is the subject of bargaining between Acquired Corporation
and Acquiring Corporation and accordingly is determined to a large
degree by the strength of competition in the market for corporate
control of Acquired Corporation. Nonetheless, shareholders of
Acquired Corporation would reasonably anticipate that their
managers would sell to the highest bidder, would exploit fully on their
behalf the competitive strength of the market for corporate control of
Acquired Corporation, and would bargain hard respecting the
allocation of that part of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive that only can be achieved by Acquiring Corporation. In
short, the managers' overarching obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth would lead shareholders to expect reasonable managers to
garner most of the Super-Reasonable Management Additive on their
behalf. t66
164. See id. at 139. The market value of Kirby is somewhat difficult to glean from the
various cases that were generated by the acquisition. It is apparent. however. that the
market for Kirby stock was thin. as only 25.000 shares of Kirby were held by the minority.
public stockholders. See id. Kirby, in its calculations of fair value. used $125 as "market
value." See id. In the Section 100b) action resulting from this transaction, the Supreme
Court reported that. between 1968 and 1973 (the actual transaction occurred in 1974).
Santa Fe Industries had been purchasing shares of Kirby at prices between $65 and $92.50
per share. See Santa Fe Indus.• Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,465 (1977). Nonetheless, while
the exact market price is uncertain, it was obviously substantially below the value that
could be recognized by liquidating the company.
165. See Kirby, 413 A.2d at 151.
166. Economic studies regarding the allocation of synergy between shareholders of the
acquired corporation and the acquiring corporation support this resolution. Those studies
indicate that, in fully negotiated deals, the shareholders of the acquired corporation are
able to appropriate most of the gains generated by acquisitions.
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The questions of whether the Labor Reduction Additive (value
generated by the elimination of employees' jobs) and the Creditor
Value Reduction Additive (value generated for shareholders at the
expense of creditors by increasing leverage) are to be included in fair
value and fair price generate additional complexities. In recent years,
a portion of shareholders' gains in acquisitions has been, at least in
the view of some commentators, at the expense of workers and
creditors. For example, following an acquisition, the new owners of
an acquired corporation may generate gains for themselves by
eliminating workers and replacing them with less expensive machines
or new, cheaper workers. 167 Similarly, through the use of highly
leveraged acquisitions, shareholders are able to expropriate a portion
of the value of creditors' investments in the acquired corporation.
Commentators cite the numerous highly leveraged acquisitions that
occurred during the 19808 as transactions involving transfers of
corporate wealth from creditors to stockholders. l68 Even more than a
Regarding the appropriation of value by shareholders of the acquired corporation,
Gilson and Black report on, and provide citations to, "many studies that find that
takeovers are very. very good for target shareholders." GILSON & BLACK, supra note 40,
at 258; see also Black & Grundfest, supra note 43, at 5 ("There is no shortage of research
demonstrating takeover premiums averaging 30-50%."). Regarding the appropriation of
synergy by the acquiring corporation and its shareholders, Gilson and Black also report
numerous studies indicating that the acquiring corporation and its shareholders typically
gain little if any from such acquisitions. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 40, at 300-04.
Gilson and Black then pose the question: "If there is synergy from combining acquirer
and target. why don't acquirers earn a share of the gains ... 1" ld. at 302. The
explanations they offer are that the market for corporate control drives bidder returns to
zero, that the managers may be able to grab part of the synergy, and that some
transactions are just bad deals for the acquirer. See id. at 302-04.
167. A significant scholarly attack has been mounted against this and similar practices.
One line of this scholarship argues that employees invest in their firms by underpricing
their services in the early years of their employment in return for an implied promise that
they will be repaid in the later years of their services, when their productivity may
diminish. The fear is that the corporation has the economic incentive to expropriate
workers' human capital investment by breaching the implied contract, firing the workers
later in their careers, and replacing the fired workers with younger, Jess expensive
workers. For explanations of these theories, see Maureen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189,1205..07 (1991), Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees
as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV.
45,48-53 (1991), Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the
Nexus-oJ-Contracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 36J...69 (1993).
168. See supra note 43; see also Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The
Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J.L. & COM. 187, 190 nn.I4-15
(1991) (finding 230 companies that, between 1984 and 1989, were involved in "event risk"
transactions, which were defined as corporate activities that "result[] in a downgrading of
the credit rating of corporate debt obligations"); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 43, at 933
n.2 (reporting that, from 1984 through 1988, the bonds of 183 companies "lost value as a
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decade later, the most famous such case probably is the RJR Nabisco
acquisition, in which estimates are that creditors lost forty million
dollars following -the announcement of the highly leveraged
acquisition of that company.l69
The imperative to include the Labor Reduction Additive and the
Creditor Value Reduction Additive in fair value and fair price can
once again be based on the obligation of corporate managers to make
all moves that enhance the wealth of stockholders. When they invest
in corporations, stockholders count on managers to enhance the
wealth of the stockholders to the extent possible from whatever legal
sources may be available. Thus, to the same extent that stockholders
expect managers to increase stockholder wealth by making profitable
investments, stockholders also expect managers to increase
stockholder wealth by expropriating value from other corporate
constituencies, such as workers and creditors, so long as the
expropriation is legal. Under such an analysis, the inclusion of the
Labor Reduction Additive and the Creditor Value Reduction
Additive in fair value and fair price, therefore, once more can be
based on a consent notion.
The weakness of this position, of course, is that some observers
consider expropriation of value from other corporate constituencies
to be an immoral act. 170 Thus a number of commentators view
harshly what they consider to be the expropriation through
acquisitions of the workers' human capital investment in their
corporations. 171 Similarly, the expropriation of creditor value during
the highly leveraged takeovers of the 19805 resulted in much
unfavorable scholarly opinion. 172
Notwithstanding such concerns, courts for the most part have
refused to extend the protection of broad fiduciary duties to
workers 173 and creditors. 174 Instead, courts have defined the fiduciary
result of mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts").
169. See Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction-The Biggest Deal Ever. 1989 DUKE L.J. I,
1. It is reported that the announcement in 1992 by Marriott Corp. that it intended to
effect a spin-off by splitting its business into two separate corporations may have cost
creditors, at least in the view of one investment banking firm, as much as $11 billion in lost
value. BRUDNEY & BRATION, supra note 10, at 220.
170. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text:
171. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the PostContractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 561, 608-10 (1996) [hereinafter Campbell,
Corporate Fiduciary Principles].
172. One writer referred to this as "possibly the largest expropriation of investors in
American business history." Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J.
CORP. L. 205, 206 (1988).
173. See generally Campbell. Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 171, at 607-15
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obligation of corporate managers as the requirement to promote only
the interests of stockholders. 175 As a result, expropriative moves
(discussing further the implied contract theory under which managers should owe
employees fiduciary duties).
174. Over the years, creditors have attempted to enforce fiduciary duty claims in both
direct and derivative actions. Generally, both have been unsuccessful. Cases rejecting any
direct claim include Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193, 199 (N.D. Tex.
1973), Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769, 773 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not liable to the
creditors on the theory of their being fiduciaries."), Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n
99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for
mismanagement, or for waste of assets except upon proof of the commission of such
fraud."), Equitable Life &: Casualty Insurance Co. v. Inland Printing Co., 484 P.2d 162, 163
(Utah 1971), Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 508 (Va. 1933), and Wheeling Kitchen
Equipment Co. v. R &: R Sewing Center., Inc., 179 S.E.2d 587, 590 (W. Va. 1971). Statutes
generally preclude creditors from suing derivatively to enforce fiduciary claims against
management. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 7.41(1) (predicating the right to
in!ltitute 1I derivative suit on one's ha\ing been a "shareholder of the corporation at the
time of the act or omission complained of'). The rules denying creditors direct or
derivative recovery for managers' breaches of fiduciary duties are longstanding general
rules. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 72a, at 184-86, § 148, at 351 (rev.
ed. 1946). Nevertheless, a few cases over the years have indicated that corporate
managers do owe creditors fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,307
(1939); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 920-22 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying
North Carolina law); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544, 545 (1st Cir.
1962); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,205 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem sub. nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Johnson v. Coleman, 20 S.W.2d 186, 188
(Ark. 1929); Sternberg v. Blaine, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1929); Great W. Producers
Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873, 878 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 825 (N.J. 1981); Underwood v. Stafford, 270 N.C. 700,
702. 155 S.E.2d 211, 212-13 (1967); Goodwin v. Whitener, 262 N.C. 582, 583-84, 138
S.E.2d 232. 233 (1964); Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C. 378, 379-80, 90 S.E. 414, 415 (1916).
The overwhelming majority rule, however. is that creditors are owed no fiduciary duties.
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.
1982); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 221-22 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975) (per curiam). Professor Mitchell correctly states that "scholars
supporting expanded bondholder rights do not have a great deal of law supporting them."
Lawrence E. Mitchell. The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165.1168 n.11 (1990).
175. While this statement essentially is accurate, it is worth noting that so-called
constituency statutes permit directors to consider the interest of other constituencies in
takeover situations. For a discussion and evaluation of constituency statutes, see
Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities
Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1451 passim (1990), James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation
on Director and OffICer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207,
1227-30 (1988), James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 103 (1991). Also, in certain takeover cases,
courts have indicated that directors, in determining whether to deploy takeover defenses,
may consider the interests of other constituencies. See, e.g., Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) ("[D]irectors may consider, when
evaluating the threat posed by a takeover bid, the 'inadequacy of the price offered. nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, [and] the impact on "constituencies" other
than shareholders .. .' " (emphasis added) (citation omitted».
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against workers and creditors on behalf of stockholders are not only
legally permissible, but also may be legally required of corporate
managers in order for them to fulfill their obligation to maximize
shareholder wealth. 176 One is able, therefore, to find a compelling
version of consent respecting the sharing of such expropriative
"gains," given that shareholders, when they invest in corporations,
reasonably anticipate that managers will gamer such expropriative
"gains" on their behalf.
In sum, fair value and fair price should include a pro rata portion
of all of the Additives, except, perhaps, some portion of the SuperReasonable Management Additive in instances when the strength of
the market for corporate control is less vigorous. Procedurally, this
could be implemented by a presumption of a pro rata sharing of all
synergy, unless the Acquiring Corporation were able to demonstrate
that, in light of the vigor of the market for corporate control and
through unfettered bargaining, it would be able to retain some
disproportionate share of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive. The resulting outcome is consistent with the conclusion
that corporate managers, in pursuit of maximizing shareholder wealth
and acting consistent with fiduciary mandates, could capture nearly
all the Additives, or synergy, for their shareholders. A rule requiring
such a pro rata sharing of synergies, therefore, is supported by the
consent of the parties and, thus, founded on attractive moral and
economic values.
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CONCLUSION

Although the courts' sophistication in evaluating fair value and
fair price cases has increased dramatically over the years, many of the
outcomes in these cases continue to be unsatisfactory, due in large
part to the lack of any consistently applied principle. The purpose of
this Article, therefore, is to propose a principle that will render a
proper measure of fair value and fair price.
Fair value and fair price should be the price that an efficient
market would place on the shareholders' proportionate interest in
their company, assuming that the shareholders' company is operated
in a manner consistent with corporate fiduciary duties and that the
market has available all material information about the company. In

J
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176. See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 149, at 502-03.
177. Delaware courts at times have articulated a fair price formula that is similar to the
one proposed in this Article. For example, in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d
1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), which is discussed at supra notes
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This principle is based on a reasonably strong version of consent and,
thus, is supported by both sound economics and moral theory.
Investors and managers can be considered to anticipate and, thus, to
consent to a measure of fair value and fair price that is consistent with
the corporate fiduciary obligations society imposes on corporate
managers and controlling shareholders. Establishing a measure of
fair value and fair price that is consistent with such fiduciary duties,
therefore, respects the ex ante bargain of the parties and is, thus,
congenial to the creation of economic wealth and to the concepts of
utilitarianism and Kantianism. Such a measure of fair value and fair
price also is consistent with society's widely shared values, as
reflected in society's rules respecting corporate fiduciary duties.
One result of the application of this principle is that shareholders
of an acquired corporation essentially share pro rata in the synergy
generated by acquisition transactions. Courts should be reluctant to
allow less than full, pro rata sharing of synergy by such shareholders,
because their reasonable expectations are that managers will garner
for the shareholders nearly all of the value created by moving their
corporate assets into new hands.
An application of the principle also leads to the elimination of a
different measure for fair value, as compared to the measure for fair
price. The premise of this Article is that shareholders, when they
115-28 and accompanying text. the court at one point defined fair price as "the highest
value reasonably achievable" for an acquired corporation. /d. at 1143 (citing Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993». This formulation
is nearly identical to the one proposed in this Article and in certain transactions may
provide workable criteria for courts to reach the outcomes sought in this Article. For
example, to restate this Article's principle in the fashion of the Cinerama articulation may
be especially helpful to a court in a case such as Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. Civ. A.
7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.), which is discussed at supra notes
89-96. Cooper involved a heated contest for Pabst in what appeared to be an efficient
market for corporate control. Although fundamentally my articulation of this principle
still expresses the essence of the fair value and fair price obligation, courts may feel more
comfortable with the Cinerama articulation in such a case, because the "highest value
reasonably attainable" may be apparent as a result of the bidding in the contest for
control. In any event, the same outcome will be reached in such a factual setting under
either the Cinerama articulation or my articulation.
In Cinerama, however, the court's articulation and use of its fair price formula is
made less forceful by two facts. First, and less significantly, the particular articulation,
"the highest value reasonably achievable," was only one of the multiple articulations of
fair price from the court's decision. See supra note 122. So long as these various
articulations are only different ways of saying the same thing, as they seem to have been in
Cinerama, such articulations are not overly troublesome. Second, and more troublesome,
is the fact that the outcome reached by the court in Cinerama seems inconsistent with the
court's own, otherwise attractive formula for fair price. See supra notes 124-29 and
accompanying text.
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purchase stock in a corporation, consent to a measure of payment in
the event of acquisition that impounds assumptions of sound
management and full disclosure. It is impossible, without stretching
the notion beyond acceptable limits, to find that shareholders consent
to different levels of payment, depending upon the path plaintiffs are
able to access during any ex post settlement that might occur.
Disparate measures of fair value and fair price based on some ex ante
consent are, therefore, unsupportable under the analysis offered by
this Article.
Although presently cases generally seem to distinguish between
the measure of fair value and the measure of fair price, society
already may be moving in the direction of eliminating such
differences. This Article, for example, describes cases in which
outcomes in fair value cases and fair price cases seem to be nearly
identical.178 Thus in Cooper, a fair value case, and in Cinerama, a fair
price case, the two courts reached nearly identical outcomes,
essentially requiring a sharing of a significant part of the synergy
generated by the transactions. 179 Recently proposed changes in the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act also may be consistent
with limiting disparate outcomes. ISO
Finally, the principle also is meant to provide the underpinnings
for sensible and intelligible fair value and fair price criteria that are
amenable to modem finance theory. Investment bankers, special
negotiating committees, shareholders, and ultimately courts involved
in disputes over fair value and fair price are required to establish a
present value for the company involved in the particular acquisition.
Only by comparing the consideration offered for the acquired
corporation with some measure of the present value of the acquired
corporation are those parties able to determine whether the
consideration amounts to fair value or fair price.
Fundamentally, under modem finance theory, the present value
for any company (or any portion of a company) is determined by
discounting the expected cash flows to be derived from the company
in the future. lSI This Article's principle provides meaningful guidance
178. See supra notes 89-96, 115-28 and accompanying text.
179. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1176-77; Cooper, 1993 WL 208763, at *7-12.
180. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) & official cmt. 2 (Proposed Changes
1998). supra note 27, at 254-57.
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181. Brealey and Myers state the matter succinctly: "Value ... always equals future
cash flow discounted ...." BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 73. The authors
provide an extensive discussion of present value calculations as applied to corporations,
shares in corporations, particular investments, etc. Always. the foundation of such
discussion is reducing future cash flows through discounting to a present value. See id. at
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for defining the cash flows appropriately considered in arriving at the
present value of the acquired corporation and for defining the
discount rates appropriately applied to those cash flows. Stated
broadly, the principle presented in this Article defines the cash flows
as all cash flows reasonably anticipated, assuming good management
and full disclosure of material information about the company,l82 and
defines the appropriate discount rate as the rate the efficient market
applies to the cash flows of companies similar in risk to the acquired
corporation. 183
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11-84.
182. To elaborate, return one final time to the parsing of Part II, see supra notes 41-44,
and indulge the following assumptions about the cash flows of Acquired Corporation.
Assume that the present cash flow of Acquired Corporation is $1,000.000 annually, or $1
per share, and that amount represents the reasonably foreseeable cash flows if Acquired
Corporation continues on as it is and without the disclosure of information concerning the
jet fighter parts contract. As each of the Additives materializes, however, assume that the
cash flow of Acquired Corporation increases by $100,000, or $0.10 per share. Thus. for
example, disclosure of the jet parts contract (the Information Additive) will increase the
reasonably foreseeable cash flow of Acquired Corporation by $100,000, or $0.10 per share,
aggressively pursuing the remedy for past mismanagement (the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive) will result in a similar increase in Acquired Corporation's cash flows, and so
forth. Under those facts, the principle presented in this Article identifies the cash flow to
be discounted in fair value and fair price calculations as $1.7 million, or $1.70 per share.
See supra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
183. For a simplified explanation of the discount rate, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 11, at 12-14 (calculating present value in a simple example by discounting cash flows
"by the rate of return offered by comparable investment alternatives"). In the first nine
chapters in their book, Brealey and Myers provide a lucid and sophisticated discussion of
modern present value theory, including a thorough discussion of the theoretical
underpinnings and calculation methodologies for discount rates. See id. at 1-235.
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IV. Two Important Kentucky Cases.

FORD V. COURIER-JOURNAL JOB PRINTING COMPANY, 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky.
1982)
The case involved a sale ofassets otherwise than in the regular course of
business. This triggered shareholder appraisal rights under Kentucky law, which at the
time was the Model Business Corporation Act. Thus, dissenting shareholders had the
right to "fair value" for their shares.
The court appointed two appraisers, who, the court stated, had "impeccable
credentials". Appraisers put a value of $124 per share on the stock. The lower court
adopted the report in its entirety. Court of Appeals affirmed.
Some observations concerning and holdings from the case:
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1. The date of the case is important. The date of the appraisal was
December 20,1978; the opinion of the Court of Appeals was 1982. This
was before Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).
2. Relatedly, the age of the case is important - it is nearly 20 years old.
The whole approach of the case is reminiscent of valuation cases from
the 1940s through the 1960s, where outcomes were usually determined
by burdens of proof and political predilections (Le., whether the court,
deep in its judicial heart, thought that shareholders were a bunch of
whining ingrates, or, alternatively, thought shareholders were decent and
unfortunate individuals who were at the mercy of unscrupulous
managers). Cases today, frankly because of better lawyering and
increased business sophistication of the courts, show much improved
analyses and outcomes.
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3. This is a Court of Appeals case, not a Supreme Court case.
4. This is a "fair value" case, not a "fair price case".
5. The Court states as its "holding" that in valuations for appraisal
purposes "the three elements to be considered.. are market value,
investment or earnings value, and net asset value." Id., at 555. This is
the old Delaware block method, which Delaware in the Weinberger case
abandoned as the exclusive method for valuation.
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6. Ultimately, the methodology applied in the case appears to be: The
Court calculated the "net asset value" of the company (Which it
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determined to be $165 per share) and then discounted that by a 25%
"marketability discount" (because the company was closely held, making
its stock "considerably less attractive to an investor than a similar stock
with access to the public marketplace").
7. As a transactional lawyer advising the board of an acquired company
or a special negotiations committee in a conflicted acquisition, I would
completely disregard the case. It provides no meaningful guidance
regarding the fiduciary obligations of fiduciaries (i.e., boards and special
negotiation committees) and, in my judgment, very little guidance
regarding the probable outcome of an appraisal proceedings (unless you
get caught in a lower court by stare decisis).
8. In an appraisal proceeding, I would expect that the "law" from this case
would not be followed, provided: (a) The appraisal litigation is welllawyered; and (b) the· case is fUlly appealed.

YEAGER V. PAUL SEMONIN COMPANY, 691 S.W. 2d 227 (Ky. 1985)
Paul Semonin Company ("PSC") merged into Paul Semonin Associates, Inc.
("PSA"). It was a freezeout transaction in which the shareholders of PSC received cash
of $1.20 per share for their PSC stock. Plaintiff owned 100 of the nearly 700,000
shares of the outstanding stock of PSC.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin the merger, alleging (in the words of the Court) "that the
plan of merger was unlawful, that it was unfair and inequitable to minority stockholders,
and that its whole purpose was to eliminate the appellant and other minority
stockholders from any ownership in the PSC."
The trial court held that the appellant's exclusive remedy was appraisal. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Statements or holdings of the Court, and observations by the author:
1. The Court rejected the "business purpose doctrine". That doctrine
provides that an acquisition solely for the purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders (i.e., with no valid business purpose) is illegal.
2. The Court stated that appraisal is not the only remedy available for a
shareholder complaining about a merger: "... we do not construe a
legislative purpose to deny judicial relief in a merger situation where
illegality or fraud are involved." At, 228
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3. The Court seems to conclude that the case before it was only a
business purpose case (i.e., that the nub of the plaintiffs claim is his
exclusion from ownership). As a result, the Court affirms the lower court's
decision that the plaintiff had no claim.
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4. I would exPect that the rejection of the business purpose doctrine
would be accepted by all courts in Kentucky. Clearly that is the trend
today and probably makes a lot of sense.
5. Regarding the non-exclusivity of appraisal.
(a) KRS 2718.13-020(2) makes appraisal the exclusive remedy,
"unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the
shareholder or the corporation."
(b) I would expect Kentucky to adopt the widely held position that
appraisal is exclusive unless the transaction involves "unfair
dealing". See, Campbell, at 108-112.
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